Building the Capacity for Sustainable Peace in Sudan

A joint project of

Africa Peace Forum and Project Ploughshares

Paper #2:

Hazards in the Power Sharing Aspects

of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the Interim Period in

the Sudan

by Alfred Sebit Lokuji, PhD

Building the Capacity for Sustainable Peace in Sudan

A joint project of Africa Peace Forum and Project Ploughshares

Paper #2: Hazards in the Power Sharing Aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the

Interim Period in the Sudan

by Alfred Sebit Lokuji, PhD

About this Paper This research paper is the second in a series to come out of a joint project of Project Ploughshares and the Africa Peace Forum that aims to help the emerging governments and civil society of north and south Sudan to build conditions conducive to a successful interim process leading to sustainable peace. The project team includes Ochieng Adala, Victor Okello (Africa Peace Forum), and Lynne Griffiths-Fulton (Project Ploughshares). Project Ploughshares and Africa Peace Forum gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). About the Author Alfred Sebit Lokuji was born in 1944 in colonial southern Sudan. He has a BA in Political Science from Berea College, Kentucky, an MA in Comparative and International Relations from McMaster University, and a PhD from the University of Georgia. Dr. Lokuji has taught at the University of Dar es Salaam and Moi University. Since 2003 he has been a consultant on management, governance, development, and policy analysis, with much of his work carried out in South Sudan. Africa Peace Forum Africa Peace Forum (APFO) is a non-governmental organization based in Nairobi, Kenya, which carries out research and analysis on peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and security issues in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region. APFO engages civil society and the political community in ongoing and joint exploration of new approaches to security arrangements in the region. Africa Peace Forum PO Box 76621 Nairobi 00508, Kenya 254-2-3874092/3871141/3871099 Fax 254-2-3872803 apfo@amaniafrika.org www.amaniafrika.org Project Ploughshares Project Ploughshares is an ecumenical agency of the Canadian Council of Churches established to work with churches and related organizations, as well as governments and non-governmental organizations, in Canada and internationally, to identify, develop, and advance approaches that build peace and prevent war. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo. Project Ploughshares 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada 519-888-6541 Fax 519-888-0018 plough@ploughshares.ca www.ploughshares.ca The views presented in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the policies of CIDA, Africa Peace Forum, or of Project Ploughshares and its sponsoring churches. First printed April 2006 ISBN 1-895722-52-7 Cover photo: “Sudan’s New Government of National Unity Inaugurated” (UN Photo #81995/Evan Schneider, 9 July 2005). In photo are, from left to right, John Garang, Vice President; Omer Hassan A. Al-Bashir, President of Sudan; Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Second Vice President.

Table of Contents Page Acknowledgements ii Executive Summary iii Acronyms and Abbreviations iv PART ONE: Overview Introduction 1 Methodology 2 The CPA: A Marriage of Incompatible Partners 3 Summary of the Protocols 5

The Machakos Protocol 5 The Power Sharing Protocol 5 The Wealth Sharing Protocol 6 The Protocol on Abyei 6 The Resolution on the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States 6 The Security Arrangements 6 Modalities of Implementation 7

PART TWO: Hurdles in the Power Sharing Protocol Hurdles in the Power Sharing Protocol 7

Hurdle One: Change of Heart? 8 Hurdle Two: The Commissions and other Instruments for Implementation 9 Hurdle Three: Honouring the Principles of Democratic Federalism 11 Hurdle Four: Garangites vs. Kiirites 12 Hurdle Five: Ethnic Affiliations 13 Hurdle Six: Demands by Groups Excluded from the CPA 15

Implementation of the Security Arrangements 16

Disgruntled Elements in the SPLA and Other Armed Groups 17 The Unity of Sudan and Religious Freedom 18 External Forces 19 Conclusion 19

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Acknowledgements Because the CPA has only recently been implemented, there is little hard data, apart from texts of the agreement, on which to base an analysis of its effectiveness. Obtaining data is particularly difficult in Southern Sudan where there are no daily newspapers with opinion pages, no network for mobiles, no government archives, and only limited distribution of such important public documents as the CPA. Into this information gap have stepped the Southern Sudanese in the Diaspora and their websites and email clubs. I owe a great deal to the SPLM Diaspora Yahoo Groups based in the USA. They have passed along information, circulated opinions, and posted articles on Sudan. I thank them sincerely, even though they did not realize how their letters and opinions might be used. Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues at the Africa Peace Forum (APFO), without whose encouragement this work would not have been completed successfully. To Ambassador Adala, Victor, and Kizito, I present this report, after endless procrastination. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for the opinions and for any errors found in these pages. Alfred Sebit Lokuji, Nairobi, Kenya 5 January 2006

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Executive Summary The core of the research problem is about how divergent interests between Northern and Southern Sudan can be satisfied without contradictions. Only two parties negotiated the entire peace deal—where or how do the others fit in? The methodology entails an analysis of some of the events that have taken place since the signing of the CPA; with a view to acquiring some understanding and clues as to whether or not peace will hold. From the perspective of power sharing, the CPA is like a marriage between incompatible partners. Neither the North nor the South likes all aspects of the CPA and if either party brings its negative attitudes into the implementation phase matters could worsen. All parties must make do. The alternative, a return to hostilities in quest of a more satisfactory result, is clearly not a palatable option. Problems began with the Machakos Protocol, which called for acceptance of the separation of religion and state, acceptance of the principle of self-determination, secession of hostilities, and a timetable that would lead to a referendum in six years for at least two constituencies (Abyei and the South) on remaining in Sudan or becoming independent. The Power Sharing and Wealth Sharing protocols strive to outline the mode by which all citizens and regions can enjoy equitable political and economic power. However, not only is the National Congress Party seen in the North as seeking to monopolize power, the SPLM/A is also perceived to be seeking a monopoly of power in the South. For this reason, there are demands in both parts of the country for ongoing dialogue that will result in a more level playing field for all parties. The Protocol on Abyei and the Resolution on the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States are handled separately. While Khartoum recognizes Abyei’s historical origins, it demands that Abyei must also conduct a referendum on retaining its current status or returning to Southern administration. Khartoum is adamantly opposed to allowing any part of Kordofan or Blue Nile to cast its lot with the South and will permit only limited democratisation. Several barriers stand in the way of lasting peace, including a possible change of heart by Khartoum; delays in the appointment of Commissions and other Instruments for Implementation of the CPA; the need to honour faithfully the Principles of Democratic Federalism; differences between groups that might be perceived as supporters of the late John Garang and those allied to Kiir (Garangites and Kiirites); and the constant menace of detrimental ethnic alliances inimical to unity among Southern Sudanese. While the modalities for implementation are in place a go-slow strategy has been evident—as can be seen in the delays in the establishment of government in all its branches. Particularly difficult will be creating an environment in which democracy can blossom. Security arrangements must be firmly in place to prevent sparks from turning into fires. Special attention will have to be paid to groups that still distance themselves from the CPA. Caution ought to be taken that ex-soldiers not compose the bulk of any such group. A properly designed and implemented DDR process needs to be put in place so that ex-combatants may see that benefits from peace dividends far outweigh any accruing from war.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations A/CDR Alternate Commander APFO Africa Peace Forum AU African Union CANS Civil Authority of New Sudan CDR Commander (SPLA military title of the highest rank) C-in-C Commander-in-Chief CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DDR Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration DOP Declaration of Principles EDF Equatoria Defence Force GECA Greater Equatoria Community Association GONU Government of National Unity GOS Government of Sudan GoSS Government of South Sudan INC Interim National Constitution KPA Khartoum Peace Agreement LC Leadership Council (may also refer to “Liberation Council”) MCA Military-Civil Administration NCP National Congress Party NDA National Democratic Alliance NEC National Executive Council NGO Non-governmental organization NIF National Islamic Front PRDA Presbyterian Relief and Development Agency SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army SSDF South Sudan Democratic Forum/Forces SSLM South Sudan Liberation Movement SSU Sudan Socialist Union UNCONA Union of Nuer Community in North America UNDP United Nations Development Program UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees USAID United States Agency for International Development

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PART ONE: Overview Introduction After years of internal strife with brief periods of respite, Sudan may have finally extricated itself from the social, political, and economic morass to the firmer path of development that can only be realized through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that formally ended the 22-year-old war between the Khartoum-based Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army.1 The CPA is a series of agreements that are a result of negotiations that, begun in the late 1980s, were of no avail until sufficient international pressure was applied. The series of solutions began with “The Machakos Protocol,” signed in July 2002 and incorporated into the CPA as Chapter I, which set out the principles upon which further negotiations took place. The major principles included an assumption that the unity of the Sudanese state would not be jeopardized outright and that the people of Southern Sudan would have a right to “self-determination” but would have to undergo a six-year Interim Period before exercising this right in a referendum. In addition, the principle of the separation of church and state was conceded and the basic mechanisms for the formation of government were agreed. Chapter Two of the CPA, “Power Sharing,” signed in Kenya in May 2004, sets down how power is to be divided between the tiers of government, principally between the Government of National Unity (GONU) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), but also between the GoSS and the 10 States of South Sudan. The Power Sharing protocol is the subject of this paper largely due to its importance in testing the extent to which South Sudan enjoys the exercise of power sharing and participation in all spheres of decision-making. This is most certainly an area of much contention, not only between GoSS and GOS but also among South Sudanese groups. A “Wealth Sharing” protocol, the subject of Chapter III, was concluded on 7 January 2004. It outlines the manner in which wealth, commerce, and finance affairs will be handled in a new economic dispensation. Chapter IV, “The Resolution of the Abyei Conflict,” was concluded in May 2004 to settle the domicile of the Dinka Ngok people, either as Northern or Southern Sudanese. Chapter V, also signed in May 2004, dealt with the same issue for the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, whose people had joined the SLPM in great numbers even though they were not traditionally considered to be people of South Sudan. The last protocol, Chapter VI, “Security Arrangements,” signed in Kenya in September 2005, set out the ways in which a permanent ceasefire, peace, and security would be maintained. Of crucial importance to the total CPA are annexes that set out the mechanisms by which the protocols would be implemented. The CPA is of great significance to the peoples of South Sudan and to Sudan, the region, and the international community because it has the potential to usher in a lasting peace in a country that has seen extremely destructive civil wars in 40 of the 50 years since its independence from an Anglo-

1Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, 9 January 2005. All six chapters plus annexes are contained in The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (Nairobi, Kenya, 2005). The text for the CPA can be found at http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Sudan/darfur/compax/.

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Egyptian Condominium.2 The strength of this peace lies in its being more comprehensive than previous attempts. Not only has the peace agreement been witnessed by the international community, it contains formidable guarantees that the peace will be monitored by the international community. However, the journey on the path of peace has not been, and will not be, smooth, for a number of reasons that form the substance of this paper. In fact, as we shall see, Northerners and Southerners hold mutual fears that there is no deeply rooted commitment to the unity of Sudan, and this may lead to a renewal of war. The general contention is that Southern Sudanese are tired of unity with Arabs and want to secede from Sudan to form a new state. On the other hand, Northern Sudanese value the enormous resources of Southern Sudan and will spare no effort to contain any secessionist tendencies or forces. This dichotomy of perspectives on the viability of the Sudanese state forms the basic explanation for the prolonged wars, the difficulty of peace negotiations, and the lack of substantial trust in negotiated settlements. The Power Sharing protocol will be examined from three perspectives. First, both the GoSS and the GOS assume that the CPA is comprehensive and will also “make the unity of the Sudan an attractive option,”3 but are still mindful of the need to engage many groups in further dialogue if peace is to survive the Interim Period.4 Not only are there factions that feel outside the power sharing protocol, but armed forces (in and out of uniform) might feel short-changed, especially when the dividends of peace are not immediately forthcoming. Secondly, the behaviour of the GOS and GoSS will be examined: how are they operating within the framework of unity while at the same time accommodating their huge differences? Thirdly, how have the mechanisms and procedures that guarantee the peace agreement thus far operated in ensuring that both the letter and spirit of the agreement are fulfilled? How have both parties and the machinery maximized peace dividends while minimizing hazards to peace and unity? Methodology This essay will analyze information and opinions about events that have taken place in the year since the agreement was signed in January 2005. Particular attention will be paid to the expressed opinions of Sudanese, especially exchanges on the Internet, which I believe best represent the spread of opinions about unfolding events in post-war Sudan. Subjects of analysis will include pronouncements and activities of the GoSS and GOS and of other important opinion leaders from both sides, as well as members of the international community. The implementation modalities (annexes to the agreement) provide schedules by which the intentions and actions of both GoSS and GOS can be measured. This paper will attempt to highlight significant dangers to the peace process that, at best, could result in a slowdown of its implementation and, at worst, could bring about renewed hostilities, plunging the Sudan into the most destructive round of confrontation the country has ever seen. It will also

2 Sudan gained independence on 1 January 1956; had a civil war in the South from August 1955 to March 1972, and then again from May 1983 to January 2005. 3 Part A, section 1.5.5 of the Machakos Protocol. 4 The six-month period immediately following the signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005 is referred to as the “Pre-Interim Period” and the following six years are referred to as the “Interim Period.” (See Part B, sections 2 and 2.2 of the Machakos Protocol.)

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point out the likeliest outcomes, given the actions of the various actors. The hope is that this analysis will thus serve as a guide so that the most obviously hazardous paths of action can be avoided while the most beneficial are relentlessly pursued. The CPA: A Marriage of Incompatible Partners The 2005 Sudan peace agreement is likely to strike most observers and those directly affected by it as an outcome of the hostilities between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Khartoum. The agreement follows years of actual war as well as shadow boxing in times of relative peace. A cursory examination of views expressed over time suggests that the present is merely a more pronounced or better defined expression of the past. In fact, such an examination is likely to show that both the pre-CPA Sudan and that which is an outcome of the CPA are composed of incompatible partners. At the now famous Juba Conference of 1947,5 it was abundantly clear that the participating Southern conferees did not sufficiently trust their own experience and skills on an untried united political playing field with Northern Sudan. Acknowledging this reluctance, the Governor of Equatoria, B. V. Marwood, urged that “the sooner Southern and Northern Sudanese come together and work together, the sooner they will begin to coalese and cooperate in the advancement of their country.” As if predicting the fear of later generations of Southerners, Buth Diu, a representative from Upper Nile Province, expressed his reservations about the claims by Northerners that they “have no desire to dominate the South,” and declared, “but this was not enough and there must be safeguards. There should be no settlement by Northerners on land in the South without permission. Secondly there must be no interference from the North in Local Government in the South. Thirdly there should be a law to prevent a Northerner calling a Southerner a slave.” This litany of demands could have been obtained in an opinion poll today, nearly 60 years after the Juba conference. The actual war, as well as the war of words, took many forms and dimensions. A delegation of Bari elders brought their concerns to SPLM Chairman John Garang in a letter in which they demanded, among other things, the “respect for and maintenance of the 1956 provincial and district borders. The creation of new counties or payams must not result in the transformation of the borders set in 1956.”6 Implicit in this statement is the belief that Northerners do not belong in the South and, ultimately, that each ethnic group should generally stick to its traditional domicile. It is worth noting that these fears have been heightened by the recent outbreak of ethnic conflict in Western Equatoria between the Dinka and local tribes (e.g., Zande and Moru). Other recent political commentators among the Southern Sudanese hold more radical interpretations, for instance, that Northerners who have held the view that “increasing the economic fortunes of the South would lead to its eventual secession” hold an “unintelligent idea …misinformed and propelled by a myth.”7 Furthermore, the Umma Party observes that “the gap of

5 The Juba Conference Report can be found at http://www.gurtong.org/resourcecenter/Documents/Articles/juba_conference_1947.pdf. 6 Venansio Loro, Eng. Lawrence Lako Moyu, and Elder Daniel Jumi (in absentia) in a June 2005 letter hand-delivered to John Garang de Mabior. 7 Peter Adwok Nyaba, “Opportunities, challenges in post-war period,” Sudan Mirror, 27 April-10 July 2005. http://www.sudanmirror.com/archives/vol2_issue20/editorial/opportunities.asp.

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distrust between the two negotiating parties was very wide. The image that comes through is that of two unwilling negotiators, who are whipped along by an international third party.”8 Not only does the CPA depict a pact by unwilling partners, it is also, in the view of some political groups and armed factions in Sudan, based on an erroneous assumption that the conflict in the Sudan is exclusively between the North and the South—and perhaps, more precisely, between the Khartoum Government of the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. In the view of the Umma Party, not only is this assumption false, but it is also a mistake to hold that the negotiating parties to the CPA adequately represented the two regions.9

In 1947 Marwood thought that “this belief is sincerely and genuinely held by many Northern Sudanese, and they hope that by including Southern Sudanese in the future Assembly [pre-independence Advisory Council], the process of unification will be hastened.”10 The country was unified; it is still hard to say to what degree, if at all, the people were united. Then, as now, echoes of the desire for unity by Northerners reverberated from every corner in the North. A recent study utilizing focus group methods echoes the sentiments of the Northerners of 1947: “We want all Sudanese to be together. We don’t want our country to be divided into two. We have to work together.”11 In spite of this reverberating willingness since colonial times to accommodate Southerners, Prof. Eric Reeves, an analyst of recent Sudanese politics, notes that the National Islamic Front (NIF) refuses even to allow for the creation of a commission to establish the north/south boundary in the crucial production areas of Upper Nile Province.12 He adds that, with the failure of the SPLM to secure either of the key ministries of Finance or Mining and Energy in GONU, the GoSS has lost the means to receive its negotiated share of oil revenues. As well, “there has been no net reduction of the approximately 48,000 troops in Juba (which is to serve as the capital city of South Sudan) and surrounding towns such as Torit, Lafon, Mongalla. In short, the NIF is already engaged in ‘violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.’” There is some evidence that the GOS itself had all along been devoid of any faith in unity through persuasion and appealing policies. If a document purportedly issued by the Republican Palace is to be believed, a combination of strategies was to be used to retain the unity of Sudan, including military action, an aggressive media, and the use of friendly nations and NGOs. The thrust of all these activities was to keep land and country united.13

The reaction of the South to the death of John Garang showed the depth of the people’s intolerance for coexistence with Arabs. Many saw the spontaneous show of fury as a literal embarrassment for

8 Umma Party, “Peace and Democratisation in Sudan,” Memorandum, 28 Sept. 2005. http://www.8ung.at/sudanplattformaustria/wozus/4105minus1.html. 9 Umma Party. 10 Juba Conference Report. 11 Traci D. Cook, National Democratic Institute, “Embracing the Promise of Peace: Citizen Views on Sudan’s Future after the CPA—Findings from Focus Groups with Men and Women in Northern Sudan” (conducted 16-28 June 2005), 12 October 2005. http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1917_su_northernsudan_101205.pdf. 12 Eric Reeves, “The Slow Collapse of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” 25 September 2005. http://www.sudanreeves.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=70. 13 Republic of the Sudan, “The General Plan for peace and unity,” The Republican Palace (2001).

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the SPLM, which had thus far operated on the assumption that unity was to be given a chance. The outcome of Garang’s tragic death was the exodus of Arabs from Juba and the continuation of the murder of Southerners in Khartoum for weeks after. In this rather confusing milieu—unclear agendas on the part of the negotiating parties, and non-fraternal behaviour between the citizens of both North and South—the objectives of the CPA become blurred. To place all subsequent events in perspective, it is necessary to carry out a brief summary of the six protocols. The protocols themselves do not constitute the last word on the intentions of the peace agreement. The CPA will probably be the subject of contests over interpretation for at least the six years that culminate in the Referendum—and the manner in which that exercise itself is to be carried out could also become a bone of contention. Summary of the Protocols

The Machakos Protocol The Machakos Protocol marked a breakthrough in the longstanding and intermittent contacts between the two major combatants in the Sudanese civil war: the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. The winning by the GOS on its insistence that the unity of the Sudan could not be an item on the agenda was balanced by an agreement that unity would be based on democratic structures and ultimately determined in a “self-determination” referendum to take place six years after the attainment of peace (c. 2011). In principle, it was also conceded by the Khartoum negotiators that there would be freedom of religion—although it is not yet clear how this translates in the context of the separation of religion and state.14 Several questions arise from this protocol. What does the agreement to work for unity imply about the exercise of democratic rights of those who are determined to vote for secession? To what degree does freedom of religion translate into some separation between church/mosque and state? To what extent will new structures of government create the constitutionally derived autonomous governments rather than delegate the powers of an all-powerful central government? And, finally, how prepared will the authorities be to honour the letter and spirit of “self-determination” not only substantively, but by ensuring that procedures are sufficiently credible to guarantee informed choice at the referendum?

The Power Sharing Protocol The protocol provides for a “decentralized system of government” (1.5.1.1) in which all levels would “respect each others’ autonomy” (1.5.1.4) by not encroaching on each level’s powers or functions. A considerable amount of space is devoted to an impressive range of human rights (1.6-1.6.2.16) that most would say were never practised in South Sudan before. A near-exhaustive description of divided powers is grouped under “Institutions at the National Level,” with a prominent section on Khartoum, the national capital: it “shall be a symbol of national unity that reflects the diversity of Sudan” (2.4.1). It is capped by Part V: Schedules that enumerate national powers, those of the GoSS and the states, and concurrent and residual powers, including the manner for resolving conflicts over concurrent powers.

14 The relevant sections of the Machakos Protocol consist of parts A (Agreed Principles), B (the Transition Process), and C (Structures of Government), followed by Agreed Text on State and Religion and on The Right to Self-Determination for the People of South Sudan.

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Because this protocol is the focus of this paper, it is sufficient here to observe that it has been behind most recent activities at all levels of government since the signing of the peace agreement. Its complexity and the untested nature of some of its provisions ensure that its provisions will be among the most contested in the entire peace agreement.

The Wealth Sharing Protocol Significant in this protocol is the “premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to development.” Although at first glance this statement seems self-evident, there are parts of Sudan where brick and mortar have not appeared in the last millennium. A controversial and potentially divisive issue concerns land, which is considered government property by Khartoum, but community property by Southerners. The sharing of oil wealth (roughly on a 50-50 basis) is potentially explosive: natural wealth in the North is not subject to sharing, while the oil in the South is being shared. The free exercise of commerce for Southerners hinges on their future ability to find sources of capital and on discarding the traditional discriminatory practices of Northern merchants.

The Protocol on Abyei The people of Abyei are largely the Dinka Ngok, whose cousins live south of them in Barh el Ghazal. Although they are acknowledged to be native to South Sudan, at the time of independence they were part of the northern province of Southern Kordofan. Therefore, Khartoum insists that they are native citizens of the North. The agreement now specifies that they are citizens of both provinces of Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal. In addition to that, the residents of Abyei include not only the Dinka Ngok, but also “other Sudanese residing in the area.” By extension, these other Sudanese could well claim that they are also citizens of Bahr el Ghazal. These observations are of major significance where the enfranchisement of these citizens in a referendum is at stake. The area is to be administered by the Presidency of the Republic until the referendum to choose between amalgamation with the North or South is held.

The Resolution on the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States Khartoum has stood against any referendum for these two areas as it considers them irrevocably territories of Northern Sudan. Under the Presidency of the Republic, they have been granted more autonomy in administering the area. During the Interim Period the SPLM/A will also participate in the administration. If the peoples of these areas fight for it within the afforded political space under the terms of the CPA, they could enjoy greater self-rule.

The Security Arrangements Security could be shattered without monitoring by the international community. The post-Addis Ababa peace was destroyed by disillusioned ex-Anyanya who felt cheated. As in previous conflicts, any attempt to move Southern members of the armed forces will be viewed as an attempt to divide and isolate the fighting men of South Sudan. The protocol attempts to allay these fears by providing exact figures for national, integrated, and GoSS members of the army Still unresolved is the problem of forces that were not directly included in peace negotiations. The bulk of these forces are militias, especially those of the GOS—e.g., the Southern Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) of Paulino Matip. Although the GOS had concluded the Khartoum Peace Agreement with SSDF in 1997, it certainly wants to make maximum use of the SSDF to weaken the South and so the Government claims that the SSDF is an independent force it does not control. The SSDF itself is at loggerheads with the SPLM/A and rejects absorption into any forces without

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negotiations in which it is an equal partner. It remains to be seen if either the GoSS or the GOS will attempt to take military advantage of any armed group that is claiming non-partisanship in the negotiations that brought about the CPA.15

Modalities of Implementation Key to the entire peace agreement is the implementation timetable. All six protocols are guided by schedules found in annexes in the official text of the CPA. The schedules governing both power sharing and the Machakos protocol were signed on 31 December 2004 at Naivasha. As each problematic development is examined, reference will be made to the text of the protocol as well as to the schedule to ascertain the timeliness of the actions of the parties to the agreement. By far the most difficult and recurring problem will be interpreting the text of the protocol and suggesting how such differences will be resolved.

PART TWO: Hurdles in the Power Sharing Protocol Hurdles in the Power Sharing Protocol As a recent Umma Party update correctly points out, there are North/North as well as South/South conflicts over which neither of the two negotiating parties can claim control.16 Thus, it will be difficult in the near future for the SPLM/A to blame Khartoum for hostile acts by some armed groups—especially the SSDF, whose presence in Unity State is fully acknowledged. And, although there is a strong belief that Khartoum’s continuing support of the LRA sustains their existence and activities on the east bank of the Nile in Central Equatoria State, there is no proof. On the other side, Khartoum cannot legitimately claim that the actions of any war groups operating in the North are directed by the SPLM/A. John Garang recognized the vital importance of cooperation between the NCP and the SPLM, particularly in view of their being the only working partners. At the signing ceremony he said:

To conclude, the comprehensive peace agreement and safeguards, full compliance with the requirements of the agreement, the SPLM will work in partnership with the National Congress Party. The objective of this partnership is to ensure a sincere implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement in both letter and spirit and to provide, within the parameters of this agreement, permanent solutions to the problems inherent in Sudan's cultural, social and political diversity.17

The first major test of this anticipated cooperation took place sooner than expected. The SPLM expected to take over the GONU Ministry of Energy and Mining. After all, went the thinking, the

15 A notorious group that has wrought considerable havoc in Eastern and Central Equatoria is the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army of Joseph Kony, who, many believe, is being supported logistically by the GOS to keep parts of South Sudan ungovernable. 16Umma Party.17 John Garang in Sudan Tribune, “Garang’s speech at the signing ceremony of S. Sudan peace deal,” 9 January 2005), p. 7. http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=7476.

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natural resources of the Sudan were principally in the South. After protracted wrangling that threatened to lead to the dismantling of the CPA, the SPLM conceded the Ministries of Finance and Energy and Mining to the NCP. There was an immediate outcry from SPLM supporters. “No question at all,” wrote one, “that the NIF [NCP] has already chopped the CPA.”18 Others noted sombrely in the days leading to January 9 that the “challenges of implementation over the coming six and a half years will be just as great as the task of reaching the point of signature.”19 “Hurdles” in this context would naturally be defined as any difficult situation that brings about disagreement between the NCP and SPLM signatories to the CPA. The severity of the disagreement may range from “easily resolvable by negotiation” to “may lead to a collapse of the peace process.”

Hurdle One: Change of Heart? The first hurdle has to do with any change of heart by the signatories, assuming a particular issue was negotiated in good faith. Given that the agreement was an exercise between two parties out of the entire field of Sudanese stakeholders, it is possible that any of the signatories may realize that it gave up too much and will seek to prevent implementation by stalling or even introducing a new interpretation. At the 1947 Juba Conference Sir T.R.H. Owen, then Deputy Governor of Bahr El Ghazal Province, reproached the Northern Sudanese for

still suffering from the sins of Zubeir Pasha and the slavers. “The sins of the Fathers shall be visited upon their children even unto the third and fourth generation”. He said that the South had not forgotten the days of oppression even if the North had done so, and even today the Southerners view was dominated by fear and suspicion. He concluded that the Southerners would never willingly join the North until the latter should prove by their acts, not merely by their words, that they had undergone a change of heart.20

Prophetic as this was, the potency of the statement has not reduced any acrimony between North and South. In the post-CPA South/South dialogues, Southern participants decided to battle non-implementation in their own way by forming a follow-up committee that would meet once every two months to report on progress and implementation of the outcome of the South-South Dialogue and the CPA.21 There is evidence of a change of heart not only in the refusal of Khartoum to give powerful ministries such as Finance or Energy and Mining to Southerners, but also in certain actions by Southerners themselves. If it is accepted that the unity of the Sudan will be given a chance, at least in the Interim Period, what then did the participants at the South/South dialogue imply by making the following resolution? They resolved that “the unity of the people and territory of Southern Sudan shall be supreme and shall have precedence over other considerations. No legislation in southern

18James Maluit Ruach, “National Congress Party Chopped the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement: What a joke?” 20 September 2005 (Diaspora Yahoo groups). 19 Justice Africa, Briefing, “Prospects for Peace in Sudan,” 7 January 2005. http://www.justiceafrica.org/Jan05.htm. 20 Report of the Juba Conference.21 Sudan Vision Daily, “Peace: Covenant of People of South Sudan, 21 April 2005. http://sudanvisiondaily.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=6479.

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Sudan shall override this interest.”22 The conferees also implicated the SPLM in their interpretations by resolving, “The government of Southern Sudan headed by the SPLM/A shall assume responsibility for the implementation of the CPA in accordance with the spirit of this covenant.”23

Both Southerners and Northerners readily presume that they know and understand each other quite well. Each side sees in the other, not a change of heart, but rather the retaining of old beliefs and intentions with nothing fundamentally new or surprising. One southern Sudanese commentator based in North America emphatically concludes, “One does not need to be an authority on political science to conclude the NIF is not prepared to implement the CPA. It is a matter of time before the NIF announces officially it is pulling out of the CPA. When the South then declares independence it will not be NIF's problem because the NIF expects the South to go anyway!” 24

Hurdle Two: The Commissions and other Instruments for Implementation

As noted earlier, John Garang placed a great premium on cooperation by the parties to the agreement to make the CPA work. Since the death of Garang, considered the driving force behind the CPA by many, a large number of Southerners—and Northerners as well—appear to have lost some vitality. The second major hurdle in the implementation of the CPA is the establishment of the Commissions and other bodies to be charged with carrying out implementation activities according to the timetable drawn in the schedules to the agreement. The Pre-Interim Period, as well as the first six months of the Interim Period, were marked by a series of long delays, including delays in the establishment of governing structures (GoSS, Ministries, State Governments), especially in the South. As of the date of this writing, the establishment of necessary authority structures for the implementation of the CPA were behind schedule.

Before reference is made to some of the delays in implementing the Machakos and Power Sharing Protocols, it may be useful to cite some of the delays perceived by some Southerners. Following the announcement that the NCP had won the two ministries of Finance and Energy and Mining, most delays (for whatever reason) were readily interpreted as refusals by the National Islamic Front.25 In that light, it was alleged that the NIF now refuses to allow the creation of a boundary commission to demarcate the oil region (Upper Nile boundaries). The NIF is also alleged to be refusing to permit the creation of an Assessment and Evaluation Commission to oversee the timely implementation of the provisions of the CPA.26

On a general level, the CPA provided “built-in regional and international guarantees” (Annexure II, Section 5) to safeguard the agreement against unilateral revocation or abrogation, to take effect “upon signature of the CPA and up to the end of the Interim Period.” Delays or non-compliance were to be handled under this banner. IGAD and other members of the international community, 22 Sudan Vision Daily. 23 Sudan Vision Daily. 24 J. K. Lupai, Diaspora Yahoo Groups, 31 October 2005. 25 Reference is generally made to the National Congress Party of President El Bashir as SPLM’s ruling partner. When hostility to the Islamic state is expressed, then reference is made to the National Islamic Front (NIF), the ideological precursor to the NCP. 26 Subject of a series of email exchanges between the Sudanese Diaspora Yahoo Groups based in North America. Accusations against Khartoum include allegations that it is refusing to withdraw its army from the South, especially Juba, Capital of the South; and to create a Ministry for Lands. Letters by Achier Deng Akol, achier@btinternet.com.

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with the possible exception of the United States, have as yet to take either the NCP government or the SPLM to task for an infringement of any aspect of the CPA. Section 6 deals with the “Enactment of Political Parties Act,” which is to come into effect upon the adoption of the Interim National Constitution (INC) or “whenever new legislation” is required. However, the SPLM has lost its steam as the political wing of the SPLA and may wither away without revival.27 Should the SPLM die as a viable political force it will leave a wide vacuum in which surrogate parties of the NCP and others will assume greater significance. The acknowledgement in the Power Protocol that Khartoum, as the national capital, should reflect the diversity of the Sudan, especially in matters of religion, is provided for in schedule 24 [source?], “Establishment of mechanisms of guarantees of the rights of non-Muslims in the National Capital.” That the Khartoum State government closed schools and restaurants during last year’s Ramadan, the Muslim period for fasting, indicates an unwillingness on the part of concerned authorities to implement both the spirit and the letter of the CPA. Apparently preferential treatment for Islam will continue to strain relations between Muslims and Christians. While Khartoum is home to a sizable non-Muslim community, Muslims will insist on their majoritarian right to govern Khartoum on the basis of sharia. Clustering National Ministries (see Appendix D, Annexure II) has already caused a severe strain. A precedent has been set and it is unlikely that any Sudanese President who originates from the North will ever place a Southerner at the head of Finance, Energy and Mining, or Defence.28 The immediate adoption of the Interim National Constitution (INC), followed by the enactment of a National Civil Service Commission Act and then the establishment of a Public Service Commission has not been done. In the absence of a governing law, how is the civil service to be run? Many measures were delayed but eventually put into effect. Until the enactment of the INC a constitution of South Sudan and, in turn, those of the states of south Sudan could not be produced. The delay in enacting the INC caused other delays in the appointment of parliamentarians and cabinet ministers Only good communication with the citizenry, particularly during times of stress, such as the days following that the death of Garang on 30 July 2005, prevented people from concluding that a deliberate delay—or outright sabotage of the CPA—was taking place. Notwithstanding the fulfilment of plans in accordance with power sharing schedules, an urgent challenge for South Sudan must be the immediate “construction of institutions and instruments of public authority” under the purview of the GoSS. As Peter Adwok Nyaba, the SPLA war veteran-cum-intellectual, asserts, “there is a need for south Sudan to rid itself of the old methods of patrimonialism. It is urgent that we emancipate the SPLM/A and its public authority from the personal and regional domains. It is about time that formal state structures emerged.”29 As pointed out earlier, the main problem at present relates to the consolidation of power in the absence of 27 The SPLM is thus far making futile attempts to downplay the significance of the quarrel in Rumbek in November 2004 where the late John Garang was taken to task by his Deputy Salva Kiir for running the SPLM/A from his briefcase. The untimely death of Garang left a vacuum in which his successors are free to mould the SPLM in their own image. The preoccupation with consolidating power within the GoSS has left little time for housekeeping in the SPLM. 28 In the power-sharing arrangement, the GONU ministries were divided into three clusters: Sovereignty, Economic, and Services and were to be divided according to the power sharing proportions. The common view is that the NCP government took the lion’s share of the Economic cluster. 29 Nyaba.

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solidified SPLM institutions. Only with organized structures can the GoSS be a strong, effective participant in the implementation of the CPA. The construction of such institutions must be accompanied by commensurate rules and regulations to ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability. There could be no worse form of power sharing than a situation in which a few Southerners benefit from positions in the civil service and army, and reap the economic benefits of Sudan’s natural resources. The South/South Covenant boldly resolved that “replacing the corrupt and inept government institutions that have caused intolerable human suffering in Southern Sudan” would have to be one of the priority tasks of the new government.30 The stormy Rumbek meeting, leads the author to assume that Garang’s challengers, who now control the reins of power, are well suited to the task.31

Hurdle Three: Honouring the Principles of Democratic Federalism

Sudan has generally opted for strong unitary government, as have most developing states whose experiments with federations ruled by parliamentary systems did not last beyond the first few years of independence. The CPA offers Sudan a real opportunity to try out what is essentially a democratic federal system, with its counterpart in the South. Fortunately, it appears that Sudanese citizens are conscious of this opportunity and understand its utility. The focus group study carried out in June 2005 found that the government of choice is a decentralized, federal system that is believed to be the only way to competently govern a country with the geographic and cultural diversity of Sudan.32

Significantly, the study also found that Muslims express an unequivocal rejection of the application of sharia to non-Muslims in Sudan, concluding that there is virtually no support for the application of sharia to non-Muslim populations. Why then could Khartoum State get away with closing schools and restaurants at Ramadan, in violation of the rights of non-Muslims?33 Echoing the belief that the North grudgingly supported the CPA, the Juba Post concluded, “Such an irresponsible decree can be interpreted as a calculated move to incite trouble in the capital and to cripple the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The government knows very well that the situation has just calmed down after being volatile following the death of John Garang. Why again provoke another situation?” 34

While the SPLM government itself appeared non-committal, Muslim SPLM member Walid Hamid did put up a spirited fight: “We are studying all issues separately. We did not refuse the closing down of restaurants during Ramadan for the sake of it, but rather because we regard this as an extension of the totalitarian mentality and its effects. Christians as well as Muslims who have legitimate sanctions to abstain from fasting will be affected by it.”35 In support of this position, MP Ahmad Issa asserted that the shutting down of restaurants represented a breach of clause 38 of the transitional constitution that guaranteed the freedom of belief and religious practice to all humans and gave them the right to declare their religion or belief.36

30 Sudan Vision Daily. 31 Justice Africa. 32 Cook. 33 Khartoum Monitor, Editorial, Oct. 27, 2005. 34 Editorial, The Juba Post, “Six years interim period: how peaceful?” 29 October 2005. http://www.warnews.it/blogs/insudan.php?p=6. 35 Al-Ayyam (Arabic), Khartoum, 9 October 2005. 36 Al-Ayyam,

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These new developments go against the old grain, including the wisdom of the colonial administrators who were coaxing the Southern Sudanese chiefs into unity with the North. Contrary to the admonition of Marwood who declared, “if the Sudan is ever really to become self-governing and self-dependent it must not be divided up into small weak units”37 the two major regions (North & South) are consolidated, both regions are divided into states, which in turn are split into counties, at least in the South. Judging by the number of decrees and orders issued in less than a year since the GoSS was instituted, democratic federalism is yet to go through hard times in which the power of various institutions will be subjected to severe tests. The traps to avoid will entail not confusing personal power with institutional power—the former leads to a new generation of dictators, the latter produces stable systems. Real success of the experiment in federal and democratic statehood will be measured by the extent to which the GOS, GoSS, the States, and even the Counties stop encroaching on the powers of other levels and protect their own areas of jurisdiction.

Hurdle Four: Garangites vs. Kiirites While the SPLM as the principal party of the South there is currently an internal struggle for power between the remnants of John Garang’s core group (Garangites) and the followers of SPLM leader Salva Kiir (Kiirites), the most powerful of whom probably felt they were on the outside looking in during Garang’s last months. Dr. John Akec admitted that he “invented” the terms “Garangites” and “Kiirites” to “describe a reality on the ground. What I will not agree to, however, is to imply that I invented the ‘divisions’ and ‘differences’ between the late SPLM Chairman and Salva Kiir Their differences were well publicised and well documented as evident in [the] Rumbek reconciliation conference in November 2004.”38

This division has a debilitating effect on the small pool of leaders that Southern Sudan has available as it emerges from decades of war. The first and greatest harm is that the division has brought about a situation in which assignment is based on allegiance, region, or pure personal ambition, rather than proven talent and the manpower needs of South Sudan. For example, long-time SPLM cadres, undoubtedly giants in Garang’s latter days, remain idle either because they are scoffed at, feel rebuffed, or have become disoriented under the new leadership of Kiir.

Salva Kiir’s own version of the division is that in “2004, there developed a misunderstanding but we resolved it in Rumbeck in November that year. … It was administrative issues [and] organisational problems within the SPLM/SPLA, but we resolved them.”39 Continuing discord within the ranks of the SPLM do not support this optimistic view.

Northern SPLM spokesman Yasir Araman reportedly told Salva Kiir (without elaboration) that he was not interested in any political position but would like to take a three-year study leave. Pagan Amum, closest ideologically to John Garang, reportedly disclosed that Nhial Deng Nhial, Garang’s point-man for foreign affairs, was being kept out of decision-making and felt sufficiently

37 Juba Conference Report.38 John Akec, “Please let's give General Kiir's SPLM/A a benefit of doubt!” SPLM-Diaspora@yahoogroups.com, 12 October 2005. 39 New Vision, “'War is Also Politics’—Sudan's Salva Kiir,” Kampala, October 30, 2005. http://www.sudansupport.no/sudan_konflikt/perspectives/salvakiir_nw_301005.htm.

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disappointed to take “leave with his family in London at the time when important decisions were being taken by SPLM leadership.”40 Pagan Amum was reportedly asked if there had been a “plot against them?” He is said to have responded in the affirmative, but hastened to add that he had no desire to “enter into battles with ‘those sides.’” However, he readily disclosed that he was not among those appointed to positions in GONU.41

The threatening and potentially destabilizing aspect of this division will become clearer as the first democratic elections approach in three years, and even more glaring towards the end of the Interim Period when the recommended choice at the referendum must be unequivocally for union or secession. With the SPLM fractured by Garangites and Kiirites, a central organization for political sensitisation and advocacy will be sorely needed. Meanwhile, the vacuum left by the SPLM will be filled by minnows whose survival cannot be assured without the protection of big brother—the NIF, and to some extent, its less virulent progeny, the NCP.

Questions have been raised about the competence of Salva Kiir to step into the shoes of John Garang. Kiir himself reasoned, “Popularity is something that people work for. Garang did not become popular because on his own [sic]. The SPLM/A developed and projected him as their leader. He was given the privilege to talk on behalf of SPLM/A. That was a collective responsibility to build him so that he became popular.”42 The implication is that, if Kiir were given the same support that John Garang enjoyed, he too could be popular.

Transfixed between a feckless SPLM organization and a threatening NIF/NCP giant with tens of Trojan horses deployed in the South, the ordinary citizens of South Sudan may take matters into their own hands, led by ex-combatants. This uprising could happen spontaneously or intermittently and culminate in a do-or-die confrontation. Not only are the borders of the South extremely porous, but the land itself is saturated with stocks of military hardware accumulated over the last two decades. The result of any widespread dissatisfaction is anyone’s guess. Fear of this general scenario compels one to conclude that the intra-SPLM divisions and the South/South dialogues need urgent attention.

Hurdle Five: Ethnic Affiliations Ethnic allegiance plays a role in the politics of Sudan. The “Kokora” of the early 1980s, the great rift in the SPLA in the early 1990s, and now the sharing of the spoils of peace in the form of appointments to high office bear traces of ethnicity. John Garang, who approaches the stature of sainthood among Southerners, could not escape allegations of tribalism. Writing immediately after rumours about the composition of Garang’s first post-war cabinet first surfaced, Akec had the impression that Upper Nile, Garang’s home region, had been highly favoured.43 An American professor, Eric Reeves, noted that Salva Kiir’s nominees to high positions were predominantly from

40 Sudanile, quoted in SPLM-Diaspora@yahoogroups.com, 12 October 2005. 41 Sudanile. In this correspondence, John Akec claimed that his “article was a warning to Salva Kiir to rise above previous divisions and polarisations and to refuse the temptation of sidelining those who were most trusted by John Garang such as Pagan Amum, Nhial Deng Nhial, Yasir Araman, and others.” 42 Sudanile. 43 John A. Akec, “Is That the GoSS We Were All Waiting for?” 22 July 2005, Diaspora Yahoo Groups net.

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his native Bahr el Ghazal region, and that six of the new southern members of the national cabinet hailed from there.44 In a series of articles entitled “The GoSS will learn in time” on the SPLM Diaspora Chapter Discussion Forum, the general consensus was that both Garang and Kiir had played the ethnic card. While Kiir had been expected to show less ethnic affinity in his official dealings, he is perceived as grossly unfair in forming the GoSS.45 Even those who made a feeble attempt at objectivity had to confess that they were not trying to ignore the “problem of under-representation of other tribes in the GoSS or push the problem under the carpet. Salva Kiir and his lieutenants got it wrong.”

The National Democratic Institute study conducted in Khartoum in the summer of 2005 quoted respondents as saying: “There is no peace. Peace means all the tribes share in the CPA, not just the GOS and SPLM.”46 While it is the rare politician or administrator who forthrightly admits that a mistake has been made, for the first time since the conflict between the Dinka Bor and the natives of Western Equatoria state began, a Dinka Bor leader has apologized to one host community for what he calls the unfortunate crisis involving the cattle-owning displaced Dinka-Bor.47 In spite of the long experience with racial abuse, there are signs of ethnic desires to remain separate, for reasons not always easy to fathom. Without placing statements or behaviour in this context, it might be difficult to understand the rationale for certain demands, such as that for “respect for and maintenance of the 1956 provincial and district borders” by the Bari Community.48

There is probably no shorter summary of the “tribal“ problem, especially as it pertains to Sudan, than that by Professor Nyamlel Wakoson, writing in reaction to the recent tribal confrontation between the Azande and the Dinka in Western Equatoria:

The more serious factor that has contributed to tribal conflicts is the general acceptance and glorification of tribalism by South Sudanese, in particular, the political leaders and intellectuals, and to a lesser extent the general rural societies. It has become a common practice in South Sudan that success in anything must be predicated on one’s affiliation to his/her tribal group. The tribe is considered the foundation for anyone to rise and compete for positions, resources, and recognition in the general South Sudan environment. For instance, Riak Machar’s original defection from the mainstream SPLM/SPLA appeared to be a South Sudan oriented move, but soon the defection became a Nuer oriented cause. When Lam Akol realized he could not maintain a high position within the Nuer system, he broke away to form his own movement that was Chollo-supported. Even now, the GoSS is operating through tribal connections. Official businesses of the GoSS are known first to tribal people then it filters down to the general

44 Eric Reeves, “The Slow Collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South Sudan,” 24 September 2005. http://www.sudanreeves.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=70. 45 SPLM Diaspora Yahoo Groups, 27 Oct.ober 2005. 46 Ansar Woman, Omdurman in Cook. 47 Philip Thon Leek, newly appointed Governor of Jongolei State, Press Statement to the Independent Sudan Radio Service, Nairobi, 11 November 2005.48 Letter to Dr. John Garang De Mabior, Chairman SPLM and Commander-in-Chief SPLA from The Bari Community—Juba, Khartoum and in Diaspora, 19 May 2005.

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public. In fact the SPLA could make things worst if deployed to deal with a situation like that in Yambio.49

This is a serious indictment of the current SPLM leadership. Few if any Sudanese nationals currently living in the Sudan would find the alleged tribal behaviour surprising, but Sudanese in the Diaspora have for a long time refused to acknowledge this problem, probably because it would be tantamount to focusing on something other than Arab racism or Islamic discrimination. Although the parties to the covenant at Mbagathi, Nairobi, boldly declared their intention to contain “rising ethnic and regional polarization in Southern Sudan,” their very foundation and continued existence depended on tribalism.50

The SPLM and the NCP have agreed on how power is to be distributed among the different parties. Naturally, some quarters are displeased. A case in point is the widespread offence taken by Nuer at what they saw as a deliberate swing of the SPLM power base from Upper Nile to Bahr el Ghazal. Gordon Buay Reath, Chairman of South Sudan Democratic Forum—Canada, reasoned, without providing any substantiating data, that the SSDF controls 2/3 of the territory [of the South] and is entitled to 55 per cent of the power in the Government of South Sudan.51

John Gatluak Kam,52 claiming to be President of the Union of Nuer Community (UNCONA) in North America, delivered his indictment of the SPLM and NCP via the Internet. He charged that the new post-CPA government was devoid of the “essence of equality”; that it is a “beacon for the perpetuation of inequality in another form”; that “there are major ethnic groups in the Sudan which are not represented”; and that “unlike the former government dominated by Northern Sudanese of Arab descent, the council of ministers of GONU is dominated by the Dinka and riverian Arabs.” Kam claims that 95 per cent of SPLM Ministers and State Ministers are Dinka; the Dinka control even positions awarded to Southern members of the opposition. No response of any kind was made to this litany—most likely for fear that any reply would call undue attention to these criticisms. Garang had said at the CPA signing ceremony, “In terms of power-sharing in southern Sudan, I want to assure all that there will be enough room for everybody, including those who have not been associated with the SPLM/SPLA. Even those who for one reason or another were opposed or against the SPLM, there will room for everybody.”53 Were he alive these words would haunt him. It seems obvious to almost all observers that the rooms, whether in Garang’s or Kiir’s house, are first and foremost for family members.

Hurdle Six: Demands by Groups Excluded from the CPA The expression of a sense of exclusion and isolation by groups of citizens in post-CPA Sudan is a telling harbinger of national unrest. Resistance to broadening the field of political players is simply postponing the day of reckoning. Shaky as the CPA is, Darfurians in the West and the Beja in the East are hot after the CPA train that they consider to have left without them. Groups in the South

49 Professor Nyamlell Wakoson, Diaspora Yahoo Groups, November 2005. 50 Sudan Vision Daily. 51 Gordon Buay Reath, “Give Garang Arafat Treatment,” 5 July 2005. http://www.southsudan.net/buay01.html. 52 John Gatluak Kam, “The Nuer Politicians Should Withdraw From GONU, Press Release, 24 September 2005. http://www.sudaneseonline.com/epressrelease2005/sep25-67157.shtml. 53 Garang.

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feel the same. And some citizens of Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains, and, not least, Abyei must be asking themselves what they gained by joining the SPLA forces. Even groups not explicitly based on ethnicity—the Umma Party, the Republican Party, the Socialists, etc—consider the CPA to be an agreement between two players only: Bashir’s NCP and Garang’s SPLM/A. Were it not for the prospects of elections in three years and, more likely, war fatigue, one wonders about the range of options those feeling excluded would consider. At the CPA signing ceremony, John Garang pointed out that “the events in Darfur, eastern Sudan and elsewhere have made it clear that we must have an all inclusive state at the national level and full devolution of power to the various regions of the Sudan, for otherwise it is unlikely that the country would stand a chance of remaining united.”54 But Khartoum appears hesitant and quite suspicious of the results of the devolution of power to the rest of Sudan. The same attitude is manifested in the South. Apparently the Leadership Council of the SPLM/A rejected the resumption of dialogue with SSDF, with the majority members of the Council united against Vice-President Kiir’s call that dialogue continue. Kiir had said in his New Vision interview: “Now that we have signed this peace agreement, we want also to sign another agreement with our brothers, who were in the armed group. Those who had been used by the government of Sudan against the SPLA and are southerners, I am now in dialogue with them so that they join us. We do not want to form the government without them.”55

While Kiir is said to have acquiesced to the majority of his council, SSDF General Matip was surprised that Kiir could not “veto” the decision of the SPLA soldiers-turned-politicians. The South Sudan Democratic Forum accused Kiir of allowing the “future of the South to be stolen by tribalists within the SPLM Liberation Council who will not live for more than ten years given the fact that most of them are at [sic] their sixties. It’s very unfortunate and unwise that SPLM could reject dialogue with SSDF at the time the movement is at loggerhead with the National Congress Party (NCP) on the implementation of the modalities of the CPA.”56

Most groups are militarised—even the traditional Northern political parties, most of which became part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that joined forces with the SPLA to fight Khartoum on the Eastern Front. Hence, any group left out is both political as well as military, and therein lies the danger inherent in anything less than a comprehensive peace plan. Implementation of the Security Arrangements Fears persist among sceptical Southern Sudanese that the SPLA will be handled in the same way that Anynya armed forces were after the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972. What should have remained as insurance for the defence of southern interests was systemically dismantled until by 1980 Khartoum had usurped all military power. This time around, all possible precautions have been taken. The numbers, deployment and control of the national armed forces are clearly laid out in both texts of the security arrangements and the accompanying schedules. 54 Garang. 55 New Vision. 56 South Sudan Democratic Forum, “Sudan’s Salva Kiir has jeopardized the Future of the South,” SSDF Press Release, 1 November 2005. http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=12351.

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Abuses committed by Government of Sudan forces during the war will always be remembered by Southerners. All trust was lost during decades of military oppression. Even now, although the SSDF sometimes behaves as if it were totally on its own, it is well known that it is a government militia that would not survive a week without the logistical support of the Government in Khartoum. Equally problematic is the continuing presence of the LRA in Equatoria. It is an open secret that Khartoum has used the LRA to keep the heat on the SPLA along the Ugandan border. If violations occur including any proxy hostilities carried out under the instigation of the SPLA or NCP forces, UN peacekeepers, IGAD, and the international community must be unequivocal in condemning such behaviour, and acting without any hesitation. The best insurance against renewed war is found in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program that falls under the Security Arrangements. There are too many ex-combatants to be absorbed into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the SPLA, or into any other branch of the armed services. Consequently, the DDR program assumes a significant role. Reintegration must hold economic hope for those involved, promising a better future as an economically productive civilian than as a soldier carrying a gun. An unsuccessful implementation of DDR has worrisome implications for the peace process. Lastly, “reintegration” must be an open-ended operation. Assumptions that those demobilized will be re-integrated into their communities should not be taken to mean that the ex-soldier from Uror in Upper Nile will necessarily return to Uror. While some will choose to return to the pastoral life of the open savannah, many more, especially those who have picked up skills that could sustain them and their families in an urban setting, are most likely to settle in towns. Uninformed assumptions and erroneous conclusions could promote instability, if not outright warfare. The next three years, until the first election, will test the effectiveness of the Security Arrangements and show if the CPA is operable and if all parties can resolve disagreements amicably without resorting to unilateral measures. The following two to three years, leading to the Referendum, will reveal the extent to which open debate is permitted, and the sobriety necessary to accept both anticipated and actual results from the Referendum has been achieved. Only the establishment of stable levels of appropriate political behavior will minimize a return to hostilities.

Disgruntled Elements in the SPLA and Other Armed Groups Future dissatisfaction could have several causes. First, not all those in uniform will want to be de-mobilized—many will be upset when they are compelled to go into civilian life. Secondly, many expect immediate benefits as a result of the peace agreement. After all, everyone senses that there is plenty of money in circulation. Thirdly, each group has its own sense of solidarity, and so perceptions of unfairness are likely to be shared and acted upon in unison (one reason why a South/South dialogue is of utmost importance). Finally, feelings of betrayal, especially by the leadership of the GoSS, could bring about a rancorous resentment of politicians, which could lead to unpredictable decisions. Compounding this situation is the absolute uncertainty of the total numbers of the fighting men and women during the civil war. As Salva Kiir explained it, “Our army was composed of peasants, people who are purely civilians but who were fighting for a cause. This is why you cannot know the size of our army and this is why we were able to resist the SAF. So these civilians also have to be

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disarmed.”57 Impossible as it is to please everyone, exactly how many will end up being displeased by the DDR program, or by what they perceive as inadequate peace dividends?

Resentment forms around the fear that the “normalization of lives of our courageous liberators and provision of support to their traumatized families and wounded comrades” have been forgotten. It is further believed that the “euphoric wind of peace” that now blows over “politicians or the would-be politicians and administrators of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)” has promoted this forgetfulness—which explains why a “sizable majority of SPLA soldiers are still sleeping under trees without proper shelter or food supply, while politicians who enjoyed luxurious life in Western World are being accommodated in five star hotels and their status is highly uplifted above that of freedom fighters at the expense of Southern Sudan’s budget.”58 It is argued that SPLA soldiers who fought “free of charge” for the last two decades now deserve “the first paycheck.”

At the CPA signing ceremony John Garang said, “I want also to assure the SPLA that the experience of Anyanya I [where some fighters were absorbed in the Sudanese army while others were so-called leftovers] will not repeat itself.”59 While this assurance might promote the belief that Garang had plans for everyone, it will also cast blame on politicians and administrators in the GoSS if anyone is left out. The Unity of Sudan and Religious Freedom It would appear that most Sudanese, outside the influence of the NIF and other groups with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, have accepted freedom of worship. However, there continues to be occasional inflammatory material in the electronic media. In a widely circulated document that purports to be the master plan for Islamising the South and the rest of Africa, it is stated that the “South stands as a bridge for spreading Islam and Arabic culture in Africa since it neighbours with Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Central Africa. The South is rich in natural resources which could be of great strategic help for the Arab and Islamic world.”60

The contentions in this document would be incredible were it not for the accuracy of the general context of the project. For instance, the blame on the colonial era for encouraging disunity in Sudan is repeated: “colonizers tried to stop the ware [sic] of Islam and Arabic culture in the South, thus dividing the North from the South.”61 The authors argue that they “cannot betray the Islamic world and for this reason our Organisation has prepared a programme in the name of Moslams [sic], for this period of transition, with the aim not only to obtain political union but also to make the South an Islamic area through education, health services, training of cadres for social and cultural activities.”62 An elaborate plan for building mosques and providing social services is then provided. Another, more comprehensive, document of note will purportedly be issued by the Republican palace. Again, it would be dismissed out of hand were it not for the elaborate plans and the logical consistency of the presentation. Except for the language (presumably a translation from an Arabic 57 New Vision. 58 “SPLA: A prematurely neglected army,” 28 October 2005, Yahoo Diaspora Groups. 59 Garang. 60 Organisation for Islam Spreading in South Sudan, A Mammoth Plan to Islamise South Sudan, Projects For Spreading Islam And Arabic Culture. http://arabworld.nitle.org/audiovisual.php?module_id=6&selected_feed=180]. 61 Organisation for Islam Spreading in South Sudan. 62 Organisation for Islam Spreading in South Sudan.

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original), it provides a substantial and logical plan of action for all the areas that are a subject of the CPA. It emphasizes the unity of the Sudan and the need to counter all activities that promote the desecration of the unity of the Sudan. It would arouse resentfulness in most Southerners even where it is logical. External Forces Despite the readiness of Northerners to blame foreigners (usually meaning the West) for the problems of the Sudan, there is no credible basis for it at the present. The United States and its allies are too involved in the Arab/Islamic world, especially Iraq and Afghanistan, to add another front. In fact, if Sudan contributes in the smallest way to the international status quo by refraining from joining another rebel state (e.g., Iran), it could buy plenty of non-interference time and get away with almost any domestic policy it wishes to implement. Having said this, the South and its friends must always be mindful of Northern suspicions, but disregard them, and work to demonstrate their will as Garang almost did. The attitude of the men and women in the streets of Khartoum is that “the foreign people played a role in this [conflict],” by which he generally means that had it not been for foreigners this war might not have begun, nor lasted this long, let alone ended as it did.63 The more significant point is whether or not the policymaker in Khartoum thinks so, too. As the Umma Party pointed out, the major mistake that might be pinned on the international community, at least in hindsight, was to give “the two parties (to the CPA) the impression that what they have signed is a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and giving them the assurance that the concessions they made” were comprehensive and final as well. This view seems confirmed by races of arrogance in the behaviour of the SPLM leadership, especially John Garang: the hurry to bring the South/South Dialogue to an end as if more important business was in the in-mail tray; the disdain for the suggestion that the name “SPLA” be changed to something more inclusive; and engaging in monologues rather than dialogue. Egypt, with its concern for the waters of the Nile, could pose the greatest foreign threat. However, Egypt and the rest of the Arab world are so absorbed with Palestinian issues and the deteriorating image of the Islamic world since September 11, 2001 that they would be highly unlikely to raise the stakes in the Sudan. That leaves only the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as an immediate fomenter of war from a neighbouring country. The determination of Uganda and the SPLA, in addition to the tacit acceptance by Khartoum of the LRA’s diminishing value, make the threat of this rebel group extremely tenuous. If anything, the external environment holds abundant blessings for Sudan in the form of support for the peace and recovery process. By a twist of fate, the withdrawal of this goodwill would constitute the greatest danger to Sudan now. Conclusion No amount of scepticism is going to derail this peace easily. All Sudanese and the international community want to see it succeed. This pervasive goodwill is, by itself, a major force in sustaining 63 Woman, Khartoum Center in Cook.

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the peace agreement. The international economic support and the monitoring services combine to create an environment for a lasting peace. Sudanese of all backgrounds and persuasions have never had the promise to practice the level of democracy envisaged in the constitutions based on the CPA. Khartoum had always been the centre of Sudanese politics, economy, culture, religion, and foreign relations. The CPA recognizes the diversity of the Sudanese people so that they will be able to express their differences within new, more democratic rules of play. International economic support, together with the rising fortunes of the domestic economy, are poised to generate a new level of economic activity that, in time, will bring a turnaround in the social and economic welfare of Sudanese. The unemployment rate will gradually decline, incomes will rise, and with them the purchasing power of households. The higher rate of domestic production and the larger tax base will allow improvements in basic services to take place—and with them a quality of life Sudanese have never enjoyed. A final reason why peace will prevail is war fatigue among all Sudanese. Northerners are grateful that Sudan’s defence budget will not have to gobble up the little they produce. Southerners will no longer have to support a large rebel army. Civilians may finally stop looking over their shoulders, stop running at the sound of Antonov aircraft, and stop fearing the approach of every stranger. These are invaluable benefits of peace. On the other hand, peace could be shattered if the right things are not done at the right time. Absolutely no group in the North, South, West or East should feel absolutely cheated. Peace must be seen to hold promises and partial gains for everyone and leave none feeling the worse off for it. Clauses in the agreement and laws derived from it must not be seen as tricks to create win-lose situations, but as guarantees that all partners win. Closely related to the above is the need to ensure the inclusion of all those thus far excluded. The problems in Darfur and the East should be viewed in this context. Failure to consider these as part of the larger Sudan problem invites a slow but sure derailment of the peace process. Equally, failure to recognize that the sporadic conflict between the Dinka and some tribes in Equatoria are indicators of failures to establish better systems for accommodating diversity will lead to broader conflicts. Systems have been put in place to ensure that perceived wrongs are corrected amicably and impartially. All levels of government in Sudan have these mechanisms in place—although they are not perfect. The UN system, the AU, and both bilateral and multilateral friends are on standby and on call to arrest any negative development in its early stages. With such a new beginning, a high state of alert, and the determination to make it work, Sudanese have themselves to blame if they lose the peace once more.

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