buddhist theory of meaning (apoha) and negative statements

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Buddhist Theory of Meaning (Apoha) and Negative StatementsAuthor(s): Dhirendra Sharma

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 18, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Apr., 1968), pp. 3-10Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398032.

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DHIRENDRA SHARMA

zudhist T h e o r y o MeaningA p o h a ) n d NegativeSta tements

THE STUDY OF THE problem of word-meaning in Indian phi-losophy has had a very complex and interesting development, much moreinteresting than is usually realized. It has probably sustained a more con-tinuous polemics than any other philosophical problem.

Speculation about the nature of word had a kind of mystical awe in the earlywritings of India, viz., the Rg Veda, the Brahmanas,and the Upanisads. Wordwas considered eternal and the prime source of knowledge.l From Patafijali(ca. 200 B.C.), however, we learn that there were two schools, one consistingof those who believed that the referrent of word was the particular, and theother consisting of those who maintainedthat it was the universal.2 Vyadi, forinstance, believed in the former, while Vajapyayana held the latter view. How-ever, as we shall see, in the later development of philosophical systems mostof the non-Buddhist philosophers synthesized the two views and contendedthat a word meant both the particular and the universal. The Mimarhsa heldthat a word denoted a genus, and only indirectly referred to the individual.3

Dhirendra Sharma is Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy,Michigan State University.AUTHOR'S NOTE: This paper is the result of research conductedat the Widener Li-brary, Harvard University, in the summer of 1966. I am indebted to the Asian StudiesCenterof the MichiganState Universityand to the Ford Foundationfor partial financialsupport.1 Cf. R. C. Pandey, The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy (Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass,1963), pp. 9-10.2 Patafjali's Mahabhasya,with Kaiyata's pradipa,Nagesa's uddyotaand RudradharaSarma's 'tattvaloka' (Banares: Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1954), pp. 35, 38.3 Kumarila Bhatta, Mimttasa-slokavdrtikam .. ..srmatpdrthasarathimisra-pranmtayanydyaratna-karakhyaya yakhyaydnugatam,Tailafiga Ramasastri Manavalli, ed. Chow-kamba Sanskrit Series, Work 3, nos. 11, 12, 15-21, 24 (Benares: CaukhambaSanskritBook Depot, 1898), akrti section,verse 4.3

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DHIRENDRA SHARMABut the Nyaya maintained that it denoted three things: an individual, its classresiding in it, and its particular configuration or form.4

IIBuddhist thinkers of the Dignaga school, however, advanced a theory called

apoha which is somewhat similar to the Western view of nominalism.Apohaliterally means differentiation or exclusion. Words are the result of men-tal conceptualization,and therefore they refer to mental images and cannot bedirectly associated with external realities. Meaning, thus, denotes the referend,the instrument of an act of reference, as distinct from the referent, the objecttoward which the act of reference is directed.5The Buddhist regards it as onlya logical concept, not an external entity inherently residing in the individuals.In other words, meaning means the relation of the word and the image of theobject. The word cannot directly be associated with external objects; it cannot,therefore, denote the object. The word has an a priori existence, independentof external objects.

IIIThe Sanskrit term artha is as ambiguous as the English term meaning.Of the two main views of meaning, one is realist and the other, with some

reservations, may be called idealist and nominalist. The division is based onthe interpretation of the tatpurusa compound sabdartha.6It means meaningof word. The term artha conveys three things: (1) purpose, (2) cause/means, and (3) object of the senses.7 The realists seem to take the term in itsthird sense, while the nominalists prefer the other two meanings. The realistgroup includes the Nyaya,8 the Vaisesika,9 and the Mimtimsa10 ystems, all ofwhich maintain that words denote both universals and individuals, and that

4 Nydya Sitra of Gautama, I. 2. 68.5There still exists some confusion in the terminology of reference, and the termreferend s used by some authors to denote the object nstead of the instrument fthe referentialact. Cf. Ledger Wood, Dictionary of Philosophy (Ames, Iowa: Littlefield,Adams and Company,1959), p. 267.6 Tatpurusaor dependentdeterminative s one in which the first memberof the com-pounddependson the last, the syntacticalrelation of the former to the latter being thatof an attribute n an obliquecase.7 Cf. MonierWilliams, Sanskrit-EnglishDictionary (New ed.; Oxford: The Claren-don Press, 1960), p. 90.8 Cf. n. 4 above.9 VaisesikaSutra, I. 2. 3. ff.10KumarillaBhatta, op. cit., apohasection.

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BUDDHIST APOHA AND NEGATIVE STATEMENTSboth are real objects to be grasped by the senses.11The Buddhist thinkers ofthe Dignaga school vehemently opposed the realist view on the ground thatuniversals are not external facts-they are post res.

Buddhist ingenuity is shown in the argument that the efficient reality(arthakriyakaritva) belongs to the extreme momentary particular (ksanika)and that it is this momentary reality that is grasped at the first moment ofsense-stimulus. What is cognized by the intellect following the first momentarysense-stimulus is the universal; and it is this conceptualized fact that is ap-prehended in inference and referred to by words. If words mean the objectsof the senses, our experiences of language would be the same as those of thesense-object-contact in perception. Then, the mere pronouncement of words,for instance, honey and fire, would produce efficient effects of sweet taste andburning sensation.12

IVThe theory of apoha is designed by Buddhist philosophers to solve the

problems of the universal (samanya) and the particular error (bheddgraha),the relation between substance and attribute (dharmi-dharma), and the wordand its meaning (sabddrthasambandha).13The theory seems to be misunder-stood as a negative approachtowards meaning. 14The charge of negativismappearsto have been based on the study of non-Buddhist scholars Uddyotakara,Kumarila Bhatta, Bhamaha, and Udayana, who vehemently criticized thetheory as negative.16In fact, the charges of negativism have been constantly

11J. Sinha, History of IndianPhilosophy (Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House, 1956),Vol. I, p. 321.12Apoha-siddhiof Ratnakirti,HaraprasadShastri, ed. In Six BuddhistNydya Tracts(Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1910), p. 9, 12-13. Another edition of Apoha-siddhihas been publishedwith nine other logical monographsof Ratnakirtientitled: Ratnakirti-nibandhavali,Anantlal Thakur, ed. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, III (Patna: KashiPrasad JayaswalResearchInstitute,1957), pp. 53-61.13Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky,Buddhist Logic (Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of theUSSR, 1932). Reprintedin Indo-IranianJournal ('s-Gravenhage:Mouton & Co., 1958),Vol. II, pp. 403 ff.14Cf. K. K. Raja, The Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians,Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, Parts 3-4, p. 11, also pp. 3-13; Sinha, op. cit., pp.331-333,883; R. C. Pandey, op. cit., p. 219.5Raja, op. cit., p. 11. Raja's Indian Theories of Meaning (Madras: The AdyarLibraryand Research Centre, 1963), reached me after I had completedthis paper.Thereis an excellent review of the book and a survey of the study of semantics in classicalSanskrit writings by J. F. Staal, IndianSemantics,I, Journal of the American OrientalSociety, 86, No. 3 (July-September,1966), 304-311.My position, however, remains un-changed,for Raja has not altered his view of apohaand Staal shows no concernwith theBuddhisttheoryof meaning.

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DHIRENDRA SHARMArefuted by Dharmakirti and subsequent Buddhist scholars.16Here we shalldeal mainly with one aspect of apoha, namely, the extent to which it is basedon the law of opposition (virodha).7 We shall also attempt to establish thata purely negative meaning theory would be contrary to the Buddhist meta-physics of extreme momentary particular (svalaksana ksanika).

VThe apoha theory is directed primarily against the pluralistic conceptionof reality according to which universals are considered to be real. For thenominalist Buddhist, a real is the extreme point instant (svalaksana) whichis beyond propositional operation.l8Everything past, future, imagined, absent,mental, notional, and universal-that is, every thought construction-is unreal.Thus, the object of a judgment or expression, that is, the propositional opera-tion, is not the momentary real (ksanika) which is in constant flux.19Thus,all verbal and logical statements express differentiation (apoha).20 To therealist argument that it is really the universal which is the object of a proposi-

tion, the nominalist rejoins that the universal itself is not real but a logicalconstruct (vikalpa). It must be conceived as the idea of exclusion of a commoncounter-correlate. For instance, the common counter-correlative of all cowsis non-horse. Thus, the concept cow can be determined by excluding allother instances of reality from which it is excluded. The universal is in itsvery essence (laksana) exclusion of the other. 21

VIFor Buddhist thinkers negation is based on a priori opposition (virodha)of unique momentary particular entities. All negations, according to Dharma-

16Pramanavarttikaof Dharmakirti,the first chapter only with auto commentarysvavrtti, and sub-commentaryof Karnakagominsvavrtti-tlka, Rahula Sankrityayana,ed.(Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1943), pp. 248-263; Jiananarimitra-nibandhavaliTwelve Bud-dhist PhilosophicalWorks of Jfidnanrimitra),ed. with introductionby Anantlal Thakur.Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, V (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute,1959), pp. 201-232on apoha.17 An independentstudy of the Buddhisttheory of meaningor apoha by this authoris being publishedby Mouton & Co.18Pramdna-vartika-bhdshyamf Prajiinkaragupta,decipheredand edited by RahulaSankrityayana.Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, I (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Re-search Institute, 1953), p. 621; Dharmakirti,loc. cit., p. 262; Ratnakirti, op. cit., p. 6(14-17).19E. Frauwallner, Die Apohalehre, Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde des Morgen-landes,Vol. 37, 275 and Vol. 40, 63.20 Jfidnanrimitra,p. cit., p. 201.21 Prajiakaragupta,op. cit., p. 200 (III. 30).

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BUDDHIST APOHA AND NEGATIVE STATEMENTSkirti,22 are rooted in opposition23 which can be divided into two classes:(1) efficient opposition or incompatibility (sahabhava-virodha); and (2)logical opposition or contradiction (anyonyopalabdhiparihara-sthitilaksana-virodha). The former is defined in the following passage: When [one fact]has duration [as long as] the sum total of its causes remains unimpaired andit [then] vanishes as soon as another, [the opposed] fact, appears, it followsthat the two are incompatible, [or efficiently opposed], just as are the sensa-tions of heat and cold. 24

The second type of opposition is explained as follows: There is also[opposition between two terms] when their own essence consists in mutualexclusion, as between the [terms] eternal and non-eternal. 25 Some otherinstances of the second opposition include such pairs as: reality and unreality,existence and non-existence, affirmation and negation, blue and non-blue.2In the first opposition (incompatibility) two facts exist independently withoutopposing each other. Their opposition becomes efficient only when they areplaced together in one time-space relation. On the other hand, in the secondopposition (contradiction) the two opposed facts are so related that neitherof the two can be defined or apprehended without excluding the other. Thevery essence (laksana) of the one consists in exclusion of the other; forexample, blue and non-blue. The first opposition seems to mean negation ofterms or entities, as can be seen in the eightfold formula of negative inferenceexplained by Dharmakirti.27 The second opposition, contradiction, appearsto be designated to refer to the negation of propositions. For the very essenceof non-blue presupposes the proposition this is blue, and vice-versa. Thispropositional opposition, however, poses many logical difficulties which are

22Dharmakirti,vavrtti,pp. 35-37.23In translating virodha y opposition e have followedStcherbatsky'sxpo-sitionof the lawof contradiction.ee Stcherbatsky,p. cit.,p. 187,n. 3.24Dharmakirti,vavrtti,p. 35; cf. also Stcherbatsky,p. cit.,p. 187.25Stcherbatsky'sbservationhereon s noteworthy. It is clearthat in thesewordswe have a definition f the Lawof Contradiction,o muchdiscussedn EuropeanLogicfromAristotle hroughLeibniz,KantandSigwartupto the modernogicians. t is there-fore of the highest mportanceo realizethe exactmeaning f the Indianview. It willbe noticed, irstof all, thatthere s no difference etween contradictionf concepts nda contradictionetween udgments,he termsbhava= vidhi = vastu,Tib. yod-pasgrub-pa= dnos-pabeing synonymous.... The term 'blue' n logic alwaysmeansthejudgmentthis is blue', t is a synthesisof 'thisness' nd 'thatness',t is contrastedwiththe mere reflexof the blue (pratibhasa), n unascertainedeflexwhichhas no place n

logic. Thus, n the quarrelbetweenAristotleandSigwarton the one side,and Kant onthe other, he Indianview will fall in line ratherwiththe firstparty.The contradictionis virtuallybetween he judgmentsthisis blue'and 'thisis notblue' (op. cit.,p. 193).26 Dharmakirti,op. cit., pp. 36-37.27Cf.Karnakagomin,p.cit.,p.86.

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DHIRENDRA SHARMAdiscussed by the Buddhist philosophers under the theory of determination(apoha) = exclusion = differentiation.28

TABLE OF OPPOSITION (Virodha)

Incompatibilityor efficientopposition Contradiction or logical opposition= negation of terms or entities (sa- = negation of propositions(anyonyo-habhava-virodha),or example, he op- palabdhi-parihara-sthiti-laksana-viro-position of the sensationsof heat and dha), for example, the oppositionofcold (sTtosnasparsavat). blue and non-blue,existence and non-existence (nianinla,bhdvabbhva), ffir-mation and negation (vidhinisedha).

Furthermore, from a purely logical point of view the Buddhists maintainthat every term or proposition is the negation of its own negation (anyapoha).Even an affirmative proposition entails the exclusion of its contradictoryproposition. Dignaga explains that a term, for instance, the blue-lotus, notonly excludes all lotuses that are not blue but also excludes those blue thingswhich are not lotuses.29Thus, it signifies the exclusion of the non-blue andthe non-lotus.30

Thus, what is intended by the theory of apoha is neither merely a positivecognition qualified by the exclusion of others.31For instance, the terms affir-mation and negation, existence and non-existence, or A and non-A are mu-tually exclusive. The relation between the qualifier and the qualificandis notultimate (paramarthika) but only dialectical (vyavaharika).32 Here we mayconclude that the theory of apoha is not a negative approach to reality buta dialectical approachbased on the law of opposition.

VIIBuddhist logicians, in apoha, maintained that every term and proposition is

discriminatory.This means that the affirmativeand the negative are mutuallyexclusive and so related to each other that the definition of one involves theother. Dharmakirti said: There can be no affirmationof a thing (A) which

28Cf.Stcherbatsky,p. cit.,p. 195,n.2.29Prameya-kamalamdrtandaf Prabhachandra,ed. with notes and introductionbyMahendraKumar Shastri (2nd ed.; Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1941), p. 436; seealso Karnakagomin,op. cit., p. 182 and pp. 260-261.30Raja, The Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians, p. 8.31Ratnakirti,p.cit.,p. 3 (6-8).32Ibid.,p. 16 (1-15); alsoKarnakagomin,p.cit.,p. 121.

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BUDDHIST APOHA AND NEGATIVE STATEMENTSdoes not exclude the other (non-A); nor can there be a negation of thatwhich cannot be affirmed. 33Hence, whereas affirmation implies negation,negation presupposes the affirmation.34Now the question arises: if the Buddhists are correct in asserting that themeanings of all words are both affirmative and negative at the same time, thendifferent propositional forms would be meaningless. Propositions are acceptedas of two kinds: (1) positive (vidhi), and (2) negative (nisedha or prati-sedha). In Indian logic, the negative form is again divided into two: (a) asimple negative (prasajya-pratisedha), and (b) negative by implication(paryyuddsa) .36

THE TABLEOFTHE FORMSOF PROPOSITIONSNegative (pratisedha)

Positive (vidhi), e.g., Negative (prasajya), Negative by implicationthis is blue (nilo e.g., the jar is not (paryyudisa), e.g., p'yam). here (iha ghato nasti). implies not q . If it issnowis not black . gray, it is not white. IfX is a ksatriya,he isnot a brahmana.(abrahmana).

The answer to this is that the Buddhists were concerned with the practicalimportance of the propositions. Karnakagomin36explains: A sentence ex-pressing an affirmative [judgment] asserts a positive [meaning] primarily[and] negation of the other [non-A] by implication (arthat). (2) And [asentence] expressing a negative [judgment] asserts a negation primarily [and]affirmation of the other [i.e., the positive non-A = B] by implication. (3)While the sentence expressing 'negation by implication' (paryyudasa), follow-ing denial primarily asserts the presence of the other fact. Thus, indeed, is thedistinction [between the three forms of statements]. 37

33Svavrtti,p. 253:na hy anvayovydvrttimatodpyananvayinoydvrttih.34 Not belongs to the class of propositionalwords. Cf. B. Russell, An Inquiryinto Meaning and Truth (London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin Ltd., [5th impression] 1956),pp. 70 ff. Strictly speaking, negation is always negation of a proposition.See D. Sharma,The Paradoxof NegativeJudgment nd IndianLogic, VishveshvaranandndologicalJournal,Vol. II, Part 1 (March,1964).35These negative kinds of statementsin Indian Logic were originally introducedbythe Mimamisakas,who were primarilyconcernedwith the problemsof the correct appli-cation of the Vedic texts in the sacrificialceremonies.Cf. Jamini Sutra, X. 8. 1. 15. Fora very lucid expositionsee J. F. Staal, Negationand the Law of Contradictionn IndianThought:a Comparativetudy, The Bulletinof the Schoolof OrientalandAfricanStudies [University of London],Vol. XXV, Part 1 (1962), 59.36 Op.cit.,p.253.37The Mimramsakawriters were the first to use the terms prasajya and paryyudasain connection with their religious and ritual interpretationsof the Vedic negative state-

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DHIRENDRA SHARMAAccording to this explanation: (1) The proposition, for instance, snowis white, is affirmative in which the negation of the other, snow is black,is implied. (2) The proposition, for instance, snow is not black, is negativein which the other affirmative, snow is white, is implied. (3) There is

negation in the proposition Mt. Everest is the highest mountain in the world.Here we primarilyassert that Mt. Everest is the highest mountain in the worldbut we do so by denying the suggestion that there is any other mountain ashigh as Mt. Everest.

However, it should be noted that the Buddhist theory of negative inference(anupalabdhi),3s corresponds to the simple negation (prasajya), and entailsthe paryyuddsa negation. On the other hand, the theory of apoha correspondsprimarily to negation by implication and involves simple negation. Accordingto Ratnakirti, negation by implication (paryyudcsa) is found rooted (niyata)in the immediate knowledge of the thing and thus is commonly applied toboth affirmative and (simple) negative propositions.39 This means that,logically speaking, there can be neither a pure affirmationnor a pure negation.This is the reason why one does not go and tie a horse or a dog when askedto tie a cow.40Apoha is the basis of discriminatory behavior in everyday life,and differentiation is the prime factor of all reflective thinking. Thus, theBuddhist would conclude that it is differentiation that is manifested by wordsand reason, and apprehendedthrough language and logic.41ments.For instance,the statement: Onemust not kill a Bramana (Dvijam na hanyat)-cf. Thoushalt not kill -defiance of which leads to sin and calamity,is to be consideredas a pure negation (prasajya). Whereas if the Vedic text reads that a particularritualshouldbe performed n a particularceremony, t implies that the ritual may or may notbe performed n some other ceremony,but must be performed n that particular nstance.Cf. Mimahms-Nyaya-Prakasaof Apadeva, A. M. RamanathaDikshita, ed. (Banares:Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1949), pp. 156 ff. However, accordingto grammarians, he stressis on the constructionof the sentence: prasajyais where the negationis essential and thepositiveelementsecondary, hat is, where negationappliesto the verb (but not to the lastmemberof the negativecompound).Where the positive element is essential and the nega-tion secondaryis paryyuddsa. t is to be understoodthat this negationappliesonly to thelast member of the negative compound.Cf. a grammaticalwork called Sarasvata, NavaKishoraKara Sarma,ed. (1936), verse 490; quotedby Louis Renou,TerminologieGram-maticale du Sanskrit. 3 pts. Bibliothequede l'gcole des Hautes :Etudes . . Scienceshistoriqueset philologiques,280-282fasc. (Paris: A. Champion,1957). I owe this refer-ence to Dr. D. Friedmanof the University of Londonand am indebtedto him for manycritical suggestions.38Cf. D. Sharma, EpistemologicalNegative Dialectics of Indian Logic, Abhavaversus Anupalabdhi, ndo-IranianJournal,Vol. IX, No. 4 (1966), 291-300.39 Ratnakirti,op. cit., p. 4 (6-7).40 Ibid.41 Jfinaarimitra, op. cit., p. 201: apohahs'abdainigabhyaih rakasyate.

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buddhist theory of meaning (apoha) and negative statements

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