bvr combat brief

BVR combat brief

Philosphy of BVR combat● kill opponent beyond visual range● USAF position

– first look– first shot– first kill

● visual range depends on size of aircraft– generalized as anything beyond 37 kilometers

Comparision with infantry combat

● infantry combat readily moved towards close to medium range combat since World War I

– sniper rifle: 1 000 - 2 000 meters range– battle rifle: 500 - 1 000 meters range– assault rifle: 300 - 500 meters range

● main weapon until Vietnam battle rifles; assault rifles appear in World War II (StG-44)

● most combat happens at ranges no greater than 100 meters

Comparision with infantry combat

● M-14 (top) was replaced by M-16 (bottom) which was initially sabotaged by US generals so it jammed in combat. M-16 itself was heavier version of very successfull AR-15

US concept of battle requirements● stealth works, enemy doesn't have it● BVR works, enemy's doesn't● air bases and aircraft carriers safe from attack● AWACS safe from attack, enemy doesn't have

it● quality can compensate for quantitiy● history shows that these necessities are

unlikely to hold true in case of conflict with competent opponent

Stealth● all US stealth fighters based on assumptions

that:– combat will be solved at beyond visual range– enemy will use active X-band radar as primary

combat sensor for both ground and air installations

– enemy will not use anti-stealth measures

Anti-stealth measures● fighters

– stay passive– RWR– IRST– IR AAMs

● ground– passive radar– HF/VHF radar– IR SAMs

Anti-stealth measures● stay passive

– forces dilemma upon opponent● use radar and risk early detection● stay passive and loose advantage given by radar

stealth– both courses of action render irrelevant

advantage provided by low RCS● RWR

– modern radar warners can detect AESA LPI radars at two times or more its own detection distance vs typical fighter target

– SPECTRA and F-22s defense suite can use opponent's radar to generate firing solutions

Anti-stealth measures● IRST

– QWIP IRST● PIRATE (Typhoon)● OSF (Rafale)● EO DAS (F-35)● OLS-50M (PAK FA)● possibly on J-20

– allows for head-on detection of subsonic fighters at distances of 50-90 kilometers, and of missile flares to 90-150 kilometers

Anti-stealth measures● QWIP can operate in very longwave 15 micron

band to detect targets whose temperature is only few degrees Celzius different from temperature of their background/surroundings

● result: air combat switch from visual+radar centric to visual+infrared centric

● IR missiles are not affected by radar stealth– modern IR imaging missiles can lock on to

target from any aspect– missile's IR sensor can be used in lieu of IRST if

latter is unavaliable

Anti-stealth measures● HF/VHF radar

– radar stealth of aircraft dependant on wavelength of threat radar

– all stealth fighters to date optimised for X band stealth

– can be used along with IR SAM

Anti-stealth measures● during Kosovo war,

Serbs used VHF radar combined with IR SAM to shoot down one and cripple another F-117

– F-117 suffered 2 losses out of 1300 sorties

– F-16 flew 4500 sorties with 1 being shot down

Anti-stealth measures● passive radar

– multiple receivers on different locations– uses environmental EM radiation to detect

stealth aircraft● multistatic radar

– similar technique to passive radar, but uses its own transmitters

BVR missile performance

● g forces in tracking turn are square of speed● modern fighters highly maneuverable

– 12 g turn at Mach 0,5 (combat speed) - 0,9 (cruise speed)

– BVR missile speed: Mach 4● missile needs to pull 237 to 768 g to defeat

maneuvering fighter

BVR missile performance

● modern BVR missiles can pull 30 g in their no-escape zone

– missile Pk● against target maneuvering at cruise speed: 13%● against target maneuvering at corner speed: 4%

– this Pk does not account for any counter measures

● BVRAAM Pk against maneuvering targets with no ECM to date: 6-8%, compare to 15% for WVRAAM; ECM can reduce Pk by 50% > 2-7%

BVR missile performance● proximity fuze can trigger explosion if anything

flies nearby● ranges given for BVR missiles only at high

altitude against aircraft in attack– at low altitude range reduced to 25%– against aircraft in flight range reduced to 25%– AIM-120D range at low altitude against aircraft

in flight: 10 km

BVR missile performance● pre-Vietnam AIM-7

claims: 0,7 Pk● Vietnam performance:

0,08 Pk against less advanced (but competent) opponent

– most shots still from visual range

● supports scepticism about BVR missile performance claims

Photo source: Air Power Australia

BVR missile performance● BVR proponents' counter: Desert Storm, Allied

Force and Iraqi Freedom– 5 BVR kills in Desert Storm; all other kills from

visual range– F-15 AIM-7 Pk: 0,34; AIM-9 Pk: 0,67– AIM-120: 6 BVR kills in Iraqi Freedom and

Desert Storm out of 13 shots

BVR missile performance● these claims are misleading

– no targets had RWR or ECM– no targets had support from stand-off jammers– no targets had BVR weapon (radar, IR or anti-

radiation)– majority of targets had no sensors to warn them

about incoming missiles and had bad cockpit visibility: did not take evasive action

– Allied forces had large numerical and pilot superiority

BVR technology penalties● increased cost and complexity

– less aircraft– less sorties per day per aircraft

● result– training penalties– numerical penalties

● personnel > numbers > technology

BVR technology penalties● F-22 and F-15

designed for BVR● F-16A designed for

WVR● JAS-39C designed for

WVR with some BVR capability

BVR technology penalties

● aircraft cost in 2013 USD– F-22A: 262 million USD flyaway, 61 000 USD

per hour in the air; 13 300 USD per kg– F-15C: 126 million USD flyaway, 30 000 USD

per hour in the air; 9 921 USD per kg– F-16A: 30 million USD; 4 240 USD per kg– JAS-39C: 40 million USD, 4 700 USD per hour

in the air; 6 040 USD per kg

BVR technology penalties● missile cost in 2013 USD

– BVR missiles● AIM-120D: 1 470 000 USD

– WVR missiles● AIM-9X: 678 000 USD● IRIS-T: 270 000 USD


● cost per enemy aircraft shot down:– AIM-120D

● Pk 3-8%● 18 375 000 - 49 000 000 USD

– AIM-9X● Pk 10-15%● 4 520 000 - 6 780 000 USD

– IRIS-T● Pk 10-15%● 1 800 000 - 2 700 000 USD


● Loadout cost and effectiveness– 8 BVRAAM

● Pk 0,24-0,64● 11 760 000 USD

– 8 WVRAAM● Pk 0,8-1,2● 2 160 000 - 5 424 000 USD

● number of missiles for Pk = 1– BVRAAM: 12-33 = 17,64 - 48,51 million USD– WVRAAM: 6-10 = 1,62 - 6,78 million USD

BVR technology penalties● radar-based combat

– radar is active sensor● gives away position of aircraft using it● can be used for IFF● radar signal can be used to target aircraft using

radar– only countermeasure to turn radar off


● longer range means larger radar– larger aircraft

● heavier● more expensive● less maneuverable

– more complex systems● more expensive per unit of weight● harder to maintain● less reliable

BVR technology penalties● Result

– smaller force for $$$– less sorties per number of aircraft– less effective per sortie– does not provide advantage in effective

engagement range

First look: electronically

● modern defense suites (SPECTRA) can target aircraft through its radar emissions

● result: radars will be turned off in next major air war

First look: visually

● the biggest target in the sky is the first one to die

First look: visually

US F-15 jets intercepting MiG-29s at medium altitude

IFF● as recently as 2003 Iraqi Freedom,

misidentified US aircraft were lost to allied systems

● only reliable IFF visual one > optical systems

First look: visually● result: biggest target is detected first

– reverses theoretical advantage of radar-based BVR combat

Image source: F-22 fighter performance by James P Stevenson

Numbers

● number of aircraft for 1 billion USD– F-22: 3– F-15C: 7– F-16A: 33– JAS-39C: 22

● Sortie rate:– F-22: 0,5, F-15: 1– JAS-39: 2, F-16: 1,2

● 3:1 ratio maximum where superior quality can compensate for superior quantitiy

Numbers● Sorties per day:

– F-22: 1,5– F-15: 7– F-16A: 39,6– JAS-39C: 44

Numbers● Missiles carried:

– F-22: 8 BVRAAM– F-15: 4 WVRAAM, 4 BVRAAM– F-16: 6 WVRAAM / 2 WVRAAM, 4 BVRAAM– JAS-39: 6 WVRAAM / 2 WVRAAM, 4 BVRAAM


Cost Cost per kg Operating cost Aircraft for 1 billion USD Sorties Missiles0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

F-22JAS-39F-15CF-16A

Numbers

● Lanchester square

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● critique not fully applicable to air combat

Numbers● OODA loop

– observe– orient– decide– act

● too large number of hostile fighters in the air can significantly slow down, or even break, the loop

USAF self-delusion

● assumption: technology neutralizes numbers● assumption: long-range air-to-air combat gives

unparalleled advantage● justification: F-22 BVR dominance in exercises● exercises between F-22 and F-15/F-16 use

BVR missile Pk of 0,65– justification based on combat in Iraq– AIM-120 had Pk of 0,46 against non-

maneuvering fighters without ECM; AIM-7 achieved 0,34 in Iraq in same conditions

USAF self-delusion

● reality:– WVR performance still important– air bases under constant threat of attack - even

when one side has undisputed air superiority● cruise missiles make this problem even worse

● rewriting history– agility was always important

● von Richthofen („Red Baron“) opted for more agile fighter at expense of speed

● agility continued to dominate air-to-air combat through WW2, Korea, Vietnam

BVR fighter performance in WVR

● as shown above, BVR combat does not work against competent opponent

● result: fighters forced to fight within visual range– requirements: small size, light weight, low wing

loading, low thrust loading, low drag, high fuel fraction, numerical superiority, ability to achieve quick kills

● how do BVR fighters compare?– BVR requirements: high speed, large missile

payload, large radar >> maneuvering and numerical penalty

Capability penalties

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5

10

15

20

25

30

GripenCGripenCF-16CF-16CF-22AF-22AF-15CF-15C

Result

● excessive BVR requirements (radar and radar-guided BVR missiles instead of RWR, IRST and IR BVR missiles) mean that most BVR fighters are (performance-wise) actually fighter-bombers

– can't fight against dedicated fighters– can't bomb as well as dedicated bombers

● but modern fighters operate at speeds too high to attack tactical targets on ground, and are too delicate to withstand AA fire

Secure air bases?● BVR fighters, especially stealth ones, based

upon implicit assumption of safe air bases– but how safe air bases really are?

● even when Allies had complete superiority in the air, their bases were attacked

Secure air bases?● US air bases use hardened shelters for fighters

Secure air bases?

● air base tendering: using fighters to shoot down opponent's fighters when they try to take off

– Sidewinder-armed Fokker DR.1 can shoot down F-22 by using that tactic, and several can close down entire air base

● aircraft spend majority (over 2/3) of time on the ground; consequently, problem of secure air bases among most important

– possible solution: use fighters that don't need concrete runways or any large, fixed facilities

– US super-carriers unable to keep CAP overhead

Secure air bases - conclusion

● air bases are never secure– small numbers of expensive, so-called „high-

performance“ fighters that have to operate from highly visible concrete runways require relatively small effort to destroy when compared to large numbers of small, cheap, rugged fighters that can operate from nearly anywhere

– large numbers of fighters are required to defend air bases

Aircraft carriers● US carrier force

– 10 fleet carriers● currently Nimitz class super-carriers● to be replaced by very similar Gerald F Ford

class– 9 amphibious assault ships

● can host V/STOVL fighters● smaller, cheaper than „fleet“ carriers

Aircraft carriers● very vulnerable to assymetric response

– cannot generate sorties as efficiently as land air bases

– can be quickly sunk by cheaper weapons● AIP/diesel submarines● „carrier killer“ cruise missiles

● problem– very complex BVR-based fighters– tankers can be converted to flattops, but what

about fighters?

Aircraft carriers

Aircraft carriers● solution

– small fighter that can take off in relatively short distance, and is cheap and simple enough to be produced in very large numbers

– dedicated strike aircraft– navalized A-10– island bases and „island hopping“

● same solutions applicable for land-based aviation

– completely contrary to BVR combat „logic“

What about AWACS?● AWACS is one of corner stones of USAF BVR

doctrine– large aircraft with huge, long-range radar

AWACS killer missiles● K-100

– range of 200 kilometers● Vympel R-37

– range of 400 kilometers against AWACS; work still in progress

KS-100

Scenario: PLAAF invasion of Taiwan

Combat assumptions

● All scenarios– all F-22s (183) on Taiwan > 90 sorties per day– use low and high end to estimate both

possibilities– stealth fighters invulnerable to BVR shots

● Scenarios 2 and 4– 450 F-35s, 225 sorties per day

● 300 F-35s on Taiwan > 150 sorties per day● 3 carrier battle groups near Taiwan > 150 F-35s,

75 sorties per day

Combat assumptions● 1 200 Chinese fighters in range of Taiwan

– by 2030 PLAAF likely to have 20 J-20, 800 Su-30/J-11B, 800 J-10

– assume 1 200 J-10 and J-11/Su-30 with 1 sortie per fighter per day

● 15 J-20: 5 sorties per day● 600 J-11: 600 sorties per day● 600 J-10: 600 sorties per day

Combat assumptions (Sc 1&2)

● BVR missile Pk– 0% against F-22, F-35, J-20– 4% against Su-27, 30, 33, 35

● WVR missile Pk– 15% against F-22, Sukhoi, J-20– 22% against F-35A, 29% against F-35B, 27%

against F-35C● gun Pk

– 30% against F-22, J-20, Sukhoi– 50% against F-35

Combat assumptions (Sc 3&4)● US missile Pk: 100%● PLAAF missile Pk: 0%

Missile loadout● F-22: 6 BVR, 2 WVR● F-35: 4 BVR

– unsurvivable in visual range combat● J-10: 6 BVR, 2 WVR● J-11: 6 BVR, 2 WVR● Su-30: 6 BVR, 4 WVR● J-20: 6 BVR, 2 WVR

Combat assumptions

● radar detection range– against F-22: 45 km– against F-35: 80 km– against J-20: 60 km– against legacy: 100 km

● WVR missile range– USAF (AIM-9X): 26 km– PLAAF (PL-8): 20 km

Combat assumptions

● Closure rate– scenario 1: 850 m/s– scenario 2: 650 m/s– range in time:

● 100 km = t● 80 km = t+23s (Sc1), t+31s (Sc2)● 60 km = t+47s (Sc1), t+67s (Sc2)● 45 km = t+65s (Sc1), t+85s (Sc2)● 26 km = t+87s (Sc1), t+114s (Sc2)● 20 km = t+94s (Sc1), t+123s (Sc2)

– does not account for time required to evade missiles

Combat assumptions

● SAMs have been taken out by cruise missiles and don't participate

● Taiwanese air forces do not participate● all sorties avaliable launched at once

– Scenario 1● USAF: 90 F-22● PLAAF: 5 J-20, 600 J-11, 600 J-10

– Scenario 2● USAF/USN: 90 F-22, 225 F-35● PLAAF: 5 J-20, 600 J-11, 600 J-10

Scenario 1● t = 90 F-22 launch 540 BVR missiles against

1200 PLAAF legacy fighters; Pk = 0,04; 22 targets destroyed

● t+65 = 1183 PLAAF fighters launch 7230 BVR missiles; Pk = 0, 0 targets destroyed

● t+87 = 90 F-22 launch 180 WVR missiles; Pk = 0,14, 25 targets destroyed

● t+94 = 1158 PLAAF fighters launch 2316 WVR missiles; Pk = 17%; could destroy 394 F-22s but only 90 present; 90 targets destroyed

Scenario 1● End result

– USAF aircraft lost: 90– PLAAF aircraft lost: 47– USAF aircraft remaining: 0– PLAAF aircraft remaining: 1158– USAF kill/loss ratio: 0,52

Scenario 2● t = 90 F-22 + 150 F-35 launch 840 BVR

missiles against 1200 Chinese legacy fighters; Pk = 0,04, 33 targets destroyed


● t+87 = 90 F-22 + 150 F-35 launch 480 WVR missiles; Pk = 0,14, 67 targets destroyed

● t+94 = 1105 PLAAF fighters launch 2210 WVR missiles; average Pk = 24%; could destroy 530 targets but only 240 present; 240 targets destroyed


– USAF aircraft lost: 240– PLAAF aircraft lost: 100– USAF aircraft remaining: 0– PLAAF aircraft remaining: 1105– USAF kill/loss ratio: 0,42

Scenario 3● t = 90 F-22 launch 540 BVR missiles against

1200 Chinese legacy fighters; Pk = 1, 540 targets destroyed


● t+87 = 90 F-22 launch 180 WVR missiles; Pk = 1, 180 targets destroyed

● t+94 = 485 PLAAF fighters launch 970 WVR missiles; Pk = 0, 0 targets destroyed


– USAF aircraft lost: 0– PLAAF aircraft lost: 720– USAF aircraft remaining: 90– PLAAF aircraft remaining: 485

Scenario 4● t = 90 F-22 + 150 F-35 launch 1140 BVR

missiles against 1200 PLAAF legacy fighters; Pk = 1, 1140 targets destroyed


● t+87 = 90 F-22 launch 180 WVR missiles; Pk = 1, 65 targets destroyed

● t+94 = 0 PLAAF fighter aircraft remaining


– USAF aircraft lost: 0– PLAAF aircraft lost: 1205– USAF aircraft remaining: 240– PLAAF aircraft remaining: 0

PLAAF Taiwan invasion summary● numbers matter

– in 3 out of 4 scenarios US defenders defeated● it is unwise to rely solely on a „silver bullet“

solutions● even with perfect missile Pk and invulnerable

aircraft, defenders were unable to win if PLAAF sent more fighters than they had missiles

– with more realistic assumptions, maximum break even force ratio is 3 PLAAF aircraft for every US one - assuming USAF superiority in every aspect

Scenarios critique● do not take into account PLA area denial

systems– cruise missiles– diesel electric and AIP submarines

● these systems are designed for assymetric warfare against US Navy; likely to prevent US carrier operations near Chinese coast

● do not take into account Republic of China's (Taiwan) air forces

● excessively optimistic

Scenarios critique● many PLAAF air bases significantly harder than

typical US air base– underground hangars– no visible fuel storage– result: US bases vulnerable to attack; US force

sizes portrayed are too optimistic● IRST not taken into account

– OLS-35 can detect subsonic stealth fighter head-on at 50 kilometers; 10% more if supersonic

– QWIP IRST allows for detection range of 90 km head on vs subsonic fighter; possibly used on J-20

PLAAF air bases

Fuzhou air base - clearly visible entrances tounderground facility

Source: 2008 RAND brief

USAF Kadena air base

Source: 2008 RAND brief

Scenarios critique● IR BVR missiles not taken into account

– unlikely to achieve significantly better Pk than radar-guided BVR missiles for reasons of physics, but negate US advantage in radar stealth

● VHF SAMs used by China - can detect stealth aircraft

Scenarios critique● PLA SAMs more likely to survive initial missile

exchange than US/Taiwanese SAMs● many PLAAF fighters - being copies of Russian

Su-27 and MiG-29 - can operate from dirt strips or any sufficiently flat and hard surface; US fighters cannot

● stealth aircraft are not invulnerable to radar-guided missiles

Written by● Picard578● http://defenseissues.wordpress.com/

bvr combat brief

Technology

safe air bases

guided bvr

air bases

air combat

large numbers

cruise speed

desert storm

enemy doesn