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Page 1: (c) crown copyright Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/43/25 …filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-65-43-wm-44-109... · Mr. D.-M FOOT. M.P., , ParliamentarSir ORMy E SARGENT

(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/43/25 Image Reference:0001

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'8 GOVERNMENT"

Printed for the War Cabinet. A ugust 1944.

SECRET. Copy No.

W.M. (44) 109th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 109 ( 4 4 ) .

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room,S. W. 1, on Monday, 21st August, 1944, at 5- 30 p.m.

Present: The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., ( The Right Hon^ ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Minister of Labour and National Affairs. Service.

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The following were also present: The Right Hon. LORD CRANBORNE, The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK,

Secretary of State for Dominion Lord Privy Seal. Affairs.

The Right Hon. L . S. AMERY, M.P., The Right Hon. A . V. ALEXANDER, Secretary of State for India and M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty. Secretary of State for Burma.

The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SIN-M.P., Secretary of State for War. CLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State

for Air. The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS,

K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Minister of War Transport (Item 5). Production.

The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P., The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, Minister of State (Items 5-6). M.P., Minister of Information. Mr. WILLIAM MABANE, M.P., Parlia-The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, mentary Secretary, Ministry of Food Paymaster-General. (Item 5).

Mr. D.-M. FOOT, M.P., Parliamentary Sir ORME SARGENT, Deputy Under-Secretary, Ministry of Economic Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs. Warfare (Item 5). Vice-Admiral Sir E . NEVILLE SYFRET, Sir ALEXANDER MAXWELL, Permanent Vice-Chief of Naval Staff (ItemsUnder-Secretary of State, Home 1-5).

Office (Items 4-7). Lieutenant-General A. E. NYE, Vice-Air Marshal Sir DOUGLAS C. S. EVILL, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (Items (Items 1-5). 1-5). Secretariat:

General Sir HASTINGS L . ISMAY. Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE. Mr. W . S. MURRIE. Mr. L . F. BURGIS.

[ 2 8 1 2 4 ] B

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Minute No.1

2

3

45

6

7

WAR CABINET 109 (44)

CONTENTS.

Subject. Naval, Military and Air Operations....

Air Operations: Home Theatre. Flying BomBs. South of France.

Naval Operations: Home Theatre. Mediterranean.

Military Operations: N.W. France. South of France. I taly. Russia.

Air Raids Attacks by Flying Bombs.

Poland .... .... The Polish Underground Army.

"Overlord" Security Blockade

Relief for Occupied Europe. Relief .... ....

Finance of Supplies to I taly.

Liberation of Paris Ringing of Church Bells.

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Naval, Military and Air Operations. (Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 106th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

. Air Operations. Home Theatre.

Flying-Bombs.

South of France.

Naval Operations. Home Theatre.

Mediterranean.

Military Operations. N.W. France.

South of France.

Italy.

Russia.

1. The Vice-Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week. *

Bomber Command had flown 4,960 sorties and dropped 15,900 tons of bombs. 4,400 tons had been dropped on targets in Germany and 11,500 on Occupied Territory, including airfields, U-boat pens, shipping targets, " Crossbow " targets and operations in support of the battle.

United States heavy bombers had flown 4,000 sorties and dropped 8,400 tons of bombs, 4,900 of which had been on targets in Germany.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 24,000 sorties, practically all of which had been in close relation to the battle and in exploitation of the enemy's withdrawal. This force claimed to have destroyed 264 tanks, 3,800 motor transport vehicles, 132 loco­motives and 900 railway trucks. Many others had been damaged. These claims had not so far been checked.

The enemy had lost 235 aircraft (including 76 on the ground). Allied losses amounted to 193 fighters and 82 bombers.

647 flying bombs had been launched, of which 464 had been destroyed.

In connection with the operations in the South of France, 3,400 sorties had been flown in addition to airborne operations. 5,800 tons of bombs had been dropped on airfields and enemy communi cations.

During the previous week confirmed shipping losses due to enemy action amounted to 3,000 tons. Confirmed shipping losses for August amounted to 28,900 tons.

Eight U-boats had been sunk and one probably sunk during August.

Enemy shipping had been intercepted in the Bay of Biscay and a number of ships sunk and driven ashore. In the assault areas there had been attacks by human torpedoes, 9 of which had been destroyed by our aircraft.

Cruisers and gunboats had bombarded targets in connection with the landing operations in the South of France. A number of enemy corvettes, E-boats and M.T.Bs. had been sunk.

In North-West France the advance of United States Forces had met with little opposition and their chief problem had been maintenance. They had now established a bridgehead across the Seine between Mantes and Vernon and were moving north towards Elbeuf. British and Canadian Forces had now joined with American Forces in the Argentan area and had closed the enemy's escape route to the west. Perhaps 12 German divisions, including 4 Panzer, were trapped in this pocket, from which they were still trying to escape.

Between the Loire and the Seine the enemy might have 36 divisions, 5 of which had not been in the main battle. In the Pas de Calais area and in the Low Countries there were 7 divisions, on the Atlantic Coast 1 only, in the Marseilles area 7 and 2 in Savoy. If we were able to prevent the enemy from crossing the Seine, except perhaps in small numbers, his main field Army would have ceased to exist, and we could claim complete victory.

Our forces were now reported to have reached Rians on the River Durance, and there had been an unconfirmed report that they had reached Aix. Opposition had been light and 12,000 prisoners had been taken. It was probable that the enemy would stand and fight in Toulon and Marseilles. In the Rhone Valley and to the north of it the Maquis was adding to the enemy's difficulties.

On the Italian Front there was little to report, but slight progress had been made on the extreme right of our line.

In the Northern Sector the Russians had crossed the border between Lake Peipus and Lake Pskof. Further south they had advanced towards Riga on a wide front to a depth of about 20 miles. German attacks in the neighbourhood of Kovno had been held. North-east of Warsaw the Russians had lost a little ground, out to the south they had extended their bridgehead across the Vistula and claimed to have annihilated three German divisions.

[28124] B 2

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Air Raids. Attacks by Flying-Bombs. (Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 99th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

Poland. (Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 108th Conclusions.)

The Polish Underground Army. (Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 106th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

The Germans had reported Russian attacks on the Lower Dniester but these had not received confirmation from the Russians.

The "War Cabinet— Took note of these statements.

2. The Deputy Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that casualties in the past week had been relatively light. The total casualties since the beginning of the attacks were :—'

Killed 5,465 Seriously injured 15,832 Slightly injured 20,813 Unclassified 21

Total 42,131 During the week 36,094 houses had been damaged and 62,561

had received first-aid repairs. Since the beginning of the attacks 1,027,269 houses had been damaged and 952,495 had received first-aid repairs.

The War Cabinet -Took note of this statement.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the latest developments in the Polish situation. Very severe fighting was taking place in Warsaw, and he proposed to circulate to the War Cabinet certain reports which we had received. Difficulties had arisen with the Soviet Government over the proposal that United States airmen should land on Russian aerodromes after dropping supplies on Warsaw, and the Poles were aware of this. They had again seen him to-day and had represented the urgent need for supplies. Arrangements had, in fact, been made for a small number of planes to drop supplies nightly for the present. This would be an encouragement to the Poles. He suggested that he, the Secretary of State for Air and the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff should meet the Poles on Tuesday, the 22nd August, and discuss whether anything further could be done in this connection. He remained uneasy about the political repercussions of the difficulties that had arisen over Russian assistance.

" (1) The War Cabinet-Took note of the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and approved the suggestion at " X . "

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to the Polish request that their Underground Army should be recognised officially as a fighting force. When this matter was previously discussed it had been felt that, for such a declaration to be of value, the Russians must be associated with it. Their support had not, however, been forthcoming. He was now advised that without using the phrase " belligerent status " His Majesty's Government, on the basis that it was they who had been supplying the Poles, could make a statement which would give some cover to the Underground Movement. He suggested that the draft of any such statement, with which he would be quite ready to ask the United States to associate themselves, should be agreed with the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air. It would not, in any event, go beyond what we had said in respect of the Maquis. Nor would it be anti-Russian in character.

The point was made in discussion that a statement at this point might well give rise to misunderstanding or criticism of the Russian attitude in the United States, while, unless it was framed in terms stronger than could probably be contemplated, it might be of little value to the Poles.

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" Overlord " Security. (Previous Eeference: W.M. (44) 104th Conclusions, Minute 10.)

Blockade. Belief for Occupied Europe. (Previous Eeference: W.M.(44)43rd Conclusions, Minute 6.)

After further discussion, the Secretary of State for ForeignAffairs suggested that the draft statement, when prepared, should be brought before the War Cabinet.

(2) The War Cabinet -Approved the action proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

4. The Deputy Prime Minister said that, in accordance with the decision of the War Cabinet at their meeting on the 9th August, Sir Findlater Stewart had taken up with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, the question of the removal of the visitors' ban and that S.H.A.E.F. had now agreed to the removal of the ban from the 25th August, on the understanding that no public announcement on the subject was made before that date.

The Secretary of State for War said that the War Office could make the necessary arrangements to remove the ban from the 25th August. No announcement need be made until the morning of the 25th.

The Minister of Aircraft Production recalled that at their meeting on the 9th August the War Cabinet had agreed that the proposal to remove the special restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland should be reconsidered in two to three weeks' time. These restrictions imposed great inconvenience on the transaction of business by the Ministry of Aircraft Production and he hoped that they could be removed.

It was explained that the intention was that the question of the removal of the restrictions should be brought before the War Cabinet for consideration early in the following week.

The War Cabinet­(1) Agreed that the visitors' ban should be removed from the

25th August, on the understanding that no public announcement on the subject was made before that date.

(2) Took note that the question of the removal of the special restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland would be brought before them early in the following week, and agreed that, in the meantime, all practicable steps should be taken to exempt Government Departments from the restrictions.

5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 446) on the subject of relief supplies for occupied Europe.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reminded the War Cabinet that they had several times considered proposals that relief supplies should be allowed to pass through the blockade and that up to the present time no concession had been.made beyond the relief shipments to Greece which had been authorised in February 1942.

There had been constant pressure both in this country and, to a greater extent, from the United States for some further concession and, although it had been hoped that the United States Government would be content with a proposal, which had been discussed during the recent visit of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare to Washington, that relief from within the blockade area should be permitted to go to certain internment camps selected by the International Red Cross, Mr. Hull had now intimated that, largely for political reasons, the United States Government felt bound to press for the setting up in London of an Anglo-American Committee to examine the possibility of providing limited amounts of foodstuffs for distribution to children and nursing and expectant mothers. It would be recalled that on the 30th June the Belgian, Netherlands and Norwegian Ambassadors had proposed a scheme

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Relief.Finance ofSupplies toItaly.

involving about 20,000 tons of foodstuffs a month and some 60,000 tons of shipping.

Experience snowed that at least four months were required for examination, agreement by the enemy and planning before any action could be taken, and, in view particularly of the present military situation, which might result in nothing having to be done, it seemed expedient to agree to the proposal made by the United States Government. If the proposals were agreed to, the first step would be to set up an Anglo-American Committee in London to draw up a scheme for submission to the British and United States Governments.

The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Economic Warfare,said that, although on merits the Minister of Economic Warfare was opposed to the proposal, he agreed that in present circumstances it would be expedient to meet the views of the United States Government. The proposed Anglo-American Committee would have to examine not only the question of finding the necessary supplies and shipping, but also the arrangements for dealing with what experience in Greece had shown to be the difficult problem of ensuring effective control. If the Committee was set up, the Minister of Economic Warfare attached great importance to its being empowered to consider not only relief in kind but also monetary relief. At present the War Refugee Board were paying hard currency to persons in enemy and occupied territories without any consultation with the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and it was desirable that the machinery of the Committee should be used to ensure that the giving of relief in monetary form was properly controlled. In suggesting this extension of the Committee's functions we should, of course, have to make it clear that our object was not to widen the scope of monetary relief but to secure a greater degree of co-ordination.

The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Food, pointed out that the amount of foodstuffs of the kinds contemplated which would be available during 1944 was already insufficient to meet the needs of civilian consumers in this country, of the Armed Forces and of the liberated areas during the military period. Unless, therefore, the United States Government were willing to cut consumption by their own civilians or Armed Forces, it was difficult to see where the necessary supplies could be found.

The Minister of War Transport said that, since it was proposed to carry the supplies in neutral vessels, no question of Allied shipping arose. So far as Swedish vessels were concerned, it was extremely doubtful whether the German Government would allow neutral shipping to leave the Baltic.

The War Cabinet—* (1) Agreed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

should return a favourable reply to Mr. Hull's letter and should agree to the setting up of an Anglo-American Committee in London to draw up a scheme of relief for submission to His Majesty's Government and to the United States Government.

(2) Agreed that it should be suggested to the United States Government that the Committee should consider also the question of controlling the grant of monetary relief to persons in enemy and enemy-occupied territory.

6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of State (W.P. (44) 455) on the finance of supplies to Italy. The relief supplies sent to Italy by His Majesty's Government and

the United States to prevent disease and unrest had been financed on our side by a Vote of Credit, and on the American side by a War Department Appropriation. An undertaking given to Congress made it impossible for the War Department any longer to accept financial responsibility for supplies to Italy. The Americans had

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proposed accordingly to make available to the Italian Government the dollar equivalent of the United States troops' pay in Italy, thus putting the Italians in a position to pay for supplies from the United States. This procedure was objectionable—

(i) as possibly implying a breach of the Armistice terms; (ii) since it would be impossible for us to follow the American

example and make the sterling equivalent of British troops' pay available to the Italian Government.

In addition, the American Government, in order to attract the Italian votes in the forthcoming Presidential election, had expressed a wish to extend the field of supplies to Italy to cover general economic rehabilitation. This would result in treating Italy better than the smaller Allies.

The matter had been discussed by the Minister of State in Washington, after the Americans had agreed not to announce their proposed policy until the War Cabinet could be consulted. The period assigned for such consultation having expired, a telegram had now been despatched, after consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for War, which made it clear that—

(a) in no circumstances could we agree at the present time to any programme of rehabilitation for Itedy;

(b) we would agree to the Americans making United States' troops' pay available to the Italian Government, pro­vided that if any further statement had to be made it would contain no reference to rehabilitation, and would make it clear that such payment was by way of advance, was without prejudice to the final settlement with Italy, and represented a difference not of policy but of financial procedure.

The Minister of State said that he had little to add to the Memorandum he had circulated on this subject. The arguments against the course advocated by the Americans in respect of troops' pay were very strong, but he thought that the arrangements which had now been made sufficiently safeguarded our position. Equally, there were decisive arguments against any proposal to agree to a programme of rehabilitation for Italy. The telegram that had been sent made that clear, and brought out also that, if American Press comment came out too strongly in favour of rehabilitation, we must hold ourselves free to make our own position clear.

The War Cabinet— -Took note of the position, and approved the action which had been taken by the Minister of State.

Liberation of 7. The Deputy Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet Paris, that the Lord Mayor of London had asked whether authority might Ringing of be given for ringing the bells of St. Paul's and the City Churches on Church Bells. the liberation of Paris.

It was explained that there was no objection to the ringing of bells from the point of view of the Ministry of Home Security.

The War Cabine t -Agreed that, although it would be inexpedient at the present time to take any action which could be regarded as a general celebration of victory, there was no objection to the limited proposal to ring the bells of St. Paul's and the City Churches on the occasion of the liberation of Paris as a compliment by one great capital to another.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, list August, 1944.

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