buridan davidson akrasia

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1/22

John Buridan and Donald Davidson on "Akrasia"Author(s): Risto SaarinenSource: Synthese, Vol. 96, No. 1, Studies in Early Fourteenth-Century Philosophy (Jul., 1993),pp. 133-153Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117803 .

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2/22

RISTO SAARINEN

JOHN

BURIDAN

AND DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON AKRASIA

1.

INTRODUCTORY

REMARKS

This article has

two

objectives.

First,

it is

my

aim

to

outline

some

medieval views

concerning

the

acts

that

oppose

one's

better

judgment.

I will

use

Aristotle's

term

akrasia

to

denote

the

moral

state

of

an

agent

behaving

in this

way.

John Buridan's

(1285-1349)

treatment

of akrasia

is

especially

relevant

here.

Second,

it will

be

argued

that

some

impor

tant

philosophical

ideas

proposed

recently by

Donald

Davidson,

in his

influential

study

'How is

Weakness of the Will

Possible?',1

are

antici

pated

in

the medieval

discussion.

Aristotle's

akrasia,

or

''weakness of the

will ,

has

recently

received

increasing scholarly

attention.2

The

problems

concerning

akrasia arise

ifwe adopt the view of Socrates, according to which no one can know

the

good

and will

evil.3

Given

this,

how

is

it

possible

to

explain

the

seemingly

common

phenomenon

of

acting

against

one's better

judg

ment? Aristotle's discussion of

akrasia

in the

seventh book

of

his

Nico

machean

Ethics

has

become

a

paradigmatic

example

of how

a

classical

problem

is

actually

perennial

and

can

arise

again

in modern

thought.

Many

recent

treatments

of the weakness

of the will

combine historical

interpretation

of

Aristotle with

developments

in

analytical

philosophy,4

thus

demonstrating

the

importance

of historical

awareness

even

in mod

ern

action

theory.

Although

this awareness has

undoubtedly

been instructive both for

historians

and

philosophers,

one

important

aspect

of the

historical di

mension,

as

far

as

I

can

see,

has been

almost

completely

neglected.

The

modern

studies and

textbooks

on

akrasia first

deal

extensively

with ancient

Greek

philosophy

and

then

immediately

proceed

to

the

twentieth-century

discussion.

The

remaining

gap

of 2000

years

of

philo

sophical

reflection is

sometimes filled with

short

references

to

Augus

tine,

Aquinas,

Leibniz,

and

Kant.5

One does

find

sophisticated

philosophical

discussions

on

akrasia,

or

incontinence

(Lat.

incondnenda),6

however,

both in

medieval

Synthese

96:

133-154,

1993.

?

1993

Kluwer

Academic

Publishers.

Printed in

the Netherlands.


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3/22

134

RISTO SAARINEN

scholastic

philosophy

and in sixteenth- and

seventeenth-century

neo

scholasticism.7

The

conceptual

refinement of

the

fourteenth-century

medieval discussion

makes contributions that

are

wholly

comparable

to

those

of

twentieth-century

philosophers.

The

neglect

of medieval authors

is rather

surprising,

as

it

is well

known that

many

of them

wrote

lengthy

commentaries

on

the Nicoma

chean

Ethics.

Nevertheless,

Justin

Gosling,

e.g.,

wrote

in

his

recent

historical

introduction

to

Weakness

of

the Will that so far

as

I

know

there is

no

literature

on

the

problem

in

medieval

philosophers .8

Al

though some preliminary studies have been done,9 the medieval dis

cussion

has

obviously

been

neglected.

The

short

chapter

on

Aquinas

and Others

in

Gosling's

own

monograph10

is,

in

any

case,

not

very

illuminating,

because he

only

pays

attention

to

Anselm of

Canterbury,

Thomas

Aquinas,

and

John

Duns

Scotus,

none

of whom

wrote

compre

hensive

treatises

on

akrasia}1

Although

the

simplest

explanation

for this

state

of affairs

might

be

that

medieval

texts

are

largely

unknown

to

modern

philosophers,

per

haps

a

more

likely

reason

for

it is the

common

prejudice

that

the

Judaeo-Christian notion

of 'free will' does

not

allow

any proper

philo

sophical

discussion of akrasia.

According

to this

prejudice,

akrasia has

no

special

philosophical

interest,

since

Christian

psychology

considers

the

will

an

autonomous

faculty

in human action. Such

an

autonomous

faculty

is

not

bound

to

any

intellectual

judgment;

therefore

the

will

need

not

obey

reason's

commands.12

Although

the Greek

notion of 'will'

certainly

differs from its Judaeo

Christian

counterpart,

the

supposition

of

the above-named

prejudice

is

proved

historically

false.

In

medieval

Aristotelianism,

e.g.,

acting

against

one's

better

judgment

was

a

difficult

phenomenon

to

grasp

philosophically,

since it

was

commonly regarded

that

the

will,

being

a

rational

capacity,

follows

the

practical

intellect. Aristotle's

problems

with

akrasia

are

in

fact

discussed

extensively

in

medieval

commentar

2.

THE

DEVELOPMENT

OF AKRASIA IN MEDIEVAL

THOUGHT

2.1.

Augustine's

Two Wills :

Doing

Something Only Reluctantly

The

complete

text

of Aristotle's

Ethics

was

introduced

to

Western

philosophy by Robert Grosseteste

in

the

1240s. Before that time

Augus




4/22

JOHN BURIDAN

AND DONALD DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

135

tinian

psychology

dominated the ethical

discussion.14

Although

Augus

tine

(354-430)

had

no

familiarity

with

Aristotle's

ethical works and

although

he used the Latin

term

incontinentia

only

to

denote the

lack

of

chastity

and

temperance,15

he

often

analyzed

examples

of moral

conduct

that

are

similar

to

those found

in

Nicomachean Ethics.

In De

spiritu

et

litera

Augustine

comes

to

the

conclusion

that

good

actions,

if

performed

only

unwillingly

or

reluctantly (invitus),

do

not

count

as

true

merits.

If,

for

example,

a

person

does

something against

his

primary

wishes

only

in order

to

avoid

punishment,

his

action

is

not

meritorious.16 Only if the person acts wholeheartedly does he receive

the

merit

toward

a

true

reward.

Nonetheless,

Augustine

also

asserts

that

by

acting

reluctantly

a

person

can

be held

responsible

for both his

external

act

and his

intention.17

This reluctant

acquiescence

bears

some

analogy

to

Aristotle's

enkrateia,

since

in

both

a

person

does

something

right

and

manages

to

thwart his evil desire

to

do otherwise.

In his

Confessiones Augustine

speaks

also

of

doing

evil

reluctantly.

Immediately

before his

own

conversion,

the church father

continued

his bad habits

only

reluctantly,

because his will could

already

see

the

right

alternatives.18

It

is

no

wonder that

some

modern authors have

seen here a counterpart to Aristotle's akrasia.19 But unlike Aristotle,

Augustine

thinks that the

agent

in

some

sense

chooses

his

own

inconti

nent

behavior,

however reluctant

this

assent

and

choice20

may

be.

Moreover,

Augustine's

psychological explanation

of 'weakness

of

the

will'

differs

significantly

from

Aristotle's doctrine.

Augustine

speaks

of

two

wills

struggling

within the

same

person.

He

is

not

referring

here

to two autonomous

wills,

but rather

to two

initial tendencies of the

human

appetite.21

He

stresses

that this

disintegration

of

the motives

takes

place

within

the

same

mind and its

single

will.

Moreover,

the

act

of

willful choice

creates

a

unity

and

wholeness

within

the

will.22

Another

important

element in

Augustine's thought

is his view of the

hierarchy

of desired ends.

The

highest

goals

are

to

be

willed for the

sake of their

own,

inherent

goodness.

But

some

lower ends

are

to

be

willed

only

for

the

sake

of the

higher

and

final

goals.23

This distinction

between

willing something

for its

own

sake

(propter se)

and

for

the

sake of

something

else

(propter aliud)

will

become

an

integral

part

of

medieval discussions

concerning

akrasia.

Augustine's

model

is

further

qualified by

his

theological

presupposi

tions. He tends

to

think

that God is the

only

rational

agent

who

never

acts

reluctantly.24 Moreover,

his

use

of

continentia is conditioned

by




5/22

136

RISTO SAARINEN

the

Vulgate

translation of

Sapientia

Salomonis

8,

21:

And

as

I

knew

that

I

could

not

otherwise

be

continent,

except

God

gave

it .

For

Augustine,

this

verse

is

universally

valid:

no

man

can

be

continent

without God's

grace.25

Thus in

Augustinian theology

the

state

of

being

'incontinent'

(mainly

in

the

realm

of

sexuality)

becomes the

fate of

every

human

being. Although

the

Aristotelian

scholastics

gave up

much

of this

Augustinian background,

the

presupposed

universality

of 'incon

tinent' behavior

is

one

reason

why

the

topic

was

so

extensively

discussed

in

the later Middle

Ages.

2.2.

Anselm and

Abelard

on

Reluctant Actions

In

his De

lib?rtate

arbitrii Anselm

of

Canterbury (1033-1109)

radicalizes

Augustine's

theory

of will.

For

Anselm,

the

freedom of

the will'

(libertas arbitrii)

does

not

imply

the

ability

to

sin

but

only

the

ability

to

carry

forward rational

decisions.

The

freedom of

a

rational

being

means

acting

in

accordance

with

reason.26

Anselm holds that

a

rational

being

can

will

irrational evil

only

so

that he in

principle

could resist

it

(ut

possit

quidem

nolle)27

Because Anselm

argues

strongly

that the

freedom of the will is a rational

capacity,

we cannot

explain

our ir

rational behavior

against

our

better

judgment

by

simply

referring

to

this

freedom.

In

this

way

the

Augustinian

theory

of will

becomes

com

patible

with

Anselm's

intellectualistic

action

theory.

In his

Ethics,

Scito

teipsum,

Peter Abelard

(1079-1142)

discusses

what

actually

happens

when

people

act

reluctantly

or

against

their

better

judgment.

He

wants

to

show

that the actual

committing

of

a

sin

does

not

increase its

degree

of

sinfulness

in

respect

to

the

mere

consent

to

commit

sin. This idea leads

him

to

distinguish

between

'will' and

'consent'.

The

distinction

is

relevant

in

examples

that

resemble Aristot

le's

akratic

behavior.

For

instance,

a man

who

falls

into

longing

for

a

woman

or

for fruit

that

does

not

belong

to

him

has

the will which

lacks

consent .28

Abelard

is also

interested

in

cases

where the

consent

can

be

under

stood

as

allowing

something

to

happen

for the

sake of

something

else

(propter

aliud)

that

is

actually

willed.

For

example,

if

somebody

bears

a

painful operation

in

order

to

be

healed,

we

don't

say

that he

wants

the

pain.

He

doesn't

will

it,

but

only

allows

it

to

happen

for

the

sake

of

something

else.

Such

behavior

is for

Abelard

a

passio ,

in which

a

person endures what he does not will (quod

non

vult tol?rai) in




6/22

JOHN BURIDAN

AND DONALD DAVIDSON ON AKRASIA

137

order

to

reach

something

else.29

The

topic

of

willing

propter

aliud

derives

from

Augustine,

but Abelard

interprets

it

as

enduring

or

suffering ,

in which the

will

orders itself

to

remain in

a

passive

state.30

2.3.

The

Semantics

of

Will

in

Peter

of

Poitiers

Anselm's and

Abelard's

ideas

are

reflected

in

many

twelfth-century

discussions

that aim

at

deepening

the

conceptual

understanding

of

Au

gustinian

topics,

such

as

acting reluctantly

and

willing something

propter

aliud.31 Some significant developments took place in the Sentendae of

Peter of

Poitiers

(1130-1205).

At least three

distinct

points

are

here

of

interest.

One,

Peter

adheres

to

the Anselmian

view that

a

rational

being

must

always

to

some

extent

possess

knowledge

of the

right.

For

him,

the

so

called

synteresis

is

the small

spark

of

reason

(scindllula

rationis),

which

cannot

be

extinguished.32

But

if

an

evil

person

simply

wills

evil,

how

can we

claim that his

synteresis

is

still

functioning?

Peter solves

this

problem

by

distinguishing

between

counterfactual

wishes

(vellem)

and actual

willing

(volo).

Some counterfactual

good

wishes

remain

in

the sinner, even if he doesn't actually want to do the right thing. So

we

can

say

that

such

people

in

some

weak

and counterfactual

sense

would like

to

behave

rightly

(vellet

declinare

a

malo).33

Two,

another

way

of

describing

the

plurality

of

desires within the

same

will

is

to

say

that

some

things

are

willed

without

qualification

(simpliciter),

whereas others

are

willed

only

if

some

pre-condition

is

present

(cum

quaedam

conditione).

For

example,

Peter

says

that

we

want

the death

of

Christ

not

for its

own

sake but under the

pre

condition

that

it

is

part

of

God's

salvatory

plan.34

Three,

according

to

Peter,

willing

the antecedens

does

not

necessarily

imply

that the

consequens

is also willed. In other

words,

N(p ?>q)

and

Wap

together

do

not

imply

Waq

(N

=

'it

is

necessary

that',

W= 'to

will',

Wap

=

'a

wills

that

p')35

Peter's

example

is

classical: consider

thatp

stands for 'a is

showing

penitence'

and

q

stands

for

'a has

sinned'.

Now

N(p

.-*

q)

is

correctly

formed,

because sins

cannot

be

repented

unless

they

have been

committed.

However,

it

does

not

follow

from

a's

willing

to

show

penitence

(Wap)

that

a

wills

to

have sinned

(Waq).36

Points

one

and

two

above

are

sometimes

connected

in

medieval

discussions

so

that

the

counterfactual

wishing

(vellem,

velleitas)

is

understood

as

readiness

to

will

something

under

given pre-conditions




7/22

138

RISTO SAARINEN

(promptitudo

volendi

sub

conditione)

31

Point three

above is

very

con

troversial,

because

it

seems

to

say

that the

side-effects

of

willing

a

goal

are

not

necessarily

themselves willed. This idea in

turn

leads

to

dis

cussion about the

possibility

of

doing

evil

to

achieve

good .38

How

ever,

we

will

only

here follow the

results of Peter's

analysis

insofar

they

are

relevant for the

explanation

of akrasia.

2.4.

Albert the Great and the

Problem

of

Moral

Certainty

Albert the Great (1200-80) was the first Latin writer to treat compre

hensively

Aristotle's notion

of

akrasia. Albert

was

well trained both

in

Augustinian

tradition and

in

Aristotle.

His

two

commentaries

on

Nicomachean Ethics

give

a

congenial

picture

of

Aristotle's akrasia inso

far

as

they

teach

that it is

impossible

to act

against

clear and

distinct

knowledge

of

a

moral

goal.39

Albert

preserves

the

Augustinian-Chris

tian

theological

stance

in

his

analysis by

arguing

that

all sin

is due

more

or

less

to

ignorance.40

He also

recognizes

the

Aristotelian idea that the

akrates

acts

against

his

own

choice

(elecdo,

prohairesis).41

In

Augustin

ian

tradition,

as we

have

seen,

the

reluctant actions

were

nevertheless

due to a

partial

assent or choice.

One of

Albert's

many

original

contributions

in

his discussion of akra

sia

is

the

distinction between various

degrees

of

moral

certainty.

A

historical

happenstance

aided

him in

making

this

distinction. The Latin

translator of Nicomachean

Ethics,

Robert

Grosse

teste,

rendered Aris

totle's akribeia

( precision )

as

certitudo

and his endoksos

( a

reputable

opinion )

as

probabilis.

Thus,

when the

Greek

philosopher

in

Nicoma

chean Ethics 1104al-6 holds

that

an

account

of

matters

of conduct

can

be

given only

in

outline

and

not

precisely,

Albert understands

Aristotle

to

mean

that

the

science

of ethics does

not

possess

the

same

degree

of

certainty

(certitudo)

as some

other branches

of

science.42

Moreover,

Albert

grasps

the

meaning

of

Aristotle's

endoksa

as

implying

that ethics

does

not

attain strict

demonstration,

but

must

rely

on

reputable opin

ions

in

a

probabilist

manner.43

Before

solving

the

problems

connected

with

akrasia,

Albert

in

his

first

commentary

discusses

whether ethics

ever

attains absolute

certainty

(certitudo)

as

presupposed

in Aristotle's notion

of

scientia. Albert ad

heres

to

the Aristotelian view

that

we

have scientific

knowledge

of

some

universal

principles

of

ethics,

but the

judgments

concerning

particular

actions

must

remain

opinions,

because

they

are

more

or

less

probable




8/22


9/22

140

RISTO

SAARINEN

theory

in

which the

agent's thought

and

decision-making

process

is

analyzed

into three

parts.

Each

of

these

parts

causes

some

activation

in

the

will. The

first

act

of the will is the

act

of

complacence

and/or

displacence

(actus

complacentiaeldisplicentiae),

which

emerges

as a re

sult of the

primary

judgment

of the

practical

intellect.

According

to

Buridan,

this first

act

does

not

yet

lead into action.

Moreover,

a

plu

rality

of

such

acts

which

are

incompossible

in

respect

to

their realization

may

reside

simultaneously

in

the soul. As the first

act

is

something

like

a

passive

reception

of sense-data offered

by

the

intellect,

the will

at

this point possesses no freedom. The second act of the will is called the

act

of

acceptation

of

refutation

(actus acceptationis/refutationis).

The

freedom

of

the

will

pertains

to

its

second

act:

it

can

either follow the

action

proposed

by

the intellect

or

it

can

defer

its

act.

The third

act

is

the external manifestation

of

the

action

(prosecutiolfuga).52

Buridan's

first and second

acts

of the will

are

rather

analogous

to

the

Stoic-Augustinian

distinction between desire

and

consent.

Moreover,

he himself

connects

them with the volo-vellem distinction

presented

by

Peter of

Poitiers and others.

The

first

act

of the will is the

hypothetical

velleitas;

only

the

second

act

can

be called the

act

of

the

will in

a

proper

sense.53

In the seventh book

of his

commentary

Buridan defines enkrateia

(continentia)

as a

moral

disposition

that

helps

us

to

stick

to

right

reason

and

thus

to

resist the

passions suggesting

deviant behavior.

But these

passions

cause

an

additional

resisting

impulse,

namely,

that

of

the

first

act

of the will

(displicentia),

to

become

connected

with

our

actual

behavior.54

Correspondingly,

in akratic behavior the

resisting

displac

ency

defending right

reason

remains

in

some

sense

within the

agent.55

According

to

Buridan,

akrasia and enkrateia

occur

in situations

in

which

two

or

more

conflicting,

simultaneous

first

acts

of the will

are

active within

the

agent's

mind. The

incompossible

alternatives A and

B

are

both

presented

to

the

agent

sub ratione

boni, i.e.,

as

being

desirable.

Buridan

calls this

a

situation of double

inclination

(inclina

tio

duplex).56

Buridan

shares

the

view of Albert and

of Aristotle

that it is

impossible

to act

against

knowledge

of the

good

in

the

strict

sense

(scientia

per

fecta).

Such

'clear-eyed

akrasia' is

impossible.

But he

repeatedly

stresses

that in

practical

decision-making

the

agent

normally

does

not

possess

such

perfect

scientia but

operates

within

a

framework of

conflicting

reasons.57 It is

no

wonder, therefore, that he pays attention

to

the




10/22

JOHN BURIDAN


141

decision-making

process

in situations of 'double inclination'.

Buridan's

main

interest

in his discussion of akrasia

is

directed toward

situations

marred with

some

ambiguity.

He thus refines Albert's

concept

of moral

certainty.

Double

inclination

makes

akratic

judgment

weak

(iudicium

debile

seu

formidinale).

Accordingly,

the second and

proper

act

of the

will,

the

act

of

acceptation,

also remains

weak

(acceptatio

debilis).58

The

weakness

of

the akratic

judgment

can

be

seen

in the fact

that

the

two

inclinations

become

successively

actual

in

the akratic

person:

after

committing sin he suffers regret.59 Like Albert, Buridan too develops

a

gradation

of moral

certainty

and concludes that it is

impossible

to act

against

a

completed

judgment

(iudicium completum).

In

order

to

explain

what

a

completed

judgment

is,

Buridan

presents

a

fourfold

gradation

of

completion

in

judgment.

In

judging

between

A

and

B,

the

weakest

case

arises

(1)

when

no reason

supports

either

A

or

B;

another

weak

case

arises

(2)

when

equal

reasons

support

both

A and B. In the

third

case

(3)

there

is

a

stronger

reason

for A

than

for

B;

but

some

other

reason

nevertheless

promotes

B.

For

Buridan,

even

the

judgment

concerning

this

third

case

remains weak

and

incomplete.

Only

in

case

(4), where all doubts, however small, are removed, can we reach a

completed

judgment.

In this

case,

A

is

categorically supported

over

B.60

Buridan also

speaks

of

uncertain

(dubium)

and certain

(certum)

judgments. Only

when

a

judgment

possesses

absolute

certainty

is it

not

possible

to

act

against

it.

But

if there is

any

reason,

however

small and

insignificant,

against

a

judgment

concerning

the

probable right,

it

is

possible

to

act

akratically.61

Buridan's

emphasis

on

the

uncertainty

of moral

judgments

is

con

nected with

his

idea

that

the will's freedom consists

mainly

in its

capacity

to withdraw its own act. Buridan shares the medieval view that the free

will is

a

rational

capacity.

But

then it would be

highly misleading

to

say

that

the

will's freedom

is

the

source

of irrational

behavior. There

fore,

the

free

will

never

resists the

rational

judgments

of

the

intellect.62

We

already

saw

that Peter Abelard

and Albert the

Great

regarded

the

will's

consent to not

doing

anything

as

useful

in

some

situations.

Buridan

cultivates

this view and

makes it

a

cornerstone

of

his action

theory.63

He does

not

consider the

will's

decision

to

remain

passive

as

an

irrational

liberty,

but

argues

that

in

cases

of double

inclination

it

is

often

the

most

rational choice.

This

rationality

is founded

in the

nature




11/22

142

RISTO SAARINEN

of

practical

decision-making:

Buridan

says

that it is

often better

not to

choose

to act

too

rapidly,

because

what

seems

good

prima

facie

might

prove

to

be

wrong

after

thorough

consideration.

It

is

difficult

to

see

the latent

consequences

of

practical

decisions;

therefore it is

useful

to

possess

the

capacity

of

delaying

the actual decision for

a

while.64

Impor

tant

decisions, however,

should

not

be

delayed

too

long.65

The

capacity

to

postpone

the will-act is thus for Buridan

an

aspect

of

prudential66

behavior. Because

our

estimations

of moral

situations

remain

incomplete

and

our

practical

judgments

weak,

it is

often

pruden

tial to postpone a decision. Moreover, in his discussion of prima facie

willing something

Buridan

seems

to

adopt

the above-mentioned view

of Peter of

Poitiers,

according

to

which

we

often will

something

without

necessarily willing

all

of the

consequences.

For

Buridan,

the

pruden

tiality

of

withdrawing

the will-act derives from

the fact that it offers

the

possibility

of

investigating

whether the

agent

in

fact

wants

all

the

implied

consequences.

We

have

already

seen

that the akratic man's

judgment

is weak

and

uncertain

(debile, dubium).

Buridan

adheres

to

the Aristotelian view

that the

akratic

intellect

is somehow

captured

by

the

passions.

But,

in

addition to that, with the

help

of his idea that the freedom of the will

consists

in

its

possibility

to

defer

its

own

act,

he also

develops

another

way

of

understanding

akratic action.

If

the

agent

in

the

case

of conflict

ing

alternatives and weak

judgment postpones

his

decision for the sake

of

reflection,

the

judgment

attains

greater

certainty,

until

most

doubts

have been

extinguished,

at

which

time

it

has become

as

certain

as

possible.

Only

then is it

prudential

to

act

in accordance

with

it.67

Buridan

seems

to

think that

passion

causes

the

agent

to

act

hastily,

that

is,

without

paying

enough

respect

to

the eventual

consequences

of

the action.

The

weak

judgment

would have

gained

more

certainty,

if

passion

had

given

the

agent

enough

time

to

weigh

the

evidence

pro

perly.

This

is also the

reason

why

the akratic

man

later

repents:

after

the

passion

has

extinguished

itself,

the

consequences

become

evident,

which

affords

rational

consideration.68

Buridan

certainly

does

not

mean

that all

ambiguities

can

be

removed

by

proper

consideration

of

a

moral situation. On the

contrary,

he

is

likely

to

think that

in

most

cases

we

do

not

reach absolute

certainty

and often

simply

have

to

make

judgments

in

the

context

of

ambiguous

situations. But false

judgments

in

totally ambiguous

situations,

if

made

after

proper

moral

consideration,

are

not

instances of

akrasia.69




12/22

JOHN BURIDAN AND DONALD DAVIDSON ON AKRASIA

143

In

sum,

we

can

say

that Buridan

employs

Aristotle's

concept

of

akrasia

as a

framework for

analyzing

what

happens

in

uncertain moral

situations.

He

defends

Aristotelian

intellectualism

by

claiming

that free

dom of the will

as

such

does

not

imply

that

free action

is

irrational

behavior.

But

Buridan's

discussion is non-Aristotelian

in

the

sense

that the

gradation

of moral

certainty

is

not

relevant for the Greek

philosopher.

Like Socrates and

Aristotle,

Buridan

denies

the

possibility

of

'clear-eyed'

akrasia,

but

he

is

in

fact

more

interested

in

the akratic

behavior that

occurs

in

situations

of

conflicting

alternatives.

In

these

situations, akrasia is due to weak judgment influenced by passion.

4.

'medieval'

elements

in

Davidson's

explanation

of

akrasia

4.1.

The Distinction between

Prima

Facie and Unconditional

Judgments

It is

not

my

aim here

to

outline

wholly

Donald Davidson's

argument

in

How is

Weakness

of

the

Will

Possible?,

nor

will I

go

into

the details

of

the

far-reaching

recent

discussion of Davidson's

ideas.70

I

will

simply

list some of the ideas that to my view have their obvious counterparts

in

the medieval discussion.

Donald

Davidson

argues

that

it

is

possible

to

perform

an

akratic

action while

judging

that,

all

things

considered,

it would be

better

not

to

do it than

to

do

it.

Moreover,

Davidson holds that the existence of

such akrasia

is

compatible

with the

principle

(which

he calls

P2)

that

[i]f

an

agent

judges

that

it would

be

better

to

do

x

than

to

do

y,

then

he

wants to

do

x

more

than he

wants to

do

y .71

Davidson makes the existence of akrasia

compatible

with P2

by

distinguishing

between

prima

facie (conditional,

'all-things-considered')

judgments

and unconditional

(sans

phrase,

absolute)

judgments.72

He

argues

that the

akrates

operates

with

prima facie

judgments

in

the

sense

that both the

reasons

for and

against

an

action in

question

and the

resulting

decision

are

not

unconditional

and

absolute,

but

only

'all

things-considered'

(prima facie)

judgments.

But

the

judgment

pre

supposed

in

P2

is

absolute.73

He further holds that

reasoning

that

stops

at

conditional

judg

ments

...

is

practical

only

in its

subject,

not

in

its

issue .74

By

this

he

means

that

the

agent's

prima

facie thoughts

concerning

an

action do

not

necessarily

materialize

as

actions. As such

they

differ

from absolute




13/22

144

RISTO

SAARINEN

judgments,

which,

if

used

in

practical

syllogisms,

have the

proposed

action

as

their

conclusion.75

Of

course

there

is

something

irrational

in

akratic

behavior,

since it

is

nevertheless odd

to act

against

one's best

all-things-considered

judgment.76

But

akratic actions

are

not

logically

impossible,

because

a

prima

facie

judgment

does

not

compel

the action

to

materialize. Therefore Davidson

can

conclude that

there is

no

(logical)

difficulty

in the fact of

incontinence,

for the

akrates is characterized

as

holding

that,

all

things

considered,

it

would be

better

to

do b than

to

do

a,

even

though

he

does

a

rather

than

b

and with

a reason.

The logical difficulty

has

vanished

because

the

judgement

that

a

is better than

b,

all

things

considered,

is

a

relational,

or

pf

[prima facie], judgement,

and

so

cannot

conflict

logically

with

any

unconditional

judgement.77

We have

seen

that

Buridan,

too,

uses78

the

expression

prima

facie

in

describing

the moral situation that arises after the first

act

of

the

will

has

produced

some

interior

motion,

that

is,

when

some

desires have

emerged.

It would be

highly

anachronistic,

of

course,

to

maintain

that

Buridan's

use

of the

term

prima

facie

is

synonymous

with that of

Davidson.

But

the

interesting

thing

to

notice here

is

that Buridan

also

makes a clear distinction between

imperfect

(iudicium

debile, iudicium

incertum)

and

perfect

judgments

(iudicium

completum,

certum),

and

holds that

akrasia

only

occurs

in

situations

in

which the

judgment

is

imperfect.

With

the

help

of this distinction Buridan extends

Aristotle's

discussion

to

moral situations

in

which

reaching

perfect

judgment

is

difficult.

This

'extended'

view of

akrasia,

which

is

already

present

in

Albert

the

Great,

has

many

affinities

with

Davidson's discussion of

prima

facie

judgments.

In

the

eighth question

of Book

VII

Buridan

asks,

e.g.,

whether the

will

necessarily

follows the

practical

intellect. He ascribes different

degrees

of

certainty

to

different

judgments,

and

concludes that the

will

necessarily

follows

only

the

most

certain

ones.79

We

have

already

no

ticed that Buridan

does

not

say very

clearly

whether

we ever

in

fact

attain

judgments

possessing

absolute

certainty

(iudicium certum).

And

the

same

problem

pertains

to

the work

of

Davidson;

it is evident

that

in

inductive

reasoning

even

the best

judgments

remain

'all-things

considered'

judgments.80

Buridan

and Davidson

differ,

of

course,

in

how

they

employ

the

distinction

between

perfect

and

imperfect judgments.

Whereas

David

son

describes

akratic behavior

as

an

irrational

course

of action left

open




14/22

JOHN

BURIDAN

AND DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

145

because of the

uncompelling

nature

of

prima

facie

judgments,

Buridan

elaborates

a

peculiar

dynamics

of the will.

According

to

him,

in

situ

ations

lacking

certainty

the

will

can

be

directed

to

various alternatives

because

the

intellect has

not

excluded

them;

therefore

a

type

of

akrasia

(though

not

'clear-eyed'

akrasia)

is

possible.

But

although

these

expla

nations

differ,

they

both

presuppose

a

distinction

between

prima

facie

and

definitive

practical

judgments.

Moreover,

Davidson remarks that it is

not

enough

to

know the

reasons

on

each

side:

he

[the

agent]

must

know how

they

add

up .

And he claims that this cannot be done in

a

syllogistic way.81 Thus, he

stresses

the

prima

facie

character of

even

the

best

'all-things-considered'

judgments.

In

holding

that

no

logical

calculus

can

determine

the

out

come

of moral

reasoning

in

complex

situations,

Davidson

approaches

Buridan's view that the

so-called 'weak

judgment'

does

not

guarantee

the

Tightness

of the

outcome

of the action.

4.2.

Prima Facie

Judgments

as

Conditional

Judgments

We have

seen

that

Davidson also calls his

prima

facie

judgments

'con

ditional'. In his article

'Intending'

Davidson concludes that

[w]ants,

desires,

principles, prejudices,

felt

duties,

and

obligations

provide

reasons

for

actions and

intentions,

and

are

expressed

by

prima

facie

judgements;

intentions and the

judgements

that

go

with

intentional actions

are

distinguished

by

their all-out

or

uncon

ditional

form.82

From

this it

again

becomes clear that

an

unconditional

judgment

is

a

final

statement

concerning

the

whole of the situation

under consider

ation.

It

yields

intentional

actions,

whereas

prima

facie

judgments

are

valid

only

relative

to

their

reasons.

The

suggested

unconditional

con

clusion of the practical syllogism, i.e. the action, is not 'detachable'

from the

prima

facie

reasons

supporting

and

opposing

it. Davidson

wants to

point

out

that

[w]e

can

hardly expect

to

learn

whether

an

action

ought

to

be

performed simply

from

the

fact

that

it

is both

prima

facie

right

and

prima

facie

wrong

....

...

if

we

are

to

have

a

coherent

theory

of

practical

reason,

we

must

give

up

the idea

that

we

can

detach

conclusions about what

is

desirable

(or better)

or

obligatory

from

the

principles

that

lend those

conclusions

colour.83

This line

of

thought

has

similarities with

the

action-theoretical

role

of

the

counterfactual,

or

conditional, willing

as

developed by

Peter

of




15/22

146

RISTO SAARINEN

Poitiers

and used

by

Buridan. The

wants

and desires that

are

recognized

but

not

carried forward

can

be

explained

as

counterfactual,

or con

ditional,

judgments.

In this

sense

Peter

of

Poitiers's

example

of the

sinner who

says

that he

counterfactually

wishes

(vellet)

to

abstain

from

sin

would

be

an

instance of

Davidson's

prima

facie

judgment.84

Simi

larly,

in

Buridan's

example

a

continent

man

is asked

whether he

wants

to

fornicate.

He

answers

that he

wants

it

only conditionally (non

respon

debit

vol? ,

sed dicet

vellem ),

namely,

only

under the

counterfactual

pre-condition

that

it

were

not

sinful. In Buridan's

analysis

this

answer

means that there exists a first act of the will supporting the fornication.

However,

no

conclusion

is detached from that

conditional

judgment,

and

the

second

act

of the will

refutes

it.85

It

looks

as

though

both Davidson

and

Buridan

in

fact

operate

accord

ing

to

a

kind

of

distinction between desire

and

assent,

in which

the

desires

are

prima

facie

evaluations

conditioned

by

the

respective

rea

sons.

This conditional

(prima facie)

evaluation does

not

lead

to

action;

the actual

assent

can

be

described

as

the 'second act' of the

agent's

mind,

emerging

as

the result of

an

unconditional

judgment.

4.3.

Reasoning

from

Prima

Facie

Judgment

as an

Instance

of

Reasoning from

Probabilistic

Evidence

Davidson also remarks

that moral

reasoning

on

the

basis

o?

prima

facie

judgments

has

an

analogy

with

reasoning

from

probabilistic

evi

dence.86

Without

entering

the fallacies shown and re-formulations

undertaken

by

Davidson

here,87

we

note

that

his

understanding

is

not

far

from how

Albert the Great and Buridan

also

understood the

nature

of moral

reasoning.

In

ethics

we

proceed

ex

probabilibus

(Aristotle's

reputable

opinions ),

and

although

this

expression

does

not

yet pre

suppose

any

elaborate

theory

concerning

probabilities,

it

is

already

evident that for Albert

and Buridan it

implies

that

our

moral

judgments

are

conditioned

by

finite

reasons

and,

therefore,

lack absolute

certainty.

The

same

analogy

is

also

visible in Davidson's

principle of

continence,

which

asserts

that

we

should

perform

the

action

judged

best

on

the

basis

of all available relevant

reasons.88

For

Davidson,

this

directive

is

analogous

to

the so-called

requirement

of total evidence for inductive

reasoning,

which

states

that

we

should

give

our

credence

to

the

hypo

thesis

supported

by

all available relevant

evidence. Just

as

this latter

maxim is

not

part of the logic of inductive reasoning but

a

directive the




16/22

JOHN

BURIDAN


147

rational

man

will

accept,

so

the

principle

of continence

has

no

compel

ling logical

force,

though

it

is

nevertheless

a

guideline

of rational be

havior.

When the akratic

person

acts

against

his

own

'all-things-con

sidered'

best

judgment,

he is

not

breaking

any

syllogistic

structure

but

only

this directive

principle.89

Davidson's

principle

of continence has

some

resemblance

to

what

we

might

call Buridan's directive

of

prudentiality,

which

asserts

that

a

pru

dent

man

should

postpone

his

decision

until

all

relevant

considerations

have

been

completed.90

As

we

have

seen,

Buridan considers the will's

postponement of its will-act

as

prudential just because it gives

an

oppor

tunity

to

collect

and

to

weigh

properly

more

evidence.

Davidson's

principle

of continence and Buridan's directive of

pruden

tiality

are

meaningful only

if

we

consider

the

ethical

decision-making

process

as

analogical

with

reasoning

from

probabilistic

evidence. David

son's

important point

in

stressing

this

analogy

is that

we

need

to

know

in ethics

as

well

how the

different

reasons

'add

up'.

In

other

words,

besides Aristotle's deductive model

of

the

practical syllogism,

ethical

thinking

needs

to

be

supported

by

some

kind

of

inductive

logic

of

decision-making.

When

Albert the

Great

and

Buridan consider ethics

as proceeding ex probabilibus, they are recognizing that inductive think

ing

is

necessary

in

situations

permeated

with

a

plurality

of,

more or

less,

probable

prima facie

reasons.

NOTES

1

First

published

1970.

We

use

the

1980

edition,

as

reprinted

with

corrections

(1982).

2

Recent

bibliographies

of

the

modern historical and

philosophical

discussion

of Aristot

le's akrasia

are

Mele

(1987,

pp.

172-80),

Charlton

(1988,

pp.

185-91),

and

Gosling

(1990,

pp.

210-12).

These

three

monographs

also offer

a

general

survey

on

the

most

important

studies.

3

For

Socrates'

position,

see,

e.g.,

Charlton

(1988,

pp.

13-33).

For

Aristotle's

view,

cf.

Charles

(1984).

4

Cf.

Mortimore

(1971);

Vermazen

and Hintikka

(1985);

Mele

(1987).

5

See

Broadie

and

Pybus (1982);

Hintikka

(1988);

Gosling (1990).

6

We will

use

the

expressions

akrasia ,

incontinence ,

and

weakness

of the will

as

synonymous.

7

Perhaps

the

most

interesting

medieval discussions

on

akrasia

are

found

in

the

two

commentaries of Albert the Great

(1891;

1987),

as

well

as

inWalter

Burley's

(1521)

and

John Buridan's

(1968)

commentaries. In

my

forthcoming study,

Weakness

of

the Will

in

Medieval

Thought,

these

commentaries

will be

analyzed.

8

Gosling (1990, p. 3).




17/22

148

RISTO

SAARINEN

9

See Kent

(1984,

pp.

269-331;

1989),

Krieger

(1986,

pp.

184-92),

and Saarinen

(1986).

10

Gosling

(1990,

pp.

69-86).

11

For

Aquinas,

see

Kent

(1989).

In

my

opinion,

the relevant

problem

for Anselm

and

Scotus

was

not

the 'fall of the devil' described

by

Gosling

(1990,

pp.

74-86),

but

rather

the

problem

of

doing

something only reluctantly,

or

with the

help

of

some

'probable'

reasons.

For

this,

see

below and Scotus

(1968:

Opus

oxon.

Ill,

d.

36,

q.

1).

12

This

line

of

thought

is

consequently

followed

by

Charlton

(1988,

e.g.,

pp.

5-7,

177).

13

This

is

contrary

to

Charlton

(1988,

p.

7),

who

claims that

Western

European

Philos

ophy

has little

to

show

on

the

subject

of

weakness

of will

before

the

present

century .

According

to

Kent

(1984,

p.

295),

even

the medieval Franciscan literature

on

inconti

nence can

only

be described

as

voluminous .

14

Cf.

Wieland

(1982).

15

Cf. Zumkeller

(1986,

p.

35).

As

Zumkeller

points

out,

Augustine

got

the notion

of

continentia

from

Cicero.

16

De

spiritu

et

litera,

8.13

and 31.53.56. See

Augustine

(1844-: Patrolog?a

latina,

Vol.

44,

pp.

207-08,

234,

236-37).

17

Cf.,

e.g.,

De

sermone

Domini

in

monte,

11.17.54-55

(Patrolog?a

latina,

Vol.

34,

p.

1294).

18

Cf.

Confessiones,

VIII.5.11-12. For

an

English

translation,

cf.

Bourke

(1966).

19

E.g.,

Charlton

(1988,

pp.

5-6)

and

Gosling (1990,

p.

70).

20

Cf.,

e.g.,

Confessiones,

VIII. 5.11-12.

Augustine

is

not

influenced

by

Aristotle's

prohairesis

(choice),

but

by

the

Stoic distinction between

(animal)

desire and

(rational)

assent/consent.

For this

distinction

and its

later

Christian

use

see,

e.g.,

Lapidge

(1988,

pp.

90-98).

For

Augustine's

Stoicism, cf. Colish

(1985,

II, pp.

142-218).

21

Cf. Bourke

(1966,

p.

207).

22

Confessiones,

VIII. 10.24.

23

A

paradigmatic

case

is

Augustine's

exposition

of the Sermon

on

the

Mount,

where

the

church

father concludes

that the

temporal things

are

to

be

willed

only

for the sake

of the eternal

goal (De

sermone

Domini

in

monte,

11.17.56:

Patrolog?a

latina,

Vol.

34,

p.

1294).

24

Confessiones,

VII.4.6.

25

Scivi

quoniam

aliter

non

possem

esse

continens

nisi

Deus

det . The

translation

is

from

Wolfson

(1965,

p.

167),

who

counts

over

twenty

references

to

this

verse

in

Augustine.

See

also Zumkeller

(1986,

pp.

35,

39).

26

Anselm

(1938,

pp. 213-14).

Cf.

also

p.

207.3:

Potestas

peccandi

non

pertineat

ad

libertatem

arbitrii .

27

Anselm

(1938,

p.

217.26-32).

28

Peter

Abelard

(1971,

pp.

24-25).

In

another

example (pp.

24-25),

a man

who

kills

his

master

in self-defense has

an

evil

consent

without evil will.

29

Ibid.

(pp.

8.26-10.21).

30

In

medieval

Latin,

non

vol?

refers

to

a

passive

state,

whereas nolo denotes

a

case

of

active resistance.

31

See

Knuuttila and

Holopainen

(1993).

32

Sent.

11.14.

Peter

of

Poitiers

(1950-61,

p.

98.256-64).

For

synteresis ,

see,

e.g.,

Baylor (1977).




18/22

JOHN

BURIDAN

AND DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

149

33

Sent. 11.14. Peter of Poitiers

(1950-61,

p.

98.271-84).

34


(1950-61,

p.

124.84-91).

See also

Sent.

IV.16 for

the

example

of

wanting

the

death of Christ: Peter of Poitiers

(1855,

pp.

1200-02).

35


(1950-61,

p.

83.141-44):

Solvunt dicentes

non

accidere

quod

si

aliquid

antecedat

ad

aliud,

et

aliquis

vult vel

potest

antecedens,

quod

ideo velit

vel

possit

consequens.

.

. .

Here the

view is

presented

as mere

opinion

( dicunt

quid

am ),

but in

his

discussion of the

two

wills in

Christ

(Sent.

IV.16:

1855,

pp.

1199-1202),

Peter

adopts

this

view.

36

Sent. IV.16. Peter of Poitiers

(1855,

p.

1199).

37

E.g.,

inWilliam

of

Auxerre's

Summa

?urea,

I,

XII,

4,

q.

3

(1980-86,

pp.

235-36).

38

Cf.,

e.g.,

McCormick

and

Ramsey

(1978).

39

Albert

(first commentary: 1987, pp. 532-36;

second

commentary: 1891, pp. 474-76).40

Albert

(1891,

pp.

206-07;

1987,

pp.

523-24).

He

here

(1987,

p.

523.45-47)

considers

this view

as

wholly

in

keeping

with

Augustine.

Cf.

Augustine's

De

duabus

animabus,

6.6

(Patrolog?a

latina,

Vol.

42,

p.

98).

41

Albert

(1891,

pp.

214-19).

42

Ibid.

(pp.

53-54).

43

For

example,

Albert

(1891,

p.

54)

compares

the

certainty

of rhetorics with that of

ethics.

Later,

Albert

(p.

176)

concludes

that

the

knowledge

of the

virtues

is

less certain

than

the

knowledge

of

nature,

but

more

certain

than

knowledge pertaining

to

the technical

artes.

44

Albert

(1987,

p.

523.48-59).

45

Ibid.

(p.

523.61-73).

Aristotle,

Rhetorics

I.

2,

14

(1357a-b).

46

Albert

(1987,

p.

530.21-22):

Tertio videtur,

quod

contra

ambiguum

facer? non sit

incontinentiae .

47

This

expression

is

adopted

from

Charlton

(1988,

p.

58).

48

Albert

(1987,

p.

530.40-49).

In medieval

Latin,

firmitas

has

also the connotations

authority

and truth .

49

It

ought

to

be noted here that

Albert in his

second

commentary

(1891,

p.

467)

is

unwilling

to

speak

of

akrasia in decisions

concerning ambiguous

situations.

50

On

the

influence

of

Buridan's

commentary,

cf.

Michael

(1985).

Walsh

(1966,

pp.

24

25)

concludes: Whatever

we

find in this

commentary

we

may

be

sure

was

available

to

thousands of students

over

hundreds of

years.

.

. .

Buridan's

practical

philosophy

is

analyzed

by

Krieger (1986).

See

also Saarinen

(1986).

51

The

most

often

quoted

scholastic

authors

in

Buridan's

commentary

are

Albert

the

Great and

the

Augustinian-minded

Franciscan Gerald

Odonis

(1290-1349).

See

Walsh

(1975,

p.

258).

52

This

view

is

presented

in

Book

III,

q.

3

(Buridan

1968,

pp.

41va-43rb).

53

Buridan

(1968,

p.

43ra-rb).

54

Ibid.

(p.

142ra):

Continentia

. . .

capitur

pro

habitu,

quo

insistentes rectitudini rationis

resistimus

passionibus

in nobis

vehementibus existentibus

non

auferentes

totum tractum

ipsarum,

propter

quod

operi

nostro

contradicentia

quaedam

vel

displicentia

annexa

est .

55

Ibid.

(p.

143va).

56

Ibid.

(p.

141rb-va: Book

VII,

q.

3).

57

Cf.,

e.g.,

Buridan

(1968, 143rb):

Quoniam

sepe,

ut

mihi

videtur,

expertus

sum,

quod




19/22

150

RISTO

SAARINEN

cum

rationes

viderem ad

utramque

partem

probabiles,

tarnen

ad

neutram

partem

iudicii

determinabam

me

. . .

sed

in

suspenso

tenebam

me

... .

Imo

prudentis

est

prius

examin

are

consilia . Cf. also

p.

42va

(cited below).

58

Ibid.

(p.

143va:

Book

VII,

q.

6).

59

Ibid.

(pp.

142va,

143va).

60

Ibid.

(p.

143ra).

61

Ibid.

(p.

145rb).

Here

Buridan

also concludes

that

the certum iudicium need

not

be

scientia ',

it

can as

well

be

an

opinion

that

the

agent

adopts

because

he has

no

reason

whatsoever

to

think otherwise.

62

This

point

is

made

with

great

clarity by Krieger (1986). Only

the

most

radical

non

Aristotelian

Franciscans,

such

as

Walter of

Bruges

(around 1270),

claimed that

the

will

could be the

source

of irrational behavior. See St?dter (1971).

63

For

this,

cf.

Krieger (1986,

pp.

146-208).

64

Buridan

(1968,

p.

42va: Book

III,

q.

3):

Ad cuius evidentiam

est

sciendum

quod

libertas secundum

quam

voluntas

potest

non

acceptare

quod

sibi

presentatum

fuerit sub

ratione boni

vel

non

refutare

quod

presentatum

est

sub

ratione

mali,

prodest

valde nobis

ad vite directionem

pro

tanto,

quia

in

multis,

in

quibus

prima

facie

sunt

alique

rationes

bonitatis

apparentes,

latent

sepe

mille

malicie,

vel

annexe

vel

cons?quentes, propter

quod

acceptare

illud

quod apparebat

bonum

esset

nobis

inconveniens

et

damnosum. Et

sic

etiam,

quod

prima

facie videtur

esse

malum,

habet

aliquando

bonitatem latentem

propter

quam

r?futasse illud

esset

nobis malum .

65

Ibid.

(p.

42va-vb).

66

Cf.

again

Buridan

(1968,

p.

143rb,

cited

above).

For Buridan's notion of

prudentia,

see

Krieger (1986,

pp.

15-145).

67

Buridan

(1968,

p.

145rb-va).

68

Cf.

again

Buridan

(1968,

pp.

142va;

143va:

Book

VII,

q.

6).

69

This

point

was

explicitly

made

by

Albert the Great

(1987,

p.

530,

see

above).

Buridan

also

concludes

(1968,

p.

145rb,

see

above)

that

even

the

opinio

falsa

may

be

certain,

if

no

available

reason

opposes

the

opinion

and if

it is

considered

long

enough.

70

For

these,

see

Vermazen

and Hintikka

(1985),

Charlton

(1988,

pp.

114-34),

Gosling

(1990,

pp.

103-18),

and

Hurley

(1992).

71

Davidson

(1982a,

pp.

22-23).

72

All

these

expressions

are

used

in Davidson's article. It

is

problematic

whether

they

can

in

the last

analysis

be

divided

into

two

synonymous groups,

but this is

normally

presupposed

in

discussion

around

Davidson's

point.

See Charlton

(1988,

p.

115)

and

Gosling (1990,

pp.

104-05).

73

Davidson

(1982a,

p.

39).

74

Ibid.

75

E.g.,

Davidson

(1982a,

p.

26;

1982b,

p.

98).

76

Davidson

(1982a,

p.

41).

77

Ibid.

(p.

39).

78

Buridan

(1968,

p.

42va,

cited

above).

79

Ibid.

(pp.

144vb-145va).

See above.

80

Davidson

(1982a,

pp.

40-41).

Cf.

also

Gosling

(1990,

p.

105).

81

Davidson

(1982a,

p.

36).




20/22

JOHN

BURIDAN

AND DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

151

82

Davidson

(1982b,

p.

102).

83

Davidson

(1982a,

p.

37).

On

detachment ,

see

also

Gosling

(1990,

pp.

107-09).

84

Peter

of Poitiers

(1950-61,

p.

98).

Cf. above.

85

Buridan

(1968,

p.

43ra-rb).

Cf.

above.

86

Davidson

(1982a,

p.

37).

87

Ibid.

(pp.

37-39).

Davidson

claims,

as

we

have

seen,

that in

practical reasoning

it is

fallacious

to

detach

absolute

judgments,

i.e.

conclusions that materialize

as

actions,

from

prima facie

reasons.

He

compares

practical reasoning

with

probabilistic

reasoning

of the

type:

(a)

if

the barometer

falls,

it

almost

certainly

will

rain;

(b)

the

barometer

is

falling;

and

(c)

it

almost

certainly

will rain.

In

this

example,

(a)

and

(b)

do

not

allow

detachment

of the modal conclusion

(p.

37).

Davidson further

argues

that

practical reasoning

should

not

proceed

in the form of universalized conditionals.

For

discussion, cf., e.g.,

Charlton

(1988,

pp.

118-23)

and

Gosling

(1990,

pp.

105-07).

88

Davidson

(1982a,

p.

41).

89

Ibid.

(pp.

41-42).

90

Buridan

(1968,

pp.

143rb, 42va,

cited

above).

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Peter:

1971,

Ethics,

ed.

D.

E.

Luscombe,

Clarendon

Press,

Oxford.

Albert the Great:

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Ethicorum Lib.

X,

in

his

Opera omnia,

Vol.

VII,

ed. A.

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Paris.

Albert the Great:

1987,

Super

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2,

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F. S.

Schmitt,

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M.:

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John:

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decem libros

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Walter:

1521,

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Charles,

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Davidson,

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in

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pp.

21-42.

Davidson,

D.:

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in his

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Clarendon

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Oxford,

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83-102.

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Histo

buridan davidson akrasia

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