building a vibrant legislature as a means of deepening democratic consolidation in nigeria

1

Building a Vibrant Legislature as a means of Deepening Democratic

Consolidation in Nigeria.

By

Dr Kayode Fayemi

Governor, Ekiti State

2

Being the Keynote Address at the Conference of Speakers of State Legislatures in Abuja, November 28, 2011.

3

Introduction

It is a honour and indeed a privilege for me to address this important conference of Legislative Heads

from the States. Alexander Pope, while commenting on the content and efficacy of governance rather

than its form noted that “for forms of governments let fools contest, what is best administered is best”.

Pope’s predilection is certainly for the performance of government rather than its form or institutional

structure. While the content of governance is quite important, its form cannot also be dismissed. It is

the form of governance and its institutional structure that shapes the nature of the relationship

between the governors and the governed as it determines the nature of parties, electoral processes,

constitutional order, issue of citizenship and rights, and other institutional mechanisms that promote

the liberties of the citizens, and limit the arbitrary tendencies of the state and its managers. In other

words, the extent to which a government is able to realise the public good will be largely determined or

at least influenced by the kind of institutional structures that exist in such system. Undoubtedly, other

factors like leadership and prevailing political values go a long way in determining the efficacy or

performance of any government. In spite of that, institutions and forms of government matter.

Within the liberal democracy strand, there are two major forms of governmental structures or

arrangements. These are the presidential and parliamentary systems of government. Both deal

essentially with how power is consummated, whether concentrated or dispersed, and who

wields what power and how, especially at the central level. As Arend lijphart noted, “defining

democracy as ‘government by and for the people’ raises a fundamental question: Who will do

the governing and to whose interests should the government be responsive when the people

are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?1. The last two democratic experiments in

Nigeria have been patterned along the presidential system of government. These are the

second republic (1979-‐1983) and the current fourth republic (May 1999-‐present). Even the

4

stillborn third republic was of a presidential mode. In spite of what

appears to be a settled question as to what model of liberal democracy Nigeria should adopt,

there are serious critique of the presidential system of government and trenchant agitation that

the country should return back to the parliamentary system of government that it used in the

first republic (1960-‐1966). The fact that both models and experiments have failed in the past

suggests that they are not foolproof or infallible systems and can collapse under enormous

political stress. But which system is more adaptable to the Nigerian political condition that may

prove more durable and enduring? What are the mediating factors or externalities that bear on

the durability or otherwise of these systems, and how can the goal of democratic stability and

consolidation be achieved in Nigeria? These are the issues addressed by the paper.

The arguments of the paper are twofold. First that both the presidential and parliamentary

systems of government are bourgeois political crafting, which historically the ruling class in

liberal democratic societies have used to legitimise their power, manage intra-‐ruling class

struggles and stabilise the political system. The indigenisation or local ownership and efficacy of

any of these systems will depend on how the Nigerian ruling class is able to reproduce the

context and political culture of the western ruling class. In other words, evolve and internalise

the values, nuances, institutions and controls of those systems. Second, beyond the façade of

formal political structures, the survival of democracy in the long haul will be determined by

how it improves the life chances of the people by providing them basic social welfare and

better conditions of living. Without this, the people are likely to develop a “democracy fatigue”,

which may sooner than later undermine the system2

Two Sides of Liberal Democracy: The Presidential and Parliamentary Systems of Government.

The terms “parliamentary” and “presidential” systems of government derive essentially from

where the locus of power is situated at the centre. A parliamentary system is a government

5

under the rule of the legislature. Put differently, it is a system in which the

legislature wields enormous powers. The executive derives its existence tenure and control

from the legislature. The president is elected from the legislature, so are the members of the

cabinet. As Ben Nwabueze puts it “an executive elected by the legislature owes its right to

govern to the legislature. This is indeed the central feature of the parliamentary system.

Government under the system is the rule of the legislature, hence it is called parliamentary

government”3. In some parliamentary systems there is usually a distinction between the formal

authority of the constitutional head of state and the real authority of the head of government.

The main features of the parliamentary system are as follows:

1. The executive is parliamentary in composition.

2. It consists of a plurality of persons who as a cabinet constitutes the government

3. It is made by and responsible to the legislature4.

There is the phenomenon of parliamentary accountability in which the executive periodically

gives account of its stewardship to the parliament. In the event of which the parliament passes

a “vote of no confidence” on the government or its policies, the government has to be

dissolved and in most cases, the parliament will also be dissolved for new parliamentary

elections.

In the presidential system of government, there is the concept of a single executive. The

president is the fulcrum of executive power. He owes his appointment and tenure not to the

parliament but the electorate and the constitution. He takes responsibility for his cabinet, and

has the power to hire and fire them. The cabinet members are seldomly members of the

executive. In the presidential system of government, the concept of separation of powers is

well enunciated. The three arms of government are well demarcated, with specific spheres of

responsibility. These three arms of government are to serve as countervailing power on each

other. This is the principle of checks and balances inherent in the presidential democracy.

6

There has been argument in the literature as to which of this institutional arrangement of

liberal democracy is more effective and durable. The urge has been to identify the strength and

weaknesses of those models. Parliamentary system of government is considered to be more

inclusive, less expensive, and accountable. It encourages coalition building and the actual

involvement of political parties in the governmental system through its role in political

bargaining and coalition processes. Added to this is that the stakes are much higher in a

presidential democracy than in a parliamentary system, as the desperation to win the oval

presidential office is usually very high in presidential democracy. Furthermore, presidential

democracy may also generate executive-‐legislative stand-‐off especially in situations in which

different parties control the two arms of government. In terms of its weaknesses,

parliamentary system of government may create friction and tension between the two

executive offices, of the constitutional head of state (president) and head of government

(Prime Minister). Also, the doctrine of separation of powers is not clearly delineated in the

parliamentary system. Furthermore, governmental activities are usually constrained by the

overriding influence of the parliament in executive operation.

For the presidential system of government, the major persuasion is that the locus of executive

power is clearly delineated, which may engender rapidity of actions and decisions and make for

executive responsibility in a clear and concise manner. As Victor Ayeni noted the major

conviction for presidential democracy is that “society is best run by a government that is

effectively organised under a clear and definite authority. A plural authority situation often

leads to confusion, unnecessary conflict and inability to locate responsibility”5.

Extant studies suggest that parliamentary system of government is more durable than the

presidential democracy. Scholars like Joan Linz6 and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose

Cheibub and Fernando Limongi 7 have pointed out in different cross-‐country studies the basis of

7

this and provided statistical data to justify such. Adam Przeworski et. al. in

a study of about one hundred and thirty five countries between 1950 and 1990 noted that the

possibility of survival of parliamentary system is much higher than that of the presidential

system. Their finding is quite revealing:

The Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), which was saddled with the responsibility of

drafting the 1979 constitution in Nigeria, also made the same submission in justifying the

recommendation of a presidential system of government for the country. According to it, “the

separation of the head of state from head of government involves a division between real

authority and formal authority (which is) meaningless in the light of African political experience

and history”13.

Endgame of Power: The Travails of Both the Presidential and Parliamentary Systems of

Government in Nigeria.

Independence in Nigeria in 1960 was heralded with pomp and pageantry. The British

Westminster model of government was bequeathed to the nation at independence. There was

the office of Prime Minister and the President, with the latter being a ceremonial head of state

and the former the head of government. There was a central legislature, while there were three

major regions that were relatively autonomous. The expectation was that this political

arrangement would engender some form of political interaction and bargaining at the centre

amongst the regionally based political parties and thereby promotes consociational politics.

David Apter shortly after independence eulogised the Nigerian experiment as a model of

consociational institutional politics in Africa that is worth being emulated. According to him, the

arrangement is one in which while the constituent parts joined together in some form of union,

they have not lost their identity. It is a system that accommodates variety of groups of

divergent ideas in order to achieve unity, and in which its corporate or collective leadership is

8

acceptable to all14. Initially some form of consociational politics was unfolding

with the coalition of the two parties that formed the government at the centre-‐ Northern

Peoples Congress (NPC), and the National Council for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). The other party

was in opposition and was supposed to form the shadow government.

Although the decolonisation process witnessed some tensions amongst the political parties as

to when and how independence should be consummated and the issue of numerical

representation in political institutions, such was largely insignificant to undermine the system

or the processes leading to political independence. However by 1964, the signpost of systemic

collapse had begun to manifest in the country. Political parties had become quite desperate

either to expand or protect their base of political and electoral support. In addition, some of the

weaknesses of the parliamentary system had also begun to show. Cracks in political coalitions

especially the ruling coalition of the NPC and NCNC was palpable, as some independent

candidates switched to the NPC giving it the needed majority to form a government and as such

making the NCNC an “irrelevant party”15 in the coalition. This problem was to threaten the

stability of the political system when after the 1964 elections, which the NPC won, the NCNC

leader, Nnamdi Azikwe, who was the president refused to invite Tafawa Balewa as new or re-‐

elected Prime Minister to form a new government. This left the nation without a government

for three full days16.

The constellation of forces and events that led to the fall of the first republic has been well

documented17, it therefore need no rehash. The important point to emphasise is that the

parliamentary system of government could not be a safeguard against systemic breakdown. It

could not diffuse the internecine struggles for political power amongst the political parties and

its elite; prevent election rigging or construct relative autonomy for the state, which would

insulate it from being the basis of primitive accumulation of wealth by the politicians.

9

In order to avoid what was considered as the pitfalls of the first republic,

there was a deliberate attempt towards an alternative model of political engineering in the

second republic. The political transition programme (1976-‐1979) that ushered in the new

republic saw tremendous political reforms, which include, local government reforms, a new

process of constitution making, reform of the electoral body, and the creation of states. The

1979 constitution was predicated on the presidential system of government. As Alex Gboyega

noted, the distasteful political experience of the first republic rather than any hopes of the

future informed the making of the 1979 constitution18. The quest for a stabilising formula as

Rotimi Suberu points out was a major driving force in the making of the 1979 constitution19.

Some of the features of that constitution include the presidential system in which a clear focus

of executive authority was created in the president. The president was to be popularly elected

un-‐subordinated to the legislature. The president was also to command enormous powers and

be a rallying point and embodiment of national unity. As such, the constitutional provision for

the election of the president was more than wining a majority vote, but a vote with a national

spread of 122/3 of the votes cast in the 19 states of the federation.

Some other stabilising measures in the constitution include the entrenchment of the federal

principle in the constitution. These include the creation of 19-‐state structure, a single tier

local government system that had constitutional recognition and specified functions, and a bi-‐

cameral legislature at the centre-‐Senate and House of Representatives. In addition the “federal

character” principle was introduced into the constitution, which was an ethnic formulae for the

sharing of public goods20. That is, all parts of the country were to be represented in state

institutions and parastatals, which include ministerial portfolios, the bureaucracy,

ambassadorial appointments, and boards of public corporations and agencies. The essence was

to prevent claims of ethnic domination and marginalisation by groups in the country. This was

to make for group rights, fairness and social justice in the country.

10

The other stabilising devices in the constitution include the provision that

political parties must be national in orientation and spread before qualifying for registration.

This was to prevent the emergence of ethnic based political parties, which was a major bane of

the first republic. Those parties were to be locally funded with the Federal Electoral

Commission (FEDECO) regulating the funding of those parties. Also, the Code of Conduct

Bureau was established in order to check corruption and financial malfeasance by public

officials, while civil liberties were guaranteed by the constitution21.

However, in spite of what seemed to be a well-‐crafted constitution, the second republic

collapsed barely four years after its inception in December 1983. How can this collapse be

explained? Billy Dudley would argue that poor political virtues or lack of civic culture among the

politicians led to the collapse of the second republic just as it did for the first22. Samuel

Huntington would likely blame weak political institutions for the nation’s apparent political

decay23. Eghosa Osaghae may likely direct our attention to the problem of ethnicity and the

need for an appropriate federal solution24. Richard Joseph identifies prebendal politics as the

cause of political failure in Nigeria25, while Julius Ihonbvere and Toyin Falola26 focused on the

crisis of the Nigerian political economy especially the crisis of accumulation as leading to

irresponsible political behaviour by the political elite. Whatever the reasons that may be

adduced for the collapse of the second republic, what became apparent is that Nigeria’s

presidential system could not safeguard the nation’s second attempt at democratic rule.

Indeed, some have argued that the presidential system of government itself was part of the

problem rather the solution. The presidency because of the enormous powers it commands

became the focus of inordinate ambition as the party or individual that controls it has

command over “life and death”. As such, the endgame of politics in the second republic was to

capture presidential power. The presidential system of government could therefore not solve

the question of political power in Nigeria. This was the context in which the second republic

collapsed.

11

The Obasanjo Regime and the Politics of Presidential Monarchism-‐

Babacracy

The collapse of the second republic led to fifteen years of military rule (1984-‐1999). A brief

period of three months of an un-‐elected Interim National Government (ING) contrived by the

military junta of General Ibrahim Babangida was the only interregnum in this period. This itself

(ING) could be regarded as part of the military process since it was installed by the military and

served its purposes. Successive military regimes during this period took the nation on

circuitous, but dubious political transition programmes, which did not produce any civilian

rule27. It was the brief Abubakar regime (1998-‐1999) that quickly transferred political power

given the circumstances in which the regime was born, and the political pressure it came

under28. Even when transferring political power the regime itself was not an uninterested actor

in the process, and sought to carefully manage the disengagement agenda. The political context

of the disengagement also ensured that a particular geo-‐political zone was a beneficiary of

political power at the centre29. The new civilian political arrangement was also factored in a

presidential mode. A new constitution was put in place-‐the 1999 constitution to serve as legal

framework for the presidential system. The 1999 constitution takes after the 1979 one except

that the number of states in the country by 1999 had increased to 36 and over 700 local

government areas had been created by this period. The PDP won the presidential polls held in

February 1999, with its candidate, General Olusegun Obasanjo emerging as president of the

country.

The trend with the Obasanjo presidency has been the emergence of what Robert Fatton refers

to as “presidential monarchism”30. According to Fatton, presidential monarchs often dominate

their political environment. He described it in these telling terms:

The centrality of the presidential monarch is continuously emphasised by the

ideological apparatuses of the state. In an effort to legitimise his rule, these

12

apparatuses incessantly nurture the cult of his personality,

imparting to it supranatural power and unlimited knowledge…the presidential

monarch has an all encompassing sphere of competence. His presence is felt

everywhere; he is the father of the nation to whom filial respect is always due31.

Fatton continued that the presidential monarch is the “the only sun of the political system; the

courtiers’ radiance can only be reflection of his rays. People must be led to believe that without

him there could be only darkness and disorder. Presidential monarchs know that their rule

depends on their capacity to suppress alternative centres of authority. A ruler does seek to

keep his courtiers at his mercy and makes sure that they all know it. He is the ultimate

dispenser of favour and disfavour, of gift and confiscation, of privilege and ruin. He places

himself above the law; indeed, he is the law”32.

The point being underscored is that the presidency in the current democratic conjuncture has

assumed enormous powers and the entire political system tends to revolve around the

personality of the president. There are structural and behavioural dimensions to this. The

structural basis is that the 1999 constitution grants enormous powers to the federal

government to be exercised by the president. He appoints and controls his cabinet, fill the

boards of parastatals and government agencies, and also appoint members to virtually all

federal commissions including sensitive commissions like the Independent National Electoral

Commission (INEC), and National Population Commission (NPC)33. The federal government also

controls enormous financial resources, which leaves other tiers of government at the mercy of

the federal government. This reinforces the centrality of the position of the president. The

behavioural dimension to it has to do with the urge to consolidate political power by

counteracting alternative source(s) of political power and contest. Some have adduced this to

the military and authoritarian background of the president, while others argue that it is a simply

one of deft political manoeuvring.

13

Making Democracy Work in Nigeria: Beyond the Parliamentary and Presidential Systems.

The foregoing analysis clearly suggests that institutional arrangements between the

presidential and parliamentary systems of government have not been a safeguard against the

collapse of democracy in the country. The feat of the first republic was repeated in the second

and signposts in the current political dispensations are not too promising. Intra and inter party

feuds have assumed dangerous proportions, politically inspired assassinations are occurring

and virtually all the current elected officials have taken it for granted that they would be re-‐

elected back to power through all means possible. This situation has led some to suggest that

there is no marked difference between the presidential and parliamentary systems of

government on the political fortune of the country. Rotimi Suberu argues this quite poignantly:

The supposed advantages of the presidential system of government over the

parliamentary system are nebulous if not preposterous. While it has been argued

that the executive presidential system furnishes a clear focal point of loyalty,

which not only avoids the clashes and conflicts inherent in the separation of the

head of state from the head of government in the parliamentary system, but is

also functional and indispensable for national integration, there is indeed no a

prior basis on which to determine which form of government, the presidential or

the Westminster type is more suitable… In a word, the change from the

parliamentary to the presidential system can be seen as cosmetic and of no

consequence in ensuring governmental stability40.

(Emphasis mine).

Suberu further argues that the departure point on government stability should be the

underlying social, economic, and cultural forces as the decisive factors influencing the dynamics

14

of political processes and the prospects of stable and effective

government41. Suberu’s observation is quite relevant. A critical analysis of the issue of

governmental stability and the survival of democracy in the country would turn our attention in

three directions. First is the issue of federalism. The whole logic of federalism is about power

decentralisation. Nigeria’s federalism has tended towards the concentration of power at the

centre such that the challenge for politicians and their parties is to seek to capture federal

power. In order to diffuse the internecine political struggles that characterise the centre, there

is need to devolve more powers and resources to the sub-‐national units and make federal

power less attractive than it is. The federal government ought to simply co-‐ordinate things

general to the commonwealth -‐ customs, immigration, external defence and national security,

currency issuance and all other matters that may be mutually agreed to by commonwealth. It is

these issues about federalism that constitutes the crux of the national question. Confronting

the national question through the federal idea may be an easier but politically expedient way

than the convocation of a sovereign national conference. There should be no illusion that

adopting a much-‐decentralised federal system will fully resolve the question of political power

in the country. It would not. What it would have done is to change the site of political

contestation from the national to the sub-‐national levels. However, this would have changed

the constellation of inter-‐ethnic group relations and tensions as it currently manifests and

produce patterns of political behaviour and negotiation in the different sub-‐national units. This

is where state Assemblies become critical.

The second issue germane to the question of democratic stability and consolidation in Nigeria is

that of institutions. Key state institutions need to be reformed and restructured for them to

support the democratic process. This will include the INEC, the judiciary and the security

apparatuses especially the police force and also the political parties. With regard to INEC the

major kind of reform to be carried out is in the composition of the body. A situation in which

the federal government appoints members of INEC is unacceptable, which cannot make for

fairness in the electoral process. The composition of INEC should be broad based representing

15

key social interests and forces like civil society groups of labour and the

human rights community, and political parties. The second reform with concern to INEC is

about the electoral process. The “first past the post” or majoritarian electoral process that the

country uses makes for a deadly contest for political power. It is a “winner takes all” game.

Those who win do so handsomely and those who lose are bad losers. There is need to change

this. The proportional representation system may provide an alternative electoral model for the

country. The reform of the judiciary and some other state institutions will take the dimension

of relative autonomy for them to act independently of executive control and to be accountable

to the people rather than the executive. These institutions need to be purged of corruption,

especially the police force.

The third dimension of democratic stability in Nigeria is the foundations of the economy. The

Nigerian economy must one at the same time promote economic growth, distribution, and

social welfare. If this does not happen politics will remain a bourgeois class project, social

alienation would intensify and political participation will continue to dwindle. The net result will

be the promotion of what Thandika Mkandawire referred to as “choiceless democracy”.

Conclusion.

The search for democratic stability and consolidation in Nigeria will go beyond the institutional

differences between the parliamentary and the presidential systems of government. The

solution will also not lie in a mixed model of both. So, will the logic of presidential messianism

take the nation too far. What would guarantee democratic stability in Nigeria will be a

confluence of three things. First is re-‐examining the federal idea as presently practised in

Nigeria. In terms of political and administrative management Nigeria currently tends towards a

unitary state. The federal idea should be reclaimed with considerable degree of political and

economic decentralisation to sub-‐national units. The second dimension is to begin to rebuild

institutions and strengthen them. The two foregoing issues will have to be accomplished

16

through a process of constitutionalism. The third dimension of democratic

stability has to do with the economic bases of society. The triple cord of economic growth,

distribution and social welfare must go hand in hand. Extreme and pervasive poverty

constitutes a threat to democracy. It is when this socio-‐economic context is re-‐engineered can

the politics of consociational democracy, which Arend Lijphart talks about begin to germinate

and take firm root in Nigeria.

From the foregoing, you would no less agree that the Legislature is a crucial institution and one

of the pillars of government in most advanced and transitional democracies in the world; and

this is largely due to the frameworks for good governance which it provides through the making

of popular laws, the control of public funds, and its oversight and monitoring of other levels of

government in order to promote transparency and accountability in the management of public

resources. Hence, as representatives of the people, you are holding sacred mandates as the

faces and voices of so many constituencies and people whose sovereignty you are giving

expression to.

Under the Presidential system, the relationship existing between the Legislature and the

Executive is defined through the doctrine of the Separation of Powers, which declares that each

branch of government – whether the Executive, the Legislature, or the Judiciary – has powers

that are unique and exclusive to it, and which cannot be exercised by any other branch. As

such, the doctrine ensures that the three levels of government are separate and check each

other from excesses. Also, there is a veto inserted in each of the branches to guarantee against

possible abuse by any domineering organ of government.

Whilst the notion of the separation of powers in the Nigerian Constitution specifies distinct roles for the

different organs of government, the reality and complexity of governance necessitates increasing

interrelationships among the branches of government, yet the critical challenge that has faced most

17

presidential democracies is how the various organs, particularly the Legislative

and the Executive, will be able to work together amicably while avoiding a deterioration in their

relationship.

It, therefore, becomes a significant issue for those of us in the Executive to continue to make

efforts to reach out a hand of support and cooperation to you our dear colleagues in our state

Legislatures, as we are essentially partners in progress, with the promotion of the welfare of our

people as the raison d’être for our intervention within the public space. And, we hope that our

honourable members of parliament will take on the gauntlet of being genuine collaborators in

development with us in good faith, because it is only when there is such synergy that our

programmes and policies can enjoy meaningful passage through the Legislature, devoid of

bureaucratic hindrances or bottlenecks. Any Executive worth its salt would understand the

benefits of having vibrant members of the Legislature who can run with its programmes on its

side.

As a country, having just come out of decades of authoritarian rule, this not only eroded

constitutional federalism through the centralisation of power and resources by the military, it also

led to the elevation of a culture of arbitrariness and impunity, the violation of the rights of

citizens, high levels of corruption, etc. And, these and other concerns can only be effectively

reversed through a harmonious working relationship between the Executive and Legislature –

between the policy/legal formulators, implementers, and the monitors; and this will ultimately

enhance the efficiency and transparency of government.

Still, with our various States espousing and making very bold statements about the direction of

progress in which their Executives seek to take the people (such as through the attainment of the

MDGS), and with the larger Nigeria being committed towards the eradication of HIV/AIDS,

illiteracy, etc and the realisation of ascending to become one of the 20 principal economies in the

world in a few years, the achievement of some of these key targets can only be met if strong and

vibrant institutions such as the Legislature are built and continuously nurtured. As such, the

Legislature has an important responsibility in the creation of people-oriented public policy, and

in the monitoring of the implementation of such by the Executive, because it is only when we

18

work in unison, devoid of rancour, that we can attain the greatest possible good

for the greatest number of our people, within the shortest possible time.

Our dear honourable Heads of Parliament from the farther and nearer reaches of this country, I

wish you a very productive engagement as you set about sharing ideas and best practices on how

to build vibrant Legislatures in your home states. Do have rewarding deliberations.

19

Notes and References.

1. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. (New

Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 1. 2. See, S. Adejumobi and A. Bujra, “Sustaining Liberal Democracy and Good Governance in Africa: The Road

Ahead” in S. Adejumobi and A. Bujra (eds.), Breaking Barriers, Creating New Hopes: Democracy, Civil Society and Good Governance in Africa. (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2002),p. 353. Also, Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa. (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2000).

3 . Ben Nwabueze, Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa. (London and Enugu: Hurst and Company and Nwamife Publishers, 1974), p. 28. 4 . Ibid, p37. 5 . Victor Ayeni, “The Executive Presidency as a Concomitant of Multipartism in Africa: An Assessment ” in Omo Omoruyi et. al. (eds.) Democratisation in Africa: African Perspectives, Vol.1. (Abuja: Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994), 213. 6. Joan Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism”, Journal of Democracy, Vol.1, 1990, pp. 51-69. 7. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes Democracies Endure? in Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner Yun-han Chu and Hun-mao Tien (eds.), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University, 1997), pp. 295-311. 13 . The Constitution Drafting Committee Draft Report cited in Rotimi Suberu “Background and Principles of Nigeria’s Presidential System” in Victor Ayeni and Kayode Soremekun (eds.) Nigeria’s Second Republic. (Lagos: Daily Times, 1988), p. 17. 14 . David Apter, The Political Kingdom of Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 24-25. 15. see, Billy Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian government and Politics. (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 62. 16 . The constitutional practice is that the President was to appoint the Prime Minister, who should be the leader of the political party that had the majority in the House of representatives. Rather than do this, Azikwe was quoted as saying that he “would rather resign than exercise the power to call on a person to form a government”. See, Oyeleye Oyediran, Nigerian Government and Politics Under military Rule: 1966-1979. (London: Macmillan, 1979), p 19. 17 . See, Billy Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian government and Politics. (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), Oyeleye Oyediran, Nigerian Government and Politics Under military Rule: 1966-1979. (London: Macmillan, 1979). 18 . Alex Gboyega, “The Making of the Nigerian Constitution” in Oyeleye Oyediran, Nigerian Government and Politics Under military Rule: 1966-1979. (London: Macmillan, 1979), p.258. 19 . Rotimi Suberu, “Background and Principles of Nigeria’s Presidential System” in Victor Ayeni and Kayode Soremekun (eds.) Nigeria’s Second Republic. (Lagos: Daily Times, 1988), p. 17.

20

20. See, Said Adejumobi, “Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No.1, 2001, p. 161. 21 . See, Rotimi Suberu, Op. Cit. 22 . See, Billy Dudley, Billy Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian government and Politics. (London: Macmillan Press, 1982). Also, Billy Dudley, Instability and Political Order. (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973). 23. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Also, Samuel Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay”, World Politics, Vol. XVII, April, 1965. 24 . See, Eghosa Osaghae, “The Federal Solution and the National Question in Nigeria” in S. Adejumobi and A. Momoh (eds.) The National Question in Nigeria: Comparative Perspectives. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 217-244. 25. Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 26. Julius Ihonvbere and Toyin Falola, The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. (London: Zed Books, 1985). 27. Both the Babangida (1986-1993) and Abacha (1993-1998) military regimes undertook lengthy political transition programmes which were designed to perpetuate themselves in power. The Babangida Transition was the most costly and apparently deceitful transition that the nation has ever witnessed. See, Said Adejumobi and A. Momoh, The Military and the Crisis of Democratic Transition: A Study in the Monopoly of Power. (Lagos: Civil Liberties Organisation, 1999). Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran (eds.), Transition Without End. (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 1996). Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje (eds.), Nigeria: Politics of Transition and Governance. (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1999). 28. The annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election by the Babangida regime, and the subsequent events that followed, together with the sudden death of both Sanni Abacha and Moshood Abiola in 1998 heigtened political tension in the country, which made it imperative for the Abubakar regime to organise a short transition programme of one year and transfer political power to elected civilian regime on May 29, 1999. 29. All the three registered political parties- the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP), and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) agreed to zone the post of the president to the South West as a form of compensation for the annulment of the June 12 election, and the subsequent events in the country, which was threatening the political stability of the country. 30 . Robert Fatton, Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992). 31 . Ibid, p. 47-48. 32. Ibid, p. 47-48. 33 . Most of the appointments are however to be approved by the Senate, especially that of the Ministers. The president has the primary responsibility to choose whom he likes. 40. Rotimi Suberu, Op.Cit. p. 26. 41 Ibid, p. 28.

building a vibrant legislature as a means of deepening democratic consolidation in nigeria

News & Politics