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THE ARAB AWAKENING: AN INSPIRATION TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

BY

MICHAEL AYELE

ABSTRACT:

From Morocco to Yemen all the way through Syria, speedy and consecutive uprisings that took

the Middle East by storm also shook the rest of the world. The Arab uprisings had generated

much hope, euphoria and optimism. At long last, the people had begun their long march towards

liberty and were overthrowing brutal dictators who had committed gross human rights violations

and overstayed their welcome. It was for many, the beginning of a new era. Today, almost three

years since the fall of Ben Ali, Mubarak and Ghadaffi, no one knows for certain what the future

holds for these countries. Tunisia and Egypt (to a certain extent) have been the most successful

in concretizing the aspiration and hope of the demonstration. Many uprisings have been

successfully repressed and Syria is now facing a civil war that has so far killed over 70,000

civilians with no end in sight.

It is critical to empirically analyze the movement from its inception. What role did the young

bloggers play prior and during the uprisings? Where did they get their training from? Were

Islamists involved and how does the West fit into this complex equation? What are civil society

and the general public responsibilities given this historic moment? And what can other African

nations learn from the Arab awakening if they wish to establish democracy in their own

countries?

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THE ARAB AWAKENING: AN INSPIRATION TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

Introduction: A Brief History

For centuries, the Arabs have been dominated by outside powers. The Mongols and Persians first

assumed control of the Middle East in the 12th century. The Ottoman Empire would replace them in the

16th century and their rule in the region would last for over 400 years. Following the collapse of the

Ottoman Empire in 1919, it was the turn of the French and the British to sweep into the region. With a

stroke of a pen, they carved up the Middle East and established local chieftains as the monarchs of these

new states.

The European Empires would themselves collapse after World War II and it would be the turn for the

two superpowers to gain control of the region and choose client states to support and control. When

the Cold War ended, Arab states that had supported the U.S prospered. However the Arab states that

were aligned with the former USSR were left with two options: either find new sponsors (something

which Syria did when it moved on to Iran) or try to make their peace with the U.S (which could explain

Libya's renunciation of its nuclear weapons in 1990’s.) In any case, the U.S had become the unmatched

and unchallenged hegemonic superpower in the world and most countries had

to accommodate themselves to its priorities. However, over the past decade, the U.S has lost the

willingness and the capacity to maintain this quasi-imperial stance. It lost its will because the Bush and

Obama administrations had respectively realized that its unqualified support of Arab dictators had

created a terrorist movement that was at its core anti-American. The two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

coupled with the financial crisis and the deep recession has also limited its capacity to act. Taking

advantage of this unique opportunity, indigenous forces in the Arab world fueled by demographics,

technology and a youth movement have begun stirring.i

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Arab “Uprisings”

The mass movements all shared common characteristics: protest against social and economic

conditions, rejection of dictatorship and fight against corruption. However, it is important to note that

each protest has its own unique features, which in turn require individual analysis. Thus the first

challenge is to understand what has taken place at its inception and in the course of its rapid expansion.

Are we talking about revolutions, rebellions, popular protests, or perhaps intifadas? Was it an "Arab

Spring" similar to the European revolutions of the recent past? Overall, interpretations of what

has occurred in the Middle East and North Africa differ widely. Some see recent events as the birth of a

new era, a radical turning point between past and future and speak of revolution.ii Others have asserted

that "popular uprisings" are changing political arrangements in North Africa and the Middle East, though

it is early to say whether it will lead to a true renewal. Others see them as popular upheavals that have

been unable to bring about reforms that may or may not alter the political and economic power

structure in the Arab World. iii

And finally, there are those who remain unconvinced at all and argue that

the mass movements are controlled from abroad. Observations and interpretations of what has

occurred in the Middle East and North Africa differ widely from one expert to another but it seems clear

that conclusions thus far reached by intellectuals and expert alike, are determined by the optimism of

the observer.

On closer analysis, the term “revolution” is not yet warranted. The upheavals that have shaken the

Middle East and North Africa did not transform the political order of most countries nor shifted the

economic balance of power. The popular movements have also not yet run their course nor achieved

their objectives. Thus it is too soon to label the mass movements as “revolutions.” Still, the extreme

position that argues that Western powers were behind the mass demonstrations is equally

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unwarranted. The Western allies have clearly played a part and have attempted to control the course of

events, but it is impossible that they actually planned the revolts from start to finish. The term

“uprising” therefore better describes the common character of the demonstrations that have shaken

the Arab countries. Women and men of all religions and social background took to the streets, without

violence, to demand an end to dictatorship, economic corruption, and denial of respect to citizens.

Based on the categories drawn up by Jean Paul Sartre, uprisings are situated halfway between

revolution and revolt. Once it is carried to its fullest extent and overthrows the existing system both as

political rule and economic structure, it can become revolution. On the other hand, if the uprising is

incomplete, it will have expressed the aspirations and hope but failed to concretize their hopes.

Iran’s “Twitter Revolution”

The first mass demonstrations in a Muslim majority society took place in Iran after the presidential

elections of June 2009. As soon as the election returns had been made public, indicating victory for

incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, demonstrations broke out across the country, organized by

supporters of the two opposition candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi. They lashed out

at electoral fraud and a system that had betrayed the principles of equality, justice, and transparency.

The protests gave themselves names that symbolized the nature of the regime: the “Green Revolution,”

and the “Green Wave,” thus appropriating Mousavi’s campaign color. They were also dubbed the

“Twitter revolution,” as opponents of the regime used the Internet and social networks to communicate

with/and mobilize supporters. Brutal repression followed, as the regime cracked down on anyone who

challenged the official results: demonstrators were beaten, summarily arrested, tortured, and even

raped in custody, according to multiple reliable and confirmed testimonies. iv Public participation was

widespread and drew substantial support from the West.

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The Tehran regime was clearly in great difficulty and felt threatened on two fronts: by the religious

reform from within and by Western pressure from without. After the reform minded Khatami

presidency, which had opened up promising perspectives, the regime began to crack down on civil,

institutional, and media freedoms, moving toward increasingly harsh repression of opponents.

However, it is important to note that Iran’s protest movement was quite different from the events that

shook Tunisia and Egypt two years later. The Western view of Iran is very biased because of the

successful efforts of Western governments and media to demonize the clerical regime. While it remains

imperative to criticize that regime especially on the restrictions of basic freedoms, and the repression of

political opponents and demonstrators, the dynamics involved must be studied with proper diligence to

avoid mistaken analyses and conclusions.

Iran’s “Twitter Revolution” had little in common with the dynamics that were set in motion in Tunisia

and Egypt because the movement arose from the ranks of upper middle-class youth in the capital,

Tehran, and other large cities, who had rallied behind the opposition. It had very little following among

the rest of the people and in rural areas. It would be a significant error not to take full account of the

broad support still enjoyed by the conservatives, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in particular,

among the lower classes in both urban and rural areas. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that

despite the fierce repression and the impact of images diffused on the Internet and by various news

outlets, support for the protestors was never as massive as it would be later in Arab countries.

Western political pressure and media coverage have clearly distorted the facts and created an optical

illusion when it comes to Iran: while the country is in crisis, the regime continues to enjoy considerable

popular support. Even the best known opponents of the regime, Mir-hossein Mousavi and Mehdi

Karoubi do not call for the Islamic Republic to be dismantled. They do not challenge the religious

parameters of the state but denounce the illegitimate exercise of power. The obligation to criticize the

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Iranian regime, its abuses and its unacceptable repression is one thing. But such criticism cannot be used

to justify a lack of careful judgment and biased geopolitical analyses. In retrospect, there is something to

be said about the American and European political and media campaigns in 2009, which supported

Iranian demonstrations in the name of freedom and democracy, while at the same time silently backing

the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes whose dictatorial nature was common knowledge. v

Chronology of the Arab Uprisings

The West was quick to support the uprising in Tunisia, and after some hesitation, the uprising in Egypt as

well. In both countries the movement had no political affiliations. Protestors rallied massively, cutting

across class and ideological lines, to demand that the dictators and their regimes simply “Get Out!” The

real and symbolic strength of these movements lies in their two outstanding characteristics: the broad

scope of the mobilizations and its nonviolent nature.

It all began with a Tunisian vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi who set himself on fire in protest of his

wares being confiscated as well as the harassment and humiliation he had to endure from a municipal

official and her aides. He was unemployed though he had a university degree. Poverty, economic

hardship, unemployment, political repression and authoritarian rule had gotten the best of him and he

would end his life on December 17, 2010. His story would go on to reach Tunisia’s men and women’s

ears, earning the sympathy for his family and the outrage for the government. Protests broke out in the

town of Sidi Bouzid that same day. The weeks that followed would bring dramatic change to the Middle

East and North Africa. On January 14, 2011, the Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali would flee to

Saudi Arabia. On February 27, a new government takes office amid confusion. Two months had sufficed

to change the face of Tunisia. To shouts of "Get out!" directed at the despot, his family, and his regime,

the people had bested the dictatorship.

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Soon, the events in Tunisia had become an inspiration, gathering momentum and intensity in North

Africa. Beginning January 25, 2011 Egyptians followed the Tunisians' lead with massive mobilizations in

Tahrir Square. They in turn toppled President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011. Morocco witnessed

a series of substantial protests called for February 20, 2011 which gave rise to the February 20th

Movement but attempts to mobilize in Algeria fell short. The domino effect was also gaining speed

across the Middle East and the authoritarian governments were starting to panic. In an effort to contain

the protests, the king of Jordan would dismiss his prime minister on February 1st, 2011 with promises of

social reform. A wave of protests and demonstrations also engulfed Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria and

Yemen. Unfortunately, however, they were brutally repressed.

Matters shifted somewhat when unrest broke out in Libya on February 15, 2011, as the population

staged nonviolent protests across the country. Reaction from Muammar Ghaddafi’s government was

immediate. Police and military crackdown left four dead and dozens injured. The demonstration that

followed two days later, on February 17th, dubbed the “Day of Rage” saw even more violent clashes.

Ghaddafi and his son son, Saif al-Islam were threatening to crack down on the demonstrators, whom

they described as “madmen,” as “linked to al-Qaeda” some of whom had “just returned from

Guantanamo.”vi Western media were quick to propagate a particularly somber account of the

repression in Libya and a sanitized version of the opposition, as Amnesty International points out in a

detailed report: “Western media coverage from the outset presented a very one sided view of events,

portraying the protest movement as entirely peaceful and repeatedly suggesting that the regime’s

security forces were unaccountable massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no security

challenge.” The reality was less glorious. On February 27th, 2011, the National Transitional Council set up

with the appointment of former Libyan Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohammed Abdel Jalil as Head of

Coucil which caused quite a stir since he had defected only five days earlier.vii

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Limited Islamist Influence

The Arab dictatorships have always been to the Western World, a necessary evil since they protected

their interests by stopping the rise of Islamism in North Africa and the Middle East. Western support for

autocrats and against the proponents of political Islam dates back to the early years of the twentieth

century. In the 1930s and 40s, the question arose in Egypt with regards to the Muslim Brotherhood, and

in Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia shortly after their independence. Following the

successful Iranian revolution in 1979 and the electoral victory in Algeria a decade later, Islamists had

emerged as political actors who could not be ignored. It was then that Western powers deemed that it

would be preferable to support despots (despite the blatant contradiction with democratic values) than

deal with Islamists. For decades there has been an alliance between Arab dictatorships and the Western

powers that have supported dictatorial regimes in North Africa and the Middle East to “maintain

stability” and safeguard the West’s geopolitical and economic interests.

In his article entitled “As Violence Rages in Egypt is the United States a Democracy Hypocrite?” Bergman

argues that unquestioned military and diplomatic support for autocratic regimes that have no regards

whatsoever for basic human rights has been disastrous and costly for US interests in the past. For

example in 1953, the US had toppled a democratically elected leader in Iran only to install a pro-

Western Shah that would be ousted from power in 1979 and replaced with an Islamist government.

Today the US has to deal with Ahmadinejad; a leader with a very hard line stance on Iran’s right to

develop nuclear weapons, and who is challenging US interests using every means he has at his disposal.

But Iran is only one of the many examples. US support for dictators in Yemen and Pakistan has not bore

fruit as well: “The U.S. has thrown billions of dollars to the leaders of both countries. Money that’s not

looking like it was too well spent as both countries have become safe havens for terrorists” says

Bergman.

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American and European policy towards Islamism has not been perfectly clear cut. Alliances have been

concluded and openly admitted to oppose the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Taliban and

Osama bin Laden were then receiving full financial and military backing from the Western powers in the

Cold War. The alliance with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where Islam is the state religion and where the

ruling monarchy claims that Islam is by its essence, opposed to democracy is proof that the West has no

problem with political Islam as long as Islamist leaders promise to protect its economic and political

interests.

With regards to the Arab uprisings, Islamists were the “odd man out.” The mass movements took to the

streets without them, and against the will of their leadership. In Tunisia, the Ennahda movement joined

the protests several weeks after they had begun, just as the Muslim Brotherhood did in Cairo. However

in both Tunisia and Egypt, younger members of the Islamist organizations joined the uprisings first, often

times against the advice of the hierarchy and of the leaders of the older generation. They disregarded

appeals for caution, and soon dissident voices began to be heard within the organizations. They quickly

adopted sharply differing attitudes towards civil society and their own “organizational structure.” They

were engaged in the web-based social networks such as Twitter and Facebook and have managed to

cultivate broad social and political relationship by taking part in virtual debates that went well beyond

their religious and ideological ties.

During the first few weeks of the uprisings, Western media continued to describe the situation in terms

of polarization between secularists and Islamists. There were also those who warned that a replay of the

1979 scenario could take place once again: a situation in which “dangerous anti-Western and ultimately

anti-democratic Islamist” would seize power. The Israeli government was first to sound the alarm by

comparing the mass demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt to the threat of an Iran-style outcome. They

even went as far as to suggest that Mubarak should be supported. viii However when it soon became

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apparent that the Islamists did not control the protestors and that the people’s aspirations were

stronger than the ruling regimes, western media made a radical shift in its covering of the events. The

massive, non-violent, and well organized demonstrations drew people from all social classes and all

political, religious, and nonreligious social groups. Young people and women had taken a visible and

irrefutable lead, and the media increasingly took notice. The presence of nonreligious and secularist

people in Tunisia and in Egypt, as well as the highly visible Coptic minority presence on Tahrir Square

was evidence that a new form of opposition has emerged. An opposition that has successfully rallied

women and men of all backgrounds around new demands drawn from the core values of freedom,

justice, equality and the transparency of government.

Predictable Arab Uprisings with Strong Support and Influence of Western Powers

In the beginning of the year 2011, a broad consensus had emerged around the world that described the

earliest upheavals as totally unpredictable and unexpected mainly because the Tunisian and Egyptian

regimes had appeared so solid and unshakable. Any fundamental political transformation seemed highly

unlikely because both regimes had the support of American and European power who credited them

with preserving regional security and stability while mercilessly repressing “dangerous opponents,”

“Islamists,” and/or “radicals.” President Obama would even go on to say that history unfolds through

the political will of “people calling for change.” Or does it?

In his book entitled The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, James Gelvin recognizes that the

Arab Uprisings have revived debates on the predictability of uprisings in general and the predictability of

the Arab Uprisings in particular: “No one really predicted the uprisings, but then no one could have done

so. All rebellions – the Arab uprisings included – are by their nature unpredictable, as are the courses

they take,” he argues. The last part of his argument is correct: no one can know for certain what the

future holds for these countries, in part because the popular movements have not yet run their course

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and achieved their objectives. Given the twists, turns, and surprises that have occurred thus far, one can

only be cautiously optimistic at best, and make rational guesses based on available data when predicting

the future. On the issue of foreseeing the Arab Uprisings however, they were predictable for a host of

reasons.

A closer analysis of the social and economic in Egypt and Tunisia shows that all the components of a

social explosion were present. The primary cause of dissent and mobilization was economic. While top

leaders were wallowing in luxury and corruption, the prices of basic foodstuffs had soared to intolerable

levels in Tunisia and in Egypt while unemployment impacted ever-widening sections of the population.

Those who had jobs were forced to survive on meager wages and often hold two or three jobs to make

ends meet. Though no one could have foreseen it, the economic data available places the meaning and

demand of the uprisings in perspective.

The past ten years for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region countries have registered an

extreme deterioration in at earnings equality, unemployment, and poverty. The combination of slow

economic growth, population explosion, and decline in labor productivity led to the reversal of the

economic gains achieved during the economic boom in the 1970s.ix According to a recent report put

together by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), on the state of the economies in the Middle East

and North Africa, per capita GDP had grown at a rate of 0.5% annually between 1980 and 2010. To

absorb the unemployed and new entrants to the job market, the annual GDP would have had to grow at

an annual rate of 7.5%.x

The lack of civil liberties, political rights, and independence of media are also important factors that

have contributed to the movement. Syria had been living in a state of emergency (which had stripped all

its citizens of fundamentals rights such as habeas corpus) since 1963, Egyptians since 1981, Algerians

since 1992, Iraqis since 2004 and Palestinians since 2007. There are reliable recurring reports of

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arbitrary arrest and unlawful deprivation of life committed by the governments of most countries in the

MENA. Furthermore, there have also been recurring reports of politically motivated disappearances,

kidnapping, torture and other degrading punishment.

According to the first Arab Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development

Programme in 2002, almost all Arab states have been categorized as “black hole states.” The term refers

to a political system in which the executive branch of the government is so dominant, that it “converts

the surrounding social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and nothing escapes.” Most

Arab states have also tightly restricted the formation of political parties and employ a large degree of

censorship on their Medias.

The role of the Internet and particularly that of Wikileaks, combined with the efforts and success of

European and American organizations in training youth bloggers (critical of the regimes they lived in,)

are all important factors to be considered in order to better understand the inevitability of the Arab

Uprisings. Young people trained in the use of the new communications technologies made available by

the web exploited the resources of the internet and social networks like Facebook and Twitter to

powerful effect. Well before the uprisings, opposition bloggers were informing, criticizing and spreading

the message of nonviolent resistance with success. They had a powerful impact on young people who

had been informed and brought into action through social networking. Their training sessions on non-

violent mobilization stressed the need of psychology.xi The suicide of Mohammed Bouazizi provided the

spark they needed to literally light the blaze. But where exactly did they get their training from?

Two television documentaries broadcasted by Al-Jazeera revealed how Egypt's April 6th Movement had

been set up three years earlier in 2007. The Al-Jazeera journalists reported on the young people's

training trips to Serbia and the Caucasus. It is important to note that the mass movement in Serbia, in

1998 was led by Srdja Popovic, founder of a group called Optor (Resistance). The group used text

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messaging, the Internet, and social networks to galvanize the population against the government led by

Solobodan Milosevic. The movement chose as its symbol the clenched fist, which had been used in the

anti-Nazi resistance, and successfully overthrew Milosevic two years later in, October 2000. In 2004,

Popovic set up an organization called CANVAS, a training center specializing in nonviolent action and

strategy. There he developed the three principles of popular mobilization: unity, planning and

nonviolent discipline. The center provided training for young activists who would later lead the "Rose

Revolution" in Georgia and the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine. Young politicized leaders would soon

flock into Serbia for training, including many from North Africa and the Middle East. Tunisians received

their training there and Mohammed Adel, one of the founders of the April 6th Movement, was trained

for a week during the summer of 2009.

A significant number of young activists and bloggers were also given training by three American

governments financed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): the Albert Einstein Institution, Freedom

House and the International Republican Institute. The methods and principles of these three are

identical: celebrating democratic values, mobilizing people nonviolently, and bringing down regimes

without confrontation with the police or the army by using symbols and slogans to shape mass

psychology and exploiting the potential of social networks and more generally, the Internet. Powerful

American corporations were also directly involved in the uprisings. Google, Twitter, and Yahoo were

involved in the training of the bloggers and were also disseminating information on the Web promoting

pro-democracy activism. The companies have indicated that they value Internet freedom and their

interests have coincided with those of the U.S administration. Google has now been working with U.S

and European officials to build a case that would make Internet censorship a trade barrier. In the

conference entitled “Liberty 2010,” Google with the participation of activists, bloggers, NGOs,

researchers, governments and corporations’ representatives has launched the Middle East and North

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Africa Bloggers Network. It should be noted that the initiative is associated with the U.S Democratic

Party.

It would border foolishness to think that that the great powers such as the U.S, France, Germany, Russia

or China were nothing more than casual observers of the growing turmoil in the Middle East. Their

relationship with national governments, their links with the region's military establishments and their

carefully calibrated dealings with each country clearly reflects their involvements before and during the

uprisings. A closer analysis of both Tunisia and Egypt reveals a context and implication far more complex

than that of unique homegrown mass movements springing from the desire and the mobilizations of

young people responding emotionally to the death of Mohamed Bouazizi.

Today, there is some debate among bloggers on whether to accept U.S funding or to attend training

sessions organized by institutions linked to Western powers. Within the movement itself, bloggers and

cyber activists of both sexes have rejected America attempts to control and direct them, as well as

American financial support. Some have even refused to meet or be seen in the company of ex-president

Bill Clinton when he visited Cairo. In Tunisia as well as Egypt there exist within civil society forces that

cut across political boundaries and display genuine political awareness and autonomy.xii

Between Manipulation and Liberation

As pointed above, there is a substantial body of data, which proves that the U.S and European countries

were either aware or directly involved in the training of bloggers and activists in the Middle-East and

North Africa. Ever since 2004, but more systematically between 2006 and 2008, young people were

trained at these and other centers in the strategy and tactics of nonviolent mobilization: social networks

and the use of symbols (where the clenched fist appears again in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Syria). Not

only were the US administration and certain European countries aware, they had funded the training

programs and helped develop organized networks of bloggers in the Middle East and North Africa. They

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had full knowledge of the activities and mobilizing efforts of the cyber-dissidents. They had also studied

their objectives and identified the leaders. The Arab uprisings can thus not be described as spontaneous.

It did not suddenly spring from nothing, taking everyone by surprise. The U.S and Europe were

supporting despots while as the same time training their opponents. In light of these facts, we should be

asking questions about the ultimate goal of training aimed at young people in countries whose

governments were autocratic allies of the West.

There is a clear difference between the process of training leaders on the one hand and attempting to

control events to seize historical opportunities on the other. Well before the uprisings, opposition

bloggers were informing, criticizing and spreading the message of nonviolent resistance with success.

They had a powerful impact on young people who had been informed and brought into action through

social networking. The training sessions on non-violent mobilization stressed the need of psychology, of

a positive message. xiii Thus for the internet driven movement to be successful, they had to maintain

and use an emotional momentum. The suicide of Mohammed Bouazizi provided the spark that lit the

blaze.

Things turned suspicious when Wikileaks revealed that the US administration was well acquainted with

the April 6th movement that was instrumental in organizing protests against Former President Hosni

Mubarak. In 2008, they had invited some of its members to the United States. The US Ambassador to

Egypt (Margaret Scobey,) had even sent her government “sensitive” information which indicated that

“opposition groups had drawn up a secret plan for regime change to be activated before the election

scheduled for September 2011.” xiv Many activists had also met with Mohamed El-Baradei in the United

States in 2008-2009. xv

Demonstrations called by young members of the April 6th movement began in Cairo on January 25th:

eleven days after the fall of Ben Ali. The date was symbolically significant in Egypt as it was declared a

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national holiday in 2009. “Police Day” commemorated the deaths of fifty policemen on January 25, 1952

for refusing to hand over their arms to the British at police headquarters in the town of Ismailia. The

holiday was meant to enhance the reputation of the police and to underline their commitment to

protect the Mubarak regime. It should be noted that the Egyptian public detests the police and images

of police brutality against nonviolent demonstrators in Tunisia spoke eloquently to Egyptians who were

well aware that the police treated people with total impunity. In designating January 25 as a “Day of

Revolt,” Egypt’s younger cyber-activists had exploited the symbolic impact of the date to the maximum.

While the US had knowledge about the plots of the opposition, the Obama administration was hesitant

on how best to respond in Egypt. This was in part due to the internal tensions within the high command

of the Egyptian armed forces which has been trained and funded by the US for decades. The Egyptian

high command was split: a faction of the military stood for the status quo while other favored reforms.

But the United States never lost touch with high ranking Egyptian officers. According to Anthony H.

Cordesman, there are many factions in the military in Egypt who either have to answer to power centers

in the Defense or the Interior Ministry. Forces linked with the Interior Ministry preferred the status quo

and were responsible for the crackdown on protestors while those linked to the Defense Ministry

wanted change and had decided to drop Mubarak. xvi

U.S calls in 2003 for democratizing the Middle East should also be taken into consideration in explaining

the mass movements. Former President George W Bush explained that the war in Iraq constituted a first

step toward a global democratic movement in the Greater Middle East and that Islam was by no means

opposed to democracy. On November 6, 2003, he would even go on to say that his involvement in the

Middle East was akin to Ronald Reagan’s support for Eastern Europe’s struggle for democracy in the

1980s. The Obama administration has also made it clear that for economic and political reasons, the

region's dictatorship had to change as a necessary precondition for opening up Arab markets and

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integrating the region into the global economy. These two factors forced the West not to support the

status quo and back the dictatorships for reasons of security and stability. Moreover, the rise of new

economic players such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey in the Middle East confirmed that

the risks of inaction were just too much.

The United States had also been present in Tunisia for a decade and had established contacts with all

political groups. They knew that Ben Ali was ill and seriously weakened. While collaborating closely with

the regime in military and security matters, the US government was also inviting opposition figures to

Washington for talk since 2006. xvii There had been close contact between US embassy and General

Rashid Ammar, commander in chief of the Tunisian army. Foreign Minister Kamel Morjane, General

Ammar and former general David Petraeus had even met to determine the best strategy to prepare for

the post Ben-Ali era. It was during that meeting that they decided that the army would be kept neutral

and would not be called upon to open fire on demonstrators. Though the army was kept neutral, the

police responded with violence, on January 11. That same day, Hilary Clinton issued a communiqué

denouncing the excessive use of force while France’s Foreign Minister Michele Alliot-Marie offered the

Ben Ali regime French military support to crush the uprising.xviii Advised to leave with his family until the

situation was brought under-control so that he could make a triumphant return, Ben Ali had walked into

a trap. He left the country by air and was prevented by American intervention from landing in France or

Cyprus before finally being rerouted to Jeddah, where he now resides. Hillary Clinton is said to have

spoken personally with Saudi Prince Nayef Bin Sulltan to request that the Kingdom accept the fallen

dictator. According to a Tunisian diplomat, on January 14 the US Embassy gave the green light for Ben

Ali’s departure. xix

Cynical Geopolitical and Economic Calculations

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In his article entitled “How Libya became a French and British War,” Michael Elliot argues that even

though Libya has oil, “it's hard to make the case that there is some pressing commercial reason for

Britain and France to take the lead in the way that they have done.” He goes on to add that both

nations intervened in Libya because they genuinely believe that the world is a more secure place if other

democracies help the U.S “carry the diplomatic and military load of ensuring global stability.”

Mr. Elliot reasoning is flawed and naïve because the situation in the Middle East and North Africa is

complex and involves a host of issues that go beyond the simplistic political viewpoint that limits itself to

putting forward democratization as the sole solution to their problems, as if no other political,

economic, or strategic issues were in play. When nations have supported dictatorships for so long in the

name of frequently undisclosed economic and military interests, it would today be foolish to consider

the North’s support for democratization as the sincere, unselfish expression of a new found love for the

peoples of the region entirely devoid of any strategic calculations. As in any economic reckoning, it

seems wise to enquire about the expectations of the parties involved and about their anticipated

benefits.

Ghaddafi’s power relied on a decentralized system of clan alliances in which tribal affiliation was more

important than good or bad relations with Tripoli. The country was a key regional player: liberating and

then controlling it promised significant political and economic interests for all concerned. Under

France’s lead, operations were launched under the aegis of NATO, whose errors of judgments and

blunders grew to alarming proportions.xx

Meanwhile Americans were attempting to organize the

rebellion to better profit from the situation irrespective of the outcome. Sources revealed that the CIA

had been directly involved even before the uprising and that it had been working continuously and

strategically with the rebels.xxi The West had accepted the risks of working with a Transitional Council

made up of former Ghaddafi cabinet ministers (some of who were agents of foreign powers), ostensibly

19

repentant Islamists, and uncontrolled, even extremist element.xxii What reasons justified the Western

intervention in Libya while NATO remained passive and silent in the face of brutal crackdown on the

civilian population in Syria? Initially advanced, the humanitarian claim simply does not hold up. The

strategic importance of Libya, which had long eluded foreign control outweighs by far the ingenuously

humanistic statements of French leaders. The truth before the Arab Uprising was that Libya’s oil wealth

had restored Ghadaffi to the good graces of the international community and Sarkozy had even given

him the red carpet treatment in Paris just a few months earlier.xxiii

So, what specific event deteriorated

relations with Libya to the extent that NATO had to militarily intervene?

True, he had embarrassed Sarkozy with his African policy of building economic ties and financially

supporting leaders to Libya’s east, west, and south which thwarted French ambitions in the region. True,

he was also not in good terms with the U.S and Israel. As a partisan of the two-state solution, Ghadaffi

never concealed his support for the Palestinian resistance and had even made a personal call for them

to gather peacefully at their disputed borders when the Arab uprisings had begun. xxiv He constantly

linked criticism to the United States and Europe to criticism of Israel while pointing to the cowardice of

the Arab countries. In the regional context, it was clear that Ghadaffi’s alliances with partners like

Venezuela, South Africa, China and Brazil that were for less pro-Israel than the United States and Europe

were as dangerous as his economic power and autonomy. The role of French media intellectual Bernard

Henry Levy, who for a few days functioned as France’s foreign minister and even brokered a deal with

the Transitional Council proved telling given that he has made a reputation on medias for his open

support to Israel. xxv Israel favored Ghaddaffi’s ouster mainly because of the danger represented by his

international alliances and his support for the Palestinian cause. The lure of oil combined with his

outspoken anti-Israeli position in Africa (particularly in Chad, Sudan and South Africa) must be taken into

account. Recent developments can also not be overlooked. A wealthy and autonomous Libya with the

intention of creating new alliances with Tunisia and Egypt could have opened new strategic relations

20

between the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Western countries feared that this would

create an uncontrolled zone thereby turning the region into a high risk area for their presence in the

region. True to his reputation as a disturbing and provocative character, Ghaddafi nonetheless displayed

undeniable strategic abilities.

At the very core of these competing claims interests lies Libya’s oil wealth. The country exports more

than $31 million worth of crude annually; 80 percent of which was shipped to the European Union.xxvi

As an OPEC member and Africa’s fourth largest oil producer, Libya enjoyed substantial autonomy vis-à-

vis the West while Europe dependence on Libyan oil production was considerable (contributing to 10

percent of French imports and as much as 25 percent for Italy). In addition, new and promising reserves

had recently been discovered. The stakes were high: the regime National Oil Corporation controlled the

bulk of Libyan production and only offered access to foreign firms through joint ventures. When they

stopped production and repatriated their personnel, he threatened to turn in the future to China, India

and Brazil. On September 1st, 2011, the Parisian daily Liberation revealed a deal dating back to March 19,

2011 between the Transitional Council and France, granting the latter 35 percent of Libya’s oil exports

after Ghaddafi’s anticipated downfall. xxvii Even before Ghaddafi had been located, and while the

fighting continued, French, American, Chinese and Turkish firms had begun the hunt for contracts.

France’s Minister of Foreign Trade had even travelled to Libya with a business delegation to secure

contracts in oil, telecommunications, transport etc. xxviii

The uprising in Libya revealed the unspoken economic considerations that underlie the dissimilar

treatments faced by Arabs and African countries. The wish to maintain economic and geopolitical

control in Tunisia and Egypt in the disguise of political democratization is radically different from the

intention to exert full control over Libya’s political alignment while getting direct access to the country’s

oil reserves. Knowing Ghaddafi’s personality, there was simply no other way to achieve these goals

21

without direct military intervention. Behind the fine words of humanitarian concern and the

celebrations of values such as freedom, dignity and the struggle against dictatorship is concealed a

battle for economic domination, control of oil reserves, and coldly cynical geopolitical calculations. How

else could the silence over repression in Syria (where Bashar al- Assad has banned all non-state media,

cut off Internet access and has commanded the army to fire point-blank at unarmed civilians) be

interpreted? (As of this writing, more than 70,000 civilians have been killed while thousands more are

injured.) Geopolitical considerations are the decisive factors in deciding upon support of lack of support

for the Arab peoples in their quest for freedom and dignity. Syria allies, which include Russia, China, and

Venezuela (where Hugo Chavez shamelessly described Bashar al-Assad as a “humanist and a brother”)

all opposed any form of military intervention. xxix Their position did shift during the weeks of repression.

Turkey, Russia and China finally requested that the Syrian president end the crackdown. Yet the fact

remains that the regime was free to act and kill and that the U.S, Europe and Israel spoke from the

outset in favor of internal reform (leaving the Assad regime in power).

In 2003, former friend and ally (during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War), Saddam Hussein, suddenly became

a tyrant with a sinister face in contrast to the purity of American policy. Prior to U.S invasion of Iraq, we

were told that it was all about weapons of mass destruction, freedom and democracy. 10 years later, we

know that they were all lies. It seems that France and Britain were playing in Libya the US game in Iraq.

Today we are learning that the war that was supposed to be fought for democracy, freedom and dignity

was far less glorious than the French and British government made it sound to be. There was clearly a

greater concern for business than human lives. xxx

Tensions in Europe

The willingness of European powers to militarily intervene in Libya was a defining moment in the

political life of the continent. Libya has set a precedent for further military intervention with Sarkozy

22

arguing that the “responsibility to protect” principle in the UN Resolution 1973 allowed for further

intervention in Africa and the Middle East. The Ivory Coast has already been the first victim with French

and U.N forces opening fire from helicopters on military camps operated by former leader Laurent

Gbagbo. Since then, France has sent an additional 500 troops to reinforce its 1500 strong military

presence in its former colony to ensure the victory of its friend and ally, Alassane Ouattara. France has

also intervened in Mali.

There are however countries in Europe who have been critical (some more vocal than others) of France

super-active role in the Middle East and North Africa which will certainly lead to tensions in the future.

Following a series of unilateral diplomatic moves such as calling “targeted air strikes” and being the first

leader to officially recognize the Libyan rebels as “the only legitimate representative of the Libyan

people,” Sarkozy was criticized by Belgian Foreign Minister Steven Vanackere who said that this had

triggered “negative reactions.” The Luxembourg Prime minister noted that such actions should not have

been taken “on the day before” EU leaders were scheduled to meet for a summit in Brussels to discuss

the deteriorating situation in Libya. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton even warned that, “We

cannot unilaterally rush into recognizing groups.”

Other European leaders grumbled that Sarkozy's unilateral announcement upset their efforts to forge a

common position on Libya. Germany was perhaps one of the more vocal critics of France. Alongside

Brazil, China, Russia and India, Germany chose to abstain on UN Security Council Resolution 1973

against its NATO allies for two reasons. First, Germany has been seeking closer relations with Russia for

years, on which it relies for its gas supplies. Second, German trade with China is in excess of $100 billion

a year. Berlin is working under the assumption that that its economic influence in North Africa and the

Middle East is the best way of projecting Germany’s global interests.xxxi In clear opposition to the US-

French-UK-led operation, Germany had even offered to deploy naval and military mission (EUFOR Libya)

23

to relieve the besieged city of Misrata during the European Union’s Luxembourg summit on Libya. The

mission was supposed to be a 7.9 million-euro operation to be based in Rome and aimed at an initial

mobilization of the EU’s two battle groups, made up of 1500 troops. Germany would have contributed

990 troops. The offer failed to gain ground and was eventually rejected by the UN. However the

government of Angela Merkel insisted that it was ready to participate in any “humanitarian mission”

asked of it by the UN. xxxii

One important country that has expressed concern over France’s “prominent role” in the UN mandated

intervention in Libya is Turkey. Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül even went on to say that “it seems

impossible for us to understand France being so prominent in this process. We are having difficulty in

understanding it acting like the enforcer of United Nations decisions.” It should be noted that Turkey

has spoken against intervention arguing that the operation should have been under UN

governance and should not have been launched at a meeting attended by a small group of

countries.xxxiii

The Libya campaign and the Arab Spring have raised important questions about the strategic objectives

and priorities of the EU diplomacy. They have also raised key questions about the EU’s ability to manage

crisis when they arise and the capability of the European External Action Service as a foreign and

security policy instrument in the Lisbon Treaty. European allies have struggled to overcome divisions and

this has subsequently led to smaller alliances between Member States. The main concern remains that

smaller European Alliances such as the Franco-British defense cooperation will undermine a coordinated

and coherent Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in the future.xxxiv

Few Successes and too many Failures: MENA in Crisis

24

While it is tempting at first glance to speak of a “domino effect” in discussing the courage and energy of

the popular uprisings, each country must be studied separately to better understand the dynamism of

the region as a whole. Tunisia has moved rapidly toward a democratization that seems destined for

success. In the elections to the Constituent assembly held on October 23, 2011, 51 percent of Tunisian

citizens registered vote, and the election produced a clear victory for Ennadha, an Islamist party. The

Congress for the Republic (Ettakol) led by Moncef Marzouki and the Democratic Forum of Labor and

Freedom led by Mustapha Ben Jaafar finished in second and third place respectively. The three parties

rejected the “secularist-Islamist” polarization and agreed to cooperate and join forces. Positions were

assigned under a tripartite agreement: Mustapha Ben Jaafar of Ettakol was elected president of the

Constituent Assembly while Moncef Marzzouki was elected president of Tunisia on December 12. Three

days later, he appointed Hamadi Jebali (of Ennadha) as prime minister. Of all the countries, to have

experienced a mass uprising, Tunisia appeared to be best situated to bring about a genuine change of

regime. Since the election, the blows dealt by hard line and extremist factions have hit hard following

the government failure of devising an economic and social policy that would ease the crisis. Popular

impatience is understandable, but it has opened the door to populists on both sides. Secular

fundamentalists, like the literalist Salafis and the Jihadist, are doing everything in their power to

destabilize the government.

The course of events in Libya is troubling: the armed forces of NATO supported an armed rebellion.

Under French and American authority, they have successfully tracked down Ghaddafi on October 20,

2011. He was taken alive and then lycnched in circumstances that showed little respect for human

dignity. Though he was a brutal dictator, he should have been brought to trial. xxxvFour days later, the

president of the NTC announced that Shar’ia would form the basic law of the land and made striking

references to divorce, marriage, and the legislation of polygamy. The proclamation affirmed to Libyans

the total independence of the NTC and its new leadership. It also served as a warning to the West to

25

downplay its current and future role in determining the country’s reorientation and reconstruction. The

following weeks revealed that political and economic dealings between new Libyan authorities, the U.S,

France, and the United Kingdom had been fraught with tension. The economic agreements and

reconstruction contracts signed provide proof that NATO support was far from humanistic and that

Western governments had intended to play a determinant economic and political role in Libya. In recent

months, Libya has been torn by clan and tribal strife and only its oil industry has been secured for the

greater benefit of American, French and British interests.

Events have taken an equally sobering turn in Egypt. The victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the

legislative elections and the second place showing of the Salafist an-Nur party seem to mirror political

developments of Tunisia. However, nothing could be further from the truth. The Egyptian Army rules the

country behind closed doors. Its violent intervention in Tahrir Square and continued suppression of

demonstrators across the country is proof of the army can act with impunity.xxxvi In recent months,

Egypt has been in the throes of a profound crisis. In an effort to neutralize the power of the armed

forces and the judiciary, which prevented him from applying his policies, President Mohamed Morsi

preemptively assumed “temporary” powers that curiously recall former President Mubarak’s

perogatives. In all fairness, the opposition parties combined with institutional interference had made

governing all but impossible. We will soon see whether the president’s measures are indeed

“temporary,” and designed to speed up the democratic transition, or a return to dictatorship. xxxvii

Unintended Consequences and Responsibilities

Syrian society is composed of a Shiite Alawite sect who rules over a country where the majority is Sunni

Muslim.xxxviii Contrary to appearances, the uprisings in Syria were not desired by the U.S and Israel.

Opposition parties and resistance are difficult to identify and control. Leftist/secularist anti American

tendencies, pro-Shiite, pro-Iranian and Islamist groups form a configuration that would clearly be

26

difficult to manage. If the regime were to collapse, very few know what might actually be the outcome.

Western countries had apparently neither anticipated nor wished for what has happened. Clearly, the

determination of the people has been strong as they have gradually managed to change the positions of

the country’s allies and enemies, who seem to have now understood that the regime is in danger and

unlikely to survive.xxxix

Though nothing has definitely been achieved by the mass protests, Syrians have

shaken the regime and put change on the agenda.

Bashar al-Assad heads a dictatorial regime founded on usurpation and corruption, a regime that has

never hesitated – dating from his late father’s decade long rule – to kill and torture its opponents by the

tens of thousands. In a country, where terror is the domestic policy, the numbers are alarming: in just

over two years, more than 70,000 civilians have died in Syria. Since August 2012, more than 5000

Syrians have been killed every month, a rate of almost 170 per day. xl The International Community

looks on helplessly as UN special representatives submit draft proposals and presidents and prime

ministers mouth fine words. And still, the civil war grinds on, with its daily reports of atrocities and

manipulations. In recent months, American and European positions have shifted and pressure against

the Syrian government has increased. Official support for the Syrian opposition and the Free Syrian

Army has firmed up. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have emerged as full participants, directly financing and

arming the political and military opposition. Neighboring Turkey has even altered its “no problems with

neighbors” policy to one of active support for regime change in Damascus. Beijing and Moscow,

meanwhile, continue to back Bashar al-Assad (while hinting that they might contemplate a future

without him). Syria has become the theater of a regional “low-intensity conflict,” under control, and

cynically more useful than harmful. The dividends may prove substantial in both the short and long

term. All the pieces on the chessboard have been maneuvered into place to create a stalemate. Neither

a political nor a military solution seems possible in the near future; the civil war drags on, and the

number of deaths grows day by day.

27

We can – and must – oppose the autocratic regime of Bashar al-Assad without falling into the trap of

oversimplifying the conflict and blindly supporting the resistance. The Syrian opposition, by virtue of its

structure, does not inspire confidence. Several of its allies, judging by their declared and undeclared

intentions, are outright dangerous. In the face of growing confusion, we must combine a principled

position that opposes any form of dictatorship with a political vigilance that leaves no room for naivety

(unconditional support for the opposition).

Syria’s situation is similar to that of Bahrain. There, protests broke out on February 14, 2011 and spread

rapidly. A demonstration took place on February 23 included people from all social-backgrounds. The

demonstrators demanded reform of the ruling regime and an end to inequality in the application of laws

governing naturalization. Slogans called for Sunni-Shiite unity. The government responded with a violent

crackdown, portraying the demonstrators as Shiite radicals intent on overthrowing the regime. King

Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa quickly played the religious conflict card, declared a state of emergency and

called in his allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to suppress the movement. Saudi Arabia, the

United Arab Emirates, and Qatar promptly rallied behind the regime at the same time that they sided

with rebels in Libya. xli The stakes were extremely high: it was imperative to contain the Arab uprisings

and prevent them from reaching even one of the sheikdoms.xlii

Collapse of the regime in Bahrain would

have sent shock waves through the entire Arabian Peninsula. The Arab League’s claim that the conflict

was a religious one and that the population’s demand had nothing in common with the people of Egypt,

Libya and Tunisia has come under sharp criticisms. Neither the U.S nor Europe reacted to the Bahraini

regime crackdown. Once again, economic considerations, regional stability and access to oil triumphed

over support for democratization. xliii

Civil society and citizens of the various Arab countries must commit themselves to imagining and

creating a vision for the future drawn from their own history, their memory, their cultural references,

28

their values and their hopes. They must reclaim the meaning of their revolt even though they were not

its sole instigators. Caution and optimism must be combined with determination and commitment. The

leaders of successful uprisings today and tomorrow will be defined by their clear sighted optimism and

their hard headed dedication. Political liberation requires freeing minds using close analysis of facts.

Arab Uprising Spreading Among Sub-Saharan Countries

After the excitement and euphoria of the Arab Spring, observers around the world wondered whether

Northern Africa would inspire its neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa, which share many of the same

demographic characteristics, including a large percentage of unemployed people, high food prices, and

years of oppression and unrealized opportunity at the hand of often-brutal dictators. At the time,

political commentators in several corners of Africa seemed optimistic that the Arab Spring would indeed

spread southward. They were correct: uprisings have followed in Angola, Benin, Mauritania, Malawi,

Mali, Senegal and Uganda.xliv

Angola

A series of protests in the Angolan capital of Luanda against long time president Jose Eduardo dos Santo

have raised some eyebrows. The protest started in March 2011 by young people using Facebook and

Youtube to spread the message of dissatisfaction with dos Santos 32 years rule. The regime has been

marked by disappearing government funds close to $1 billion, state-sponsored censorship of the

press, and arbitrary killings and disappearances. Dos Santos’ latest notable act was

spearheading changes to the Angolan Constitution that did away with direct presidential elections

and would allow him to stay in power until 2022. However, there is no denying that he still enjoys some

support from some older Angolans who feel a loyalty to him and the MPLA because of the party’s

role in Angola’s fight for independence against Portugal from 1961-1974. He has also been credited

29

with Angola’s double digit growth and has even beaten China as the fastest growing economy in the past

decade, expanding 11.1% percent from 2001-2010. Angola is now the continent’s second-biggest oil

producer, behind Nigeria. And with Nigeria’s recurring political violence and power struggle in the

oil-rich delta region, investors have been turning more and more to Angola and its relative

stability. Nonetheless, separate reports released last year by Global Witness and the Open Society

Initiative and Human Rights Watch, reveal gaps worth billions of dollars in the accounting records of

Angola’s Ministries of Finance and Petroleum and Sonangol, the state-owned oil company: $6 billion

flowed out of Angola in 2009, according to the advocacy group Global Financial Integrity, by way of

“trade mispricing.”xlv

In an effort to contain the movement in Angola, Dos Santos has proposed new statutory restrictions on

the internet. The regime has grown concerned with how social networking sites are being used to

spread antigovernment ideas and organize protest events. The new legislation would outlaw the

“dissemination of information with the goal of damaging national integrity or independence, to destroy,

alter or subvert state institutions through the use of information systems.” It would also allow the

authorities to “intercept or block communications, retain data and make it illegal to use recording, video

and photography without authorization, even if the material is produced legally.”xlvi

It remains to be

seen what effect the protests will have on the Angolan government. Analysis of the Middle East has

shown that stability in the government will certainly be favored by Angola’s biggest investors: the

United States and China. China in particular has made huge investments in Angola and has won

contracts to rebuild much of Angola’s infrastructure with Chinese laborers undertaking the construction.

Whether the winds of change blow in Angola will require reassurances to these interested parties that

their investments will be protected.

Senegal

30

Senegal is often presented as a model for the rest of Africa, particularly when it comes to politics. Most

of the elements of an open society are present in the political system and how it functions. Its

bureaucracy is patterned on those of France and the United States and operates to a large extent as it is

meant to, with the boundaries of state and society well-defined, which could explain why Senegal is the

only country in mainland West Africa that has not experienced a military coup d’etat. Things turned

suspicious when Wikileaks revealed that former Senegal President Abdoulaye Wade was “preparing the

way for a presidential dynastic succession.”xlvii

Wade was quite popular at home and abroad when he first came to power. He had forged his reputation

as an opposition leader during the two-decade presidency of Abdou Diouf, and faced arrest in the

violent aftermath of the 1988 elections, which the opposition had denounced as fraudulent. His rise to

the presidency as the candidate of the Democratic Party in 2000 marked a significant milestone for the

country, which had known only two presidents since independence in 1960, both from the Socialist

Party. However, political tensions increased during Wade’s second term, which began in a climate of

doubt surrounding the legitimacy of his 2007 reelection. Since that year’s poll, the government has

amended the constitution more than a dozen times, and the public had grown resentful of the 85-year-

old Wade’s apparent attempts to ensure that his son Karim eventually succeeds him as president.

Political sources of popular frustration have been compounded by high unemployment rates, continual

power shortages, and the flagrant misuse of public funds. 48 percent of Senegalese are unemployed,

and 54 percent live below the poverty line, even as energy and housing costs are on the rise.

Electricity shortfalls had already triggered civil unrest. In June 2011, power was cut to homes in Dakar

for nearly 30 hours, leading demonstrators to attack the headquarters of the national power company.

Security forces responded with a harsh crackdown. One example of wasteful spending is the

government recently sponsored statue called the “Monument of African Renaissance” at a cost of $27

31

million, and Wade had said he is entitled to 35 percent of any revenue generated by visits to the

site.

It is in this political and economic atmosphere that Wade had decided to run for a third term, a step

many considered to be unconstitutional. Still, the Constitutional Council sided with the president

claiming that because the two-term limit was imposed in 2001, it did not apply retroactively to

Wade’s first term. At one point in the summer of 2011, the administration even attempted to lower

the vote threshold for a first-round victory from 50 percent to 25 percent, in a bid to avoid runoff

elections. The move set off violent opposition protests. On December 22, 2011 opposition Socialist Party

youth leader Barthelemy Dias allegedly shot and killed a man during a confrontation with Wade

supporters in Dakar. Since then, clashes between protesters and police became increasingly violent,

spreading throughout the country and touching the lives of ordinary citizens. On January 30, 2012, two

civilians were killed when police fired live rounds at protesters.

Growing antigovernment sentiment had fueled the formation of several new opposition movements

with mass appeal. Foremost among these are Y’en a marre, or “enough is enough,” and the June 23

Movement (M23). The latter is a coalition of 60 opposition and civil society groups, while Y’en a marre is

led by socially engaged hip-hop musicians from the group Keurgui, who have become very popular

with younger Senegalese. However, this popular mobilization has not resulted in a strong and unified

opposition. The well-known singer Youssou N’Dour hoped to challenge Wade in the election, but

the Constitutional Council rejected his candidacy on the grounds that he lacked enough valid

signatures.xlviii Thankfully, Wade lost the election in the second round to now President Macky Sall and

the protests came to an end soon afterwards.

Mali

32

Until recently, Mali was praised as being a prime example of an African democracy. The constitution has

been in place since 1992 and elections held since have largely been free and fair. This all changed when

Gaddafi's administration began to crumble and the hundreds of ethnic Tuareg mercenaries, who had

fought for both Gaddafi and the NTC rebels, returned home to Northern Mali to restart their own

rebellion. After the colonial French left in 1960, the nomadic Tuareg found themselves under the rule of

Mali's southern tribes, with whom they had little affiliation. Feeling marginalized and oppressed by the

Malian south, a handful of Tuareg men armed with a few rifles and traditional swords began a small

rebellion in 1963. This was soon quashed, and the leaders were imprisoned or forced to flee and hide in

the mountains. However, the grievances remained, and rebellions later erupted in 1990, again in 2000,

and then again between 2006 and 2009. Up until the current uprising, the Tuareg rebellions all followed

a similar trend: the rebellion started out with unity and strength but quickly ended with negotiations

between certain rebel leaders and the southern government; tempted by cash and influential positions

in the state military, the rebellions always crumbled. The Tuareg rebellion of 2009 was somewhat

different than all the previous ones. Refusing to negotiate with the Malian government, Ibrahim Ag

Bahanga had fled to Libya after the uprising had ended in 2009. There, he kept quiet until Gaddafi's

regime began to fall. Then, Ag Bahanga, together with hundreds of Tuareg who had fled after the

previous rebellion returned - this time armed with heavy weaponry.

The Tuareg were not only well armed - they were also extremely well organized. For consecutive

months, they attacked the Malian military with success. On March 20, 2012; mid-ranking officers staged

a coup. The officers accused the Malian president for “not doing enough to support the army,” claiming

the frontline troops were often low on supplies. The power vacuum in Bamako allowed the "National

Movement for the Liberation of Azawad" (known by its French acronym MNLA) to sweep across the

north and seize three of the largest and most strategic towns in the north: Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. The

Malian army had apparently withdrawn from the north without even a fight. In response to the crisis

33

that was slowly engulfing the country, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

placed sanctions on Mali. After days of negotiations, we learned that an agreement was reached

between Malian President Toure and the coup leaders: both had agreed to step down. xlix

In the early days of April, the MNLA declared its independence, stating that it had secured all of its

desired territories. But the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) both rejected the

independence, claiming it was invalid. As of 8 April, the MNLA was holding 400 Malian soldiers captured.

According to a report published by Amnesty International, the fighters with Ansar Dine (Islamist

militants formerly aligned with the MNLA) were trying to impose Sharia Law; an idea not well received

by the population in the north, which ended up sparking protests against rebel control. According to

Amnesty's International researcher Gaetan Mootoo, "the entire north of the country has been taken

over by armed groups who were running riot. Tens of thousands of people fled the region, creating a

humanitarian crisis in Mali and in neighboring countries."l Amnesty International had also documented

instances of gang rape, extrajudicial executions and the use of child soldiers by the Islamists.li

On October 2012, the Mali government and ECOWAS requested foreign military intervention. The U.N

Security Coucil passed a French resolution approving an African-led force to assist the Army of Mali in

fighting the Islamist militants.lii

On December 20, 2012; U.N Resolution 2085 authorized the deployment

of an African led Mission for an initial period of one year. liii Less than three weeks later, France had

decided that African leaders were taking too much time and launched Operation Serval, interfering for

the first time in the conflict on January 11. liv

To make matters worse, at an AU summit held in Ethiopia;

the president of Benin told his fellow leaders that their response to the conflict in Mali was too slow,

and thanked France (the country’s former colonial ruler) for taking the lead in the military intervention

in clear defiance of previous U.N Resolutions.lv With the help of its former colonial ruler, Mali has now

recovered most of its territories back from the Islamist militants. While the world looks on, France’s

34

political class has come to an agreement on the principle of military intervention in northern Mali

against a coalition of Islamists. French President Francois Hollande, who seemed utterly lost at the head

of a rudderless government, has now gained new prestige and refurbished his image as a statesman -

and a military leader dedicated to “destroying the enemy.” Thus, Mali seems fated to become the mirror

in which France admires the image of its strong and determined president.

Clearly, the ideology and methods of the Salafists and jihadist armed groups merit only condemnation.

To this principled position must be added a powerful dose of geopolitical analysis — all the while

avoiding confusion between an imperative moral stance on the one hand, and a simple-minded binary

political position on the other. To oppose the jihadist extremists does not mean accepting French policy

in the region. George W. Bush’s claim that “you are with us or with the terrorists” is as fundamentally

false as it is perilous, both in terms of substance and consequences. Behind France’s “noble”

commitment to the endangered people of Africa, several explicit questions remain unaddressed. The

West in general and France in particular, had for decades forgotten the people’s suffering under

dictatorship in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya before changing their tune and singing the praises of

“revolution” and the Arab Spring. In Libya, humanitarian intervention revealed its true face as an open

affirmation of interest in oil and economic advantage.

Now France is intervening in Mali, ostensibly for the “good of its people;” its only intention being to

protect a “friendly” country from the danger of extremists allied with the Tuwareg rebels. The accuracy

of this version remains to be seen, but the absence of economical and geopolitical analysis from the

media presentation of the French intervention raises serious doubts. Even less is said about the lengthy

history of France’s connections with a succession of Malian governments. Events are unfolding as

though France were suddenly expressing its solidarity with grace, generosity and selflessness. However,

the raw truth is that behind the recent political upheavals in Mali, France has never stopped meddling,

35

pressuring, removing Malian political or military leaders seen as uncooperative and creating alliances at

the highest levels of government and among the country’s tribal, military and civilian figures. President

Amadou Toumani Toure was overthrown by a military coup on March 22 last year. Toure paid for his

policies towards the northern part of the country and for his preferences in the future distribution of oil

exploration permits.lvi

The French government and the executives of the oil and gas multinationals have attempted to

downplay recent discoveries in the Sahel, a region including Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Algeria.

However, the data is much better known and established than most people are willing to admit. Jean-

Francois Arrighi de Casanova, Total’s director for North African operations, was more forthcoming when

he described it as “a new Eldorado,” with its vast oil and gas potential. The region possesses no fewer

than five promising deposits. The resource potential of the Touadenni basin, on the Mauritanian border,

has already been confirmed. To it must be added the Tamesna and Lullemeden basins along the border

with Niger, the Nara basin close to Mopti and the Gao Graben. France’s Autorite pour la Recherche

Petroliere (AUREP) has also confirmed the potential of Mali’s subterranean resources (primarily oil and

gas). Mali, Mauritania, Algeria and Niger now find themselves directly involved and, following the fall of

Gaddafi, the way is now open for the oil companies of France (with Total in the lead), to take full

advantage.lvii The blood, the liberty and the dignity of the friendly people of Mali are certainly all the

more worth defending when enormous oil and gas deposits lie hidden beneath their sands. And yet,

instead of indignation, all we see today is euphoria, celebration or silence in the face of France’s

“liberating action” and of the International Community’s unanimous support for it. Instead of proving

ourselves capable of coming together as brothers against a common threat (whose stated mission is to

reverse the progress made in Mali,) heads of African governments have chosen to fight and bicker

among each other while at the same time kneeling and giving praise to the West for openly stealing the

natural resources of the country. Shame on all of us for idly standing by.

36

Africa’s greatest service to itself, and to the West, is not to bend before the West’s nostalgia for power

and its illusions, but to resist with dignity and coherence in the name of the values that the West and

France claim to hold dear and yet every day betray by their hypocritical and lying policies in South

America, Africa and Asia. Northern Mali is a wake-up call that makes the blood run cold. Behold, people

that mistake a new form of enslavement and economic suffocation for political liberation. Behold,

Africans and Arab politicians and intellectuals with no dignity who grin and applaud. The hypocrisy and

cowardice of the latter is but the mirror image of the hypocrisy and manipulations of the former. lviii

Conclusions

African and Arabic societies have shaken the status-quo that has been in place for decades and taken to

the streets by answering the call of younger generations. Entire people are now realizing that they have

the power to oust tyrants and that dictatorship has nothing to do with some form of historical

determinism. It is imperative that we turn our attention to this phenomenon with optimism while

remaining vigilant. The job of civil society is to launch genuine debates on political, economic and

cultural emancipation and avoid unproductive polarization. Both African and Arabic societies need not

only a political uprising, but also a thorough intellectual revolutions that will help improve the condition

of people living there. Now is the time to define priorities and determine a common vision we would like

to pursue from good governance to economic justice, from rejecting corruption to halting poverty and

from accepting universal values to defending singularity.

37

Work Cited i “A New Middle East,” by Fareed Zakaria dated may 1

st, 2011: http://fareedzakaria.com/2011/05/01/a-new-middle-

east/ ii The Arab Awakening, dated July 14

th, 2011 from the Economist: http://www.economist.com/node/18958237

iii

“Arab Uprisings: Challenges During Political Transitions and Comparative Lessons for Civil Society in the

Middle East and North Africa,” dated April 2012 from the Geneva Graduate Institute:

http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/6305/Amman%20Conference%20Report01102012.pdf

v “Islam and the Arab Awakening,” by Tariq Ramadan pp 33-34.

vi “Je combattrai jusqu’a la derniere goute de sang,” dated February 2011:

http://www.rue89.com/2011/02/22/kadhafi-je-suis-a-tripoli-pas-au-venezuela-191416 vii

“Libya Crisis: Profile of NTC Chair Mustafa Abdul Jalil,” dated August 2011 from BBC:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14613679 viii

Egypt Crisis: Israel rallies to support Egyptian regime, January 31st 2011 by Adrian Blomfield:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8293536/Egypt-crisis-Israel-rallies-to-

support-of-Egyptian-regime.html ix

“Unemployment and Poverty in the Middle East and Africa,” edited by Wassim Shahin and Ghassan Dibeh:

http://books.google.com/books?id=21FarAOLIQwC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=

onepage&q&f=false x “The Arab Uprising: What Everyone Needs to Know,” by James Gelvin, p11.

xi Srdja popovic: http://www.trust.org/trustmedia/multimedia/video-and-audio/detail.dot?mediaInode=9caaaeba-

6155-46af-b552-f34fed368261 xii

The Internet Freedom Fallacy and the Arab Digital activism, dated September 17th,

2010 by Sami Ben Gharbia:

http://nawaat.org/portail/2010/09/17/the-internet-freedom-fallacy-and-the-arab-digital-activism/ xiii

Srdja popovic: http://www.trust.org/trustmedia/multimedia/video-and-audio/detail.dot?mediaInode=9caaaeba-

6155-46af-b552-f34fed368261 xiv

“Egypt protests: secret US document discloses support for protesters,” from the Telegraph:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289698/Egypt-protests-secret-US-

document-discloses-support-for-protesters.html

xv

“US scramble to size up El Baradei,”, dated January 31, 2011 by Helene Cooper, from the New York Times:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/world/middleeast/01elbaradei.html

xvi

New challenges for U.S – Egyptian military ties, dated February 2011 by Tom Curry:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41521234/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/new-challenges-us-egyptian-military-

ties/#.UKIQ14fAchU xvii

Tunisie: la fin d’un tabou. Enjeux autour de la succession du president et degradation du climat social by

Vincent Geisser and Labri Chouikha xviii

French minister defends offer of security forces to Tunisia, by Kim Willsher from the Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/18/french-minister-tunisia-offer

xix Behind the scenes of Ben Ali’s final hours dated January 25

th 2011, from Le Figaro:

https://plus.lefigaro.fr/note/behind-the-scenes-of-ben-alis-final-hours-20110125-382712 xx

“In Strikes On Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian Toll,” dated December 2011 from the New York Times:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/world/africa/scores-of-unintended-casualties-in-nato-war-in-

libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 xxi

“C.I.A Agents in Libya Aid Airstrikes and meet Rebels,” dated March 2011 from the New York Times: http://warincontext.org/2011/03/31/cia-agents-in-libya-aid-airstrikes-and-meet-rebels/

38

xxii

“Libyan rebel commander admits his fighters have Al Qaeda links,” from the Telegraph:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8407047/Libyan-rebel-commander-admits-

his-fighters-have-al-Qaeda-links.html xxiii

“West Steps Up to Gaddafi after years of feints,” dated March 2011: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/west-

steps-up-to-gaddafi-after-years-of-feints/764777/4 xxiv

“Gaddafi Tells Palestinians: Revolt against Israel,” dated February 2011, from Reuters:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/13/libya-israel-palestinians-idAFLDE71C0KP20110213 xxv

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=618xTGiSru0 xxvi

http://fr.rian.ru/infographie/20110222/188689447.html. xxvii

“Petrole: l’accord secret entre le CNT et la France,” dated September 2011 from Liberation:

http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012357324-petrole-l-accord-secret-entre-le-cnt-et-la-france xxviii

“Dure chasse aux contrats en Libye,” September 2011 from Le Journal du Dimanche:

http://www.lejdd.fr/International/Afrique/Actualite/Des-societes-francaises-seront-a-Tripoli-cette-semaine-en-vue-

de-conquerir-un-marche-de-200-milliards-386867 xxix

“Hugoo Chavez and the Arab Spring,” dated June 20, 2011 from: www.theworld.org/2011/06/hugo-chavez-arab-

spring/.

xxx Tariq Ramadan, September 2011; Hope and disappointment in Libya: http://www.tariqramadan.com/Hope-and-Disappointment-in-Libya,11723.html?lang=fr xxxii

From World Socialist Web Site on 5th

April 2011; The war against Libya and the eruption of European Imperialism: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/apr2011/pers-a05.shtml xxxiii

From Today’s Zaman on 30th

April 2012, Turkey criticizes France’s role in Libya Intervention: http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=238853 xxxiv

From Great Britain Office on June 2011: Libya and its implication for the UN, NATO and the EU: http://www.kas.de/grossbritannien/en/publications/28638/ xxxv

“Muammar Gaddafi Killed, Captured in Sirte,” from the Huffington Post:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/muammar-gaddafi-killed_n_1021462.html

xxxvi

From Al-Jazeera: www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/201/1/12/2011121884410921287.html xxxvii

“The Mid-East: Danger and Hope,” dated December, 2012 by Traiq Ramadan:

http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article12645 xxxviii

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html xxxix

“Russia says Assad losing control, rebels could win,” dated Decemmber 2012: http://news.yahoo.com/russia-

says-assad-losing-control-rebels-could-win-134424812.html xl http://syrianshuhada.com/?lang=en

xli “Sectarian clashes at Bahrain School,” dated March 2011 from Al-Jazeera:

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011310201330454225.html

xlii

“Top E.U defends Bahrain crackdown,” by Andrew Rettman dated March 2011:

http://euobserver.com/foreign/32038 xliii

“Sectrian Slants,” al-Ahram Weekly, dated March 2011, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1040/re801.htm xliv

“Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Spring,” dated December 2011 by Nancy Brune:

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10995/sub-saharan-africa-and-the-arab-spring?page=1 xlv

“The Arab Spring comes to…Angola,” dated October 2011:

http://thiscorneroftheworld.wordpress.com/2011/10/10/the-arab-spring-comes-to-angola/ xlvi

“Angola, fearing an Arab-Spring style uprising, paves way for new anti-digital communication legislation”

http://www.searchlightcatalysts.org/node/544/Tools

xlvii Revelation de Wikileaks sur le Senegal: L’image du pays ternie par les scandales:

http://www.leral.net/REVELATIONS-DE-WIKILEAKS-SUR-LE-SENEGAL-L-image-du-pays-ternie-par-les-scandales_a12948.html xlviii

In Senegal, Years of Frustration come to a Head, dated February 2012 by Brandon Harris from Freedom House: http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/senegal-years-frustration-come-head

39

xlix

Mali’s Irrevocable Crisis, dated 16th

April 2012 by William Lloyd George from ALJAZEERA: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/201241572956363410.html l “Mali rebels face backlash after months of instability and violence,” dated May 2012 from the Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/16/mali-rebels-instability-violence?newsfeed=true li Mali’s worst human rights situation in 50 years; dated 16 May 2012 from Amnesty International:

http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/mali-s-worst-human-rights-situation-50-years-2012-05-15 lii U.N Security Council asks for Mali Plan within 45 days; dated October 2012 from Reuters:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/12/us-mali-crisis-un-idUSBRE89B17U20121012 liii

Resolution 2085 from the UN: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085(2012) liv

Hollande: L’operation au Mali “n’a pas d’autre but que la lutte contre le terrorisme.” from Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/01/12/la-france-demande-une-acceleration-de-la-mise-en-place-de-la-force-internationale-au-mali_1816033_3212.html lv Mali Conflict overshadows A.U Summit; from News 24: http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/DRC-Mali-

conflicts-overshadow-AU-summit-20130128 lvi

The War on Mali. What you should know: An Eldorado of Uranium, Gold, Petroleum, Strategic Minerals; from Global Research: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-war-on-mali-what-you-should-know/5319093 lvii

Decouverte du Petrole au Mali: le premier forage en Mars 2010. Les vrais raisons de la guerre au Mali: http://lynxtogo.info/links/oeil-du-lynx/3463-decouverte-du-petrole-au-mali-le-premier-forage-en-mars-2010-les-vraies-raison-de-la-guerre-au-mali-.html lviii

Le Mali, La France et les Extremistes: by Tariq Ramadan: http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article12693