business “not” as usual: the national incident management system, federalism, and leadership

84 Public Administration Review • December 2007 • Special Issue

Federal, state, and local governments did not work well

together to provide an eff ective response to Hurricane

Katrina. Some of this failure can be attributed to the

power struggle between the federal and state governments.

Th e National Incident Management System (NIMS)

was designed to foster collaboration among govern-

ments and their departments and agencies. However,

this system largely failed. To overcome this failure, many

have proposed centralizing disaster response in the federal

government. Centralized control would damage the

basic federal structure of our government as the national

government appeals to the ever-present dangers of terrorism

and natural disaster to gain permanent primacy in the

relationship. Th e current federal

system actually can work better

than centralization if leadership

and organizational transformation

are stressed. Th e National Incident

Management System has many

elements in place that can make

the federal system of disaster

response work if the proper stress on

organizational transformation and

leadership is applied.

If we ignore the systemic issues

and simply replace people or

re-assign responsibilities, we

may simply fail again in the

not too distant future with a

diff erent cast of characters.

John R. Harrald, director of the Institute for

Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management,

George Washington University

U.S. House Committee on Government Reform

hearing, September 15, 2005

After September 11, 2001, Americans expected

their government to be prepared for and

protect them from any future terrorist attack.

In order to make this a reality, the Homeland Security

Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland

Security, which was vested with the federal authority

to deal with the organization of domestic defense

against terrorism and to prepare for natural disasters.

As a result, the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) was absorbed into the newly created

cabinet-level department.

Th is centralization of authority at the federal level

would theoretically aid the national government in

coordination eff orts. However, the American federal

system can make this straightforward approach quite

complicated. Constitutionally,

powers are divided and shared

between the national and state

governments. Th e Department

of Homeland Security was tasked

with designing a system that

could take all this divided and

shared governmental power and

authority into account while at

the same time making a coordi-

nated response quicker and more

eff ective than it had ever been. In

response, the Department of

Homeland Security, working

through FEMA, developed the

National Incident Management

System (NIMS) to facilitate this

coordination.

NIMS was designed to coordinate the response of

local, state, and federal responders and decision

makers by establishing an Incident Command System,

standardizing communications, working for joint

preparedness (planning, training, qualifi cations,

certifi cation), creating a Joint Information System to

disseminate a unifi ed message, and setting up a

National Integration Center to guide the process of

coordination. Both the Incident Command System

and National Integration Center stress that NIMS is a

“joint” and “collaborative” system (see DHS 2004 ).

William Lester Daniel Krejci Jacksonville State University

Business “Not” as Usual: Th e National Incident Management

System, Federalism, and Leadership

William Lester is an assistant professor

in the Department of Political Science and

Public Administration at Jacksonville State

University. His research interests include

organizational theory, intergovernmental

relationships, leadership studies, ethics, and

public personnel.

E-mail: [email protected]

Daniel Krejci is an assistant professor in

the Department of Political Science and

Public Administration at Jacksonville State

University. His research interests include

leadership and ethics, social policy, state

and local politics, public fi nance administra-

tion, and public management. He currently

serves on the Executive Council of the

Alabama Political Science Association.

E-mail: [email protected]

Part II—The Responders: Official and Grassroots Actors in the Aftermath of the Hurricane

Constitutionally, powers are divided and shared between the national and state governments. Th e Department of Homeland

Security was tasked with designing a system that could

take all this divided and shared governmental power and

authority into account while at the same time making a

coordinated response quicker and more eff ective than it had

ever been.

National Incident Management System, Federalism, and Leadership 85

While this government reorganization and

centralization through the Department of Homeland

Security, FEMA, and NIMS looked good on paper

and in some training exercises, it soon faced its

sternest challenge when one of the nation’s top three

forecast disasters came to fruition: the fl ooding of

New Orleans by a Category 4 or 5 hurricane. Th e

landfall of Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005,

made this a reality. Some of the disaster planning and

cooperation that needed to take place prior to the

arrival of Hurricane Katrina had indeed taken place

during the Hurricane Pam exercise, which was

insuffi ciently funded and understaff ed (see U.S.

Senate 2006 for more information). Despite the

training, it is obvious that something (or many things)

went very wrong. Fundamentally, local, state, and

federal responses were uncoordinated and often late,

and many issues of jurisdictional authority and

resource allocation were being worked out even as the

disaster was unfolding. Supposedly, this was to be

coordinated by NIMS. However, NIMS exercises and

policies were based on joint and collaborative

mechanisms that dodged basic questions of authority

and leadership. Serious preparation and coordination

requires continuous planning, resource allocation, and

training ( Berman, Berman, and Lynch 2005 ). Fur-

thermore, it requires intra- and interorganizational

leadership that recognizes and deals with the hard

questions of authority and coordination. NIMS failed

to adequately deal with issues of leadership and

authority.

Can a collaborative system based on federalism be

maintained and succeed when disasters occur? Many

answer this question with a “no” and off er a preferred

solution that focuses on a swift, centralized, and early

federalization of major disaster responses ( Sammon

2005 ). Yet are we willing to take

this step, which is rife with all

sorts of implications that would

have an impact on the basic

relationship between local, state,

and federal government?

Federalizing the Government Response to Disaster? An overly quick federalization of

disaster response would be

damaging to the relationship

between state and national

government, and it would be less

eff ective at dealing with a major

disaster. Th e federal government has used or is

attempting to use “ opportunistic federalism” to

expand its power with regard to state governments by

appealing to the ever-present threat of terrorism and

the equally ever-present threat of natural disaster in

order to claim primacy in the federal relationship.

Basically, in these types of situations, the federal

government has an opportunity to expand its author-

ity in relation to state governments by projecting the

idea that only a large and centralized federal response

can accomplish the given task ( Conlan 2006 ). In the

name of security from all forms of disaster, the danger

persists of a decisive and lasting shift of power in favor

of the national government. Once this is ceded, it

would prove diffi cult for state governments to retrieve

their lost authority. For example, the George W. Bush

administration has called for the immediate federa-

lization and military-enforced quarantine of any city

or area that is infected in a pandemic ( Brown 2005 ).

With the proposal coming on the heels of Katrina,

it appeared that the federal government was taking

advantage of “bird fl u” pandemic fears in order to

expand federal authority. Yet it is precisely this

scenario of federal government hegemony that many

experts warn against. Instead, most experts agree that

a more collaborative approach is the best solution to

eff ective disaster response ( Waugh and Streib 2006 ).

Th e centralization of authority in the federal

government is certainly an option, but is it the best

option? A decisive and lasting shift of power in favor

of the federal government could be the result of

centralized disaster response as the ever-present threat

of disaster from terrorism and natural phenomena is

used as an argument in favor of federal control. Th e

relationship between the national and state govern-

ments would become more unitary and less federal

as the potential for disaster incessantly looms and

at times becomes reality. Th e repercussions for the

federal relationship could be far reaching and have an

impact beyond just emergency response as govern-

ments from all levels are linked to an ever-growing

federalized response mechanism. Th is possibility

makes the diagnosis of problems

within our current collaborative

structures very important in

order to head off calls for a

monolithic and dominating

federal response. Remedies need

to be found that can keep the

basic federal structure intact

while at the same time respond

well to disasters. Emergency

management theory and practice

relies heavily on a collaborative

approach, which could be

signifi cantly damaged by a

federally dominated hierarchical

command and control system

( Waugh and Streib 2006 ). In the rush to fi x the

system, it is important not to jettison what is good

about the American federal system.

Additionally, it should be noted that the states, as well

as local governments, have gained enormous amounts

Th e federal government has used or is attempting to use “opportunistic federalism” to

expand its power with regard to state governments by appealing

to the ever-present threat of terrorism and the equally ever-

present threat of natural disaster in order to claim primacy in the

federal relationship.


of capability and capacity over the last several decades.

Th ese governments are more professional than ever

and have important and ever-developing capabilities.

Th ese developed and developing capabilities are

present on the ground in both state and local

governments. Th ese state and local government

professionals are not likely to respond well to a top-

down “national government knows best” approach. To

impose such a system on the states would be to ignore

the enormous capabilities and possibilities present in

state and local governments. Th e states are in the best

position they have ever been in to respond as full

partners to federal government initiatives and to

launch their own initiatives in disaster response

( Bowman and Kearney 2006 ).

Hence, collaboration among federal, state, and local

governments is essential for the development of

optimal plans for disaster response. Anything less than

real collaboration would squander valuable resources

located outside the federal government. Importantly,

the federal government would also benefi t from a

better understanding of the state – local government

relationship. Th e state – local government relationship

is unitary. Local governments, therefore, are most

likely to respond to state authorities for a myriad of

reasons, not the least of which is that local govern-

ments are used to functioning in the state system.

Familiarity is important and should not be

discounted. State authorities are necessary for an

eff ective federal government response to local

government.

Th is is where an examination of NIMS becomes quite

important, as NIMS strives, at least in its rhetoric, to

organize the many actors in the federal system for

optimal disaster response ( OIG 2005 ). Th e system

was supposed to work, but it obviously had break-

downs in the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Our thesis

is that NIMS has avoided the tough questions

of collaboration with state and local entities when

dealing with issues of leadership and decision making.

While this may make training sessions run more

smoothly, it does not serve well in a major disaster

situation. Th e collaborative

mechanisms were in place and

NIMS has laid out some good

technical goals, but the hard

questions centering on leadership

were avoided, thus providing a

false sense of cooperation.

One of the primary components

missing from the Hurricane

Katrina disaster response was

leadership. Th e ability to provide

guidance is fundamental to leadership. Th ough some

may be off ended by the assertion that leadership was

absent, it should not be taken to mean that leaders

were absent. Simply put, the system was not set up to

allow leaders to provide eff ective guidance. Further-

more, leadership was not broadly diff used throughout

the organizations and governments that responded

to the disaster. Had the personnel involved in the

response from every level of government been

better trained in leadership, the collaborative

relationships and decision-making processes would

have been improved, which would have translated

into better disaster response. Because the current

system did not work well, changes need to be made in

the system. Th ese changes need to result in

organizational transformation. More specifi cally,

transformative leadership is needed to bridge the gap

between chaotic cooperation and disciplined, well-

trained collaboration.

Real collaboration means sharing power, which is, by

its very nature, a relationship that is defi ned by lines

of authority. For one of these governing entities to

cede authority to the another in the relationship is to

lose a degree of governing power. Th e relationship

between the national and state governments can be a

very calculated relationship with regard to their

interactions. It is this very calculated and confl ictual

relationship that complicated much of what went on

during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Some basic

collaborative mechanisms were in place, but the issue

of leadership had been pushed to the side in an eff ort

to maintain cooperation. Th is can be seen in NIMS.

Th e system attempts to be an eff ective centralized

command, which it is not, nor can it be in a federal

system without a fi rmer understanding of and respect

for federalism and the multiplicity of actors that

federalism brings to the table. A few comments about

NIMS help demonstrate this lack of understanding.

First, under the Incident Command System, it states,

“Th is unifi ed command not only coordinates the

eff orts of many jurisdictions, but provides for and

assures joint decisions on objectives, strategies, plans,

priorities, and public communications” ( DHS 2004 ).

Th e words “command” and “joint” are revealing. Th is

would require a great deal of voluntary cooperation

between governments. Can the

successful establishment of a

“joint command” become a

realization without an apprecia-

tion for the intricacies of the

federal relationship? In other

words, the mechanism is in

place, but the “how” of decision

making and, perhaps more im-

portantly, the “who” of decision

making have been left in doubt.

For further illustrative purpose,

in the Joint Information System, it states, “Th is

system employs Joint Information Centers (JIC) and

brings incident communications together during an

One of the primary components missing from the Hurricane Katrina disaster response was leadership.… Simply put, the system was not set up to allow

leaders to provide eff ective guidance.


incident to develop, coordinate, and deliver a unifi ed

message” ( DHS 2004 ). Th e development and coor-

dination of a unifi ed message is a daunting task

during a disaster situation. It is all the more daunting

when the entities involved have overlapping

sovereignty and jurisdictions. Without eff ective

leadership in place, the expectation that these

governments — governments that have a

fundamentally confl ictual relationship — will suddenly

“develop, coordinate, and deliver a unifi ed message”

( DHS 2004 ), especially a message that is delivered in

a timely manner in the midst of a disaster, is highly

unlikely. So, is it best to coordinate by making the

states subservient to the federal government, or is it

best to collaborate by encouraging and fostering real

interaction within the federal system? If the rhetoric

of NIMS is taken seriously, the attempt can and

should be made to foster real collaboration and

leadership.

Leadership, NIMS, and Federalism Eff ective leadership can mitigate these problems and

aid in overcoming the fundamental problems of

development and coordination that plague NIMS.

Solid leadership, and most eff ectively transformative

leadership, must be exercised by those at the top levels

of state and national government in order to develop

truly coordinated responses and decision making.

Transformative leadership principles, such as

recognizing the need for revitalization, creating a new

vision, and institutionalizing change ( Van Wart

2005 ), are essential ingredients in the development of

coordinated intergovernmental responses. Th ese three

transformative leadership principles can be seen as

overlapping stages that are

necessary if organizations are to

successfully transform their

intergovernmental relationships.

NIMS has the potential to be-

come an eff ective vehicle for

promoting the change necessary

within the collaborating organi-

zations. NIMS can help provide

an environment that stresses

common interests and training

toward truly collaborative

decision making. Th is will

require rethinking roles and not “glossing over”

problem areas with overly optimistic language about

coordinated responses, as NIMS has done in the past.

On this point, there can be little argument because

the language found in NIMS about collaboration

melted away under the stress of the disaster. For

example, the state of Louisiana was not prepared to

interface with NIMS despite previous training and the

earlier Hurricane Pam exercise. Louisiana offi cials

actually had to hire consultants to train elements of

the state government on the basics of NIMS two days

after Katrina made landfall. Th e earlier NIMS training

was arguably ineff ective. Th e power and authority

ended up being negotiated during the disaster. A

NIMS that does not dodge the tough issues of

jurisdiction, authority, and leadership can provide the

forum necessary to implement transformative

leadership principles. However, NIMS should not

attempt to command in a centralized way, as some

have proposed for the federal government, but should

emphasize the “joint” part of its mission. Again, “joint

command” cannot be understood thoroughly or

implemented effi ciently and eff ectively without facing

these tough questions.

Th e basic federal – state confl ict over spheres of

sovereignty, power, and authority does not dissolve

during a disaster because each side understands that

ceding authority to the other can be dangerous to the

long-term relationship. As evidence, when President

Bush began to make a federal push to take care of

New Orleans, Mayor Ray Nagin said, “Since I have

been away a day or two, maybe he’s the new crowned

federal mayor of New Orleans” ( Connolly 2005 ). It

would seem that even in the midst of a major disaster,

it matters who has authority. Basically, it does matter

who is in authority and, even more importantly, who

exercises leadership. Th is fundamental truth must be

recognized before proceeding with disaster planning

and training.

Training exercises have to refl ect these real tensions of

authority and leadership. Th e entire chain of com-

mand of the various governments must be involved in

the exercises. Transformative leadership cannot work

without commitment from

governors, state legislatures, the

president, and Congress. If the

leaders of these governing

institutions are not directly

involved in the transformation

and subsequent planning, they

will attempt to assert themselves

into the disaster situation despite

earlier agreements put in place by

subordinates or predecessors.

Th is will create confusion as the

agreements are either reasserted

or renegotiated during the crisis.

When top-level and intermediate-level decision

making involves all pertinent government actors, it is

easier to implement policy decisions ( Mazmanian and

Sabatier 1983 ). Th is makes the necessary devolution

of decision making down to a more localized level

more palatable to top-level decision makers in both

national and state governments.

Localized decision making is vital in an emergency

situation. Leadership exercised further down the chain

of command is essential because plans that have been

NIMS has the potential to become an eff ective vehicle for

promoting the change necessary within the collaborating

organizations. NIMS can help provide an environment that stresses common interests and

training toward truly collaborative decision making.


put into place often require adaptations as events

unfold. Th e old saying by the 19th-century Prussian

soldier Helmuth von Moltke the Elder that “no plan

survives contact with the enemy” is apropos here. A

very high premium needs to be put on transformation

and initiative, which are terms mentioned often in the

U.S. House report A Failure of Initiative, the Senate

report Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared,

and the White House report Th e Federal Response to

Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned ( Menzel 2006 ).

Th e trick is to actually implement the transformation

and initiative instead of leaving it buried in reports.

If a disjointed and dysfunctional system is to change,

it must be transformed into a system that can

accommodate the change. First, there must be an

understanding of the need to change ( Bass and Avolio

1994 ). Th is takes more than just mentioning the word

“cooperation” — it takes collaboration. Th ough the

two terms are not mutually exclusive, “collaboration”

is a deeper concept that allows for a more intense

relationship. It entails a shared sense of both process

and expertise being brought to bear on a problem

( McGuire 2006 ). In order to accomplish this,

intergovernmental relationships must be deep, lasting,

and peppered with frequent

contact. NIMS already provides

some of this contact. However, if

NIMS becomes synonymous

with federal government control,

then it will likely fail because

true collaboration is not

domination. Yet a case can be

made that the present system

already has much of the

mechanical and systemic

organizations and procedures in

place, but it does not adequately account for the

depth of basic confl ict between the national and state

governments. Instead of changing the fundamental

relationship between the national and state govern-

ments to create national government hegemony,

as some have proposed ( Waugh and Streib 2006 ),

the current relationship needs to be preserved (for

many goods reason even beyond disaster response)

and transformed. It takes the transformation of

relationships to eff ectuate the needed change.

Transformational leadership off ers a way to bridge the

gaps in the current setup.

Real transformational leadership does not shy away

from identifying a problem and proposing solutions —

in this case, the problem is to improve disaster

response while maintaining federal relationships. Th is

leadership style examines the situation and attempts

to fi x the problem using leadership principles adapted

from the human relations approach to management.

In addition, transformative leadership seeks to imbue

an organization with a sense of vision and mission.

However, transformative leadership does not rely on

vision alone ( Smart 2003 ). Rather, it incorporates the

concepts of charisma, transactional leadership, and

visionary leadership while maintaining a clear focus

on the mission of the organization in order to bring

about needed change ( Nahavandi 2006 ). By

“charisma,” it is meant that popularly elected offi cials

have a certain persuasive power. Persuasion is

important to gaining support for needed changes,

which means expending political capital. On the other

hand, transactional leadership is the ability of elected

offi cials, appointed offi cials, and managers to

command by the power of their offi ces and to use this

power to make policy and enforce decisions. At the

end of the day, this transactional authority is crucial to

change. However, this type of authority alone cannot

bring about transformation, but it is necessary to

enforce the changes once they are made.

Furthermore, transformative leadership presses for

leadership development that encompasses the total

organization. Leadership is not centralized; its

development is encouraged throughout the

organization. If the diff usion of leadership is

organization-wide, more members of the organization

will understand the basic goals

and mission. With transforma-

tional leadership ensconced at

the top, the next step is to get

these very engaged organizational

members to look not only at

the good of the organization but

also at the greater societal good

( Bass and Avolio 1994 ). In

the aftermath of Katrina, there

appeared to be no shortage of

good will from both organiza-

tions and individuals, yet there were systemic

breakdowns. Th erefore, the desire for response (greater

societal good) was present, but a system was not in

place that could bring this about.

During Katrina, there were numerous success stories,

but they were stories of individual organizations

accomplishing a task, which points to individual

organizational competence and to an understanding

of organizational mission. Coordination across

organizations and especially intergovernmental

coordination was lacking ( Moynihan 2006 ). For

instance, FEMA director Michael Brown failed to

report important information directly to the

Department of Homeland Security leadership —

instead he reported to White House offi cials, thus

frustrating the process. Th e Louisiana state

government lacked the ability and understanding to

interface eff ectively with the federal government. Th e

most fundamental element that transformative

leadership off ers is an emphasis on teamwork and a

vision orientation that focuses on the greater good

With transformational leadership ensconced at the top, the next step is to get these very

engaged organizational members to look not only at the

good of the organization but also at the greater societal good.


and leadership development. In essence, trust is

established as interactions within and between

organizations increase ( Gulati 1995 ). Th is was certainly lacking in the two examples cited here.

Th e often confl ictual interactions of the two major

actors in the federal system must be accounted for, or

else the system will be

fundamentally fl awed. As

examined earlier, some would

like the relationship between

these two governments to be

more hierarchal or unitary in

nature when it involves disaster

response. However, 50 governors

and state governments probably

feel diff erently ( Bush 2005 ). Th e

current federal system is at least

somewhat cooperative, though

the potential exists for the system

to become deeply collaborative in nature. Th erefore,

the starting point is the status quo, where individual

states are in charge of disaster response, with requests

for assistance made from the states to the federal

government. Th e goal is to improve the current

relationship, making it even more respectful of the

state’s role in disaster response, as respect for this role

protects federalism and provides a better response to

disaster. Of course, if there were a disaster so vast that

a state government was eff ectively annihilated, which

Hurricane Katrina did not accomplish, then the next

functioning level of government would have to move

in and assume control — and that, obviously, is the

national government. Th ough the devastation caused

by Katrina was crushing, state authorities were still

functional. Being “still functional,” however, does not

mean that state authorities do not need aid in the

form of rescue, supplies, and administration. Lessons

from the military can be useful in eff ectuating

transformation without calling for militarization of

disaster response.

Learning from the U.S. Military Th ere are several reasons why the U.S. military

performs well. First, it has centralized command and

control. Th is would be diffi cult for governments to

emulate in an intergovernmental environment, yet it

should be coordinated at the lowest level possible in a

disaster. Even in light of the diffi culties presented by

federalism, there are elements of the military structure

that government organizations could imitate.

Th e military trains, trains, and then trains again. Th is

training usually simulates “real-world” scenarios that

attempt to put troops under stress similar to what

they will actually encounter. Th ere is no substitute for

training, and training takes time and costs money.

Certainly, exercises have been conducted and are

being conducted. NIMS has been a big part of these

training exercises. However, the exercises often lack

real-world applications because too few people and

organizations are involved ( Waugh and Hy 1990 ).

Also, the organizations that participate sometimes do

not involve the top levels of leadership. Leaders must

be involved in the conceptual design and execution of

training exercises that are geared toward addressing

problems that governments face

when providing disaster relief.

Military training exercises often

involve the entire chain of

command. Governmental

disaster response organizations

would do well to copy this

military model. NIMS could

conceivably provide the locus for

this type of training.

Second, although many stress the

highly centralized and bureau-

cratic military command structure, leadership is

stressed at all levels of the military, down to the level

of the individual squad. Th e basic mission is defi ned

and operationalized with a clear focus on each

member’s responsibility. In the absence of leadership,

the squad acts in accordance with the mission. For

example, if a lieutenant is killed or incapacitated, the

sergeant takes over; if the sergeant is killed or

incapacitated, the corporal takes over; and so forth.

Each level of the unit has an ability to carry the

mission forward in the absence of direct leadership.

Organizations responding to a disaster need to have

this kind of training and leadership ability if they are

to act eff ectively ( Bryant 2005 ). Th is kind of

organizational capability must be developed, and this

development must be driven by transformational

leaders who are committed to organizational change.

When responding to a disaster, government organi-

zations could benefi t greatly from the application

of the military model of leadership, which stresses

the ability to understand and execute the mission

even when troops are cut off from their command

and when quick decisions need to be made in the

fi eld. Similar circumstances often arise in

disaster response.

Th ese lessons are applicable to sound disaster re-

sponse. Th e need for mission execution at all levels of

response and for superior training are fundamental to

a comprehensive and successful disaster response plan.

Th erefore, the military off ers a good model for

success. However, these lessons can be applied in the

current system without a turn toward centralization of

authority. In fact, the lesson is the opposite. By infus-

ing lower levels of the organization with authority to

act, the military has decentralized authority in dealing

with decisions as they are made in the fi eld toward an

overall goal. Likewise, by exercising sound leadership

that leads toward change (transformation) and

Military training exercises often involve the entire chain of command. Governmental

disaster response organizations would do well to copy this

military model. NIMS could conceivably provide the locus

for this type of training.


empowerment, government organizations can become

more eff ective as all elements of the response work

together toward a common purpose. Federalism can

provide the decentralized structure that makes for an

adaptive and eff ective response.

Respecting Federalism: A Prescription for Change Transformational leadership must begin with the

president and the 50 state governors. Did NIMS

include these high-level decision makers in its

planning? Although those who oversee NIMS might

answer affi rmatively, the evidence points to the

contrary. According to the Senate and House reports

on Hurricane Katrina issued in 2006, it is apparent

that the state of Louisiana did not know how to

operate within NIMS and knew little about

establishing an Incident Command System. As

explained earlier, Louisiana had to bring in people to

explain to them what to do days after the storm had

made landfall. Despite the language found in NIMS

touting “coordination,” “collaboration,” “planning,”

“training,” and “joint command,” the real work that

would bring these words to reality had not been done.

Much of this was attributable to a fundamental

misunderstanding of how the federal system operates.

Major issues related to coordination and collaboration

must involve those making the decisions at the very

top of government. Th is requires working through real

issues of authority and power relationships. A basic

failure of the NIMS system was laid bare by

Hurricane Katrina: a lack of respect for the federal

system and all of the actors that such a system brings

to the table. Redesigning the organizational landscape

will require new thinking that goes beyond intra- or

intergovernmental thinking. Transformation is

needed. Hence, transformation will require leadership

if it is to foster new or at least improved processes and

ways of thinking about the big picture of disaster

response. Th erefore, several things need to take place

in order to bring about timelier, effi cient, and eff ective

responses to disasters.

First, there must be a shared vision and mission for

the team ( Bass and Avolio 1994 ). Th e national

government and state governments must act as a

team, not as competitors. Th is takes more than just

mentioning collaboration on paper. Th e national

government, working primarily through the president,

must recognize that it will provide needed resources,

directed by the state government, in the event of an

emergency. On the other hand, the state government

must allow federal agencies a great deal of authority

and autonomy when operating in a crisis situation.

Th e eff ort must be collaborative. Much of the basic

structure for this, a least in stated goals, has been done

by NIMS. If every major player is on the same page

when it comes to the vision and mission of disaster

response, much of NIMS’s goals will have been

translated into reality. Th is means that NIMS can play

a central part in this transformation.

Second, after a shared vision and mission are

espoused, the organizational cultures must undergo

change. Th e president and the state governors must

continually press the message of collaboration so that

the vision of the greater good is front and center.

Transformational leaders must connect the larger

vision and needs of the outside environment to the

needs of the organization. Th ese leaders are often the

nexus between the internal organizational environ-

ment and the larger society ( Van Wart 2005 ). Th is

helps organizations avoid becoming too inward

directed and focused. In government, the primary

organizational leaders are the president and the state

governor. Th e internal organization at the national

and state levels must have executives working in a

transformative leadership fashion. Once the executives

have agreed to move in a transformative way, how and

what do they transform?

First, the shared vision of collaboration (not lip

service) is communicated by the leadership in both

the national and state governments. Th is also applies

to others who are in elected and appointed positions

in both governments. Th e vision and mission is to

have the best possible disaster response for the people

of the United States by collaborating and implement-

ing the vision. If NIMS is presented as a vehicle for

transformation and implementation, then NIMS

becomes quite useful to any overhaul that takes place,

especially because much valuable coordinating work is

already a part of the NIMS operational structure.

Second, it is vital that the executive leaders of each

government, along with the respective legislative

branches, grant others the authority to act. Th is might

require a change of attitude toward empowering

associates to act, especially in the absence of guidance

provided in standard operating procedures or in cases

when there is a breakdown in communication as a

result of the impact of the disaster or technical

reasons. Th e disaster environment may well knock out

technical communication and necessitate decisions

being made further down the chain of command.

Transformational leaders respond better to these types

of cases because these leaders see other organizational

members as being competent and capable of action

( Koehler and Pankowski 1997 ). In this area, train-

ing — and lots of it — is essential to the success of

disaster relief. Granted, this will not be inexpensive.

National, state, and local offi cials will need to receive

training that is coordinated and state centered. NIMS

can be front and center in this training process.

Comprehensive disaster training requires the

involvement of all relevant state and federal offi cials.

However, there will be diff erences in how deeply this


training needs to extend into an organization; it needs

to err on the side of inclusion. Interagency or interde-

partmental job internships can allow for more techni-

cal know-how and operational knowledge, they also

can improve interorganizational communication and

the sense of teamwork across departments and

agencies ( Kunhert 1994 ). All of these exchanges

should extend across intergovernmental boundaries as

well. Whatever statutory constraints or traditions that

stand in the way should be abolished. Once more, this

will take leadership and political will on the part of

the president, the governors, Congress, and state

legislatures.

Outside of job rotation, there must be real delegation

and empowerment ( Nahavandi 2006 ). Kunhert states,

“Transformational leadership, on the other hand, is

based on more than the compliance of followers or

the establishment of agreements: It involves shifts in

followers’ beliefs, values, needs, and capabilities”

(1994, 12). Th e rhetoric of NIMS was not backed up

by changed attitudes, values, and capabilities. While

the rhetoric is good, transformational leadership can

work to make agreements practicable by bringing all

parts of the organization on-board for the agreements.

Th is focus on empowerment must now work its way

throughout the government organizations. Th is

broadened view of leadership is needed and could

have made a diff erence in the aftermath of Katrina.

Empowered lower-level leaders could have avoided

some appalling mistakes. Th e stories of bureaucratic

red tape that illustrate poor leadership include doctors

being given mops by FEMA offi cials at the New

Orleans airport because of fears of medical liability

when sick people were all around. Another incident

involved FEMA diverting other states’ fi refi ghters

from New Orleans to Atlanta for community and

sexual harassment training. Even the delivery of

much-needed supplies was hindered when trucks were

stranded on the side of the road for days because the

trucks lacked a tasker number ( Lipton et al. 2005 ).

Had some of the bureaucrats been trained to exercise

authority (leadership) in the absence of leadership,

some human suff ering could have been alleviated and

some of the systemic breakdown mitigated. As Bass

states, “transformational leaders are … more likely to

view objectives as more important than avoiding the

violation of rules and precedents” (1994, 118). Also,

they are “more likely to change the rules and even the

culture as needed over time” (118). Th ese leaders will

want subleadership to function in the same way. Th is

happens through delegation and empowerment.

NIMS can provide solid training opportunities that

encourage this type of leadership development.

Th e process of transformation must be proactive in

reaching out to current organizational members, but

it must also recruit individuals who are like-minded.

Individuals who will not work cooperatively or who

continually try to “gum up the works” must be dealt

with. Th is can range from more aggressive training to

reassignment or even to termination. An organization

in the midst of transformation will not likely be able

to persuade every member of the organization that

change is needed. Th is is especially likely when

dealing with entrenched bureaucrats who have civil

service protection. Hiring, training, retaining, and

fi ring individuals is essential to the transformation

and maintenance of the best possible disaster response

organizations. In essence, the personnel function is

vitally important to transformation.

In some ways, the Department of Homeland Security

has off ered a personnel model that rewards employee

performance and allows leadership to make changes

with less obstruction. In a transformational

environment, the personnel function is vital to

eff ecting change. However, too much direction from

the top of the organization in ways that seem

dictatorial can backfi re. Th is could seriously hurt the

development of teamwork and vision that is necessary

to accomplish organizational change. Collaboration

should permeate the organization. Collaborative

relationships between management and employees can

make diffi cult personnel decisions more palatable.

While entrenched civil service bureaucracies cannot

be allowed to drive the process, attention must be

paid to employee concerns in transforming govern-

mental departments and agencies at the federal

and state levels ( Nigro, Nigro, and Kellough 2007 ).

Th ere is an opportunity for management and unions

to experience a new level of collaboration as both seek

the good of the organization and the greater good of

enhanced disaster response. Th ese personnel issues are

vitally important to the transformation of the

intergovernmental relationships, and they deserve

further examination.

Conclusion Th e reports issued by the White House, Senate, and

House of Representatives relating to the Katrina

disaster and response all call for transformed

organizations and much greater organizational

initiative. Will these just be reports that mention

needs and then are forgotten, or will there really be

transformation? Real leadership and authority must

infuse the organizations that respond to America’s

disasters. Th is means full and active collaboration on

the goals and strategies for success. Th is authority to

act and eff ectuate change can be called “interventional

leadership.” An interventional leader can adapt and

make changes as conditions arise and decline while

remaining focused on basic overall goals. Organiza-

tions that encourage this kind of leadership will

successfully transplant the military mind-set of

mission accomplishment that is seen when diff erent

levels of military units continue toward their

objectives even in a chaotic environment. NIMS is


uniquely positioned to provide the systemic vehicle

necessary for this type of change. However, the type of

organization that allows for intervention and initiative

must fi rst be formed. Th is will require recognition of

the need for change from top leadership at the federal

and state levels. In essence, it is the need to transform

the organizations under their control by transforming

their intra- and intergovernmental relationships.

NIMS can become the focal point for this colla-

borative transformation. Th is hoped-for transformation

cannot occur if it is kept within the pages of a report

or if the federal government tries to force-feed the

states rules for collaboration.

Some basic things need to happen in order to make

the transformation of the current disaster response

system a success. First, the knee-jerk reaction to

centralize authority in the federal government should

be avoided. It will not provide for the best response,

and it ignores or, at a minimum, marginalizes the

deep and ever-developing capabilities of state and

local government. A national government – dominated,

top-down, command and control approach will not

only hurt the basic federal relationships in many areas

(a spillover eff ect) but also will further confuse the

situation and not be nearly as eff ective as a truly

collaborative approach. Th e American federal system

holds the key to what might in actuality be the best

response to disasters: a multilayered, well-trained,

collaborative approach that stresses leadership and

initiative ( Waugh and Streib 2006 ). NIMS can be an

important vehicle for this collaboration, if the realities

of the federal relationship are laid bare and worked

through. Th en again, NIMS could be used by the

federal government in an attempt to dominate the

disaster response system. One of these two possibilities

is likely to be the future of NIMS.

Second, with the temptation of federalizing disaster

response put away, the leadership must recognize the

need for a basic change in relationships within and

across governments. Th is will take transformative

leadership emanating from the top levels of the federal

and state governments. If there is no recognition of

the need for organizational change or if it is given

mere “lip service,” the status quo will remain, and

there will be failure again at some point in the future.

Now is the time for leaders throughout government to

lead their organizations into a collaborative, trained,

and adequately fi nanced disaster response. Th is cannot

happen without transformative leadership. Again,

NIMS stands as a potential vehicle for aiding in this

transformation if it is used properly.

Th e importance of leadership — and more specifi cally,

transformative leadership — is an important addition

to the discussion of disaster response, particularly as it

relates to Katrina and possible future catastrophes.

Th e offi cial reports relating to the Katrina response are

fi lled with the word “transform” in various usages.

Leadership is also an important topic of these reports.

If the status quo is to change and the prediction of

John R. Harrald, quoted at the beginning of this essay,

is to be avoided, the very system of disaster response

must be transformed. Transformative leadership

principles off er a means for accomplishing this goal.

NIMS is a particularly interesting system that has

been set up and has language that lends itself to

relationship building. If used properly — not as a tool

for federal government domination — NIMS can aid

immeasurably in fostering a climate of transformation

and collaboration. However, this can only happen if

the “800 pound gorilla in the room” is not ignored:

federalism. Each governing entity brings its own

perspectives, power, and authority to the table.

Collaboration is impossible if the tough questions

based in federalism are not confronted. Basically, if

NIMS is supported by leaders who want to colla-

borate for the best possible disaster response that a

federal system can give the people, it can be used as a

transformative vehicle for aiding in this change. If not

NIMS, it will need to be a NIMS-like system that

provides the arena for collaboration. Without the

leadership to push for this transformation, the current

system will remain eff ectively the same, with minor

improvements made here and there. It may even work

in smaller-scale disasters (still not as well as it could),

well enough to pass the examination of the public.

Unfortunately, when a large-scale disaster occurs

again, the system will cost many lives, as it did during

Katrina. Th e leaders in government need to seize on

this moment to transform the current disaster

response environment into one of collaboration for

the good of the American people. Th is window of

opportunity for real change will not likely remain

open indefi nitely. As time progresses, the window will

shut and a “dressed up” status quo will continue to

operate. When the next major disaster occurs on

the level of Katrina or larger, a new system that

takes advantage of the strengths of the federal

relationships needs to be in place. Otherwise, they

will be trying to work it out once again during the

disaster.

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business “not” as usual: the national incident management system, federalism, and leadership

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