May 2008 n ARMY 47

By Stanley T. Grip Jr.

n December 1961, officials

of the Kennedy ad-

ministration

viewed security

developments in Southeast

Asia with increasing con-

cern. In particular, they saw

the communist-led insurgen-

cy in South Vietnam as an in-

creasingly dangerous threat to the

stability of that country’s pro-Western

government. The President shared

his advisers’ concern but

was reluctant to consent

to any large-scale Ameri-

can military response. As

an alternative, he approved

small-scale U.S. military ad-

visory assistance to the South

Vietnamese army.

Soldiers of the National Guard’s 19th Special ForcesGroup, Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 944, fre-quently shop at the markets in downtown Avghani.

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President Kennedy was particularly enthusiastic in hissupport of the Army Special Forces (SF) teams who pre-dominantly served in this advisory capacity. Coincident tovisiting their Fort Bragg, N.C., headquarters earlier thatyear, he personally authorized the distinctive green beretthat is still worn by Special Forces soldiers today.

Throughout the subsequent Vietnam War years, theGreen Berets did significant service. Their actions in Viet-nam (and in numerous deployments since the end of theVietnam War) have made Special Forces the stuff of Ameri-can legend. Today, the men who wear the green beret areonce again essential players in a counterinsurgency crisis.Though their deployment location is different, contempo-rary SF soldiers are serving in roles that their 1961 counter-parts might find remarkably familiar.

In modern SF parlance, that role is known as foreign in-ternal defense (FID). This combat advisory function is one ofthe five core missions of Special Forces. Units tasked withthe FID role are responsible for organizing, training and as-sisting the defense forces of foreign nations. Foreign internaldefense is essentially a long-term mission and is better un-derstood in contrast to one of SF’s other core missions: di-rect action.

Direct action tasks include specific, short-term combat ac-tions, generally inside enemy-held territory (such as blow-ing up a bridge or attacking an enemy headquarters). WhileFID-tasked SF soldiers could certainly participate in theiradvisory unit’s combat activity, the fighting role of theseGreen Berets is secondary to the mission of training and as-sistance. In a very real sense, the roles and risks of FID activ-ity are much the same today as they were 40 years ago: A1960s-era SF soldier transplanted from South Vietnam

would likely have little difficulty com-prehending the mission of his contem-porary Iraq-deployed counterpart andrecognizing the independent spirit oftoday’s Special Forces (although theVietnam-era Green Beret might need amoment to acquaint himself with evo-lutions of uniform and equipment).

To his Regular Army counterpart,that independent spirit is never moreobvious than in the SF soldier’s readi-ness to “go native” whenever circum-stances require. Just as in the Montag-nard highlands of Vietnam in 1969,contemporary SF soldiers (especiallythose in FID or similar unconven-tional warfare roles) share every as-pect of the lives of the foreign soldierswith whom they serve, often includ-ing appearance. In October 2005, awidely released set of photographs ac-

companying a press report about U.S. counterinsurgencyoperations in Afghanistan graphically portrayed this incli-nation. The report led with a stark photo of a pair of sun-burnt, bearded SF operators, who looked like a hybrid ofMuslim imams, Foreign Legionnaires and Lawrence ofArabia.

Given all the similarities between the SpecialForces soldier of 1965 and his contemporaryIraq-deployed counterpart, there is one dis-tinctive difference that the 1965 Green Beret

might find particularly surprising: In the 1960s, SF unitswere virtually all either active duty Army or Army Re-serve. Currently, two Special Forces units are actuallydrawn from the National Guard. If anything, these Na-tional Guard Green Berets reflect an even more indepen-dent mind-set than their Regular Army peers. They alsotend to be marginally older than their active Army coun-terparts. Like other Guard members, they also bring thebonus experience of their civilian skills to the mission, anadvantage that can be critical in the sort of far-flung inde-pendent operations that Special Forces undertake. One ofthese National Guard units, the 19th Special Forces Group(Airborne), is of particular interest because of its recent ex-perience in Iraq. That experience serves as the nexus of is-sues and outcomes that are of national-level interest.

The interest begins with the 19th Special Forces Group’s(SFG) National Guard mission: to support the activeArmy’s Iraq-deployed 5th Special Forces Group (Air-borne). Given that support connection, the 19th SFG sendsits own Special Forces teams (now referred to as Opera-tional Detachment Alpha or ODA) for eight-month toursin Iraq. In 2006, the 19th Group’s ODA 944 returned fromsuch a deployment in Avghani, a large town in northernIraq. With a population of about 13,000, Avghani serves asthe regional administrative hub for 51 other villages in the

48 ARMY n May 2008

STANLEY T. GRIP JR. is a former Army Reserve lieutenantcolonel, with experience in air defense, military intelligenceand air-ground liaison roles.

U.S

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Special Forces troops lead a Montagnard commandoteam near Ba To, Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam. Today’sSpecial Forces fill roles remarkably similar to those oftheir Vietnam-era counterparts.

area. It is situated about 6 miles north of the nearest city,Tal Afar, about 25 miles from the Syrian border.

Before ODA 944’s arrival in June 2005, terroristsof the al Qaeda-affiliated band Taqfir al Jihaddestroyed the town’s police headquarters. Af-ter the attack, there was no viable police de-

partment left in the community, and the town governmentwas in shambles. The traditional Sunni-Shiia religious splitof larger cities was present in Avghani, and the ethnic com-plications of the regional Arab-Kurd mix were furthercomplicated by a third distinct ethnic group, the Turkmen.

The overall situation was a matter of particular concern toAmerican commanders in the area because Avghani wasseen as a choke point for insurgent travel to and from theSyrian border and as a safe haven for insurgent rest and re-supply. Elements of the American Army’s 3rd ArmoredCavalry Regiment (ACR) swept the town for terrorist sus-pects and weapons, but the effect was minimal and transi-tory. In short, the insurgents succeeded in paralyzing day-to-day activity in Avghani.

Accordingly, when ODA 944 arrived in the Avghani area,the unit received a traditional foreign internal defense mis-sion: Train an Iraqi infantry battalion to reassert control ofAvghani and its environs, then bring the battalion to a levelof self-sufficient proficiency in regional counterinsurgencyoperations. From June 2005 to January 2006, the NationalGuard Green Berets of ODA 944 worked hard to success-fully achieve this FID objective. In doing so, they authored ajoint Iraqi-American success story that is now cited as amodel Iraq FID mission. Along the way, ODA 944 forged afirm link not just with the officers and men of its counterpartIraqi infantry battalion, but also took the initiative to trainand reintegrate the newly formed local Avghani police de-partment. This initiative (undertaken at the request of ODA944’s leaders) helped cement not just the Iraqi-Americanworking relationship, but also the long-term relationship be-tween the Avghani police force and the Iraqi army battalion.

Two Special Forces “Bay Staters” played essential rolesin this success. Tom Sarrouf, a Massachusetts state trooper,served as the team’s commander. Mike Cutone, anotherMassachusetts state trooper, served as the team’s seniorNCO. Both men unhesitatingly credit their 10 fellow teammembers for ODA 944’s success; both men likewise com-mend the work of the Iraqi infantry with whom theyserved, and both are unequivocal in their praise of theIraqi police who risked so much in the defense of Avghani.

Though Capt. Sarrouf’s and MSgt. Cutone’s high esteemof American subordinates and their Iraqi comrades ringstrue, the record is clear that both Capt. Sarrouf and MSgt.

Cutone exercised the crucial officerand NCO leadership roles. Maj. DougOverdeer, commander of the RegularArmy SF company to which ODA944 belonged, described the two men as “a phenomenal leadership team,”recalling in particular how they“worked closely with the company topush the envelope and find creativesolutions to difficult problems.” Theiractions in Avghani demonstrated clas-sic SF characteristics of up-front com-bat leadership, tactical knowledge, lo-cal empathy, embassy-level tact andindependent flexibility. In conversa-tion, both men reflect with a smile the independent mind-set of SpecialForces when they occasionally refer to Regular Army forces as “Mother

50 ARMY n May 2008

U.S. Army vehicles head south on Avghani’smain street. ODA 944 fashioned a modelforeign internal defense mission here be-tween June 2005 and January 2006.

Only 25 miles from the Syrian border, Avghani was a safe ha-ven for insurgents before the arrival of ODA 944 in June 2005.

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Army” or “Big Army” and then go on to praise the supportthey received from heavy units like the 3rd ACR. Both mensingle out 3rd ACR Lt. Col. Joel Armstrong for the unstint-ing logistics support he provided during the Avghani op-erations.

MSgt. Cutone’s easygoing conversation and friendlypersonality exude a youthful manner that belie 20 years ofsuccessful SF experience. Combining that experience withhis civilian law-enforcement background, he worked inAvghani to build the confidence and capability of mem-bers of his counterpart Iraqi infantry and police. Buildingfrom the ground up, MSgt. Cutone and his fellow GreenBerets began by teaching basic skills, then putting thoseskills into practical application with confidence patrolsand, ultimately, with combat missions. At every step of theway, he leavened the training with a straightforward per-sonal commitment to the Iraqis: “We’re not going any-where. We’re going to live here and sleep here. We’re goingto fight when you fight, suffer when you suffer.” A devoutCatholic, MSgt. Cutone never hesitated to characterizehimself as a man of faith to his fellow Iraqi soldiers andpolicemen and never discouraged those among them whopracticed the tenets of their own faith from doing so.

F ocusing first on hard-taught, hard-learned, op-erational basics, Capt. Sarrouf likewise nevercompromised the importance of personal com-mitment and face-to-face presence. “We go

downtown, we buy vegetables,” Capt. Sarrouf explained.“Every trip downtown we buy from different vendors andspread the wealth. It’s socioeconomic. It helps stimulatetheir thought process about what we’re there for.” Capt.Sarrouf was instrumental in arranging and leading a meet-ing with Sheik Salah Al-Taha, leaderof the regional Jahaysh tribe. The tribespanned a large area of the countryfrom southern to northern Iraq nearthe Syrian border and included bothShiite and Sunni adherents. As a re-sult of the Sheik’s patronage, theAvghani police force grew from 60men to nearly 250. In addition, the Ja-haysh subsequently played an impor-tant role in securing the area anddenying insurgents freedom of move-ment through the region.

Speaking of meetings with Iraqi civilians, Capt. Sarroufobserved, “Guys from Mother Army would have to wearhelmets and body armor because it’s the rule, and theyhave no choice. We go in, we take our boots off, take ourbody armor off and take our helmets off. If you don’t, then

MSgt. Mike Cutone, senior NCO of ODA 944, combines 20 years of Special Forces experience with civilian law-

enforcement expertise as a Massachusetts state trooper.

Iraqi soldiers discovered an improvisedexplosive device made of 60 mm mor-tar rounds and a bottle of jellied gaso-line; it was detonated by an ODA 944

sniper then reconstructed for study.

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52 ARMY n May 2008

the cultural language you’re speakingis, ‘We don’t feel safe in your home asyour guest.’ It’s disrespectful.”

Going above and beyond the call ofduty, Capt. Sarrouf and MSgt. Cutonemade a habit of “eating whatever theyfeed you … You know you’re gonnaneed the Cipro after this one.” Risk ofdysentery notwithstanding, face-to-facemeetings like this helped to establishexcellent working relationships inAvghani and its environs, makingfriends and working allies out of localofficials who might otherwise have onlybeen neutral bystanders—or worse.

Ultimately, Capt. Sarrouf, MSgt. Cutone and theGreen Berets of ODA 944 achieved what theyset out to do. When ODA 944 returned to theUnited States in January 2006, the Iraqi in-

fantry battalion of Avghani was operational. The battalionsuccessfully conducted operations in conjunction with“heavy” units of the 3rd ACR, integrating fixed and ro-

tary-wing air support. In the course of mutual operations,improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were neutralized,weapons and ammunition caches found, and “blacklist”insurgents identified and captured. The improvement oflife in Avghani itself was evident.

ODA 944 also established the essential precedent of inte-grating Avghani’s police company into the counterinsur-gency equation. In doing so, ODA 944 created a competent,long-term and fundamentally local response to the coun-terinsurgent threat. The resulting cooperation between localinfantry and police succeeded in stabilizing the town andits environs. Most important, in the integration of local po-lice forces, Capt. Sarrouf and MSgt. Cutone succeeded indefining the insurgency in a new way: not as a militaryproblem, but as a law enforcement problem. Though theyreadily agree that such a characterization still requires thepresence of Iraqi infantry forces, they both hope for the daythat police, not the infantry, will solve Avghani’s problems.

ODA 944’s story is now seen as a benchmark SpecialForces FID mission; it is reviewed within the Special Forcesand conventional Army communities as the Avghanimodel. In a real sense, it helped pave the way for subse-quent in-country successes in 2007. Similarly, ODA 944’seffort established a benchmark Army success in the mindsof Americans at home. The Avghani model exemplifies asuccessful plan that is feasible in the context of any strat-egy short of immediate withdrawal. Moreover, it repre-sents a viable method that need not be contingent onwhether Iraq ultimately remains one nation or three. Fi-nally, it is based on a straightforward and fair proposition:that we should spare no reasonable effort to train Iraqiforces to assume responsibility for both local defense andthe maintenance of peaceable order. Given that proposi-tion, the men of ODA 944 have shown us a way forward. Itis worthy in equal measure of grateful appreciation andthoughtful consideration. M

SFC Rick Homestead and an Iraqi soldierexamine the crater made when a suicidebomber detonated himself and his vehicleoutside the truck that served as a ‘mobilegate’ to the ODA 944 compound.

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SFC Deiter Kolle-ing probes a trench

containing an am-munition cache that

security patrols dis-covered just 400 me-

ters east of ODA 994’scompound.

54 ARMY n May 2008