buttigieg, joseph. (1995). gramsci on civil society. boundary 2. vol. 22. nº 3

8/9/2019 BUTTIGIEG, Joseph. (1995). Gramsci on Civil Society. Boundary 2. Vol. 22. N 3.

1/33

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2/33

Gramsci

on

Civil

Society

Joseph A. Buttigieg

Antonio Gramsci's

analysis

of

civil

society,

much like his

study

of

the role of intellectuals

in

society

and his

concept

of

hegemony,

has

long

In

order

o

avoidcumbersome

ootnotes,

I

have

indicated

n

the text the titles of Gramsci's

articles romwhich

I

quote

and

have

provided

he date of

publication

f the

newspaper

n

which

hey

first

appeared.

These

articles

are

easy

to

locate

in

the

following

olumes

of the

critical ditionof Gramsci'spre-prisonwritings,wheretheyare reproducednchronologi-

cal order:Cronache

orinesi:

1913-1917,

ed.

S.

Caprioglio

Turin:

inaudi,

980);

La

citta

futura:

1917-1918,

ed. S.

Caprioglio

Turin:

inaudi,

1982);

/II

ostro Marx:

1918-1919,

ed. S.

Caprioglio

Turin:

inaudi,

984);

L'Ordine uovo:

1919-1920,

ed.

V.

Gerratana nd

A.

Santucci

(Turin:

inaudi,

1987);

Socialismo

e fascismo. L'Ordine uovo:

1912-1922

(Turin:

inaudi,

966);

and La costruzionedel

Partito

omunista:1923-1926

(Turin:

in-

audi,

1971).

Gramsci's

ettersare also

chronologically

rderedand

hence

easy

to

locate,

in

either

the

Italianor the

(more complete) English-language

ritical

edition-see

Let-

tere dal

carcere,

ed. E.

Fubiniand

S.

Caprioglio Turin:

inaudi,

965);

and Letters

rom

Prison,

2

vols.,

ed.

F.

Rosengarten

New

York:Columbia

University

ress,

1994).

For he

extracts rom he Prison

Notebooks,

Ihave

provided

he

pertinent

notebookand section

numbers hat would

enable the reader o locate them

quickly

n

the Italian ritical

dition,

Quaderni

del

carcere,

4

vols.,

ed.

V.

Gerratana

Turin:

inaudi,

1975),

and,

in

the case

of

the first two

notebooks,

in Prison

Notebooks,

vol.

1,

ed. J.

A.

Buttigieg New

York:

Columbia

University

ress,

1992).

boundary2

2:3,

1995.

Copyright

1995

by

Duke

University

ress.CCC

0190-3659/95/$1.50.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/33

2

boundary

/

Fall

1995

been

recognized

as one of the

most

original

and

important

eatures of

the

politicaltheory he elaborated in his Prison Notebooks. Scholars have de-

bated at

great length

the

differences and

similarities between Gramsci's

concept

of civil

society

and

Hegel's,

whether it

represents

a

significant

de-

parture

from traditional Marxist

thought,

and what

place

it

occupies (or

should be

assigned)

within the

history

of

political

philosophy.

Outside

the

specialized

fields of social and

political

theory,

however,

civil

society

has

not

always,

or

everywhere,

been a familiar

erm,

even

among

well-informed,

politically

ophisticated

general

readers.

In

the United

States,

for

example,

civil

society

does

not

appear

in

many

basic dictionaries

(such

as those

most

widely

used

by university

students),

and it is

rarely,

f

ever,

encoun-

tered

in

mainstream

political

discourse. What

brought

the

concept

of civil

society

to the attention of a broader

spectrum

of

political

observers,

at least

in

the United

States,

were the events that resulted

in

the

political

trans-

formation of the Eastern

European

countries and the

dismantling

of the

former Soviet

bloc, or, rather,

he efforts to

interpret

and account for the un-

expected,

breathtakingly

rapiddevelopments

occurring during

that

period.

The

phrase

civil

society

recurred

requently

n

the

writings

and

speeches

of

Eastern

European

intellectuals who were

participating

n,

when not

actually

stimulating

and

guiding,

the

sociopolitical recomposition

of their countries.

Predictably,

t was

quickly

picked up

by many

journalists,

commentators,

and

pundits

who

were

only

too anxious to find some

general

theory

or ab-

stract

concept

that would

help

them

explain

the

complex phenomena they

were

witnessing.

(One

must not

forget

that the

overwhelming

majority

of

the

political

experts

and

Sovietologists

in

the West had

completely

failed to

anticipate

the events

that,

in

the

space

of a

year

or

two,

were to

utterly

re-

configure

the

geopolitical

order.)

This is not to

suggest

that the

increasingly

frequent

allusions to

the

concept

of civil

society

were

always-or

even

in

most

cases--accompanied

by

a clear

understanding

of its intricate

geneal-

ogy

and of

its

many

different

nuances,

or,

even

less,

by

an awareness

of

Gramsci's

perspicacious

treatment of

it. In

the late 1980s

and

in

the

1990s,

the term

civil

society

was

employed,

more often

than

not,

somewhat

like

a

magical

explanatory

formula,

and

its

meaning

remained

vague,

since those

who

invoked it

rarely

bothered

to

define it

in

any illuminating,

ystematic

way or to explain convincinglywhy it (orthe phenomenon itsupposedly de-

scribed)

came

to assume

such

overwhelming

importance

at

this

particular

time and

specifically

in Eastern

European

countries.

Those who

looked

into Gramsci's

works for

some

insight

that

would

shed

light

on

the events that

transpired

n

Eastern

Europe invariably

eroed



4/33

Buttigieg

Gramsci

n Civil

Society

3

in

on one brief

passage:

"In he East the state was

everything,

civil

society

was primordial nd gelatinous; in the West there was a properrelationbe-

tween

state

and civil

society,

and

when the state trembled a

sturdy

structure

of civil

society

was

immediately

revealed"

(Notebook

7,

?16, p. 866).

It

was

in

the last month or

two of

1930

that

Gramsci,

in

a

fascist

jail, jotted

down

this observation

in

one of his notebooks.

Almost

six decades

later,

these

remarks,

plucked

out of their

historical

context,

acquired (or,

rather,

were en-

dowed

with)

a

propheticquality; hey

supplied

a

ready-made

explanation

of

the

disintegration

of the communist

regimes

once dominated

by

the

Soviet

Union.Thus, for example, in a New YorkTimes article, "The Rise of 'Civil

Society'

"

(25

June

1989),

Flora

Lewis,

the

newspaper's

senior

foreign

affairs

correspondent

at the

time,

used

this

often-quoted

passage

from

Gramsci

as the basis for

declaring:

"The Communist ideal is

destroying

itself as the

century

ends because it could not

create

the

'fortresses and earthworks'of

civil

society,

nor accommodate them."

This,

of

course,

is a

perfectly

tenable

diagnosis

that

could

be

reasonably

buttressed with

arguments

drawnfrom

Gramsci--although

one

must hasten to add that the rest of

Lewis's article

offers a

hopelessly garbled

account of Gramsci's views. At the

same

time,

however,

the

isolation of this

particular

passage

from the rest of

Gramsci's

extensive

discussions of civil

society

is

fraught

with

problems.

First of

all,

the

"Oriental"tate to which

Gramsci refers

in

this

instance is

quite specifi-

cally

czarist

Russia;

to

apply

his

characterization of the

Russia of

1917 to

the

Soviet Union of

1989

is,

to

say

the

least,

ahistorical.

Such a

simplistic

application

also tends to

obscure the

fact that

in

his

analyses

of civil

society,

Gramsci focuses

primarily,

ot to

say

exclusively,

on

the

anatomy

of

modern

Western

states;

the

countries to which

he devotes

special

attention,

apart

from

Italy,

are France and the United States. The main value of Gramsci's

concept

of civil

society,

which is

intertwinedwith

his

theory

of

hegemony,

resides

in

its

exposure

of

the

mechanisms and

modulations of

power

in

capitalist

states that

purport

o be

democratic. When

Gramsci's

insights

are

employed

principally

s an

instrument

or

explaining

what went

wrong

in

the

Soviet

Union and its

satellites,

attention is

deflected

away

from

his

forceful,

demystifying

critique

of

the

liberal/capitalist

tate,

its

ethos,

and its

claims to

universality-a critique

that

urgently

needs to

be

revived and

reelaborated

today as a remedyto the pervasive complacency and the povertyof oppo-

sitional criticism

that

have followed in

the

wake of the

short-lived

euphoria

triggered by

the

end

of

the cold

war.

Another,

more

serious

problem

arises when

Gramsci's

brief com-

parison

between "East"

and "West"

s

removed from

its

original

context

and



5/33

4

boundary

/

Fall

1995

used

(anachronistically)

as a

key

for

interpreting

he

Soviet/Russian

phe-

nomenon rather than as a stimulus for research into the anatomy of the

state

in

its

prevalent

Western form: t

may

lend

credence to the notion that

the state and civil

society

are

two

separate

and

opposed

entities.

When

Gramsci's

remarks on "East"

and "West"are

treated

in

isolation,

it is

easy

to overlook

or

conceal his most

distinctive contribution o

our understand-

ing

of civil

society.

Gramsci

regarded

civil

society

as an

integral

part

of the

state;

in

his

view,

civil

society,

far from

being

inimical o the

state,

is,

in

fact,

its most resilient constitutive

element,

even

though

the most

immediately

visible

aspect

of the state is

politicalsociety,

with

which it is all too often

mistakenly

identified. He was also

convinced that the

intricate,

organic

re-

lationships

between

civil

society

and

political

society

enable

certain strata

of

society

not

only

to

gain

dominance within the state

but

also,

and more

importantly,

o maintain

it,

perpetuating

the

subalternity

of other strata.

To

ignore

or to set aside these crucial

aspects

of

Gramsci's

concept

of civil

society

is tantamountto

erasing

the crucial

differences

that set his

theory

of

the state

apart

from the

classic liberal

version. This is

precisely

what Flora

Lewis does

in her

article,

when she

quotes

Gramsci's

remarks

merely

as a

point

of

departure

for

reiterating

he most tiresome shibboleths: the

omnipo-

tence and

omnipresence

of the state made communist

countries

despotic;

the

autonomy

of civil

society

in

the United

States

ensures freedom.

Why

in-

voke

Gramsci

to

support

these

kinds of assertions? The same

point

would

have been better

reinforced

by

a

quotation

from Locke

or,

for that

matter,

from Ronald

Reagan

The

only

reason

why

Lewis finds it

necessary

to turn

to Gramsci

is that she wants to

explain

to

her readers the

significance

of

civil

society-a

term

with which most of them

(including,

probably,

Ronald

Reagan)

are not

acquainted.

While

pretending

to

explain

Gramsci's

concept

of civil

society,

Lewis

ends

up

misconstruing

it

as

simply

another version

of

what,

in

U.S.

politicalparlance,

is

routinely

called

the

"private

ector"

or

"private phere."

She

also

has a novel

explanation

for

the absence of civil

society

from the

politicalvocabulary

in the United

States:

"Americans

don't

talk about civil

society

because

they

take

it

for

granted.

It s

the

society."

The

triumphalistic,

elf-congratulatory

one of this assertion

fails to conceal

its

unintended

irony:

f Americans need to be

introduced o Gramsci's

thought,

it is precisely so that they would cease takingcivilsociety forgranted, de-

velop

a better

critical

understanding

of

it,

and start

thinking

of alternatives

to the current

configurations

of

power.

Gramsci's

concept

of civil

society,

like most of his

ideas

and

cate-

gories,

is not to

be found

encapsulated

in

a

single

sentence or

passage.



6/33

Buttigieg

Gramsci

n Civil

Society

5

Rather,

it

emerges gradually,

starting

with some

relatively straightforward

observations in the earliestjournalisticwritingsand culminating nthe com-

plex,

though fragmentary,

ormulations

recorded

in

the

prison

notebooks.

Yet,

even before

turning

to

Gramsci's

texts,

it is

important

to take

cogni-

zance of certain

misleading

assumptions

and

prejudices

that have become

ingrained

notions

(or

that,

as Gramsci

would

say,

have

become

"common

sense")

thanks to the

pervasive

influence of the liberal

tradition--assump-

tions and

prejudices

that have

often

hindered,

sometimes

in

obvious

ways

and

at other times more

subtly,

an

understanding

of

Gramsci's

thinking

on civil society. The most obvious of these assumptions is the identifica-

tion

of the "state"

with the

"government"

r

"government

apparatus."

Thus

conceived,

the state is the embodiment of

power,

which

it

exercises

by

enacting

laws and

enforcing

them.

This

conception

is often

accompanied

by

the conviction that the activities of the

state

(i.e.,

government)

must be

held

strictly

in

check,

since its incursions into the

"private" phere

almost

always

result

in

a diminution

of individual reedom. From this

viewpoint,

then,

the existence of the

state

poses

a threat to

freedom,

but it

cannot

be eliminated

entirely

because,

in

order to avoid

anarchy,

it alone can be

allowed to exercise coercive force

against

external and internalenemies of

the social order. The

private sphere (i.e.,

civil

society

as distinct from

and

opposed

to the

state,

in

the liberal scheme of

things),

on the other

hand,

is

regarded

as the terrainwhere freedom is exercised

and

experienced.

In

the reductive

rhetoric of

politicians,

these liberal

concepts

are

translated

into

diatribes

against

so-called

big government

and exhortations to

transfer

responsibility

or the

delivery

of

"public"

ervices

(including

not

only

trans-

portation,

communications,

and

utilities,

but also

health

care,

education,

and even the incarcerationof

criminals)

o the

"private

ector"--in

the name

not

only

of

efficiency

but also of

greater

freedom from

government

"con-

trol"

and

greater

"freedomof choice"

for individuals

often

referred

o,

in

this

context,

as

"consumers").

Within

his kind of

rhetoric,

he

term civil

society

or

private sphere

designates

not so much the

terrain of freedom

in

some

general

abstract sense but rather

the "free-market"

ystem,

more or less

specifically.

Further,

t

is

commonly

assumed that

freedom and

democracy

mean

virtually

he

same

thing,

and

that

democracy

entails

a free-market

economy or vice versa. Thus, many different erms have lost theirprecise

meaning

and are now

routinely

used

as if

they

were

interchangeable:

civil

society(private

phere),

ree

market,

emocracy,

ree

society,

free

country,

et cetera.

In

fact,

there exists a

very

large

contingent

of

expert

economists,

influential

policy

advisers,

and

powerful

government

officials who

believe,



7/33

6

boundary

/

Fall

995

or workhardat

propagating

he

belief,

that the

creation

of a

free-market

economyconstitutes he necessaryfirst tep inthe processof developing

civil

ociety

and

establishing

democratic

ystem.

These

assumptions

onstitute he basis

of

a

widespreadprejudice

that

has been at

the

root

of

many

confused and

confusing

nterpretations

of Gramsci's

writings.

The

prejudice, aldly

tated,

goes

as follows:Since

Marxist

or

socialist)

heory

s

categorically pposed

to

laissez-faire

n

the

economic

sphere,

socialism avors

some

would

ay

inevitably

eads

to)

the

installation

f

an

omnipotent

tate;

therefore,

ocialism

would

suppress

the private phere (i.e.,

civil

society)

and hence erase the

terrain f free-

dom. This

prejudice

s alimented

by

liberal

heory,

but

nothing

helped

re-

inforce

t more

strongly

han the

tragic-pathetic

istory

of the now defunct

Eastern

European

ommunist tates. So

firmly

ntrenched

s

this

prejudice

that

socialism

and

"big

government"

ave become

virtuallyynonymous

n

many

people's

minds.Nor s this

merely

a

vulgar

misconception;

t s heldon

to

fiercely

ven

by

prominent

ntellectuals,

uch as the

Nobel

Prize

winner

Milton

Friedman, ho,

in

his introduction

o

Friedrich

on

Hayek's

Road

to

Serfdom

University

f

Chicago

Press,

1994),

sets

up

a

simplebinary

ppo-

sition:

on one

side,

he

posits

unbridled

apitalism,

which

ensures

voluntary

cooperation, rosperity,

nd

freedom;

nd

on the other

ide,

socialism,

with

the

government

oordinating

ll

activities,

whichensures

economic

ailure

and

serfdom.

Howdoes

one

begin

to

explain

hat Marxist

heory,

arfrom

advocating

tronggovernmental

uthority,

ctually nvisages

the end

of

the

state?

Or hatGramsci's

isionof a social

order

based

on consensus

and

rid

of coercive

state

power

does notconstitute

departure

rom,

much ess an

abandonment

f,

the socialist

deal?

In

order o

read

Gramsci

ntelligently,

thisprejudice eeds to be set aside.

The

main

question

addressed

by

Gramscihas

nothing

o do

with he

desirability

r otherwise

of

a

strong

state; indeed,

Gramsci

s

even

more

radically

ommitted

o

whittling

he

coercive

power

of

the state

than

the

most

dogmatic

ibertarian.

ramsci,

owever,

lso

recognizes

hat

coercion

and

domination

y

force

are

not the

only,

nor

necessarily

he most

effec-

tive,

means

of control

nd subordination

n

society.

He,

therefore,

xplores

aspects

of

the

state,

and

of

civil

society

in

particular,

hat liberal

heory

s

loathto examine-namely,the relationsof powerand influencebetween

political

ociety

(i.e.,

what the liberals

call

"government,"

r

"state")

nd

civil

ociety

(i.e.,

the

"private

ector,"

n

liberal

ocabulary),

hich

mutually

reinforce ach

other o

the

advantage

of

certain

trata,

groups,

and

institu-

tions.

Thus,

for

Gramsci,

ivil

society

is

best

described

not as

the

sphere



8/33

Buttigieg

Gramsci

n

Civil

ociety

7

of

freedombut

of

hegemony.

Hegemony,

o

be

sure,

depends

on

consent

(as opposedto coercion),butconsent is notthe spontaneousoutcomeof

"free

choice";

onsent

is

manufactured,

lbeit

hrough

xtremely

omplex

mediums,

diverse

nstitutions,

nd

constantly

hanging

processes.

Further-

more,

he

power

o

manufacture

onsent is not

evenly

distributed

n

society

(or,

to

put

it

in

the

metaphoric

anguage

of

sports

that

permeatespolitical

oratory

n

the

United

States,

civil

society

is not

a

level

playing

ield);

n-

deed,

not

everyone

s

in

an

equal position

o understand ow consent

is

manufactured,

nd there are even those who remainunaware

of the

fact

that consent is manufacturedndactuallybelieve hattheygivetheirown

consent

"freely"

nd

spontaneously.

ar

rom

opposing

iberal

emands or

a minimal tate and an

extensionof the

sphere

of civil

society,

Gramsci's

elaboration f the Marxist

heory

of the state

exposes

(just

as Machiavelli

had

exposed

the

mechanisms

of

government

n

a

different

istorical

on-

text)

those

apparatuses

nd

processes

of

power

at work

n

civil

ociety,

as

wellas

in

the

relations etween

civil

ociety

and

political

ociety

that iberal

theory

generally gnores.

His

purpose

s not to

repress

civil

society

or to

restrict

ts

space

but rather o

develop

a

revolutionarytrategy a

"war

f

position")

hatwould

be

employed

precisely

n

he

arena

of civil

ociety,

with

the

aim

of

disabling

he coercive

apparatus

f the

state,

gaining

access to

political

power,

and

creating

he

conditions

hat could

give

rise to a con-

sensual

society

whereinno

individual r

group

s

reduced o a

subaltern

status.

It is

important

o

bear

in

mind hat Gramsci's

heoretical r

philo-

sophical

reatment f this

subject

emerges

out

of,

and

even

depends

on,

his

detailed

tudy

of the

concrete

political

nd cultural

istory

f

Western-

especially

Italian nd

French-society,

that it is animated

by

the

urgent

need he feltto

acquire

a

more

horough

nderstanding

f the

sociocultural,

economic,

and

political

onfiguration

f

Italy

n

order o

be better

able

to

devise an effective

trategy

o

revolutionize

t,

and that t is the

fruit f

a

long

process

of direct

political

ngagement,

discussions,

experiences,

reflec-

tions,

and

reconsiderations

hatstretch

back o his

earliest

years

of

socialist

activism.

In

other

words,

Gramsci's

nsights

on

the

state and civil

society

are

deeply

rooted

n

a

concreteand

specific

sequence

of

turbulent

vents

and developments the RussianRevolution,WorldWarI, rapid ndustrial

development, ostwar

ocial

instability,

ise of

fascism),

especially

as

they

were

experienced

n

Italy

and,

above

all,

seen from

he

point

of view of

a

major

participant

irst

n

the

socialistworkers'

movement

nd

subsequently

in

the

shaping

of a

communist

party.

tis also

important

otto

lose

sight



9/33

8

boundary

/

Fall

1995

of Gramsci's

specific

intellectualand

political

ormation,

he

early

stages

of

which he describes succinctly ina letter (6 March1924) to his wife Giulia:

The rebellious nstinct

which,

when

I

was a

child,

was directed

against

the rich

because

I

was unable to

pursue

my

studies-1,

who ob-

tained a

10

in

all

subjects

in

elementary

school-whereas

the sons

of the

butcher,

the

pharmacist,

the

shopkeeper

all went

to school

well-dressed. That

rebellious instinct

grew against

all the rich

people

who

oppressed

the

peasants

of

Sardinia;

and at that

time

I

thought

that it was

necessary

to

struggle

for

the national

independence

of

the region:"Drive he mainlanders to the sea " Howmanytimes did

I

repeat

those words Then

I

came to know

the

working

class of an

industrial

city

and

I

understood the real

meaning

of those

things

of

Marx's hat

I

had first read out of intellectual

curiosity.

Thus

I

became

passionate

about

life,

the

struggle,

the

working

class.

Another

significant

formative influence on the

young

Gramsci-which he

mentions elsewhere

in

his

writings

but not

in

this

particular

etter to

Giulia-

was

liberalism,

or ratherthose elements of

liberalism

hat he encountered

(and

was

initially

attracted

to)

in

the

"Southernist"

politics

of Gaetano Sal-

vemini

and

in

the

philosophy

of

Benedetto Croce. Gramsci

also

sympa-

thized,

though

not

uncritically,

with the

radical strain

of

liberalism

champi-

oned

by

his friend Piero Gobbetti.

In

his

early journalism,

Gramsci

adopted

and

promoted

certain

posi-

tions

that,

in

theory,

at

least,

were advocated

by

liberals.

Thus,

for

example,

he

argued

in

favorof free

trade,

calling

for the abolitionof the

government's

protectionist

policies.

These

policies,

designed

to

strengthen

the

country's

growing

modern

industry,

which

was concentrated almost

exclusively

in the

North,

were

often defended on nationalistic

grounds,

and therefore

had

a rather

popular

appeal.

On the

surface,

protectionist

laws

appeared

ad-

vantageous

to the urban

working

class,

which

gained

numerical

strength

as well as

increased

political

leverage

as

northern

industry

continued

to

grow;

in

fact,

many

reformist

socialists and trade union leaders

supported

protectionism.

Gramsci

strived hard to

explain

to his readers

that,

while

ap-

pearing

to favor the

seemingly

common interests of industrial

capital

and

the industrial aborforce, the government's protectionist policies were, in

reality,

perpetuating

the

misery

and

exploitation

of

an enormous

segment

of

the

population, especially

the

poverty-stricken

peasants

in

the

South,

who remained

trapped

in

a

quasi-feudal

socioeconomic

system.

In

II

Grido

del

Popolo

of

19

August

1916,

Gramsci

reprinted

wo articles

by

antisocialist



10/33

Buttigieg

Gramsci

n Civil

Society

9

liberals

promoting

free trade-"Contro

il

feudalismo economico"

(Against

economic feudalism) and "Perche il libero scambio non e popolare"(Why

free

trade

is

unpopular)

by

the economist

Luigi

Einaudi and the Catholic

philosopher

Lorenzo

Michelangelo

Billia,

respectively.

By publishing

hese

two

articles,

Gramsci

explains

in

his

introductory

note,

he

meant to

stimu-

late serious discussion

on an issue of immediate

concern to the

proletariat.

While

lamenting

the failure of

socialist writers to

expose

the

underlying

motivations of

protectionism

and

its

injurious

effects on the

working

poor,

Gramsci makes

an

assertion

that,

prima

facie,

at

least,

one would

expect

to

find in a liberalmanifesto ratherthan a socialist newspaper: "Thestruggle

for the

freedom

to have

bread,

the

freedom

to obtain all consumer

goods

cannot be deferred."The

antidogmatic

Gramsci, however,

has little

patience

with

ideological

labels;

he

enjoins

his

readers to "extractwhatever is useful

from the search for

truth,

no matter its source."

Einaudiand Billiamaintain

that the

question

of

free trade cannot be confined to

economics;

it is also a

moral

issue,

and for that

reason,

in

Gramsci's

view,

what

they

have to

say

on the

subject

"has universal

significance,

it

transcends class boundaries."

What endows the liberals'

position

on free trade with universal

sig-

nificance and enables it to

transcend class divisions

is,

of

course,

the funda-

mental

principle

hat informs

it,

namely,

the

right

of

individualsand

groups

to

operate

freely

as

long

as

they

do not curtail the

freedom of others-a

right

hat is

protected

by,

simultaneously:

(1)

limiting

o a minimum he

incur-

sions of the

state's coercive

apparatus

into the

sphere

of civil

society,

while

juridically

mpowering

the

constitutive elements

of civil

society

to

contest

all

such

incursions;

and

(2)

ensuring

that

the state

possesses

a coercive

apparatus

capable

of

restraining

any

individualor

group

from

encroaching

upon

the freedom of others. Gramsci's

discovery

of some common

ground

with

the liberals

is not

confined to their

position

on the

question

of

free

trade;

he

also

espouses

the

fundamental

principle

on which their

position

is

based.

In

"Diritto omune"

(Common

law)-Avanti ,

22

August

1916-for

example,

he

fiercely

condemns the

police

use of

plain-clothes

agents

to

keep

watch on

certain

private

buildings

(such

as the

offices and

meeting

places

of

legally

constituted workers'

associations

and

political

organiza-

tions)

and to

spy

on

and harass

the

law-abiding

ndividualswho

frequented

them. Everycitizen witha sense of humandignity,Gramsciwrites, is aware

of "the

right

to

protect

at all

costs his freedom

to

live,

to

choose his own

way

of

life,

to select

the

activities he wants

to

pursue,

and that

he has the

right

to

prohibit

curious outsiders

from

poking

their

noses into his

private

life."

Why,

then,

are

police

exempt

from

the

punitive

sanctions

imposed

on



11/33

10

boundary

/

Fall

1995

whoever violates the

basic

right

to

privacy

and freedom of

association?

Only because, Gramsci laments, "the Italians have such littleawareness

of

what freedom

really

is." Once

again,

Gramsci's

argument

seems to be

taken

straight

out

of

a textbook

of liberalism.

Hence the

obvious

question:

What

leads

the

antireformistGramsci

to

espouse

certain

fundamental

prin-

ciples

of liberalism

and,

at the same

time,

to

embrace

a Marxismthat is

committed to the dissolution of

liberalism? The answer is to be found

in

Gramsci's

concept

of the

state,

which

he takes to be

integral, comprising

both

the

juridical-administrativeystem

and

civil

society.

He

rejects

the

lib-

eral notionthat the state consists solely in a legal and bureaucraticorder,

which remains neutral and indifferent o class interests

while

safeguarding

the

autonomous

development

of civil

society.

From Gramsci's

point

of

view,

the liberal state

represents

the con-

crete realization

in

history

of

fundamental

liberties,

but

only

as

they

were

gained

by,

and

for,

a

particular

class-the

bourgeoisie.

That is

to

say,

the

fundamental

principles

of

civil

rights,

or the

"rights

of

man,"

normally

as-

sociated

with

liberalism

may very

well

be

universal,

but

in

the liberal

state,

these

rights

are secured and

protected

in a form that

privileges

the

bour-

geoisie

and

perpetuates

its socioeconomic dominance.

Theoretically,

he

proponent

of

liberalism

will

argue

that the social and

economic

advantages

enjoyed by

the

bourgeois

(or

any

social

group,

for

that

matter)

can

be

chal-

lenged,

attenuated,

or even erased

through

the initiatives and activities

that

everyone

is

free to

undertake

within the

sphere

of civil

society-as

long

as

the

"rules

of

the

game"

(embodied

in

the

system

of

government,

which

liberal

doctrine

equates

with the

state)

are

observed.

Gramsci

would

counterargue

that

the

rules

of the

game

were

established

by

the

dominant

class and

are themselves an

integral

part

of

what needs to

be transformed

before

the fundamental

principles

of

freedom and

justice

can

be extended

to

the

point

of

eliminating

all forms of

subalternity.

Furthermore,

Gramsci

would

go

on to

argue,

the

very

fact that

there exists a coercive

appara-

tus

to

ensure

compliance

with the rules of the

game

is

itself indicative

of

the nonuniversal character

of the

liberal/bourgeois

state,

notwithstanding

its

appeals

to

universal

principles.

One

of

Gramsci's

earliest

attempts

to

articulate

more

or less

system-

atically he relationof socialism vis-a-vis liberalism s the essay "Tre rincipii,

tre

ordini"

Three

principles,

three

orders)

in

La

Citta

Futura,

11

February

1917.

The

rights

of man and

the

individual

reedoms

ensconced

in

liberal

doctrine

are

the

product

of a

long

history

of

struggles

and

revolutionary

movements,

Gramsci

explains.

The outcome of these

struggles

was the



12/33

Buttigieg

Gramsci

n Civil

Society

11

establishment

of

bourgeois

civilization,

and it could not be

otherwise,

be-

cause "thebourgeoisie was the only effective social force and the only one

really

at

work

in

history."

his

fact

by

itself

does

not diminish he

progressive

and universal

character of the

rights

that were

gained.

"Was the

principle

that asserted

itself

in

history through

the

bourgeois

revolutiona universal

one?

Certainly,yes."

But

then

Gramsci

hastens

to add:

Universal

does not mean absolute. In

history,

here is

nothing

abso-

lute and

fixed. The assertions

of liberalismare

boundary-ideas

which,

once

they

were

recognized

as

rationally

necessary,

became idea-

forces;

they

were realized in the

bourgeois

state, they helped give

rise to an antithesis

to that state

in

the form

of the

proletariat,

and

then

they

became

worn out.

They

are

universal

for the

bourgeoi-

sie,

but

they

are

not universal

enough

for the

proletariat.

For the

bourgeoisie

they

were

boundary-ideas;

for the

proletariat

hey

are

minimal deas.

And,

in

fact,

the

integral

iberal

program

has become

the minimal

program

of the

socialist

party.

In

other

words,

it is the

program

hat we use

in

our

day-to-day

existence,

as we wait

for the

arrivalof the moment that is deemed most useful for[ ... ]

The

last

few words of this

paragraph

were erased

by

the

censor,

but one

can

surmise from the context that Gramsci was

referring

o the

opportune

time

for

launching

the revolution

that

would

topple

the

bourgeois

state.

When

Gramsci wrote

this

article,

and

for the next few

years,

there was

reason

to

believe

that

in

some

countries,

among

them

Italy,

he conditions

favoring

a socialist revolutionwould soon be at hand. As

it

turned

out,

of

course,

quite

the

reverse

happened;

the

bourgeois

state

proved

itself much more

resistant than

Gramsci and

his fellow

revolutionaries

imagined--although

the fact that the

fascist

dictatorshipprevented

its

total

disintegration

a

few

years

later

confirmed

its

fundamental weakness.

Later,

n

prison,

Gramsci

would reflect at

length

not

only

on the

failureof the

revolutionary roject

but

also,

and more

fruitfully,

n the

complex

reasons

why

the

bourgeois

state,

in

its

variable

forms,

is so

durable,

so

resourceful,

as to be able to

withstand

the fiercest

onslaughts

and survive the most

debilitating

crises.

The

young

Gramsci overestimated the

revolutionary

potential

of

his

time, but he was by no means unaware of the difficulties nvolved or of the

enormous amount of work that

needed

to be

done

before

the subaltern

classes

could

seriously

vie for

power.

Already,

n

"Tre

principii,

re

ordini,"

e

was able

to

identify

a

major

source

of

strength

of

bourgeois

rule

in

the most

politically

developed

and

economically

advanced

states--the

examples

he



13/33

12

boundary

/

Fall

995

uses

are

Britain

nd

Germany.

n

hese

countries,

Gramsci

xplains,people

havebecomeconvinced hat heidealofa statethat ranscends lass inter-

ests can be

attained

hrough

he

continual

erfecting

f the

present

ystem.

Fostering

and

cultivating

his

conviction re

legislative

nd

administrative

traditions

hat

convey

a sense of

fairnessor

reasonableness;

n

other

words,

the

government, hough

controlled

by

the

bourgeoisie,

till

protects

the

basic

rights

of the

working

lass

and allows

t

the

social

space

to

organize

itself

and

compete

for

government

ower.

The social

policies

of

the

liberals

in

Britain,

or

instance,

assumed

the

formof what

Gramscidescribes as

a "kind f bourgeois tate socialism-i.e., a non-socialist ocialism." heir

posture

was such that"even he

proletariat

id

not

look

oo

unkindly

n the

state

as

government;

onvinced,

rightly

r

wrongly,

hat

its interestswere

being

looked

after,

t

conducted

ts

class

struggle

discreetly

and without

the kindof moral

xasperation

hat

s

typical

of the workers'

movement."

n

Germany,

s

in

Britain,

he subaltern lasses do not

have

to

resort

o des-

perate

measures,

such as

taking

o

the streets

in

open

rebellion,

o secure

their

basic

rights.

Why?

Because

in

those

countries,

"onedoes notsee the

fundamental

aws of the states

trampled

n,

or

arbitrary

ule hold

sway."

In

other

words,

hese

are states where

the

rules

of

the

game

are

carefully

observed;hence,

there

is

a

sense of order

and

stability.

And,

as

Gramsci

observes,

common ense

(which,

nthis

article,

he describes

as

the

"terrible

slave-driver

f the

spirit")

nhibits

eople

from

disrupting

he

orderly

tatus

quo

and

makes

them scared

of the uncertainties

hat

accompany

radical

change.

As a

result,

"theclass

struggle

becomes less

harsh,

he

revolu-

tionary

pirit

oses

momentum.

The

so-called

law

of

least

effortbecomes

popular-this

is the lawof

the

lazy

whichoftenmeans

doingnothing

t all.

Incountriesike

his,

the revolutions less

likely."

n

Italy,

y

contrast,

hings

are not

so well

ordered,

n

large

measurebecause

the

ruling

lasses

pursue

their nterests

blatantly,

mposing

ll

the sacrifices

necessary

foreconomic

growth

n

the

proletariat.

his

eads Gramsci

o believe hat

Italy

s

a

prime

candidate

or

a

socialist

revolution;

ut

he

is

also aware

hat

the

ground

or

a

successful

revolution as

yet

to be

prepared.

There

are

many

elements

in

this

article hat

foreshadow

he more

thorough

nd

incisive

analyses

of

the

prison

notebooks.

Even beforehe developedhisconceptsof civilsociety,hegemony,

and

so

on,

Gramsci

ould

already

perceive

howa dominant lass becomes

securely

entrenched

not

by

forcefully epressing

he

antagonistic

lasses

butrather

y creating

and

disseminating

whathe calls a

forma

mentis,

and

by

establishing system

of

government

hat embodies

this

formamentis



14/33

Buttigieg

Gramsci

n Civil

ociety

13

and

translates t intoan

order,or,

better

till,

makes

it

appear

o

be

orderli-

ness itself.For histohappen,ofcourse, hedominant lass orclasses must

accept

that he

government

pparatus

annot

always

assert their

orporate

interests

narrowly

nd

directly;

he

necessary

fiction hat he

government

f

the state

transcendsclass

distinctions an remain

redible

nly

if

conces-

sions

are made

to address

the

most

pressing

needs

and to accommodate

some of

the

aspirations

f

the

disadvantaged

trata

of the

population.

he

groups

hat are

out

of

power

n

this

kindof state

are allowed o

aspire

for

power,

but he

prevailing

ormamentiswill

nduce

hem

o

pursue

heir

goals

ina manner hatdoes notthreaten he basicorderororderliness s such;

in

other

words,

hey

will

not

aimto overthrowhe

state and

establisha

new

kindof

state but

instead

will

compete

for

a

greater

hare of

influenceand

power

according

o the

establishedrulesof the

game. (This

s

what

trade

unions,

or

example,

have often

done;

n

the

United

States

today,

he

same

function

s

performed

y

so-called

obby

groups.)Consequently,

he

notion

that

the

social ordercan be

perfected

hrough

"fair nd

open"competition

becomes

entrenchedas

common

sense-in

other

words,

as an

ingrained

forma

mentis,

whichseeks to

remedyproblems

nd

injusticeshrough

e-

forms

ought

orand

negotiated

mong

competing roups

withinhe

existing

overall tructure

f

the

social

order,

hus

leaving

he

juridical-administrative

apparatus

f the

state moreor less

intact,

while he

campaigns

or

change

are

waged

within

he

sphere

of civil

ociety.

It s

a forma

mentis

hatmakes

the

revolutionary

dea

of

eliminating

ompetitiveness

i.e.,

greed)

as the

pri-

mary

motivating

orce

in

society

seem

unreasonable,

nrealistic,

r

even

dangerous.

Gramsci

bitterly

opposed

reformist

trategy

both

in

the

Socialist

Party

andinthe tradeunion

movement,

ince,

inhis

view,

tserved

only

o

strengthen

ather

han

underminehe

bourgeois

tate.

Instead

of

opposing

the

state,

reformists

ollaborated

with

it;

they

did

so not

only

in

parlia-

ment

(i.e.,

within

he

political

pparatus

f

government),

where

they

were

effectively

"domesticated"

y

transformism

nd

to some

extent

by

nation-

alism,

but

also

in

the

institutions f

organized

abor

i.e.,

in

the

economic

sphere

ocated

n

civil

ociety),

which

hey

ended

o reduce

nto

nstruments

serving

he

narrowly

onceived

corporate

nterests

and

mmediate

eeds

of

the workinglass withinhe existingeconomic tructureandwith ittle e-

gard

or

other

underprivileged

trata,

uch

as the

peasantry).

This

does

not

mean

that

Gramsci

dvocateda

frontal

ssault

against

he

state.

Quite

he

opposite.

As is

well

known,

he

was

relentless n

his

polemics

against

anar-

chism,

ncluding

he

anarchist

urrents

n

syndicalism,

whose

violent,

direct



15/33

14

boundary

/ Fall 995

attacks

on

the

state

he

regarded

as worse than ineffectual ecause

they

wereconducive o reaction.Revolutionaryctivity,orGramsci,has littleor

nothing

o

do

with

nciting

people

to

rebel;

nstead,

t

consists

in

a

pains-

taking

process

of

disseminating

nd

instilling

n alternative

ormamentis

by

means

of

cultural

reparation

i.e.,

intellectual

evelopment

nd

education)

on

a

mass

scale,

critical

and theoretical

laboration,

nd

thoroughgoing

organization.

hese

kindsof

activities

an

only

be carried

ut

in

civil

ociety;

indeed,

at

one

and the

same

time,

they require

he creation

of,

and

help

to

extend,

new

spaces

in

civil

society beyond

he

reach

of the

governmental,

administrative,

nd

juridical pparatuses

of the state.

Whereasreformists

collaborate

with

he

state,

the most

urgent

ask

of the

revolutionary

ocial-

ist

Party

or Gramsci

onsists

in

establishing

ts

own,

different

oncept

of

the state.

He sketches the

broadoutlines

of a

revolutionarytrategy

n

both

negative

and

positive

erms

n

"Dopo

l

Congresso"

After

he

congress),

an

article

he

published

n

II

Grido

del

Popolo,

14

September

1918,

soon

after

the

15th

Congress

of the ItalianSocialist

Party,

t

which

he

"intransigent

revolutionary

raction"

ad outvoted

he reformist

locof the

party:

The collaborationistnd reformistpiritmustbe destroyed;we must

set

down

exactly

and

precisely

what

we

mean

by

"state."

.

.

It

is

necessary

to

establish

and

to make

it

widely

understood

hat the

socialist

state

...

is not

a continuation

f

the

bourgeois

tate,

that

it

is

not

an

evolution

f

the

capitalist

tate

which s made

up

of

three

powers-the

executive,

parliament,

nd

the

judiciary.

he

socialist

state

is, rather,

continuation

nda

systematic

development

f

the

workers'

rganizations

nd

the local

bodieswhich

he

proletariat

as

alreadybeen able to bring nto existencewithin he individualistic

regime.

The immediate

ask of

the

proletariat,

herefore,

must

not

favor

he

extension

of state

power

and state

interventions;nstead,

its

goal

should

be

to de-center

he

bourgeois

tate

andto

increase

the

autonomy

f local

and trade

unionbodies

beyond

he reach

of

regulatory

aws.

Once

again,

certain

elements

of

Gramsci's

evolutionaryosition,

f

taken

in

isolation,

appear

to

have

a liberal

imbre:

evelopment

f

independent

professional rganizations,esistinghegrowth fthe centralized owerof

the

state,

reinforcing

he

autonomy

f local

associations,

t

cetera.

Interest-

ingly,

Gramsci

oncludes

this

paragraph

witha reference

o

Britain,

which

he considers

o be a

paradigm

f

liberalism

nd advanced

capitalism:

The



16/33

Buttigieg

Gramscin Civil

ociety

15

kindof order hatthe

capitalist

tate has come

to have

in

England

s

much

closerto the Sovietregime hanourbourgeoisies willingo admit."

In

his characterization

f

Britain,

Gramsci

s

obviously

resorting

o

hyperbole

or

polemical

purposes.

He knowsfull well

that,

in

reality,

he

chances of

transforming

ritainntoa

socialist

country

are infinitesimal-

unlike

taly,

where he

possibility

f

a

successfulsocialist

revolution

ctually

existed,

even

if

remotely.

Gramsci

nvokes

Britain

s an

example

because

he wants

o stress the

importance

f

enlarging

he

sphere

of civil

ociety.

His

thinking

eems

paradoxical

n

this

point:

n the

one

hand,

he believes hat

ina country uch as Britain,where civilsocietyis verydevelopedand the

coercive

apparatus

f the

state

remains,

or he

most

part,

concealed,

revo-

lutionary spirations

end to

languish;

n the

other

hand,

he is convinced

that he

preparation

hat

must

necessarily

precede

a

socialistrevolutionan

only

ake

place

in

the

sphere

of civil

ociety

and

actually equires

n

expan-

sion

and

an intensificationf

the kindsof

activities

hat

would

enlarge

and

diversify

he terrain f civil

ociety.

There

s

a

cynicalexplanation:

ramsci

criticizes he

authoritarianism

f the Italian

tate and

makes

demands

for

the

kindsof

civil

iberties

and

the freedom

of

associationavailable

n

a lib-

eral

state

only

because he

wants

to

acquire pace

within

which

o

organize

and mobilize he

cadres of the revolution.

his, however,

s

definitely

not

the

case,

forwhen

Gramsci

bemoans

he

poverty

f

civil

ociety

in

Italy,

e

is

as

much

and

perhaps

even

more)

concerned

with

he

miserable evelof

general

culture,

moral

ntegrity,

ducation,

nd

intellectualife

n

his

country

as he is

with

he

repressive

haracter f its

government

nd the

intolerance

of

its

ruling

lass. The road o

socialism

n

a nonliberal

ourgeois

tate

such

as

Italy,

Gramsci

maintains,

s

hampered

not

onlyby

the

tacticsof intimida-

tion

directly

r

indirectlymployed

with

mpunity

y

the dominantlass and

its

government

ut

also-and much

more

seriously-by

the

cultural ack-

wardnessof the

masses as

a

whole,

the

political npreparedness

f even

the

organized

ectors of the

working

lass,

the

intellectual

neptitude

nd

confused

motivations f

many

of

the

socialist

eaders,

he

overall

bsence

of clear

ideas and

rigorous

hinking

bout

why

the

system

needs to be

changed,

how

to

go

about

changing

t,

and what

would

replace

t.

Gramsci

and his

confreres

n

the

OrdineNuovo

group

sought

to

remedy

hese

de-

ficiencies hroughheir nvolvementn the factory ouncilmovement,heir

cultural

nd

educational

nitiatives,

heir

theoreticaland

critical

writings,

and their

workwithin

he

Socialist

Party

and later

he

Communist

arty.

At

the

same

time,

though,

Gramsci

emains

onvinced hat

this kindof

work



17/33

16

boundary

/

Fall

995

alone

cannot bear fruitas

long

as

the

whole nation

including

he various

strataof the bourgeoisie) emainsmired npettypolitics,moral orruption,

intellectual

isorder,

and

cultural

poverty.

Gramsci

gives

no credence

to

the

ingenuous

belief

hat "worse

s

better"--that

he

more

repressive,

or-

rupt,

morally

nd

culturally

estitute,

and

so

on,

the

bourgeois

tate

is,

the

better

he

prospects

or

revolutionary

ransformation.

ather,

he

perceives

a

connectionbetween

the

deplorable

ondition f Italian

ociety

and

the

debilitating

eaknesses

of

the socialist

movement,

connection

he articu-

lates

explicitly

n

his

article

"Dopo

l

Congresso."

he

relevant

assage

from

this article

merits

quotation

t

some

length,

because

it

foreshadows

ne

of

the

major

underlying

oncerns

that

animates

many

of the reflections

n the

prison

notebooks

on the numerous ailuresof

the ItalianLeft.

The Italian

Socialist

Party,

Gramsci

writes,

has

provided

n arena

for

bizarre

ndividuals nd restless

spirits;

n

the absence

of

the

political

ndeconomic iberties

hat

spur

ndividu-

als

to action

and that

continually

enew he

leadinggroups,

t

was

the

Socialist

Party

hat furnished

he

lazy

and somnolent

bourgeoi-

sie withnew individuals. hemostfrequently uoted ournalists,he

capable

and

active members

of the

bourgeoisie

re

deserters

from

the

socialist

movement;

he

party

has

been the

gangway

o

politi-

cal success

in

Italy,

t

has been

the most efficient ieve

forJacobin

individualism.

The

inability

f the

party

o function

n

terms of class

was

related

to the

backwardtate

of

society

in

Italy.

Production

as still

n

its

in-

fancy,

rade

was

weak;

he

regime

was

(as

it

still

s)

not

parliamentary

butdespotic-in otherwords,it was not capitalistbutpettybour-

geois.

Likewise,

talian ocialism

was

pettybourgeois,

meddlesome,

opportunistic,

channel

or he distribution

f some state

privileges

to a

few

proletarianroups.

The

importance

hat Gramsci ttaches

to the free

development

f

a

vibrant ivil

ociety

manifests tself

most

clearly

n

his

many

articles

dealing

with:

1)

the

oligarchic

nd

repressive

haracter

f the

Italian

overnment

apparatus;

2)

the

narrow-mindedness

f the

dominant

bourgeois

culture

andthe failure f the intellectuals--includinghe self-proclaimediberals-

to

provide

forceful

ritique

f

the

retrograde

ocial structures

f the coun-

try

and

to

move

the

nation oward

he

type

of

capitalism

nd

democracy

practiced

n

advanced

Western

ountries,

uch as

Britain;

nd

(3)

the

need

for the

cultural

and

political

preparation

of

the subaltern

classes

prior

to

the



18/33

Buttigieg Gramsci

nCivil

ociety

17

transition

o

socialism.

Even

as

modern

capitalist

productionlowly

gains

ground n Italy,Gramsciobserves in "llpassivo" The shortfall)nAvanti ,

6

September

1918:

"The nstitutions

re

backward

.. the

police

force

is

organized

s

it

was

under

he

Bourbons

n

Naples,

or

King

CharlesAlbert

n

Piedmont,

when

all

movements

by

the

citizenswere

regarded

s

conspira-

torial: t

hobblescivil

existence,

it

causes

an

enormousdeficit n the

social

balance

sheet."

n"La

democrazia

taliana"

Italian

emocracy)-in

II

Grido

del

Popolo,

7

September

1918-he bemoans

the

weakness

of the

politi-

cal

organizations

f the

bourgeoisie,

heir

nability

o

formulate,

issemi-

nate, and defendclear ideas andconcreteprogramsnthe publicarena.

In

the confusionand absence of

continuity

hat

characterize

talian

politi-

cal

life,

he

newspapers

become

demagogicplatforms,

he forums f sterile

polemics.

Under hese

conditions,

pposition

o

the

government

mounts

to

little

more

than

mere

rebelliousness;

roblems

re solved

"in

alons,

in

the

offices of banksand

industrial

irms,

n

sacristies,

or

in

the

corridors f

parliament";

ithout

trong

national

political arties,

he

people,

including

the

majority

f

the

bourgeoisie,

annot

participate

n

the formulationf a

national

agenda

and a

cogent government olicy.

Gramsci oncludes his

assessment of

Italian

emocracy

with

ome

very

harshwords:"Becauseof

its lackof

scruples,

ts

reluctance

o

accept

and to

respect

partydiscipline

in

policy

matters,

ts love

of

vacuous

novelty

and

stale

'fashions,'

talian

bourgeois

democracy

s

condemned o

having

no

worthypolitical

ife.

In-

stead,

it

is condemned o

consuming

tself

n

factional

onflictsand

always

remaining

he

swindledand

scorned

victimof

adventurers." ead

with

he

benefitof

hindsight,

hese harsh

wordsseem to

foretell he

rise

to

power

of the

adventurer

ar

excellence,

Mussolini.

Gramsci,

of

course,

was no

prophet,

and the Fascist seizure of

power

n 1922 took him

by surprise,

as

it

did

virtually

veryone

else.

Nevertheless,

his

diagnosis

s

correct:

he

impoverishment

f civil

ociety

has

catastrophic

onsequences.

Gramsci

ttributeshe

decrepitude

f

political

ife

and culture

n

Italy

to a

number

f

factors,

among

hem

he

retrograde

nfluence f the

Catholic

Church,

which,

n

its efforts o

guardagainstany

diminution

n

its

authority,

constantly hallenged

he

legitimacy

f

the

secular

state,

undermined

he

development

of

modern

democratic

tructures,

which,

under

normal

cir-

cumstances,accompaniesheevolution fliberalism,ndthusretardedhe

growth

of

autonomous

nstitutions

n

civil

society.

Still,

Gramsci

reserves

his

fiercest

condemnations

or

the Italian

middle

lasses and the

intellec-

tuals. On more

than

one

occasion,

he

compares

he

petty

bourgeoisie

o

monkeys,

that

is,

creatures who can

mimic

the

rightgestures

butwho lack



19/33

18

boundary

/

Fall

995

ideas

and

values

and are

incapable

f

lookingbeyond

heirown most

im-

mediateneeds orinterests-they have no sense ofhistory, osense of the

universal.

n

one such merciless

attack,

"La

cimmia

giacobina"

The

Jaco-

bin

monkey)-in

Avanti ,

2

October1917-Gramsci

describes

the Italian

pettybourgeoisie

as follows:

They

have

no

sense

of the

universality

f

law;hence,

they

are

mon-

keys. They

have no moral ife.The

ends

they

pursue

are immediate

and

extremely

narrow.

n

order o attain

ust

one of their

goals

they

sacrifice

everything--truth,

ustice,

the

most

deeply

rooted

and

in-

tangible awsof humanity.norder o destroyone of theirenemies

they

are

willing

o sacrifice

allthe

guarantees

hatare meant o

pro-

tect

every

citizen;

hey

are

even

willing

o

sacrifice

he

guarantees

meant

or heirown

protection.

As the

last

phrase

makes

clear,

Gramsci

holds

he

bourgeoisie

esponsible

for

ailing

o

safeguard

ven its

own

ong-term

nterest,

or

gnoring

he

very

basic

principles

hat

provide

t,

as

a

class,

with

ts

own raison

d'etre.

Be-

cause of the pettynarrow-mindednessf its middle lasses, Italyhadyet

to benefit rom

he

legacy

of

the

French

Revolution,

which as

profoundly

transformed

France

and the

world,

which has been

affirmed

mong

the

masses,

which

has

shaken

and

brought

o

the

surface

deep layers

of sub-

merged

humanity"-and

his

proved

detrimental

ot

ust

to the

bourgeoisie

itself

but

to the

Italian

eople

as

a

whole,

including

he

subaltern

lasses.

This

is

another

way

of

saying

thatthe

Italian

ourgeoisie,

whileanxious

o

protect

ts

privileges

and

preserve

ts

dominance

over othersocial

strata,

lacked he

inclination

nd

ability

o

provideeadership

or

he

country

s

a

whole

at a time

when

Italy

was

being

inexorably

though

most

unevenly)

transformed,

y

historical

orces

thatwere

beyond

anybody's

ower

o

halt,

into

a modern

ndustrial

apitalist

tate.

More han

anyone,

he

intellectuals

were

to

blame,

especially

hose

intellectuals

ho characterized

hemselves

as liberals.

n "I

iberali

taliani"

Italian

iberals),

n

Avanti ,

2

September

1918,

buttigieg, joseph. (1995). gramsci on civil society. boundary 2. vol. 22. nº 3

Documents