W.P. (42) 121

122

S e c u r i t y o f Rad io Telephone T r a n s m i s s i o n s : Note "by t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e War C a b i n e t .

Dominion C o - o p e r a t i o n : Note "by t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e War C a b i n e t .

123 Welsh R e p r e s e n t a t i o n : Memorandum by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Dominion A f f a i r s .

124 The P r e s s : R e p o r t byof t h e C o u n c i l .

t h e Lord P r e s i d e n t

125 Pay of B r i t i s h S e r v i c e O f f i c e r s w i t hU n i t s and F o r m a t i o n s : Memorandum byS e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r War.

I n d i a n t h e

126 A l l i e d Economic Warfa re S t r a t e g y f o r 1942: Memorandum by t h e M i n i s t e r of Economic W a r f a r e .

127

128

C i v i l S u p p l i e s t o t h e Middle E a s t A r e a : Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e War C a b i n e t .

Manpower: - Note by t h e M i n i s t e r o f Labour and N a t i o n a l S e r v i c e .

129 N a v a l , M i l i t a r yResume.

and A i r S i t u a t i o n : Weekly

130 Supply of B r i t i s h O f f i c e r s f o r I n d i a n Army and t h e i r P a y ; Memorandum by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r I n d i a .

131 The " D a i l y M i r r o r " :Home S e c r e t a r y .

Memorandum by t h e

132 J o i n t War P r o d u c t i o n S t a f f :t h e M i n i s t e r of P r o d u c t i o n .

Memorandum by

133

'134

Committee on R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P r o b l e m s : R e v i s e d Compos i t ion and Terms of R e f e r e n c e .

S h i p p i n g Tonnage and Losse s i n t h e F a r E a s t : Note by t h e M i n i s t e r of War T r a n s p o r t .

135 P o s i t i o n of C i v i l i a n s e v a c u a t e d fromP a r E a s t t o t h e Dominions and I n d i a : Memorandum by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t eDominion A f f a i r s .

t h e

f o r

136 N a v a l , M i l i t a r yWeekly Resume.

and A i r S i t u a t i o n :

137 Vichy Squadront h e F i r s t Lord

a t of

A l e x a n d r i a : Memorandum by t h e A d m i r a l t y .

138 I n d i a : Te legrams exchanged between t h e Lord P r i v y S e a l and t h e P r ime M i n i s t e r .

139 R e p o r t by the R i g h tM . P . , on h i s p e r i o dof S t a t e .

Hon. O l i v e r L y t t e l t o n , of O f f i c e a s M i n i s t e r

140 '

3? aval?, M i l i t a r y ;Weekly Restime.

and A i r S i t u a t i o n :

he

W . P . ( 4 2 ) 141

142

I n d i a : d r a f t t e l eg ramf rom t h e Pr ime M i n i s t e r t o t h e Lord P r i v y S e a l .

Communist P a r t y : Memorandum by t h e Home S e c r e t a r y .

143 F u n c t i o n s ofMiddle E a s t :M i n i s t e r .

t h e M i n i s t e r of S t a t e in Memorandum "by t h e Pr ime

t h e

144 P r o p o s e d A n g l o - S o v i e t T r e a t y :

by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r

Memorandum

F o r e i g n A f f a i r s .

145 The Malayan Campaign: Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y .

146

147

Some Remarks made by J a p a n e s e Dip lomats and A t t a c h e s in European C a p i t a l a t e n dF e b r u a r y .

I n d i a i Te legrams t o and from t h e P r ime M i n i s t e r .

of

148 Coal P r o d u c t i o n :P r e s i d e n t of t h e

Memorandum by t h e C o u n c i l .

Lord

149 I n d i a :I n d i a ,

Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r c o v e r i n g a t e l e g r a m from t h e V i c e r o y .

150 P o l i t i c a l Mee t ings i n F a c t o r i e s : Memorandum by t h e Lord P r e s i d e n t of t h e C o u n c i l .

151 J u r i s d i c t i o n over members of the U .S . Armed F o r c e s i n t h e U.K. J o i n t Memorandum by t h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , t h e Home S e c r e t a r y and t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r S c o t l a n d .

152 A n t i - g a s P r e c a u t i o n s :of S t a t e f o r Dominion

R e p o r t by t h e A f f a i r s .

S e c r e t a r y

153 ( 1 ) R e l e a s e of Whole- t ime C i v i l Defence P e r s o n n e l f o r War I n d u s t r y .

( 2 ) R e l e a s e of P o l i c e f o r t h e Armed F o r c e s . Memorandum by t h e Home S e c r e t a r y and M i n i s t e r of Home S e c u r i t y .

154 N a v a l , M i l i t a r yResume.

and A i r S i t u a t i o n : Weekly

155 Propaganda a t Home: Memorandum byM i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n .

t h e

155 A n g l o - S o v i e tS e c r e t a r y of

T r e a t i e s : S t a t e f o r

Memorandum by t h e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s .

157 The S h i p p i n g S i t u a t i o n : Memorandum byM i n i s t e r of War T r a n s p o r t .

t h e

158 Enemy i n t e n t i o n s :t h e War C a b i n e t ,

Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y of

159 E x t e r n a l Monetary and Economic P o l i c y : P r e l i m i n a r y d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e U .S . : Memorandum by t h e P a y m a s t e r - G e n e r a l .

160 E v a c u a t i o n of I n d i a n s from Burma: Memorandum j by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Burma.

161 O r g a n i s a t i o nC o n t i n g e n t s :Committee.

of A l l i e d N a v a l , Army and A i r R e p o r t by t h e C h i e f s of s t a f f I

W.P. (42) 162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169 -

Polio

E v a c u a t i o n of I n d i a n Refugees from Burma: Memorandum by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Burma.

Enemy O i l Q u e s t i o n s : Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e War C a b i n e t .

N a v a l , M i l i t a r y and A i r S i t u a t i o n ; Weekly Resume.

P o s t - w a r Commodity P o l i c y and R e l i e f : Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y of the War C a b i n e t .

A t t i t u d e of I n d i a n N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s : Memorandum by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r I n d i a .

R e l e a s e of Ex-Mine r s from the Army. Memorandum by t h e S e c r e t a r y of s t a t e f o r War.

Communist P a r t y : Memorandum by t h e Home S e c r e t a r y .

Vichy M i n i s t e r s i n t h e Dominions : Memorandum by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Dominion A f f a i r s .

0 is not open to public inspection,

-in

l u I N I BF K E P T U N O E R j C ^ A U , R O

. ..eK1,... ....... 5

DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY' S GOVERNMENT.)"

S E C R E T . 2Q

W . P . ( 4 2 ) 1 8 1 . COPY NO.

15!TH MARCH. 1942 .

. WAR CABINET.

SECURITY OP RADIO TELEPHONE TRANSMISSIONS.

Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y .

The a t t a c h e d Memorandum by t h e Chairman of t h e W i r e l e s s T e l e g r a p h y Board i s c i r c u l a t e d t o t h e War Cab ine t by d i r e c t i o n of t h e Pr ime M i n i s t e r .

( S i g n e d ) E .E . BRIDGES.

S e c r e t a r y to t h e War C a b i n e t .

Grea t George S t r e e t , S .W.1 .

13TH MARCH, 1942 .

SECURITY OP RADIO TELEPHONE.

Memorandum by t h e Chairman of t h e W i r e l e s s

T e l e g r a p h y Board .

The W i r e l e s s T e l e g r a p h y Board i s s e r i o u s l y d i s t u r b e d by t h e i n c r e a s i n g u s e of R/T f o r a l l p u r p o s e s . The s e c u r i t y of t h e v a r i o u s d e v i c e s u s e d f o r d i s g u i s i n g r a d i o t e l e p h o n y t r a n s m i s s i o n s has b e e n ' d i s c u s s e d a t t h e Board w i t h w i r e l e s s e n g i n e e r s from t h e G e n e r a l Pos t O f f i c e . The Board i s of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t no s e c u r i t y d e v i c e has y e t been p r o d u c e d which g i v e s any r e a l s e c u r i t y t o r a d i o t e l e p h o n y t r a n s m i s s i o n s . S e c u r i t y d e v i c e s ( e . g . s c r a m b l i n g ) a r e on ly of a v a i l a g a i n s t t h e c a s u a l e a v e s d r o p p e r , and a f f o r d no s e c r e c y w h a t s o e v e r when t a p p e d by a f u l l y q u a l i f i e d r a d i o e n g i n e e r w i t h ample r e s o u r c e s .

As f a r , t h e r e f o r e , a s the enemy a r e c o n c e r n e d , a l l - radio t e l e p h o n y t r u r ^ u i s s i o n R shou ld be l o o k e d on as h a v i n g no more s e c r e c y t h a n i f t h e y were i n o r d i n a r y s p e e c h , and we can be t o l e r a b l y c e r t a i n t h a t t h e y a re a l l o v e r h e a r d by t h e enemy, who, we know, wa tch our v / i r e l e s s t r a f f i c .

I t i s r e q u e s t e d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h i s o p i n i o n may be b rough t t o t h e n o t i c e of t h e War C a b i n e t , and t h a t suitabllf i n s t r u c t i o n s may oe drawn up t o e n s u r e t h a t n o t h i n g of v a l u e t o t h e enemy i s e v e r t r a n s m i t t e d over t h e r a d i o t e l e p h o n e .

(S igned) C.V.L. LYCETT. 16TH FEBRUARY.

TO 8F KEPT UNDER LOOK A N D KgV, ' ' t is A i q i v s ^ i tha t spepial care may be taken to

^oauiv tJae jjecrepy.of this document. \ /\ /(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT) ,

S E C R E T . M

W.P.CU-2) .122,

1U-TH MARCH, COPY NO.

WAR CABINET.

DOMINION C O-OPERATION

by t h e S e c r e t a r y ,

The a t t a c h e d most s e c r e t and p e r s o n a l t e l e g r a m i s c i r c u l a t e d to the War C a b i n e t by d i r e c t i o n o f t h e Pr ime

Min i s t c r ,

(S igned ) E .E . BRIDGES.

S e c r e t a r y of t h e War C a b i n e t ,

Grea t George S t r e e t ' , S . W . 1 .

11+TH MARCH, 191+2.

M O S T S E C R E T A N D P E R S O N A L T E I ^ G R A M T O T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , F R O M T H E P R I ML- ^-^ISl^ uj A U S T R A L I A T F T E O E I V E D IJTH" MARCH ,j 91+2 1 , D e s i r e t o inform you t h a t Dr. H.V. E v a t t , M i n i s t e r f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s and A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l who i s accompanied by h i s v / i f e , i s l e a v i n g A u s t r a l i a immed ia t e ly f o r t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and Un i t ed S t a t e s of America . He i s t r a v e l l i n g by a i r a c r o s s t h e P a c i f i c Ocean and w i l l v i s i t t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s f i r s t .

2 . His v i s i t i s b e i n g made so t h a t t h e r e can be d i r e c t M i n i s t e r i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e Government by a M i n i s t e r who i s f u l l y f a m i l i a r w i t h i t s p r e s e n t p rob lems and views t h e r e o n .

3 . On a r r i v a l i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom i t i s d e s i r e d t h a t he be a c c e p t e d as the a c c r e d i t e d " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government i n t h e War C a b i n e t and a d m i t t e d t o i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s on t h e same b a s i s as Si:? E a r l e P a g e . Dr . E v a t t w i l l a l s o be the A u s t r a l i a n r- jprc t e n t a t i v e on t h e P a c i f i c War C o u n c i l .

C U R T I N ,

9 ; : u - -.-y;, r " y " f ' l"'r f

IS DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OF' HIS 3RITAITNIC IIAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

3 E 0 R E T .

W.P.(U2) 1 2 3 .

15 th March. 19U2.

WAR CABINET.

WEjCSH REPRESENTATION,

Memorandum by the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Dominion A f f a i r s .

Y e s t e r d a y I r e c e i v e d a d e p u t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e Welsh M.P..S, They complained, t h a t i n d e p a r t m e n t s g e n e r a l l y t h e r e i s a f a i l u r e t o r e c o g n i s e the p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n of Wales a s a d i s t i n c t n a t i o n . There i s too much of a t e n d e n c y to c o n s i d e r a l l q u e s t i o n s on a narrow t e c h n i c a l p o i n t of v iew - Wales b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d mere ly a s a p a r t of a l a r g e r g e o g r a p h i c a l a r e a . Th i s i g n o r i n g of Wales p r o v i d e s powder and s h o t f o r t h e ex t reme Welsh n a t i o n a l i s t s who a r e m i s c h i e v o u s and tend t o be a g a i n s t the war e f f o r t 0 I was g i v e n ' q u i t e a number of i n s t a n c e s i n which the Welsh c l a i m f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on v a r i o u s i m p o r t a n t - c o m m i t t e e s had been ignored , , , and I c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e d e p u t a t i o n made i t s c a s e , I s u g g e s t t o the C a b i n e t t h a t a d i r e c t i v e should be I s s u e d to a l l d e p a r t m e n t s to t h i s e f f e c t .

I n a l l d e p a r t m e n t s a t t e n t i o n s h o u l d be p a i d t o a d e q u a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b e i n g g i v e n on c o m m i t t e e s , a d v i s o r y c o u n c i l s and s i m i l a r b o d i e s to Welsh p e r s o n s , and to t h e s e t t i n g up of s e p a r a t e commi t t ees or o r g a n i s a t i o n s f o r

Wales where the s e p a r a t e i n t e r e s t s of Wales as a n a t i o n may be i n v o l v e d - and where there-, i s no s t r o n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e a s o n f o r no t do ing so 0 , , r When Welsh men and women, e s p e c i a l l y when t hey a re u n i l i n g u a l , have fo r war r e a s o n s to be p l a c e d o u t s i d e Y/ales , c a r e s h o u l d be t aken to see t h a t so f a r as p o s s i b l e t hey a r e p o s t e d to Welsh u n i t s . U n l e s s s e c u r i t y g rounds r e n d e r i t u n d e s i r a b l e , they shou ld be a l lowed t o p e n r j f-pri r e c e i v e l e t t e r s i n t h e Welsh l a n g u r . g c a . *,

( I n t l d . ) " C.R.A.

Dominions O f f i c e ,

1^th March, 19U2..

l' KEPT U N D E R LOCK A ND KEY. l\ Is requested that special care may betaken to " " " '

ensure the secrecy of this document.

IS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

S E C R E T .

W.P. (1+2) 1 2 k .

17TH MARCH4

WAR CABINET,

THE PRESS.

V COPY NO. &

/

R e p o r t by t h e Lord P r e s i d e n t of t h e C o u n c i l .

At t h e i r m e e t i n g on t h e 9 t h March t h e War Cab ine t i n v i t e d a Committee o f . M i n i s t e r s t o c o n s i d e r what s t e p s c o u l d b e t a k e n t o p r e v e n t t h e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h i s c o u n t r y of a r t i c l e s , o r t h e s e n d i n g o u t of t h i s c o u n t r y of m e s s a g e s , c a l c u l a t e d t o undermine p u b l i c mora l e a t home o r t o c r e a t e i l l - f e e l i n g be tween t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s (W.M.(k2) 3 2 n d Conc lus ions , Minute k ) .

I submit on b e h a l f of t h e Committee t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t of t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n s ,

2 , We c o n s i d e r e d f i r s t what s t e p s might b e t a k e n t o p r e v e n t p u b l i c a t i o n of such m a t e r i a l i n t h i s c o u n t r y .

We agreed t h a t i t would n o t be p r a c t i c a b l e t o d e a l w i t h t h i s by way of an e x t e n s i o n of p r e s s c e n s o r s h i p . The p r e s e n t sys tem i s a v o l u n t a r y c e n s o r s h i p conce rned w i t h s t a t e m e n t s of f a c t . I t i s d e s i g n e d to p r e v e n t t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of any m i l i t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n ( i n the w i d e s t s ense ) l i k e l y t o be u s e f u l to t h e enemy; and i t h a s been p o s s i b l e t o i n d i c a t e w i t h r e a s o n a b l e p r e c i s i o n t h e k i n d of m a t e r i a l which should be s u b m i t t e d fo r c e n s o r s h i p on t h i s ground,, I t would be imposs ib l e , t o d e f i n e t h e k i n d of m a t e r i a l which might undermine p u b l i c mora l e a t home; and i t would be n e c e s s a r y t o r e q u i r e the ' whole of each e d i t i o n of a newspaper t o be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c e n s o r b e f o r e i t went t o p r i n t * T h i s was i n f a c t t h e sys tem of c e n s o r s h i p employed i n F r a n c e d u r i n g t h e months i m m e d i a t e l y b e f o r e t h e f i n a l c o l l a p s e of t h e F rench Government.

I n our view such a sys tem would be i m p r a c t i c a b l e , as a m a t t e r of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n t h i s c o u n t r y . I t i s a l s o a r g u a b l e t h a t i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o r e c o n c i l e i t w i t h t h e c o n t i n u ance of t h e p o s i t i o n by which M i n i s t e r s a r e r e s p o n s i b l e t o P a r l i a m e n t and t h e i r a c t i o n s can be c h a l l e n g e d i n t h e Courts , ,

3 . We,have, t h e r e f o r e , c o n s i d e r e d what o t h e r a c t i o n c o u l d be t a k e n t o check t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of o b j e c t i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l .

I n our view i t i s n e c e s s a r y i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e t h a t t he Government should make i t c l e a r t h a t the c o n t i n u e d p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s k i n d of u n w a r r a n t e d and m a l i g n a n t c r i t i c i s m of t h o s e i n a u t h o r i t y may do t h e S t a t e a m o r t a l i n j u r y by s a p p i n g p u b l i c con f idence and b r e a k i n g dov/n t h e s p i r i t of u n i t y i n p r o s e c u t i n g t h e . w a r . I f a g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t on t h e s e l i n e s were made, by t h e h i g h e s t a u t h o r i t y , a l l members of t h e Government shou ld fo l l ow i t up by c o u n t e r i n g t h i s t y p e of c r i t i c i s m , whenever i t o c c u r s , by v i g o r o u s c o r r e c t i o n and c o u n t e r - s t a t e m e n t . Above a l l , i t would be h e l p f u l i f an example could be made of one of the newspapers which h a s been a f l a g r a n t o f f e n d e r i n t h i s r e s p e c t .

kc With t h i s l a s t p o i n t i n v iew, we have c o n s i d e r e d whether i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e e x i s t i n g powers unde r t h e Defence R e g u l a t i o n s . Under R e g u l a t i o n 2D, t h e Home S e c r e t a r y may s u p p r e s s any newspaper i f he i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t i t has s y s t e m a t i c a l l y p u b l i s h e d m a t t e r which i s i n h i s o p i n i o n c a l c u l a t e d t o foment o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e war t o a s u c c e s s f u l i s s u e . We have c o n s i d e r e d w h e t h e r i t would be p o s s i b l e t o t a k e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e "Da i ly M i r r o r " unde r t h i s R e g u l a t i o n . We i n v i t e d the A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i th t h e Lord C h a n c e l l o r t o a d v i s e whe the r t h e word ing of t h i s R e g u l a t i o n i s such t h a t t h e Home S e c r e t a r y must have r e g a r d t o t h e m o t i v e b e h i n d the p u b l i c a t i o n o r w h e t h e r i t i s s u f f i c i e n t i f he i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e n a t u r a l consequences of t h e p u b l i c a t i o n would be to "foment o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e war t o a s u c c e s s f u l i s s u e " . The o p i n i o n s g i v e n by the Lord C h a n c e l l o r and t h e A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l on t h i s p o i n t a r e r e p r o d u c e d i n t h e Appendix .

* I n view of t h e s e o p i n i o n s , we have no doubt t h a t t h e r e . h a s b een i n t h e "Da i ly M i r r o r " s y s t e m a t i c p u b l i c a t i o n of m a t e r i a l which would r e n d e r i t l i a b l e t o s u p p r e s s i o n unde r t h i s R e g u l a t i o n .

' 5* At the same t i m e , we doubt w h e t h e r i t i s r e a l i s e d by P a r l i a m e n t , P r e s s or p u b l i c t h a t m a t e r i a l of t h i s k i n d comes w i t h i n R e g u l a t i o n 2D - which was d e s i g n e d , and i s a t p r e s e n t r e g a r d e d , a s an i n s t r u m e n t f o r use r a t h e r a g a i n s t p o s i t i v e p ropaganda i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e war or i n f a v o u r of a n e g o t i a t e d p e a c e .

I f on ly f o r t h i s r e a s o n , we do not t h i n k i t would be e x p e d i e n t t o t a k e immediate a c t i o n t o s u p p r e s s the "Da i ly M i r r o r " unde r R e g u l a t i o n 2D w i t h o u t p r e v i o u s w a r n i n g . I t should f i r s t be made c l e a r t h a t , i n t h e view of t h e Government , t h e s y s t e m a t i c p u b l i c a t i o n of i r r e s p o n s i b l e and m a l i g n a n t c r i t i c i s m of t h i s k i n d makes a newspaper l i a b l e to be s u p p r e s s e d under t h i s R e g u l a t i o n . Th is would s e r v e a s a w a r n i n g , no t on ly to t h e " D a i l y M i r r o r " , b u t t o such o t h e r newspapers a s may s t a n d i n need of i t .

6 . We t h e r e f o r e recommend t h a t the Home .Sec re t a ry should

make a c o n s i d e r e d s t a t e m e n t , i n answer t o a P a r l i a m e n t a r y

Q u e s t i o n , e x p l a i n i n g t h e Government ' s view of the p u b l i c a t i o n

of such m a t e r i a l and making i t c l e a r t h a t i t i s t h e i r

i n t e n t i o n t o a c t under t h i s R e g u l a t i o n a g a i n s t any newspaper

which o f fends i n t h e f u t u r e *

We a l s o recommend t h a t t h e Home S e c r e t a r y s h o u l d a t t h e same t ime send f o r t h e E d i t o r of t h e "Da i ly M i r r o r " and him t h a t t h e pape r w i l l be s u p p r e s s e d i f t h e o f f e n c e i s r e p e a t e d .

-

7. We have a l s o c o n s i d e r e d what a d d i t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s should be p l a c e d upon incoming and o u t g o i n g messages c a l c u l a t e d to c r e a t e i l l - f e e l i n g be tween t h e Un i t ed N a t i o n s . We have had i n mind, p a r t i c u l a r l y , messages such as t h o s e r e c e n t l y t r a n s m i t t e d t o c e r t a i n A u s t r a l i a n and New Zea land p a p e r s by t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d e n t s i n London,

There shou ld be no d i f f i c u l t y i n a p p l y i n g s t r i c t e r

c o n t r o l t o o u t g o i n g messages by use of t h e e x i s t i n g c e n s o r sh ip m a c h i n e r y . Before t h i s can be done , however , i t w i l l

be n e c e s s a r y f o r a p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t to be made w i t h d r a w i n g

p r e v i o u s M i n i s t e r i a l a s s u r a n c e s which have b e e n g i v e n t o

the e f f e c t :

s t h a t c e n s o r s h i p w i l l be c o n f i n e d t o m a t t e r s

a f f e c t i n g m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y ; and

t h a t wha teve r has been p u b l i s h e d i n t h i s c o u n t r y may be c a b l e d ab road w i t h o u t f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n ,

B8 We recommend t h a t t h e M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n shou ld be a u t h o r i s e d to make a s t a t e m e n t i n P a r l i a m e n t w i t h d r a w i n g t h e s e a s s u r a n c e s and g i v i n g warn ing t h a t i n f ix ture a s t r i c t e r c o n t r o l w i l l be e x e r c i s e d w i t h a view t o s t o p p i n g o u t g o i n g messages c a l c u l a t e d / t o c r e a t e i l l - f e e l i n g be tween * the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . '

9 . Incoming messages c o u l d no t be d e a l t w i t h by means of c e n s o r s h i p . Machinery a l r e a d y e x i s t s t o ensu re t h a t such messages a re b rough t t o t h e n o t i c e of t he a u t h o r i t i e s Concerned, who can g e t i n touch w i t h t h e e d i t o r of t h e paper w i th a-view t o p e r s u a d i n g him to d i s c a r d o r modify the message b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n h e r e . Censors w i l l be i n s t r u c t e d i n f u t u r e to widen t h e c a t e g o r i e s of messages which t hey r e p o r t t o t h e M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h i s purpose, ,

1 0 . I f t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s s e t out i n p a r a g r a p h s 8 and 9 above are approved , Dominion Governments shou ld be informed, i n o r d e r t h a t t h e y may c o n s i d e r t a k i n g c o r r e s p o n d i n g a c t i o n .

-

( I n i t i a l l e d ) JvAo

Great George S t r e e t , S .W.1 .

1 7 t h March, 1 9*4-2.

APPENDIX.

Note "by t h e Lord C h a n c e l l o r .

I do n o t f i n d any d i f f i c u l t y i n the words ^ca&cu la tad t o " . I n o r d e r t o s a t i s f y t h e s e words i t i s n o t t h e purpose which the w r i t e r had i n mind which m a t t e r s , b u t t h e e f f e c t which the w r i t e r ' s words may have on some of t h o s e who read them. I t i s r a t h e r more d i f f i c u l t , I t h i n k , to be s u r e abou t t h e words "foment o p p o s i t i o n " . No doub t the newspaper would say t h a t i t was fomen t ing i n d i g n a t i o n and u r g i n g t h e d i s m i s s a l of i n c o m p e t e n t s , a l l w i t h a view t h a t t he war might be p r o s e c u t e d t o a s u c c e s s f u l i s s u e . But , s p e a k i n g f o r mysel f , even i f t h e w r i t e r s a i d s o , I should not b e l i e v e him. Words so o u t r a g e o u s l y v i o l e n t a s t h e s e a r e c l e a r l y c a l c u l a t e d t o foment o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e war, a t any r a t e i n t h e minds of t h o s e who a r e war-weary or d e j e c t e d by our r e v e r s e s , to say n o t h i n g of Q u i s l i n g s and F i f t h C o l u m n i s t s . Suppose t h e l e a d e r w r i t e r met a F i f t h Columnis t i n t h e t r a i n and r e p e a t e d t h e s e words t o him; can anybody doub t t h a t he would have f o r t i f i e d the F i f t h Columnis t i n h i s o p p o s i t i o n to the war?

I t i s , of c o u r s e , e n t i r e l y f o r the Home S e c r e t a r y t o d e c i d e whe the r he " i s s a t i s f i e d " . So f a r a s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n of the words of the R e g u l a t i o n go , I v e n t u r e to t h i n k t h a t he would be w e l l j u s t i f i e d i f he d i d come t o t h a t c o n c l u s i o n .

Two q u e s t i o n s , of c o u r s e , would t h e n a r i s e on t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ' s Order . F i r s t , could the newspaper t ake e f f e c t i v e l e g a l a c t i o n to r e c o v e r i t s freedom? I do n o t t h i n k i t could, , s h o r t of e s t a b l i s h i n g i n an a c t i o n t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e was n o t s a t i s f i e d and t h a t t he Order he had made was , t h e r e f o r e , u l t r a v i r e s .

The more s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n , of c o u r s e , i s what w i l l be t h e e f f e c t on t h e p u b l i c , on s o l d i e r s who r e a d t h e paper , ' on F l e e t S t r e e t , and on P a r l i a m e n t ? As to t h i s , I t seems t o me, i f I may s ay s o , t h a t t h e suddenness and comple t enes s of t h e a c t i o n t a k e n i s i n i t s f a v o u r . The newspaper w i l l n o t be a b l e i n f u t u r e i s s u e s to compla in . Pe rhaps a memory from the l a s t war may n o t be q u i t e out of p l a c e . When t h e then Home S e c r e t a r y q u i t e i l l e g a l l y s u p p r e s s e d t h e Globe newspaper because i t would go on s a y i n g t h a t Lord K i t c h e n e r had r e s i g n e d and our A l l i e s i n F r a n c e became g r e a t l y d i s t u r b e d , t h e r e was a row i n the House i n one d e b a t e i n which the Government r e c e i v e d overwhelming s u p p o r t , and n o t h i n g was e v e r hea rd of the Globe newspaper a g a i n .

S.

12 th March, 1942,

Note "by t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l .

The q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d a r e ( l ) the meaning of " c a l c u l a t e d " ; and (2) whe the r the a r t i c l e s cou ld "be h e l d t o he w i t h i n t h e words of R e g u l a t i o n 2D.

( l ) The word " c a l c u l a t e d " does n o t impor t t h e i dea of mot ive t o the e f f e c t which the words would he expec t ed t o p roduce i f b e l i e v e d . T h e r e - i s a c e r t a i n amount"of a u t h o r i t y on t h e word " c a l c u l a t e d " i n o t h e r c o n t e x t s . I n the Nor th C h e s h i r e e t c . Company and the Manches te r Brewery Company, 1899, Appea l Cases 8 3 , the name of t h e a p p e l l a n t was -held t o b e c a l c u l a t e d to d e c e i v e owing t o i t s s i m i l a r i t y to the name of t h e r e s p o n d e n t company, a l t h o u g h i t was a c c e p t e d / t h a t t he a p p e l l a n t company were i n n o c e n t and had no i n t e n t i o n t o d e c e i v e . I n Sax Lehner v. . A p o l l i n a r i s 1897 1 Ch. 893 a t page 900 - a t r a d e - m a r k case - Kekewich J . s t a t e d t h a t no e v i d e n c e was r e q u i r e d to p rove the i n t e n t i o n t o d e c e i v e , t h e r u l e b e i n g t h a t a man must be t a k e n t o have i n t e n d e d the r e a s o n a b l e and n a t u r a l consequences of h i s a c t s .

(2 ) O p p o s i t i o n to the s u c c e s s f u l p r o s e c u t i o n of a war can t a k e two f o r m s : (a) t h a t t h e war and i t s aims a r e wrong; (b) t h a t i t i s no good going on b e c a u s e i t i s bound t o be l o s t i n t h e end. The a r t i c l e s c l e a r l y do n o t come w i t h i n (a), which i n p r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s no t a form of o p p o s i t i o n which-would be p u t fo rward . The on ly form of o p p o s i t i o n t h a t i s p o s s i b l e and p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous- i s ( b ) . The e f f e c t of t h e a r t i c l e , i f b e l i e v e d , would be to undermine t h e mora le of t h e army and t o make the c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n b e l i e v e t h a t t h e army was i n c a p a b l e of f i g h t i n g the enemy w i t h any chance of s u c c e s s . The c a r t o o n s u g g e s t s t h a t s a i l o r s a r e drowned t o e n a b l e t h o s e who s e l l p o t r o l to g e t a penny more f o r what t h e y s e l l . I t may be s a i d t h a t any c r i t i c i s m ' of t h e h i g h e r command or of i n e f f i c i e n c y of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c r e a t e s some d i s c o u r a g e m e n t and t h e r e f o r e

. might make p e o p l e f e e l d o u b t s as to v i c t o r y . I t i s , however , p e r f e c t l y p l a i n t h a t c r i t i c i s m can be framed w i t h o u t any such i m p l i c a t i o n . The q u e s t i o n , however, w h e t h e r a t t a c k s on the army or the runn ing of the war come w i t h i n t h e words depends on t h e i r n a t u r e . I f they a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y m a l i g n a n t and canno t be r ead as ' e x a g g e r a t i o n s of a l e g i t i m a t e l i n e of c r i t i c i s m , the e f f e c t t h e y a r e c a l c u l a t e d to p roduce may d i f f e r i n k ind from t h a t of r e a s o n a b l e or e x a g g e r a t e d c r i t i c i s m . The e f f e c t t h e n i s , o r m a y b e , i f t h e a r t i c l e s a r c b e l i e v e d , to s p r e a d d e f e a t i s m , which i s t h e on ly i n s t r u m e n t a v a i l a b l e t o t h o s e who a r e opposed t o the war.

f D. S.

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT.

I 2 t h March. 1942.

This document is the property of His Britannic Majesty's Government

Printed for the War Cabinet, March, 1 9 4 2

SECRET COPY N O . 2 9

W.P. (42) 1 2 5 igth March, 1 9 4 2

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AMD KEY It is requested that special care may be ttfken to ensure the

secrecy of this documenjf.

WAR CABINET

P A Y O F B R I T I S H S E R V I C E O F F I C E R S W I T H I N D I A N U N I T S

A N D F O R M A T I O N S

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR

I regret that it is necessary to refer to my colleagues a question on which there is a difference of opinion between the Secretary of State for India and myself which we have not been able to reconcile and on which a decision is long overdue.

- The details of the case are set out in the attached memorandum, and the Secretary of State for India is also circulating a memorandum on the question.

So far as I am concerned the case presents itself not as a financial but as

a moral issue.

British officers serving in India, whether with British or with Indian troops,

receive in emoluments considerably more than British Service officers serving

outside India. I am asked to agree that any who happen to be selected to serve

with Indian troops shall receive the same favourable treatment when serving

outside India.

The question is whether it is right at a time when men in this country are

called upon to give up their civil occupation and perform military service in

the ranks, that those who are fortunate enough to be given commissions should,

if they are selected to serve with Indian troops, receive outside India considerably better financial terms than their fellows serving with British troops in the

same area. I cannot think that it is.

The absolute advantage enjoyed by officers serving on Indian emoluments

is enhanced by the fact that the Indian rate of income tax (now to be levied both

in and out of India) is less than the British rate, though a larger proportion

of Indian emoluments are taxable than is the case with British emoluments. At

present the differences in net emoluments are (for example) 8 a month for

Captains and 3 5 for a Lieutenant-Colonel.

These differences are not insignificant and, though there may be some increase of Indian income tax in the forthcoming budget, they are not likely to be affected very materially.

I had proposed that the matter should be remitted to the Lord President to act as conciliator, but the Secretary of State for India feels that the question is of such importance that it must be settled by the War Cabinet.

P. J- G. T H E W A R O F F I C E ,

14th March, 1 9 4 2 .

PAY OF BRITISH SERVICE OFFICERS WITH INDIAN UNITS AND

FORMATIONS

i. The question relates to the rates of pay which should be paid to officers of the British Service serving with Indian units or formations outside India.

2 . Indian Army rates which are drawn both by Indian Army officers and British Service officers in India attached to Indian Army units are more favourable in themselves than the British rates admissible under the Pay Warrant and Army Allowance Regulations, and the effect of these differences is accentuated by the fact that Indian taxation is lighter than British taxation. It is possible that the forthcoming Indian budget may increase the rates of taxation, but such an increase is unlikely to remove disparities of emoluments in ranks above Lieutenant which, in the War Office view, cannot be justified, even accepting (and it must not be taken that this is accepted, especially in war time) that officers are entitled to higher pay if operating with Indian troops. Higher pay is not given generally to British officers operating with other troops from, e.g., East or West Africa in war time.

3 . British Army officers in British units in India draw slightly less favourable rates than Indian Army officers and British Service officers attached to Indian Army units, in that they do not receive what is known as the " Indian Army allowance ". But even so such officers, in both units and formations, draw (in ranks higher than that of Lieutenant) appreciably higher emoluments than British Service officers in British units and formations serving outside India, and when their units and formations move outside India they drop to the appropriate British rates and pay British and not the lower Indian income tax.

4 . The view of the Army Council is that in principle British Service officers serving with Indian Army units or in Indian formations outside India should be treated exactly the same as any other British Service officers serving in the same theatre. Otherwise there is the anomaly of two British officers of the same rank and roughly the same history both starting from this country but drawing very different rates of net pay merely because one serves with an Indian unit or formation and the other with a British.

5 . Shortly after the outbreak of war it was agreed in principle, and instructions were sent to India in connection with certain forces then being sent out of India to Egypt and Malaya, that all categories of British Service officers serving outside India should receive British rates with the exception of:

( 1 ) Staff Officers who before leaving India were serving for a definite tenure and continued to hold the same appointment outside India, and

( 2 ) officers who were serving with Sappers and Miners, Mountain Artillery and Indian Signals.

These categories already serving in Indian appointments or units were accepted by the. War Office as having vested rights to Indian rates. Unfortunately the intention of this decision was not understood in the same sense by the War Office, the India Office and the Government of India, and a lengthy correspondence and exchange of telegrams ensued in the course of which further misunderstandings arose resulting in considerable extensions of the vested right categories. The Army Council, while recognizing the difficulty created by these vested rights, have pressed that the principle of British rates and British tax

, out of India should be accepted for all future attachments to Indian units or appointments to Indian formations so that at any rate the number of specially privileged officers and instances of glaring disparity should not be increased. As things stand there are such instances as that a Major with an Indian unit in the Middle East may be receiving more in net emoluments than the Lieutenant-Colonel of a British unit; a Brigade Major in an Indian formation more than a Brigadier in a British, and a Lieutenant-Colonel commanding an Indian unit

more than a Major-General commanding a British Division. It must also be remembered that under the Indian expenditure plan the cost in effect falls on the British Taxpayer.

6. There have been complaints from officers of British units that on leaving India they are much worse off than officers with Indian Army units, but clearly they have no more ground for complaint than British officers sent to the same theatre from this country or elsewhere.

7. The view of the Government of India is that the anomalies of. the present situation should be solved by the simple expedient of allowing Indian rates to all officers who happen to be serving with Indian units and formations and ignoring the differences between their net emoluments and those of British officers with British units and formations. Mixed formations would be classified for this purpose either as British or Indian, and a British formation might be changed to Indian as dilution increases, altering the rates of the Commander and staff to Indian, but leaving the British units on British rates.

8 . A recent complication which makes the need for a decision of particular urgency is that whereas British Service officers required for the Indian expansion programme up to now have been attached without change of status and (apart from those with vested rights) could be brought on to British rates outside India there is now a proposal to transfer instead of attaching some 4 , 0 0 0 officers who would thereby acquire the privilege of Indian rates throughout their service. The War Office has taken the view that these officers should not be transferred, but should remain in the British Service and be attached, and that to avoid further discrimination between these and other British candidates for service with the Indian Army the Indian Army should also cease to take further candidates direct from this country for appointment through O.C.T.Us. in India or by appointing British other ranks to Indian Army commissions, meeting all their requirements By" attachment. It is felt strongly that in war time British officers, most of whom are serving on temporary emergency commissions and would otherwise be liable to compulsory service in the ranks, should be sent to serve wherever required in the public interest on British rates of pay, and that special financial privileges outside India should not be given to some of them merely because they serve with Indian units.

9. The Secretary of State for India, it is understood, does not go so far as the Government of India. He has intimated that he personally would be ready to go a great way to meeting the War Office case in other respects provided the War Office would be willing not merely to allow but to help the India Office to the best of the War Office ability to obtain volunteers for employment as Indian Service Officers on Indian Sen/ice terms in those branches of the Service which are not normally manned by British Service officers. It is clear from what is said above that this does not by any means meet the War Office point of view, and in any case the Secretary of State for India feels that he must carry the Viceroy and the Indian Military authorities with him in any concessions he makes to the War Office point of view.

1 0 . As matters stand fresh vested rights continue to be created, increasing the anomalies between one British officer and another and sowing the seeds of serious discontent, and officers who are required for service with Indian units are in a state of great uncertainty as to their position. It is, therefore, imperative from the War Office point of view that the question of principle should be settled without further delay.

II . A separate but smaller question raising similar considerations arises in connection with the.rates.-of Indian Army officers in British Staff appointments. The rule hitherto has been that an officer in this category should receive British Staff rates or the Indian Regimental rates of his substantive rank whichever are the more favourable. The Government of India asks that in all cases in which it is accepted as desirable that the Indian Army officer should hold such an appointment because of his special Indian experience, he should be paid at Indian Staff rates.

1 2 . It is represented that the present rules prevent the best use of officers, as Indian Army officers are unwilling to serve in British Staff posts or posts in mixed formations to which British rates are applicable unless they are given the financial benefits of Indian Staff rates.

1 3 . The War Office view is that there are no real grounds for paying an Indian Army officer in a British Staff appointment more than a British Service officer would receive in the same appointment except in so far as the Indian Army officer has a vested right to Indian Regimental rates if more favourable.

(B41/66) So 3/42 W.O.P. 10362

29

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. March 1942.

SECRET. Copy No.W .P. (32) 126. March 21, 1942. \

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

ALLIED ECONOMIC WARFARE STRATEGY IN 1942.

Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare.

I hope that the War Cabinet will read with interest the attached memorandum prepared in my Department, drawing attention to certain important changes in the economic factors affecting our own and the enemy's position, of which Allied strategy must take account in 1942.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,

March 21, 1942.

ALLIED ECONOMIC WARFARE STRATEGY IN 1942.

SUMMARY.

The basic factors which condition the economic war have undergone

important changes, of which the principal are:

(1) The resources of the Far East have passed under the control of a new

enemy. These resources cover many of Germany's deficiencies; Germany could

supply many of Japan's needs. Each would be greatly strengthened if it could

make contact with the other. Both are planning to do so and expect to succeed.

. (2) Vichy France assumes greater importance (a) because Metropolitan France and Vichy Colonial possessionsFrench

North and West Africa and Madagascar-form a link between the two enemy worlds;

(b) because the strain on the Allied Navies enhances the danger of any hostile action by the French fleet.

(3) The German military threat to all adjacent neutrals (excepting perhaps

Sweden and Turkey) is much reduced by the Russian campaign. The relative

influence of the two belligerent sides over these neutrals has not yet greatly

changed, but. it has become unstable and may vary greatly and suddenly in either

direction with the course of the war in 1942.

(4) So much of the world's resources and shipping has now passed under

the control of the belligerents that the remaining neutrals find themselves

increasingly dependent on one side or the other and are correspondingly

susceptible to' economic pressure. The belligerents, however, as their needs grow,

their debts rise and their exports fall, become more reluctant to supply the

[23591] B

neutrals with their essential needs, even in exchange for valuable supplies, whilst the neutrals become less willing to part with their products on any other terms. The possibility of denying to the enemy the resources from European neutrals which he increasingly requires will depend largely upon the Allies' ability to supply at least small quantities of the commodities which the neutrals most need to maintain their internal economy.

(5) The occupied countries have become more important to German economy and a greater potential source of danger to it.

(6) Germany has been forced to concentrate all her resources of men and materials on preparing for this year's campaigns with greater intensity than ever before; her economy has thereby become more inelastic and vulnerable.

(7) The Allies have built up a large air force which is available for attacking enemy shipping and other economic objectives.

(8) The Allies are themselves subject to economic war on a scale far exceeding anything which they have experienced hitherto. The Americas and Africa may become the Allies' only trans-oceanic sources of supply.

CONCLUSIONS.

The principal objects of Allied economic warfare strategy during 1942 should be

(1) To prevent the two enemy dominions from establishing economic exchange by blockade running; still more, of course, to prevent their opening regular communications by land or sea.

(2) To develop the increased possibilities of economic pressure on the neutral border States adjacent to German Europe and on Vichy French colonies to the fullest extent which the military situation permits, with a view both'to obtaining supplies and to denying to the enemy resources which are becoming more than ever essential to him.

(3) To develop within occupied countries both in German Europe and in the Far East all forms of passive and active resistance to economic exploitation.

(4) To develop methods for directing against the increasing weakness of Germany's war potential attack from the air which shall really be effective.

(5) To devise combined operations against the most important accessible economic targets in enemy-occupied territory and against his lines of communication.

(6) To defend important sources of supply and access to them, including the supplies of South America.

ALLIED ECONOMIC WARFARE STRATEGY IN 1942.

1. The conditions of economic warfare have abruptly changed. The blockade has become more difficult. The counter-blockade has become vastly more formidable. At the same time the scope and possibilities of our economic offensive have widened and the relative' importance of its weapons has altered. The principal changes are analysed below :

I . - T H E THREAT TO THE BLOCKADE..

2. During the first stage of the w a r - u p to the collapse of France-the denial of supplies to the enemy was effected by the interception and examination at British or French bases of vessels bound for the countries bordering on Germany. War Trade Agreements and Shipping Agreements were negotiated and helped the blockade but, in effect, it was exercised by, and depended on, the Navy.

3. In the eighteen- months following the fall of France, although the ultimate deterrent to blockade-runners was still the' British Navy, hew methods for denying Overseas supplies to Germany were developed. By the end of 1941,

these methods (compulsory navicerts, sh ips ' w a r r a n t s and thei r a t t endan t machinery) were adequate , w i th very l i t t le naval assistance, to deny to Germany practically all ocean-borne supplies, except those carr ied in enemy or Vichy blockade-runners, or in Vichy ships in convoy.

4. Enemy blockade-running: of which there was a recrudescence in the summer of 1941, had been pract ical ly stopped by naval action, and the immobilisation of enemy ships in Amer ican por ts had greatly reduced t h e fear of i ts resumption. The overseas blockade was thus vir tual ly complete except for French Colonial produce reaching enemy ter r i tory from French Nor th and West Af r i ca in Vichy ships. Naval action aga ins t Vichy ships had also stopped, at least temporar i ly , French convoys from the F a r E a s t and Madagascar .

5. The entry into the war of J a p a n and her subsequent conquests have created a new enemy a rea of grea t size and economic wealth, and have placed a t the disposal of J a p a n supplies of r a w mater ia ls sufficient to make good most of her own long-term deficiencies and also many of the pr inc ipa l ex is t ing deficiencies of Germany. A t the same t ime i t has grea t ly increased the J a p a n e s e need for a number of manufac tu red and semi-manufactured products obtainable from Europe.

6. Thus , the p r inc ipa l problem of blockade, which has h i ther to been the denial of neu t ra l resources to one enemy, has become in 1942 the denial to two enemies of access to the products of each o ther ' s dominions. Th i s can only be done by the fighting services. So once aga in a major p a r t of the blockade will depend directly on naval interception, assisted probably more t h a n in the ear l ier period by a i r reconnaissance and at tack.

7. Contact between the two enemy worlds might be established by four possible routesacross Russ i a ; by Suez or the Pe r s i an Gulf; round the Cape of Good H o p e ; and round Cape Horn . The first is denied by Russ ian a r m s ; the second by the Br i t i sh hold on the Middle Eas t . The t h i rd and four th are a l ready possible, a l though precarious, to blockade-runners. The Cape H o r n route involves a 17,000 mile passage wi thout refuel l ing; since the J apanese w a r began two blockade-runners have so far (13th March , 1942) a t tempted the inward passage, one successfully, whi ls t another is believed to be loading for an ou tward voyage. The route via the Cape of Good H o p e involves a voyage of 11,000 miles (reckoned from Singapore) on which the only possible refuelling s ta t ion is a t present Madagascar . No enemy or Vichy ships, so far as is known, have used th is route since J a p a n entered the war . There are a number of ships capable of mak ing either voyage wi thou t refuell ing. F rench Wes t Africa, French Nor th Afr ica and the A t l a n t i c coast of Metropol i tan France provide a l ternat ive te rminal por t s more or less under A x i s control, whi ls t the At lan t i c por ts of Nor thern Spa in can also be used for t r ansh ipment w i thou t serious danger .

8. The prospects of successful and frequent blockade runn ing by the H o r n or by the Cape would, of course, be increased, if Br i t i sh and Amer ican naval forces were denied bases a p p r o p r i a t e for intercept ion. Hence the importance, on the one hand, of Br i t i sh a n d Amer ican bases and facili t ies on and off the A t l an t i c Coast of South A m e r i c a ; on the other, of the ports of South Afr ica . The South Afr ican por ts a re even more impor t an t as safeguarding the supply routes l inking Br i t a in and the Un i t ed States wi th Aus t ra l i a , Egyp t and the Middle East . These routes, however, must be held from both ends. Pract ica l ly all the supplies for the Allied f ront which stretches from Libya to Afghan is tan enter through two relatively na r row i n l e t s - t h e Red Sea and the Pers ian G u l f - a n d almost all the oil on which t h a t front, I n d i a and E a s t Afr ica , depend, comes out through the la t ter channel. Reverses which cUt communications between E g y p t and the Cape, or Egyp t and the Pe r s i an Gulf, by endanger ing our position in the Middle East ! would give the enemy the hope of opening the direct route from the Medi te r ranean to the F a r Eas t . ' '

9. A few blockade-runners (say a dozen cargoes) would relieve Germany ' s essential needs for 1942 in rubber, wolfram, t in , hemp and woolif wool became available to J a p a n a n d might t ake back to J a p a n ball bearings, precision ins t ruments and machine tools sufficient to be of real assistance in the expansion of her indust ry .

[23591] B 2

I I . T H E INCREASED SIGNIFICANCE OF VICHY.

10. Metropol i tan France and Vichy colonial possessionsFrench Nor th and West Afr ica and Madagascaracqui re greater significance as a link between two enemy worlds. The appearance of J a p a n as a combatantand her ea r ly successes--have increased the importance of t ha t en igmat ic factor, the French fleet.

I I I . T H E COUNTER BLOCKADE.

11. Japanese successes have already denied to the Allies impor tan t supplies of rubber, t in, wolfram, chrome, oil and food, and, if they continue, may leave the Americas and Afr ica as the All ies ' only trans-oceanic sources of supply. Al l the Allies now face economic war of the same k ind and scale as t ha t which they have waged agains t Germany hi ther to . The enemy, in par t i cu la r the Japanese , are known to be fully conscious of the possibilities of economic war and essential supplies are likely to be objectives for special a t tack. Even the vi ta l supplies of South America, which is still relatively remote from the batt le, a re not immune from a t tack from within, by methods r ang ing from obstruct ion and sabotage to armed revolt by the large and well-organised enemy minor i t ies in these countries. The protection of these supplies and of access to them, as well a s of the routes by which they move, has thus become a mat te r of h igh impor tance and perhaps of considerable urgency.

IV .THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.

12. The neutra l countries bordering on German Europe have from the beginning of the war constituted an economic " No M a n ' s L a n d , " whose resources have been in p a r t denied to the enemy by war - t r ade agreements and pre-emption and indirect ly by ra t ioning. There are now only five such countriesSweden, Switzerland, Spain, Po r tuga l and Turkey. The dominan t factor governing the i r a t t i t ude has been the menace of German mi l i t a ry power. I n March 1942, al though the threa t remains, i t i s dist inct ly less. Weakened and preoccupied by the Russ ian campaign, Germany will not wil l ingly extend the area of her occupation, especially agains t resistance, in any direction which does not contribute directly to the task of defeat ing Russia . A n occupation of the Peninsula , Switzerland, Unoccupied France, French Nor th or Wes t Afr ica , or pe rhaps even Sweden or Turkey, is therefore less probable than heretofore.

13. Th i s change does not appear as yet to have affected the enemy's influence over these countries, except possibly S p a i n ; for B r i t a i n , though enter ing on 1942 wi th new allies and wi th armed forces s t rengthened in men and mater ia l , has lost prest ige through her defeats in Libya and the F a r Eas t ; and she and her Allies have had to divide their forces to meet a new enemy. The relative influence of the two sides has therefore not yet great ly changed; but it has become unstable and may vary great ly and suddenly in ei ther direction wi th the course of the wa r in 1942. The Allies must be ready to take advan tage of any var ia t ion in thei r favour.

V.THE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF THE NEUTRALS.

14. Hi ther to , for a number of their most impor tan t requirements, the countries in " No Man ' s L a n d " have sought from B r i t a i n only navicerts, t h a t is to say, the r igh t to impor t - ?a facil i ty which w e h a v e hesi ta ted to refuse a t d is cretion. Now, however, the vastly increased supply programmes of the Allies and their claims on the diminishing pool of available merchant sh ipping, are makingit impossible for neutrals to obtain thei r requirements except through posit ive action, and sacrifice by the Allies. Spa in and Por tuga l , for example, can a t present hope for adequate oil supplies only by the goodwill of the Uni ted States Government, which, in order to ensure adequate supplies for the Allies, is t ak ing steps to control the dis t r ibut ion of oil produced in the Amer ican continent. The neutrals , in fact, a re bound to become ever more dependent on one or other of the belligerent groups. There is thus an oppor tuni ty to subst i tute for the negat ive

conception of economic war fa re which has h i the r to prevailed a positive policy under Which the economic power of the Allies would be used to ex tor t from the border Sta tes economic advantages in r e tu rn for guarantees of essential supplies. By this means we may hope both to deny neu t ra l European resources to the enemy and to secure them for the Al l iesand at the same time to p u t an end to the absurd s i tuat ion, so common hi therto, in which the Allies buy from a neu t r a l a t fantastically inflated prices, whils t supplying i t s needs a t the pr ices ru l ing in the free world.

15. These possibili t ies are of par t i cu la r significance a t a t ime when J a p a n ' s conquests have deprived the Allies of valuable sources of supplies , and thus made the resources of the Eu ropean neu t ra l s fa r more impor tan t to us, whilst the wastage of the Russ ian campaign has made them hO less i m p o r t a n t to Germany.

VI.MORE SCOPE FOR ATTACK.

(i) Night Bombing. 16. U n t i l relatively recently, the only weapon for a t t ack ing the enemy's

economy behind his f ront ier was the n igh t bomber. This new weapon has not yet played a decisive p a r t in economic war , pa r t ly because of the l imited size of our bomber force, pa r t ly because the science of us ing i t has not yet been mastered. I t is understood t h a t in 1942 a greater force wil l be available. T h i s will const i tute an impor tan t new factor in the economic wa r if, bu t only if, i t can be so appl ied as to yield the results expected of it .

(ii) Attacks on Shipping. 17. Sea t r anspor t has become of increased importance to Germany. To

J a p a n i t is v i t a l ; her capaci ty to continue the w a r beyond 1942 will depend upon extended lines of sea communication. Enemy sh ipp ing has thus become an even more impor t an t t a rge t t h a n h i ther to for a t tack by sea and air .

(iii) Other Forms of Attack. 18. I n recent months, for the first time, a t t aeks upon economic ta rge t s behind

German Europe ' s f ront ier have been successfully carr ied out by dayl ight r a i d i n g from the a i r and by combined operat ions from the sea. M a n y highly impor t an t targets invi te a t tent ion as the possibilities for such a t tacks grow greater .

(iv) Resistance in Occupied Territories. 19. The growth of organised resistance throughout the occupied countr ies

of Europe provides a fu r ther weapon of immense potent ia l i ty which ha's only recently begun to make itself felt. Germany grows more dependent on the occupied countries, and in pa r t i cu la r on thei r man-power, whether working in the i r countries or in Germany. The countries at present occupied by Germany a re more than six times the area of Greater Germany, and contain a popula t ion two-anda-half t imes as great . The extent to Which th i s vast commitment can be made a burden may decisively affect the war . The oppor tuni t ies for polit ical w a r f a r e and for all forms of subversion and sabotage are grea ter than ever before.

VII.CHANGES IN GERMANY'S ECONOMY.

(i) Over-Mobilisation. 20. H a v i n g developed her resources in order to defeat Russ ia in 1941,

Germany is having to p repa re for another campaign in 1942 aga ins t the same enemy wi thou t having any win te r respi te for refitting. I n order to achieve this she is concentrat ing both men and mate r ia l on her immedia te wa r needs a t the cost of cutt ing all her other economic activit ies to and beyond the danger-point . This renders her economy more inelastic- t han at any previous time.

(ii) Dependence on Occupied Countries: 21 . Germany can only relieve the present s i tua t ion by the fur ther exploi ta

tion of the occupied countries. She already employs w i th in Grea te r Germany nearly 4 million immigran t civilian workers and prisoners of war (more t han

10 per cent, of her total labour force), and there is evidence of her intention great ly to increase her in take of forced labour from the occupied countries. She also relies on these countries for r a w materials , for agr icu l tura l surpluses and for indus t r ia l production. She must ma in t a in in these countries the forces necessary for occupation, security and admin is t ra t ion as well as for defence; these demands grow and will grow. The extent to which she can extor t by force a dividend commensurate wi th the effort involved is l imited.

(iii) Raw Material Shortages. 22. He r task is complicated by the growth of r a w mater ia l shortages, notably

oil, rubber, leather, textiles and some metals. These shortages l imit the use which she can make of the vassal countries. Al l these shortages are growing greater. Al l are affecting the armed forces, or will shortly do so, except in so fa r as the s i tuat ion may be relieved by blockade runn ing from the F a r East .

(iv) Germany^ Task for 1942. 23. Germany's war potent ia l was mobilised to secure the maximum mili tary

effort dur ing the la t ter p a r t of 1941, and is a l ready out of balance. H e r only hope of redressing the balance is to defeat the Russ ians decisively and establish communication wi th the F a r East , or else (an inadequate substitute) to set the occupied countries to work for her w i th a success far beyond anyth ing which a t present seems likely. ' She will, of course, t ry to do both, but d u r i n g 1942, unless and un t i l she has decisively defeated Russia, Germany 's economic s i tuat ion is likely to be inelastic and vulnerable to a much greater extent t han ever before.

V I I I . T H E ENTRY OF JAPAN.

24. J a p a n ' s position differs from t h a t of Germany in almost every respect. H e r conquests have al ready secured to her all the r aw mater ia ls she needs except lead (which is available in Burma and Aus t ra l ia ) , wool (which is available in Aust ra l ia , Chile, P e r u and Argent ina) , cotton (which is available in Ind i a , Peru and Brazil) and copper (which is available in Chile a n d Peru) . Her weaknesses are on the indus t r ia l side. H e r iron and steel indus t ry is far smaller by cornpa r ison wi th her popula t ion; her reserves of technical skill and experience are less. Whereas German Europe is full of factories wi thout r aw mate r i a l and markets without supplies, J a p a n ' s new dominions are full of r a w mater ia l wi thout factories and supplies wi thout markets . The problem of " s u r p l u s e s " in these areas has been made much worse, and the odium of fai l ing to solve i t will fall upon J a p a n .

25. J a p a n ' s chief needs from Europe are machinery, machine tools, precision instruments and technical advice. She can expect l i t t le contr ibut ion in indus t r ia l ou tput from her conquests (other than the production of r a w materials) and must expand her indust ry at home. H e r homeland, though probably more vulnerable than Germany to aerial at tack, is fa r less accessible except to an a t tack by Russ ia ; and her dominions are l inked to it, not as Germany 's , by an overburdened, though efficient, system of ra i l and river t ranspor t , bu t by very long sea routes along which a chain of islands offers unique oppor tuni t ies for protection by shore-based a i rcraf t .

26. J a p a n entered the war wi th substant ial stocks of her many deficiencies, probably on^the average about a year ' s supply. H e r four-fold task for 1942 is to complete and consolidate her conquests, to damage the Allies as much as possible, to develop her captured resources before her stocks are exhausted and at. the same time to ma in ta in and develop her a rmament production. Th i s task will make great demands on her capacity to produce p lan t and machinery on a large scale and to develop and t ranspor t from the areas which she has overrun such of their products as she needs.

O .1 ^

I g i S DOOUMEMT IS THE PROPERTY Off HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.)

W O R S T .

j . P , ( 4 2 ) 127 COPY NO uJjAlso A.S ,E . ( 42) 90 Ifand S 0 MoE 0 (42) l 0 )l8 th .March 0 1942^ WAR CABINET

C R / j j v ^ S U P P L I E E TO THE MIDDLE EAST-AREA.

Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e War Cabine t ,

TJie Pr ime M i n i s t e r has approved t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a Committee, under t h e Chairmanship of t h e F i n a n c i a l S e c r e t a r y t o the Treasury. , t o c o n s i d e r q u e s t i o n s of p o l i c y r e l a t i n g t o c i v i l s u p p l i e s t o t h e Middle Eas t a r e a ? i n c l u d i n g P e r s i a and I r a q Q

2o The Committee w i l l be composed of one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of each of t h e f o l l o w i n g d e p a r t m e n t s : -

Treasury, , ' F o r e i g n O f f i c e ?I n d i a O f f i c e , C o l o n i a l Officer, Beard of T r a d e 0M i n i s t r y of Supp ly , M i n i s t r y of War T r a n s p o r t PM i n i s t r y of Food ,e

A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e U n i t e d Kingdom Commercial C o r p o r a t i o n w i l l a l s o be a member of t h e Goramittee 0

3o The Committee w i l l no t? l i k e i t s p r e d e c e s s o r P be a Sub-Committee of t h e A l l i e d S u p p l i e s E x e c u t i v e I t w i l l r e f e r any q u e s t i o n s on which i t i s not ' i t s e l f

a

competent t o r e a c h c o n c l u s i o n s t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e committee of t h e War Cabine t s For i n s t a n c e q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o i n l a n d c l e a r a n c e c a p a c i t y i n P e r s i a

s

would be r e f e r r e d t o t h e A l l i e d S u p p l i e s E x e c u t i v e P w h i l s t q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e a l l o c a t i o n of s h i p p i n g between t h e U n i t e d Kingdom Impor t Programmes and C i v i l S u p p l i e s t o the Middle E a s t would be r e f e r r e d t o the Import Execut ive*

4,-: J o i n t Secretaries t o the Committee w i l l be a p p o i n t e d from the Ministry or War T r a n s p o r t and t h e War Cab ine t O f f i c e . P a p e r s for circulation to the Committee shou ld b e : : s e n t t o t h e Joint Secretary at the War Cab ine t O f f i c e s D A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Ar rangements ,

5 0 The f o l l o w i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r angemen t s have been made f o r t h e t r a n s a c t i o n of d a y - t o - d a y b u s i n e s s r e l a t i n g t o c i v i l s u p p l i e s f o r t h e Middle E a s t a r e a , A s p e c i a l s e c t i o n i s b e i n g s e t up i n t h e M i n i s t r y of War T r a n s p o r t . This s e c t i o n , which w i l l be known a s "The Supply S e c t i o n f o r t h e Middle E a s t " ? w i l l be i n . c h a r g e of Mr E0M* N i c h o l s o n , who w i l l a l s o be t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c

o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f War T r a n s p o r t o n t h e M i d d l e E a s t S u p p l i e s C o m m i t t e e ^ T h e d u t i e s o f t h i s S e c t i o n w i l l i n c l u d e : ^

f o r t h e M i d d l e E a s t , o t h e r t h a n f o r c i r c u l a t i o n ,

( a ) C o m p i l a t i o n o f r e q u i r e m e n t s p r o g r a m m e s f o r s u b m i s s i o n t o t h e C o m m i t t e e .

( b ) H a n d l i n gM i d d l e

o f c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h E a s t S u p p l y C e n t r e .

t h e

( c ) P r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e C o m m i t t e e o f p a p e r s o n q u e s t i o n s o f p o l i c y a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e w o r k o f t h e M i d d l e E a s t S u p p l y

- C e n t r e .

6 . A l l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o C i v i l S u p p l i e s p a p e r s

t o t h e M i d d l e E a s t S u p p l i e s C o m m i t t e e ( s e e p a r a g r a p h 4 ) , s h o u l d b e a d d r e s s e d t o t h e S u p p l y S e c t i o n f o r t h e M i d d l e E a s t i n t h e M i n i s t r y o f W a r T r a n s p o r t . .

( S i g n e d ) E . E . BRIDGES. S e c r e t a r y o f t h e War C a b i n e t s

G r e a t G e o r g e S t r e e t , S . W . 1 . ,

18TH MARCH, 1 9 4 2 .

*(THISJQOOUMEM! IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTYfS (MVERHMBMP).

SECRET. COPY NO.. ^

W.P.(42) 128.(Revise)

7th May. 1942, - .

WAR CABINET.

MAN POWER.

Note by the Minister of Labour and National Service. I c irculate herewith for the information of W colleagues a Memorandum

prepared in my Department showing the Man Power requirements for the Forces and Munitions Industr ies for the second half of 1941, and the extent to which those requirements have been met. The Memorandum has already been circulated to the Man Power Committee under cover of the attached note which summarises the position.

So B .

i^nrggjjgCtfMEMr IS THE PROP&RTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY.1 S GOVERNMEW:'

w.s.fM.P.P. )U2) 5. (Revise) ; COPY NO. WAR CABINET. jMJBtU^JtL MAN POWER M I S ' MOST SECRET.

*" MAN POWER

(NOTE BY MINISTRY OF LABOUR AID NATIONAL SERVICE).

1* The attached memorandum, showing the man power requirements for

the Foroes and the munitions industr ies for the second half of 1941

and the extent -to which those requirements have been met, i s circulated

for the information of the Man Power Committee.

2. The figures for the Services and for the Munitions Industries

are given in Tables A and B of the memorandum. These show that for

the Armed Forces and the nunitions industries (excluding c ler ica l and

administrative staff) there has been an increase in the 6 months of

568,000 men and 453,000 women, a t o t a l of men and women of 1,021,000.

3. For the Forces, there was,an intake of 410,000 men, an excess

over estimated requirements of 7 1 , 0 0 0 ; and an intake of 116,000 women,

a deficit compared with stated requirements of 6 9 , 0 0 0 , although the

numbers enrolled were not greatly below what the Services could absorb. o r^ Industry, there was a net increase of men operatives employed on

Government work -in the munitions industr ies of 158,000, an excess over

estimated requirements of 28,O00j and a net increase of women opera

tives of 357,000, an excess over estimated requirements of 67,000.

MAW-POWER HBQUIRBS.S5ITTS - SBOOND HALF OF 1941.

1, The Tables attached show the man-power requirements for the.Forces and

the munitions industries for the second half of 1941 and the extent to which

those requirements have been met. -. - --.

- - ' - -; -.. ' X . : .... ' . . " 2, The figures of requirements for the Forces are those given in the Ministry of Labour memorandum-for the Man-Power Committee's Report of October,. 1941,(N. S. (M. P. P. ) (41)41.) while those for industry have been taken as half the

numbers, specifically stated by the-Committee as being required for the twelve

months ending June, 1942, plus an allowance as shown in paragraph 6(2) below

-in respect of the numbers required for the September programme and the new bomber programme of M.A.P..

3. The figures representing what, has . been, achieved.-show as regards the

Forcos the actual intake (including volunteers) and as regards the munitions

industries the estimated net - increases as derived from the Ministry of Labour

quarterly and weekly surveys of employment. - The industr ial figures'"relate -to operatives only.

:4. Forces - Men. - - - . -.-."' .-. - - . - . .. ... ,.

( l ) Royal -Navy. . The actual intake.--exceeded estimated requirements by, over 13 ,000 , In the la t te r -par t of the. half-year new-vessels-became available at a fas ter rate than had been- expected and non-tradesmen were therefore . posted' up t o ' the limit of: the- numbers- available in the Allocation Registers. .

(^) Army (General Service). The actual intake exceeded estimated requirements by 4*9,000, During the half-year the Army "ceiling" was fixed and thereafter men were posted for General Service up to the limit of the numbers available so as to enable the "ceiling" to be reached as quickly as possible,

(3) Royal Air Force, Actual intake exceeded estimated requirements by8 , 5 0 0 .

5. Women1s Services. ( l ) ';!.R. N. S. The actual intake exceeded estimated requirements by

over 2 ,4oO. (2) A.T.S. and W.A. A.F. In both these Services the intake was below

estimated requirements. The intake into the W.A.A.F. was as great as the Force oould absorb for training. While the intake into the A.T. S. was not sufficient to meet requirements in the early months, i t was not greatly below what the Service could absorb in the la te r months, 6, Munitions Industries.

( l ) Numbers required. The Report of the Man-Power Committee gave the following figures as the estimated requirements for the munitions industries in the twelve months ending 30th June, 1942:-

Men 315,000 Women 460,000

Total . 775,000 These figures arc made up in the following way (N, S, (M. P. P. (41)41)).

^ Men Women - Total ^ Operatives 262,000 360,000 622,000 Administrative and c l e r i ca l workers 25,000 100,000 125,000

Other unskilled labour 2 8 , 0 0 0 ^ - 28,000^ TotaIs 315,000 460,000 775,000

I

For. the six months ended December,- 1941, the. requirements'were 130,000 men operatives and 180,000 women operatives. , '

(2) The Man-rPower Committee's Report showed that, in addition, 400,000 workers of- a l l classes wore stated to be required'to meet the demands of the Ministry of Aircraft Production for .what ;is known as the September programme and the new bonbor programme," The September programme was putinto effect, in the autumn of 1941 but i t was not unt i l '10th December ,that the decision was taken to proceed with the new bomber programme, Tt i s not possible to say how much of the- 400,000 ought to be added to the requirements up to the end of 1941 but an addition of 90,000 operatives and 10,000 c ler ica l and administrative workers is a generous estimate. I t has been assumed. that this additional 90,000 should have been women, making a t o t a l addition required of 130,000 men and 270,000 women. '' - *' --. ".'...

(3) Not increase. On the foregoing basis the net "increase in the number of male operatives as shown in Table 3 attached, "exceeds the. requirements u p " to December, 1941, by about 28,000. ' In the base of women operatives, there has been a net increase of 537^000 in the number employed on Govertija l^fb orders . as compared with an.estimated roquirbraent of 270,000, showing an:;.exces.s of '67,"OQ0.

7, Although, the net increase in the numbers of men-and women for/jarinitienS' -'-' was iti-excess .af the estimated i-oquirements, this.;does not moan that ' all ' demands, wore met, In particular, thoro were outstanding demands for./wc.rk of high , " ' rpr iori ty, o'.g, the Fil l ing'Factories, in certain areas where", the requirements can only be met- by the- transfer of mobile workers from other areas, . .' . - '

MOST SECRET.

Estimated man-power requirements for the Forces and for Munitions Industries (Survey of Man-Power (N.S.(M.P.P.) (41)41)) and actual intake.

TABLE A.

SERVICES - July - December, 1941,

Service.

Numbers required as shown by Man-Power Committee Report (N.S. (M.P.P.)(4l)4l).

Actual Intake Excess (4-) or

Deficit (-)

Royal Navy 55,000 6 8 , 2 0 0 * 13,200

Army (General Service) 125,000 174,000/ + 49,000

Men. Royal Air Force 159,000 1 6 7 , 5 0 0 * 8 , 5 0 0 Total 339,000 4 0 9 , 7 0 0 * 7 0 , 7 0 0

Civil Defence 37,000 16,410 (posted)

- 20,590

W.R.N.S. 5,500 7 ,926 * 2,426

A.T.S. 100.000 4 5 , 4 9 4 - 54,506

Women. W.A.A.F. 80,000 6 2 , 7 2 0 - 17,280

Total 185,500 1 1 6 , 1 4 0 - 69,360

Other Services

(N.A.A.F.I,, Land 53,000 Not available. Army, Nursing e t c )

K The figures of intake exclude transfers from Reserve,. These consist mainly of men recalled after having been temporarily released for industr ia l work, but during the period of six months in question the number recalled was almost exactly counterbalanced by the number of others released. The intake figures also take no account of inter-service t ransfers .

-/ This figure includes a l l men posted to the Arm;' for general service and a l l men who joined the Army as volunteers, including those who joined as tradesmen. The number in the l a t t e r i s not know&, but i t i s possibly of the order of 7,000.

INDUSTRY - July - December, 1941.

Net Increases - Government Orders.

J L Industry.

Numbers required as shown by Man-Power Committee Report (N.S. (M.P.P.) (41)41).

Actual Intake (or Increase) Achieved.

Excess (H-) or

Deficit (-)

Munitions Industries: '

Men. Operatives

Clerioal e tc . staff

130,000

13,000

158,000

Not available

4- 28,000

Unskilled labour (certain special c lasses) .

28,000 Not available

-

[/omen. Operatives 270,000 337,000 + 67,000

Clerical e tc . staff 50,000 Not available

liQ, 2 2 6 - 8 5 S.L

33 THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

SECRET. Copy No. 29

I

W . P . (42) 129 \ J (Also C.O.S (42) 178)

March 19, 1942

TO BE K E P T U N D E R LOCK A N D K E Y .

I t is requested tha t special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET .

WEEKLY RESUME (No. 133)

of the

NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION

from 0700 March 12th, to

0700 March 19th,

1942

[Circulated with the approval of the Chiefs of Staff.]

Cabinet War Room

NAYAL SITUATION.

General Review.

1. An I t a l i an U-boat has been sunk in the Medi te r ranean . H.M. Destroyer Vortigern has been sunk by E-boats. Shipping losses, pr incipal ly due to U-boat a t tacks in the Wes t At lan t ic , have

been heavy.

Northern Waters. 2. On the 12th the Russ ian Submarine 402 was damaged by depth charges

nor th of Murmansk. H.M. Trawler Stefa shot down a J u . 88 off the Murmansk coast on the 13th.

Home Waters. 3. A large enemy merchant ship, heavily escorted, passed down Channel

early on the morning of the 14th. A n a t tack by Dover coastal c raf t was beaten off. La te r five of our destroyers a t tacked wi th torpedoes, one of which probably h i t the merchant ship. Two E-boats were probably sunk and a destroyer h i t by gunfire. Three of our destroyers sustained superficial damage, but no casualties. Subsequently the enemy force was reported in Havre .

Dur ing the n igh t of the 14 th /15 th two convoys off the Eas t coast were unsuccessfully at tacked by E-boats, one of which was probably sunk and another damaged. H.M. Destroyer Vortigern, escorting one of the convoys, was sunk: three officers and seven ra t ings were rescued.

On the morning of the 15th three M.G.Bs. off I jmuiden a t tacked and sank an E-boat; ten prisoners were captured. La te r an engagement took place with four E-boats, one of which was seriously damaged. M.G.Bs. sustained abovewater damage and six casualties. Subsequently our a i rc raf t located the E-boats, se t t ing one on fire and damaging the remainder.

On the evening of the 14th an enemy aircraf t , which was a t t ack ing a convoy in the Bristol Channel, was shot down by the Polish Destroyer Kujawiak.

H.M. Destroyer Windsor was slightly damaged in collision off the Eas t coast on the 16th.

Some typical examples of the performance of H .M. ships are given in Append ix A.

Mediterranean. 4. On the 6th March H.M. Submarine P. 31 torpedoed and sank a 7,000-ton

south-bound merchant ship, escorted by two destroyers, off the Tunis ian coast. P. 31 sustained minor damage du r ing a counter-attack.

Dur ing the n igh t of the 14 th /15 th l ight naval forces, in co-operation with the R.A.F. , bombarded the por t and sh ipp ing in the harbour of Rhodes.

Dur ing the week 22,157 tons of French shipping east bound and 21.641 tons west bound have passed through the S t r a i t s of Gibra l t a r under escort.

t

South Atlantic. 5. On the 12th, 300 miles south of Cape Verde- I s lands , H.M.S. Pretoria

Castle (Armed Merchan t Cruiser) intercepted the Spanish s.s. Monte Gorbea (3,720 tons), which was taken into Ba thur s t for examinat ion. The' German Ambassador to the Argen t ine was t ak ing passage in the Monte Gorbea.

Anti-Submarine Operations. 6. H.M. Submarine P. 34 sank the I t a l i a n U-boat Admiral Millo (1,500

tons) 100 miles south-east of the S t ra i t s of Messina on the 16th. Some survivors were rescued. Surface craf t have a t tacked U-boats off the west coast of Ireland, to the west of Lisbon a n d off Vancouver I s land.

A n American a i rc raf t made a promis ing a t tack south-east of St. John's, Newfoundland. Three a t tacks by our a i r c ra f t were carr ied out in the North-Western Approaches, but, al though hi ts were claimed, in no instance was there evidence of destruction.

Enemy Intelligence. 7. The Ti?yitz has been located a t Trondheim.

On the 15th five destroyers were reported north bound off the Skaw.

U-Boats. ' 8. The main concentration has continued to be in the Western A t l an t i c and

Caribbean Sea. Others have been ope ra t ing in the Nor th-Western Approaches, off the east coast of Ice land (C) and off the Liber ian coast. Japanese.

9. The main fleet is presumed to be in home waters . Nearly all i ts cruisers and l ight craft have been detached to other areas. The Southern Fleet is now concentrated on nor thern Sumat ra , and there is a naval force which is consolidating the various bases established or taken over in the J a v a Sea area. The only un i t known to be opera t ing in the Ph i l i pp ine a rea is one flotilla of four destroyers. The operations in New Guinea are being carried out by the Fourth Fleet, whose s trength, w i th reinforcements from the main fleet, is estimated to be : four 8-inch cruisers, two 6-inch cruisers, two 5-5-inch cruisers, three seaplane carr iers , two a i rc ra f t carr iers , eight destroyers and nine submarines.

Protection of Seaborne Trade. 10. D u r i n g the week ending 18th March 887 ships, including 181 Allied

and 16 neutral , were convoyed. Six an t i -a i rc raf t ships, four ocean board ing vessels, 77 destroyers (including 16 American destroyers) and 102 sloops and corvettes were employed on escort duties. D u r i n g the month of Februa ry 3,848 ships were convoyed, of which eight were lost by enemy action. Since the beginning of the war 510 ships have been lost out of 107,453 ships which have been convoyed.

Impor t s into Grea t Br i t a in by ships in convoy dur ing the week ending March totalled 332,000 tons compared wi th 627,000 tons dur ing the previous

seven days and a n average of 616,000 tons for the pas t ten weeks. Of the week's imports, ,132,000 tons were oil of various grades.

Enemy Attack on Trade. 11. According to the informat ion a t present available 22 ships, including

11 tankers , have been at tacked by U-boats dur ing the week, 20 in the Wes t At lant ic and Wes t Indies , one off the Liber ian coast and one off M a d r a s ; of these 11 are known to have been sunk. Two ships were mined off Aberdeen and Aldeburgh respectively, and one snip was sunk, probably by a mine, off Capetown. One ship was bombed and sunk off the Por tuguese coast, and one Dutch ship is known to have been seized by the Japanese in Batavia .

British Minelaying. 12. D u r i n g the week mines have been la id by surface craft in the F a r o e s -

Iceland (C) area, in the E a s t coast Bar r i e r and off the Dutch and Belgian coasts. Minelaying by a i rc raf t has been carr ied out off the German Nor th Sea coast

and in the Medi te r ranean off Benghazi and Tr ipo l i (L).

Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping. 13. Minelaying by enemy a i rc ra f t took place on two nights of the week off

the Eas t Coast between Lowestoft and the Thames E s t u a r y and in the Bristol Channel. E-boats were opera t ing on one n igh t off the Norfolk coast.

Twelve magnet ic and three acoustic mines have been destroyed d u r i n g the week. The mine totals now are : 1,903 magnet ic , 1,246 acoustic and 1,116 contact.

Foreign Waters. 14. On two n ights of the week E-boats laid mines off Vale t ta (Malta) . A submerged mine was reported off Capetown on the 17th and a dangerous

area has been declared. A d r i f t ing mine has been reported off Sydney, New South Wales .

[23594] l s

Enemy Merchant Shipping, 15. Between the 10th and the 27th J a n u a r y the Russ ians claim to have sunk

four German merchant ships, totall ing 4,000 tons, and to have damaged eight others in Nor thern waters.

The I t a l i an s.s. Calitea (4,013 tons) has been sunk. The German s.s. Tacoma (8,268 tons), which has been interned at

Montevideo, has now been seized by the Government of Uruguay .

vlCiiy intelligence.

Madagascar. 16. The following ships were recently seen a t Diego Suarez by a i r recon

naissance : Three submarines (one in dry dock), sloop d'Iberville, the Armed Merchant Cruiser Bougainville, the naval tanker Elorn, one Greek and two I t a l i a n merchant ships. The s.s. Conde (7,202 tons) is reported to have left Dakar a t the end of February for Madagascar . The Armed Merchant Cruiser Quercyarr ived at Tamatave on the 12th February from Dakar . On the 12th March it was est imated tha t there were six or seven submarines a t Madagascar , bu t all of them were not based there.

Yichy Merchant Shipping. 17. I t has been announced t h a t the s.s. Ste. Marcelle (1,518 tons, ex Nor

wegian s.s. Vigor) was torpedoed in the Medi te r ranean on the 14th March, and tha t two of the crew are missing. This ship has been engaged in t r ad ing between Marseilles and Tunis , and is known to have carr ied I t a l i an lorries and provisions for troops in Libya.

M I L I T A R Y S I T U A T I O N .

Russo-German Campaign. (An outline m a p showing operat ions in Russ ia is included in th is Resume as

inset.)

Lake Ilmen-Lake Seliger Sector. 18. - I n the S ta raya Russa sector operat ions against the encircled portion

of the German 16th A r m y are re