bop - marketing the $100 laptop
TRANSCRIPT
ANANYA J A I N ( 1 2 2 0 / 1 5 ) | CH LO E L E A L ( 1 2 3 5 / 1 5 ) | S A LON I PAR I KH ( 4 0 2 8 / 2 1 )
BHARA T L ODHA ( 0 9 6 / 5 1 ) | E SHA L A KRA ( 0 1 3 2 / 5 1 ) | P RA SHAN TH ( 0 2 6 8 / 5 1 )
P R I Y A T AM RA J ( 0 2 7 8 / 5 1 ) | HAR SHA RA YA ( 0 2 9 4 / 5 1 )
MARKETING THE“$100 LAPTOP”
MARKETING TO THE BOTTOM OF PYRAMID
- WHY DID IT NOT SELL?
With the targetedpopulation not havingaccess to basic amenities,a laptop and propereducation were notconsidered a necessity.
WHY DID IT NOT SELL?
Is it aNECESSITY?
The feedback on theprototypes was given bythe government, criticsand experts in theindustry, not by the peoplewho would end up usingit. This might have led to aproduct that was notappealing to the BOPconsumers, since theirwants and requirementshad not been considered.
Is it APPEALING tothe consumer?
Is there anASPIRATIONAL VALUE
attached?
The product wasmarketed solely on thebasis of its low price, andnever with the idea ofmatching the developedcountries’ lifestyle /education.There was no generationof aspiration for theproduct.
Is a SOCIALIDENTITY being
created?
There was no presence ofthe product in thetargeted market. Thismeant there was no socialidentity to comply with byusing the product.Also, the product was notan innovation that wouldlead to an elated socialimage.
MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”
“I consider that criminal, because childrenshould me making things… not running (MS)Office automation tools.”Negroponte wanted the product to bepathbreaking in every aspect, be it the OS,the battery, or the software. He put toomuch of himself in the ‘idea’.The industry was constantly evolving,whereas Negroponte was staunch aboutnot adding features in the name ofmaintaining costs.
(NOT VIABLE) VENTURE
Idea = Anything + You Opportunity = Idea + Action
Not being able to deliver the productat the $100 price point hampered thetrust build up.The product was proposed in 2002,and even by 2007, production had notcommenced. This huge time delay gave an openingfor competitors to enter the marketwith alternative choices.
MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”
“The appeal was obviously the price, and people realized that you can do one laptopper child.”
But a BOP consumer will buy on the basis of need/appeal, not price.
MISFITTING STRATEGIES
For a supply side push strategy product, trying to generate a demand pull would notwork.
The product being of discretionary use, would have a fluctuating demand when theconsumer belongs to BOP.
It was publicized that the price would come down to $100 with economies of scale. Thisled to postponement of purchase by governments, giving time to competitors for
coming up with comparable products.
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MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”
Competition from well known brands like Intel, AMD, Encore Software
BRAND EQUITY
Governments might be more inclined towards buying from established brand ratherthan a new enterprise due to trust issues
OLPC withheld from production until confirmation of orders. This gives a signal of lowconfidence of OLPC in their own products as they are not ready to take risks
Open criticism from well known players in the industry like Bill Gates and Craig Barrettfurther diminished the Brand Equity of OLPC
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MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”
OLPC was planning to not add/change features at a later time -> Wrong strategy intechnology space where technology changes rapidly
TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
Lack of parity with other mainstream computing devices -> Need for further training tobe employed -> Making it less attractive for government to invest in.
Technology space is ecosystem based where creating a new ecosystem is not easywhich OLPC was trying to do. [Breaking away from wintel ecosystem]
Rather than using well established and growing mobile networks; use of proprietarymesh networks to access internet
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MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”
The cost involved in manufacturing laptops & desktops was going down globally
COMPETITION
Intel launched a cheaper version of Windows run laptop called the Classmate PC at $285 andwith better features when compared to the OLPC laptop
In May 2007, Brazil reportedly was more inclined to order Classmate PCs over OLPClaptops
Intel bundled its Classmate PCs with education software and teacher training support, and wasable to start commercial production within 18 months from ideation
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MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”
Smaller players such as the India based Encore Software were developing customised laptopswhich featured regional languages for the local population
Mobilis PC developed by Encore Software had already started providing few evaluation units toBrazilian and Indian governments
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AMD was also developing its own low cost laptop. With the increasing number of options,governments were delaying their purchase decision so as to get the best low cost laptops
at a reasonable price
ANANYA J A I N ( 1 2 2 0 / 1 5 ) | CH LO E L E A L ( 1 2 3 5 / 1 5 ) | S A LON I PAR I KH ( 4 0 2 8 / 2 1 )
BHARA T L ODHA ( 0 9 6 / 5 1 ) | E SHA L A KRA ( 0 1 3 2 / 5 1 ) | P RA SHAN TH ( 0 2 6 8 / 5 1 )
P R I Y A T AM RA J ( 0 2 7 8 / 5 1 ) | HAR SHA RA YA ( 0 2 9 4 / 5 1 )
MARKETING THE“$100 LAPTOP”
MARKETING TO THE BOTTOM OF PYRAMID
- WHY DID IT NOT SELL?