business integrity country agenda (bica) kenya report · 2018-06-06 · the public sector reviewed...

BUSINESSINTEGRITYCOUNTRYAGENDA(BICA)

KENYAREPORT

BUSINESSINTEGRITYCOUNTRYAGENDA(BICA)KENYAREPORT

©TransparencyInternational-Kenya,2018

Everyefforthasbeenmadetoverifytheaccuracyoftheinformationcontainedinthisreport.

AllinformationwasbelievedtobecorrectasofMay2018.Nevertheless,Transparency

International-Kenyacannotacceptresponsibilityfortheconsequencesoftheuseofthereport's

contentsforotherpurposesorinothercontexts.

BUSINESSINTEGRITYCOUNTRY

AGENDA(BICA)

KENYAREPORT



ABOUTBUSINESSINTEGRITYCOUNTRYAGENDA(BICA) .................................................................2

Theroleofbusinessintegrityin�ightingcorruption ...........................................................................2

WhyBICA?................................................................................................................................................3

Methodology ............................................................................................................................................4

Data .......................................................................................................................................................5

Scoring ...................................................................................................................................................7

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

................................................................................................................................. ..8

AssessmentsummaryforthePublicSector

..........................................................................................9

AssessmentsummaryforthePrivateSector

.....................................................................................20

AssessmentsummaryfortheCivilSociety ........................... .............................................................27

Annex1 – NationalAdvisoryGoupMembers........................................................................................ 29

Annex2 - TRACQuestionnaie .................................................................................................................. 30

TABLEOFCONTENTS

01

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

TransparencyInternationalKenyatakestheopportunitytoappreciateallthosewhowere

involved in the planning, facilitation and production of this report. The various

organizationthatwerepartoftheNationalAdvisoryGroupwhoseguidance,supportand

inputwasinvaluabletotheproject.

Wewouldliketothankourrespondentsfortheirinvaluablecontributionandfeedback,

withoutwhomthereportwouldnothavebeenpossible.

OursincereappreciationtotheTI-KenyaresearchteamcomprisingFidialiceMuthike,

Fridah Kanana and Jackline Were led by Harriet Wachira for the technical input in

collectingthedataandcompilingthereportandKevinMabongaforthereviewofthe

report.WethankSheilaMasindeandSamuelKimeuforfacilitationoftheproductionand

theoveralloversightofthepublication.

WewouldalsoliketothanktheExternalReviewerDr.LanoiMaloyandtheeditorMr.Jerry

Abugafortheexpertreviewandeditingofthereport.

The support and overall guidance by the Transparency International team- Susan

MulcahyandChristineHosack-wasinvaluablefortheproductionofreport.

ThispublicationhasbeengenerouslyfundedbytheSiemensIntegrityInitiative.


01

ABOUTBUSINESSINTEGRITYCOUNTRYAGENDA(BICA)

Theroleofbusinessintegrityin�ightingcorruption

TheBusiness IntegrityCountryAgenda (BICA) is an initiativeofTransparency

International(TI)developedbothtoenhancenationallevelbusinessintegrityand

tocreateabodyofevidenceonbusinessintegrityinvariouscountries. BICAisa

widely shared agenda for reform and acts as a collectivemomentum towards

enhancedbusinessintegrityamongkeystakeholders.ItisenvisagedthatBICAwill

becomeanimportantreferencepointfor�ightingcorruptioninbusinesspractices

aroundtheglobe,includingKenya.

Theprivatesectorisgenerallyviewedasthesupplysideofcorruption,withthe

makingofcorruptpaymentstogainbusinessadvantages:thereisacommonbelief

that companies that do not engage in corrupt practices may lose business

prospects. The business environment is thus not a level playing �ield but

improving business integrity is a way to create an environment in which all

businessescanprosper.

TransparencyInternationalde�inesbusinessintegrityas“adherencetoglobally-

recognisedethicalstandards;compliancewithboththespiritandletteroflaws

andregulations;andthepromotionofresponsiblecorevaluessuchashonesty,

fairnessandtrustworthiness”.Businessintegritycanpromoteahealthyworking

environment foremployeesandalsofosterastrongercommunityrelationship.

Commitment to business integrity drives companies to proactively pursue the

objectivesandvaluesofavailablelawsratherthanjuststayingwithintheboundsof

thelaw.BICAaimstoestablishcollectiveactionamongthreemainstakeholders:

thepublicsector,privatesectorandcivilsociety.Thisisre�lectedintheBICA

frameworkillustratedinFigure1.


02

Source:TransparencyInternational

The BICA Framework illustrates the dynamism of collective efforts towards

developingabusinessintegrityenvironmentamongthethreemainstakeholders.

Althoughthefocusistheprivatesector,inordertofostersoundbusinessintegrity,

theactiveparticipationofboth thepublic sectorandcivil society isnecessary.

Overall,thereare15thematicareasand51indicatorsforassessmentofthethree

stakeholdergroups.

WhyBICA?

BICAisthe�irstreporttoanalysetheoverallbusinessintegrityenvironmentina

givencountry—inthiscase–Kenya-bylookingattheeffortsofallstakeholders.

Furthermore,itisthe�irstcomprehensiveassessmentaimedatreducingprivate

sectorcorruption.Thereportcreatesabodyofevidenceandactsasabenchmark

to assess future progress in private sector anti-corruption movements.

Additionally,BICAinformsacollectiveactionagendathatwillbeadoptedbasedon

the �indings of the report. TheBICA assessment is designed to encourage all

stakeholderstousethe�indingsandcollaboratetoimprovebusinessintegrityand

leveltheplaying�ieldforeveryone.

Tax and Customs

Figure1.TransparencyInternational-Supplement1BICAFramework

TransparencyInternational-Supplement1BICAFramework


03

1

Methodology

Thethreemainstakeholdergroupsareassessedbasedonthematicareas.Forthe

publicsectorthereareninethematicareasorassessmentcategories:prohibiting

bribery of public of�icials; prohibiting commercial bribery; prohibiting the

laundering of the proceeds of crime; prohibiting collusion; whistleblowing;

accounting, auditing and disclosure; prohibiting undue in�luence; public

procurement;andtaxesandcustoms.Eachofthesethematicareashasfromthree

tosixkeyindicators,eachwithascoringquestion.Thefocusofthepublicsector

assessment is to determine to what extent the country's laws and practices

prevent,reduceand/orrespondtocorruptionintheprivatesector.

For the private sector there are �ive thematic areas or assessment categories:

integrity management; auditing and assurance; transparency and disclosure;

stakeholderengagement;andboardofdirectors.Likewise,eachofthesethematic

areashasfromthreetofourindicators,eachwithitsscoringquestion.Thefocusof

theprivatesectorassessmentistodeterminetowhatextentprivatesectorefforts

prevent,reduceand/orrespondtocorruptioninthissector.

Finally,civilsocietyhasjustonethematicareaorassessmentcategory:broader

checks and balances. This thematic area has three indicators with a scoring

questionforeach.Thefocusofcivilsocietyassessmentistodeterminetowhat

extentcivilsocietyeffortsprevent,reduceand/orrespondtocorruptioninthe

privatesector.

The BICA adopts a multi-stakeholder approach in order to elicit a wealth of

information and diverse views that may otherwise not be used or even be

unknown.TothisendaNationalAdvisoryGroup(NAG)wasestablishedat the

outsetoftheassessment.TheNAGfortheKenyaBICAcomprisedofninemembers

from each major stakeholder group, complemented by other national and

internationalexperts.


04

ThemainareasofresponsibilityoftheNAGduringtheBICAAssessmentwere:

Ÿ �Reviewing the assessment framework and proposal of adaptations to

re�lectthenationalcontext

Ÿ �Assistingtheexternalresearcherindatacollectionandveri�ication

Ÿ Reviewingandvalidatingscoringofindicators

Ÿ Proposingrecommendationsforrelevantstakeholdergroups

Ÿ Supportingdisseminationofassessmentresultsafterpublication

th thTheNAGmet twice,on12 July2017and26 March2018,and the full listof

membersisavailableinANNEX1.

Data

The data was collected and validated through a comprehensive process that

included:

· DeskResearch:Themaindatasourcefortheresearchwasdeskresearchof

bothprimaryandsecondarysources.Dataincludedinformationfromlaws,

reportsfromvariousoversightinstitutionsandlawenforcementagencies,

international institutions, local NGOs, private companies, and media

publications.Thiswasconducted inAugustandSeptemberof2017and

additionaldataupdatedinJanuaryandFebruary2018.

· Fortheprivatesectorassessment'sindicatorsoncorporatetransparency

anddisclosure,anadaptationofTI'sTransparencyinCorporateReporting

(TRAC)methodologywasusedasabasisforcollectingtherelevantdata.

Thequestionnaireusedcanbe found inANNEX2. Informationonanti-

corruptionprogrammes,�inancialdisclosureandstakeholderengagement

among others was obtained by searching the companies' websites for

policydocuments,�inancialreports,activityreports,CSRandsustainability

reportsaswellasanyother informationrelevanttothestudy. Datafor

TRACwascollectedinOctober2017.

06


05

2

Ÿ ExpertInterviews:Wheretherewasinsuf�icientsecondarydataavailable

to attribute a score, researchers conducted expert interviews from the

public sector, private sector and civil society. These were conducted

betweenAugustandOctober2017.

Ÿ Draft of the scores: Following the research, expert interviews and the

references for each sub-indicator, TI Kenya generated the �irst draft of

scoresalongwiththecommentsrelatedtoeachindicatorandsub-indicator.

Theresearchersbasedtheproposedscoresontheirholisticanalysisofthe

aggregateddata.

Ÿ FeedbackfromNAG:TIKenyasharedtheindicatorscoresandcomments

withNAGmemberstovalidatetheBICAreportandtoensuretheobjectivity

of theresults.Threeworkshopswereheld todiscusseach indicatorand

validate each score. Some of the scores were modi�ied based on the

recommendationsandfeedbackofNAGmembers.

· Finalscoresattribution:Researchersrevisedthescoresandcomments

based on NAG input and �inalised the report. An independent expert

reviewereditedandprovidedadditionalcommentsonthereport.


06

Scoring

AtthecoreoftheBICAassessmentframeworkareindicatorswhichtranslatethe

(largely)qualitative information intoaquantitative score (ona �ive-point scale

withtheoptionsbeing0,25,50,75and100).Eachindicatorhasanoverall“scoring

question”andmorespeci�icassessmentcriteria.

Inordertofacilitatecomprehension,thescoringresultsarevisualisedintraf�ic

signalcolours.Theindividualindicatorresultsperthematicareaareaggregatedto

anoverall thematicarea result,usinga simpleaveragecalculation. Thus,each

indicatorwithinathematicareaisweightedequally.

Indicator Qualitative Judgement Visualisation

0

The

scoring

question

is

answered,

“No,

not at all”. The

evidence

collected

for

the

assessment criteria

indicates

that

the

requirements

are

not

met

at

all.

Red

25

The

scoring

question

is

answered,

“To

a

limited

extent”.

The

evidence

collected

for

the

assessment

criteria

indicates

that

a

few

of

the

requirements

are

fully

met;

or

that

many

requirements

are

met

to

a

limited

extent.

Red-Yellow

50

The

scoring

question

is

answered,

“To

some

extent”.

The

evidence

collected

for

the

assessment

criteria

indicates

that

roughly

half

of

the

requirements

are

met;

or

that

most

requirements

are

met

to

some

extent.

Yellow

75

The

scoring

question

is

answered,

“Largely”.

The

evidence

collected

for

the

assessment

criteria

indicates

that

many

of

the

requirements

are

met

or

most requirements are met to a great extent.

Yellow-Green

100 The scoring question is answered, “Yes, fully”. The

evidence collected for the assessment criteria

indicates that (almost) all of the requirements are

met.

Green


07

Again,theoverallthematicareascoreisexpressedthroughthetraf�iclightanalogy,

usingthecoloursymbolwhichcorrespondsclosesttotheaggregatedscore.

Theideaofthescoringisnottocastanegativelightonstakeholdersorsuggestthat

theylackwillingnesstoimprovethebusinessintegrityinKenya.Onthecontrary,

thepurposeofscoring is to launchcontinueddiscussionandengagementwith

relevantstakeholdersandtohighlightwheremoreeffortsareneededintermsof

lawenforcementandlegislativeinitiatives.Ascoringmetriccreatesbenchmarksto

assesscontinuedprogress,shouldTIKenyaconductafollow-upBICAassessment

infuture.

EXECUTIVEASSESSMENTSUMMARY

TheBICAassessmentexaminesthreemainstakeholders:publicsector,business

sectorandcivilsociety,allofwhichareinstrumentalinbuildingastrongbusiness

integrityenvironment.Thestakeholdersareanalysedusing15thematicareasand

51 indicators. In this summary, we present the key �indings for the three

stakeholdergroups.


08

AssessmentsummaryforthePublicSector

Thepublicsectorreviewed31indicatorscoveringninethematicareasasseeninthegraph

below.

Thematicarea:Prohibiting briberyofpublicof�icials

1.1.1

Lawsprohibitingbriberyofpublicof�icials

1.1.2 Enforcementoflawsprohibitingbriberyofpublicof�icials

1.1.3 Capacitiestoenforcelawsprohibitingbriberyofpublicof�icials

Thematicarea:Prohibitingcommercialbribery

1.2.1 Lawsprohibitingcommercialbribery

1.2.2 Enforcementoflawsprohibitingbriberyofpublicof�icials

1.2.3 Capacitiestoenforcelawsprohibitingcommercialbribery

Thematicarea:Prohibitinglaunderingofproceedsofcrime

1.3.1 Lawsprohibitinglaunderingofproceedsofcrime

1.3.2 Enforcementoflawsprohibitinglaunderingofproceedsofcrime

1.3.3 Capacitiestoenforcelawsprohibitinglaunderingproceedsof

Crime

Thematicarea:ProhibitingCollusion

1.4.1 Lawsprohibitingcollusion

1.4.2 Enforcementoflawsprohibitingcollusion

1.4.3 Capacitiestoenforcelawsprohibitingcollusion

Thematicarea:Whistleblowing

1.5.1 Whistleblowerlaws

1.5.2 Enforcementofwhistleblower laws

1.6.1 Accountingandauditingstandards

1.6.2 Enforcementofaccountingandauditingstandards

1.6.3 Professionalserviceproviders

1.6.4 Bene�icialownership

Thematicarea:Accounting,auditinganddisclosure

Thematicarea:Prohibitingunduein�luence

1.7.1 Lawsonpoliticalcontributions

1.7.2 Enforcementandpublicdisclosureonpoliticalcontributions

1.7.3 Lawsonlobbying

1.7.4 Enforcementandpublicdisclosureonlobbying

1.7.5 Lawsonothercon�lictsofinterest

1.7.6 Enforcementandpublicdisclosureofothercon�lictsofinterest

Thematicarea:PublicProcurement

1.8.1 OperatingEnvironment

1.8.2 Integrityofcontractingauthorities

1.8.3 Externalsafeguards

1.8.4 Regulationsfortheprivatesector

Thematicarea:Taxesandcustoms

Operatingenvironment

1.9.2 Integrityoftaxadministrationauthorities

1.9.3 Externalsafeguards

25 50 75 100

�igure2:Assessmentscoresforpublicsectors


09

1.9.1

0

Theassessment�indsthattheAnti-corruptionandEconomicCrimesAct,2003

(ACECA) and theBriberyAct 2016 contain suf�icient provisions thatprohibit

passiveandactivebriberyofpublicandforeignof�icials.Additionally,these

lawshave speci�icprovisions thatprohibit facilitationpaymentsand includea

broad category of what constitutes undue advantage to include money,

employment,etc.Theassessmenthowevernotesthatthereisnoexplicitprovision

prohibitingbribesasataxdeductibleitem.

The assessment notes that there is some active enforcement of the laws

prohibiting bribery of public of�icials by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption

Commission(EACC)andtheOf�iceoftheDirectorofPublicProsecutions(ODPP)

butundertheACECA.Thisthereforemeansthatchargespreferredagainstaccused

personsarecurrentlyreported(inODPPandEACCreports)aseconomiccrimes

andnotspeci�icallybriberycases.TheestablishmentoftheAnti-corruptionand

EconomicCrimesdivisionattheJudiciaryhasalsoaidedintheenforcementofthe

anti-corruptionlaws.

TheEACCandtheODPPlistlimitedcapacity(Inadequate(humanand�inancial

resources) as a key challenge to execute their mandate; investigation and

prosecution respectively. They also particularly note the arduous process

associatedwithMutualLegalAssistance(MLA)asanotherfactoraffectingproper

enforcement.

TheBriberyAct, 2016prohibits passive and active commercial bribery. The

enforcementoftheActontheseprovisionsisyettostartastherehavebeenno

casesinvestigatedorprosecutedsofar. Thedevelopmentofregulationstoboost

implementationandenforcementisongoing.

CapacitiesoftheEACCandtheODPPforhandlingcommercialbriberycases

remainlowastheyareyettoadjusttheirresourcesaccordingly.Theassessment

notesthattheBriberyActsigni�icantlyexpandsthemandateoftheEACCtofocus

on the private sector. TheODPP reportsmaking efforts to improve its human

resourcecapacitytohandleanti-corruptionmattersingeneral.


10

TheProceedsofCrimeandAntiMoneyLaunderingAct(POCAMLA)2009contains

provisions that prohibit launderingofproceedsof crime. This includes the

concealmentordisguiseofpropertywithknowledgethatitwasproceedsofcrime;

acquisitionoruseofpropertyknowingthatthepropertyistheproceedofcrimeas

wellasassociationorparticipationinaconspiracytofacilitate,abetorcounselin

theconcealmentoracquisitionofproceedsofcrime.

TheActdoesnot,however,haveprovisionsthatprohibittheconversionortransfer

ofproperty,knowingthatsuchpropertyistheproceedsofcrime,forthepurpose

ofconcealingordisguisingtheillicitoriginoftheproperty.

TheassessmentnotesthattheFinancialReportingCentre(FRC)hastheprimary

mandate to enforce POCAMLA with the assistance of various reporting

institutionsandsupervisorybodies.Itishowevernotpossibletoestablishtowhat

extentthelawhasbeingenforced,norestablishthecapacityoftheFRCasithasn't

producedanyannualreportsinceitsformationin2012.

TheCompetitionAct,2010istheprimarylawthatprohibitscollusioninKenya.

TheAct contains key provisions that prohibitmaking collusive tenders, �ixing

prices,sharingofmarketsbyallocatingcustomers,suppliersetc.,andestablishing

outputrestrictionquotas.

Enforcement of the Act is primarily the responsibility of the Competition

Authority.TheAuthority,initsannualreports,hasindicatedactiveenforcementof

collusion cases. Additionally, it has launched a leniency programme that is

currentlybeingrolledouttoimprovecompliancetotheAct.

TheAuthorityreportshavingaworkingrelationshipwiththeCommonMarketfor

EasternandSouthernAfrica(COMESA)CompetitionCommissionandisinvolved

inactivitiesthataimtoseetheEACCompetitionCommissionoperational.This

booststheirenforcementcapacityacrossmemberstates.TheAuthorityreportsa


11

relativelysteadyallocationofresourcesfromtheexchequerthatallowsthemto

executetheirmandatewithminimalchallenges.

Theassessmentnotesthatthecountrydoesnothaveanindividualwhistleblower

protectionlaw.Therearehoweverprovisionsinotherpiecesoflegislationsuchas

the Bribery Act, 2016 that protect whistleblowers in the public and private

spheres.TheBriberyAct,however,hasaspeci�icde�initionofawhistlebloweras

onewhomakesareporttotheCommissionorthelawenforcementagencieson

actsofbriberyorotherformsofbribery.

TheAct,whileitprovidesforpenaltiestothosewhoareresponsibleforretaliation

towhistleblowers,itdoesnotprovideforremediesforwhistleblowersthatsuffer

detrimentalactionasaresultofwhistleblowing.Additionally,theactrequiresall

lawenforcementagenciestoputupmeasurestoprotectwhistleblowersbutdoes

notrequireothergovernmentagenciesorprivateentitiestodothesame.

Theassessmenthowevernotesthatlistedcompaniesrequiretheboardtoensure

thatacompanyhasaWhistleblowerPolicyandaresubjecttotheprovisionsofthe

CodeofCorporateGovernancePractices for IssuersofSecurities to thePublic,

2015.There ishowever, limited informationon internaldisclosureprocedures

usedbypublicandprivateorganisationstoadequatelyprotectemployeeswho

reportwrongdoing.

Despitethefactthereisnoindependentwhistleblowerinvestigation/complaints

authority or tribunal, there are government agencies such asKenyaRevenue

Authority (KRA) and EACC that receive and investigate reports from

whistleblowers.


12

TheCompaniesAct,2015containsprovisionsthatrequirecompaniestoprepare

annual�inancialstatementsthatadheretoprescribedaccountingand�inancial

standards,assetbytheInstituteofCerti�iedPublicAccountantsKenya(ICPAK).

Additionally,theActrequiresacompanytokeepaccuratebooksofaccountsatthe

company'sregisteredof�iceforaminimumofsevenyears.TheActfurtherrequires

only listed companies to have external audits according to internationally

recognised standards and for these companies to publish their external audit

reportsannually.TheAct,however,doesnotrequirecompaniestosetupinternal

controlsystemssuchasinternalauditfunctions.

Theassessmentnotesthatthereisagapinenforcementofthesestandardsas

ICPAKcanonlyensureenforcementamongitsmembership;ICPAK'smembership

isnotrequiredofallthatserveasaccountingprofessionalsinvariouscompaniesin

theprivatesector.Additionally,theassessmentnotesthatwhiletherearelegal

requirementsforprofessionalserviceproviderssuchasauditors,accountants

and providers of rating or related advisory services to be licensed, there is

signi�icantproportionofpractitionersinthemarketwhoarenotlicensed.

Thisthereforeposesachallengetoprofessionaloversightbodieswhosereach

onlyextendstotheirlicensedmembership.Independenceandautonomyofthe

service providers ismostly guaranteed through their ethical and professional

standardsasthereisnolegalorpolicyframeworksthatspeakstothis.

The Assessment also notes that annual reports submitted to the Business

RegistrationServiceandannualreturnssubmittedtotheKRAarenotreviewedfor

compliancetoaccountingandauditingstandards.Additionally,thereisnolegalor

policyframeworkthatwouldgrantICPAKaccesstothesereportsforreview.


13

TheCompaniesAct,2015outlinespenaltiesandsanctionsfordirectorsthatfailto

prepare annual �inancial statements as per the requirements. Institutions in

charge of enforcement such as The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), the Capital

MarketsAuthority(CMA)andICPAKdonotnecessarilypublishreportsthatshow

enforcementactionsanddecisionstakeninindividualcases,includingaccounting

matters.

TheAugust2017amendmenttotheCompaniesAct,2015broughtinprovisions

onbene�icialownership.Theamendmentsincludeade�initionofabene�icial

ownerandrequirementstoprovideinformationonbene�icialownersinaddition

tothatofdirectorsandmembers.Theinformationonbene�icialownersshouldbe

includedinthecompanyregister–keptatthecompany'sregisteredaddressand

lodged at the Registrar of Companies. The Act neither penalises willful

misrepresentationofinformationonbene�icialownershipnorfailuretodisclose

nomineesfrontingdirectorsorshareholders.

TheElectionOffencesAct,2016andthePoliticalPartiesAct,2011haveprovisions

thatprohibituseofpublicresourcesforthepurposeofcampaigningduringan

electionorareferendumbyanypersonorreferendumcommittee. Additionally,

thePoliticalPartiesAct,2011providesforamechanismthatdeterminesequitable

andtransparentpublicfundingtopoliticalparties.

TheActsfurtherprovideforlawfulsourcesoffundingtopoliticalpartiestoinclude

individualsandcorporates,with limitsputoncorporateanddonations froma

singlesource.Anonymouscontributionsarebanned.Politicalpartiesarerequired

tokeeprecordsoftheirsourcesoffunding(amongotherdetailsofthesame)as

wellaspublishthepartiesauditedaccounts.


14

The Registrar of Political Parties and the Independent Electoral Boundaries

Commission (IEBC) have the mandate to enforce laws on political

contributions.TheassessmentnotesthattheRegistrarreportedfullcompliance

frompoliticalpartiesinthelastgeneralelectionsandassuchhadnotimposedany

sanctionsadministrativeorotherwiseonanypoliticalparty.TheIEBCprepared

andgazettedregulationsoncampaign�inancingbuttheyweresuspendedbythe

Nationalassembly.

ThereiscurrentlynolegalorpolicyframeworkinKenyathatregulateslobbying

andassuchnorequirementsoncompaniestodisclosetheirlobbyingactivities.

ThePublicOf�icerEthicsAct,2003andLeadershipandIntegrityAct,2003arethe

twomain laws thatmanagecon�lictsof interestsbetweenpublicandprivate

sector.Publicentitiesarerequiredtokeeparegisterofcon�lictofinterestwhere

publicof�icersandstateof�icersarerequiredtodeclarecon�lictsofinterest(gifts,

bene�its,hospitalityetc.)onneedbasis.Whilethesedeclarationsarenotmade

public,publicentitiesarerequiredtosubmitannualreportstotheEACConthe

giftstheyhavereceived,thosetheyhavedisposedofforintendtodisposeoff

. Further, the twoActs prohibit state andpublic of�icers from taking up other

gainfulemployment.Thelawsdonot,however,putawaitingperiodforelected

publicof�icialsorseniorcivilservantsintendingto movetoprivatesectororfor

corporate executives intending tomove senior public of�ices and positions in

government.

Theassessmentnotesthatinformationregardingpublictendersismadepublicly

availableongovernmentwebsitesnationwidecirculationnewspapersandother

availablepublicspaces.


15

Thecountryadoptedadigitalsystemforuseinpublic�inancemanagement,the

IntegratedFinancialManagement Information System (IFMIS).However, there

have been reported challenges in the roll out of the system especially at the

counties. Additionally, thePublic Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015

outlinesproceduresforvarioustypesofprocurement,includingthosethatrequire

competitivebiddingasperthe�inancialthresholdoutlined.

TheassessmentnotesthattheActrequiresprospectivebidderstodeclarethat

theyor their sub-contractorshaven'tbeenbarred fromparticipating inpublic

procurementproceedings.Theyarefurthersupposedtodeclarethattheywillnot

engageinanyfraudulentorcorruptpractice.Otherthanthesedeclarations,there

arenootheranti-corruptionrequirementsmadeonbiddingentities toqualify

themtorespondtogovernmenttenders.Conversely,therearenoincentivesor

advantages to prospective bidders that have effective anti-corruption

programmesinplace.

Contractingauthorities,ontheotherhandare,subjecttoprovisionsofthePublic

Of�icersEthics,Act2003andtheLeadershipandIntegrityAct,2013withregards

to setting integrity management initiatives. Such initiatives include wealth

declaration by public of�icers, which is done once every two years. These

declarationsarehowevernotmadepublicbutcanbeaccessedthroughprocedures

laiddownintheActs.Additionally,theEACCprovidesadvisoryservicesonanti-

corruptionandmainstreamingofthesametovariousgovernmentagencies.

ThePublicProcurementReviewBoard(PPRB)offersaggrievedbiddersachannel

through which they can appeal the outcome of a procurement process. The

decisionsofthereviewboardareavailableonthePublicProcurementRegulatory

Authority (PPRA) website. Additionally, the PPRA is charged with the

responsibilityof receivingand investigatingcomplaints thatarenot subjectof

administrative review on procurement and asset disposal proceedings. They

however neither have a dedicated line nor mechanism that receives such

complaints nor a voluntary disclosure programme that allows companies to

reportoncorruption.


16

DespiteprovisionsintheActforcooperationbetweenPPRAandnon-stateactors

toimprovethepublicprocurementsystems,notmuchhasbeendoneinthisregard

yet.

The Kenya Revenue Authority has the primary responsibility of tax

administrationinthecountry.Theyhavestandardisedtheprocessandmethodof

collectingandpayingtaxesdeterminedbytheNationalTreasuryandMinistryof

Planning. The processes are digitised to a large extent with application for

PersonalIdenti�icationNumber(PIN)numbersforindividualandcorporatetax

payersaswellaspaymentand�ilingoftaxreturnsbeingdoneonline.Information

onnumberandleveloftaxrates,criteriafortaxexemptionsisreadilyavailable

online. Information regarding tax deals with national and multi-national

companiesismanagedbytheNationalTreasury.

KRAhasanintelligenceandstrategicoperationsdepartmentwiththemandateof

prevention,detectionandinvestigationofcorruptionandunethicalconductinthe

Authority. They are guided by the KRA anti-corruption policy and a code of

conductthatallemployeessignandareregularlytrainedon.Theinternalaudit

departmentisalsoresponsibleforinvestigationoffraudandfraudrelatedcasesat

theAuthorityand isrelatively independent.Reportsof their investigationsare

howevernotmadepublic.Additionally,theAuthorityhasawhistleblowerpolicy

thatprovidesforprotectionofwhistleblowerscontactingtheauthority.

Intermsofexternalsafeguards,theassessmentnotesthatKRAissubjecttoaudit

bytheOf�iceoftheAuditorGeneral(OAG)whoseindependenceisguaranteedby

theConstitutionandthePublicAuditAct,2015.TheAuditorGeneralmakesthe

resultsoftheauditsavailableonitswebsite.


17

KRAoperatesa complaint and information center that receives complaintson

corruptionandotherrelatedoperationalmattersoftheauthorityviaphoneand

email. TheAuthoritydoesnothoweverhaveavoluntarydisclosureprogramme

that allows companies to self-report on corruption cases in exchange for

mitigationsanctions.Theyinsteadhaveaninformerrewardschemethatallows

membersofthepublictoreportorprovideinformationonunpaidtaxesandgeta

percentageoftherecoveredamounts.

Theassessmentthereforerecommendsasfollows:

Recommendation

Agency

1.

EstablishapolicyorLegalframeworkfortheMultiAgencyTeam

(MAT)toconcretisecollaborativeeffortsoftheagenciesinvolved.

Thiswillimprovetherateofresolution(investigation,

prosecutionandconviction)ofcorruptioncases.

Attorney

General

2. Fasttracktheestablishmentofapublicregistershowing

bene�icialownershipofcompanies.

BusinessRegistrationService

3.

Expeditethedevelopmentofregulationstoaidinthefull

implementationoftheBriberyAct.

EACC/ODPP

4.

AdjustthebudgetaryallocationtoEACCandODPPtoallowthem

expandaccordinglytoaccommodatetheadditionalmandate

broughtaboutbytheenactmentoftheBriberyAct,2016.

EACC,ODPP

,NationalTreasury

5.

FasttracktheenactmentofaWhistleblower ProtectionLawto

enhancethe�ightagainstcorruption.

AttorneyGeneral

6.

PPRAshouldsetupadedicatedcorruptionreportingmechanism

toreceiveallprocurementrelatedcorruptionreports.

PPRA

Intheshortterm:


18

1.

AmendtheBriberyAct,2016:

a.

To

anexpressprohibitionofdeductibilityofbribesfor

taxpurposes.

EACC,

KRA

b.

Toincludeprovisionsforallgovernmententitiestoputinplacewhistleblowerprotectionmechanismsaspartoftheiranti-corruptionprogramme.

EACC,KEPSA,KAM

c.

To include

remedyforwhistleblowersthatsuffer

reprisalasaresultoftheiractions.

EACC,AttorneyGeneral

2. AmendtheCompaniesAct,2015includecrucialaspectsofbene�icialownershipdisclosureparticularly criminalisation ofwillfulmisrepresentationofbene�icialownershipinformation.

BusinessRegistrationService

3.

AmendtheAccountants ActtoensuremandatoryregistrationofpracticingaccountingprofessionalstoICPAKtoensureproperapplicationandenforcementof accountingandauditingstandardsinKenya

ICPAK,AttorneyGeneral

Recommendation

Agency

IntheMidterm:


19

1. EnactlegislationtoregulatelobbyinginKenya.

AttorneyGeneral,KEPSA,KAM

2.

The PublicProcurementRegulatoryAuthorityshouldincorporateintegritypactsasaccountabilitymeasuresintheprocurementprocess.Thiscanbedonewiththehelpofthecivilsocietysectorto actualise provisionsofsection9 (1q)ofthePublicProcurement andAssetDisposalAct(PPDA) 2015. Additionally,regulationsforthePPDA2015Actshouldincludeaclausecompellingprocuringentitiestoincludecivilsociety organisations oversightduringtheprocurementprocessforprocurementaboveacertainthreshold.

PPRA

3.

Toenhanceaccountabilityandintegrityofbiddingentities,thePPDA2015shouldbeamendedtoincludepreferenceorcertainadvantagesforcompanieswitheffectiveanti -corruptionprogrammes

PPRA,NationalTreasury,KEPSA/KAM

Recommendation

Agency

Inthelongterm:

AssessmentsummaryforthePrivateSector

Theassessmentontheprivatesectorfocusesontheanti-corruptionefforts

initiatedbythebusinesscommunitytopromotebusinessintegrity.Itassesses5

thematicareasand17indicators.

Belowisagraphicalrepresentationofthekey�indingsofthethematicareas:

Thema�c area: Integrity Management

Thema�c area: Audi�ng and assurance

Thema�c area: Transparency and disclosure

2.5.1 Oversight

2.5.2 Execu�ve remunera�on

2.5.3 Conflict of interest

Thema�c area: Board of directors

25 50 75 100


20

2.4.1 Stakeholder rela�ons

2.4.2 Business driven an� corrup�on ini�a�ves

2.4.3 Business associa�ons

Thema�c area: Stakeholder engagement

2.3.1 Disclosure of an�-corrup�on programs

2.3.2 Disclosure on organiza�onal structures

2.3.3Disclosure of key financial data on a country

by country basis

2.3.4 Addi�onal disclosure

2.2.1 Internal control and monitoring structures

2.2.2 External Audit

2.2.3 Independent assurance

2.1.1 Provision of Policies

2.1.2 implementa�on of prac�ces

2.1.3 Whistleblowing

2.1.4 Business partner management

�igure3:Assessmentscoresforprivatesector

0

The assessment notes that provision of anti-corruption policies among

companiesisnowmandatoryafterenactmentoftheBriberyAct,2016.Priorto

that,onlyspeci�iccategoriesofcompanieswererequiredtohaveanti-corruption

policies or programmes; companies listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange

(NSE),companiesregulatedbytheCentralBankofKenya(CBK)andthosethatare

signatoriestotheCodeofEthicsforBusinessesinKenya.

There are no guidelines or minimum requirements for the content of anti-

corruptionpoliciesorprogrammes.TheBriberyAct2016requirescompaniesto

implementanti-corruptionprogrammesaccordingtosizeandriskwhiletheCBK

andthecodeofethicsforprivatebusinesshasnospeci�ications.Allcategoriesof

polices outlined above require adherence across all levels and areas of the

company.

ForcompanieslistedatthestockexchangeandthoseregulatedbytheCBK,the

boardhastheresponsibilitytoensurethattheethicsandanti-corruptionpolicies

areadoptedandimplementedwithinthecompany.

There is no standard way in which the companies implement their anti-

corruption programmes. Some programmes contain training aspects and

feedbackorreviewmechanismstoensureeffectiveness.Forinstance,companies

listed at the stock exchange arehowever required tohave annual governance

auditswhiletheothertwocodesdonothavesucharequirement.Onlycompanies

listedatthestockexchangearerequiredtopublishtheircodeswhilefortheothers

itisdiscretionary.

TheBriberyAct,2016doesnotrequirecompaniestoputinplacewhistleblower

protectionmechanisms;onlylawenforcementagenciesarerequiredtodoso.

The Act has provisions that protect whistleblowers from retaliation from

employersbutdoesnotofferremedialactionforthosethatsufferdetrimental

actionasaresultofwhistleblowing.Companieslistedatthestockexchangeare

requiredtohaveawhistleblowerpolicybutinformationonimplementationofthis

waslimited.


21

Intermsofapplyinganti-corruptionprogrammestorelevantbusinesspartners,

signatories to the code of conduct, at the integrating and reporting level are

encouragedtousetheirin�luencetoencourageothercompaniestosignontothe

codeTheothertwocodesdonothavesimilarprovisions.

The assessment notes that there are legal and policy provisions that require

companies to set up and maintain internal controls over accounting, record

keepingandotherbusinessprocesses.Theseincludekeepingaccuratebooksand

recordsthatdocumentall�inancialtransactions.However,onlylistedcompanies

arerequiredtohaveinternalauditfunctionswhiletherearenolegalprovisionsfor

non-listedcompaniestoestablishthesame.

TheAuditcommitteesoflistedcompanieshavethemandatetoreviewthe

effectiveness of the internal audit function as well as ensure that

recommendationsfromtheinternalauditreportsareimplemented.TheBoardof

Directorsisresponsibleforpreparingandapprovinga�inancialstatementofa

company.

The Companies Act, 2015 requires companies to conduct annual external

audits.Theseshouldbeconductedbylicensedauditors.Forlistedcompany,the

auditorsshouldbeingoodstandingwithInstituteofCerti�iedPublicAccountancy

ofKenya(ICPAK).Theexternalauditorsshouldbeindependent,notemployeesor

board members and their families. Additionally, external auditors of listed

companies shouldbe rotatedevery six tonineyears. External audits reports

shouldbepresentedasanannextoacompany'sannualstatutory�inancialreport,

be sent out tomembers of the company and in case of public companies, be

presentedatanannualgeneralmeeting.

Companies listed at the stock exchange are required to undergo an annual

governanceaudit,conductedbypractitionerslicensedbytheInstituteofCerti�ied

Public Secretaries of Kenya (ICPSK). There are no requirements to publicly

disclosetheassuranceopinions.


22

Theassessmentreviewedtransparencyanddisclosurepatternsof35outof

64 companies listed at theNairobi Securities Exchange. These companies

represent a category of companies with stringent regulations and statutory

obligations from the Companies Act,2015 and the Capital Markets Authority

(CMA).

The assessment notes that anti-corruption programmes were the least

discloseditemsintheassessment.Halfofthecompaniesassessed(18outof35)

didnotdiscloseanyinformationontheiranti-corruptionprogrammeswhile34%

of the companies (12 out of 35) had a score of between1 and50%with the

remaining �ive scoringmore than50%.Noneof thecompaniesassessedgota

perfectscore.

In terms of disclosure of organisational structures, 20% of the companies

assessed (7 out of 35) did not disclose any information regarding their

subsidiaries.Thisincludedcompaniesthatdidnotstatewhetherornottheyhad

anysubsidiaries.Majority(74%)ofthecompaniesassessedobtainedascoreof

morethan50%with20%ofthecompaniesgettingaperfectscore.

Intermsofdisclosuresofkey�inancialdataoncountry-by-countrybasis,44%of

thecompaniesassessedscored50%andabovewhile22%scored25%andathird

ofthecompaniesscoredzero.Noneofthesecompaniesgotaperfectscore.

The assessment notes that there are initiativeswithin the private sector that

encourage sustainability of �inancially sound enterprises. These are usually

multi-stakeholder- led initiatives, bringing together business member

organisationsandregulators. TheseincludeawardssuchastheTop100Mid-

Sized Companies and FiRE Awards. It is howeverworth noting that in these

initiatives, anti-corruption issues take little or no prominence. Various

stakeholdersinvolvedincorporategovernanceprocesseshaveaccesstorelevant

information,butthisislargelyguidedbybestpracticeandstatutoryinformation.

3.Disclosureondetailsofananticorruptionprogramsuchasvariouspolicies(giftsandhospitality,prohibitingfacilitationpayments,politicalcontributions),acodeofconductthatappliestoemployees,boardandexternalstakeholdersamongotherelementsofananticorruptionprogram.4.Disclosureonsubsidiaries(Consolidatedandnon-fullyconsolidated),theirpercentages,countriesofoperationandincorporation.5.Disclosureonrevenues,capitalexpenditure,pre-taxincome,incometaxandcommunitycontribution.

06


23

3

4

5

OtherprivatesectorledinitiativesincludeaCodeofEthicsforBusinessinKenya

thatwasspearheadedbyapexbusinessassociationsKAM,KEPSAandUNGlobal

Compact Kenya. This is a voluntary initiative that has 700 signatories so far.

Membersthathavebeenimplementingitforafewyearsaretakingleadpromoting

thebene�itsofsigningontothecodeamongothermembers.Theprivatesector

hasalsocollaboratedwithgovernmentandcivilsocietyinvariousforumssuchas

theKenyaLeadershipIntegrityForum.

Therearealsoinitiativesthatarespearheadedatthesectorallevel.Forinstance,

thebankingandmanufacturingsectorsprovidesupporttomembersatsectorand

nationallevelinformoftrainingandprovisionofrelevantmaterials.

TheCompaniesAct,2015;theCodeofCorporateGovernancePracticesforIssuers

ofSecuritiestothePublic2015andCBKPrudentialguidelineschargetheboard

with the responsibility of shaping and enforcing a company's governance

practices. The board is also responsible for communicating, to various

stakeholders,thelevelofcompliancetothecodeofcorporategovernance.There

are,however,noexplicitprovisionsformandatorycomplianceoftheboardwith

the company's anti-corruption programme. However, the code of corporate

governancerecommendsthattheboardundergoesannualtrainingonareasof

governancefromcrediblesources.

Intermsofexecutiveremuneration,thecoderecommendsthattheboardhasan

independentremunerationcommitteetorecommendtoittheremunerationand

structure of the compensation of the executive and non-executive directors.

Further, the code recommends that the remuneration of the executive board

should be linked to corporate performance, while that of executive directors

shouldbeinlinewithindustryrates.Informationonthedirectors'remuneration

andbene�itspackageshouldbeapprovedbyshareholdersatanannualgeneral

meeting and should formpart of the notes in the company's annual �inancial

report.


24

TheCodeofCorporateGovernancePracticesforIssuersofSecuritiestothePublic

2015,TheCompanies(general)RegulationsandtheCompaniesAct,2015have

variousprovisionsoncon�lictofinterestoftheboard.

Thecoderecommendsabalanceofexecutiveandnon-executivemembers,

withthenon-executivemakingupthemajorityandhaveapolicythatensures

independenceoftheboard.Additionally,thecoderequiresthattherebeapolicyto

manage con�lict of interest of the board. This should include a register of the

board'scon�lictofinterestdeclarationsthatshouldbeupdatedbythecompany

secretary.Therearehowevernorequirementstomakethisregisterpublic.

TheCompaniesAct,2015requiresthatadirectorofacompanyavoidssituations

thatcanpresentacon�lictofinterestwiththecompany. Theregulationsonthe

otherhand,requirethatthedirectorsdeclarethenatureandextentofthecon�lict

andavoidsvotingorbecountedasquoruminmattersrelatingtothedeclared

con�lict.

Theassessmentthereforerecommendsthefollowing:

IntheShortterm:

Recommendation Agency 1. AmendtheBriberyAct2016toincludeprovisionsfor

privatecompaniestoprovideforWhistleblowerprotectionmechanismsaspartoftheiranti-corruptionprogrammes

EACC,KEPSA,KAM

2.Civilsociety,incollaborationwiththeEACCandBusinessMember Organisations

to sensitise

theprivatesectoron

theimportanceofbusinessintegrity.Thiscanbeginwithasensitisation

campaignontheprovisionsoftheBriberyAct.

EACC,KEPSA,KAM


25

1. KEPSA,KAMandtheUNGlobalcompactshouldpreparesampleanti-corruptionpolicywithminimumrequirementstobeadoptedbysignatoriestothecodeofethicsforcompaniesinKenya

KEPSA,KAM,UNGlobalCompact

2.

ConsiderincludinganindicatoronadoptionandimplementationofintegritymanagementmechanismsasanassessmentcriteriaintheexistingawardinitiativessuchasFiReAwardstoencourageaccountabilityintheprivatesector

CMA,ICPAK,EACC,KAM,KEPSA

Recommendation Agency

Inthemid-term:

1. Thereisneedforthecountrytoadoptcohesiveintegritystandardsthatapplytoallcategoriesofcompanies.

KEPSA,CMA,


Inthelongterm:


26

AssessmentsummaryfortheCivilSociety

Theassessmentofthecivilsocietylooksintotheirroleinreducing,preventingand

respondingtocorruptionintheprivatesector.Itassessestwothematicareasand

threeindicators.Overall,theassessmentnotesthatintermsofbroaderchecksand

balances,thecivilsocietyperformsaveragelywhiletheyperformpoorlyintermsof

engagementwiththeprivatesector.The�indingsarepresentedgraphicallybelow:

Thematicarea:Broaderchecksandbalances

Independentmedia

Civilsociety monitoringofbusinessintegrity

Civilsocietyengagementin businessintegrity

25 50 75 100

Themedia inKenya is largelyownedand controlledby theprivate sector for

commercialpurposes.Thishasbeenperceivedtocompromisetheirindependence

andreportingtheprivatesectorinnegativelight.Theassessmentfurther�indsthat

mediapractitionerssubscribetoacodeofconductprescribedandenforcedbythe

MediaCouncilofKenya.

On the other hand, the Constitution of Kenya guarantees independence of the

mediafromgovernment.Thishoweverhasbeenputtotestseveraltimes,with

governmentattempting,andsometimessucceeding,inunderminingthisthrough

passageofvariouspiecesoflegislationsuchastheSecurityLawsAmendmentact

andtheMediaCouncilAct.

In termsofcivil societymonitoringofbusiness integrity, the interventions

undertakenarenotedtobethematicanduncoordinatedforthemostpartandhave

led to limited success.However, some successful initiatives of the civil society

engagingthepublicsectorincreatinganenablingenvironmentforthebusiness

sectorhavebeenrecorded.


27

0

�igure4:AssessmentscoresforCivilSociety

Nevertheless, therehasbeen limitedcivil societyengagementwith theprivate

sector.Whiletherehavebeensectorbasedinitiativesandcampaignsundertaken

by the civil society, there are limited reports outlining the success of such

initiatives.

Theassessmentthereforerecommendsthefollowing:

Intheshortterm:

Recommendation

Agency

1.

Strengthen

theenforcementmechanismattheMediaCouncilofKenya

tocheckissuesofintegrityamongjournalists.

MediaCouncilofKenya

2.

Thereisneedforcivilsocietyorganisationstoconveneaforumthatfocusesonbusinessintegrity.Similarforahaveseensomelevelofsuccessintheinitiativesundertakeninthepublicsector.

CivilSociety

1. Thereisaneedtocivilsocietytohaveaconcertedefforttoengagetheprivatesectorinmattersofbusinessintegrity.Theycanleveragetheirexperienceinengagingthepublicsectortoengagetheprivatesectorongovernancematters.Forinstance,civilsocietycanseekobserverstatusinBusinessMemberOrganisation initiatives.

CSOs,KEPSA,KAM


IntheMidterm:


28

Organization Sector

1. KenyaRevenueAuthority Government

2.

BusinessregistrationBureau

Government

3. EthicsandAnti-CorruptionCommission

Government

4. UNGlobalCompactKenya–

UNGC-K

PrivateSector

5. KenyaAssossiationofManufacturers-KAM

BusinessMemberOrganization

6. GlaxoSmithKline

PrivateSector

7. KenyaBankersAssociation

PrivateSector

8. InstituteofCerti�iedPublicAccountantsKenya-

ICPAK

ProfessionalBody

9. CUTS-Nairobi CSO

Annex1–NationalAdvisoryGroupMembers


29

Annex2-TRACQuestionnaire

REPORTINGONANTI-CORRUPTIONPROGRAMMES(ACP)

1. Doesthecompanyhaveapubliclystatedcommitmenttoanti-corruption?

2. Doesthecompanypubliclycommittobeincompliancewithallrelevant

laws,includinganti-corruptionlaws?

3. Doesthecompanyleadership(seniormember[s]ofmanagementorthe

board)demonstratesupportforanti-corruption?

4. Doesthecompany'scodeofconduct/anti-corruptionpolicyexplicitly

applytoallemployeesandtheboardofdirectors?

5. Doesthecompany'santi-corruptionpolicyexplicitlyapplytopersons

whoarenotemployees,butareauthorisedtoactonbehalfofthe

companyorrepresentit,forexampleagents,advisors,representativesor

intermediaries?

6. Doesthecompanymakeanti-corruptionrequirementsonnon-controlled

personsorentitiesthatprovidegoodsorservicesundercontract,for

examplecontractors,subcontractorsorsuppliers?

7. Doesthecompanyhaveananti-corruptiontrainingprogrammeinplace

foritsemployeesanddirectors?

8. Doesthecompanyhaveapolicyongifts,hospitalityandexpenses?

9. Isthereapolicythatexplicitlyprohibitsfacilitationpayments?

10.Doestheprogrammeenableemployeesandotherstoraiseconcernsand

reportviolationsoftheprogrammewithoutriskofreprisal?

11.Doesthecompanyprovideachannelthroughwhichemployeescan

reportsuspectedbreachesofanti-corruptionpolicies,anddoesthe

channelallowforcon�identialand/oranonymousreporting

(whistleblowing)?

12.Doesthecompanycarryoutregularmonitoringofitsanti-corruption

programmetoreviewtheprogramme'ssuitability,adequacyand

effectiveness,andimplementimprovementsasappropriate?

13.Doesthecompanyhaveapolicyonpoliticalcontributionsthateither

prohibitssuchcontributionsorrequirescontributionstobepublicly

disclosed?


30

ORGANISATIONALTRANSPARENCY(OT)

1. Doesthecompanydiscloseallofitsfullyconsolidatedsubsidiaries?

2. Doesthecompanydisclosepercentagesownedineachofitsfully

consolidatedsubsidiaries?

3. Doesthecompanydisclosecountriesofincorporationforeachofitsfully


4. Doesthecompanydisclosecountriesofoperationsforeachofitsfully


5. Doesthecompanydiscloseallofitsnon-fullyconsolidatedholdings?

6. Doesthecompanydisclosepercentagesownedineachofitsnon-fully

consolidatedholdings?

7. Doesthecompanydisclosecountriesofincorporationforeachofitsnon-

fullyconsolidatedholdings?

8. Doesthecompanydisclosecountriesofoperationsforeachofitsnon-

fullyconsolidatedholdings?

COUNTRYBYCOUNTRYREPORTING(CBC)

1. Doesthecompanydiscloseitsrevenues/salesincountryx?

2. Doesthecompanydiscloseitscapitalexpenditureincountryx?

3. Doesthecompanydiscloseitspre-taxincomeincountryx?

4. Doesthecompanydiscloseitsincometaxincountryx?

5. Doesthecompanydiscloseitscommunitycontributionsincountryx?


31


32

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HEAD OFFICE

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Gate No. 713, Suite No. 4

P.O. Box 198 - 00200, City Square, Nairobi, Kenya

Tel; +254 (0) 202 727 763/5, +254 722 296 589

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P.O. Box 198 - 00200, City Square, Nairobi, Kenya

Tel; +254 (0) 202 727 763/5, +254 701 471 575.

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