INF'ONilIIITION BTITT,ETINNumber 30 $s.00

Special Issue on Israel and the Middle East

EditorialIsrael and Palestine

Most of this special issue on the Middle East is about thePalestinians and the Israelis-about a forty-year conflictwhich is just now searing the conscience of the world.

It is impossible to e4plain Israeli intransigence. It cannotbe a question of "secure borders" in this age of guided mis-siles. Nor can it be seen as a question of retigious funda-mentalism, even though the Israelis justify the tand grabs withbiblical references.

The Israelis have themselves united the palestinian opposi-tion by 2Lyears of the duily humiliation of occupation and mi-litarization, by creating a nation of homeless people, killingand maiming tens of thousands and juili"g many thousandsmore, in a move to reduce and disperse the palestinianpopulation. This policy can be defined, under internationallaw, as genocide. (Even the New York Times points out thatmost Israelis think of Arabs as less than human.) It is unques-tionably a policy of wholesale terrorism.

Israel's critics are growing in number, like Albert Vorspan,the senior vice president of the Union of American HebrewCongregations, who called the conflict "Israel,s Vietnam,Kent State, and Watts rolled into one." (New york TimesMagazine, May 8, 1988.) But Israel's mindless apologists stillabound, and theyinsist,likeNew Republic editor Leon Wiesel-tier (NewYork Times,June 12, 1988), that it is ,,effrontery,, tocompare the Israeli military to the Nazis.

But what other comparison can be made when an entirepopulation is subjected to collective punishmenr and purunder curfew or herded into camps, and people are rear-gassed to death, and captured prisoners have their bonesbroken, and houses of suspects are bulldozed to the ground-and people are called animals and buried alive, and the an-nounced policy of the government is one of random beatingsand general terror and shoot-on-sight orders? Are we sup-posed to exonerate the Israeli government just because it hasnot killed as many Palestinians as the Nazis killed Jews?

The Israelis have ruled the occupied territories for twenty-one years. Now, by standing up and raising their arms withstones against the occupiers, the occupied have forced eventhe most racist Israelis to call them by their rightful name

-Palestinians. Despite Israel's refusal to bend to world pres-sure, it is only a matter of time before the Palestinian peoplehave the nation-state they deserve.

AfghanistanThis issue also contains several articles relating to Af-

ghanistan.It is ironic that as the Soviet Union attempts to dis-engage, as it attempts to cooperate internationally andbilaterally, the Reagan administration sabotages the Afghansettlement. This is the same reprehensible policy which theadministration has applied to Nicaragua and Angola. o

EditorialIsraeli State Terror

By Naseer AruriThe Assassination of Abu Jihad

Interview with Ghassan BisharaThe "Transfer" Proposal

Interview with Israel ShahakThe Intifada and, Israel's Dirty lVar

By Ellen RayIsraeli Occupation

By Katherine WatjenIsraeli Chemical Warfare

By Louis WolfThe Israeli Arms Bazaar

ByJane HunterHakim's Connections

By Peggy Adler Robohm

Table of Contents

35

Israel in AfricaByJane Hunter

Israel's Nuclear ArsenalBy Meir Vanunu

Israeli Arms to the ContrasByJack Colhoun

The Buckley AffairBy Edward J. Dobbins

Destabilizing Afghani stanBy Steve Galster

The Afghan PipelineBy Steve Galster

The Afghani ContralobbyBy Sayid Khybar

News NotesDisinforming the World on Libya

By Bill Schaap

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45

M

49

10

13

22

26

29

52

55

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Cover photo: Armed Israeli soldiers charge stone-throwing Palestinian demonstraters in Ramallah. crdir Associated pless.

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coE4A{o! !fo!a{io! Bullctin, Numbc-r 30, !lryn!J,l988,.opydgnt O 1988 by Cowrt Action Publications, Im., a District of Columbia NonprofitCorporation; P.O, Bo( 5022, -washjrgtoq Dc M; Q0\ 7n-$17; iid c/o Institurc ior Mcdia Anab'sis,Inc., 145 w.4itr St., l,te* yort, Ny tmtZi(Ztz)

?'1j1-061. Al].ttglts t6crvcd. Staff: Elln Ray, w-iltam_Schaap,lruis wolf, and William vombcrgcr. rlpeiet tj ara; pfntcir uy,rrcu!.frtss, nrooilyr"NY. Indexed in thc A,t c/rarn Pcss lrder. ISSN 0275-:XDi

2 Covert Action Number 30 (Summer 1988)

A Policy of 6tMight, Force, and Blows"by Naseer Aruri*

The U.S. and Israel have an interesting perspective on themsaning of "terrorism." President Reagan often describesterrorism as an international conspiracy (similar to his defini-tion of communism) directed against the United States and its"way of life." 1 The State of Israel uses a si mil ar definition whenjustifying its repression of Palestinian aspirations. While Is-rael and the U.S. share a similry definition of "terrorism," howthey use the term depends very much upon to whom they arereferring.

tn his fqg+ speech before the Jonathan Institute,2 Secretaryof State Shultz quoted the words of the late Senator HenryJackson, who addressed the same forum in 1979. SenatorJackson had said:

The idea that one person's "terrorist" is another's"freedom fighter" cannot be sanctioned. Freedomfighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses contain-ing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedomfighters don't set out to capture and slaughter schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fightersdon't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack andhold hostage innocent men, women, and children; ter-rorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracieswould allow the treasured word "freedom" to be as-sociated with the acts of terrorists.3

However, in his personal diary, which was publishedagainst the wishes of the Israeli establishment, former IsraeliPrime Minister Moshe Sharett reveals that Israeli militaryoperations against Arab civilian populations were designed toterrorize them and create fear, tension and instability."Sharett's documentation shows that Israel's territorial expan-sion (such as in the Suez in 1956) was facilitated by Israeli actsof provocation, which generated Arab hostility and created

'Naseer Aruri is Professor of Political Science at Southeastern Mas-sachuetts University in North Dartmouth. His most recent book is entitled:Occupation Israel over Palxtine.

1.. Demonshating a powerful command of the English language andcharacteristic opcn-mindedness, Reagan once described Nicaragua, NorthKorea, Libya, Cuba and Iran, as a "confederation of terrorist states" whomake up 'the strangest collection of misfits, Looney Tunes and squalidcriminals since the advent of the Third Reich."

2.For more on the Jonathan Institute see G,IB,No. 22 (Fall 1984), p. 5.3. Address by George Shultz, Secretary of State, "Terrorism: The Chal'

lenge to the Democracies." Washington: Bureau of Public Affairs, Depart-ment of State (Current Policy No.589), June?A,L9&4.

4. From the personal diary of Moshe Sharett discussed in LMa Rokach,Israel's kcred Tenoism,3rd ed. (Belmont, Mass.: AAUG Press, 1986), pp.?8-33.

Number 30 (Summer 19E8)

Israeli State Terror:

pretexts for intervention. For example, the attack by IsraeliA.-y Unit 101 led by Ariel Sharon on the Palestinian villageof Kibya in October 1-953, causing numerous civilian casual-ties and destruction of homes, was condemned by Sharett. Hewrites, "[In the cabinet meeting] I condemned the Kibya af-fair that exposed us in front of the whole world as a gang ofblood-suckers, capable of mass massacres regardless, itseems, of whether their actions may lead to war.")

Israeli State TerrorismMore recent accounts by Israeli writers show how earlier

acts of terrorism provided a historical background to theadoption of a poiicy of state terrorism by israel.6 B.rroyMorris's explanation of the Palestinian exodus in L948, basedon state, military and Zionist archives, refutes the official Is-raeli version that the Palestinians bear responsibility for theirown expulsion. An earlier work by Irish journalist ErskineChilders demonstrated that, contrary to the official Israeli ver-sion, there wereno Arab radio broadcasts ordering the Pales-tinians to leave.' And Israeli journalist Tom Segev reveals inhis book how instrumental was Zionist terrorism in the crea-tion of the Palestinian refugee problem. Sixteen months after250 Arab civilians wero massacred in the village of Deir Yas-sin (April 9, 1948) by the combined forces of ETZEL (knownas Menachem Begin's Irgun) and LEHI (known as YitzhakShamir's Stern Gang) there was a debate in the Israeli Knes-set in which, according to Segev, a member of Begin's HerutParty had boasted: "Thanks to Deir Yassin, we won the war."S

Another account by Lrnny Brennerg ieveals that IsraeliPrime Minister Shamir was a convert to the pre-MussoliniBetar (Zionist Brownshirts) in the late 1930s and that his SternGang had attempted to strike a deal with the Nazi regime inGermany in 1941 in which the establishment of a Jewish statein Palestine on a "totalitarian basis" would be bound by atreaty with the German Reich.

Shamir's commitment to rightwing causes and to terrorismwas unmistakably revealed in an article he wrote in the LEHIjournal Hehazit (The Front) in the surnmer of.L943. This ex-

5.Ibid.6. See Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Prcblem

(Cambridge and NewYork Cambridge UniversityPress, 19S8)t Tom Segev,The Firt Israelis (New York: The Free Press, 1980); Simha Flapan, TheBirth of Israel: MJths and Realities (New York Pantheon Press, 1%7).

7. Erskine Childers, "The OtherExodus," TheSpectator(London), May12, 1961. Reprinted in Walid Khalidi, ed., From Harren to Conquest(Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 7%7).

8. Segev, op. cit.,n.6.9. Irnny Brenner, The Ircn Wall (l-ondon: Zrd Press, 1984).

CovertAction 3

cerpt stands in contrast to Shamir's constant moralizing andcondemnation of what he calls "PLO terrorism:"

Neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can dis-qualiff terrorism as a means of combat.... [T]errorismis for us a part of the political battle being conductedunder the present circumstances, and it has a great partto play: speaking in a clear voice to the whole world, aswell as to our wretched brethren outside this land, itproclaims our war against the occupie..l0

Shamir's cabinet colleague Yitzhak Rabin who, as DefenseMinister in charge of the occupied territories, proclaimed thepolicyof "might, force, andblows" inJanuary 1988 (whichhasso far resulted in an estimated 281 deaths, more than 50,000

Israeli Prime MinisterYitzhak Shamir conferring in 1983with then Undersecretary of State L,awrence Eagleburger.

injuries and 30,000 detentions) has also had a consistentrecord of terrorism for more than forty years. As the deputycommander of Operation Da.i, he, along with the late formerPrime Minister David Ben-Gurion and the late former DeputyPrime Minister Yigal Allon, were responsible for the expul-sion of between 50,000 and 70,000 people from the towns ofLydda and Ramleh in July 1948. The town of Ramleh had sur-rendered without a fight after the withdrawal of the JordanArmybut the inhabitants were rounded up, e4pelled and toldnever to come back. Benny Morris characterized that as the"biggest expulsion operation of the 1948 war." Rabin ex-pressed empathy with "the great suffering inflicted upon" hismen who caused the expulsion!

One of those e4pelled was a 13-year-old boy by the nameof Khalil al-Wazir, later known as Abu Jihad. Yitzhak Rabin,

10. Reprinted in N-Hamishmat, December 24,19f37. See Middle fustReport,No. 152 (May-June 1982), p. 55.

4 CovertAction

who was responsible for that act as a member of the Zionistmilitia, was one of the inner cabinet decision makers whodecided, forty years later, to assassinate al-Wazi far awayfrom his home in Ramleh. The man who headed the innercabinet, Yitzhak Shamir, told an inquirer who wanted to knowwho killed Abu Jihad, "I heard about it on the radio."

It was tlpical of the official response to the killing; claimsof ignorance, broad hints that Abu Jihad's responsibility forthe Palestinian uprising could only trigger that kind ofresponse, and the usual reference to a factional conflict withinthe Palestinian movement as being responsible for the assas-sination. In fact, the murder of Abu Jihad is the latest incidentin a continuous pattern of Israeli assassinations of Palestinianleaders and intellectuals among whom are Karmal al-Adwan,Ghassan Kanafani, Kamal Nasser, Majid Abu Sharar, Abu-Yurif and many others.

lnaNewYorkTimes article summarizing the official Israeliinterpretation of its own policies, Thomas Friedman main-tains that Israel endeavors to "turn terror back on the ter-rorists." This strategy has gone through several differentstages. For the period of 1948-1956 the strategy was describedas "counterterrorism through retaliation or negative feed-back" and was employed against Egypt and Jordan to preventborder crossings by Palestinian refugees attempting, in.themain, to check on the conditions of their former homes." ByLg7z,Israel was striking against "the nerve centers and theperpetrators themselves" using letter bombs, exploding carsand telephones, and quiet assassinations of Palestinianleaders and intellectuals on the back streets of Europe. Lateracts of terrorism including the destruction of entire villages inLebanon, raids on Beirut, Baghdad, and Tunis have becometypical of Israeli policy towards Arab non-acceptance of itsregional hegemony. Such acts have rarely evoked U.S. con-demnation. In fact the Reagan administration characterizedIsrael's raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis as an act ofself-defense.

U.S. and Israel-6'Special" RelationshipStrategic cooperationbetween Israel and the U.S. was con-

summated between L982 and 1988 and has dramaticallyelevated Israel's role in U.S. global strategic calculation. By1983, the Reagan administration had accepted the Israeliviewthat the Palestine question was not the principal cause of in-stability in the Middle East. Henceforth, it would not be al-lowed to interfere in the "special relationship" between asuperpower and its strategic ally.

In the special relationship between the United States andIsrael, the iatter is considet"d u "unique strategic asset."l2Inthe crucial Middle East, Israel is viewed as the cornerstone ofAmerican policy, which is perceived as a bulwark against theSoviet Union and radical revolutionary transformation. Out-side the Middle East, Israel has emerged as the most impor-tant supplier of the technology of repression, anti-guerrilla

1.L. Thomas Friedman, "Israel Turns Terror Back on the Terrorists, ButFinds No Political Solution," NewYorkTimes, December4, 1984.

12. Reagan's descriptionina Washington Pastarticle of August 75,1979.He has adhered to this view consistently ever since.

Credit: Associated Press

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

training, and infrastructure to combat revolution, alleuphemistically phrased "counterterrorism."

Israel ranks as the fifth largest exporter of arms in theworld, according to CIA estimates, ild it has become an es-sential component of the global counterinsurgency business."Hit lists" used by the death squads in Guatemala have beencomputerized with Israeli assistance and the Uzi machine gunis the standard weapon of the death squads.

The special relationship between the U.S. and Israel is atwo-waystreet.Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. economicandmilitaryaid andin returnlsraelhas muchto offer the U.S.

The Reagan administration has publicly declared thatIsrael's substantial experience and "success" in coping withterrorism should provide guidance for the United States.When George Shultz spoke at a New York synagogue in 1-984he said:

No nation has more experience with terrorism thanIsrael, and no nation has made a greater contribution toour understanding of the problem and the best way toconfront it. By supporting organizations like theJonathan Institute, named after the brave Israeli soldierwho led and died at Entebbe, the Israeli people haveraised international awareness of the global scope of theterrorist threat... . tflh" rest of us would do well to fol-low Israel's example.t'

The fact that the U.S. and Israel are so closely allied anduse the same criteria for defining who are "terrorists" and whoare not, necessarily makes the U.S. a dubious participant inmediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and brings into ques-tion the possible results of U.S.-sponsored negotiations withGeorge Shultz behind the wheel.

When Secretary of State Shultz became the Reaganadministration's chief proponent of close strategic coopera-tion with Israel he went far beyond the initiatives of hispredecessorAlexander Haig. Haig's framework for U.S. Mid-dle East policy was the "consensus of strategic concerns,"which would bring together a conservative constellation ofregional powers that would include Israel. Shultz'sframework, however, promoted Israel to the center of U.S.policy and assigned it a global role in addition to its regionalduties on behalf of the status quo. Thus with Shultz in power,the United States conducted its Middle East policy on thebasis of the "consensus of strategic concern" plus the specialrelationship with Israel.

With all the attention George Shultz received on his fivetrips to the Middle East in the last six months, and with theoutcome never in question, it is important to ask, "What werethe real objectives behind the'shultz shuttles?' "

Reagan's Commitment to PeaceAmerican involvement in the Middle East since the L967

war reveals a number of precedents for unimplementable13. Address by George Shultz, Secretary of State, "Terrorism and the

Modern World," Washington: Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State(Current Poliry No. 589), October ?5, 798y'..

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

peace plans actually designed to justify u.S. obstruction of theglobal consensus and to contain Palestinian nationalism. Anexample was the Reagan plan of September L, L982, whichdenied sovereignty over the west Bank and Gaza to both Is-rael and the Palestinians. Its territorial and confederal aspectsevoked a swift yet predictable rejection from the Israelicabinet.

The principal spur for the Reagan plan was the siege ofBeirut, which tarnished Israel's image and at the same timeprovided a catalyst in the world community for linking pLOwithdrawal to Palestinian statehood. To justifu its virtual soledissent from the international will, the Reagan administrationfelt obliged to launch its own initiative based on the ..Jordanoption," which proved to be a non-option.

More recently, Reagan has sent his premier ambassador ofpeace, George Shultz, to the Middle East to again make apublic press for a settlement. However, knowing that Israel

George Shultz with friends Yitzhak Shamir (right) andformer ambassador Moshe Arens (left).will not meet even the minimum requirements for a territorialsettlement, what then does Mr. Shultz hope to accomplish inview of the fact that his initiative lacks any means of pressur-ing Israel?

The U.S. has three objectives:1. The Shultz plan is an attempt to contain the Palestinian

uprising and prevent its extension to U.S. allies and clients inthe region. It is also designed to repair Israel's tarnished imagein the United States.

2. The United States would like to set the terms before anyother actor emerges with a plan for settlement. The SovietUnion, which has been trpng to broaden its options in theregion, is one such actor. The Arab states or the PLO are alsopossible sources of peace initiatives. The Shultz Plan repre-sents a reaffirmation of U.S. custodianship over the MiddleEast. It serves as a reminder that the area is U.S. turf andhence it is designed to elbow out or preempt any genuineproposals for a settlement.

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Credit: TrippetV SIPA Press

CovertAction 5

3. The plan also attempts to bridge the gap between the re-quirements of public opinion and those of public policyin theUnited states. The u.s. has broken barriers for the first timein the Middle East. The public mood in this country haschanged and the people seem ready for a political settlement.Yet Palestine has never been high on the official agenda.There is no sense in washington that the Palestine question isurgent. Unless it becomes urgent, there will be no movementtowards peace.

America's policy objectives in the region center on oil andcontainment of Soviet influence as well as containment of thenatives. As long as Palestine does not interfere with these ob-jectives, the administration feels no compulsion to initiatepeace proposals. But given that the public mood has changedin this country, the Shultz plan offers the U.S. public a rejec-table plan, which would absolve Washington of responsibilityfor the impasse.

The Reagan administration clearly perceives the uprisingas a political threat to its hegemony in the region and wouldlike to check its potential for extension beyond the occupiedterritories into Arab countries ruled by conservative regimes.The administration is also concerned about Israel's repressiveimage-perhaps more than Israel itself-in the United States.Washington's strategic relationship with Israel must continueto have the blessings of American public opinion.

Hence, Shultz's sudden awakening to the fact that the un-resolved Palestine-Israel conflict is a threat to the status quoand his embarking upon a mission to save Israel in spite of it-self. The erosion of U.S. public support for Reagan's policytowards Israel is seen as a dangerous strategic step backward,and his administration is desperately trying to counter the badpublicity.

Shultz's endeavor turned out to be a series of diplomaticshuttles not only between Arab capitals and Israel but also be-tween the two heads of the Israeli government. His diplomacyseems to operate on the assumption that the crucial choicesare between Israel's Likud preference for functionalautonomy (which keeps "Greater Israel" intact as the Pales-tinians in the West Bank andGazaare enfranchised in the Jor-danian state), and Labor's "territorial" autonomy, which is adiminutive version of the Jordan option. His diplomacy alsoassumes that the only choices are between Labor's cosmeticinternational conference and Likud's direct negotiations.

The fact that theJordan option is dead, that the concept ofa Palestinian-Jordanian delegation is unacceptable, and thatthe Camp David formula is discredited throughout the ArabWorld seems to have escaped Mr. Shultz's attention. The out-come of Shultz's diplomacy has so far worked for the benefitof Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Shamir's visit to theU.S. in March 1"988, ostensibly to discuss peace with theReagan administration, enabled him to respond to U.S. criticsof Israeli repression in the occupied territories, to raise fundsin the American Jewish community and to solidiff andupgrade the U.S. strategic alliance. In his visit, Shamirrepeated the Israeli position that the Palestinian uprising wasnot a demonstration of civil disobedience but a war waged"against Israelis, against the existence of the State of Israel;"

6 CovertAction

hence, he declared the media coverage unfair and non-con-textual.'* This theme was dutifully repeated by prominentAmerican Jewish figures such as Morris Abram, chairman ofthe council of Presidents of MajorJewish orgarizations, andNew York Mayor Edward Koch, among others.

"Elder statesman" Ffenry Kissinger, who had erected theprincipal barrier to a Palestinian-Israeli settlement back inL974, and who was willing to bomb vietnam back to the stoneage, was already on record one week prior to Shamir,s visit assaylng, "Israel should bar the media...accept the short termcriticism...and put down the insurrection as-guickly as pos-sible-overwhelmingly, brutally, and rapidly."ls

The recent dramatic ascendancy of the far rlght in the Is-raeli body politic, and the rampant anti-Arab racism sweep-ing the country provide a fertile environment for the kind ofstate terrorism witnessed today on the west Bank and in Gaza.

Ariel Sharon touring the West Bankwith his militaryentourage.

The orientation of this rapidly growing group toward bruteforce and its contempt for debate is partly the cause for thesharp increase in repression against Palestinian civiliansunder occupation. Worse yet is the tendency of members ofthe political and religious establishment to encourage suchacts of terrorism.l6

v

Given the close and special relationship between the U.S.and Israel, given the fact that no prominent U.S. politician iswilling to condemn Israel publicly for its repression of thePalestinians and glven that the U.S. and Israel share the sameunderstanding of what terrorism is, it seems likely that if peaceis to come to the Middle East it will be in spite of what the U.S.and Israel do.

14. NewYorkTimes, March 14,1988.15. Robert McFadden, NewYork Times, March 5, 1988.16. Former Likud Minister of Science Professor Yuva Neeman, Knesset

member Haim Druckman, and former Chief of Staff Bytan, among others,are on record justiffing Israeli acts of terrorism in the West Bank and Gazaas far back as 1983. *e Christian kience Monitor, May 10, 1983.

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

Interview with Ghassan Bishara:

Israeli Commandos Assassinate

photos in the media showing an Israeli sniper having Arafatin his crosswire sight. The hint was that they could have killedhimbut they did not.r I don't knowwhether that's true or not.But the idea or the theory that heads of state do not knock outequivalent people is correct. It still applies. Now this appliesuntil or unless one looks at another event, a previous Israeliexperienceinlg73. Maybe we can come back to that later on.

CAIB: What do you think was the Israeli objective in assas-sinating Abu Jihad?

GB: Why did they do it now? I think they actually decidedto violate this unwritten agreement because of several reasons.Most important in myview is the intifuda,the uprising.I thinkthe uprising has shown Israel's weaknesses. It has shown itsinability to deal with the uprising, simply with people throw-ing rocks, burning tires; it has shown Israel's true face to theworld whereby its harsh acts against the Palestinian peoplehave made Israel look very bad. The world media has simplyreflected or carried to their bases in the U.S., in Europe andAfrica, wherever, what is happening in the territories. Andwhat has been happening since December is something real-ly that cannot be easily equated with any other such case,where you have a very powerful army shooting children rightand left, killing somethingbetween, according to PLO figures,280 and, according to world media, 170 or something like that,burying people alive, deporting people, putting people-half amillion, sometimes several hundred thousands-under collec-tive punishment. Town arrest, house arrest, curfews, cuttingelectricity, denying food and water, cutting telephone contact.

I mean, these are measures practically unheard of inmodern times. All of this, of course, with the intention of quell-ing the uprising, has not worked. So Israel had in a way to findother means, hoping that they will succeed. One of thosemeans, Israel's leaders believe, was to kill the man who theythought was most in charge of the uprising, who was AbuJihad. That was the most important reason, to try to quell theuprising. Now, in as far as would it work or not, I don't thinkit will work. I don't think that disappearance of a political ora military leader in the midst of such an uprising can ever quellthe uprising.

l.Zr'ev Schiff, an Israeli commentator for Ha'aretz newspaper in TelAviv, reported that the U.S. extracted Israel's promise "not to hit" the PLOleadership during the 1982 withdrawal. Ha'aretz, April 22, L988.

Abu Jihad

A respected Palestinian joumalist, Ghassan Bishara, hascovered Middle East affairs for many years for Al-Fajr, a lead-inglerusalem-based Palestinian newspaper. In Apil of this year,Bisharawas in Tunis, interviewingrankingmembers of the PLO,and was with Abu lihad only hours before his assassination byI sraeli commandos. Rec ently, CovertAction Information Bul-Letin conducted this exclusive interuiew with Mr. Bishara inWashington, DC.

CAIB: Ghassan, youwere inTunis duringthe assassinationof Abu Jihad. Let me first ask you to describe for us what hap-pened the day of the assassination.

GB: Well, I had been waiting for a phone call from the of-fice of Abu Jihad himself because I wanted to interview him.I had been asking for an interview with him for some time.Around the fourth or fifth of April, I received a call invitingme to come to Tunis, to conduct the interview with Abu Jihadand other Palestinian leaders. I also intended to interviewArafat, the chairman, and Abu Luft of the political depart-ment. On the Sth, which was a Friday, I took off from here toTunis, arriving there the next morning. I had the interviewwithAbu Jihad on Thursday, April 14th. I was taken up from myhotel to his office at about eleven o'clock. I stayed in his officewith him and others. When I conducted the interview, I waswith him alone, until three o'clock, three-thirty. Then we con-tinued the interview at his house and I finished the interviewabout seven p.m.

CAIB: Abu Jihad was known as one of the founders ofFatah and identified as the number two in the organization.How do you perceive the significance of this Israeli-sponsoredassassination? What does it mean? I thought that previouslythere was at least a silent understanding that one does not goafter the leadership of a movement or of a country in the Mid-dle East, but this seems to be broken now.

GB: I think that you made a very interesting point. Therewas and there is an agreement, an unwritten agreement for avery long time, that heads of states do not use power availableto them to kill or knock out other heads of states. That alsoseems to have worked between the Israelis and the PLO. Asa matter of fact, you probably remember that during the 1982war, prior to the PLO's departure from Beirut, there were

Number 30 (Summer 1988) CovertAction 7

CAIB: I just want to mention a brief commentarywhich wasprinted in Yedi'ot Aharonot newspaper in Tel Aviv on April17th.It cites the motives for the assassination. First, it was todeter Palestinians and Arabs from escalating further. Second,it was to deter "would-be PLO terrorists" from joining thatbody. Third, the Israelis claimed that this was an effort toboost the morale of the population. What doyou think of this?

GB: I accept fully the third reason. And it is not just the Is-raeli population, it is also the Israeli Army. The Army has beendealt a couple of setbacks. It is demoralized. It is one of the

Credit: March Simon/SIPA Press

Yasser Arafat and Abu Jihad.

most powerful armies, or at least it is supposed to be, and itsimply does not know how to quell an unarmed population.There were a couple of cases actually where Israeli troopssimply ran away. They ran away in front of Palestinian fighters.The hang-glider case is a very clear-cut one where one Pales-tinian killed six Israelis. Then, the Dimona operation wheretwo off-duty soldiers left their car and ran away. Really, it issignificant of the IsraeliArmy's morale nowadayswhich is ap-parently in pretty bad shape.

So this operation intended obviously, I think, as the num-ber two reason, to lift up the morale of the Israeli Army, un-doubtedly. I don't know about the other motives aboutescalating attacks on Israel. I don't think it's really valid.

CAIB: That seems to be negated by the whole history of thePalestinian movement in the occupied territories.

GB: I think that there are actually other reasons. There arethose who believe that Israel, having been put under somepressure by world public opinion, U.S. public opinion, somemild pressure from the U.S. government to accept the Shultz

8 CovertAction

initiative,Israel thought that knocking out AbuJihad, a pales-tinian leader, would be the nail that would probablyshut thecoffin on this thing because they know that with kilting AbuJihad no Palestinian leader could come and talk peace, at leastnot for some time.

what is clear, I think, is that Israelwanted the Shultz initia-tive killed, and this is one way of killing it. I think there isanother reason, which one should not tail to mention. Israel isgoing to have elections in November. If you look through therecord of Israeli elections, prior to almost every election, therewas some drastic move, something just for show, a showpieceof some sort that Israel's government undertook, whichevergovernment it is, to boost its electabilitywithin Israeli society.Prior to the last election, if you remember, the Israelis flewover Baghdad and bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, whichgave a great boost to the Bego government at the time. Now,this operation would probably help Shamir's government also.I think that a combination of these reasons would answer thequestion as to why they may have done this at this point.

CAIB: As you know, there is also a long history ofAmerican-Israeli collaboration, even joint American-Israelioperations, for many of these secret activities, especiallystrikes; covert action against many Arab elements in the Mid-dle East. This is seen in the revelations of the lran/contra scan-dal. In the case of the American hostages, there was actualplanning ofjoint U.S.-Israeli operations to bring out some ofthe hostages. Do you think that it is possible that the Israelis,by using their equivalent of the U.S. Delta strike force,2 con-ducted this killing without any knowledge whatsoever on thepart of the United States?

GB: Well, having been in Tunis through this tragedy, thebelief in Tunis is one hundred per cent for the Israelis havinginformed the U.S. about what theywere about to do, and thatthe U.S. at least did not say no.'This is what the Palestiniansin Tunis believe. You cannot convince them that things wereotherwise.

CAIB: Perhaps the form of Israeli-American consultationin this case would be like in the case of Israel's invasion oflrbanon in 1982, where U.S. officials were told about it. Theyhad no objection to it, so the Israelis went ahead.

GB: Right. Again, if we drawthe analogywith 1982,Israel,sleaders can sometimes maneuver their way, and extract whattheywant from the U.S. officials without eyen sometimes tell-ing them what it is and without even the U.S. officials sayrngit outright. So they could go back to their government, to theircabinet meetings, and say, "you see, that's what my conversa-tion with an American official was and that's what he said."

2. According to various sources, the unit involved is "Force 1.3," known inHebrewas "Sayeret Matkal," made up of elements from the Mossad and fromRegiment 269.T\e unit was attached to the Israeli chief of staffls office. Thestructural chain of command resembles that of the U.S. Delta Force.

3. Accordingto GIB sources, the U.S. providedveryspecific intelligenceto Israel concerning the PLO's set-up in Tunis but it wanted Israel to strikethe PLO main headquarters instead.

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

The American official may not be in fact approving it, but bynot standing strongly against it the U.S. can be actuallymanuevered into going along with Israel.

CAIB: The plane that Israel used, the707 that was stationedoff the Tunisian coast and interfering with local communica-tion systems, weren't the Tunisians, ild the Americans, andother parties able to pick up this interference? This took placefor several hours.

GB: They did. The Tunisians did, the Italians did. The lat-ter very clearly did. They actually read the markings on theplane, they knew what it was. The problem was that it wasgoing through internationally recognized commercial airways.It did not penetrate Tunisian airspace nor did it penetrateItalian airspace. What the plane did was that it went throughthe normal commercial airways that El Al and other airlinesgo through. It was apparently so powerful that it was able todisrupt Tunisian telephone and other means of communica-tions in the area that the Israelis were focusing on, which isthe Sidi Busain area of Tunis.

The Tunisians and the Italians picked this up. There is nodoubt that the Americans also were aware of it." The point isthat one could not have assumed such a thing because it is acommercial airliner going through commercial airways, and itwas late at night. One cannot assume that the plane is there toknock off communications in Tunis so that Israeli terroristscan undertake such an operation.

CAIB: I gather that the Israelis have sort of honed theirskills in this assassination business for a long time. Elementsof the media sometimes get the impression that this act wasdone only by the Likud government because of the more im-mediate pressure generated by the uprising? Could youelaborate on Israel's role and background in assassinations?

GB: Of course, to assume that this is just like, as somepeople try to say, the settlements on the West Bank and Gazabeing the product of the Likud party, it is wrong. It is the Laborpartywhich began the settlement drive in the first place. TheL973 operation which killed three Palestinian leaders in theheart of Beirut was done under a Labor government. Even inthis case, the Defense Minister, Mr. Rabin, is himself aLaborite; and the Foreign Minister is a Laborite. Two of thetop three in the Israeli government that eventually made thedecision to assassinate Abu Jihad are Laborites.

It is a symptom of the Israeli government's behaviortowards the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is to really treat the Arabswith such acts hoping that this would resolve the issue. Ob-viously, it did not. The point is that it is a symptom of Israel'sgovernment, not of a particular party in Israel's government.

4. The BoeingT0Twas a flyingcommand and control postwith electronicsdesigned for special warfare operations, i.e. communications links with Is-raeli commandos carrying electronic briefcases. Apparently, Gen' EhudBarak, Israel's IDF Deputy Chief of Staff, was on the 707 supervising the as-sassination. Barak was the leader of the Israeli raid on the PLO in Beirut in1973. Washi ngton Posf, April 21, 1988.

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

Assassinations and acts of terrorism, it has been said byJewish leaders themselves, were introduced into the MiddleEast by Zionist leaders. I think Ben Gurion-one can look forthat quote-once is quoted having said that Begin is the firstterrorist in the Middle East. Shamir, the present Prime Min-ister, his group, is responsible for the killing of Count Ber-nadotte, the U.N. Commissioner. His group was in charge ofbombing the King David Hotel. One can go into the history ofthese things and find many cases which are symptomatic, notonly of the government of Israel, but of the Zionist movementas a whole.

In this case and others, decisions in Israel are made collec-tively. We know the details in this case.s It's very clear nowthat they voted on it. The only attending minister that seemsto have expressed anyviews against it was Ezer Weizman. Mr.Rabin was enthusiastic about it, Mr. Peres apparently wentalong with it by not voicing any objection at all. And Mr.Shamir pushed it. Therefore, it was executed. To assume thatit is only, as other people had assumed, the work of the Likudoperatives, is wrong. It is the government of Israel which nowrepresents, as a matter of fact, all of Israel's main parties. Youhave the two major parties approving the assassination of apolitical leader.

If anything, one has to apply the same yardstick to thesethings, if one wants to use state terrorism, one must use thiscase in the same context. It is a state that, in a supposedly of-ficial forum, sat and debated how to assassinate a human beingwho happened to be a Palestinian political leader. If this is notstate-sponsored terrorism, I don't know what is.

CAIB: Given the assassination of Abu Jihad, how do yousee it affecting the Palestinian-Israeli issue?

GB: For one, I think that the immediate outcome, as wehave seen, was an escalation of the uprisingthat actuallyhasn'tbeen seen before or since. Fourteen people died on that verysame day. Since then, we have seen quite a few successfulpenetrations into Israel and other not so successful penetra-tions. Again, that's indicative of the will and determination onthe part of the Palestinian people to escalate their struggle orto radicalize the whole area. I don't think what Israel hopedto achieve with it will be achieved, that is to quell the uprisingor to humiliate further the Arabs or to dehumanize them.

And for those who thought that the peace process wassomehow under way, I think that this will put a great damperon it. I don't think any Arab or Palestinian leader for sometime to come now would feel comfortable-I don't want to say"will dare"-or actually any longer be convinced that Israelwants peace. Because a country that wants peace would notpursue such a policy. It's as simple as that. o

5. According to knowledgeable sources, the Israeli commandos involvedapparently spoke French and Palestinian Arabic. The accompanying womanwho videotaped the killing spoke Tunisian Arabic. After Abu Jihad was shotdead, four commandos came over to his body and discharged the ammuni-tion clips of their submachine guns on the dead man, riddling his bodywith104 bullets. Washington Posr, April21, 1988.

CovertAction 9

Israel Shahak on the 6sTransfer" ProposalAnd the Process of Nazification

In February, CAIB co-editor Ellen Ray and other membersof a delegation of Ameican women visitingthe West Bank andGaza met with Hebrew University chemistry professor IsroelShahal

are going to be expelled-the transfer idea.

Death SquadsThere is another factor, beyond the usual aspects of an oc-

cupation, which is still unknown outside Israel. But in Israelthe use of death squads to murder Palestinians has been dis-cussed in some of the Hebrew press. It was not employed inthe occupied territories until about September or OctoberLg87 ,when we had one very well-documented case in the GaraStrip. According to the Israeli Hebrew press, three Pales-tinians were discovered dead, in a car. One of them was aPalestinian guerrilla who had escaped from prison. The twoothers were collaborators [Palestinians who work with or sup-port the Israelis]-well-known, rich collaborators. One ofthem had estabtished a branch of the Tel Aviv stock exchangein Gaza. The other was of a similar background. So you canunderstand that such people are neither guerrillas nor helpersof guerrillas.

Since the families were very rich they could employ verygood lawyers-Palestinian lawyers from Israel. And by usingsuch lawyers, and with the help of a Hebrew weekly calledKoteret Rashit,which is sensitive and courageous about cor-ruption in the intelligence and security services, even if not sogood about Palestinian national rights, the case was broughtinto the open. By now it is completely clear that the twobusinessmen were murdered simply because they were acciden'tally eyewitnesses to the murder of the guenilla.

There was also a recent case in which Israeli television,against orders, photographed an Israeli Jewish civilian shoot-ing straight into a crowd of Palestinians. But when it was dis-covered that the person was a member of the General SecurityService, Shabak, there was not even the smallest judicial in-vestigation. It was simply announced that he was repri-manded. And that was it.

It is well known that Israel is involved with death squads incountries like Guatemala, and many others, so it is only naturalthat this matter would come home. I think there is no doubtthat the employment of death squads, especially in the GazaStrip, was one of the sparks which ignited the violence.

The Palestinian BoycottThere is another subject we should discuss, the Palestinian

boycott of the Israeli economy. In the beginning the Israeligovernment made light of the boycott, and there were alsosevere limitations on reports relating to it. But as the situationdevelops, it is very clear that the boycott is seriously harmingthe Israeli economy.

First of all, if you read the American press' you will hearthat only seven percent of the workers in the Israeli economyare Palestinians from the territories. This is just a lie. The num-ber is much greater. First of all, most of the Palestinians areself-employed, presenting themselves for work in what usedto be called slave markets in the towns. Palestinians from theterritories dominate some areas of the Israeli economy: con-struction, low-paying agriculture jobs tike picking, and severalother things,like what we call the cleaning jobs.

In Tel Aviv, 40 to 50 percent of the workers employed in

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

Credit: Michael Moore

Palestinian demonstrators confront the Israeli military.

garbage removal have been absent nowfor sixweeks, althoughthis fact was only published this week. The cityliterally stinks,but it was not reported for several weeks that it stinks. In con-struction work there are greatdifferences around the country,but for example, in the area around Beersheva in the Negev,80 percent of the construction workers are Palestinians.

Next week Israel is going to import 5,000 workers fromRomania. There are also negotiations to bring workers fromPortugal, Thailand, and the Philippines.I think that it all maybe tied in to the transfer plan.

The History of TransferTwo respected reporters in Davar, the paper of the labor

organization Histadrut, wrote a two-page article (February19, 1988) called "This is the History of Transfer." Because ofcensorship, I will have to describe it in full.

Most of the article is devoted to information which ap-peared for the first time in Israel in this paper. Apparently theLabor Party rr.1967 had discussed on the highest governmentlevel the transfer of Palestinians for reasons of principle. InL967, a few weeks after the Six Day War,

CovertAction 11

the Minister of Finance of the Labor party with thesupport of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr.Abba Eban,proposed that all the refugees be settled in Arab states,especially in Syria and Iraq. But because of the long dis-cussion no decision could be taken for mass resettle-ment in that meeting. However, the spirit of thediscussion was according to the ideas of the DeputyPrime Minister at the time, Mr. yigal Allon, of theLabor Party, who proposed that the Palestinian refugeesof the Gaza Strip be removed to Sinai, and once there,that an attempt be made to force them to emigrate.Allon also complained that we are not doing enough toencourage emigration of Arabs out of this country.

The rest of the article discusses attempts actually made be-tween L967 and1972to encourage emigration of palestiniansto Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. In Paraguay-the countryof Mengele and so many Nazis-the Israeli officers who werein charge of this plan cheated the Palestinians. Theypromisedthem that after going to Paraguay, moneywould be deliveredto them there, to begin work. And then they did not pay themoney.In 1970, some Palestinians who despaired entered theIsraeli Embassy in Paraguay and tried to kill the Ambassador,but only killed his secretary. The program was transferred toUruguay and Brazil and continued up until L972.

After describing this history at great length and emphasiz-ing the role of the Israeli Labor Party, the article jumps to thetransfer plan which I have described for you. There is greatemphasis on the notion that it is the Palestinian uprisingwhichis causing part of the Israeli establishment to support trans-fer. The last paragraph says, and I must explain that the word"riot" is the official name in the Hebrew press for the pales-tinian revolution:

The latest riots in the territories are causingpolariza-tion in Israeli public opinion, and especiallyin the Israeliestablishment. On one side, more and more people un-derstand that they cannot escape the need to find apolitical solution which will free Israel from most of theterritories. But on the other hand, in the opinion of thosepeople who welcome the mass expulsion as the most ef-ficient means now remaining in the hands of Israel afterthe ballot, the clubbings and beatings are not sufficient.What will happen between those two points of polariza-tion we cannot yet predict.

The FutureNow, about the future. The question to be asked is not so

much about the Israeli government, but about the IsraeliJewish people. Even if there is enough pressure from thePalestinian people or from other, outside forces, we still arein great danger. Half the Israeli Jewish people are preparedto make a war, not only on Palestinians but on other states, inorder to effect this transfer.

But there is also great hope. If the Palestinian people con-tinue the uprisitrg, o majority of the Israelis can be persuadedto withdraw from the territories. But, I must be clear, we are

12 CovertAction

now no more than 15 percent of the people with this moralconsideration. we might increase to 30 percent, but that is notenough. However, by making things unpleasant for oursociety, we could capture the majority. Then it would not bea question of an international conference; we would speakdirectly with representatives of the palestinian people, just aswe did with Sadat. That was not because sidat came toJerusalem but because of the war of 1973;because the Egyp-tian army and the Eglptian societywhich supported the aimyhad shown itself to be effective. If the palestinian society con-tinues to be as effective as it is now, they have a very greatchance of achieving independence.

Now an international conference by itself is very unclear,because what the PLo and the majority of the worrd mean bythe term "international conference" is completely differenlfrom what the Israeli government, Mr. peres, and the govern-ment of the united States mean. Because of this, I am of theopinion that if anything real can be settled, it will not be by aninternational conference; it will be settled by negotiations be-tween the elected and rightful representatives of the pales-tinian people and the Israeli government.

Let me make one other point. Palestinians, in general, didnot correctly analyze why Israel withdrew from Lebanon. Is-rael withdrew from Lebanon not because of Sabra and Shatila,and not because of the bombardment of Beirut. During thefirst half of L983, Israel intended to remain in occupiedLebanon forever. It was already being called in Hebrew theNorth Bank. Israel left Lebanon because, from 19g3 to 19g5,390 Israelis were killed, which was actually a bigger numberthan those killed in 1982, and because there was no end to it.

under the rules of Israeli society an Israeli Minister mustalways attend the funeral of a fallen soldier. In the year of L9g5it happened not once but many times, that when a Likud Min-ister attended a funeral where the father of the dead soldierwas also a Likud person, known to him, the father actuallysaid, at the open grave, "I tell you, if you are a partysupporter,let my son be the last." This is a very, very powerful fbrm ofimmediate pressure when you have elections.

ConclusionIn my opinion, the Israeli government, together with its

military experts, is awfully stupid. Not just immoral, but arsostupid. The Israeli government will try in the coming monthsto break the spirit of the Palestinians and to restore them towhat in their opinion is the normal situation of servility. Mean-ing that they obey orders; that they go back to picking up thegarbage. But for the Palestinians from the territories, it hasbeen a state of slavery. You cannot use any other e4pressionto describe their daily life. This is why they prefer to starve andto suffer all the things you knowthey are suffering rather thanto go back to a state of slavery.

The Israeli government wants to reduce them to slaveryagain. I do not think they will succeed. It is only a prediction,and I admit that we cannot always predict Israeli steps. Do notask me what the Israeli government will do. Accept that theywill do horrible things; but they will not succeed. o

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

Covering the Intifadaand Israel's Dirty War

By Ellen Ray

The April 16 murder by Israeli commandos of PalestineLiberation Organization (PLO) Fatah leader Khalil al-Wazir,known as Abu Jihad, has qualitatively changed the course ofthe Palestinian uprising- the Intifada,- the Israeli reactionto it, and the manner in which it is reported in the UnitedStates. To the Palestinian people fighting for their sovereigntyin the occupied territories and abroad, and to the Reagan ad-ministration, which has persisted in tryrng to defuse the Pales-tinian uprising by compromises disguised as "peace"initiatives leaving out any PLO participation, the message ofPrime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud Party govern-ment is unequivocal

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there will be no negotiation. The Israeliwar has always been rooted in insatiable greed over turf, andit will not be ended for many Israelis until the last Palestinianhas been driven out of what the Zionists claim is their Judeaand Samaria (the West Bank) andGaza.

The U.S. media in response, typified by the New YorkTimes, have dropped what had been relatively sympatheticcoverage of the Intifuda,'and have resumed parroting Israeligovernment positions, referring, for example, to the killing inShamir's terms as a "political assassination," rather than theterrorist murder it was.

According to John Kifner's ,ou."".,2 the Israeli Cabinetdecided on April 13, after very little debate, to kill Abu Jihadbecause their intelligence had determined he was responsiblefor the direction of the uprising which theywere (and remain)

1. The Times coverage was so unusually critical of Israel that as recentlyas May 1988, Jeane Kirkpatrick's syndicated column complained of its"marked bias against Israel." Washington Posr, May 9, 1988. Indeed, someof the best Timesreprtage in Januaryand Februarywas from John Kifner,one of their most objective writers. In March and April, however, more spacewas given to Alan Cowell, a decidedly conservative journalist, whosecoverage from Palestine, as from South Africa earlier, hasbeen subtlyracist.By May and June, almost all the Times reporting from the occupied ter-ritories was by Joel Brinkley, even more pro-lsrael than Cowell.

Kifner's reports gave more names and details than Cowell's, and theywere not as snide and one-sided. In an egregious example in the February28,1988 Nen York Times, Cowell described a typical battle between armed Is'raeli soldiers and rock-throwing Palestinians, which left many woundedPalestinians and a number of prisoners. He concluded with this description:"That left only the mopping-up. Six prisoners, hidden in sweaters pulled overtheir faces, were marched away, while Palestinian men pushed Palestinianwomen out of the hospital to keen and wail for them." And finally, "Out onthe highway where it all started four hours earlier, a hurled rock smashedthrough the windshield of an lsraeli caf .... Two Israelis tumbled from it withautomatic rifles in their hands and only an empty street to shoot at." Cowellis possibly the only reporter with the temerity to equate submaclinegunswithstones. In ttre March 16, 1988 New York Times he wrote: "The conflict isfought with uneven, though potentially equal, weapons. Many settlers travelwittr ermy-issue M-16 assault rifles or Uzi submachine guns. What they fearfrom Palestinian villages is rocks that could shatter windshields and skulls,or firebombs."

2. NewYork Times, April 23,1988.

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

desperate to circumvent. In a meeting which was reported tolast only a few minutes,3 the death wairant for the Jf-year-oldmilitary commander, a co-founder of Fatah, revered by hisown people and respected by many others working toward ajust solution in the Middle East, was figuratively signed. Thedecision to kill Abu Jihad was publicly justified by some whosaid they believed it would confuse and delay the Palestinian"riots" and by others who claimed they only wanted revengefor the PLO bus hijacking of Israelis working in the nuclearplant at Dimona. Whatever the reasoning, however, the kill-ing resulted in an intensification of the rebellion' and seriousmoves toward unitybetween the PLO and Syria and within thePLO itself.s

An International ConferenceEqually important for the Israeli Right in an election year

is the necessity to put an end once and for all to U.S. pressurefor an international conference. Indeed, one of the more in-teresting aspects of internal Israeli politics is the announceddecision by former United Nations Ambassador BenjaminNetanyahu to campaign for the Likud nomination as its can-didate for Prime Minister in the November elections. Thisshould not be viewed as a sop to the liberals who might be un-comfortable with the brutality-and often bestiality-of theunsuccessful attempts by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) tocrush the uprising. Netanyahu says there may be a "clearingof the air" after the election, but no fundamental shifts inpolicy. He believes the PLO is "not reformable," and that Is-rael must maintain military control of the West Bank.6

It was Netanyahu who founded the notorious Jonathan In-stitute Seminars, annual events held alternately in Israel andthe U.S. and attended by extreme-right policy-makers andjournalists of both countries and a few others from the West.7

3.Ibid.4. In the three days following the assassination, occupation troops killed

some 22 Palestinians and injured more than 160, the bloodiest threedayperid in the 20 years of occupation. Anita Vitullo, "Israel's Hit Squad," TheGuardian, April27,1988, p. 1.

5. See lhsan A. Hijaz| "Arafat Regaining Supremacy in EmbattledBeirut," New York Times, May 25, 1988. And see, Phyllis Elennis, "NewMoves for PLO-Syrian Unity in Wake of Abu Jihad Assassination,"Frcntline, May 9, L988, p. 1.

6. John Corry, "Two views on a Schism in the Middle East," New YorkTimes, May 11, 1988, p. C25.

7. One notable "exception" to the designation "rightwing journalist" isthe Washington Posfs star, Bob Woodward, who has often been a guest lec'turer at Jonathan Institute events. Woodward, it should be remembered,senied as a naval intelligence officer, presiding over "the encoding, decod'ing, and distribution of ClA, National Security Agenry, State Department,National Security Council, and Defense lntelligence Agency communiquds,and was personally responsible for maintaining a daily journal of highlights,

CovertAction 13

Credit: Angela Gilliam

Palestinian woman, shot in the stomach by soldiers,flashes victory sign (see sidebar).

Duringthe Reagan administration's first term, the most chill-ing example of the Jonathan Institute's influence on U.S.policy-making was its espousal of the efficacy of the Israelidoctrine of "preemptive retaliation," a policy of killing per-sons determined by the government to be terrorists beforethey can act.8

Palestinian reaction to the murder of Abu Jihad was care-fully anticipated by the Israeli Knesset, which moved to thenext stage in its war against the PLO. Harsher measures wereintroduced in the occupied territories and a new wave of beat-ings and maimings and killings ensued, even as massive arrestswere undertaken. On April 24 the Israeli government an-nounced that "4,900 Palestinians were being held in prisonsand detention centers as a result of the unrest, including L,700in'administrative detention,' ...who can be held for up to sixmonths without formal charges, a hearing or a trial. At the endof the detention period, the order can be renewed."

The Times reported these numbers with feigned surprisethat the Israeli military's figures were as high as theywere, andsaid that even Palestinian leaders had no idea how manypeople were i" juil. But in fact, Palestinian estimates of thetotal number of imprisoned range from L5,000 to 30,000, withthe military court in Ramallah issuing over 5,000 charge sheets

aswell as for decidingwhere, how, and to whom each communication shouldbe routed." "Spurious," Boston Phoenix, October 23,1987,p.3.

8. See UIB, Number 22 (Falllg8r'.),p. 5; Number 23 (Spring 1%5), pp.1.6-17 . ln a grandstand media ploy, Secretary of State Sh ul tz urged acceptanceand passage of this doctrine by the then Senate Committee on Security andTerrorism, to deter, among others, the PLO and the Libyans. The bill, for-tunately, was never brought to the floor.

14 CovertAction

alone.9

Casualties of the latifadaAnother report, prepared by the Database Project on

Palestinian Human Rights, covering the period from Decem-ber 9, 1"987 through June 1-5, L988, lists 28L Palestinians killedin the uprising, L88 from gunfire and 93 from other causes suchas beatings and the U.S.-manufactured poisonous CS gas.10The overwhelming majority of those killed were young

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over85 percent under 30. According to the group's reports, at least54 people had died from tear gas exposure by May n. Al-though Times reporter Kifner admitted that "deaths at-tributed to tear gas have not been counted on the assumptionthat the gas might have aggravated an existing medicalproblem,"" the mainstream press saw fit to ignore the com-pany in Saltsburg, Pennsylvania, which produced the gas-until massive protests and demonstrations outside thecompany's laboratories forced its parent company to an-nounce a suspension of sales to Israel."

It is curious that there is such a discrepancy in the numberof Palestinians deaths reported, for example, by the NewYorkTimes, and the figures directly from sources in the West Bank.Although theTimes has been careful to qualiff their numberswith the words "at least," they have largely ignored deaths re-lated to tear gas or, recently, even to beatings. Moreover, ac-cording to a report by Palestinian women from the occupiedterritories delivered to a June 1988 conference in Elizabeth,NewJersey, sponsoredbythe Union of PalestinianWomen inthe U.S., a new Israeli tear gas is being used. According tothese reports, the new gas, delivered by spray guns, causes lossof consciousness for more than five minutes and frequentlyleads to severe nerve damage and sometimes death. ThePalestinians view this new chemical warfare as an attack onfuture generations, like Agent Orange was in Vietnam.

It is also alarming that since the assassination of Abu Jihad,there has been very little reporting of Palestinian casualties inthe western press at all, and victim totals and their names havealmost completelydisappeared.In part, this maybe due to theincreasing restrictions onjournalists, discussed below. In part,it may be because vast numbers of Palestinian leaders andspokespeople have been arrested, leading to what the Israeligovernment hopefully describes as "relative calm" and Israel'sintention "to try to bring life slowly back to normal."13

9. Figures from Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights, Update,March 21-April 5, 1988. This valuable resource, and other helpful material,can be ordered from: Beth Goldring, Database Project on PalestinianHuman Rights, 220 South State Street, #1308, Chicago, IL 606M.

10. Palestinians Killed by Israeli Occupation Forces, Settlers, andCivilians DuringUprising (confirmed), December g, 19{17, thrcugh June L5,1988 (Chicago: DBPHR, 1988).

11.. New York Ti mes, February 27, 1988, p. 4.12. Associated Press, May 6, 1988. Variants of the dangerous gas-all

produced by the same company, Federal l:boratories, a subsidiary of Trans-Technolory of Sherman Oaks, California

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have been around for manyyears.Itwas discovered that in 1980-81 the CIA supplied it to the Afghan rebels foruse against the cMlian population of Afghinistan supporting ttre Soviet in-tervention. See Phillip Bonosky, Wash ington's Secre t War Agai nst Afgh an is-fan (NewYork: International Publishers, 1985), p.225; and Iona Andronov,O n t h e Wol f 's Tra c k (Moscow: Pravda Publ ish i n g House, 1 984), pp. \M -1.45.(See article in this issue on the U.S. manufacturer of the tear gas.)

13. NewYorkTimes,April25, 1988, p. A3.

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

Questions from the West Bank

Alicia Partnoy, an Aryentinian witer and poet who washerself "disappeared" and brared, was on the women'sdelegation with CAIB co-editor Ellen Ray. Here shedescibes some of her impressions.

That Thurdsay, the last one in February, started as aregular dayfor our delegation. We were not shot at, as hadhappened on Monday while we were joining in a women'sdemonstration. We were not the target of tear gas andbul-lets, as we would be the following day while t!4ng to stopthe soldiers from beating young Palestinians. True, wevisited a hospital and were distressed at the sight of thewounded.Ittihad, in Nablus, was however the third hospi-tal we had seen that week. We had already met too manypeople injured by explosive bullets and beaten up by Israelisoldiers.

A few miles from the hospital is Balata Refugee Camp.Almost as soon as we got there, we heard the sound of gun-shots and saw children running down the street, escaping.A house opened to us for shelter. The sweet hot tea ofhospitalitywas served. Men, women, children told us aboutthe recent victims from that camp, from that family: a 56-year-old woman, another woman L9, a 13-year-old child.Their pictures were circulated. A woman recalled that thathouse had been attacked a few months earlier. For twohours soldiers had sprayed more and more gas into it whileforcing the family to remain inside. "Until we all fainted,"added a little girl.

While they talked softly, we heard the thud of soldiers'boots outside and shots, closer and closer. The membersof our group looked at one another in fear, expecting any-thing: a bullet, poison gas, violence.

Almost two hours later we left Balata. It is hard todescribe our relief. Yet we had been there for a short time.We could only imagine the feeling of breathing that airevery minute of our lives.

But the day was not over. That evening the news came:Two hours after we left the Ittihad hospital, the soldiershad arrived. They had beaten up 30 doctors and nurses.They had taken away six patients and their families. Theyhad beaten them systematically, cruelly, and thrown themback inside the hospital building.We heard in horror, un-willing to believe. Some cried, some tried to remember thefaces of the possible victims, their stories.

Could the soldiers have chosen the 17-year-oldwounded in the abdomen by a dum-dum bullet at ademonstration? Or the 15-year-old who had smiled at uswhile showing the wounds in his legs? Maybe the youngman who, staying overnight in Tel Avivwithout permission,was attacked in the middle of the night, soaked withkerosene, and set on fire? Perhaps the soldiers had chosento punish the two women, L8 and 20 years old, who had triedto stop the Israelis from taking away their brothers andwere shot in the stomach. Maybe it had been "unsuitable"to beat up the new arrivals, two boys aged 15 and L8 whowere being treated when we left.

We had seen the pain in those faces. We were desperateat the thought of those wounds brutally hit. Many of us feltguilty. Had the Israelis attacked them because they hadbeen brave enough to report their suffering to us, to ask forjustice? Should we in the future abstain from seeing, hear-ing, recording? But even if the denunciation of theatrocities provokes punishment, if not even a hospital is asafe haven, if those who cure are to be themselveswounded, what is the way out? What can the Palestinianvictims do? Where can we, the witnesses, turn for reas-surance that justice exists?

The crimes we witnessed that last Thursday in Februaryare still taking place. It is only natural to feel compassionfor the victims; it is, however, a moral obligation to resortto action in order to stop that suffering. o

But undoubtedly the major reason for the lack of detailedreporting on the casualties of the uprising has been abacklashby the pro-Israeli establishment press, particularly the NewYork Tintes, to the graphic reporting of Israeli brutality. TheTintes's ardently pro-Zionist columnist, A. M. Rosenthal, an-nounced in his April 29 column that "Palestinians in Israel[must] realize that their future depends not on publicity buton the Israelis. Good foreign press does not last long and can-not meet a people's hopes."I4

Was Rosenthal expressing New York Times policy withrespect to their future coverage of the occupied territories?It would certainly seem so, as evidenced by a scandalous full-page piece a few days later in the }..f'ay }issue of that paper byJoel Brinkley, cleverly entitled "Many Arabs Working in Is-

L4. NewYorkTimes, Apil29,1988, p. A39.

Number 30 (Summer 19E8)

rael Voice Mixed Feelings on Unrest." A close reading of thearticle turns up only six Palestinians who are quoted byBrinkley, three from the same family and one who is describedonly as a waiter. The other six people quoted about Arabreluctance to join the uprising are Israelis: "They don't wantto be doing this," an Israeli tour boat captain professes, "ft'sjust a few outside people winding them up." Another says"I've been living with Arabs here and abroad, and they are ofvery good temperament

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unless someone incites them."r)

Reporters in the Occupied TerritoriesThe Israeli government has grven its armed forces the

15. These people may be more concerned about the drastic decline intourism than anything else. See Joel Brinkley, "Dip in Tourism Has IsraelisWorried," NewYorkTimes, May 16, 1988, p. ,43.

CovertAction L5

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Still from telephoto footage of Israeli soldiers breaking captive's bones with rocks.

power to ban journalists from any area. Although prior to theuprising this power was exercised sporadically, it has beenused with regularity since February of L988, and mostreporters have been totally excluded from areas of known con-frontation. The armed forces claim that the censorship relatesonly to military necessity, but in fact many officers express thebelief that Palestinians will not demonstrate if there are nocameras or reporters in front of whom to demonstrate. Thisof course is belied by the fact that, of the hundreds of Pales-tinian demonstrators killed by soldiers during demonstra-tions, there has not been a single recorded killing on camora.And of all the thousands of severe beatings, only one wasfilmed.

Indeed, the uprising has continued unabated in areaswhere no journalists have been admitted. Ironically, the onlyviolence which can be attributed to the presence ofjournalistsis the punishment of some Israeli soldiers who were foolish orunlucky enough to brutalize prisoners on camera. As an Is-raeli soldier who finallv refused to continue to serve with theoccupying forces explained,l6

I want it to be clear that the only men punished werethose photographed by the television team. ...thetelevision plays an important psychological role amongthe soldiers; it is always the principal guilty party.

L6. Ha'aretz, Supplement,March 11, 1988; translated by the PalestineHuman Rights Information Center, Jerusalem.

16 CovertAction

The harassment of journalists is comprehensive: ..The on-going process of the military simply declaring areas closed(either without supporting documentation or by documenta-tion signed on the spot by the soldier refusing admission) com-bined with blocking cameras, confiscating film andoccasionally physically attacking journalists may well close theterritories to accurate reporting far more effectively than for-mal closure and without the accompanyllg international cen-sure a formal order would produce."r / Moreover, in lateMarch the Israelis "shut down the Arab-owned PalestinePress Service, which has been a major source of informationon the daily clashes since the Palestinian demonstrationsagainst Israel began...."18 The closing was protested by theNew York-based human rights Broup, the Committee toProtect Journalists.

A leading proponent of the exclusion of the press turnedout to be Henry Kissinger. Much to his dismay, notes of hisremarks in a private, off-the-record meeting with someAmerican Jewish leaders, including Lawrence Tisch, the chiefexecutive of CBS, welg leaked to the press. According to thenotes, Kissinger said: rY

Israel should bar the media from entry into the ter-ritories involved in the present demonstrations, accept

17. Database on Palestinian Human Rights, Update, March 3,1988.18. Nerr, YorkTimes, March 31, 1988, p.A1.19. NcwYork times, March 5, 19{18, p.5.

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Number 30 (Summer 19EE)

Apartheid in the West Bank and GazaAngela Gilliam, Professor of Anthropologt at the State

University of New York at Stony Broolg was also a memberof the women's delegation. The followingis an excerptfromher testimony to the Congressional Black Caucus on Apil26, 1988.

As I visited the region, what struck me was the con-solidation of policies similar to what I had learned of apart-heid. After a week in the occupied territories, I learned adifference between that situation and South Africa's. Be-cause apaftheidhas no supporters who will openly embraceit in the international community, those who struggle fordignity in South Africa feel a communion with the rest ofthe world. The feeling is harder for those struggling in theWest Bank and Gaza, partlybecause of the religious fervorassociated with the problem.

Just as in South Africa, funerals are banned in the oc-cupied territories. We learned of a teenage girl killed bythe bullet of a settler; her body was returned to the familyat midnight for immediate burial. Also as in South Africa,even religious services and attendance are controlled andsubject to army invasion. One rightwing party, Tehiya,called upon the Israeli Defense Force to "cleanse themosques of those who incite to rebellion."

In the occupied territories, settlers are razingArab vil-lages so that they no longer exist; they are also "disappear-ing" the names of Arab villages, even some that still exist,

from the maps.Palestinians must carry ID cards at all times under

threat of imprisonment, and are subject to strict curfews.Our delegation felt the curfews in a profound sense. Wehad to stop all gatherings with Palestinians at a certain timein the evening to allow them to get back to their homes. Noone from the West Bank or Gaza, for example, could be inJerusalem after midnight. Most Israeli towns depend onthe Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank for cheaplabor, yet the workers cannot stay in those towns after dark.

I also learned of another analogy to South Africa whenI met a young woman who lived "inside the Green Line,"inside the pre-1!b7 Israeli border. Almost in passing shementioned that as a Palestinian, she was not allowed tostudy her primary interest, computer technology. Thisreminded me of "job reservation," the South Africangovernment's practice of allocating jobs by ethnicity, thecornerstone of the Bantu Education Act, designed to per-petuate inequality.

Just as in South Africa, where a display of the flag of theAfrican National Congress is a crime, so too reference toany symbol connected to Palestinian nationhood andsovereignty, or to the Palestine Liberation Organization, isforbidden in Israel. AnyattemptbyPalestinians to run theirown lives is considered terrorist activity, because itpromotes the notion of self-determination, in consequencea PLO principle. .

the short-term criticism of the world press for such con-duct, and put down the insurrection as quickly as pos-sible

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overwhelmingly, brutally and rapidly.The insurrection must be quelled immediately, and

the first step should be to throw out television, a la SouthAfrica. To be sure, there will be international criticismof the step, but it will dissipate in short order.

Kissinger's views predominate in the Israeli cabinet. Onecabinet member w-as quoted by the Times after a late Februarycabinet meeting:20

I came to the conclusion after 80 days of riots that thepresence of the media causes the riots. If the media willnot be there, I don't think there will be any more riots.

In fact, the press ban is nothing but a question of image.The "appearance of the incident [of the Palestinian prisonerbeing beaten with rocks] on foreign television seemed moreimportant to many Israelis than its actual occurrence. Therehas been virtually no public uproar here [in Israel] overreports that at least three Palestinians, and possibly more,

20. NewYorkTimes, February 29,1988, p.A1.

Number 30 (Summer 19E8)

have been beaten to death by sotdiers in recent weeks."21Virtuallyall independent reports confirm that thetheoryis

hogwash. ihe Washington Post noted:Zz

Despite government claims that restricting residentsand closing off the area to journalists would inhibitviolence, military officials said there were major inci-dents in at least 23locations, andwitnesses said the armyin the West Bank used more aggressive tactics and morefirepower against rioters than in the past.

The more sophisticated Israeli officials must recognize thatthe uprising is a function of their occupation and oppressionof the Palestinians. The media cover the oppression of thePalestinians because Israel has announced a policy of "force,might, beatings," in the words of Defense Minister YitzhakRabin. But Israelis are concerned more with what the worldthinks of them, than what may actually be happening. Eventhat is an overstatement; most Israelis are concerned onlywithwhat those members of the United States Congress think whovote them some $4 billion every year.

They want their benefactors to believe that the beatings of

21.Ibid.,pp. A1, A15.22. Washington Posr, March 31, 1988, p..A1.

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Credit: AP

Most modern wars of democracies are fought notonly on the ground, but also in the living rooms of thewestern democracies, starting with the United States.Public opinion is the war. Because in terms of violence,Israel could put down what is happening in a day.

Some network executives accept the criticism; some do not.Some noted that the Israelis and American Jews had fewcriticisms of television coverage of the 1982 invasion ofLebanon. And Jack Lawrence of ABC News pointed out that"of the more than 90 Palestinians killed in the [first threemonths of the uprising], there was not a singlepicture, still ormoving, of anyone being shot by a soldier."'' On the otherhand, in a rather contorted comment, Bob Simon of CBSNews referred to a built-in bias in favor of the Palestinians."The Palestinians start out with an enormous edge. They arecivilians, unarmed and occupied, an enormous advantagecompared to starting out as uniformed, armed and occupiers."He seems to be suggesting that being the underdog is an un-fair advantage! Moreover, according to the Times reporter,Simon "said he tried to overcome that bias and avoid exploita-tion... ."28

Whether it was in an attempt to "overcome" the bias oftheir dramatic footage of the prisoners being beaten withstones or not, Bob Simon was also one of the two CBSreporters who, in violation of network rules, gave a copy oftheir outtakes to Maj. Gen. Amram Mit_zna, the commanderof Israeli West Bank Lccupation forces.2g efi". an internal in-vestigation, the network concluded that it was "an innocentmistake."

Without understanding the irony of his complaint, an Is-raeli Embassy spokesperson was quoted: "How do you fightthose plqtures? Even the best information campaign is nomatch."n In the Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere of Israelipolitical life, you do not fight pictures of prisoners being tor-tured by stopping the torture; you do it by banning photog-raphers!

More ominous is a campaign to dehumanize the Pales-tinians even more than Arabs are generally demeaned in theIsraeli and American press. One aspect of this campaign,which has appeared in both the New York Times and the

27.Ibid.?8. Ibid. The charge that the U.S. press is pro-Palestinian is ironic, to say

the least. There is even considerable debate within the American left overwhether the progressive press in general is sufficiently attuned to the Pales-tinian arguments. See Rashid Khalidi, "Irft Fails to Meet the Challenge ofPalestinian Oppression ," fn Tbese Timeq May L8, L988, p. 16. Khalidi arguesthat Ted Koppel's weekJong ABC-TY Nshtline broadcasts from Jerusalemand the reports of John Kifner and Anthony I"rwis in the NewYork Timesprovided "crucial facts about the current situation that go unreported inmore progressive organs." Some notable exceptions are: the fine reportingfrom the West BankbyMichael Moore in Moore's Weekly(P.O. Box 18L35,Washington,DC2A036; $?4lyear); a special issue of Red flz.ss (Number 12,entitled "For Palestine," $4 f.rcm ?A25 Burgundy St., New Orleans, LA70l17);Jane Huntefs Israeli Foreign Affairc(P.O. Box 19580, Sacramento,CA 95819; $20fear); consistent coverage in The Guardian and Frcntlinqand, of course, AlexanderCockburn'scolumns and Noam Choms\y's articlesand books. Unfortunately, many progressives who are willing to travel toNicaragua would not consider a visit to the West Bank.

29. NewYorkTimes, March 3, 1988.n.Ibid.

After beating Palestinian boy in Ramallah, furious Israelisoldiers drag him off for arrest.

Palestinians are aberations, not, as is the case, standard prac-tice. They want them to think that Arabs are treated relative-ly humanely; the Israelis and their supporters never tire ofinsisting that Palestinians were treated much more harshlybyother Arabs. They do not want Congress to comprehend, asJohn Kifner quoted an Israeli officer, that most Israelis "don'tregard Arabs as humans."23

It is astonishing the extent to which Israelis and their sup-porters blame the existence of pictures for their troubles,rather thanwhat the pictures depict. When a group of Jewishleaders in Florida presented a petition supporting a televisionban to the local Israeli Consul General, they said, "There's amajor difference between the camera and the press....Television gives a distorted view of the entire conflict. You geta completJy aiff"r"nt picture from the print."24 Ardently pio-Israel former journalist Marvin Kalb agreed. He said that TVimages have "a resonance above and beyond the picture andthe Event."5

The Israeli complaints are shrill and extreme. Former U.N.Ambassador Netanyahu told the New York Times:26

23. New York Times, March 13, L9E8., P. 12.24. Associated Press, March 26,1988.25. Associated Press, January24, 1!)88.?5. New York Times, March ?.0, 1988., P. 20.

18 CovertAction Number 30 (Summer 1988)

Washington Post, is the notion that Palestinians havedeveloped a self-image as victims which can perpetuate theirstatus as victim. Thomas L. Friedman wrote in the Times:3|

The danger for Palestinians is that their visibility ontelevision depends on their role as victims, and this rolecan become an end in itself-rather than a phase, or aninstrument, to bringing about a peaceful resolution. Atsome point theywill have to get off stage and collective-ly decide how they want to live with the Israelis.

The racism and arrogance of this comment is substantial.For one thing, it assumes that if the Palestinians were not beingvictimized, no one would care about them. Secondly, it seemsto say that the Palestinians are deliberately putting themsel-ves in the position of being brutalized in order to use that as"an instrument" in their political struggle.

ThePosr's Stephen S. Rosenfeld also wrote that the Pales-tinians "have gotten accustomed to acting as the victim-arole which disables their capacityfor self-discipline and initia-tive."3z How does a victim not act as a victimZ fne Palestiniansare being victimized and Rosenfeld thinks they ought to stopacting. But even more baarcely, he wrote:

Does this [asking only for some form of self-deter-mination rather than for a sovereign state] not leavePalestinians branded as less than the Israelis' equal inthe crucial matter of sovereignty, second-class sharersof a doubly promised land? Yes it does. That's not fairto the Palestinians, but it's good to the Palestinians.It'swhat's in the ballpark in the next few years. Those whoencourage the Palestinians to insist now on statehoodand a separate delegation and full justicebytheir stand-ards do them a disservice by reinforcing the all-or-noth-ing tendency that has produced only a dead end.

In short, because they are not likely to get it from the Is-raelis right now, it is wrong for the Palestinians to demand jus-tice. One can imagine the advice Rosenfeld might have giventhe slaves in the South before the Civil War-and perhapsduring it.

One side effect of the televised beatings of prisoners hasbeen, ironically, "a division of labor between the army and thesettlers."r' Because the occupying troops are soschizophrenic about their role, they leave, by default, a greatdeal of decision making to the settlers, who "mock thearmy...and do what they want."

The Refugee Camps as Concentration CampsRefugee camps and Palestinian villages have been turned

into virtual concentration camps through collective punish-ment, extensive curfews and the increasing policy of literallywalling up the inhabitants, with as many as 400,000 people at

31. New York Times, March 1.3, 1988, Sec. 4.32. Washington Posr, April 15, 1988, p. A19.33. Op. cit.,n.1. See article in this issue on the settlers.

Number 30 (Summer 1988)

Credit: AP

Soldiers bash woman's head against a wall during women'sprotest in Al-Amari refugee camp.

a time sealed up.3 In many villages considered troublesome,Israeli army bulldozers have filled the roads leading in withhuge mounds of dirt, and in numerous camps concrete wallshave been erected over the entrances and exits to the camps,leaving only one passage which is guarded day and night by Is-raeli soldiers. In many cases, for weeks and months on end,the camp inhabitants are not allowed to leave to shop for food,medicines and other necessities. All this combined with theconstant anticipation of indiscriminate military or settler raidsmake the fabric of life for the Palestinians little different fromthat once experienced by the Jews themselves. The victimshave become the execution.rr.3S

Economic WarfareIn addition, there is a serious form of economic warfare

beingwaged by the Israelis against the Palestinians. While thePalestinians have tried to disengage their economy from thatof Israel, the Israelis have banned foreign transfers, cut localand international telecommunications, closed printing shops,and more frequently cut off utilities, fuel, and even water.$

The occupation-imposed bureaucracy became "the latestIsraeliweapon," when the Israeli armyin Gazademanded thatmore than 400,ff)0 Gazans exchange their old identity cardsfor new Israeli identity cards, in a process which takes each

A. New York Times, May 15, 1988, p. 1. Many months before the startof the Intifada, accordingtoanAl Fajrpoll reportedin &nadian Dimension(May/June 7987), p. 37, 17.6 percent of the Palestinians polled were fromfamilies which had experienced the demolition or the sealing of their homes;already 47.5 percent were fircm families which had experienced a political ar-rest.

35. For an excellent discussion of the "use and misuse of the Holocaustand anti-Semitism to senre Zionist ends," see Cheryl Rubenberg, "TheHolocaust and Anti-Semitism," Palestine Fuus, March-April 1987, p.4.

36. Joe I-ockard, "Economic Warfare in the Occupied Territories," ftrTbxe Times, Api127,1988, p. 9.

CovertAction 19

person many hours on [ine. The reason, Joel Brin*ley noted,was to let "Gazans know who makes the rules,"" but it wasreminiscent of South Africa's pass laws.s

In flagrant violation of international law, the Israelis arestepping up their forced "deportations" of Palestinians fromtheir homelands in the occupied territories, depositing themacross the borders of neighboring countries.

The'6Transfertt PolicyIsrael has developed its ownversion of a fina