c / q7 o - national association of letter carriersmseries.nalc.org/c16970.pdf · 2018-12-11 · c /...
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c / q7 oREGULAR ARBITRATION AWARD
In the Matter of the Arbitration GRIEVANT: Nancy Vaughan
between POSTOFFICE: Lewiston, Idaho
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE CASE NO: E90N-4E-D95015396NALC CASE NO: CF-94-16
and
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTERCARRIERS, AFL-CIO
BEFORE: Donald E . Olson, Jr.
APPEARANCES:
For the U.S. Postal Service: Mr. Mitchell J. Hicks , Senior Labor RelationsSpecialist
For the NALC : Mr. Paul L. Price, Regional Administrative AssistantPacific Northwest Region
Place of Hearing: Lewiston, Idaho
Dates of Hearing : October 3,19% and March 27, 1997
AWARD: The grievance is sustained . The Employer shall rescind the Noticeof Suspension issued to the Grievant on October 27, 1994, and purge copies ofsame from appropriate records, including the Grievant ' s personnel file. TheEmployer is directed to make the Grievant whole for any lost wages, plusinterest at the Federal Judgment Rate .
Date of Award : June 24, 1997
RECEIVEDJUN 2 6 199/
JIM WILLIAMS, NBANWOnd AnooWlon Letter carriers
Donald E. Olson, J ,Arbitrator
OPINION OF THE ARBITRATOR
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
This matter was conducted in accordance with Article 15 - GRIEVANCE -
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE of the parties collective bargaining agreement . A hearing
was held before the undersigned in Lewiston, Idaho on October 3, 1996 . The hearing
commenced at 9:00 a.m. and ended at 4:15 p .m. At the conclusion of the hearing day the
parties requested a continuance of the hearing. The second day of hearing reconvened on
March 27, 1997, commencing at 9 :00 a.m, and concluding at 2 :55 p.m. All witnesses
testified under oath as administered by the Arbitrator . Each party was given an
opportunity to examine, cross examine all witnesses, as well as present evidence in
support of their respective positions . Mr. Mitchell J . Hicks, Senior Labor Relations
Specialist, represented the United States Postal Service, hereinafter referred to as "the
Employer". Mr. Paul Price, Regional Administrative Assistant, Pacific Northwest Region,
represented the National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to
as "the Union", and Ms . Nancy M. Vaughan, hereinafter referred to as "the Grievant" .
The parties introduced twenty-one (21) Joint Exhibits, all of which were received . The
Union introduced eleven (11) exhibits, all of which were received and made a part
the record. The Employer objected to Union Exhibits 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 11 . The Arbitrator
noted the Employer's objections . The Employer introduced four (4) Exhibits, all of which
were received and made a part of the record . the Union objected to Employer Exhibit No .
4. The Arbitrator noted the Union's objection. The parties were unable to stipulate to the
issue(s) to be determined by the Arbitrator in this dispute . However, the parties agreed
the Arbitrator could frame the issue(s) to be determined . At the conclusion of the hearing
the parties requested an opportunity to file post-hearing briefs . The Arbitrator received
the Employer's brief on June 14, 1997, and the Union's brief on June 18, 1997, at which
time the hearing record was closed . The Arbitrator promised to render his Opinion and
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Award within thirty (30) calendar days after the record had been declared closed . This
Opinion and Award will serve as the final binding Opinion and Award of this Arbitrator,
regarding this matter .
ISSUE
The Arbitrator frames the issue(s) as follows:'Did the Employer have just cause pursuant to the terms of the NationalAgreement to issue a Notice of Suspension to the Grievant on October 27,1994? If not , what is an appropriate remedy?
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL AGREEMENT
ARTICLE 3MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
The Employer shall have the exclusive right , subject to the provisions of thisAgreement and consistent with applicable laws and regulations :
B . To hire , promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in positionswithin the Postal Service and to suspend , demote, discharge, or take otherdisciplinary action against such employees ;
C. To maintain the efficiency of the operations entrusted to it ;
ARTICLE 5PROHIBITION OF UNILATERAL ACTION
The Employer will not take any actions affecting wages, hours and other termsand conditions of employment as defined in Section 8(d) of the National LaborRelations Act which violate the terms of this Agreement or are otherwiseinconsistent with its obligations under law .
ARTICLE 13ASSIGNMENT OF ILL OR INJURED REGULAR
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WORKFORCE EMPLOYEES
Section 1 . Introduction
B . The U.S . Postal Service and the Union recognizing their responsibility to aidand assist deserving full-time regular or part -time flexible employees who throughillness or injury are unable to perform their regularly assigned duties, agree tothe following provisions and conditions for reassignment to temporary orpermanent light duty or other assignments . It will be the responsibility of eachinstallation head to implement the provisions of this Agreement within theinstallation , after local negotiations .
ARTICLE 15GRIEVANCE-ARBITRATON PROCEDURE
Section 2 . Grievance Procedure--Steps
Step 2 :
(d) At the meeting the Union representative shall make a full and detailed statementof facts relied upon, contractual provisions involved, and remedy sought . TheUnion representative may also furnish written statements from witnesses or otherindividuals. The Employer representative shall also make a full and detailedstatement of facts and contractual provisions relied upon . The parties'representatives shall cooperate fully in the effort to develop all necessary facts,including the exchange of copies of all relevant papers or documents in accordancewith Article 31 . . . .
(g) If the Union representative believes that the facts or contentions set forth in thedecision are incomplete or inaccurate , such representative should, within ten (10)days of receipt of the Step 2 decision , transmit to the Employer's representativea written statement setting forth corrections or additions deemed necessary by theUnion. Any such statement must be included in the file as part of the grievancerecord in the case . . . .
(h) The Union may appeal an adverse Step 2 decision to Step 3 . Any such appealmust be made within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the Employer's decisionunless the parties' representatives agree to extend the time for appeal . Any appealmust include copies of (1) the standard grievance form, (2) the Employer'swritten Step 2 decision, and, if filed, (3) the Union corrections and additions tothe Step 2 decision .
Step 3 :
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(b) The Grievant shall be represented at the Employer's Step 3 Level by a Union'sRegional representative , or designee. The Step 3 meeting of the parties'representatives to discuss the grievance shall be held within fifteen (15) daysafter it has been appealed to Step 3 . Each party's representative shall beresponsible for making certain that all relevant facts and contentions havebeen developed and considered . The Union representative shall haveauthority to settle or withdraw the grievance in whole or in part . The Employer'srepresentative likewise shall have authority to grant the grievance in whole orin part. In any case where the parties' representatives mutually conclude thatrelevant facts or contentions were not developed adequately in Step 2, theyshall have authority to return the grievance to the Step 2 level for fulldevelopment of all facts and further consideration at that level . . . .
(c) The employer's written Step 3 decision on the grievance shall be providedto the Union's Step 3 representative within fifteen (15) days after the partieshave met in Step 3 , unless the parties agree to extend the fifteen (15) dayperiod . Such decision shall state the reasons for the decision in detail andshall include a statement of any additional facts and contentions not previouslyset forth in the record of the grievance as appealed from Step 2 . . . .
Section 4. Arbitration
A. General Provisions
6. All decisions of the arbitrator will be final and binding . All decisions ofarbitrators shall be limited to the terms and provisions of this Agreement,and in no event may the terms and provisions of this Agreement by altered,amended, or modified by an arbitrator . . . .
ARTICLE 16DISCIPLINE PROCEDURE
In the administration of this Article, a basic principle shall be that discipline shouldbe corrective in nature, rather than punitive. No employee may be disciplined ordischarged except for just cause such as, but not limited to, insubordination,pilferage, intoxication (drugs or alcohol), incompetence, failure to perform work asrequested, violation of the terms of this Agreement, or failure to observe safetyrules and regulations . Any such discipline or discharge shall be subject to thegrievance-arbitration procedure provided for in this Agreement, which couldresult in reinstatement and restitution, including back pay .
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ARTICLE 19HANDBOOKS AND MANUALS
Those parts of all handbooks , manuals and published regulations of the PostalService, that directly relate to wages, hours or working conditions, as they applyto employees covered by this Agreement, shall contain nothing that conflicts withthis Agreement, and shall be continued in effect except that the Employer shallhave the right to make changes that are not inconsistent with this Agreement andthat are fair, reasonable, and equitable . This includes, but is not limited to, thePostal Service Manual and the F-21 . Timekeeper's Instructions .
BACKGROUND
The Grievant is employed as a Letter Carrier at the Lewiston, Idaho Post Office . She
has been employed at that facility since October 10, 1987 . On August 17, 1994 while in
Spokane, Washington with a friend, she experience car trouble . They were unable to
start the car. The Grievant was scheduled to report to work on August 17, 1994. The
Grievant called the Employer between 2:00 a .m. and 2 :30 a.m. to notify them of the
problem with the car . Upon the Grievant' s return to work the next day, management
asked her to provide evidence that the car had been worked on. The Grievant indicated
that she had no documentation to provide , since her friend fixed the car . On October 27,
1994, the Grievant received Notice of Suspension of 14 Days or Less from the Employer,
which entailed a suspension of five (5) working days, beginning on November 7th at
0600 hours. The Grievant was instructed to return to work on November 14, 1994, at
0600 hours . There were two reasons given by the Employer for issuing the October 27,
1994 Notice of Suspension to the Grievant , She was charged with an Absence Without
Official Leave (AWOL) for the absence from work on August 17, 1994 . In addition, the
Employer claimed in the second charge that she had excessive unscheduled absences for
an extended period time . Prior to this notice being issued to the Grievant , the Employer
had issued the Grievant a Letter ofWarning for Irregular Attendance on December 30,
1993, as well as issuing the Grievant a two (2 ) Calendar Day Suspension for Irregular
Attendance on February 17, 1994 . A timely grievance was filed . A Step One meeting was
held and the Employer denied the grievance on November 3, 1994 . The Union appealed
the grievance to Step 2 on November 11, 1994 . The Employer denied the grievance on
November 15, 1994, however did not furnish a written decision to the Union . The Union
did not file a written statement of corrections or additions to the Employer's oral decision
denying the grievance . On November 25, 1994 , the Union appealed the grievance to Step
3 . The Employer rendered a written decision to the Step 3 appeal on March 27, 1995 .
Once again, the Employer denied the grievance. The Union appealed the matter to
arbitration on April 1st . Arbitrator Walter Lawrence held a hearing on this matter on June
13, 1995. He decided to remand the grievance back to Step 3 of the grievance procedure
in order for the parties to fully develop and further address the issues in dispute .
The parties advocates agreed with Arbitrator Lawrence's decision . At the arbitration
hearing the Union raised the issue that the Employer may have violated the Family
Medical Leave ACT (FMLA) . Pursuant to the arbitrator 's ruling the parties met on
August 22, 1995 at Step 3 . After the meeting had concluded , the Employer issued its
Step 3 decision on September 8, 1995 . The Employer denied the grievance. Once again,
the Union appealed the grievance to arbitration on September 19, 1995 alleging the
Employer violated Articles 16 and 19 of the National Agreement , as well as the Family
Medical Leave Act .
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
POSITION OF THE EMPLOYER
First, the Employer maintains it did not violate the National Agreement when it issued
a seven day suspension to the Grievant on October 27, 1994 . In support of that
contention, the Employer asserts the Grievant has been disciplined numerous times for
attendance problems . Moreover, the Employer contends it issued progressive discipline to
the Grievant in an effort to correct her behavior dealing with absenteeism , prior to issuing
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the suspension on October 27, 1994 . Furthermore, the Employer claims it acted properly,
applied applicable law and regulation , prior to issuing the suspension to the Grievant .
In addition, the Employer claims the Union has attempted to raise new arguments dealing
with a violation of the Grievant's rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, as well as
the Darrell Brown Memo, by asserting these arguments for the first time at the arbitration
hearing . As such, the Employer avows that raising these new arguments at the arbitration
hearing is violative of the terms set forth in Article 15, and should not be allowed or
considered by the Arbitrator. Additionally, the Employer avers if the Arbitrator allows the
Union's argument dealing with the FMLA to be considered, the Grievant never gave
notice of her illness in "sufficient detail" as to make it evident that the requested leave was
FMLA protected . Also, the Employer argues that the Grievant's medical condition did
not meet the definition of "chronic serious health condition" as defined under the FMLA .
Contrary to the Union's position, the Employer contends that supervision conducted a
stand-up with employees to inform them of their rights under FMLA, and that FMLA
postings were posted on appropriate bulletin boards for employees to observe . In
summary, the Employer asserts it has shown that the Grievant acted as charged, and
requests that the grievance be denied .
POSITION OF THE UNION
The Union claims the Employer did not have just cause to issue the Grievant seven (7)
calendar day suspension on October 27, 1994 . Moreover, the Union argues the Employer
violated Articles 3, 5, and 19 of the National Agreement, when it issued the suspension to
the Grievant, and violated the Family Medical Leave Act, as well as the Darrell Brown
Memo. Additionally, the Union contends the Grievant was treated in a disparate manner
by the Employer. Specifically, the Union asserts there were other employees who used
more sick leave in a less amount of time then the Grievant, however none of these
employees were disciplined . Furthermore, the Union avows the Grievant's due process
rights were violated, by the Employer's improper investigation of the facts surrounding the
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Grievant's absences from work . Also, the Union avers the Grievant was subjected to
double jeopardy, in that she received an "official discussion" about the AWOL charge,
which resolved the matter , but the same issue was again raised in the Notice of
Suspension . Again, the Union claims the discipline received by the Grievant on October
27, 1994, was not meted out by the Employer in a timely manner. Further, the Union
argues the Employer failed to demonstrate the Grievant was AWOL as charged in the
Notice of Suspension. Last, the Union maintains the Employer in this case failed to follow
its own rules and regulations regarding leave provisions, such as ELM 515 and 513 . As
such, the Grievant may not be disciplined . In summary, the Union requests the Notice of
Suspension be rescinded, the Grievant be made whole and the Grievant be treated properly
as a limited duty employee and afforded a position she can accomplish within her medical
restrictions .
DISCUSSION
This Arbitrator has carefully reviewed the record, pertinent testimony, post-hearing
briefs, and cited arbitration cases .
Initially, this Arbitrator concludes the Union's claim that the Employer violated the
Darrell Brown Memo has no validity or merit in this case . Indeed, the moving papers of
this case have no mention of a Darrell Brown Memo alleged violation . The Union may
have raised a Darrell Brown Memo violation at the original arbitration hearing on June 13,
1994 before Arbitrator Lawrence, however, the moving papers do not indicate that there
was any discussion of that contention after the case had been remanded back to Step 3 .
Moreover, there is no mention of a Darrell Brown Memo violation in the Union's Request
For Arbitration on September 19, 1995 . Therefore, this Arbitrator concludes this
argument was not properly raised in accordance with the provisions set forth in Article 15,
and as such will be given no consideration in deciding this case. However, the
Employer's contention that the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was not raised in the
processing of this grievance, lacks merit . The parties including Arbitrator Lawrence
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entered into an agreement on or about June 13, 1995, which states in pertinent part the
following : The undersigned mutually agree that the above -referenced grievance will
be remanded to Step 3 of the grievance procedure in ORDER TO FULLY
DEVELOP AND FURTHER ADDRESS THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE It is further
agreed that this grievance , if not resolved , will he relitigated . . . . (Emphasis supplied) .
The evidence indicates the Union on June 13, 1995 had raised at least the FMLA
argument in support of their position, and that Arbitrator Lawrence remanded the case
back to Step 3 to give them an opportunity to fully develop their respective contentions,
and address the issues in dispute. Indeed, that is exactly what the parties did, On August
22, 1995 the Union's National Business Agent, Jim Williams, met with the Employer's
representative, Porter L . Kimmel. Without doubt, the Union in this meeting once again
raised the FMLA argument in support of their position . In fact, the Employer's Step 3
decision rendered on September 8, 1995 clearly supports the Union contention that FMLA
was raised . In that decision, Porter L . Kimmel states in pertinent part : . . . It is the
position of management that any alleged violation of the A is not arbitrabl
Further, even if it were ruled arbitrable. the union has failed to demonstrate
sufficient number of the dates of unscheduled absences should be excused under
FMLA. Grievance denied . (Emphasis supplied) . Furthermore, the Union's Request For
Arbitration dated September 19, 1995 expressly stated that the contractual violations it
relied upon were Article 16, 19 and the Family Medical Leave Act . As a matter of fact,
National Arbitrator Mittenthal, in Case No . N8- W-0406, on pages 9-10 while addressing
the validity of a new contention being raised by the Postal Service at the arbitration
hearing, stated : . . . . The difficulty here is the lateness of this argument Article XV
describes in great detail what is expected~ f the parties in the grievance procedure
The Postal Service's Step 2 decision must make a "full statement" of its
understanding of . . .the contractual provisions involved It Step 3 decision must
include "a statement of any additional . . .contentions not previously set forth "
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Its reliance on this contract provision did not surface until the arbitration hearing
itself Under s . h circumstances. it would b inappropriate to consider this belated
Article X111 claim. (Emphasis supplied). This Arbitrator supports Arbitrator Mittenthal's
reasoning. In this case, for whatever reason the Employer failed to render a Step 2
written decision, which is explicitly required in processing a grievance under the terms of
Article 15 . However, it is quite clear as stated above, the Union properly raised the issue
of a possible violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, and the parties had an
opportunity to discuss same at their Step 3 meeting on August 22, 1995 . The Employer
merely took the position that the FMLA was not arbitrable . Certainly, in the opinion of
this Arbitrator, the Employer's claim that the Union's contentions raised at Step 3
pertaining to a FMLA violation amount to "an ambush at arbitration" cannot be
countenanced. By all means, in the opinion of this Arbitrator, not only can both parties to
this Agreement utilize the grievance-arbitration procedure for alleged violations of its
express provisions, but the Union can also avail itself of the grievance-arbitration
procedure for alleged violations of applicable law . (See Article 3 and 5 of the National
Agreement) . However, with all of this said, this Arbitrator does not believe the FMLA
has to be considered in order to adjudicate this matter, albeit the FMLA is arbitrable .
In essence, this Arbitrator must determine if the Employer had just cause to suspend
the Grievant by letter dated October 27, 1994 . In the opinion of this Arbitrator, the term
"just cause" clearly implies some investigation, fact-finding and weighing of the
circumstances, prior to taking disciplinary action against employees . Due process
mandates that an Employer is obligated to investigate all of the circumstances, before
reaching any decision to discipline employees, and to give an employee a fair opportunity
to explain his or her side of the case .(Emphasis supplied)
Generally, as in this case, this Arbitrator must determine if the Grievant absenteeism
was excessive . In determining if the Employer acted reasonably in disciplining the
Grievant, this Arbitrator has given consideration to the length of, and time during which
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the Grievant had an alleged poor attendance record , the reasons for the absences, if any,
the nature of her job, the attendance records of other employees , and whether the
Employer had a clear policy relating to absenteeism , which was known to all employees
and which was applied fairly and consistently . Moreover, was the Grievant warned that
disciplinary action could result if her attendance record failed to improve .
By the same token, as the Employer so correctly argues, if it is to survive as a
business, it needs employees who will be regular in attendance and who will work, and
stay at work, when they are supposed to . Clearly, that is not an unreasonable expectation
in the opinion of this Arbitrator .
However, in this case the Employer did not treat the Grievant fairly . First, the
Employer charged the Grievant with being AWOL on August 17, 1994 . The record is
clear the Grievant called supervision in the early hours of August 17, 1994 from Spokane,
Washington to report car trouble . Shortly after her return to work she was asked by
management to provide copies of repair bills. The Grievant explained her friend repaired
her car, so she had no repair bills to provide . To this Arbitrator that appears to be a
reasonable explanation for not having repair bills . Both Branch President Chris Fey and
the Grievant indicated the Grievant received an official discussion from Mr. Akers
regarding this matter, and the parties left Mr . Akers office with the understanding the issue
was resolved. This Arbitrator finds that testimony to be plausible . If Mr. Akers really had
decided shortly after August 17, 1994, that the Grievant absence was in fact an AWOL
situation, he certainly had reason to issue another Notice of Suspension to the Grievant,
for Irregular Attendance . Prior to August 17, 1994, the Grievant was absent on March
30, 1994, May 12, 1994, May 13, 1994, June 22, 1994 and four (4) days in June 1994 .
Nonetheless, the Employer for whatever reason waited until October 27, 1994 before
issuing its Notice of Suspension to the Grievant. This Arbitrator is convinced that the
Employer did indeed know why the Grievant was absent from work . For example, the
record indicates in late February 1994 the Grievant was offered and she accepted a limited
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duty job offer, which was later rescinded by the Employer in April 1994 . However, even
prior to that event taking place, the Employer was put on notice that the Grievant had
suffered two ankle injuries while employed carrying mail. Without doubt, Article 10,
Section 5 .1) pertaining to sick leave and usage of same, states : For periods of absence of
three (3) days or less , a supervisor may accept an employee's certification as reason
for an absence.. This Arbitrator must assume the Employer requested certification from
the Grievant for the absences between July 23 and July 28, 1994, since she received
payment for those absences . These actions by the Employer, clearly indicate to this
Arbitrator that the Employer was aware of the Grievant's serious medical condition, and
the her work limitations . Equally important, this Arbitrator notes the Employer's own
reference material dealing with the FMLA, charges supervisors with the responsibility for
designating whether or not an absence is FMLA qualified and to give notice of the
designation to employees, if such employees have a serious health condition, such as the
Grievant had. There is no doubt in the opinion of this Arbitrator that management knew
of the Grievant's serious health condition, however, blatantly disregarded their
responsibility to notify the Grievant of her FMLA rights for qualified FMLA absences .
Additionally, there was no evidence in the record that the Employer after being made
aware of the Grievant's medical condition, required her to provide current certification
from a health care provider that the FMLA definition of a serious health condition was
met . These requirements are mandated by the Employer's own regulations. However, in
the instant case, the Employer did not comply with its own regulations dealing with this
issue .
In the same vein, this Arbitrator is of the opinion the Employer failed to properly
investigate this matter prior to issuing the October 27, 1994 Notice of Suspension to the
Grievant. Moreover, there was no investigative interview held with the Grievant prior to
meting out the suspension . Frankly, this Arbitrator was somewhat taken back by the
testimony of Postmaster Baldus, who testified under oath that he had no idea of why the
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Grievant was absent from work . Taken at face value, this admission makes the
Employer's case untenable . Article 16, Section 8 of National Agreement states : In no
case may a supervisor i ose suspension or discharge upon an employee unless the
proposed disc lid nary action by the supervisor hag first been reviewed and
concurred in by the installation hand or designee. (Emphasis supplied). Obviously, if
the Postmaster the individual charged with reviewing suspensions of his employees, had
no idea why the Grievant was absent, this Arbitrator concludes he did not properly review
the case prior to issuing the suspension .
In particular, this Arbitrator is of the opinion that Charge No . 1 given by the Employer
as a reason for the Grievant's suspension is clearly stale . As a rule, it is an essential aspect
of industrial due process that discipline be administered promptly after the commission of
the offense which prompted the discipline . Moreover, as in this case, such a delay in the
imposition of discipline clearly leads an employee into a false sense of security that his
conduct is acceptable to an employer . Further, this Arbitrator was struck by the fact that
albeit the Grievant was being charged with AWOL for August 17th absence, not one of the
Form 3971's introduced at the hearing stated such a fact . Clearly, this is contrary to the
Employer's own rules and regulations dealing with Form 3971s .
In review, this Arbitrator notes the Grievant was also treated in a disparate manner in
her use of sick leave versus co-workers. During the period in dispute, the Grievant used a
total of 88 hours of sick leave . On the other hand, some employees used more sick leave
than the Grievant, however, the record indicates they received no discipline . For example,
the record shows that Carrier Wiggens utilized 480 hours of sick leave in just a few
months, while Carrier Fraker used 320 hours of sick leave and Carrier Olney used 160
hours of sick leave . The general rule is that disparate treatment such as unequal treatment
for similar conduct will not be tolerated by arbitrators . This Arbitrator without
reservation supports that rule .
Thus, based upon the record and for the reasons stated above , this Arbitrator
concludes the Employer did not have just cause pursuant to the terms of the National
Agreement to issue a Notice of Suspension to the Grievant on October 27, 1997 .
AWARD
The grievance is sustained . The Employer shall rescind the Notice of Suspension
issued to the Grievant on October 27, 1994, and purge copies of same from appropriate
records, including the Grievant' s personnel file . The Employer is directed to make the
Grievant whole for any lost wages, plus interest at the Federal Judgment Rate .
Dated this 24th day of June, 1997Tacoma, WA