Building Sustainable Inspection Reforms

Jordan Coordination Model

Wafa’a M. Aranki

June 2014

Amman – Jordan

Work Plan

Problem Definition & Institutional Options

Impact Assessment (Legal, Economical)

Selection of “Best options Presentation to the GoJ

Political decision and legalization

2

• Quick Scans ®

• Framing the options

• Analysis – per option• Consultation

• Selection of preferred option

• Draft action plans

• Political decision• Drafting legal measures

Options Considered for the Jordan Case

Option 0: No Action Option

Option 1: Cooperation Agreement / Memorandums of Understanding

Option 2: Coordination Body – Slovenia, Netherlands

Option 3: Merger of inspections with similar policy areas - Lead Agency - UK

Option 4: Consolidated functions into single inspectorate – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia

3

Option 0: No Action

Cons

‐ Estimated Government cost at $20 M‐ Estimated private sector cost at $60 M

(time, samples , fees, etc)‐ Ineffective visits‐ Expected increase in formal sector

Pros

Law enforcement to ensure compliance and protection of public interest

4

Continue working with the current enforcing system without introducing any changes

Option 1: Cooperation Agreements /MOUs

Cons

‐ CAs and MoUs need to be renewed and monitored frequently

‐ Not binding and depends on the inspectorates commitment and willingness

‐ May not ensure sustainability given frequent changes in top management

‐ May not address the root causes of duplication and overlap

Pros

‐ Estimated Savings for GoJ at $30 M

‐ Streamlined requirements expected to increase compliance

‐ Streamlined requirements expected to enhance the quality of regulations and efficiency of the process

5

Signing cooperation agreements or MoU between two or more inspectorates to coordinate inspection functions jointly or on behalf of each others. Examples are Jordan Food and Drug Administration and Greater Amman Municipality, Ministry of Health and JFDA, MoH - GAM

Option 2: Coordination Council

Cons

‐ May not address the root causes of duplication and overlap

‐ Require political well and commitment to ensure proper functioning of the council

Pros

‐ Estimated savings at $50 M‐ Streamlined requirements expected to

increase compliance ‐ Streamlined requirements expected to

enhance the quality of regulations and efficiency of the process

‐ Streamlined requirements expected to enhance risk based targeting

‐ May not require major restructuring of inspection authorities

6

Establish a coordination body responsible for the strategic directions of reform that enjoy the power and resources required to draft policies, execute reforms and monitors performance of the different inspectorates

Option 3: Merging Inspectorates with Similar Functions Lead Agency

Cons

‐ May not serve inspectorates with limited or narrow mandate

‐ Difficult to reverse if proven ineffective

Pros

‐ Estimated Savings for GoJ at $30 M

‐ Creating a collaborative culture

‐ Enhance efficiency and effectiveness of inspection functions

‐ Optimal use of resources

7

Merging inspectorates that has similar mandates under one agency and could include giving the lead agency (e.g. Environment, Food, Safety, etc) the sole authority to inspect certain sectors

Option 4: Consolidated FunctionsSingle Inspectorate Approach

Cons

‐ Requires strong political well and commitment to sustain and finance

‐ Requires substantial change in the government structure

‐ Sudden and transformational change could create confusion

‐ Very difficult to reverse if proven ineffective

Pros

‐ Estimated Savings for GoJ at $60 M

‐ Powerful and influential inspectorate to enforce regulations

‐ Consistent law enforcement system due to common practices under one authority

‐ Expected to enhance risk based targeting

‐ Enhance public accountability and responsibilities

‐ Optimal use of resources

8

Creating a single authority where all the inspection functions in the different authorities are moved under a one authority

Complementary Option:Inspection Legal Framework

Cons

‐ Cost of drafting and enactment of a legal framework could reach $3M

‐ Needs supporting enforcement and awareness to execute efficiently and effectively

Pros

‐ Ensures sustainability and maintenance of reforms

‐ Ensures underlying inspection principles are adopted and implemented

‐ Ensures proper governance and transparency of the system

9

Enacting a legal framework to authorize the inspection structure, the adoption best practices, roles and responsibilities of regulators and firms, and the like

“Best” Option within the Jordanian Context

Coordination council titled

The Higher Committee for Inspection Reform

10

Higher Committee’s Goal

Create a national committee from highest ranking officials to oversee and monitors inspection reform with the following mandate

− Setting policies and strategic plans to improve regulatory delivery in Jordan

− Ensure that reform initiatives are implemented across inspectorates

− Monitor and Evaluate performance to ensure results are achieved

11

Higher Committee – Org Structure

12

Council of Ministers

Economic Development

Ministerial Committee

Co- Chairpersonship Minister of Industry and Trade and Supply and

Minister of Public Sector Development

IFC – Technical Advisor

Secretary General - MoIT

HC – Secretariat MoIT Inspectorates – Working Groups – Technical Committees

Sec Gen/ DG Agency 1

Sec Gen/ DG Agency 2

Sec Gen/ DG Agency ….n

Private Sector Reps

Identify Reform Priorities

Approve

Form Relevant Working Groups

Define the objectives and scope of the WGs

WGs puts proposals for the HC

HC evaluates proposals

Involved Agencies:

‐ Inspectorates

‐ Higher Committee

‐ Working Groups

‐ HC – Secretariat

‐ IFC

‐ Private Sector representatives

‐ Council of Ministers

HC submits to the CoM

Implementation

Yes

No

Approve Yes

No

Evaluation and Continuous Improvement 13

Higher Committee – Workflow

Jordan Council of Ministers Decree approving the Higher Committee mandate, roles and responsibilities Dated October 24, 2013

Thank You

Questions and Answers