bsidessf 2014 fix what matters

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Fix What Matters: Why CVSS Sucks And How To Do Better

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Why using CVSS for vulnerability management is nuts. How to fix the vulnerabilities that truly matter, and how to create and measure an effective security practice.

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Page 1: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Fix What Matters: !

Why CVSS Sucks And How To

Do Better

Page 2: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Once Jailbroke an Iphone 3G

Michael Roytman

Proud Owner of Remote Controlled AirplaneRecently a Naive Grad Student

Data Scientist, Risk I/ODoes Not Wake Up Before 11 CST

qualifications:

Page 3: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

PART 1: !

YOU SUCK AT YOUR JOB

!

(and don’t even know it yet)

Page 4: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Why Are We Here?

Empirical Failures of CVSSProper Remediation Frameworks (Yeah, they exist)

CVSS SUCKS

Analytical Failures of CVSS

(+Data Driven Alternatives)

Page 5: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Remove the Threat

RemediationAccept the Risk

Repair the Vulnerability

Page 6: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

C(ommon) V(ulnerability) S(coring) S(ystem)

“CVSS is designed to rank information system vulnerabilities”

Exploitability/Temporal (Likelihood)

Impact/Environmental (Severity)

The Good: Open, Standardized Scores

Page 7: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.

!

!

!

Insensibly, one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of

theories to suit facts.”

Page 8: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

FAIL: Data FundamentalismDon’t Ignore What a Vulnerability Is: Creation Bias http://blog.risk.io/2013/04/data-fundamentalism/ !

Jerico/Sushidude @ BlackHat https://www.blackhat.com/us-13/briefings.html#Martin

!

Luca Allodi - CVSS DDOS http://disi.unitn.it/~allodi/allodi-12-badgers.pdf

Page 9: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

F1: Data FundamentalismSince 2006 Vulnerabilities have declined by 26 percent.” http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/documents/vulnerability-trends10.pdf !

!

The total number of vulnerabilities in 2013 is up 16 percent so far when compared to what we saw in the same time period in 2012. ” http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-intelligence_report_06-2013.en-us.pdf

Page 10: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

FAIL 2: A Priori Modeling“Following up my previous email, I have tweaked my equation to try to achieve better separation between adjacent scores and to have CCC have a perfect (storm) 10 score...There is probably a way to optimize the problem numerically, but doing trial and error gives one plausible set of parameters...except that the scores of 9.21 and 9.54 are still too close together. I can adjust x.3 and x.7 to get a better separation . . .”

Page 11: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

F3: Logical InconsistencyTemporal Scores Hurt Decision Making

Report Confidence is Useless

Base Rate Fallacy

Page 12: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

F4: Stochastic Ignorance

Attackers Change Tactics Daily

Page 13: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

F4: Stochastic Ignorance

Page 14: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Empirical Failures of CVSSObjective: Remediate the riskiest vulnerabilities

Constraint: Can’t measure impact/priority

Need:

MOAR DATA!!!

Page 15: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Repair the Vulnerability

Page 16: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

I Love It When You Call Me Big Data50,000,000 Live Vulnerabilities

1,500,000 Assets

2,000 Organizations

Page 17: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

I Love It When You Call Me Big Data

3,000,000 Breaches

Page 18: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Baseline AllthethingsProbability (You Will Be Breached On A Particular Open Vulnerability)?

=(Open Vulnerabilities | Breaches Occurred On Their CVE) /(Total Open Vulnerabilities)

2%

Page 19: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Probability A Vuln Having Property X Has Observed Breaches

RANDOM VULN

CVSS 10

CVSS 9

CVSS 8

CVSS 6

CVSS 7

CVSS 5

CVSS 4

Has Patch

0.000 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040

Page 20: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

PART 2: !

FIX WHAT MATTERS

Page 21: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Proper Framework

Know which vulnerabilities put you most at risk.

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Counterterrorism

Known Groups

Surveillance

Threat Intel, Analysts

Targets, Layouts

Past Incidents, Close Calls

Page 29: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters
Page 30: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Uh, Sports?

Opposing Teams, Specific Players

Gameplay

Scouting Reports, Gametape

Roster, Player Skills

Learning from Losing

Page 31: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

InfoSec?

Page 32: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Defend Like You’ve Done It Before

Groups, Motivations

Exploits

Vulnerability Definitions

Asset Topology, Actual Vulns on System

Learning from Breaches

Page 33: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Work With What You’ve Got:

Akamai, Safenet

ExploitDB, Metasploit

NVD, MITRE

Page 34: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Bad Alternatives

Why Don’t I Just Patch The Important Assets?

Page 35: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Good Alternatives

Page 36: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Probability A Vuln Having Property X Has Observed Breaches

Random Vuln

CVSS 10

Exploit DB

Metasploit

MSP+EDB

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3

Page 37: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Data Is Everything And Everything Is Data

Page 38: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Data Is Everything And Everything Is Data

Page 39: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Be Better Than The Gap

Page 40: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Data is Everything and Everything is DataSpray and Pray = 2%

CVSS 10 = 4%

Metasploit and Exploit DB = 30%

Page 41: BsidesSF 2014 Fix What Matters

Holler!www.risk.io@mroytman