Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942-1 May 1944 by Samuel Eliot MorisonReview by: Gordon W. PrangeThe American Historical Review, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Jul., 1951), pp. 928-931Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1852047 .

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928 Reviews of Books

development of landing ships and craft and amphibious vehicles, and the fact that the writing does not rise to the level of the subject.

The authors, however, have compartmentalized their approach too rigidly. They seem to have no interest in amphibious operations generally, but only in those of the U.S. Marines. We are shown little or nothing of the interplay of amphibious experience between the Pacific and other theaters; for example, we see the headquarters ship, with special communication facilities, making its ap- pearance in the Pacific in 1944, but we are not told that this idea had been fully developed in European waters much earlier. The authors' information about landing operations in which the Marines did not take part seems to be as defec- tive as their knowledge of Marine ones is comprehensive; yet in spite of this they have chosen to attempt by implication to depreciate the former in comparison with the latter. The U.S. Army's landings in Sicily were not "at Palermo" (p. 67) nor would most people agree that its Attu operations "cost little" (p. I99). Most remarkable, however, are the statements about the Normandy assault. Not only is the old legend of the German division "on maneuvers" on Omaha Beach resurrected-evidence of the state of the authors' knowledge-but they have the assurance to assert that there was "relatively little resistance along most of the Allied beaches." The Third Canadian Division attacked an average section of those beaches; and it suffered on D Day 335 fatal casualties-very nearly as many as the Fourth Marine Division on the first day at Iwo Jima, and about twice as many as the Fifth Marine Division (p. 482). This reviewer would like to see Mr. Isely and Mr. Crowl explaining to the survivors of that Canadian division, or any other Normandy assault division, that "the assault began, not along the coast, but after the beachhead had been secured, in the breakthrough at St. Lb" (p. io). He nominates this as the most grotesque historical statement of the past five years. And the saddest thing about it is that the authors' inclusion of a com- paratively few remarks like this will blind many readers' eyes to the fact that, within the rather narrow bounds they have set for themselves, their book is a very sound and useful production.

Historical Section, C. P. STACEY

Army Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada

BREAKING THE BISMARCKS BARRIER, 22 JUJLY 1942-I MAY I944. By Samuel Eliot Morison. [History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume VI.] (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1950. PP. xxix,

463- $6.oo.)

TImE Bismarck Barrier was a combination land-sea-air roadblock of strong Japanese bases centered around the powerful and pivotal fortress of Rabaul at the northern tip of New Britain Island. It was flanked in the Papuan Peninsula by such strategic positions as Lae, Salamaua, and Finschhafen and protected

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Morison: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier 929

from the south by the scattered and inhospitable group of islands in the Solomon chain whose niarrow, reef-infested waters made operations in any part of the area extremely hazardous. This volume covers the significant period from the feeling-out and uncertain actions of mid-1942 to the final capture of the Admiralty Islands in May, 1944, when Rabaul was ringed and neutralized, and thousands of Japanese soldiers and sailors isolated in the Solomons to "wither on the vine." It includes the shoestring operations of General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area command in the swampy and steaming jungles of New Guinea and the numerous and risky fleet and land actions of Admiral Halsey's command in the South Pacific.

Morison's excellent book fills an important gap between Midway and Guadal- canal on the one hand and the opening of the Central Pacific front by Admiral Nimitz and the great thrust to the Philippines by General MacArthur on the other. It represents a vital and anxious interlude in the timetable of war in the Pacific when the Japanese were being reluctantly but steadily pushed back from their outer perimeter of conquest to a position where they were irrevocably forced on the defensive. During this highly significant period the United States with her worthy allies, the Australians, New Zealanders, British, and Dutch, grasped the initiative and swung the balance slowly and securely in their favor.

Like the old seadog historian that he is, Morison reports directly from the bridge, and his story profits from close personal contact with many of the men and actions he describes. Visits to Admiral Halsey's headquarters in Noumea, General MacArthur's headquarters at Brisbane, trips to Port Moresby and Milne Bay and the coast of Papua, and participation in the Central Solomons cam- paign under Rear Admiral Ainsworth have put the author in a position to make lively, on-the-spot reports and stamp his story with an authoritative label. A trip to Tokyo in the spring of 1950 and talks with some of the leading Japanese commanders in the field have also enabled him to spice his narrative with a more authentic and piquant Japanese flavor than his other volumes on the history of the naval war in the Pacific.

The volume is well documented both from United States and Japanese sources, but the story on Japanese planning (pp. 15-26) requires comment. Whereas there is little doubt that excessive respect for rank in the Japanese Navy did not provide the freedom for suggestion generally attributed to lower-ranking officers in the United States Navy, it is not true that the prerogative of Japanese naval planning was strictly reserved for those on the highest echelon of command in the Naval General Staff in Tokyo or in the Combined Fleet. The illustration which the author uses to punctuate his point (p. 21) is misleading. As a matter of fact a great deal of the strategical and tactical planning for the Pearl Harbor attack did not come from the Japanese admirals. The original idea germinated in the fertile brain of Admiral Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, but the strategical and tactical plan was worked out to an almost unbelievable extent by "lowly" commanders on the staff of the Combined Fleet, the operations

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930 Reviews of Books section of the Naval General Staff, and even more particularly the staff of the First Air Fleet. There were also some good solid argumnctts an-id no mincing of words by the planners in the lower brackets vis-a-vis the lofty admirals before the fateful strike was launched. The same can be said concerning Japanese planning for the battle of Midway.

A word too about interrogations. Like learning, they are dangerous things if there are too few of them and if they are not used carefully. No one could expect the author to question all Japanese commanders during his visit to Japan, but the right people could have been consulted on a number of points to his advantage. For example, Morison informs the reader that Foreign Minister Shigemitsu told him that because of the strained relations between the Japanese Army and Navy "General Tojo was still ignorant of the score at Midway one month after that battle" (p. 23). There are two things wrong here: first, Shigemitsu, in spite of his well-established political position, was not the person to consult for military information; secondly, his report to the author is incorrect. Shigemitsu was ambassador to Great Britain in 194I and ambassador to Nangking from January, 1942, to April, 1943, and not in a position to know too much about military affairs. Any responsible ex-member on the Naval or Army General Staff at the time of Midway could have told the author that Tojo knew all about Midway as soon as the unwelcome information concerning the disastrous defeat reached Tokyo. Not only that, practically every member of the operations section, Army General Staff, also knew the score. That the Naval General Staff was also well informed goes without saying. There are a few other miscues in the volume but it seems that mistakes in writing on Japanese military operations are, like death, inevitable. That they have been kept to a minimum is a real credit to Mori- son and to his Japanese translator and able assistant, Roger Pineau.

It was not easy to write this book. Of the three essentials to top-notch historical writing-a first-rate story, an abundance of material, and the unquestionable ability to write-the author, through no fault of his own, could not count on the advantage of the first. The history of the eighteen months of bitter land, sea, and air fighting which he so expertly describes presented no great fleets moving into tremendous and epoch-making battle such as Midway or Leyte Gulf. By no magic stroke of the pen could the engagements of Kula Gulf, Kolom- bangara, or Vella la Vella be given the high drama and significance of the battle of Surigao Straits or the crucial action off Samar in October, 1944. Morison was forced to deal with a series of relatively small and isolated actions-some of the least-known operations of World War II. But he squeezed his documents for every juicy tidbit they contained, and that he was able to draw together the loose fragments of many diverse actions and weave them into a clear, forceful, and intelligible pattern is all the more tribute to his historical craftsmanship. He crowds a mass of detail into his book and he ties together a score of dangling loose ends, but never once does the reader lose perspective.

There is also a lot of salt in Morison's terse and realistic language, and the

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Welles: Seven Decisions That Shaped History 93I

personal touch he is able to give his story helps him to score many a bull s eye. A series of brilliant descriptions and the obviously genuine affection with which he writes about the sea and the men who fight across its trackless expanse keeps his narrative vivid and alive. The speed with which the author has been forced to write his volumes (six down and eight to go) may perhaps rob them of some of the high literary quality of his books of a decade or two ago. But there is never any doubt that here is a highly gifted scholar with a remarkably fine talent for telling the story of naval warfare. The author also deserves a salute for his treat- ment of the battle of the Bismarck Sea and for his welcome corrections of the same that were long in order. His laudatory comments on General C. A. Willoughby's "Daily Summary of Enemy Intelligence" (p. 27) are well-deserved praise. Morison's sixth volume is another resounding success in one of the most prodigious historical writing programs undertaken by one man and a mere handful of assistants in this generation.

Tokyo, Japan GORDON W. PRANGE

SEVEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPED HISTORY. By Sumner Welles. (New York: Harper and Brothers. I95I. Pp. XViii, 236. $3.oo.)

THIS volume has the merit of brevity and forthrightness. The fact that the author was himself a controversial figure within the framework of his book, which appraises men and events, lays him open to the admonition "Judge not, that ye be not judged." Many readers will ask why Welles beholds the mote that is in his brothers' eyes, without considering the beam in his own. However, this is neither here nor there in a review in the pages of a historical journal, where the book must be judged by its value as a contribution to knowledge, however controversial it may be.

From first to last, Welles is an admirer of Franklin D. Roosevelt-for his decisiveness and promptitude, for his perception and finesse, for his ability to see a given problem in its relation to others, for his knowledge of geography, and for his grasp of the principles of geopolitics. I-is most serious criticism of the President is that he "was occasionally apt to rely too greatly upon a few favorite panaceas for problems that were actually too basic . . . to admit of any easy solu- tion." Welles admits that during Hitler's first years in power, Roosevelt under- estimated the extent of the Nazi menace, but he never underestimated the danger to the United States from Japanese aggression.

Throughout, the author is disposed to palliate Roosevelt's mistakes and short- comings by pointing out that he had to reckon with opposition from Cordell Hull, from cautious officers in the armed forces, from statesmen abroad, and from politicians in hostile camps. He justifies his Far Eastern policy and his policy at Yalta; he attributes his mistakes in these categories to inaccurate information furnished by subordinates and to pressure from military leaders. He argues that it is illogical for critics to allege that Roosevelt's policy has failed when it has

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