BOUNDARIES IN NATURE: EATING WITH ANIMALS IN THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.

CATHERINE OSBORNE

‘On the day that Adam went out of the garden he offered frankincense, galbanum and stacte and spices, as a food offering of soothing odour; and so he did every day in the morning, at sunrise from the day he covered his shame. And on that day the mouths of all the wild animals and the cattle and the birds, and of everything that walks or moves, were shut, so that they could no longer speak (for up till then they had all spoken with one another in a common tongue). And he sent out of the garden of Eden all creatures that were in it; and they were scattered to the places naturally suited to them, according to their kinds and species. And Adam alone, as distinct from all the wild animals and the cattle, did he cause to cover his shame.’ Jubilees 3.27-30

The apocryphal book of Jubilees’ suggests that divisions occur as a result of the Fall, in five different relationships. Firstly the relationship between humanity and God has changed in that Adam now makes a food-offering daily to God, an offering of spices;? this was apparently unnecessary in the days before man fell out with God.’ Secondly the roles of men and women are differentiated: their equality is lost. Woman becomes a child-bearer, dependent on and subject to the man4 Furthermore she receives a name, given by Adam,‘ just as the beasts had been named by Adam before the fall.h Adam is now ‘master’ of the wife who was to have been his ‘ ~ a r t n e r ’ . ~ Thirdly, humanity’s bond with the earth he tills and the plants it grows is severed. It no longer co-operates with his needs but resists; the invention of the ‘weed’ inaugurates man’s hatred for the world he lives i n x Fourthly mankind is newly marked out from the beasts by his use of clothes and the sense of shame that goes with it,’ and by his speech which the other creatures lose when they leave the garden.“’ The communion of all the inhabitants of Eden is disrupted when Adam can no longer communicate with the dumb animals and they cease to know their names. Finally the beasts themselves are set apart and

I Jubilees or the Little Genesis: Ethiopic version ed. R. H. Charles (Oxford, 1895); English translation in H. F. D. Sparks, The A p o c ~ y h a l Old Testanwrit (Oxford, 1984), 1-139. The original, now lost, was in Hebrew, and is usually dated to the second century B.C. Jubilees 3.27.

for the man and his wife. Jubilees 3.24; cf. Genesis 3.16. Jubilees 3.33. Jubilees 3.1-2. Cf. Jubilees 3.3-4 and 2.14. Jubilees 3.25; cf. Genesis 3.18. Jubilees 3.20-22: 26; 30-3 1 .

’Jubilees 3.15-16 describes Adam’s activities in the garden of Eden. None of the fruits is set aside for God but all

l o Jubilees 3.28.

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divided as they leave the unnatural enclosure of the garden and take to their natural habitats," reinforcing divisions of kind and species by means of divisions of place and lifestyle.

In addition to these divisions marked out as an immediate consequence of the Fall, we find one further cause of disunity as evil increases in the period after the Fall; humans and animals alike cease to be vegetarian (as they had been in Eden and after the expulsion from Eden) and start to devour one another.'?

According to Jubilees the natural world is itself characterised by a series of divisions or boundaries which, while inherent in creation as such, assume a divisive significance only after the Fall when the harmony of Eden is ruptured. Boundaries may exist without being observed; they may be observed without being divisive. The use and abuse of boundaries to make a divided world is, on this view, the result of evil. Essentially the writer is offering some explanation, of a more detailed kind than that offered by Genesis itself, for the vital distinctions that underpin humanity's attitudes to God and to the rest of the created world. This may be treated as representative of the Hebraic tradition that is part of what lies behind the Western Christian attitudes which are familiar to us: nevertheless it will not account entirely for the attitude adopted by the West for many centuries, according to which it seems that the world was made to be consumed by man, and that humanity not only needs to exploit it but is encouraged to do so by the express command of his creator. It is fashionable to suggest that this attitude is at least partly responsible for current ecological problems (and this indeed is justified as a rebuke, for sure) and hence it has become common practice to look for some convenient scapegoat, the pernicious influence that corrupted the Hebraic purity of earliest Christianity. Greek philosophy has been suggested as the source of the trouble, as usual.I3

The fact that some features of Greek thought assume a certain degree of anthropocentrism might at first sight seem to lend credence to the idea that it encourages exploitation. However we should not be too ready to assume that all Greek philosophical thought, or indeed popular thought either, took the same stance on this issue, nor does it follow that an anthropocentric viewpoint will necessarily lead to advocating exploitation, or even freedom from moral constraints with regard to the natural world. In this paper I propose to argue that even if some traditions in antiquity seem to be vulnerable to the charge (a case might be made for Stoicism, for instance) there are plenty of mainstream traditions in Greek thought that do not encourage attitudes anything like those characteristic of early modem Europe. Hence if Western Christianity took up these views from its Greek heritage, it did so by selecting from a wide range of alternative views; while Eastern Christianity, likewise endowed with a rich heritage of Greek thought, did not develop that characteristically Western urge to dominate nature by means of science and technology, regardless of cost.

This paper focusses on the ideas that can be traced in the period before Plato, in an attempt to identify the significant boundaries used in fifth century thought about the natural world and how we use it; the examples are taken both from those whom we might call philosophers, sometimes talking about boundaries, and from the implicit assumptions of those who are using the boundaries in history (Herodotus) and medicine (the Hippocratics). Much of the evidence, however, comes from sources themselves much later than the fifth century BC, either because they are reporting the earlier views, or simply for comparison and juxtaposition.

' I Jubilees 3.29. I 2 Jubilees 5.2. Cf. Genesis 1.29-30 and 9.2-3. I' See for example John Passmore, Man's Responsibility f o r Nature (London, 1974), 13- 14. On changing attitudes

to animals and plants in early modem Europe, Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World (London, 1983). Also on the effects of adopting Aristotelianism after the Renaissance, Philip Sherrard, The rape of man and ncitiox, (Ipswich, Golgonooza Press, 1987).

CATHERINE OSBORNE 17

Augustine: rationality and inhumanity

In the City ($God 1.20 Augustine treats it as obvious that the command ‘Thou shalt not kill’ is not to be extended to ‘irrational animals’. If you extend it to animals, why not to plants, he asks. The result of extending it so would apparently be absurd; hence, Augustine concludes, the boundary between what we may kill and what we may not kill is drawn by rationality. Just as we do not apply the commandment to plants which lack senses, so we do not apply it to animals that lack reason. Just because they lack reason, it follows (Augustine claims) that i t was by a just ordinance of the creator that their life and death was put at our disposal and given over to the use of mankind.IJ

Two significant features of Augustine’s argument should be noted. ( I ) The first is the fact that the division between humans and other animals is so great that no reasonable grounds are envisaged for the beasts being objects of moral consideration at all. It is not just that we may kill them in certain circumstances in certain ways: clearly it would be possible to maintain that the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ does not apply to the beasts and yet maintain that some rules apply about the killing of animals; but Augustine goes further. The irrationality of the beasts is taken to justify the strong interpretation of Genesis, according to which when mankind was given ‘dominion’ over all the living creatures the effect was to license humanity to use them alive or dead in any way it pleased.” (2) Secondly, perhaps because of the gulf between mankind and the beasts, no other divisions in the natural world can have any significance. Vegetarianism is not an available option, since no relevant distinction can be drawn between plants and animals: any argument applied to beasts also applies to plants, and indeed more suprisingly, what is true for plants is true for beasts. Furthermore it seems that Augustine does not regard the possession of life as marking out plants and animals in any important way from non-living nature. He argues (in the same chapter) that plants can be said to be alive, his purpose being to show that it can make sense to talk of ‘killing’ a plant. But his evidence for the idea that plants can be said to live is no feature of the plants themselves but quotations of scripture that show that it is traditional to talk of plants as living or ‘being killed’.Ih As regards observable characteristics it seems that plants are virtually indistinguishable from those parts of nature that are devoid of life. Humanity clearly has no more moral obligation to living things that lack reason than to the minerals and rocks of the earth.

With Augustine’s emphasis on the rest of nature’s failure to be human there is little place for other boundaries to play a significant role. Despite the prominence of use by mankind as a feature of nature, the distinction between tame and wild or healthy and harmful, cultivated and uncultivated or even useful and useless effectively disappears from view, just as do the divisions between plants and animals, meat and non-meat, living and non-living.

There is of course, a long-standing tradition in at least some ancienr texts that humankind is marked out significantly from the other animals and occupies a special place between beasts and gods.I7 Nevertheless it is not clear that the nature/culture divide that separated man from the other animals was necessarily seen as indicating that man was a better creature or that

I d Augustine De civ. Dei I .20. Cf. D e mot’. r d . cuth. et de mor. Man. 11, ch. 17 (P.L. 32.1368-72). I’ Genesis 1.28. On the weaker interpretation, man’s lordship over creation need not imply unlimited freedom to use

I(’ De c i i . . Dci 1.20, citing I Cor. 15.36 and Ps. 78.47. the creatures for his own ends just as a proper ruler should be concerned for the welfare of her subjects.

See for example J . P. Vernant, ‘Between the beasts and the gods’, in Myth and Society in A1icicnt G/YWT (transl. J. Lloyd, 1080). reprinted from M. Detienne, The Grrrdens c!f’Ador7is (transl. J. Lloyd, 1077); also M. Douglas. ‘In the nature of things’ in /nip/i(,it Mcuiiiiig.s (1975). 210-29. Cf. Augustine 117 Ep. .lorr1117i.s rid for th . 8.4.7 (P.L. 35.2030-40.).

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animals would be better if they could be like men; nor did it follow that the rest of nature was made for the benefit of mankind alone, or that man was made to use the rest of nature. Indeed it is also clear that some thinkers questioned whether there was a strong distinction between humans and other animals; at the same time as they question the division between man and the gods by rejecting animal sacrifice and the eating of sacrificial meat, the Pythagoreans seem also to abolish the division between mankind and the beasts that could be sacrificed.

Androcles: the lion’s share

When Androcles the runaway slave went to live in the desert with a lion, so Aelian tells us, they lived in the same cave together. But Androcles cooked his portion of meat, while the lion ate his raw.IX The lion remained a lion - eater of raw flesh - and the man remained a man - eater of cooked flesh. In befriending and taming the lion Androcles had not taught i t to eat human food, nor is it implied that it would have been a better animal had he done so. On the contrary the lion, even in its beastly omophagous state, has certain characteristics that are clearly superior to the man. When Androcles and his lion meet again in the arena the man fails to recognise his old friend whose hospitality he had enjoyed for three years, while the lion recognises Androcles at once. The moral we learn from this story, in Aelian’s view, is that memory is a characteristic possessed by animals; but it is worth noting that the memory of the lion is better. than the man’s memory, and moreover that the story is constructed round two occasions on which the lion tries to communicate with the man, despite lacking the power of speech, and eventually succeeds in communicating; while the man on both occasions, although able to speak, does not attempt to communicate until he (rather belatedly both times) becomes aware that the lion has something to say. So far from the dumb animals falling short of human beings, this lion is clearly portrayed as equal to, or better than, the man.

It is thus possible to maintain a strong distinction between man (eater of cooked meat) and beast (eater of raw meat) and indeed between man (possessor of speech) and beast (as lacking speech), and yet not infer either that the beasts are inferior, or that they are outside the scope of a moral code, as for example the rules of hospitality and sharing of the common table, to which the lion unfailingly adheres even in the arena. In thinkers of the fifth century, then, we might expect to find distinctions drawn between humankind and the beasts, but it will not necessarily follow that what we would call anthropocentric attitudes would be built on these distinctions, nor need we expect that the significance of the distinctions would go unquestioned.

Herodotus: the hare’s lot

Herodotus sketches in book 3.108 a theory of nature’s providence which he attributes to the Arabioi. Nature ensures that no species will die out, and to this end she makes creatures that are of a timid nature and vulnerably edible more fertile so that they produce greater numbers of offspring, while the more fierce and predatory beasts produce fewer offspring.Iq However, it does not appear that Nature is provident solely for the benefit of mankind; rather Herodotus implies that her concern is with all species equally, eaters and eaten alike. The hare is remarkable in being more fertile than any other beast (in that it alone can conceive again while pregnant with an earlier conception). This is not because the hare is peculiarly valuable to

I n Aelian De natura anirnalium 7.48; cf. A. Gellius Noc.te.7 Atticue 5.14. ”The same idea occurs in the myth of Protagoras, Plato Protugorm 321b 5-6. and compare also Aristotle Dc piivt .

animalium 696b 23-24.

CATHERINE OSBORNE 19

mankind, but rather because it is prey to all beasts and birds as well as man. Nature’s concern seems to be for the hare as a species in its own right, not as a useful species.

Lions, on the other hand, are less at risk of extinction. Consequently, says Herodotus, each lioness produces only one cub in her whole lifetime, since at the time of giving birth to her first-born she sheds her womb also, in tatters and useless from the damage done to it by the lion-cubs claws. Perhaps there has been some error of mathematics here, since even lions would need to produce two cubs in a lifetime to maintain a stable population however low the mortality rate. At any rate the principle seems clear; it is not that lions are destined for extinction or even reduction in numbers, as we might suppose if nature’s providence were aiming at the well-being of mankind and those creatures that serve the needs of humanity. Nature cares for lions as lions and for hares as hares.

From what Herotodus says about the predators of hares it seems that he would classify animals as beasts, birds and men (and we might suggest that fish would complete the set, only that hares are not usually prey to fish).”’ Man has a place of her own, distinct from the beasts and birds, but it does not apparently give her pride of place in nature’s provident plan. Human beings are merely one class of predators among many that make hares an endangered species.

Regimen 11: fish-eating for a healthy life

It might be thought that the Hippocratic writers took a view of nature that was more anthropocentric than that implied by the passage of Herodotus just discussed. On Regimen I1 46-55, for example, is a survey of animals and plants from the point of view of their use in the human diet and their effect on health. It has been much discussed as evidence of pre- Aristotelian biological taxonomy, but this is clearly mistaken.” The passage is a list of meat, seafood and vegetables, and bears more resemblance to the sort of classification we should expect in a calorie counter than a biological text-book. Certainly it does not constitute evidence that fifth-century thinkers were interested in animals only with regard to their use to mankind. The writer of Regimen I1 was interested in that aspect since he was writing on diet. It may be possible to see some assumptions about wild and cultivated nature,’? the more open and the more enclosed habitat,?’ and the clean or unclean l i fe~tyle ,?~ behind the accounts of the various dietary effects, but it tells us little about how the writer would have answered the question of man’s relation to beasts in general.

In the discourse on edible fish in Regimen I1 the writer observes that fish that feed in muddy places are particularly heavy on the digestion, and moreover that because they absorb some of the gas from their muddy habitat this is taken in by those who subsequently eat the fish and can be positively harmful in effect.?5 It might be tempting to infer that fish who live in such places are in themselves impure; but the writer does not say that. He classifies them as heavy on the digestion and harmful to men, but their effect in relation to human use does not lead to an absolute judgement that they are impure or unclean.

?‘I But see unrh gr. 9.14 where an octopus catches a hare, and 9.17-18 concerning a hare which jumps into the sea

?I As is shown by G. E. R. Lloyd, Sc , ienc~~. Folklore and ldeolo~qy (Cambridge, 1983), 14 n.21. ’? Regimen I1 47: birds which feed on seed are driest, though of course this is not restricted to cultivated seed, but

?3 Ch. 49: wood and outdoor animals are drier than those reared indoors. ?4 Ch. 48: fish vary according to the muddiness of their habitat. 25 Regimen I1 48.

and is killed by a fish.

would include it.

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Heraclitus: the healthy life for fishes

Heraclitus appears to comment on the relativity of terms such as ‘pure’ or ‘harmful’ when he observes (so Hippolytus tells us) that ‘sea-water is most pure and most polluted; drinkable and life-preserving for fishes, undrinkable and detrimental to humans’.?h The claim that both qualities are correctly predicated of the water suggests that Heraclitus is questioning the anthropocentric view that sees sea-water as essentially impure and undrinkable. The fish, i t seems, have as much say on whether the water is life-preserving or not. If we are right, as I think Hippolytus suggests,” to take Heraclitus’ words as having implications for judgements on morality and value, then it also implies that we are not justified in hehaving as if only our viewpoint was valid. Sea-water is not simply grotty, and its uselessness to humaniry does not give humanity a mandate to use it as a cess-pool. Every observer will classify things in relation to his own interests, but that does not mean that another point of view is not also valid and deserving of consideration.?X

Protagoras: the measure

Heraclitus’ stance can fruitfully be compared with what we know of Protagoras. I t might appear that Protagoras’ dictum ‘man is the measure of all things ...’ opted for an anthropocentric viewpoint, in complete contrast to the view I have just outlined for Heraclitus. However it would probably be inappropriate to take Protagoras’ dictum as anthropocentric: rather than understanding anthropos as referring to human beings as a class, we should probably take it to mean ‘a man’, ‘any man’; in each case some individual is the measure.?9 It is true that Protagoras uses anthropos and does not explicitly extend the point to observers outside the human race, and in that respect his assumptions are clearly anthropocentric since he expects the relevant observer to be human. But Plato, in a joke that has some philosophical force, remarks that it is surprising that Protagoras did not say it was a pig or a baboon that is the measure of all things.”’ Certainly if we read Protagoras in the way that Plato interprets him (and we have no authority for doing otherwise)” the stress is not on the humanity of the man in question but his status as observer in relation to the thing on whose existence and character he is passing judgement. Like Heraclitus, then, he is remarking that objectivity is a fiction; I make my judgements according to the way I perceive things, and the fact that someone else sees things differently does not prevent them from seeming (and therefore being for me) the way I perceive them to be. And the same goes, apparently, for any other observer.

Nevertheless while it appears that both Protagoras and Heraclitus would have to agree that there is a sense in which sea-water is both pure and impure (when observed by fishes or

2h Hippolytus Rejictutio 9.10.5 (DK B61). ?’ See Catherine Osborne, Rerh i r~k i r i~~ Early Grwk Philosophy (London, 1987). 164-9. ?x Compare Xenophanes’ observation that human representations of the gods are not superior to the pictures that

lions or horses would draw. His conclusion is, however, that all are wrong, rather than all are correct in their own way. Xenophanes B I S (from Clement Strwn . 5. I 10).

2y On this see J. McDowell, Pluto’s Theaererits, 118; W. K. C. Guthrie, his tor:^ c!f’G/wk P/ii/o.sop/ry 111. I XX-9: and J. P. Maguire ‘Protagoras - or Plato’?’. Phrorirsis 18 (1973). 137 11.41.

3o Plato Theuetrtits 16 I c. ’I Sextus Empiricus ( A h . Math. 7.60) offers the same interpretation of Protagoras‘ dictum. Plato’s interpretation is

spelt out in detail in the T/iiweri~rir.s. Maguire has argued that there is reason to believe that Plato is manipulating Protagoras for his own ends (P/ i r .o / i i~s i s 18 ( 1973). I 15-37) and see also C. Farrar. T/ic Ori,qi/i.s of’ Dc~nroc~/~trtic. Thinkiqg (Cambridge. 1988). 53-6. Since even the ‘man the measure’ dictum is incorporated into the Platonic interpretation i t is not as easy as these scholars suggest to determine what Plato has o r has not done to Protagoras.

Xenophanes’ argument is based on the assumption that animals must be daft.

CATHERINE OSBORNE 21

humans respectively) the moral implications of Protagoras’ thesis are very different from those we have suggested for Heraclitus. So far from concluding, as Heraclitus apparently does, that we cannot assign an absolute value to something on the basis of just one of the various alternative views, Protagoras seems to advocate that I should judge the world in all respects as if there were no observer other than myself. Sea-water is cold, horrid and useless to me. The fact that you enjoy swimming, sailing and wind-surfing has no effect on the way things arefor me; and it is the way things are for me that will govern my actions and my decisions, values and morality; I shall therefore treat the sea as a cess-pool.

If this is a reasonable reconstruction of Protagoras’ point it will be clear that his theory does not count as anthropocentric so much as egocentric. It is not that it marks out a major boundary between mankind and the other animals and takes account of the views of humans but not the rest. Although Protagoras apparently disregards animals,j* the important boundary comes between one observer and another within humanity. No one else’s views can count in such a way as to alter the way the world is for me.

Protagoras: Plato’s myth

Protagoras’ views on the relation between humankind and beasts may possibly be further illuminated if we are entitled to take the myth attributed to Protagoras in Plato’s Proragoras as a rough guide to Protagorean views.” Here we find that mankind is not better- but less well- endowed than the beasts, and seems to be in danger of extinction as a result.74 The idea of an inherent natural superiority in humans seems to be questioned. On the other hand humans are subsequently given two gifts from external sources, firstly the gift of fire from Prometheus and secondly the ability to live together in political communities from Zeus. Human survival being under threat from the beasts, making war on the rest of nature is apparently necessitated by the will to survive, in a way in which it would not be if humans were physically well-endowed, and therefore not immediately threatened.I5 Thus the theory that humans are naturally weaker than the beasts is used as the basis for justifying an attitude of hostility towards them, while the subsequent gift of political skillqh explains why we are in fact rather successful in this effort to conquer nature. Furthermore the appeal to our dependence on the gods for any ability to defend ourselves gives us a hint of the argument familiar from later appeals to Genesis: namely that we have a divine mandate to dominate and subdue nature in whatever way we can; and that the division between us and the irrational animals is of a different order from the differences between other types of creatures - we are marked out by a relationship with the gods unparalleled in any other species; all the rest were equipped only with the natural characteristics allotted by Epimetheus and no more.”

j2 But later in the Theaetc.tus animals are included: 162e, 171c, e. j3 This is not first hand evidence, nor even purporting to cite a work of Protagoras. The most that we can say is that

it is unlikely to be obviously incompatible with the well-known doctrines of Protagoras. Diogenes Laertius lists a work n&pi q s Pv h p ~ y ~a‘raozdro~o~ by Protagoras (9.55) but this may be mere inference from Plato’s myth. Guthrie regards the myth as substantially Protagoras’ own (HGP 111, 63); Maguire is more sceptical (‘Protagoras . . . or Plato? 11 The P r.ora,qorus’, P hionesis 22 ( 1 977), 103-22, pp. 1 1 1-20).

jJ Protagoras 321~2-6; cf. 322bl-3. j 5 322bl-5. 76 322c 1-3; cf. Critias frag. B2 I . 1-6. ‘’ 320d7-321cl; cf. 322a3-8. These features of the myth (making war on the beasts, the intervention of Zeus, the

relationship between men and gods) are the very points that Maguire finds un-Protagorean, Phronesis ( 1977), I 15-7.

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How many of these details of the myth are Protagorean rather than Plato’s construction is far from clear. The idea that there is a basic hostility and difference of outlook not only between humans and beasts but also between individuals within the human race fits coherently with the ‘man the measure’ theory. But the idea that waging war on nature as an enemy is morally justified and sanctioned by divine fiat may be Plato’s intuition. Moral justification for hostility can be found in other thinkers, but the reference to the gift of the gods makes a significant difference and is apparently without parallel in the fifth century.

Anaxagoras: human weaknesses

The idea that man is by nature weak, and if anything less well-endowed than his fellow- creatures, can be traced in other Presocratic thinkers. Democritus apparently extends this to matters of skill, and not just physical strength:

‘Perhaps we are foolish to admire animals for their learning’, says Plutarch in L k sollertia unimaliirm, ‘but Democritus asserts that we are their pupils in all the most important things: the spider in weaving and mending, the swallow in building, the song birds, the swan and the nightingale in singing by imitation.”x

It appears however that Democritus restricted his comments to skills and did not go on to attribute intelligence or rationality to animals (which is what Plutarch himself would like to do). It is more usual to suggest that animals lack human skills as well, and that it is by developing the tachnai that the human race overcomes its physical disadvantages. Plutarch again, reporting Anaxagoras in De fortuna, says:

‘In all other respects we are more unfortunate than the beasts. But by experience and memory and wisdom and skill, according to Anaxagoras, we use them, taking their honey and their milk, herding them together and doing what we will with them, so that here nothing depends on fortune but everything on planning and foresight.’14

Anaxagoras appears to assume that mankind’s mental superiority is his own innate advantage, built in from the start. Plutarch also quotes an extract from Euripides Aeolirs to the effect that men are short on physical strength, but have the ability to subjugate all the beasts of land, sea and air by resourcefulness of mind..“’ The lack of any coherent context for either the quotation from Anaxagoras or that from Euripides makes it impossible to tell whether the sayings were part of an argument to justify human exploitation of the beasts, or (as is equally possible) a way of questioning whether it was justifiable, or, as is perhaps more likely, a less loaded observation that human use of ‘planning and foresight’ for mastering the other animals is unique. It is not clear that either text gave a clear answer on the question of the morality of doing so.

Nevertheless it is worth noticing that these texts do not simply observe man’s use of his wits and superior intelligence, but also stress his weakness in other respects. From the Protagoras myth it is clear that this is an important feature of arguments that attempt to justify human hostility towards the rest of nature on the grounds that it is really a form of defence on the part of the weak and disadvantaged.

Democritus: on the death penalty

A similar line of argument occurs in more detail in a set of sayings of Democritus apparently concerned with the killing of animals. If the killing of animals is a matter of defence, we need

1x Plutarch DCJ so//er~tia aninialirrni 20.974A: Dernocritus B 154. ” Plutarch Defbr~ir/ia YXF: Anaxagoras B2 I B.

‘(I Plutarch Dr s o / / . (117. 959CD and cf. De,fiwtiriiu 98E. Euripides fr. 27 Nauck.

CATHERINE OSBORNE 23

to detine who counts as the enemy. 'Your enemy is not he who wrongs you but he who wishes to' is the definition offered by Democritus.Ji Clearly this would make virtually every animal an enemy, if we are entitled to call animals' actions towards human beings a matter of 'wronging' (&&K&ov) - surely we might dispute this on the grounds that to commit injustice or wrong you must possess an understanding of right and wrong, a moral sense; this is precisely what irrational animals might be thought to lack.." Democritus is apparently undeterred:

and in case we were to conclude that 'contrary to justice' (nap& G i q v ) could not apply to animals, one further saying apparently clinches the matter:

'One ought to kill all the things that do harm contrary to justice in any way',''

'Concerning the killing or not killing of certain animals the matter stands thus: the man who kills those who do injustice and who wish to do injustice is not guilty - indeed to do so contributes more to the general good than not to do so.'"

Clearly Democritus does consider that some animals can be regarded as committing injustice towards people, and considers that this makes them enemies in exactly the same way as human enemies are enemies, and he advocates precisely the same approach to human and animal enemies.j5 Killing animals is a matter of defence and involves the same general considerations of utility as, for example, capital punishment.

However it is worth observing the strictly egalitarian principles of Democritus' position. It is not that animals, being inferior, are to be treated more harshly than human beings or are to be killed and exploited with moral impunity. On the contrary they are to be treated strictly on a par with men, according to the laws, and in accordance with justice. The fact that killing is recommended for some animals follows from the fact that killing is similarly recommended for human enemies and criminals.'h

Thus we should be less surprised at the strange unreasonableness of deciding that the pig committed deliberate crimes when she broke in and trampled the crops,j7 or that the ox committed sacrilege in stealing cakes from the altar,JX than at the sense that animals have equal rights with men. Democritus, after all, does not draw a major boundary between humankind and the beasts, nor does he use the differences between them to justify different standards of treatment. In this respect he is more like the Pythagoreans than Augustine.''

Pythagoreans and Empedocles: on the fate worse than death

It is the Pythagoreans and Empedocles that we are most likely to think of as having a peculiar attitude to the treatment of animals and as drawing the boundaries in nature along different lines from their predecessors and contemporaries. They were the ones who, tradition has it, refused to sacrifice in the normal way and regarded eating beans as equivalent to eating your parents. Does this not suggest that they were questioning the propriety of marking out some

'I B89. '? The beasts' lack of morality and law is implied in Critias B2 1.1-6. 'j B25X. JJ B257. 45 B259: we should treat men the same as we treat animals, that is killing any enemy, unless the laws of the country

Jh B260. '7 Cf. Ovid M ~ 1 u n i 0 i ~ ~ h 0 . s ~ ~ 15. I I I - 13; Aelian De nut. unirn. 10.16.

or religion forbid it. Compare Porphyry De uhstinrntiu I1 22-3.

But note that the Bouphonia ritual presupposes that the ox was not worthy of death, and the slaughter is considered an act of impiety, Porphyry De uh.stinc.nfiu I 1 29.

'' For a very similar theory attributed to Pythagoras cf. Plutarch De So// . An. 964EF.

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boundaries (madanimals, kinhon-kin, as well as man/gods), and replacing them with others? The comparison with Democritus should make us hesitate: it may be correct to say that the Pythagoreans are relocating the kinship boundaries, but it is not necessarily true that the boundary between man and beast is less distinct in Pythagorean thought: their treatment of animals may simply result from a different attitude to their fellow human beings. For Democritus animals are on the same terms as men; a different code for men would mean a different code for animals.

It is not possible to disentangle the web of traditions about Pythagorean beliefs in order to establish exactly what fifth century Pythagorean thought was, and there are conflicting reports about precisely what the dietary rules they observed were, if there were any, which I shall not attempt to resolve. It will be sufficient to consider some of the traditional explanations of why the Pythagoreans had rules about killing and eating.

In support of the idea that the issue was to do with kinship there is a passage in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 9.127-9?O

'Pythagoras and Empedocles and the rest of the Italians declare that we have some fellowship ( K O L V W V ~ X ) not only with each other and with the gods but also with the irrational animals. For there is one breath which pervades the whole world rather in the manner of the soul, and this unites us with them. Therefore if we kill them and eat their flesh we commit injustice and impiety in as much as we are killing our kin. Hence these philosophers advised abstinence from animal food.'

It is easy to find evidence that kinship was involved in Empedocles, whose objections to sacrifice and meat-eating are concerned with the idea that children are slaying their parents and parents are eating their children.s1 Traditionally these ideas have been linked with the notion of transmigration, but it is unnecessary for now to analyse how that could constitute an explanation. What matters is that kinship was the way the Pythagoreans defined our relationship with other animals, and that the rules of kinship governed their treatment. Whereas Democritus had suggested that animals should be treated like pirates and highwaymen, Empedocles places them in the same category as human sons and daughters. Nevertheless in both cases the same rules apply to fellow men: all animate things deserve the same. Aristotle remarks that this does not depend upon formal contracts:

'As everyone somehow surmises, there is by nature a common justice and injustice, even in the absence of community and compacts ... This is what Empedocles says about not killing animate creatures: it is not the case that this is just for some and not for others,

but a law for all, through the broad air it endlessly extends and through the boundless light.'52

Indeed Pythagoras' attitude to his fellow men is also considered remarkable by Diogenes Laertius, who claims that Pythagoras did not punish human beings, either slave or free, when angered.s3 It seems clear that treatment of fellow human beings and treatment of the rest of nature goes hand in hand; as Diogenes has presumably observed, it would make little sense for Pythagoras to protest about hearing a puppy beaten until it screamed,s4 and not to do the same about a slave.

5"This comes in a context concerning justice and how it depends on the existence of God. s 1 See particularly B 137, quoted by Sextus Empiricus in support of this point, A&. Marh. 9.129. 52 Rhetoric I373b6- 17. S T Diogenes Laertius 8.20. s4 Diogenes Laertius 8.36, quoting Xenophanes.

CATHERINE OSBORNE 2s

How far, then, does kinship extend? Apparently for Empedocles the whole world is included: Sextus Empiricus in the passage cited ear lie^'^ implies first that irrational animals are included, but then goes on to say that there is a breath (nv~ijpa) which makes the whole cosmos united as if it were animate. The conclusion concerns abstinence from animal food, but there is some suggestion that what we would define as inanimate parts of the cosmos can be considered animate and akin as well. Similarly the couplet from Empedocles cited by AristotleSh speaks of a law that extends endlessly through the broad air and through the boundless light. Whether we take it that only humans are bound by this law, or that it extends to animals that prey on other animals, it is clear that all possible victims are included. Aristotle concludes that the prohibition was on killing empsuchu, animate things, but again it is unclear what precisely would count as empsuchu for Empedocles; on some interpretations even the elements themselves are thought of as living and thinking,” and it is clear that strife and bloodshed have a cosmic effect not limited to living things in our restricted sense.

In the case of the Pythagoreans as opposed to Empedocles it would be more doubtful whether kinship extended so far, but what are the boundaries is obscure. According to Porphyry Pythagoras taught that all living things (Epwuxa) should be considered as belonging to the same family (6poy~v4),’~ where by ‘living things’ it appears that we are to understand the commonly held notion of what counts as a living thing having life or S O U I . ~ ’ Nevertheless many texts suggest that there were distinctions to be drawn even between animals, and it is certainly doubtful whether plants count as empsuchu.

The dispute as to whether Pythagoras himself, or some or all of his followers, were completely vegetarian or ate some types of meat is discussed in some detail by Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticue 4.1 1.1-3) and Diogenes Laertius (8.19); it has also been given another airing by M. Detienne“’ and 1 do not propose to go over the same ground. Nevertheless certain texts seem to suggest that particular animals or plants were the subject of special attention.

Beasts for the gods

Iamblichus indicates that it is perfectly acceptable to eat those animals which it is right to sacrifice, since human souls do not enter the sacrificial animals.“ Kinship, on this account, is not extended to all living things: sacrificial animals are not our kin. However Iamblichus specifically tells us that this is one of the acousmata, given to the less committed followers who were involved in public life, and later in his Vita Pyhugol-icuh? he gives more precise details of Pythagoras’ attitude to sacrifice, from which it emerges firstly that Pythagoras and his theoretic followers never sacrificed but only the acousmatici, and secondly that the animals allowed for sacrifice even by the acousmatici were more restricted than was usual in Greece: the acousmatici were permitted ‘occasionally’ to sacrifice a cock or a lamb or some other newborn creature (this most likely meant a kid or a sucking pig), but never an ox. When Iamblichus says that those animals that are permitted for sacrifice can be eaten he probably does not mean all

55 Ad,,. Muth. 9.127-9. 5h Rhetoric 1373 b 16- 17. 57 On this issue see Catherine Osborne, ‘Empedocles Recycled’ CQ 37 (1987), 46-7. 5 x Porphyry V.P. 19. 54 But for the idea that the kosmos is en7psuchos, see Diogenes Laertius 8.25. h‘l The Gurdms of’ Adonis (tr. J. Lloyd), 40-49. h ’ V.P. 85. (2 V.P. 150.

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the sacrificial animals recognised by habitual Greek practice but only those allowed by Pythagorean rules.

What basis can we suggest for those rules’? One feature to note is the fact that the animals must be newborn. According to Gellius (citing Aristoxenus)h’ Pythagoras himself ate sucking pigs and young kids. Diogenes Laertius mentions a rule against damaging or destroying ‘any plant that is tame or any animal that does not harm men’.w The boundary is not the division between plants and animals, but that between tame and wild: the tame, both in plants and animals, is protected. The newborn animal, however, seems to need a classification of its own: although it has not had a chance to harm men it has not proved itself man’s friend. If we are right to suggest that tame and wild are Pythagorean categories, the suggestion that they make newborn animals an anomaly fits well enough.h5 The working ox, by contrast, is the beast that most clearly falls into the domestic class as man’s helper.hh Tameness seems to apply not just to types of animal but to individual members of a species, so that Empedocles can evisage cill nature being tame and friendly in a golden age.(”

The gods’ beasts

Distinct from the rules for sacrifice are the rules that mark out certain animals as sacred or sacrosanct: these are the ones that cannot be harmed or eaten. The terminology is somewhat vague: Athenaeus, discussing what is known as the ‘sacred fish’ (iX19iq i ~ p o 5 ) , ~ ~ and considering various candidates for the title, mentions some fish that are considered sacred in that they are to be sacrificed,h9 and others are clearly to be eaten;7” but finally he says ‘others understand the sacred fish to be one that is consecrated (TOV &VETOV), as the sacred ox is’ -that is one set apart as untouchable, not to be used or harmed. It is unclear whether Athenaeus has in mind a particular fish that is sacrosanct and tabu; it seems from Diogenes Laertius (citing Aristotle) that Pythagoras was thought to treat some fish as sacrosanct in this way. He gives as one of the Pythagorean prohibitions ‘not to touch such fishes as are sacred (itpoi): for i t is not right for the same things to be assigned to the gods and to men, just as to slave and free’.71 I t seems that these were fishes set apart not for sacrifice but for a life free of interference, dedicated to the gods. The curious reason, based on the idea that slave is to free as man is to god, may come from Aristotle. It would conflict with my suggestion that Pythagoreanism presupposed that all humans were akin and to receive equal treatment, whether slave or free. I t also fits ill with the idea that Pythagoreanism questioned the traditional gulf between gods and men.

What marks out certain creatures as sacrosanct? We should not be entirely surprised to find that several are regarded as anomalous in a variety of ways. Four specific fish are mentioned as

h3 Cited by Gellius, N o ( . / . At/ . 4.1 I .6. hJ Diogenes Laertius 8.23. Cf. Plutarch De so//. unim. 964EF. h5This is not to say that being on the boundary necessitates any special response, nor am I suggesting that the

newborn are by nature on the boundary of tame and wild. The boundary is defined by the Pythagorean categories. which I am suggesting may be identified as tame and wild. On the general issue see R. Needham. Syniholic. C/assifrca/ion (California, 1979). 43-7.

hh On oxen see J. L. Durand, Sucw’jk~ et lahour en G1.6c.e onc.irrine (Paris-Rome. 1086). h7 See for example Empedocles B 130 (schol. to Nicander Thrricrcu 452). “ Deipnosophistes 7.284 a-c. hy 284a, citing Theocritus.

71 Diogenes Laertius 8.34. 284 b-c.

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tabu for Pythagoras: the uythrinos (perhaps a type of sea bream, notably red in c ~ l o u r ) , ~ ~ the black-tail (yeh&voupo~) ,~~ the sea-nettle (iXvah~'lcprl),~~ and, most notably, the red-mullet

The sea-nettle is a sea anemone, and one of Aristotle's boundary crossers, in that it resembles the testacea insofar as it adheres to the rocks but unlike proper testacea it has no shell but just a fleshy body.7h It resembles animals insofar as it has sensation and eats fish, but it resembles plants in that it does not (apparently) evacuate any It is tempting to see the ambivalence between plants and animals as a key feature, given that there is some reason to think the boundary between plants and animals may be important for the Pythagoreans. If in some respects our kinship ends at this boundary the sea-nettle may be the ambiguous one on the boundary line. Similarly its carnivorous nature, which fits ill with its plant-like immobility, makes it anomalous, as does its ability to sting.

Of the characteristics of the black-tail we know less, but the fish called eryrhrinos is the subject of some attention in the ancient writers on fish. It is regularly associated with two other fish (cp&ypo<, ~ ~ T K X T O S ) ~ ~ and sometimes with the i i q ~ which is also known as the sacred fish.7' The most remarkable feature of the erythr-inos seems to be that it has a white triangular heart,x" although Aristotle also mentions on a number of occasions a type of fish called 2pu6pivo~ which is peculiar for being hermaphrodite.x' It seems again that boundary crossing (failing to observe the male/female boundary) may be in question, but we also know that the Pythagoreans were interested in hearts - the heart is one of the four principles of animals for Philolaus and is said to be the principle of soul and perception,x? and heart itself is a forbidden food." Furthermore triangles have an important place in Pythagorean mathematics and number- mysticism, and white is the colour we find prescribed for Pythagorean clothing, burial garments and certain sacred or sacrificial victims.xd It is thus not surprising to find importance attached to the heart of the eryrhrinos.

The fourth fish, zpiyhq or red-mullet, is one about which we know a good deal. According to Aelian it was tabu both at the mysteries of Eleusis and at the sanctuary of Hera at Argos.*' It is also associated with Hecate and ArtemkXh Three characteristics seem to be considered remarkable: (1 ) Its eating habits are revolting; it is held to be gluttonous and to feed on dead bodies, and it apparently takes delight in foul and polluted food.X7 This might suggest that the Pythagorean prohibition concerned the impurity of the fish; however two other features indicate

(zpiyhTl).7'

72 Diogenes Laertius 8.19. 73 Diogenes Laertius 8.19.

74 Aulus Gellius N.A. 4.1 I . 12. 75 Diogenes Laertius 8.19. 7h Aristotle H.A. 53 I a 3 I -b I . 77 H.A. 531 b 8-10. 7x Athenaeus Deipn. 7.300e. 7y Athenaeus Deipn. 7.300f; and cf. 284c.

Athenaeus Deipn. 7 . 3 0 1 ~ . G.A. 741 a 35; H.A. 538a20, 567a27-9: cf. G.A. 755b20, 760a8. But on the confusion over what fish is in question see D' Arcy Thompson, Glossary ofGr.eekfrshes, 66.

xz [lamblichus] Theol. Arithm. 25.17-26.3. x 3 Aulus Gellius 4.1 1.12. x4 E.g. white clothing, Diogenes Laertius 8.19. White cocks are the subject of special rules, Diogenes Laertius 8.34. xs Aelian De nut. anim. 9.65 and cf. 9.5 I . Xh Athenaeus 325 b-c. x7 Aelian De nut. anim. 2.42.

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its sanctity. (2) It eats the sea hare (hctycb~) which is deadly to humans.XX This makes it the friend and ally of human beings, the same reasoning as that which grants the working ox immunity. (3) It gives birth three times a year which makes it anomalous since all other fishes give birth once or at most twice a year.xy The association with three-ness is reflected in its name and its association with Hecate.

The idea that certain creatures are not for sacrifice but are sacred in the sense of untouchable is not peculiar to Pythagorean thought. Herodotus is clearly familiar with it and employs the notion in analysing the attitude of the Egyptians towards their crocodiles.”I Herodotus observes particularly that the sacred beast is often treated as if it were human: he comments on features such as mourning for a beast when it dies and carrying out elaborate funeral rites,” and the curious Egyptian custom of living with animals, for example with cats.’? Relocating these sacred animals within the human category means that they are treated as human: sacrifice and eating of human beings is not the done thing.

Conclusion

In considering Pythagoreanism, Empedocles and Democritus I have been suggesting that the tendency is to reduce the distinction between humanity and the beasts and treat at least some if not all beasts as significantly akin to the human race. However, there is a sense in which this attitude is anthropocentric, not in the sense that the animals are there for humans to use and exploit at will - clearly they are not, particularly in Pythagoreanism - but in the sense that their right to consideration stems from their kinship with humanity, not from their beastly nature. Man’s viewpoint is the one that counts - man who partakes in justice and the rational soul - and the beasts share her viewpoint to the extent that they can be described as just, or unjust, or as possessing something like the human soul.

In this respect Heraclitus seems to stand apart from the rest. He, as we saw, does not assume that only the human viewpoint is valid: fishes have a markedly different view of sea-water, a distinctly non-human viewpoint, but it seems that their view is valid too. Several other Heraclitean sayings appear to confirm this impression that for Heraclitus human beings are not any more correct in their judgements about what is valuable than the beasts: ‘Pigs wash in mud and farmyard birds in dust and ashes’;y3 ‘it seems that each animal has its own pleasure . . . the pleasure of horses, dogs and men are different - so Heraclitus says that donkeys would prefer rubbish to gold, for food is more pleasing to donkeys than

It is true that Heraclitus elsewhere seems to suggest that there is the possibility of a line of thought that gets above such differences, but for the most part, he claims, humans are governed by their appetites which are no better than those of beasts.y5 For Heraclitus it is not the fact that the other creatures are nearly like us that is the basis for morality, but the recognition that although they are very different from us and take a quite opposite view of many things, that does not in itself make them inferior. Thus Heraclitus apparently rejects, what Democritus

x X Aelian De nut. anim. 9.5 I ; Pliny N . H . 32.8: Athenaeus 325c. xy Aelian De nar. anim. 9.5 I ; 10.2; Aristotle H . A . 543a5; Pliny N . H . 9.162.

Herodotus 2.69; cf. 2.65. ‘)I 2.46.1-4. ” 2.36.2; 65.2; 66-7. y7 B37, Columella On agric~ulfure 8.4.4. y4 B9, Aristotle Nit,. Eth. 1176a3, a5-8. ‘)5 B29. Clement Sri.oni. 5.9.59.4-5.

CATHERINE OSBORNE 29

would surely accept, the idea that mankind's values are the only true values. For Heraclitus, unless we can get above the appetites and desires (which are the basis of choice in donkeys too) we have no reason to judge a thing choiceworthy, on the basis of human views alone. The donkey's preference is on the same basis and equally justified.

The boundary between man and the other animals is only one of the boundaries that are significant; doubtless others, and perhaps the division between plants and animals particularly, should also be taken into account. However, it is apparent even now that maintaining a strong distinction between humankind and the rest of nature does not necessarily lead to anthropocentric views or to attitudes of exploitation; nor does it follow that if we identify humans as close to the other creatures, a specific moral attitude to the beasts or the natural world will result. There is little to support any idea that fifth century Greek attitudes lie behind the views taken up by Augustine and Western scientific and technological developments.4h

" Thanks to the audience at the seminar on Greek history at the Institute of Classical Studies in London, and to the Classical Society at King's College Cambridge: also in particular to Geoffrey Lloyd, Richard Sorabji, John Ackrill and Rodney Needham for detailed comments: and to the British Academy for a Post-doctoral Research Fellowship.