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Joseph McGarry Evangelical Theological Society Annual Meeting“Theological Anthropology Beyond Metaphysics: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Anthropology and Formation in Christ”14 November, 2012

Formation in Christ is a curious doctrine when considered dogmatically or systematically. This is

because a doctrine of spiritual formation might be considered a “downstream” doctrine, as it

incorporates prior theological categories. One operates—explicitly or implicitly—with, among others,

specific doctrines of pneumatology, anthropology, holiness, Christology, ecclesiology, and sanctification

because, systematically considered, formation in Christ lies at their intersection. Today, I will specifically

address one of those “upstream” doctrines—anthropology—its relationship with theologies of Christian

formation, and the downstream consequences of upstream development. We begin with anthropology

because, in many ways, it sets parameters regarding what formation in Christ can and cannot become;

anthropology asks, “What is human being, that it may be formed in Christ?”

To assist the conversation and highlight the specific contributions to theologies of formation,

this essay will make a distinction between theological and philosophical anthropology. Theological

anthropology will be humanity considered in reference to the biblical categories of humanity in Adam

and humanity in Christ. Though the biblical text speaks at considerable length regarding humanity and

human being, affirming our body, mind, spirit, and soul, it is somewhat silent regarding how these

complex aspects of human being interact. Theological anthropology is primarily concerned with what it

means for humanity to be fallen in Adam, renewed in Christ, and living in anticipation of Christ’s return.

Specifically delineating how body, spirit, mind, and soul interact is more properly a philosophical

investigation, and I will speak of philosophical anthropology as the discipline which addresses the

aspects of human being, body, spirit, mind, and soul, their interaction, and how we talk about it.1

Consequently, a theology of formation in Christ necessitates both a theological and philosophical

anthropology, even if such a differentiation is rarely made, as it attempts to articulate how body, spirit,

1 In similar fashion, Dallas Willard draws attention to this distinction as he discusses the interaction between spirit, heart, will, mind, body, and social relations in Dallas Willard, The Great Omission (NY: Harperone, 2006), pp 55-56.

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mind, and soul exist and relate in Adam in sin then renewed in Christ, and function within Christian life

as humanity awaits Christ’s return.

As it now stands, treatments of spiritual formation almost universally work from an Aristotelian

or Thomistic philosophical body/soul metaphysic which speaks of the soul being shaped through specific

behavior. The haibits—with their point of reference at the level of being—transform us being into

certain types of people. This assumed anthropology is reflected in theologies of theosis, the work of the

reformers, and the more popular work of Dallas Willard and Richard Foster. But what happens when a

philosophical anthropology moves beyond Aristotle? What happens when you go upstream and

reconsider some of this work and begin with a formal ontology that, a-priori, refuses the categories

believed most germane to spiritual formation?

Today, through an unfortunately brief foray into Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s technical theological and

philosophical anthropology, I hope to accomplish two concurrent tasks. Initially and most importantly, I

hope to demonstrate this to be a substantial issue within theologies of spiritual formation: how does

anthropology hang together with formation, and what if you’re unconvinced by the Greeks? If and when

one moves beyond what one might consider this classic Thomistic or Aristotelian philosophical

anthropology, in which the soul as a specific ‘thing’ is shaped and developed through intentional habit,

significant downstream implications suddenly emerge which force us to reconsider formation in Christ.

Secondly, I hope to show that, in specific, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s work and his consequent treatment of

Christian formation provides a stimulating way forward. We begin with a brief overview of Bonhoeffer’s

thought.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s oft misunderstood and at times confusing work Act and Being has had a

muddled reception over the decades as interpreters have struggled to come to terms with what exactly

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he is attempting to achieve through the text.2 The text is a highly provocative work of philosophical and

theological anthropology. Specifically, Bonhoeffer is deeply interacting with Martin Heidegger’s work as

he wrestles through the philosophical implications of his Christology.

Consequently, in order to grasp Bonhoeffer’s work, a very brief and incomplete overview of

central aspects of Heidegger’s work Being and Time is in order.3 Published in 1927, Being and Time had

an immediate impact on the philosophical world because Martin Heidegger radically altered how

philosophy approached the question and meaning of being. No longer debating the metaphysical

substance of being, Heidegger questions the place of dialogue regarding metaphysical substance in the

first place. He challenged the very discourse as he insisted that all we can talk of is the way of being

which he calls “being-there”, or Dasein.4 Heidegger’s great philosophical achievement in Being and Time

was shifting the field of conversation from the substance and metaphysics of being into the

interpretation and hermeneutics of existence. Being is. But it can exist in many ways, and all we can do

is interpret the multifaceted shapes existence takes. Thus, Dasein is not a “thing” as if it could be

considered in abstraction from a located and interpreted existence, let alone a “thing” with a soul that

can be shaped or formed. Additionally, we must note Heidegger’s evaluative criteria by which he

interprets lived existence: authenticity or inauthenticity. For Heidegger, as the individual chooses her

particular way of being human—the shape her existence takes—she does it with reference to how she

2 Clifford Green notes over nine different interpretations of Act and Being before ultimately concluding it is a work of theological anthropology. Clifford Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, revised edition, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), pp 68-70. Bonhoeffer also restates the core aspects of this argument in his 1930 University of Berlin inaugural lecture, “The Anthropological Question in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology” at DBWE 10:389 ff.3 Though Heidegger would continue writing during Bonhoeffer’s lifetime, Being and Time is the only work Bonhoeffer interacted with. Hence, Bonhoeffer’s work will draw exclusively from this early work and will not interact at all with other aspects of Heidegger’s corpus. 4 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p 14. Emphasis original.

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understands herself to be able to exist in any given moment. What this means is that existence, and

therefore human being, is interpreted in reference to its specific way of existing and in dialogue with

what it could have become at any given moment.

Thus, a few central aspects of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time become quite important for

Bonhoeffer’s work, and will tease out in his doctrine of formation in Christ—particularly his use of

Dasein in reference to being.5 As I mentioned, Dasein is the being of the subject who is interpreting his

existence, knowing himself living either in authenticity or inauthenticity to his potential to exist in the

world.6 Bonhoeffer puts it like this, “Dasein is already its possibility, in authenticity or inauthenticity. It is

capable of choosing itself in authenticity and of losing itself in inauthenticity. The decisive point is,

however, that it already ‘is’ in every instance what it understands and determines itself to be.”7 And

again, Dasein, has no self-existent nature—it’s not a thing— which can be spoken of in abstraction. It

already is in reference to what it understands itself as to be capable of being, and you cannot discuss

Dasein apart from the interpretation of being found in the present, reflective, moment.8 This means,

quite significantly, that human being has no pre-existent metaphysical composition. It is not some-thing

to be considered, and—very importantly—is not some-thing which can be shaped, molded, or formed,

let alone transformed into Christlikeness. Heidegger’s great achievement is shifting the field of

conversation away from a substance metaphysics of being into the interpretation and hermeneutics of

concrete existence.

5 Bonhoeffer also restates the core aspects of this argument in his 1930 University of Berlin inaugural lecture, “The Anthropological Question in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology” at DBWE 10:389 ff.6 DBWE 2:70. See also Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 68-69.7 DBWE 2:70. See also Being and Time, 68-69.8 DBWE 2:68, See also Being and Time 183.

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Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger is not without its problems. Specifically, though Heidegger’s

inherently non-theistic approach to Dasein allows him to speak of being without reference to God,

Bonhoeffer’s specifically Christian approach compels him to speak of being in reference to Christ’s

resurrection. Consequently, there is a transcendent ‘what’ of being which Bonhoeffer must

acknowledge; his Christology and theology of the resurrection hold that Christ renewed all humanity

and human being through the resurrection.9 And yet he must address it without either making it a

possibility for the form human being can take, or treating it as an external object of knowledge which

could be treated in abstraction.10 In effect, Bonhoeffer has to acknowledge the theological transcendent

reality of all humanity in Christ without making living in reference to this reality something

philosophically or existentially possible prior to God’s revelation. Just as Dasein isn’t some-thing,

Bonhoeffer has to treat this-thing—all human being renewed in Christ—as if it’s no-thing until and

unless the person encounters God’s revelation in Christ.

Act and Being, therefore, portrays a theological anthropology—the reality of a transcendent

metaphysic—through a philosophical anthropology that denies its existence. Bonhoeffer maintains the

tension through an appreciation of the Lutheran doctrine of the bound will, understood in reference to a

term he coins, Wiesein. Wiesein (“how-being” which corresponds to Dasein’s “there-being”) draws upon

the relationship between Dasein’s existence and its potential-to-be in any given moment; “how” we are

determines the possibilities we see our Dasein to be able to take and, therefore, the shape and form of

existence.11 The heart turned in upon itself believes its only possibilities to exist is from the self, thus

binding the individual away from any transcendent possibility-to-be. Life in reference to the self binds

9 See DBWE 1:144, 190, 286-287; DBWE 2:112, 134; DBWE 3:65; DBWE 4:214-217; and DBWE 6:83, 91 for various articulations of the renewal of being as complete through the resurrection.10 See Bonhoeffer’s critique of the objectification of being at DBWE 2:70-72, and 10:394, 404-405.11 DBWE 2:137-138.

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the individual, forbidding them to live in reference to their transcendent reality in Christ. Thus,

humanity’s transcendent reality is genuinely inaccessible because it isn’t a possibility for the form Dasein

can take. The person is truly bound, and cannot be free apart from the inbreaking Word of God in Jesus

Christ. This is why vision plays such a key role in Bonhoeffer’s theology, particularly in the conclusion of

Act and Being. You cannot live in reference to Christ until you see him beyond yourself. Prior to God’s

revelation, Wiesein binds Dasein to only be able to exist in reference to the self—which Bonhoeffer calls

being in the mode of Adam. After revelation of reality in Christ, Wiesein can exist in reference to its

eschatological potential-to-be in Christ—which he calls being in the mode of Christ. When this occurs,

the individual exists in the mutually constitutive unity of act (Wiesein) and being (Dasein), as both are

ordered in Christ.

Bonhoeffer’s complex, theological and philosophical work has a few important downstream

considerations. Theologically, all human being is completely renewed in Christ through the resurrection,

and this necessarily removes all talk of progress, growth, and formation away from any reference to

being in Christian life. Precisely because all humanity is already new humanity, complete and entire in

Christ. Positively stated, there is no place to grow to because one is already everything in Christ.

Philosophically, Bonhoeffer reflects the fullness of humanity at the level of being through his use of

Dasein. Human being cannot be treated with respect to progressively developmental categories because

it is a conceptual unity in Dasein. Even moreso, his conscious adoption Heidegger’s categories tacitly

rejects metaphysics in the first place. The way of being is key for Dasein, not the “stuff” of being. The

how of being, not the what. Looking downstream, this implies Bonhoeffer will not call formation in

Christ the shaping of the soul, or the inner dimension of the self, as if it was a thing that could be treated

apart from the rest of the aspects of being (mind, spirit, body), or had anywhere to progress to.

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Consequently, by the time he speaks of growth and con-formation to Christ, his conceptual die

has already have been cast, so to speak, and many common categories are already off the table.

Formation in Christ simply cannot talk about developing habits that shape the soul, or work through

categories of progressive development of human being because the theological and philosophical

categories deny that from the outset. I believe this reflects the genuinely unique aspect Bonhoeffer’s

theology brings to spiritual formation discourse: what is Christian formation if you’ve rejected the

Greeks?

So how does Bonhoeffer hold these points and still have a developed theology of formation?

Broadly stated, he accomplishes it in two ways. First, by theologically articulating progress in Christian

life in reference to a way of being, instead of in reference to being itself.12 Secondly, he treats formation

as an ecclesial concept and speaking of Christ taking a specifically social form. He treats formation as

Christ taking form in the church and thus gives it a primarily social shape—as the church exists in a

certain way that corresponds to its being in Christ. Which, it seems to me, is the precise logical appeal

Paul makes in the pastoral epistles. You are in Christ, therefore act in a way which faithfully

corresponds to your being in Christ.

Here, I’ll transition into a brief overview of how Bonhoeffer understands Christian formation as

the precise way Christ exists as community. Bonhoeffer’s doctoral dissertation, Sanctorum Communio,

explores the theological and sociological nature of community. Among other things, the text

theologically interprets a central sociological insight regarding the relationship between individual will

and its role in structuring community. It spends considerable time developing the concept of will within

12 Though beyond the purview of this paper, note how he describes the process of sanctification in terms of increasingly living in harmony with the being one has by right of Christ’s resurrection and baptism into the church. See DBWE 4:253-280.

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the church, specifically highlighting its renewal in God’s justification. In justification the will to self is

renewed as the will for God and for neighbor, and his argument investigates the relationship between

individual will and community, showing community to be, essentially, the community of wills.13 A

sociological mark of community is this common, unified, communal will towards something. Just as

individuals possess a will which can be exercised in daily life, so too does the community.14 As an

example—think of a the common will the Chicago Bears defense possesses on a Sunday afternoon, and

how this unified desire in the same direction allows them to be treated as “The Defense”, instead of

simply naming off all 11 players at the same time. This notion of a collective person is quite important in

the text. It underscores a significant point for Bonhoeffer, that, sociologically speaking, communities can

become collective persons and be treated as people. Looking forward, we can note Bonhoeffer’s

theological insight that a collective person that wills can will itself either in harmony or conflict with the

will of God and therefore emerge as a certain kind of collective person.15

Bonhoeffer ties his comments regarding will and collective into the sociological concept of a

community’s objective spirit. He is drawing attention to another insight, namely that, “where wills unite,

a ‘structure’ is created—that is, a third entity, previously unknown, independent of being willed or not

willed by the persons who are uniting.”16 Through the way in which persons originate and communal

wills are identified, both being sociological insights, a third entity—what he calls the objective spirit—

emerges and encapsulates the social ethos defining the community’s will. And, a community’s objective

13 DBWE 1:83. 14 Ibid., 103.15 As will be developed below, it is also significant to note that Bonhoeffer’s theology is inherently sociological because of the precise way in which Christ has taken all humanity into his body, in reality, through the resurrection. Reality as a concept and its role within Bonhoeffer’s theology has been helpfully developed by Andre Dumas. See Dumas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality, trans Robert McAfee Brown, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968) 32-37.16 DBWE 1:98.

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spirit can be treated as a collective person and given a personal character—the ethos behind the will. So

you might think of the 1974 Pittsburgh Steelers “Steel Curtain” defense, and what values it stood for—

kindness and gentleness are not among them.

All of this is crucial because it allows him to speak of communities as a person and, importantly,

shows how community can be treated as an individual. This is particularly relevant as he considers how

Christ takes form in the world as a collective individual borne through the communal will of the church.

And, again, it is significant to note that none of this formation has anything to do with human being in

and of itself.

Bonhoeffer demonstrates the theological significance of these sociological realities by putting

them in conversation with the biblical categories of humanity in Adam and humanity in Christ. Humanity

in Adam is the collective individual representing the bound will as objective spirit. Individually, and as

community, the human race was created to will God’s will, “the will to community and the will to

embrace God’s purpose.”17 Instead, the individual defies the divine will in service of the self. Bonhoeffer

portrays this self-willing objective spirit as Adam existing as community: fallen humanity as collective

person.18 In rising up against God in rejection of her created will, the individual fragments herself from

the community, making God’s community (the collective person who wills the very will of God)

impossible.19 This is precisely the philosophical dynamic he described through Wiesein in his Habilitation.

The will-to-self as objective spirit is humanity in Adam bound to itself and existing as a collective person.

This allows him to position Christ’s work as the second Adam, renewing through obedience what

Adam destroyed through disobedience, and thus to reflect the biblical symmetry of Romans 5. Christ, as

17 Ibid., 263.18 Ibid., 107.19 Ibid., 107-109.

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the second Adam, renewed human being and took it into himself, establishing the church in his body

through the resurrection.20 Additionally, through justification, the individual’s will is renewed and can

now begin willing God’s will, individually and communally, such that a new type of collective individual

takes form in the world. This is the formal, ontological, structuring of the church as collective individual

and is the transcendent metaphysic he works around in Act and Being. Christ’s resurrection brought all

humanity into himself; the church, as Christ’s body, takes a specific shape as it exists in space and time

—through the collective spirit of humanity renewed in Christ and willing God’s will. The church is Christ

existing as community, precisely because (at a formal, ontological, level) it is Christ’s body, and

(sociologically understood) it is the collective individual emerging through the objective spirit of the

renewed will.

Christ’s presence as community is a deeply theological concept which permitted a sociological

interpretation that opens a series of conceptual paths for him to develop his unique theology. He

possesses theological tools to develop an extensive theology of formation in Christ without any

reference to being. Act and Being’s anthropological fine tuning sets the parameters Discipleship and

Ethics built upon as Bonhoeffer developed the social form of Christ in the world. Though he never

returns to a proper sociological investigation of the church, he also never departs from the primarily

social understanding of Christ’s presence in the world. This is how he can treat ethics as formation,

because Christ takes form through the behavior of the church. From early to late, Bonhoeffer notes that

Christ takes form among us. As he says in the Ethics, “He who bore the form of the human being can

only take form in a small flock; this is Christ’s church. “Formation” means, therefore, in the first place

Jesus Christ taking form in Christ’s church.”21

20 Ibid., 152. 21 DBWE 6: 96. Italics original.

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This is how Bonhoeffer’s upstream work cashes out, as he puts forth an elaborate and extensive

theology of formation in Christ that speaks of progress (as Christ increasingly takes form in the world

through the church) through a specific way of existing in the world—willing the will of God for God and

neighbor. But, he does all this from a categorically different metaphysical presupposition. And this is

where, I believe, Bonhoeffer’s theology can be most instructive for those doing constructive work in the

relationship between anthropology and formation in Christ. Particularly for those theologians working

from a post-Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophical anthropology, Bonhoeffer reinforces that formation

need not be soul shaping after virtue or that being shaped in Christlikeness means growing in Jesus’s

character. One can speak of developing certain ways of being, we can be more faithful to our holy

character in Christ. but being remains static, secured in Christ through the resurrection. The soul doesn’t

have to grow anywhere. Thus, on aggregate, Dietrich Bonhoeffer can become a very helpful

conversation partner. He not only illumines requisite systematic issues underneath a theology of

formation, articulating theological loci to be worked through, but his particular contribution is quite

provocative as we consider formation within the local church.

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