bright talk intrusion prevention are we joking - henshaw july 2010 a

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Bright Talk Security Summit: July 8 th 2010 Mark Henshaw

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Page 1: Bright talk   intrusion prevention are we joking - henshaw july 2010 a

Bright Talk Security Summit: July 8th 2010Mark Henshaw

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Statistics Employees spend 50 minutes a day using social networking at work 40%+ of work emails are of a personal nature and non business related 3-5% of users will enter personal data into a phishing site if they reach it 46% of the respondents to a messaging survey said they had experienced

an increase in malware incidents More than 2700 websites hosting malware are going online every day Malware delivery vectors: email 15%, Web 85% 20%+ of outgoing emails contains content that poses a legal, financial or

regulatory risk Social-networking sites do not monitor content for the hosting of

malware 49% of companies allow unlimited access to social networking sites Web email or web postings account for 37% of information leaks Two-thirds of organisations are using at least one Web 2.0 application,

yet also see these applications as a serious privacy concern

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INC

RE

AS

ING

RISKS GENERALLY CATALOGUED - IN A MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Threat in depth1. Your senior management2. Your user communities3. Your processes, or lack thereof4. Your software and applications5. Your infrastructure6. Your suppliers and outsourced processes7. Your competitors

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Agenda

So what can we do to reduce the likelihood?

Can you prevent state sponsored intrusion?

Is defence in depth just a feel good distraction?

If they [cyber criminals] want your IP then is it just a matter of time?

Elastic cloud computing or elastic intrusion?

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Sponsored intrusionSponsored intrusion is a deliberate targeted

attempt by a hostile party to gain unlawful access to another network and systems, and ultimately a) steal their intellectual property, b) complete some malicious electronic act causing destruction and/or collapse

The attack is funded and supported, possibly by the state

Coordinated and employs a good level of expertise and sophistication

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Intrusion Prevention SystemA misnomer - even the best IPS are unable to

detect all cyber attacks, therefore IPS will not prevent all intrusions

The CEO/COO and Board see IPS as another ‘silver bullet’

We’ve got firewalls and now this IDS/IPS stuff, we must be bullet proof

Just one element in your overall defence in depth strategy – one instrument in a very large orchestra

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Agenda

So what can we do to reduce the likelihood?

Can you prevent state sponsored intrusion?

Is defence in depth just a feel good distraction?

If they [cyber criminals] want your IP then is it just a matter of time?

Elastic cloud computing or elastic intrusion?

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Business as a targetIntrusion attacks, highly sophisticated across

multiple surfacesThe ‘as a service model’ has been available to

cyber criminals and state sponsored organisations for some time

Exponential computing power is available, and now offered as a service through the cloud ~real-time password computation

Everything is hackablePeople are fallible, social engineers are feasting at

the all you can eat buffet of social networking sitesPresent an easy target, may as well advertise

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High profile attacksWhat if your company is high-profile and symbolic of a

countries national identityMcDonald’s = USADefacements and hacking associated with multinational

companies or product lines, and high-profile organisationsMcDonald’s, Skype, Mazda, Burger King, Pepsi, Fujifilm,

Volkswagen, Sprite, Gillette, Fanta, Daihatsu, and KiaUnited Nations, Havard University, Microsoft, Royal Dutch

Shell, the National Basketball AssociationThe intrusion attack on your company may come from an

unexpected quarterNot in it for financial gainA foreign power attempting to overthrow the capitalist

dictator

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But it’s all about the user1. Your senior management2. Your user communities3. Your processes, or lack thereof4. Your software and applications5. Your infrastructure6. Your suppliers and outsourced processes7. Your competitors

And it’s really not that difficult!

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Spear PhishingGhostNet, Chinese espionage ring1,300 infected computers in 103 countries30% located in government offices, media

companies and non-government organisations (NGOs)

RAT named gh0st RAT, complete control of host computer

Variant of an old Spear Phishing schemeAttacker sends out carefully worded email

message

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Worlds largest botnet - AfricaAfrican IT experts estimate an 80% infection

rate on all PCs continent-wideUnable to afford anti-virus softwareDial-up download times make updates

obsoleteBroadband service is now delivered mid 2010

providing a massive, target-rich environment100 Million computers available for botnet

herders to add infected hosts

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Authentication and ease of access

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Third age of hacking1st Age: Servers

ServersFTP, Telnet, Mail, Web.These were the things that consumed bytes from a bad

guyThe Hack left a foot print

2nd Age: BrowsersJavascript, ActiveX, Java, Image formats, DOMsThese are the things that are getting locked down

Slowly Incompletely

3rd Age: PasswordsGaining someone's password is the skeleton key to their

life and your businessTotally invisible – no trace

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$100 For an email password

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WeaponsKeylogger’s

Both hardware and software

Easy to useSearch for invisible

keylogger on YouTube

Phishing

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iPhone p0wnedStealing the email credentials for an iPhone

Run a man in the middle attack over wirelessSpoof an Access Point with ID ‘BTOpenZone’ using HotspotteriPhone automatically joinsFake SSL cert using ettercapVery weak alertMajority of users accept, creds are sent, domain creds if Exchange syncFake certificate cached permanently, works on v3.0 B5Only defence is the ‘sleepy’ iPhone, or the very latest firmware

‘BTOpenZone’ iPhone joins network automatically

Tries to synchronise email, sends certificate

Capture certificate, fake a response, using valid info

Weak alert, user accepts

iPhone sends us its email/domain password

Credit Ken Munroe, PTP

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Another way in to your network

• Business has been asking for advice relating to the suitability of iPhone’s for corporate email use

• Many people believe the iPhone offers equivalent or better security for email when compared with BlackBerry or Windows Mobile Does it?

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Social (networks) engineeringExploiting usersStealing their private dataTrust and relationship mapping to other

legitimate users

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Social networks, trust Increase in the pervasiveness of

vulnerabilities due to unfettered hyperconnected trust is challenging the traditional defence in depth security strategies.

Network-to-network (n2n) bridgeheads can develop creating attack points passing through traditional defence layers and into the heart of your corporate network.

Trust can present real risks to your business.

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Social networkingSocial networking - becoming a big risk

Current issues People giving out information – Yes passwords and sensitive

data The hackers No.1 social engineering tool Very very soft target for passwords Twittergate was a social engineering hack APIs feeding…Apache Lucene, Hadoop and Nutch…creating

Hotnets for the social network analyst Virtual entities are pretending to be real people in a way that

enables criminals to gather personal information from the unsuspecting

Emerging issues – watch this space Robots can appear online as a genuine person Integrate other site functions (Your tweet’s in my Facebook) Password hacking SSO mode

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Agenda

So what can we do to reduce the likelihood?

Can you prevent state sponsored intrusion?

Is defence in depth just a feel good distraction?

If they [cyber criminals] want your IP then is it just a matter of time?

Elastic cloud computing or elastic intrusion?

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Defence in depth, a distractionA feel-good distraction?Obviously not, but from the Boards

perspective…yesJust as IPS suggests another ‘silver bullet’Defence in depth strategy, integrated,

holistic, organism, many moving parts each intimately connected

Log files, monitoring, alerting, responding, automation

Behavioural management, AI and adaptive

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Defence in depth, a distractionWe know its all about the user…But the education and awareness training

budget got slashed again, needed it for a new Zoominfo website

We let them loose with web 2.0 technology, it’s good for the business, and the business wants to use the latest iPhone

Social networking sites are a boon, and Second Life helps our design teams

We don’t have a Social Media Policy yetWe’ve got firewalls and IPS so we’re sorted…

right?

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Defence in depth, a distractionThe board thinks Defence in depth is mostly doneIt’s about technical solutions to technical problemsThey are distracted by the poor coding of

applications, and rightly soAnd they are concerned by the SOX control

deficiencies, that could make them smart a littleSurely the users can exercise a little common sense

But its all about the user, they are exposed

and in trouble

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Agenda

So what can we do to reduce the likelihood?

Can you prevent state sponsored intrusion?

Is defence in depth just a feel good distraction?

If they [cyber criminals] want your IP then is it just a matter of time?

Elastic cloud computing or elastic intrusion?

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Your IP, a matter of timeIf you are an interesting target then…yesCountless examplesThe recent "Operation Aurora" attacks showed how

world class IT and Defence companies could be caught out

Do you know where you Intellectual Property (IP) is?How is it managed?Who has access and why?How is it protected?Interestingly there are many organisations who are

unable to answer these simple questions, some have not categorised what their IP is…

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Agenda

So what can we do to reduce the likelihood?

Can you prevent state sponsored intrusion?

Is defence in depth just a feel good distraction?

If they [cyber criminals] want your IP then is it just a matter of time?

Elastic cloud computing or elastic intrusion?

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Risk taker

Risk averse

How do you see it?

Cloud provider

Start-up Mature businessCIO

Business unit LegalGovernance

Security

(E.g., Cost dominated) (E.g., Risk dominated)

CISO

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Elastic computing, cloudYou are a target or will become a target where your

data is held alongside valuable informationGovernance/Compliance: maze of data handling rulesLegal maturity: Cloud models complex hard to define,

poor or non existent legal structures and precedentsCost: driving utilisation of possible high-risk providersData is fungible and can be transferred to lowest cost

cloud provider, without consent of customer – low cost provider may have poor or non existent policy and security

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Elastic computing, cloudFirewalls can't manage access to cloud

applications because by definition these applications are accessed over the Internet outside the corporate firewall

Poor system authentication, authorisation and accounting (AAA) could facilitate unauthorised access to resources, privileges escalation, impossibility of tracking the misuse of resources and security incidents in general

Cloud makes password based authentication attacks (trend of fraudster using a Trojan to steal corporate passwords) much more impactful

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Elastic computing, cloudGeography can lose all meaning, location

seems irrelevant – not able to tell where data is at any given point in time

Multiple data copies being stored in different locations – also true for private cloud

Public cloud economics is about trading available processing and storage capacity…data is fungible, and able to be moved …like trading electricity

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Elastic computing, cloudYour organisation releases the elastic cloud

space previously used – it may be done by an aggregator you are unaware of

You think your data has gone…it’s still thereOrganised crime has identified thisThey watch for elastic cloud space release

and then buy upForensically examine and mine your

informationNo need to execute some elaborate intrusion,

just sit and wait

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Agenda

So what can we do to reduce the likelihood?

Can you prevent state sponsored intrusion?

Is defence in depth just a feel good distraction?

If they [cyber criminals] want your IP then is it just a matter of time?

Elastic cloud computing or elastic intrusion?

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Reducing the likelihoodThe advent of the netcentric world has

changed the threat environment dramaticallyOrganisations need to reassess how they

collect, analyse and use intelligenceOffence must inform defenceReduce your company attractiveness, make

someone else the targetThere is a need to find the right balance

between security and transparency – pragmatic approach

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Reducing the likelihoodDrive change from the topDeliver Social Media PolicyThreat modelling, coupled with a risk

assessment and risk management programTesting high risk groups of people within the

organisation for social engineering attacksImplement 2-factor authentication for all

remote users

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Reducing the likelihoodA layered defence of active and passive

defencesActive defences may provoke, or violate

internet lawsDuty of preventionSocial Media Policy and OPSEC trainingEnforce application securing principlesEducation and awareness training for all staffPatch vulnerable systems

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Reducing the likelihoodCloud computing must provide security on

par with what exists inside the firewall - compliance is impossible without controls

Password based authentication will become insufficient and a need for stronger or two-factor authentication for accessing cloud resources will be necessary

Requires intelligent cloud strategy from the very beginning

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Reducing the likelihoodEmploy skilled staff with thorough

understanding of the network environment and then train them on the attacks and mindset of the cybercriminal

Remove domain admin accounts for end users

Ensure all logs produced are reviewed and acted upon

Education, education, education…Training, training, training…

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Agenda

So what can we do to reduce the likelihood?

Can you prevent state sponsored intrusion?

Is defence in depth just a feel good distraction?

If they [cyber criminals] want your IP then is it just a matter of time?

Elastic cloud computing or elastic intrusion?

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EndFor more information please contact

[email protected] the IT Duco blog to download the

complete forum raw transcript (Word doc, docx), you can also leave your comments there toohttp://duconotitia.blogspot.com/2010/06/intrusio

n-prevention-are-we-joking.html

A version of this slide deck will also be available on the blog

Thanks to all who contributed, writing into the blog and LinkedIn groups