Religion i 1991) 21, 115-139

DILEMlWUOFlWODERMslWIWUIiA BUDDlfIST MONKS IN RELATION TO ETHNIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

Sarath Amunugama

The ethnic and political conflict in Sri Lanka have created ethical dilemmas for Sinhala monks. They have had to react to a Tamil separatist war. an Indian threat to the country’s sovereignty and the extensive use of violence by Sinhala rebel groups and the state. Contrary to common belief Sinhala monks do not act as a monolithic body, particularly on political issues. This essay describes the different organizations within the Sangha, and the Buddhist laity. and their coalition building in order to present an effective response to the above mentioned issues. It also analyses concepts brought into pla!-, particularly by radical young monks, to resolve these dilemmas in terms of Sinhala Buddhist ideology.

On 29 July 1987, India and Sri Lanka entered into an agreement, commonly- referred to as the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, aimed at ending Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka. By this agreement the Sri Lankan authorities agreed to effect changes in the country’s constitution and devolve substantial power from the centre to the provinces. Eight Provincial Councils were to be established, one of which-the council of the amalgamated North and Eastern provinces- would be Tamil dominated. This would, in effect. grant a degree of autonomy- to the Tamils in what they claimed were their ‘traditional homelands’.

The signing of the Accord, with little advance notice or discussion, sparked off mass opposition in Sinhala-dominated parts of the country. These demon- strations were organized by the hlacbima Surakeeme VQaparqa (MSY) or ‘The Movement for Safeguarding the Motherland’. Founded in July 1986 the MSV had grown rapidly as a powerful ‘umbrella organization’ ofmonks, non- Marxist political parties of the opposition (SLFP, MEP and J6’P through its front organizations) and important lay Buddhist associations.

The mass opposition to the Accord, which caught the Government by surprise, led to the rapid deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in the North and East, releasing Sinhala troops for active duty in the South. A few days later the JVP, which had up to now kept a low profile in the MS\:, took over the anti-Accord struggle. From then on, till the killing of its top leadership in late 1989, the JVP became the main adversary of the govern- ment and the severest critic of the Accord, though they did receive varying

116 S. Amunugama

degrees of support from their erstwhile partners in the MSV. Many of. the Sangha and lay Buddhist associations which constituted the MSV were sympathetic to the JVP’s implacable opposition to President Jayawardene and his policies. A journal of one such group of radical monks. which claimed to be ‘the only journal published by Sri Lankan Bhikkus’ reports:

\Vhen the correct history of this country is lvritten. the 29 July 1989 \vill undoubtedly be recorded as a day of special significance. Two aspects of this day will be recognized. On one hand it will denote the betrayal of a land and a people after gagging and chaining them: thereby making them a sla1.e nation.

On the other hand 29 July 1987 will be seen as the day on which the patriotic people, rejecting slavery under a foreign imperialist po\\‘er and reftlsing to fall on their feet even with the threat of death, decided to fight the invading foreign power as well as the treacherous. cowardly and power-hungry ruling rrgimr of this country.

That spontaneous uprising of patriotic citizens-who came onto the streets of their towns and villages-has now, two Tears later. become an organized, broad- based national liberation struggle, drawing towards it all patriotic elements.’

In this paper I shall explore the reaction of radical Sinhala Buddhist monks, particularly those groups within the ,X31’, to ethnic and political issues related to the Accord. How did it affect their perceptions of the role of the Sangha in relation to national problems7 \Vhat were the consequences of their deep involvement in political activity including, in the case of some monks, armed revolt3 What were the elements of Buddhist ideology and symbolism which were highlighted in this encounter? In sum, how did the) ‘manage’ the contradiction between Buddhuputra (sons of the Buddha) and Bhumiputra (sons of the soil)?

MA VBIMA SUR4KEEME VIYAP.4R4 I:4 The Tamil struggle for a separate state-Eelam, was predicated on the claim that the Northern and Eastern provinces were their ‘traditional homelands’. While the numerical preponderance of Tamils in these two provinces was a demographic reality, the concept ofa historical Tamil ‘homeland’ was bitterly contested by the Sinhalese. The Jayawardene regime itself, up to the time of the Accord, treated it as a non-negotiable issue. Previous negotiations on the ethnic problem (the Jayawardene-Parathasarathy talks as wt=ll as Thimpu and Bangalore negotiations) had floundered principally on this issue.

The MSV also treated this question as the centrepiece of its policy. It insisted that it was a non-negotiable issue, in its very first policy statement:

Sri Lanka is the mother country of us all-Sinhalese, Tam&, Muslims, etc. We have lived together for over a thousand years on that basis. It should be so in the future as well. Today we face a secret national and international conspiracy

Buddhaputra or Bhumiputra 117

to divide the motherland. By implementing the proposal to divide power on the basis of race, and cutting the country into two out of ‘nationalist sectarianism’ the whole country will be destroyed. Let us defeat murderous Eelamism and national and international conspiracies to divide the country. Our great hope is that all races will live in friendship, peace. and amity. :\fter all, wealth is distributed on this basis in our country.

Though President Jayawardene was finally compelled to treat the ‘strong centre vs. traditional homelands’ issue as basically a political and demo- graphic problem for purposes of obtaining a settlement, it was one which went to the heart of Sinhala-Buddhist consciousness. The ferocity of Sinhala- Buddhist opposition to the Accord can be understood only by examining the depth of this concern. According to Sinhala-Buddhist tradition, fashioned largely by Vamsa literature, Sri Lanka is the Dharmadvipa (the island of faith), consecrated by the Buddha himself as the land in which his teachings would flourish. The Mahavamsa states that on the very day of the Buddha’s death, \<,jaya-the founder of the Sinhala race-landed in Sri Lanka, as if’ to bear witness to the Buddha’s prediction. ’ Furthermore, it was believed that the Buddha had visited the island thrice. One of those visits was to Nagadipa in the northernmost part of the Jaffna peninsula. (Ironically, to establish concord between two quarrelling kinsmen.)” The north was thereby firmly established within the sacred geography of Buddhists. Till the beginn- ing of the ethnic war Nagadipa was an important pilgrimage centre for Sinhala Buddhists on a par with Mahiyangana and Kelaniya.

Centres of Buddhist pilgrimage provided dramatic evidence of Buddhist claims to the North and East. Some of these sites continued to be centres of Buddhist worship. Others, such as the legendary Gokanna Temple in Trin- comalee, had been transformed into centres of Hindu religiosity. Most were in ruins. But they were identified and perpetuated in Buddhist consciousness through the repertory’ of Vandana gatha (worship stanzas) known to most Buddhists.

These feelings of religious inclusion were strengthened by a twentieth century phenomenon. Buddhist and Hindu lay organizations (sabhas) began to reclaim historic sites and rebuild religious edifices. For the Buddhists, the classic example was Anagarika Dharmapala’s attempt to reclaim and restore sacred Buddhist sites in India, particularly the Temple at Buddha Gaya. Following him, Valisinghe Harischandra campaigned to ‘save’ the eight sacred sites or Atamasthana in Anuradhapura.4 Modern Buddhists, concen- trated in the South and Southwest of Sri Lanka, discovered that most of their sacred sites were located in the North Central, Northern and Eastern parts of the country. In the pre-independence period Buddhists restored ancient sites at their own expense (for example the restoration of Ruvanveli

118 S. Amumqama

Seya). With independence, and particularly after 1956, these reconstructions were undertaken either directly by government or by. senior government officials, particularly Government Agents, who could mobilize the resources of the state on an informal basis as well as draw contributions from local entrepreneurs. (Among such officials were Nissanka \Vijeratne who cstab- lished the ‘sacred city’ in Anuradhapura, Ridgeway Tillckcratne \vho repaired the Somawathie Chaitya in Polonnaruwa and Somapala Gunadhccra who re- stored temples in Trincomalee District). Thus to most Buddhists the North and East constituted a part of their patrimony, a land from which they had been driven off by the Tamils, as graphically described in the Vamsa literature.

President Jayawardene had a reputation as a hardliner on the ethnic issue. A student of archaeology, passionately involved in Buddhist historical research, and a former office bearer of the Anagarika Dharmapala Trust, he was very sympathetic to the Buddhist view. But he was fast running out of options. As a clever politician, he had come to the realization that the ethnic impasse could not be overcome without a concession on the ‘home- lands’ issue.

The MSV was formed at this junction with a variety of manifest and latent objectives. Buddhist leaders feared that there would be a ‘sell out’ 1~1, way of a negotiated settlement, which gave recognition to the Tamil ‘homeland’ concept. They had by now, come to dislike and distrust Jayawardenc. In particular they felt that he was not hard enough in prosecuting the war against Tamil separatists. In their estimation he was not a person who would ultimately give way to the Buddhist leaders. The MS\. was also aware that Marxist parties and their allies-the LSSP. CP, NLSSP, and SLMP. would support the President in reducing the power of the centre and devolving powers to Provincial councils. At the all-party conference convened by the President in 1986, devolution of power had been discussed and endorsed by the Left. Buddhist leaders felt that the need of the hour was a coalition which would be powerful enough to influence political events. Up to now they had acted independently. with little effect on government policy. The MSV was therefore primarily designed to be ‘the voice’ of the unified Buddhists. It was to be a pressure group which no power in the country could ignore. To the non-Marxist opposition (SLFP and MEP) pursuing its own agenda, the SMV provided an opportunity of building a broad coalition against the UNP. The new electoral system, for both the Presidencv and Parliament, did not favour a single party approach. The SLFP which had emerged as the only credible alternative to the UNP, realized that it had to reach out to voters beyond its party vote bank. Traditionally ‘nationalistic’, it saw great electoral possibilities in this new configuration.

In many ways the strongest backers of the MSV were a group of Sinhala- Buddhist politicians and professionals who could not be accommodated in

Buddhaputra or Bhumiputra 119

the old hierarchy bound parties of both the Right and Left. They could see in this new coalition a leadership role for themselves based on possession of modern skills (e.g. Dinesh Gunawardene, Gamini Iriyagolla, Nath Amara- kone, Gamini Wijesekera and Rupa Saparamadu). For instance, though Dinesh Gunawardene is a charismatic politician, the new electoral system appeared to portend the demise of his small party. The SM\’ appeared to him to be a good platform to gather a wider constituency, leading later perhaps to an electoral arrangement with the SLFP.

What were the constituent elements of the MS\’ and how was it organized? We could classify those constituting the SMV under three heads: Political organizations, Sangha associations and Buddhist lay associations.5

Political organizations

1. Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)

2. Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP)

3. Sinhala Bala Mandalaya (SBM)

4. Sinhala Janata Peramuna

5. Sri Lanka Deshapremi Peramuna

Sangha associations 1. Deshapremi Taruna Bhikshu Sanvidanaya

2. Manava Hitavadi Bhikshu Sanvidanaya

3. Samastha Lanka Pragatisili Bhikshu Peramuna

Lay-Buddhist associations

1. Loka Srima Maha Sammelanaya

2. Sri Lanka Eksat Bauddha Maha Sammelanaya

3. Sinhala Sanvardana Sanvidanaya

4. Eksat Tri Sinhala \‘imukti Sanvidanaya

5. Dudley Senanayake Gunanusmarana Sangamaya

Represented 41 Sirimavo Bandaranaike Lakshman Jayakody

Dinesh Gunawardene

Nath Amerakone

(JVP oriented)

(JVP oriented)

u\‘P oriented)

(MEP oriented)

(SLFP oriented)

Businessmen’s organization (Senanayake UNP oriented)

(Senanayake UNP oriented)

120 S. Amumqama

6. Sinhala Taruna Peramuna i SLFP oriented)

7. Sinhala Janata 1’atu Kamkaru Sangamaya

8. Bauddha Saba Sammelanaya

9. Kelanipura Bauddha Bala Mandalaya

10. Anagarika Dharmapala Taruna Samitiya

11. Sri Lanka Bauddha Samiti Niyojita Sammelenaya

12. Buddhist Theosophical Society (Gamini Iriyagolla)

13. Sinhala Kantha Peramuna (Mrs Indrani Iriyagolla)

Though the MSV proposed an elaborate organization on paper, reflecting perhaps the preponderance of Sinhala Buddhist professionals who acted as ‘back room boys’-lawyers, civil servants, engineers and businessmen. in practice each of the constituent parts continued to maintain their identity though, they did coordinate information and publicity,. \Vith well attended meetings, press statements. articles, pamphlets and links with mainstream Sinhala newspapers, they were able to present themselves as the voice of Buddhist opinion. They were also successful in getting the endorsement of Sangha chiefs (M~ahanq~~kes). Palipane Chandananda Mahanayake of Asgiriya chapter emerged as the strongest clerical supporter of the MSV. His pre-eminent role in the movement was recognized by the International media which dubbed him, ‘Sri Lanka’s Buddhist Khomeini’.

The stated ob.jectivcs of the MS\’ were an encapsulation of the demands of organized Sinhala groups on the ethnic issue.’ The li‘nividu magazine lists 29 points as a draft of a common programme amplifying the following core ob,jectives:

Prevention of Sri Lanka becoming a colony of the Indian Empire: the estab- lishment of national unity in the basis of independence, territorial integrit!-, sovereignt)- of the people, democracy. freedom and basic human rights.

Let us analyse how these ‘code words’ create dilemmas for the Sinhala monks and examine the ways in which they seek to resolve them within the realm of Buddhist ideology and symbolism.

THE ROLE OF ILYDIA The traditional view is that Sinhala-Buddhist ideology is deeply permeated with anti-Indian feeling. We need however to examine countervailing beliefs within the same ideology. India is the land of the Buddha. President Jaya-

wardene’s oft stated pronouncement, ‘I am a lover of India and a follower of her greatest son’ represents an important strand ofsinhala-Buddhist thinking. India is A~yavarta, the land of the Aryans with whom the Sinhalese claimed kinship, thereby excluding ‘the other’-Dravidian Tamils. Even more signifi- cantly, it was from India that the gift of Buddha Bhanna-the most precious of gifts, was brought by the Thera Mahinda. In modern times Xnagarika Dharmapala devoted the best years of his life to rekindling the flame in India. restoring sacred sites and making a pilgrimage to Buddha Gaya--‘the Buddhist Jerusalem’-the touchstone of a Sinhala Buddhist commitment.

Dharmapala also set in motion a significant political trend by inducting young Sinhala Bhikkus for missionary activity in India. Several such monks, who were trained in Bengal, were fascinated by revolutionary politics in the province and the struggle for Indian independence. L’idyalankara Pirivena. a major centre of Buddhist learning, established strong links with India.

The Centenary Commemoration \‘olume of Vidyalankara Pirivena refers to these links, which were strengthened during the time of its third principal Lunupokune Dharmananda.

It is impossible to describe his contribution to Buddhist missionary activit). in India. The world will recognize its value onI)- in the future. ;Z large number of‘ Indian intellectuals came to him to stud) Buddhism. blan)- of them were so convinced by the doctrine that thrv entcrcd the monkhood. Today they art engaged in Buddhist missionary activity in India. Though Buddhist missionq activity in India has a long history there was no interest in translating Dharma texts into local languages. till his students entered this field Today the better part of the Tripitaka has been ti-anslated into Hindu. :Zll this was done by his students.

With the establishment of a department of Pali studies in the university of Calcutta, again thanks to Anagarika Dharmapala, several Sinhala scholar monks came to India to teach (Rambukwelle Siddharta, Walpola Rahula). Some others came to study Sanskrit. The). were associated with the Vidya- lankara Pirivena and were the driving force behind the pathbreaking \‘idya- lankara declaration of 1946, which justified the active social intervention of the Bhikku. (Among these monks were U’alpola Rahula, Naravila Dham- maratane, Kotahene Pannakitti, and Bambarandc Siri Sivali.) This decla- ration is taken as a charter by radical monks today.’

Thus to ‘progressive’ monks, India was essentially a friendly country counterbalancing the alleged ‘pro-western’ bias of UNP regimes. For these monks the India of Subhas Chandra Bose and Nehru, with its socialist objectives and traditional cultural symbols, was an attractive model. The) first supported the dominant socialist party of the Forties, the LSSP. Later they threw their support to S.\$‘.R.D. Bandaranaike, vvhose SLFP claimed a close affinity with thr policies of the Indian Congress.

122 S. rlmunugama

With the escalation of ethnic conflict however Sinhala opinion-en- couraged by both government and private media-took a distinctly anti- Indian turn. Each of the Indian moves in this area were perceived as anti- Sinhalese. Let us examine the chronology of events. The growing estrange- ment between the two communities was intensified by the anti-Tamil riots of July/August 1983.* The immediate provocation for this communal violence was the death of 18 Sinhalese soldiers, blown up by a land mine in Jaffna. These claymore mines and other sophisticated weapons were supplied by India as a way of escalating the civil war. The 1983 riots led to a new phase of Indian intervention in Sri Lankan affairs. An estimated 130 000 Tarnils fled to India, particularly to Tamil Nadu.” This strengthened India’s hand as a ‘broker’ in the ethnic confrontation. From 1983 India engaged in a series of acts which showed up the inability of the Sinhalese to control events. Tamil guerilla groups were trained and equipped by India. Tamil leaders were received in India and accorded ‘state guest’ status in New Delhi, human rights issues were raised in International fora, the Sri Lankan military offensives were halted, food parcels were dropped from Indian planes to counter an economic blockade of the north, Sri Lankan air space was violated and a threat of military invasion was made public. This intcr- vention culminated in the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of 1987 and the arrival of Indian troops.

The majority of Sinhalese looked on these Indian activities as an infringe- ment of the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Within the UNP itself, a group led by the Prime Minister R. Premadasa accused India of meddling in local affairs and denounced the Accord.

Let us now examine how the monks associated with the MSV looked at this dilemma from a religious perspective, as distinct from the political perspective, which they generally shared with the Sinhalese.

For Sinhala monks the Thera Mahinda, believed by them to be the son of Emperor Asoka and historically the founder of the sasana in Sri Lanka, is second in significance only to the Buddha himself. He is called anubudhu

(like the Buddha) and monks claim ecclesiastical descent from him. How is Mahinda Thera represented in this time of trouble? The Founding Father from India is contrasted strongly with Rajiv Gandhi, son of the ‘Empress of India’-Indira Gandhi.

The Vinividu, celebrating Poson, the festival marking Mahinda’s arrival, makes a direct comparison. It highlights Mahinda’s words to Devanam- piyatissa, the Sinhala King:

0 great King, equal are the followers of Dharmaraja. It is with loving sentiment that I come from Jambudvipa.

The Vinivida states,

Buddhaputra or Bhumiputra 123

These friendly words of that great son of India the Arahat Mahinda still ring in our ears. It is a statement of peaceful coexistence. In the past sons of India treated this beautiful island with respect and affection. This was because WC had within our country the strength to safeguard that noble religion which saw birth in India. Political and religious emissaries of that time had no desire to subjugate us. They made us the heirs to their [religious] inheritance for the benefit of mankind. This sacred trust has been honoured [by us] for over two thousand five hundred years. During this long period India has remained India. Sri Lanka remained Sri Lanka,

Mahinda’s compassion is contrasted with the actions of Rajiv Gandhi

Though we inhabit a small island, due thr possession of the Dharma we are treated with respect by the world. Another highborn son of India has sullied this [age old] relationship by acting foolishly; by breaking all ethics of inter- national behaviour by dropping dirt on this country by force.“’

This same contrast is manifest in a feature in the magazine entitled Letters to Thera Mahinda wherein the problems caused by Indian interven- tion and even the faults of Senior monks who do not openly protest against such injustice, are ‘reported’ to the founding father.” Maduluwawe Sobhita a leading ideologue of the MSV, on the other hand emphasizes the ‘Sinhala- ness’ of the Sangha by turning the spotlight on the Bhikku Maha Aritta- the first Sinhala monk. We see how skilfully he makes Maha Aritta impor- tant for the present time.

The Sri Lankan Bhikshu Sasana began when Arahat Mahinda arrived in the island and ordained, as a Bhikku. the Sinhala youth Maha ;iritta. In the thousands of years since this [event] the Bhikshu Sasana has been the indeprn- dent. driving force of our nation.”

U’hat is noteworthy in this debate is the effort of the Sangha to separate the issue of the Indian origins of Buddhism from the ongoing political crisis with India. What is at issue here is the legitimacy of the Sinhala Sangha itself. Any doubt cast on the value of ecclesiastical succession originating with Mahinda would strike at the very roots of the Sangha organization. The history of each of the three main sects (,Vikqas) of the Sangha begins with the validation of this succession. When the Mahavihara succession died out in the country. Sinhalese Kings facilitated its resumption by getting down monks from Siam with legitimate succession to give higher ordination to locals. The later sects sought this legitimacy in Burma. The Amarapura went to Ava while the Ramanna were first given higher ordination at Pegu in 1861.

The Tapasa Nikga which created a furore in the late 1950s did not believe in such ecclesiastical succession. l3 Its leader Tapasa Himi claimed the right to ordain monks even though he himself had not received ‘Legitimate’

ordination. Nor had he received higher ordination. This was one of the main arguments used by other sects against the ru@zsa monks. The ethnic war was a crucial period for the Sangha. They were not only leading Sinhala opinion, they were also reacting to strong lay sentiment. Any dissonance could call into question their closely guarded claims to traditional charisma. Due to the Sinhala monks identifying themselves strongly with Sinhala anti-Indian and anti-Tamil political sentiment they pre-empted any move to question the grounds of their legitimacy. The need to ‘indigenizr’ the Sangha did not arise.

THE MOh’K AS A POLITICAL ACTIVIST The changing role of the monk is an ever present phenomenon in Buddhist society. Though Max Weber, emphasizing the canonical view, defined the Sangha as a ‘community of renouncers’ they have played an important social role from the very inception. While the salvation seeker (in contem- porary terms the meditative forest monk) is held in high esteem as a role model, Buddhist societies have always accommodated village monks (grama- vasi) who have provided religious and social services to the laity. The laity in turn provided sustenance (alms) to these monks in exchange for ‘merit’ (&yu). The village monks had to be larger in number as the ‘merit’ needs of the laity could not be accommodated by ‘meditation’ monks, whose ob,jectives in any- case did not mesh with the needs of the laity.

Thus in Buddhist societies we see two distinct, though interacting, cultures. One is the canonical culture with the Abhidhamma as its apex. The other is the culture of Bahujana Hitqxz-the Sangha’s intervention in society which is clear from the Vamsa K&ha and related Buddhist literature.

A key stage in the Sinhala Sangha’s social interventionist culture was reached with the Vidyalankara Declaration of 1946 referred to earlier. This declaration clearly and directly recognized the changed status of the monk:

Today economic, social, and political conditions are difrerent from the time of the Buddha. So, we must accept that the life of Bhikkus today is different from that of Bhikkus of the Buddha’s time.

Then the monks’ objective, by and large, was to achieve Nirvana in that birth. Later monks, postponing ?Jirvana for a later time, involved themselves in both self and social realization.14

The monk who postpones his own salvation, it is argued, has found time for social amelioration. Since the 1940s this has meant either pre-occupation with social work (e.g. rural development sponsored by Heenatiyana Dhamma- loka: Sarvodaya monks) or politics.

The Vidyalankara declaration rationalized the Bhikkus involvement in the left politics of that time, despite the strong opposition of the Buddhist

Buddhaputra or Bhumiputra 125

establishment. However, it was only with the founding of the SLFP by S. W. R. D Bandaranaike that the radical monks found a party which was close to their concept of politics. They threw themselves into the 1956 election campaign and were largely responsible for creating the SLFP’s identity as a ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ party. (This was not Bandaranaike’s original conception as the first SLFP manifesto and list of office bearers will show.) The election of 1956 was introduced in Buddhist terms by monks who were the chief speakers on SLFP platforms, as a ‘Mara Yuddha’, a fight against evil.

With their success at the election, the immediate post-1956 period marks the zenith of Bhikkhu influence in the country. The new Prime Minister Bandaranaike made changes in his cabinet to satisfy the monks. Newl) designated ministers started out from Kelaniya temple for their oath taking. A new department of cultural affairs was set up to look after the interests of the monks. Bandaranaike made Sinhala the sole national language with their approval. An agreement reached between Bandaranaike and Chel- vanayagam, the Tamil leader, for the resolution of the ethnic problem was ‘torn up’ unilaterally in deference to the wishes of the monks. The recom- mendation of a leading monk that all vehicles should carry a Sinhala symbol, a direct affront to the Tamils, was implemented. Vidyalankara and I’idyo- daya Pirvena were given university status.

The undoubted success of the monks in 1956 led to the institutionalizing of their political role. Every Sri Lankan party with a Sinhala base used monks in their election campaigns. They also set up ‘front’ organizations of monks sympathetic to their party position. The UNP, emulating the SLFP. proclaimed that they would create a ‘Dharmista’ (Righteous) society, a phrase resonant with Buddhist hopes. Bhikku organizations were established by the UNP in every Sinhala electorate, thereby neutralizing the SLFP‘s advantage.

Though the UNP, after winning the 1977 elections, continued to court the monks, particularly the seniors in the sangha hierarchy, they could not make the same ‘connection’ that the SLFP established with their monks. Buddhist monks were never comfortable with J. R. Jayawardene who had his own vision of Buddhism drawn from a textual interpretation of the canon. He emphasized canonical concepts and downgraded the ritual and social role of monks. His was an intellectual Buddhism derived from the writings of western scholars like Rhys Davids and Edwin Arnold, as will be discerned in his Buddhist essays (later published as Golden Threads (Colombo, 1986)).

What was more significant for the monks however were the consequences of the UNP’s ‘free market’ economy. Though the state sector continued to be the dominant component of the economy, the UNP managed to liberalize the manufacturing and trade sectors leading to an influx of foreign goods

126 S. Amunugama

and the creation of wealth and employment. This also meant, however, an increase in inequality in the distribution of income. Traditional positions were downgraded while the ‘mudalali’ (trader) ethos was on the aacendcnt. It also meant that monks, intellectuals, artists. etc. who as custodians of traditional culture depended on state patronage, would be challenged b!. creators of new, more market oriented cultural products. Consumerism was a challenge to the ‘modest life style’ (alpecca) that Buddhism prescribed.

New commercial banks, hotels for tourists, newspaper advertisements and T\ commercials depict a new economic orientation. The Consumerism that has been established goes beyond meeting day to da!. needs and tries to enslave the mind Due to this strategy the cities will prosper \\.hilc \rillages sufler. This new mentality being entrenched in our society is foreign to us. Short cuts, profit motive, entrepreneurship, selfishness. cunning and instant gratification are its characteristics.”

Many of the monks who were later to form the MS\. attempted to protest against this growing consumerism. The government broke up man)- of these meetings.

With the spread of ethnic violence, monks were drawn more forcefully into the arena of political agitation. From the beginning they were reckoned by government as actors in the drama. Parathasarathy, foreign policy advisor to Indira Gandhi, was requested to discuss his proposals for ethnic peace with senior monks. ‘They are my Parathasarathy’s’ said Jayawardene, thereby legitimizing the monks’ role as advisors on the ethnic issue. Monks were in the forefront ofdemonstrations against Indian intervention, often in collusion with government authorities.

However, once they perceived the Jayawardene government as ‘unreliable’, they began to follow a more independent course, particularly h?- establishing the MSV. While both the UNP and SLFP were prepared to use the monks. it was the JVP-the Sinhala based revolutionary party that raised their social role to a new intensity. In the case ofJ\‘P there was no ambiguity re- garding the monks’ role. Unlike senior monks who still recognized the need for both self-realization and the discharging of social responsibilities, ,J\‘P monks place a premium on their political role. The J\.P sangha organization was the first grouping of monks to participate in a Ma)- day parade. About a thousand young monks clad in their distinctive saffron red robes walked under the banner of the Socialist Bhikku Front. Recognizing their special role monks were positioned in the parade immediately behind the.J\‘P top leadership. Later monks participated en max$e in all J\-P sponsored demonstrations.

After the signing of the Accord and the launching of the J\‘P insurrection the slogan ‘Motherland above all’ became the battle cry. University students

Buddhaputra or Bhumiputra 127

adopted ‘Motherland first, degree second’ as their battle cry and began to boycott classes. Secondary school children amended the slogan to ‘Mother- land first, school second’. Wh’l 1 e young monks presented their version: ‘Motherland first, Pirivena’ second’.

The 1980s then see the rapid politicization of the Sinhala sangha. What started as a trickle in the 1940s had now become a flood. All Sinhala-based political parties have established support organizations among the sangha. They compete for monks’ favours by offering material benefits-official resi- dences. Mercedes Benz cars, trips abroad, state appointments and construc- tion of temples. Pirivenas and universities became recruitment centres of’ monks for different political parties. The ethnic conflict provided an oppor- tunity for the monks to openly engage in social and political activity since it was presented as a problem of national concern. Any doubts regarding their proper role had to be suppressed in a time ofcrisis. This approach was taken to its logical extreme, as we shall see later in this essay, by the J1.P which began to view the monk as another foot soldier in the revolutionary struggle.

MONKS AGAINST ‘Cd.4 THOLIC rl CTIOh” Another source of insecurity for the modern monk is the growth of rival religions. The SLFP is usually identified as a defender of Buddhism against the intrusions of other religions. It checked ‘Catholic action’ in the 1950s. took over denominational schools, evicted catholic nursing nuns, provided Buddhist preachers more time over national radio and secured employment in the higher echelons of the administration and armed services for more Buddhists. It also singled out Buddhism for special status in its 1972 constitution.

The UNP, on the other hand, drawing more support from minorities, including a Roman Catholic block vote, is more suspect. The dragging out of the ethnic war led to the suspicion that the government was unwilling to go all out militarily against the Tamil guerrillas. These fears were com- pounded when publicity was given in Sinhala media to the involvement of the Catholic Church which provided shelter to the guerrillas, operating in Catholic-dominated areas like Mannar. The trial of a Tamil priest Father Singaraiya and other priests accused of aiding the guerrillas, the stattments of Rev. Deogupillai, Bishop of Jaffna and the number of Catholics among the guerrillas were closely monitored by Buddhist monks.“’

International conspirators have urged the Catholic Church to enter remote villages of the very poor. A dangerous leopard has donned the white cassock t<) convert impoverished Buddhist villagers to Catholicism. This is only the first step on the road to Eelam. Those lay Buddhists who used to visit the temple to attend to needs of monks have now fall&n before the church and make the sign of the cross.”

128 S. Amunugama

Unlike the 1950s when Buddhist leaders complained of the influence ot ‘Catholic action’ in the higher strata of government, the present threat is perceived from young Catholic priests who arc adherents of ‘Liberation Theology’. They live with the poor and in the pursuit of their congregational tasks become a direct rival of the socially oriented monk. \Vhat amounts to a case study of such an encounter is found in an article by Tiranagama Ratanasara, a well known Buddhist monk. Ratanasara describes his ex- periences with a ‘liberated’ Catholic priest in the =Ingunukolawewa village in the deep south. The priest lives in a poor man‘s house and rides a bicycle. He teaches in the village school ‘where when he arrives the children welcome him with joy’. He brings clothes, milk foods, medicine, and chicken coops to the village. Once a week a meeting of Christian youth are held.‘” \l’hen a Buddhist temple is built the ‘father’ is the first to offer flowers. The article ends on a pessimistic note.

Today, with Angunukolawewa as its headquarters about twenty villages in the area are being ‘developed’ by Catholics. This is a ‘religious hunt’ for poor rural people. Can all this lead to peace in the country?

ON THE i/SE OF VIOLENCE Though Buddhist doctrine prescribes ahimsa and Buddhist social practice bears its influence we see numerous instances of dilemmas created by this teaching. The tension between the needs of the Buddhist state and the prescriptions of the Dhamma is ever present in Buddhist societies.‘” The classic instance is the dilemma of Dutugemunu.‘”

The decision of Tamil youth to take to violence in their struggle for a separate state, the induction of Indian troops to the island, and the decision of the JVP to use ‘revolutionary violence’ created dilemmas-of varying degree-for Sinhala monks. Let us examine their responses in each of these instances. In the case of the Sri Lankan, in effect Sinhala, army killing Tamil guerrillas the majority of monks supported it without serious reservation. (There were exceptions-(a) those who lived on the borderlands between Sinhala and Tamil areas organized as the Saama Bkikshu Padanama, (b) those who supported the Marxist oriented parties and (c) those associated with the Sarvodaya movement. But they were small both in number and in influence.) Unlike the monk from Pulingurata who, according to the Mahavamsa attempted to salve the conscience of Dutugemunu by refusing to grant ‘human’ status to the slain Damilas, Sinhala monks attempted to resolve the dilemma by making a distinction between non-violent Tamil people and violent Tamil rebels. The Tamil argument that the Sinhalese are ‘racist’ is turned against them by highlighting the racial basis of Eelam. As Peter Schalk, analysing the MSV manifests puts it, ‘Militancy is evident not only in the language (murdering Eelamism) and in its aggressive suspicion

Buddhaputra or Bhumiputra 129

(conspiracies), but above all in that the text consciously turns the argument of being racist against the “conspirators” who are credited with wanting to divide the country on a racial basis’.

This approach is given a Buddhist perspective in the Viniuida which contrasts racism engendered by colonialism with the experience of Asoka.

History has cursed us with colonialism which changed our historic path. Today our people are paying for this diversion in blood and bullets. Those who fight for barren earth are nothing but savages. Arhat Mahinda’s father. the King Asoka chose Dharma Vijaya because he realized the futility of fighting for land. It being so, we are compelled to characterize those who do not live together but quibble about historic homelands and thereby break up their motherland. as well as those who encourage them. as savages.*’

The epithet ‘savage’ (mlecca) resonates with anti-Buddhist connotations in the Pali chronicles. For the monks there were immediate reasons for such a usage. They had special reason to fear Tamil attacks. Tamil guerrillas appear to have singled monks out for punishment. The temple at Nagadipa was attacked and Buddhist monks were evicted. Others fled from temples in the North and East. Even those in the border areas were in danger. Tamil guerrillas injured and killed over a hundred worshippers at the Sacred Bo tree in Anuradhapura. An attack on the Temple of the Tooth was anticipated. A busload of monks, returning from a pilgrimage, were brutally murdered at Arantalawa, leading to a joint appeal to government by the Mahanayakes seeking military protection for the sangha. Maduluwave Sobhita lvrites of the insecurities of the sangha,

Today, the Buddhist monk is assailed from every side. In the North and East Tamil terrorists have flattened Buddhist temples. A few days ago terrorists attacked the Trikonamadu forest hermitage, killed the monk there and offered his flesh as alms to the Buddha. The massacre of Bhikkus at Aranfalwa is unprecedented in history The heart of Sinhala Buddhism is the Sacred Bo tree. The massacre at this site, hallowed for thousands of years, is an attack on all Buddhists. The sacred site which is usually bathed in incense and watrr was bathed in blood.”

The characterization of Tamil rebels as ‘mleccas’ helped the monks to extend their patronage to the armed services. Military commanders, after assuming office, worshipped at the Temple of the Tooth and met the Mahanayakes of Asgiriya and Malvatta to obtain their blessings. Bodhi Pujas were held in leading temples to seek the blessings of gods in ensuring the safety and success of military personnel. Monks officiated at militar) functions and the central army cantonment at Panagoda saw the erection of an impressive ‘chaitya’ (pagoda).

Though the induction of Indian troops (IPKF) helped Sinhalese troops

130 S. Amunyama

first by enforcing a ceasefire, and later taking over the fight with the Tamil guerillas, Buddhist monks were reluctant to recognize this development as they strongly opposed the Indo-Lanka Accord. Also the terror tactics of the JVP prevented any favourable, or even objective. assessment of the Indian contribution. Thus the focus was placed on the misdemeanours of the Indians and their alleged continuing links with the guerillas. MaduluwcMTa Sobhita takes such an approach:

Ten months ago Indian troops were inducted here saying peace would come in seventy-two hours. \Ve know that the Sinhalese of Tricomalee stayed on in their lands even amidst great difficulties and threats from terrorists. The IPKF came to disarm the Tamil terrorists. But in addition to gifting fifty lakhs of rupees [to the Tamil administration] the): joined hands with the Tiqers and have now began to exterminate the remaining Sinhalese and their monks in places like Tricomalee.”

The violence which was unleashed in the South by the JVP security forces and vigilante groups on the other hand, created major problems for the Sangha. CVhile the monks could find a broad consensus in their views regarding Tamil separatists and the IPKF, the extension of violence to the South was traumatic.

\Ve can examine this dilemma in terms of (a) the monks and the J\‘P? (b) the monks and the UNP regime, (c) differences in perception of violence in the Sangha hierarchy and (d) the monks and the vigilantes or ‘death squads’.

THE MONKS A,vD THE JVP The JVP is a revolutionary party which draws its membership from rural Sinhala youth. It has launched armed attacks on the state twice (1971 and 1987-89) without success. Obeysekere’s observations regarding the social composition of the JVP in 1971 still holds good.

In the first place the movement is unequivocally a revolt of the youth of the country, and those who actively participated in it were predominantly males the statistical information also reveals that the overwhelming majority of sus- pected insurgents were Sinhala Buddhists.

He concludes that

one simply has to view the insurgency as a Sinhala Buddhist movement spear- headed by the youth of the country.

Of all the Sri Lankan political parties, it was the JLrP that set out de- liberately to mobilize the monks as a vital support group. This decision reflected the party’s emphasis on youth, as opposed to the working class, as the motor of the Sri Lankan revolution. They looked upon universities as

centres of recruitment. For a variety of reasons, young Buddhist monks had come to constitute a significant proportion of the univcrsit): population. The egalitarian, ‘Sinhala Buddhist’ ideology of the Ji-P appealed to the young monks. Referring to the 1971 insurgency, A. C. Alles states that Buddhist temples were used for concealment of arms and ammunition, as hiding places for members of the movement, and as outposts of the JVP. Members were posted to abandoned Buddhist temples to do propaganda work among villagers. The decision to launch an attack on the government forces in 1971 was taken in a Bhikku hostel of a university.

Though the monks did play an important role in 1971. it was in the late 1980s that they became crucial to the JYP. The J\-P was proscribed by the government following the anti-Tamil riots of 1983. FYhilc the top leadership wrnt ‘underground’ they maintained their strength through ‘front’ organi- zations. Three key ‘fronts’ of the J\‘P were (a) university and senior college students, (b) Buddhist monks and (c) women. Each of these ‘fronts’ had its distinctive constitution, office bearers. budget and publications.

Organization-wise the J\‘P had three departments. (a) Zonal organi;u- lions-the country was divided into fi1.e zones, i.e. (1) ivestern and Sabara- gamuwa; (2) Central; (3) Rajarata: (4) U va and Eastern; (5) South. Each of these ‘zones’ were subdivided into districts and subdistricts. Central committee members were in charge of each district. while each zone had two high level part). leaders as political and military secretaries respectively. (I)) :Valional Cofnmittees on education, finance. militaq organization and propaganda. (c) Front organizations, i.e. the three mentioned earlier as ~~11 as ‘fronts’ for workers and youth.

If we take the monks organization for detailed scrutiny we find that each of the territorial divisions-zone, district and subdistrict. had a branch of the J1’P Bhikku organization. Thus it could be called the most comprehensive ‘non-formal’ Sangha grouping outside thr traditional Sangha hierarch) . based on .Yikya. The J\‘P organization was radical in that it cross cut .Vikqa differences by establishing itself as a Tri-;ViTikqYka (:&sect) organization throughout the country. Monks frotn all sects were fret to join.

The importance attached by the Ji-P to its monks organization can bc gauged by the fact that it was placed in charge of a top leader D. M. Ananda (alias Dissanayake Mudiyanselage Nandasena) 1 generally reckoned to be the No. 3 in the J\‘P hierarchy, after the leader Rohana \Vijeweera and General Secretary Upatissa Gamanayake. The following description of Ananda’s career highlights the various strands of support which gave the %JlrP its strength.

.A n.ltive of\Variyapola. 3.5 years of age. He graduated in Arts from the University of Kelaniya in 1980. He \vas a Buddhist monk when he entered the University. but qave up robes in his final year. The leader of the Socialist students union at

Kelaniya University and the Secretary of the inter University students Federa- tion, [He] was the organizer of the countrywide protest against the proposed white paper on education in 1981. Till the proscription of the party he was the president of the Socialist students Union of the JV’P. His importance increased tremendously in the years following the proscription and while functionally the most important man in the organization, he was in the eyes ofhis party comrades. No. 3 in the organization.‘”

While the monks were deployed for JVP propaganda, they were particu- larly useful in agitation on special issues which tended to give the party a good image among the youth. Monks were in the forefront of agitation against the White Paper on Education, the privatization of the Medical College, Pirivena reform and the Indo-Lanka accord. They also participated in student agitation for higher payments to University scholarship holders, higher salaries for university teachers and other employees and for the holding of early general elections. Monks were also used as couriers and many temples and university Bhikku hostels were used as safe-houses.2”

However, JVP monks were confronted with a major dilemma when their party decided on the path of ‘revolutionary violence’. There is some ambiguity created deliberately by the JVP regarding the use of violence! particularly the assassination of political opponents and government officials. Wijeweera, the JV’P leader, took up the position that the JVP did not engage in violence. That was the work of the Deshupremi Junatha V&~rya (DJV) which he said was

not the armed division of the JVP. You ask what the connection between the DJ\’ and JYP is? As far as we are aware the DJV is a mass peoples organization. There are members of the JVP, as well as non-members in it. We believe that some members of the UNP, the SLFP and other groups, who are against the Indian invading armies, who are against the fifth columnists of the Indians, who are against the Tamil Eelam terrorists, who are against India swallowing Sri Lanka, who oppose the merger of the North and East, who are against the second Kandyan convention of Rajiv Gandhi and Jayawardene, who are against the provincial councils and who do not want Sri Lanka to be another Sikkim, are also in the DJV.‘”

In reality the DJV carried out decisions of the political sections of the party taken at the appropriate national, zonal, divisional or sub-divisional level. This was known to the leaders of JVP Sangha organization, though it is quite likely that the general membership accepted the official party view. The JVP’s commitment to the DJV, however, was never in doubt.

How did the monks react? Here we must also add another dimension to this question. M’hile the DJ\‘/JVP did carry out assassinations of its opponents, it claimed that it was only reacting to state violence.

When the public protested peacefully against the Jayawardene-Gandhi pact of

Buddhaputra or Bhumiputra 133

betrayal, 142 people were shot. It is in this situation that the DJV was born on a solid foundation. It cancelled the monopoly that Mr Jayawardene and the Indian fifth columnists held on the use of violence.*’

It is correct that UNP ‘workers’ attacked the MSV during the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord leading the JVP/DJV towards counter violence. Yet many of the organizations in the MSV began to rethink their positions once the JYP began to dominate the anti-Accord opposition and, more significantly, began using widespread terror and violence. The major political organizations-SLFP, MEP and the Sinhala Bala Mandalaya-distanced themselves from the MSV. So did its chief monks, particularly the Maha- nayake of Asgiriya, Palipane Chandananda. About this time the elections for President were anounced. The SLFP candidate Mrs Bandaranaike, issued her manifesto. 1l’ith the support of ethnic minorities in mind, the SLFP pledged to establish two provincial councils in the East-one for the Tamils and another for the Muslims. This raised a storm of protest. The SLFP which opposed the creation of even a single provincial council in the East, when they were in the MS\‘, were now going even beyond the Accord by agreeing to create two provincial councils. Gamini Iriyagolle? President of the Theosophical Society and a live wire of the MSV, openly repudiated the SLFP and threw- his weight behind the UNP. Cyril Matthew, another MS\’ hero, went further. ‘A special hell’, he said, ‘should be invented for Mrs Bandaranaike and the SLFP for the betrayal of Sinhala Buddhists’.

The withdrawal of the senior monks from the SMV left the JVP monks in a quandary. They could not repudiate the violence of the JVP/DJy. On the other hand, their senior monks did not come to their rescue. In this situation the JVP monks reacted to the impasse in several ways:

(a) allowed the J\.P to the assassinate senior monks who were supporters of the UNP or Left parties.

(b) pressured senior monks in their temples, regional organizations and Karaka Sabhawa’r to desist from supporting the UNP or SLFP.

(c) criticized senior monks who did not support the J\‘P. (d) organized a national and international campaign against attacks on

J17P monks. The assassination of senior monks including Pohaddaramulle Pemaloka

(patron, SLMP), Thambugala Sumanasiri, Vellatota Pannadassi and Koti- kawatte Saddhatissa and many leading priests of regional areas, have been attributed to the DJ\‘/J\7P. These monks had broken the rule imposed b) the JVP/DJV that they should not lend support to parties which were in favour of the Accord. The Vinivida attempts to resolve this dilemma by suggesting to its readers that the JVP was not involved in these killings and drawing attention to state killings of young monks. This response became necessary as senior monks including those in the ‘non-violent’ sections of

134 S. ilmunugama

the MSV, openly condemned Prmaloka’s murder

The assassination of Pcmaloka Them appears to be another step in a political conspiracy. Ft’e ha\.e recei\,rd information that this cvas not a killing carried out by the Deshapremies; [DJY]. 0 n reading the statement of a certain group of’ monks, published in the niz~a~ina of 23rd of December, !I‘? came to the con- clusion that there is a coterie of monks in this country who are unaware of’ the arrest, torture, disrobing- and killing of [young] monks.‘”

Though not visible to laymen, J\‘P monks were also exerting pressure on senior monks from both within and outside their traditional organization. JVP monks organized several sapagrahas and fasts at centres of Buddhist worship. A mass sat_yagruha was arranged near the Temple of the Tooth, a show of strength which was designed to impress the sangha establishment of Asgiriya and Malwatta. Soon after this demonstration the highest decision making bodies (Ku&a Subha) of these two establishments passed resolutions condemning the Accord and seeking protection for the monks who had been taken into custody by armed services. FVhen the J\‘P escalated their terror tactics, leading Buddhist monks were characterized as ‘traitors’ and sent ‘death threats’. As a result some left the island and others drastically cur- tailed their religious and social activities.

While pressure was being put on chief monks through Sangha Sabhas, a public campaign criticizing them for ‘inaction’ was also launched. Buddhist reformers from the time of Anagarika Dharmapala have been critical of ‘the sloth and lack of commitment’ of the Sangha leadership. Later on, reformist monks, who were sympathizers of socialist parties, criticized their chiefs for supporting the UNP in exchange for worldly benefits. This critical vocabular) (‘lazy, spittoon-filling monks’) was resurrected by pro-JI’P monks to criticize their elders.

CRITIQUE OF THE X4NGH.4 LEADERSHIP In an essay in Vinivida, a young monk Kumbalgamuwe Dhammananda presents a critique of Sangha elders.2” He begins by broadly classifying these elders:

In modern Sri Lanka out of about 30 000 Bhikkus, over a thousand are Nqakas. Such nayakas have been appointed at provincial, district and sub-district level. In each district there are chief, deputy, chief adhikarana (adjudicator of ecclesiastical law), deputy adhikarunu, etc. for each of the sects.

He then describes the functions of these Nayakas, which he claims are incorporated in their sannas or letters of appointment. These functions are:

The protection and enhancement of the Buddha Susuna, ensuring the safety of the sangha, resolution of conflict among monks in order to safeguard sangha

Buddhaprctra or Bhumiputra 135

unity. ensuring the \vclfare of the Buddhist laity and giving leadership to the Sri Lankan nation.

However, says the writer,

these leaders have deliberately shirked their duty and have tragically allowed international conspiratorial forces to drag dowm the country, race and the Buddha sasana.

Contrasting present sloth with the glorious heritage of a Bhikku, he says that in the past monks like Kudapola and \Vcliwita Sangaraja placed ‘the motherland first’ because ‘without a sovcrcign territory’. language, religion and culture cannot flourish. How then did the Nayakas lose sight of their mission? According to the writer, British colonialists were responsible because the); converted sangha or commonly ownrd property to private ownership of the chief monks, thereby making them selfish and ‘this worldly’. Thus the monk lost sight of his ‘patriotic tasks’ and became a seeker after monc) and property. The monk who was previously engaged in the-Tuga mehzara

(historic task) of protecting the race and sasana now ‘began to waste his time in the law courts, litigating with teacher, fellow monk, and lay supporter in order to gain wealth, property and position’. This decline had many con- sequences. Politicians ha\.c used monks for their own ends. The Catholic Church has conducted a subtle campaign to encourage Eelamism, discredit monks and convert Buddhists to their religion. This is due to the weakness of Sangha leadership fragmented on party. sect, caste, and parshaua (groups within a Nikaya) lines. Learned monks, who obtain doctorates, prefer to go abroad to spread the mrssa,gc to ti)rci,qncrs while their own countrymen suffer.

The writer then comes to his immediate concern.

ifhen the young monk (f’odi Hamuduruu~o) who cntcrcd the university together with the village Duyaka‘r (lay supporter) son begins to h,qht the anti-Buddhist aggression of international conspirators and a,qitates against cut backs in free education, killing of unarmed people and the massacre of students, they arc assaulted, tortured and imprisoned. ,Man! othrr\ arc killrtl and hurncd. But some Mahanayakes know nothing of this.

Next comes a broadsiclc at the Nayakas:

Chief priests have no time for these problems. But they have time to invite a Minister to declare open the new temple Thorana, pull down the Is-cubit Buddha statue and build [in its plarc] a Wcubit Buddha statue, lay a marhlc floor in the bathroom and trade in the car fi)r a new model Datsun.

The writer contrasts thrsc selfish conccrnb with the commitment of young monks ancl concludccl by inviting the seniors to relinquish their positions if

thcv cannot fulfil their rcsponsibilitics.

\Vhen the armed serlrices and +lantc> groups lamlched an offensive against the JVP, young monks faced cxtrcmr dangrr. Unlike their part). lcadcrs who had gone underground. ~nonks 1) ho had spearheaded public agitation were easy targets. At this stage man!- of the senior monks, who had borne the brunt of radical attacks, like the one quoted earlier. kvcre not lvilling to come to their resruc. B>, this time Mahanayakas’ ‘bete noir’ J. R. ,Jayawar- dene was out of power and his successor President R. Prcmadasa, w:as quite acceptable to them.

The l’iniuida is indignant about chief monks who were quoted as saying: ‘young monks were more dangerous than the Northern Tamil Terrorists’.“” According to this journal hundreds of monks were being tortured and killed by their armed opponents. JL7P monks responded to this crisis in several ways. Some surrendered. or criticized the J17P for misleading them and became supporters of the go\,crnment. Their statements were given wide publicity in the media. Some others gave up robes or fled to other countries. It is likely that core supporters gave up robes and joinedsthe J17P guerrillas who had retreated to .jungle camps. There \vere many reports of the dis- appearance of monks, sightings of laymen with shaven headr ancl the discovery of discarded robes in public places.

The poetry and short stories published in journals like li’nir,ida, Kazqa, Vioarana and the largest circulation Sinhala newspaper Diq-inn depict the dilemmas of young monks who find their ‘holy cause’ defeated b>- violence. In all cases they remain silent on ,J\-P violence and seek to focus attention on the victimization of innocents.

In a short story entitled .4 Briff Talr we meet a young monk, Mahinda. He is his chief monk’s favourite. Mahinda gets on very well with the \:illage youths who, despite their difficulties, help the monks to repair the temple and string up colourcd lights for Poson. FVhen the villagers fail to contribute to temple charity, the chief monk loses his temper. Mahinda pacifies him b) explaining that their congregation is poor; )-et they never fail to send food for the monks.

On? day, the peace of the \rillage temple is shattered. Mahinda’s father. a \Gllage carpenter, his eyes full of tears, conveys a fateful message

‘You tell me father that Malli (younger hrothrr) was absolutely innocrnt.’ ‘You know that he is innocent. He and his friends had fired the brick kiln

and were chatting on the Lake Bund when the armed men came. They put hot coals into his mouth and threatened to kill him if he did not give information. I have looked c\-rrvwhcrc for him. He’s not to lx fi,und.‘

The father falls at Mahinda’s feet in worship and goes looking for his other son. Mahinda, standing very still ‘like a rock statue’ sees in his mind’s

Buddhaputra or Bhuniputra 137

eye his younger brother who had unselfishly taken over the burdens of helping his parents. Without the brother’s generosity he could not have become a monk. Mahinda’s reverie is broken by his friend Gunapala who comes with bad news.

‘I rowed your father across the river. &ear the rubber estate there were a lot of people looking at a body which had washed up. Your father took one look at it and started wailing. It was Piyadasa Malli.’

‘Enough Gunapala. I cannot cry like my father. I had a hunch it would come to this. Do me a fa\-our. please look after my fathrr.’

The following morning Mahinda was gone. His robes were left behind. The chief priest said ‘Mahinda is a good person. He ma) have given up his robes. But he had gone to do good’.‘3’

This ending leaves the clear impression that Mahinda has joined the guerrillas. In a poem which has the same theme, the ending is more explicit. The monk sheds his robes, takes a T-56 submachine gun (the T-56 came to symbolize JVP military strength) and disappears into the night.

CONCLllSIOiVS

Most writings about the Sri Lankan crisis tend to describe the Sinhala Sangha as a monolithic organization having ‘clear cut’ views on ethnic and political issues. In reality it is not so. At the formal level there are the sangha’s institutional structures for the making of pronouncements. It is rare that they make pronouncements on public issues. Informally, monks participate in a variety of organizations with their own agendas for action. Charismatic leaders of the Sangha work to build coalitions of these organi- zations so that a common position can be articulated. They do not often succeed. Nor does the success of such coalition building depend entirely on the sangha. The strength and commitment of lay groups become crucial.

Second, we see that the notion of Sinhalese ‘custodianship’ of Buddhism is so strong that monks are willing to rationalize the use of violence against the ‘other’, even though it contravenes the basic tenets of Buddhism. The arguments and strategies adopted to resolve this dilemma favoured the domain of realpolitik. In this they were directly in line with the sangha we encounter in the Pali chronicles who link the fortunes of the Buddhist Church with the Sinhala state. Despite more than a century of ‘Protestant Buddhism’ its intellectual overlay was stripped as soon as the modern Sinhala ‘nation’ faced a real crisis.

Third, changes in Bhikku education, particularly in the Pirivenas and universities and changing patterns of recruitment to the Sangha (not analysed in this essay) are creating a new strata of radical socially committed monks. The)-, however, still operate within the traditional ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ axis.

138 S. Amunugama

It was this strata which formed an important support group for the .J\-P. Their membership and influence is likely to increase.

Fourth, though the use of violence against the Tamils, the UNP and the Left was rationalized by the radical monks in terms of the needs of modern ‘realpolitik’, they attempted to draw on classic Buddhist textual concepts of the inviolability of the monks (anantacharipapakarma) and an interpretation of social intervention (Bahujanahitaya) when they in turn were the subjects of state violence.

Fifth, the commitment to social revolution is so strong among radical monks that they are willing not only to condone the use of violence by the JVP, but also in many cases shed their robes and take up the gun. This phenomenon which has been noticeable in several contemporary Buddhist societies juxtaposes the radical monks persona, Buddhist ‘selflessness’ and new Buddhist interpretations of social intervention.

Sixth, we see the attempts of Sinhala monks to understand social reality in terms of Buddhist symbolism. n’hen dealing with secular notions like ethnicity, democracy, revolution and violence, monks attempted to relate them to their culturally prescribed world of symbols. They go back to the examples of the monks-LVariyapola, Kudahapola, etc. who confronted state power. Communism is understood in terms of the Buddha’s prescription of communal living (absence of private property, sharing of alms, etc.) for the sangha. This leads to the continuous ‘oversimplification’ of complex con- temporary issues.

Finally, in contrast to the conventional view of Sinhala monks as a con- fident, assertive power group within the national polity we find that they perceive themselves as a deprived, alienated group inadequately recognized by both political authorities and the Buddhist public. They believe that they are ‘used’ by politicians and unless better organized, would be out- manoeuvered by ‘foreign conspiratorial forces’ including Eelamists and Roman Catholics.

The intrusion of monks into the arena of revolutionary politics has resulted in a loss of their charisma. Monks are arrested, stripped of their robes, publicly humiliated and even killed by armed Sinhala Buddhists. This change in perception has been noted by the monks themselves.

When demonstrating monks are teargassed and assaulted they are forced to run for cover with their robes tucked up. \Vhen they run about the streets like laymen, will the public exhibit religious devotion? \%‘ill not their bhakti be destroved?“”

This dwindling of social esteem of and for Buddhist monks may have long term implications for recruitment, education, influence, and the religious vocation of the Sinhala Sangha.

Buddhaputra or Bhumiputra 139

NOTES

1 2

Vinivida 24, July 1989, p, 6. The Mahavamsa: trans. Wilhelm Geiger. Colomho, Govt. Information Dcpart- ment, 1950. Mhc. 1.46.

6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13

A. C. Alles, The Trial of W’alisinghe Harischandra and C)ther,r, Colomho. Lake House Investments, Ltd, 1989. Peter Schalk, ’ “Unity” and “Sovereignitv”. Key concepts of a militant Buddhist organization in the present conflict in Sri Lanka’. Temenos. 1989. pp. 55-82. Schalk, 1989, pp. 64-71, li’nicida 14. June 1988, pp. 2-6. S. J. Tambiah. Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democrarr. Chtcago, University of Chicago Press. 1986. pp. 28-33. Neu, York Times, 11 March 1990. ~i’moida 14, June 1988, p. 1. Ti’nwida 24, July 1989. pp. 9, 10. Limvida 13, May 1988, p. 14. Michael Carrithers. The Forest Monks of Sri Lanka, Delhi. Oxford University. 1983.

14

15 16 17 18 19

20

li’dpalankara Pirillena Centenary Folumc. (:olombo, Government Press, 1975. p. 61. PinirGda 18, November 1988, p. 25. Vinivida 18, November 1988, p. 11. Vinivida 18, Novemher 1988, p, 12. Clnirida 18, November 1988, p. 26. S. J. Tambiah. Nhrld Conqueror and It’orld Renouncer. London, Cambridge University Press, 1976. p. 47. Gananath Obeysekrre. Meditations on Conscience. Colombo, Social Scientists Association, 1988.

21 Li’nizlida 14, June 1988, p. 1. 22 Vinivida 13, May 1988, p. 15. 23 L?nivida 13, May 1988, p. 15. 24 C. .I. Chandraprema. ‘Profiles of leaders’. in Island, 5 February 1990. 25 .A. (1. Alles, Znsurgen~~ 1971, Colombo, Colombo Apothecaries Ltd., 1976, p. 97. 26 Sri Lanka Sunday Times, 13 November 1988. 27 \Vi.jeweera, Sri Lanka Sunday Times, 13 November 1988. 28 Ji’nioida 20, January-February 1989, p. 7. 29 Vinioida 18, November 1988, p. 3. 30 I’inivida 18, November 1988, p. 4. 31 blnivida 24, July 1988, p. 22. 32 l’inirida 24. July 1988. p. 17.

SARATH AMUNUGAMA is a fellow of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. He holds a Doctorate from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. Formerly Director of the Inter- national Programme for Communication of UNESCO, Paris, he was a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University in 1990.

5011, Siripa Road, Colombo 5, Sri Lanka.