bolivia's maritime claim: alternatives to solve a centenary dispute by vanya candia
DESCRIPTION
This paper is an anlysis of the alternatives that Bolivia should seek in order to improve its access to the Pacific Ocean. It includes an alaysis of interdependence and conflict.TRANSCRIPT
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
1
Bolivia’s Maritime Claim: Alternatives to solve a centenary dispute
1. Background information and definition of the problem
Bolivia and Chile fought the War of the Pacific in 1879; the war began after Chile invaded
Antofagasta because Bolivia did not comply with the Boundary Treaty of 18741.
After the War, Bolivia signed the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” in 1904, and in its position as
the defeated nation, resigned to its access to the Pacific Ocean.
Since 1910 in many occasions Bolivia has unsuccessfully tried to regain sovereign access to the
sea through different diplomatic efforts. After negotiations failed in 1978, Bolivia severed
diplomatic relations with Chile. Today Chile is the only country in America with which Bolivia
does not have diplomatic relations.2
Bolivia fought different wars through its history; however the only one that left a deep
psychological and political effect on its population is the War of the Pacific. This can be seen by
the following examples:
Bolivian Gas Conflict (Guerra del Gas): In October of 2003 people in Bolivia took to the
streets to protest against a possible decision of the government to export Bolivian gas to the
Mexican and Californian markets via a Chilean port. 67 people died, more than 150 were injured
and the elected president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was expelled out of the country.3
Bolivian gas referendum: In July of 2004 Bolivia held a referendum to decide on its natural gas
resources. Five questions were asked to the population, one of them related to Chile, asking
whether or not a citizen agrees with President Carlos Mesa's policy of using gas as a strategic
resource to achieve a sovereign and viable route of access to the Pacific Ocean. 56% of the 2.7
million Bolivians that participated in the referendum answered with “yes” to this question.4
New Bolivian Constitution: A new Constitution entered into force in February of 2009 enacted
by President Evo Morales. Article 2675 proposed a new element that was not before in the
1 Gonzalo Bulnes, Guerra del Pacifico: De Antofagasta hasta Tarapacá (Valparaíso: Sociedad Imprenta y
Litografía Universo, 1911), 121. 2 Presidencia de la Republica de Bolivia, Libro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano (La Paz: Dirección de
Informaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica de Bolivia y Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2004), 15. 3 Carlos Mesa Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2008), 249.
4 Ibid., 260.
5 Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, (Congreso Nacional, 2008). Capítulo cuarto.
Reivindicación Marítima, 61.
Artículo 267. I. El Estado boliviano declara su derecho irrenunciable e imprescriptible sobre el territorio que le dé
acceso al océano Pacífico y su espacio marítimo.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
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Constitution, and it is related to the right of Bolivia to regain sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean.
Two attitudes are derived from this “tattoo on the soul of Bolivia”6 after the War of the Pacific:
The first is a strong nationalism7, the feeling that the whole nation is identified with the injustice
occurred to Bolivia. Former Bolivian President Carlos Mesa explains this feeling in his book.8
During primary and secondary education and military service children are taught about the loss
of more than 120,000 km2 of territory to Chile. Later on young generations learn from older
generations the following:
a) Chile has transformed Bolivia into a landlocked country, b) it is Chile’s fault the fact that
Bolivia is underdeveloped since Chileans reduced Bolivia’s opportunities of international
commerce, c) Chile is continuously seeking to extract Bolivia’s natural resources. d) Currently
Chile wants to take Bolivia’s water, gas and minerals with little benefit to Bolivians.
The second attitude perceived in the population is that Bolivians grow up with the belief that the
“whole problem of Bolivia becoming a landlocked country is because Bolivia has been a victim
of a long series of deceptions from Chile”9. Montenegro mentions that the fact of “feeling the
victim” of the situation causes the risk that leaders of the country forgot to analyze Bolivian
shortcomings before, during and after the War of the Pacific and do not get prepared for future
negotiations on this matter. Also in his book he says that leaders who negotiate with Chile expect
that Chile solves the problem, and Bolivia does not propose its own alternatives.
A good example of this attitude, is President Morales’ recent statement about the past five years
of negotiations with former President Michelle Bachelet and President Sebastian Piñera; Morales
said “Chile me tendio una trampa” (Chile set a trap for me), explaining to the general public, the
6 “Tatuaje en el alma” is the expression former President Carlos Mesa uses to describe Bolivians deep feelings about
the maritime cause”. See: Mesa Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, 246. 7 “Nationalism is a celebration or assertion of national identity that commonly finds political expression in the claim
of a right of self-determination and self-government.”. See: Joseph S. Nye Jr. and David A.Welch, Understanding
Global Conflict and Cooperation (Boston: Pearson Longman, 2010), 329. 8 “El mar se convirtió en el gran cohesionador espiritual del país, un tema que nadie pone en cuestión y que además
fue el eje de aglutinamiento de la idea fuerza que tenemos y que alimenta el patriotismo”. See: Mesa Gisbert,
Presidencia Sitiada, 246 9 Walter Montenegro, Oportunidades Perdidas: Bolivia y el Mar (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1987),
190.
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reason why negotiations with Chile were unsuccessful. He also said that he asked President
Piñera to present a written proposal stating how to solve Bolivia’s Maritime Claim.10
Defining the problem for Bolivia:
Despite more than 100 years of diplomatic efforts between Bolivia and Chile, Bolivia is still a
landlocked country and part of the reason that it remains underdeveloped is because its “cualidad
maritima”11
is limited. Therefore Bolivia will claim for a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean
until it gains fully access with no restrictions to the sea.
Factors that affect Bolivia’s reduced “cualidad maritima" are a weak foreign trade and the
dependence of Chile in terms of compliance of agreements such as the free transit through
Chilean territory and administrative decisions for the export and import of goods that utilize the
sea as mean of transportation.
Bolivians’ strong nationalism hinders possible solutions to the problem; this was the case that in
2003 Bolivia preferred not to export gas to North America if it was to be exported through a
Chilean port.
This paper will review the history from 1879 to 1987; the current situation developed since 2002
until today, and will propose policy options to the Director of the recently created Maritime
Claim Commission, Ruben Saavedra Soto12
(former Minister of Defense).
Finally the paper will conclude recommending two options that are considered the most realistic
and could produce the desired outcomes for Bolivia.
10
“En las últimas reuniones que tuve en Brasil, junto con el canciller David Choquehuanca y el ministro de Defensa
(Rubén Saavedra), presionamos (a Chile y sostuvimos que) queremos saber una propuesta formal escrita, que será
una base de negociación. Y el Presidente de Chile me dice: esta reunión es informal. Cuando exigimos ¿dónde está
la propuesta?, ¿por dónde va ser la soberanía? no hay, entonces, ¿qué nos toca?, también apelar a los tribunales
internacionales”, explicó.” See: El Presidente dice que Chile le tendió una trampa, La Razon, March 31st., 2011
http://www.la-razon.com/version.php?ArticleId=127810&EditionId=2484&idp=&ids=&page=12& (accessed April
1st., 2011). 11
Author’s note: For Bolivians “cualidad maritima” means: access to the sea that allow Bolivians to build and use
ports, warehouses and any other needed facility, also the rights of owning marine fleet and having marine military,
using marine natural resources and having Bolivian legislation in the area next to the ocean.” 12
Designan a Rubén Saavedra como titular de la Dirección Estratégica Marítima, Los Tiempos, April 5, 2011
http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20110405/designan-a-ruben-saavedra-como-titular-de-la-
direccion-estrategica_120243_239737.html (accessed April 6, 2011).
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Part I: History and Current Situation
2. History
The War of the Pacific 1879: Chile invades Antofagasta on February 14 of 1879. Bolivian
President Hilarion Daza announced from his balcony to the citizenry that: “Two Chilean
warships with 800 men have taken over our defenseless ports of Antofagasta and Mejillones”.13
Bolivia defended its Littoral with help from Peru, since these both countries signed a Treaty of
Defensive Alliance in 1873. In the treaty they committed to support each other in case one of
them would be invaded by a third party.
1883: Peru and Chile signed the Treaty of Ancón, Peru temporary cedes the province of
Tarapacá, in which Tacna and Arica were located.
1884: Bolivia and Chile signed the Treaty of Truce. Bolivia looses the department of Littoral.
Chile takes the administration and funds of the Bolivian customs as war payment.14
“Chile defeated Peru and Bolivia, and acquired territories that contained vast deposits of sodium
nitrate, a leading fertilizer. Chile’s export tax on nitrates later accounted for at least one half of
all government revenue”.15
1895: Chile's government commits to transfer Tacna and Arica to Bolivia if Chile would acquire
dominion and sovereignty on those territories and if not Chile commits to transfer the creek of
Vitor or another equivalent, so that Bolivia can satisfy its maritime needs.16
The Bolivian
congress criticized the offer. Because of lack of determination and vision of Bolivian leaders at
that time17
, Bolivia lost this opportunity to avoid the enclosure.
1904: Bolivia’s coast was under Chilean military occupation. By then Bolivia was not able to use
ports, and its customs administration was in Chilean hands. Bolivia accepts to sign the Treaty of
Peace and Friendship with which Bolivia buried its maritime aspirations by recognizing the
absolute and perpetual right of Chile to the territories obtained from Bolivia in the War of the
13
Gonzalo Bulnes, Guerra del Pacifico: De Antofagasta hasta Tarapacá, 165. 14
Libro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 8. 15
Richard Sicotte et. al., The fiscal impact of the War of the Pacific, Cliometrica, 3 no. 2 (2009): 97. 16
Walter Montenegro, Oportunidades Perdidas, 36. 17
The opposition did not agree with the offer and made a press campaign against it. See: Walter Montenegro,
Oportunidades Perdidas, 44.
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Pacific. In return, Chile agreed to concede Bolivia free transit to reach the sea, to pay 300,000£
and to build a railroad from Arica to La Paz that would be under Chilean administration.18
1910: Bolivia begins diplomatic efforts to recover sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs writes to Chilean and Peruvian counterparts a letter in
which he states “Bolivia cannot be isolated from the sea. Now and always will do all the possible
efforts to posses at least a port in the Pacific Ocean, La Paz can offer compensations to Santiago
or Lima in the case any of them would open the issue.”19
1929: Peru and Chile signed a new treaty to solve the temporary cession of territory of the
province of Tarapaca. In this new agreement they decided that Peru recovers Tacna and Chile
stays with Arica. The Treaty signed had a Supplementary Protocol20
, because of which in
different occasions after 1929 Bolivia and Chile could not find reconciliation in the dispute.
Solutions proposed were in areas in Arica, and Peru has not consented to agreements between
Bolivia and Chile that involve Arica. Details of each situation will be presented later on in this
paper. It is worth nothing that although Arica stayed as part of the Chilean territory, Chile does
not possess absolute sovereignty21
in Arica.
1950: The proposal of 1950 was to obtain a strip in Arica and a port for Bolivia in exchange of
water of the Titicaca Lake. Chilean President Videla was interested to use Bolivian water
resources for irrigation of the desert areas of the north of Chile and for power generation. U. S
Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that his government would be willing to provide the
funds needed for building the port, irrigation works, power generation and other economic
projects to promote regional integration. Unfortunately before agreements were accomplished
and made public, the Chilean Press in its magazine “Ercilla” in June of 1950 published an article
describing the negotiations. At that time the public opinion of the involved countries was not yet
ready for the news. In addition, Peru was not yet included in the conversations and after the note
18
Libro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 9. 19
Ibid. 10. 20
“Article 1: Neither Chile nor Peru could cede to a third state any of the territories over which they were granted
sovereignty in the treaty without the prior agreement of the other signatory.” See in Ronald, Bruce St John, Chile,
Peru and the Treaty of 1929: The final settlement, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (2000), 92. 21
“Sovereignty: Within its borders the state or government has an entitlement to supreme, unqualified, and
exclusive legal authority.” See: Anthony McGrew, “Globalization and Global Politics” in The Globalization of
World Politics: An introduction to international relations, ed. John Bayles and Patricia Owens, (New York: Oxford
University Press 2008), 23.
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in the Chilean magazine, the Peruvian government announced that would not consent to the use
of the Titicaca Lake waters, which are shared by Bolivia and Peru.22
1962 Lauca River: In 1939 Chilean President Pedro Aguirre announces his intentions to use the
waters of the bi-national river to irrigate areas of the Azapa Valley. The Lauca River is a river
that begins in Chile and flows into Bolivian territory. Since 1939 Bolivia has expressed its
opposition to the use of this water source by Chile, because it would mean the deviation of the
waters that could have consequences to Bolivia’s natural habitat. Chile argues that it is not a
deviation of the waters; it is only the use of them from its natural flow. Even without reaching
an agreement Chile built a damp on its side of the river. Bolivia took the case to the Organization
of American States (OAS), which approved a resolution that practically implied a denial to
Bolivia’s allegations.23
This year Bolivia severs diplomatic relations with Chile for the first time.
1974 – 1978: Representatives of both military governments the one of General Augusto Pinochet
(Chile) and the other of General Hugo Banzer (Bolivia) worked together in a series of diplomatic
efforts before the historical meeting of Chara a in 1975, in which Bolivia reassumes diplomatic
relations with Chile. During the meeting both Presidents committed to work together in solving
the Bolivian Maritime Claim. In August of that year Bolivia proposes Chile to obtain sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean in Arica, in this period of negotiations Peru was informed from the
beginning. Chile requested in exchange of the territories i) an equivalent territory as the one
Bolivia could gain after negotiations including the territory on the sea (which was to be
determined), ii) the authorization to use all the water of the Lauca River and iii) Bolivia’s
commitment to avoid military presence in the assigned territory.
Before both countries could further advance the negotiations, Chile was required to ask for
consent to Peru complying with the Supplementary Protocol of the Treaty of 1929.
Peru answered in favor of ceding territory to Bolivia for building a port in Arica, however added
a new variant to the negotiations, Peru suggested converting Arica into a tri-national territory
with shared sovereignty among the three countries. Chile considered the suggestion inadmissible
and denied the possibility. After Peru’s proposal Chile did not propose any other alternatives to
22
Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui, El Derecho al Mar, (La Paz: Librería Juventud, 1964), 117 – 120. 23
Carlos Bustos, “Dos siglos de Relaciones Chileno – Bolivianas” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed. Mario Artaza Rouxel
and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 210-212.
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Bolivia. For that reason in 1978, President Banzer decided to severe diplomatic relations with
Chile once again and that status has not changed until today.24
1979 The Maritime Claim obtains multilateral relevance: The General Assembly of the
OAS declares: “That it is of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be found
whereby Bolivia will obtain appropriate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”.25
Since that year
Bolivia reports on its Maritime Claim every year to the General Assembly.
1987 Bolivia proposed Chile, to accede to an enclave26
by different alternatives: either through
Arica or between Caleta Camarones and Pisagua, between Tocopilla and Cobija, and between
Caleta Michilla and Mejillones. Chile rejects the Bolivian proposition because would affect its
territorial sovereignty.27
3. Analysis of the current situation
3.1. 2002 – 2003 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada – Guerra del Gas
In 2002 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada from the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)
became Bolivia’s constitutional president for the second time. He won the elections with 22.46%
of the vote and later formed a coalition with Jaime Paz Zamora from Movimiento de la Izquierda
Revolucionaria (MIR), who came in fourth place during the elections with 16.31% of the vote.
The coalition was difficult since it did not have the support of neither Evo Morales, who became
second with 20.94% of the vote nor Mamfred Reyes Villa who became third with 20.91% of the
vote.28
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada began his presidency with a lot of challenges to face such an
economic crisis and the decision to sell Bolivian gas to North America via either a Chilean or a
Peruvian port. The Peruvian port option was $600 million dollars29
more expensive than the
24
Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia:133-146. 25
Organization of American States, Certified Text of the Resolutions, Ninth Regular Session, (La Paz – Bolivia,
October, 1979), AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79), 55.
http://www.oas.org/dil/general_assembly_resolutions.htm (accessed March 14, 2011). 26
“Enclave is a portion of territory within or surrounded by a larger territory whose inhabitants are culturally or
ethnically distinct.” Defined in: The New Oxford American Dictionary, (Oxford University Press, 2008), eBook
Location 268695. 27
Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia:146-147. 28
Porcentajes y totales parciales obtenidos por los Partidos Políticos a nivel nacional, Resultados Nacionales (La
Paz: Corte Nacional Electoral, 2002).
http://www.cne.org.bo/proces_electoral/eg2002.aspx (accessed February 12, 2011) 29
Juan Forero, Lingering Feud With Chile Threatens Bolivia's Pipeline Plan, The New York Times, July 8, 2002.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/08/international/americas/08BOLI.html?scp=1&sq=Lingering%20Feud%20With
%20Chile%20Threatens%20Bolivia%27s%20Pipeline%20Plan&st=cse (accessed April 3, 2011)
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Chilean port option. In any other country with a different history the decision may have been
straightforward, but for Bolivia’s public opinion was not easy to accept to sell Bolivian gas
through Chile. At that time Edward Miller, president and general manager of British Gas Bolivia,
a subsidiary of one of the three companies involved in the project said to the press that “If the
Bolivian government would give us $600 million dollars, we would be happy to consider Peru,
all the risk right now falls to the private sector, and for our money, Peru is not the option.''30
The situation escalated when former President Sanchez de Lozada announced that the Chilean
port option was more viable.31
Gas Conflict (Guerra del Gas)
A series of unattended issues by the government originated the Gas Conflict; some of those were
the severe economic crisis, the lack of trust to President Sanchez de Lozada because of the
measurements he took while privatizing Bolivian national companies in his previous
administration (1993-1997) and the decision about the selection of the port to export Bolivian
gas32
. The last one had to do with the Bolivian resentment towards Chile. The chronology below
was obtained from one of the Bolivian newspapers with the largest circulation “El Diario”. The
chronology details the events of the Gas Conflict and in particular it gives an idea on how Evo
Morales as leader of Moviemiento al Socialismo (MAS) (Movement Towards Socialism) pushes
for the resignation of President Sanchez de Lozada and together with leaders of grassroots
organizations he stops the project to export Bolivian gas in 2003.
Gas Conflict Chronology:33
September 17, 2003: Evo Morales, a congress representative and leader of MAS announces the
beginning of the Gas Conflict.
30
Ibid. 31
"Ahora estamos estudiando si lo podemos sacar por Perú o por Chile. Preferimos el Perú, por razones obvias.
Ningún boliviano quiere que salga por Chile, pero el gran problema es que puede ser que tenga que salir por Chile,
para que pueda ser viable económicamente” See Ana María Copa: Goni ve más viable sacar gas por Chile, El Deber,
March 23, 2003.
http://www.eldeber.com.bo/anteriores/20030331/nacional_4.html (accessed March 25, 2001). 32
Luis Maira and Javier Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia: Dos visiones (Santiago:
Taurus 2004), 159. 33
The chronology in this section is based on author’s free translations of publications from the periodicals of
El Diario, (from September 20 to October 17, 2003).
http://www.eldiario.net/hemeroteca/?2003 (accessed April 5, 2011).
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September 20, 2003: “Social-movements” call upon thousands of people to protest against the
Chilean port option. The “social-movements” are conformed of various grassroots organizations
and are led by Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) (Bolivian Workers Union).
October 6, 2003: Principal Bolivian roads are blocked by “social-movements” in protest against
the Chilean port option.
October 8, 2003: Political leader Filemon Escobar of MAS announces that in September of 2003
the government of Bolivia had already requested a loan from the World Bank to finance the
export of Bolivian gas through a Chilean port.
October 10, 2003 16 people are wounded in the localities of Ventilla and Senkata in the city of
El Alto.
The same day the Bolivian Government announces that it would not discuss the gas conflict with
neither Evo Morales nor Jaime Solares (leader of the COB).
October 12, 2003: Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada orders the military control of the city of El Alto.
October 14, 2003: Congressman and leader of the Movimiento al Socialismo, Evo Morales, tells
Radio Cooperativa of Santiago – Chile, that there is a possibility that his country would reach
the civil war because of the repressive measures taken by the government of Gonzalo Sanchez de
Lozada and that his resignation is the only way out of the conflict
October 17, 2003: Sanchez de Lozada leaves the presidency in the hands of the Congress as a
consequence of strong social pressures, which resulted in deaths and wounded people. The Gas
conflict threatened to have unpredictable consequences.
3.2. 2003 – 2005 Carlos Mesa
After Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation, his Vice-president Carlos Mesa assumed the
presidency. Carlos Mesa explains his foreign policy towards Chile in his book “Presidencia
Sitiada”: he decided to stop the expansion of the Economic Complementation Agreement (ACE
22), which in his opinion it was no beneficial to Bolivia, he decided to insist in the case of the
Silala34
waters and he called for a dialogue with President Lagos. The Bolivian maritime cause
was Mesa’s central point of his foreign policy.35
34
Chile and Bolivia currently have a dispute on the bi-national watershed of the Silala. Chile currently utilizes the
waters with no payment to Bolivia because it argues that the Silala is a river, and as per international law the waters
of a river are shared therefore Chile would not have to pay to Bolivia. For Boliva the Silala is a spring and per
international law the owner of the water should be the country in which the spring originates 35
Mesa Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, 251.
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In his memorials36
President Mesa cites his declaration at the Especial Summit of the Americas
in Monterrey in 2004, during which he had convoked President Lagos and the Chilean
Government to search together with Bolivians for a definitive solution to the sea-coast claim.
The Bolivian Head of State acknowledged that a solution to Bolivian’s Maritime Claim would be
beneficial not only to the two nations but also to the whole region. A demand that had no other
objective than to recover a “quality”, that would allow Bolivia “useful access to the Pacific
Ocean”.
In 2005 the gas protests organized by the “social-movements” resumed. MAS insisted that the
new hydrocarbon law had to increase royalties on transnational petroleum profits from 18 to 50
percent; however Carlos Mesa knew that this was impossible without paying high value fines to
the transnational companies for not complying with contracts37
.
Mesa was pressured to leave with road blocks and hunger strikes, resulting in his resignation in
March and June 2005.
3.3. 2006 – 2011 Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo Government
The “social-movements” leads by Evo Morales were composed of native Bolivians, miners,
union leaders and coca farmers. As per Bolivia’s constitution, a few months after Carlos Mesa’s
resignation elections took place Evo Morales, leader of the Movement Toward Socialism,
became President of Bolivia.
It is worth noting that the role of Evo Morales in both conflicts related to Bolivian gas; one
caused the resignation of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and the other caused the
resignation of President Carlos Mesa. Evo Morales gained more popularity leading protesters as
the head of the coordination of the “social-movements” during the gas and other conflicts.
Two days after winning the elections, Evo Morales announced that any negotiation with Chile
would include conversations about the Maritime Claim.38
3.3.1. Evo Morales and Michelle Bachelet
President Evo Morales and Michelle Bachelet improved the bilateral relations between Chile and
Bolivia. Together they have initiated a series of conversations to work on topics of common
36
Ibid., 256-257. 37
Jeffery R. Webber, “Carlos Mesa, Evo Morales, and a divided Bolivia (2003-2005)”, Latin American Perspectives
37, no. 3 (2010): 62. (accessed February 28, 2011) doi: 10.1177/0094582X10364033 38
“Si Chile quiere diplomacia, si quiere gas, si quiere energía o quiere comercio, tiene que haber mar para Bolivia.
Estamos dispuestos al diálogo, a buscar soluciones”. See: Futuro gobierno empieza a delinear política exterior, El
Diario, December 21st., 2005.
http://www.eldiario.net/noticias/2005/2005_12/nt051221/ (accessed February 15, 2011).
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interest. The public believes that this approach was originated because of the leftist ideology of
both. In relation to the Maritime Claim, Bolivian press published recently that Michele Bachelet
was about to concede Bolivia a territory next to the Pacific Ocean with no sovereignty. The press
explained that Bachelet left the final decision to President Piñera, who considered that giving
Bolivia access to the Pacific Ocean as Bachelet have thought would have been “too much”.39
Both presidents Morales and Bachelet created “The agenda of the 13 points, without exclusions”
which means “without excluding the Bolivian Maritime Claim from the conversation”. For the
first time after 132 years of the War of the Pacific, Chile agrees to include the Maritime Claim in
the Agenda. The Agenda also included other areas of negotiation. From 2006 to 2010 both
countries had conducted twice a year “Political Consultation Mechanisms” in which they
analyzed and monitored the advancement of each of the 13 points.
The last Political Consultation Mechanism took place in La Paz in July of 2010. The minutes of
the meeting reflect the then positive environment of the two delegations and detail that he Head
of the Delegation of Bolivia highlighted the progress in the last years of constructive dialogue,
reflecting the closer ties between both countries.40
The 13 points both countries worked on included the following items:
1) Mutual Trust Development, 2) Border integration, 3) Free Transit 4) Physical Integration 5)
Economic complementation, 6) Maritime Claim, 7) Silala and other water resources, 8)
Instruments in the fight of poverty 9) Defense and security 10) Cooperation for the control of
illicit drugs, traffickers and essential chemicals 11) Education, science and technology 12)
Culture, 13) Other topics of mutual interest.41
The Bolivian press also informed that Chile and Bolivia had agreed to a territorial exchange after
declarations of Chilean congressman Ivan Moreira to a Bolivian radio42
. However the minutes of
the last Consultation reflected that the possible territorial exchange was not official and little
advancement had been achieved in five years of consultations in regard to Point VI of the
39
Con Evo, 13 puntos y una efímera opción de enclave, Los Tiempos, March 23, 2011.
http://www.lostiempos.com/especiales/edicion/especiales/20110323/con-evo-13-puntos-y-una-efimera-opcion-de-
enclave_118278_235259.html (accessed March 23, 2011). 40
Free Translation from: Acta de la XXII Reunión del Mecanismo de Consultas Políticas Bolivia-Chile (Sala de
Prensa del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Julio 2010)
http://www.minrel.gov.cl/prontus_minrel/site/artic/20100715/pags/20100715165143.php (accessed March 18, 2011) 41
Ibid. 42
Senadores analizan petición de informe a Cancillería sobre tema mar, Erbol February 21, 2011
http://www.erbol.com.bo/noticia.php?identificador=2147483941085 (accessed April 3, 2011).
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
12
Agenda. Concerning this point, the minutes of the last consultation, reflect the encourage of
keeping the dialogue but nothing more concrete than that, as can be understood from the
following translation of the section that refers to Point VI: “Maritime Claim: Both vice
chancellors stressed the importance of the bilateral dialogue as a mechanism of understanding
between governments. Reaffirming that the process reflects a policy of agreement by both
governments and considering the achievement of high levels of mutual trust in the meeting, they
confirmed to preserve this positive climate that encourages bilateral dialogue to address the issue
of Point VI of the Agenda. The dialogue proposed is intended to achieve concrete solutions that
are feasible and useful to this issue in the next and successive meetings of the Political
Consultation Mechanism”.43
3.3.2. 2011 Evo Morales and Sebastián Piñera
Since President Sebastian Piñera enter into power in March of 2010 the pace of the negotiations
had slow down in comparison to the one during Bachelet’s administration. Both Presidents and
their Ministers of Foreign Affairs have conducted meetings to dialogue on issues of common
interest during last year and the beginning of 2011 without positive outcomes for Bolivia in
relation to Point VI of the bilateral agenda. Piñera and Morales administrations established a
High level Bi-national Commission, chaired by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and
Chile, David Choquehuanca and Alfredo Moreno. This Commission is further composed of Vice
Chancellors; however as of today no positive outcome for the Maritime Claim of Bolivia resulted
after the conversations.
Every March 23rd
Bolivians remember the War of the Pacific in a national holiday, this year
President Morales set the 23rd
of March as a deadline of five years of negotiations with Chile. He
asked President Piñera to propose a concrete solution to the Bolivian Maritime Claim. After it
was clear that no proposal from Piñera’s administration would be made, Evo Morales announced
43
Free translation of Point VI of Acta de la XXII Reunión del Mecanismo de Consultas Politicas Bolivia-Chile
“Tema Marítimo. Los vicecancilleres destacaron la importancia del diálogo bilateral como un mecanismo de
entendimiento entre los gobiernos. Reafirmaron que el proceso refleja una política concertada entre ambos gobiernos
y, considerando los altos niveles de confianza mutua alcanzados en la presente reunión, confirmaron preservar este
clima de modo que estimule el diálogo bilateral a fin de abordar la temática del punto VI (...) y proponer así cómo
alcanzar soluciones concretas, factibles y útiles en las próxima y sucesivas reuniones del Mecanismo de Consultas
Políticas”.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
13
in a speech during the “Day of the Sea” holiday, that he would seek international mediation
through the International Court of Justice in The Hague.44
In response to President Morales’ announcement President Piñera said that Bolivia cannot expect
that Chile would continue with the dialogue if Bolivia pretends to seek changes of current
treaties at the International Court of Justice or other International Organizations. For Piñera the
change of the Bolivian diplomatic strategy is inadmissible.45
On April 11 of this year President Evo Morales has invited five former Bolivian Presidents46
to
create and Advisory Council that will support President Morales’ plans to take the Maritime
Claim to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
After Bolivia's decision to attend an international demand, the dialogue was suspended. President
Sebastian Piñera announced that Bolivia could not use two strategies at the same time: the
bilateral dialogue and the international litigation. He stated that Chile would prepare Chile’s
defense in the case Bolivia takes the Maritime Claim to the ICJ.47
3.4. Other initatives and factors
3.4.1. Economic Complementation Agreement (ACE22)
Bolivia and Chile signed an Economic Complementation Agreement (ACE22) in 1993.
The balance of trade between the two countries shows the asymmetry in the trade relations
favorable to Chile48
. Because of that in 2002 both countries intended to improve Bolivia’s deficit
with a free trade zone. But in 2004 Mesa’s administration decided to stop negotiations to expand
the (ACE22) after concluding that the free trade zone would increase the asymmetry against
44
“El anuncio fue efectuado ayer por el presidente del Estado, Evo Morales, quien cambió de discurso diplomático y
ahora abre la posibilidad de que Bolivia haga respetar su reclamo de soberanía sobre tierras usurpadas ante
instancias judiciales internacionales como la Corte de La Haya”. See: Bolivia acudiría al arbitraje para resolver
reivindicación marítima, El Diario, March 24, 2011.
http://www.eldiario.net/noticias/2011/2011_03/nt110324/2_01plt.php (accessed March 25, 2011). 45
Declaración del Presidente de la República sobre Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, March
24, 2011.
http://www.minrel.gov.cl/prontus_minrel/site/artic/20110324/pags/20110324101224.php (accessed March 26,
2011). 46
Guido Vildoso (1982), Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-93), Jorge Quiroga (2000-01), Carlos Mesa (2003-2005) y
Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé (2005) 47
Bolivia sigue "esperando" propuesta de Chile sobre salida soberana al mar , El Mercurio, April 19, 2011.
http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=477024 (accessed, April 20, 2011) 48
“El Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior (IBCE) informó que el intercambio comercial con Chile en el 2010
arrojó un récord en exportaciones (83 millones de dólares) pero también el segundo déficit comercial más alto de la
historia para Bolivia (221 millones de dólares). See: Déficit comercial con Chile supero los 1,600 millones de
dólares entre 2000 y 2010, Notas de Prensa de IBCE , (E-259/2011), March 21, 2011.
http://www.ibce.org.bo/noticias/nota_completa.asp?id=305 (accessed March 26, 2011).
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
14
Bolivia. Tensions between Chile and Bolivia worsen after Bolivia’s government decided that
“not even a gas molecule would be sold to Chile”.49
Bolivian President Eduardo Rodriguez, who was a transitory President between Mesa’s and
Morales’ governments, initiated a series of negotiations with Chile and in December of 2005 La
Paz and Santiago extended the (ACE22) for most Bolivian product exempting them of tariffs and
reciprocity requirements.50
In addition to that both countries agreed that Bolivia could yearly
export 6,000 tons of sugar to Chile tariff-free.51
Other areas of work of the (ACE22) include permanent cooperation between ProChile (Export
Promotion Bureau) and Bolivia Promueve (Bolivian Promotion Center), Customs Cooperation
Agreement and other agreements between Bolivian and Chilean entities.52
3.4.2. Interdependence between Bolivian foreign trade and tourism and Northern
Chilean Economy
“Interdependence refers to situations in which actors or events in different parts of the system
affect each other. Interdependence means mutual dependence. The benefits of interdependence
are sometimes expressed as a zero-sum situation, your loss is my gain and vice versa. In a
positive-sum situation, we both gain; in a negative-sum situation we both lose”.53
Bolivia and Chile are interdependent in a positive-sum situation. On one hand Bolivia needs to
export and import goods through the Pacific Ocean, therefore Bolivia needs free transit through
Chilean territory as well as port infrastructure that is given in Chilean Ports, the most used port
by Bolivians is Arica. On the other hand the main costumers in Arica, which has the lowest
average income of all regions in Chile54
, are Bolivian business as well as tourist, thus northern
Chile depends on Bolivian commerce and tourists and Bolivian business depend on northern
Chile’s port infrastructure and free transit. The following numbers illustrate the interdependence:
49
Horst Grebe Lopez, “Las Relaciones entre Bolivia y Chile. Situación y perspectivas” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed.
Mario Artaza Rouxel and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 184. 50
Lorena Oyarzun Serrano, “La agenda regional y sus posibles efectos” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed. Mario Artaza
Rouxel and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 312. 51
Enrique Cepi Di Lecco, “Estado de las relaciones económicas y como avanzar en ellas” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed.
Mario Artaza Rouxel and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 345. 52
Ibid. 53
Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 246. 54
Ministerio de Planificación de Chile, “Tabla Ingreso promedio de la ocupación principal por sexo según región y
edad (2006)”, Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional, CASEN (2006).
http://www.mideplan.gob.cl/casen/Estadisticas/empleo.html (accessed April 4, 2011).
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
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1. Zona Franca de Iquique (Zofri SA), is a free trade complex in Iquique, where Bolivia is
the first buyer, in 2010 46% of sales of Zofri S.A went to Bolivia.55
2. Port of Arica, Bolivian cargo accounts for 74% of the load circulating in this port.56
3. Tourism
“134.709 Bolivian tourists visited Chilean regions I (Tarapaca) and II (Antofagasta) in
2004. In the same period in 32.353 Chilean tourists visited Bolivia.”57
4. Distances from Arica to main economic areas of Bolivia and Chile:58
Arica - La Paz 487 km
Arica - Santa Cruz 1.102 km
Arica - Santiago 2.075 km
3.4.3. Peru and Ilo port
In 1992 while in office President Jaime Paz Zamora and President Alberto Fujimori signed a
contract in which Peru concedes 5 km of coastline for Bolivia in the Peruvian city of Ilo. Even
after having this option Bolivia has not utilized the territory to expand its use of the Pacific
Ocean. This initiative is called Boliviamar. In Ilo Bolivia could build a port, warehouses, an
industrial and a touristic complex, however this area is not a sovereign territory of Bolivia, the
sovereignty remains of Peru.59
In 2010 President Evo Morales and President Alan Garcia met in Peru to re-launch the
agreement for the use of Ilo and the Boliviamar initiative. After the re-launch Bolivia has
obtained substantial advantages for the handling of import and export cargo through the port.60
Reasons why Bolivia has not taken advantage of Boliviamar are explained by the Peruvian
ambassador in Bolivia Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros and a Chilean newspaper, Estrella de Arica.
The Peruvian ambassador explains that Ilo was not utilized by Bolivia in almost 20 years
55
Zofri S.A. Memoria Anual 2010, 22.
http://www.zofri.cl/images/stories/pdf_pruebas/ZOFRI%20S.A.%20MEMORIA%202010.pdf (accessed March 2,
2011) 56
Empresa Portuaria de Arica, Memoria 2009, 6. “Durante el año 2009, en particular, fuimos el puerto del Pacífico
más importante de todo el comercio exterior para Bolivia. Además, cabe destacar que, del total de carga movilizada
por nuestro Terminal, el 74% corresponde a carga boliviana.”
http://web.puertoarica.cl/archivos/memoria_2009_3.pdf (accessed March 2, 2011). 57
Alberto Zalles, “Bolivia y Chile: Los imperativos de una nueva época”, Nueva Sociedad, 207, no. 34 (2007): 42 58
Ibid. 59
“No quiero tu salida: Bolivia busca caminos alternativos a Ilo para obtener su salida al mar”, Perú Económico
32, no.9 (2009), 5. 60
José Guillermo Tórrez , La cualidad marítima de Ilo, Los Tiempos, April 21, 2011.
http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/opiniones/columnistas/20110421/la-cualidad-maritima-de-
ilo_122431_244940.html (accessed April 21, 2011).
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
16
because “The agreement was very general, it only expressed the intentions of the states, but for
the practical application a regulation was required. For example, issues that need to be cleared
are the levels of investment, tax exemptions, how to manage customs and free transit, etc.
Additionally it was not expected that investors had access to the property, making it difficult for
investment.”61
Estrella de Arica estates that the infrastructure of Ilo does not compete with the ports of Arica or
Iquique, it says in the short term is not an option for Bolivian exporters since it needs a multi-
million investment in order to build the required port capacity to satisfy the Bolivian demand, not
only the infrastructure must be built but also the services need to have the same level of quality
as the ones currently provided by Chilean ports.62
In conclusion, for Ilo to be an option for the Bolivian international trade there is a need of high
investments in order to improve the infrastructure of the port. To compete with Arica road
improvements are needed, as well as railways that connect Ilo with the main Bolivian cities.
3.4.4. Bi-oceanic corridor
Despite Bolivia and Chile have a pending issue with the Bolivian Maritime Claim, this issue was
not an impediment to expand regional initiatives that could benefit both states as well as a third
one in the region. The bi-oceanic corridor is a highway of about 5.451 km63
, which will connect
Arica and Iquique in the Pacific coast of Chile with Santos in the Atlantic coast of Brazil
crossing through the Bolivian departments of La Paz, Oruro, and Santa Cruz and the states of
Mato Grosso del Sur and Sao Paulo in Brazil. This project initiated in 2007 was planned to be
finished in 2010, however in 2011 there are still portions of the highway that are under
construction64
.
61
Acuerdo de Ilo expresa una política de Estado, Diario La Primera, October 21, 2010.
http://www.diariolaprimeraperu.com/online/politica/acuerdo-de-ilo-expresa-una-politica-de-estado_72655.html
(accessed April 21, 2011). 62
Las falencias de Ilo que aprovecha el puerto de Arica, Estrella de Arica, December 19, 2010.
http://www.estrellaarica.cl/prontus4_nots/site/artic/20110109/pags/20110109054648.html (accessed April 2, 2011). 63
Falta construir un 17% del tramo boliviano de corredor, Los Tiempos, September 19, 2010.
http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/economia/20100919/falta-construir-un-17-del-tramo-boliviano-
de_90292_173658.html, (accessed February 28, 2011). 64
Comisión trinacional trabaja en corredor Bolivia- Brasil- Chile, El Diario, March 19, 2011.
http://www.eldiario.net/noticias/2011/2011_03/nt110319/2_02plt.php (accessed March 22, 2011).
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
17
Agreements in terms of transit of goods and people are still under negotiations among the
countries. On March 17 and 18 of 2011 a Technical Working Group65
with members of the three
states met to coordinate the role of the three countries in this international project.
The topics of the meeting were the physical capacity of the corridor, the rules governing transit
and trade benefits for Bolivia in particular, since it is the only landlocked country among the
three. Bolivia needs to use this opportunity to provide goods and services to users of the
highway, as well as to negotiate trade benefits. Otherwise there is a risk that the bi-oceanic
highway turn to be a free transit zone for both Brazil’s and Chile’s freight only.
4. Actors
For more than 100 years Bolivia claims the right to a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean
through Chilean territory. Bolivia and Chile currently do not have diplomatic relations after
Bolivia broke them off for the second time in 1978.
The principal cause of the disagreement is that each side has a position that is very different from
the other and they do not agree on the definition of the dispute. Both positions have more to do
with a strong nationalism than with the practical access to the Pacific Ocean.
4.1. Bolivia
Bolivian position (Strong nationalism):
Chile invaded Bolivia and took away by force 400 km of coastline on the Pacific Ocean66
Lack of access to the Pacific and high tariffs imposed by Chile are one – if not the main –
cause of Bolivia’s lack of economic development.67
To resolve the issue, Chile needs to cede territory to provide Bolivia with sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean.68
By participating in various negotiations and by offering some sort of access in 1895, 1950
and 1975, Chile recognizes implicitly that Bolivia has a right to access.
Frequent and occasionally violent public protests against Chile.
65
Ibid. 66
ElLibro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 4. 67
“La mediterraneidad de Bolivia originada en el conflicto bélico con Chile tuvo y tiene implicaciones significativas
en el desarrollo económico y social del país.” See: ElLibro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 28. 68
“Bolivia sufrió muchas desmembraciones, pero solo una la del Litoral la privo de un atributo de soberanía, que
únicamente se puede alcanzar con la restitución de ese atributo” See: Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo
Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia, 162.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
18
Current diplomacy
Bolivia has severed diplomatic relations with Chile since 1978, Bolivia has repeatedly
announced its intention to establish diplomatic relations with Chile, but conditioned to
advancement in the negotiations to its request for sovereign access to the sea69
.
Bolivia has announced to take the Maritime Claim to the International Justice Court. In order to
do that Bolivia has created the Maritime Claim Comission (Dirección de Reivindicación
Marítima) to prepare the cause.70
4.1.1. Government
Governments have used the conflict with Chile to rally domestic support, particularly when
governments came under pressure due to facts unrelated to the issue.
During the first term of President Morales (2006 – 2009) the Maritime Claim was not part of
the main newspaper headlines, this could be because of the improved relations and advanced
negotiations with former Chilean President Michel Bachelet. From 2011 during a severe food
crisis and domestic problems between the government and one of its main allies, the COB,
president Morales decided to take a new approach (take the case to the IJC) apart from
dialogue with Chile.
Typically requests Chile to propose a solution instead of proposing alternatives. In a recent
interview Bolivian vice chancellor Juan Alurralde said that “We are waiting, because the ball
is on the side of Chile, we are waiting for that useful and concrete proposal of Chile, we are
open to that possibility”.71
Bolivian government has not proposed a concrete alternative to
solve the issue currently it is waiting for a Chilean proposal.
4.1.2. General Public and Civil Society
Strong nationalism – not considerations about what is the national interest (see Guerra del
Gas).
69
“La reanudación de las relaciones diplomáticas es un deseo que Bolivia tiene vehemente, y que por supuesto se
concretara en el momento en que se haya resuelto definitivamente el problema de nuestra soberanía”. See: Mesa
Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, 257. 70
Demanda marítima contra Chile: Congreso boliviano ratificará tratado para recurrir a La Haya, El Mercurio
March 24, 2011
http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=471979 (accessed March 25,
2011). 71
Bolivia sigue "esperando" propuesta de Chile sobre salida soberana al mar, El Mercurio, April 18, 2011.
http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=471979 (accessed April 22, 2010)
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
19
Bolivians want to regain access to the Pacific Ocean, however as a nation Bolivians have not
yet define what alternative would be sufficient to substitute the lost Litoral72
.
A survey conducted in Bolivian major cities in March 2011 shows that 79% of Bolivians
believe that Chile would not give full access to the sea.73
In recent years Bolivian and Chilean civil society have initiated different exchange activities,
such as academic74
and cultural exchanges.75
“Social-Movements” met in March with President Evo Morales to support his new Maritime
policy to take the issue to international courts in order to resolve the hundred years old
demand.76
4.1.3. Business
Bolivia and Chile do not have diplomatic relations since 1978, however there is an actor that
never stopped bilateral relations, that actor is the “business sector”77
. A good example of this
continuous effort to improve businesses relations between Bolivian and Chilean companies was
the last Business Roundtable that was organized by Promueve Bolivia78
and Pro Chile in 2010
with the result of $1.7 million79
of sales for Bolivian manufactures of home and construction
products. Business relations were not affected by any result on the negotiations between these
two nations and there is no reason to believe that this will change in the future.
72
Walter Montenegro, Oportunidades Perdidas, 191. 73
Pesimismo local sobre soberanía, La Razon, March 23, 2011.
http://www.la-razon.com/version.php?ArticleId=127363&EditionId=2476 (accessed March 25, 2011). 74
Consejo de Rectores por la Integración de la Subregión Centro Oeste de Sudamérica. CRISCOS
Es un organismo subregional; sin fines de lucro; dedicado a la integración y colaboración interuniversitaria, estando
constituido por universidades del noroeste de Argentina, de toda Bolivia, del norte de Chile y sur del Perú.
http://www.campus-oei.org/guiauniv/red005.htm 75
Bolivia y Chile suscriben programa de intercambio cultural, Agencia de Cooperación Internacional de Chile,
November 2010.
http://www.agci.cl/que-es-agci/apuntes-destacados/noticias/bolivia-y-chile-suscriben-programa-de-intercambio-
cultural/ (accessed April 2, 2011). 76
Movimientos sociales respaldan política marítima de Morales y piden elaborar la mejor estrategia, Los Tiempos,
March 28. http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20110328/movimientos-sociales-respaldan-
politica-maritima-de-morales-y-piden_119006_236983.html (accessed March 30, 2011). 77
Máximo Quitral Rojas, “Chile y Bolivia: Entre el abrazo de Charaña y sus relaciones económicas, 1975 – 1990”,
Revista Universum Universidad de Talca 25, no. 2: (2010), 150. 78
Promueve Bolivia is an Agency of the Ministry of Productive Development and Plural Economy 79
Rueda de Negocios Bolivia – Chile cierra con más de $US 1,700.000. Noticias del Ministerio de Desarrollo
Productivo y Economía Plural, Agosto 02, 2010.
http://www.produccion.gob.bo/content/rueda-de-negocios-bolivia-chile-cierra-con-m%C3%A1s-de-us-1700000
(accessed March 5, 2011).
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
20
4.2. Press
Bolivian Press has contributed to the public opinion about Chile, one of the newspapers with
highest circulation in the country El Diario has a permanent link80
to a page that wants to inform
Bolivians and the international community how unjust is that fact that Bolivia lost its access to
the Pacific Ocean. The page reflects a strong nationalism; it is designed with pictures of Bolivian
Army, poems to the fatherland and it is evident that the page does not provide space for the
Chilean or regional view of the conflict.
4.3. Chile
Chilean position81
The delimitation of the boundaries of Latin American countries does not have to do with the
limitation of the territories occupied by its native people. The Bolivian argument that the
Tiahuanacu civilization had access to the Pacific Ocean is not relevant.
Some Chilean historians deny that the Audiencia of Charcas (former Bolivian territories
during the Spanish colony) had a Littoral, however some other Chilean historians provide
evidence to the contrary.
A few years before the War of the Pacific, most population occupying the area in dispute
were Chileans”.
It is necessary to leave the accusation that in the time of the War of the Pacific Chile was a
warlike country that sought confrontation with the whole coast.
Between Chile and Bolivia there are no pending territorial or boundary issues, only the
aspiration to the sea of one of the sides. The handling of this issue is bilateral exclusive to
Bolivia and Chile.
Current diplomacy
There are two instances in which Chile’s diplomacy periodically talks with Bolivia, one is the
Mechanism of Political Consultations in which vice chancellors and other officials of both
Ministries of Foreign Affairs discuss different issues of common interest, since 2006 those issues
are outlined in the “13 points Agenda”. In January 2011 both Ministers of Foreign Affairs have
decided to create a second instance called a High Level Commission led by both of them since
80
Link to the page “Demanda Maritima Bolivia” http://www.wix.com/libroazul/retorno-al-mar#!quienes-somos 81
Los fundamentos de la Postura Chilena in Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y
Bolivia, 25-38.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
21
they have acknowledged that the Mechanisms of Political Consultations were not sufficient to
move forward in the conversations.82
4.3.1. Government
“The solution to the problem is not only determined by Chile but also by the fact that Bolivia
is a very instable country, in 120 years it had more 192 different governments. President
Lagos had conversations from 2000 to 2004 with 4 different Bolivian Presidents.
Bolivian crisis in respect to Chile are auto regulated. Normally a strong Bolivian demand of a
solution to the Maritime Claim is placed after internal institutional adjustments. The
resulting governments after these crises have strong citizenry support and take the Maritime
Claim to international encounters. However after little time of negotiations the domestic
problems re-appear as central preoccupation of the government and the Maritime Claim is set
aside. For Chileans this cycle is recurrent and part of the Chilean policy is to let the cycle
flow.”83
According to the former Chilean consul in Bolivia (1979-1980) Carlos Bustos, despite the
good will of Chilean governments they lacked a “State Policy” to solve the issue with
Bolivia. Similar to the case that Bolivia has not identified what it exactly wants as a State,
Chile has not identified how far it can go in terms of concessions.84
4.3.2. Population
The “Encuesta Nacional Bicentenario”85
conducted between June 14 and July 20, 2010
showed that 43% of Chileans believe that Chile should not give Bolivia neither access to the
sea nor benefits to export their products. According to experts the results show that Chileans
see territory as a fundamental part of its identification with the Nation. 35% agree to give
Bolivian economic benefits at the time they use Chilean ports, 13% agree to give Bolivia
sovereign access to the sea and 9% have no preference.86
82
Bolivia y Chile crean comisión y fijan agenda, Los Tiempos, January 11, 2011
http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20110118/bolivia-y-chile-crean-comision-y-fijan-
agenda_109084_214209.html (accessed January 30, 2011). 83
Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia, 37-38. 84
Carlos Bustos, “Dos siglos de Relaciones Chileno – Bolivianas” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed. Mario Artaza Rouxel
and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 231. 85
Encuesta Nacional Bicentenario, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile-Adimark, 2009-2010
http://www.uc.cl/sociologia/encuesta_05.html (accessed March 27, 2011) 86
Ibid.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
22
Most recently a survey conducted by El Mercurio on April 9 this year indicates that 64.2% of
Chileans agree to facilitate access to the sea to Bolivia, but without offering sovereignty over
the territory it lost in the war of 1879.87
4.3.3. Arica
In the case Bolivia and Chile would negotiate access to the Pacific Ocean via Arica, the local
government, as well as the people living there would need to be consulted, since any decision
on Arica’s territory will directly affect their lives.
After Bolivia’s proposal of 1987 a National Committee of Sovereignty was organized in
Arica, in a few hours the Committee obtained the participation of 2,000 members who were
for the defense of the national territory and who were disgusted by the possibility that Bolivia
could obtain a strip of territory in northern Arica88
. All of this despite the fact that Bolivian
shipping is already major contributor to economy.
4.3.4. Press
The Chilean press also contributes to Chile’s strong nationalism with arguments such as “there is
no conflict with Bolivia”, “any border issues were solved with the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship in 1904”, “under any circumstances Chile should cede territory”, etc. The following
statements appeared in the Chilean press after Bolivia proposed a solution to the Maritime Claim
in 1987.
“It is not Chile’s duty to satisfy again the Bolivian aspiration. We did it in the past in (1866 and
1874) and the sister republic of Bolivia deceived the naive intentions of the Chilean authorities
of that time that wished to promote Americanism”. (El Mercurio, May 25 1987) 89
“In the issue with Bolivia all Chileans feel that territory cession is unacceptable, this should not
even be asked.” (El Mercurio, May 25 1987)90
4.4. Peru
Since 1873 until today an important factor in this dispute has been Peru. In 1873 Bolivia and
Peru ally to defend their territories in case other nation would invade them. From 1879 to 1883
87
Evo Morales: Encuesta chilena sobre salida al mar de Bolivia es "un avance", El Mercurio, April 9, 2011.
http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=475111 (access April 9, 2011).
Author’s note: There is no information in the article of El Mercurio in regard to the number of people that
participated to the survey or the types of questions. 88
Fernando Hormazabal Diaz, El Libro Blanco de Chile: , (Santiago: Ediciones
Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2005) 365. 89
Fernando Hormazabal Diaz, El Libro Blanco de Chile, 325. 90
Ibid.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
23
both countries fought against Chile in the War of the Pacific. In 1929 Peru recovers Tacna and
cedes Arica to Chile under the condition that if Chile would want to cede former Peruvian
territories to a third nation, Peru may need to be consulted. In 1950 Chile and Bolivia intended to
swap territory with water resources from the Titicaca Lake; however Peru and Bolivia share the
lake and Peru opposed to that alternative. From 1975 to 1976 President Pinochet and President
Banzer tried to solve the Bolivian Maritime cause, Chile offered Bolivia a strip in Arica but
because of the Treaty of 1929, Chile consulted Peru whether they would agree with that option,
Peru answered by proposing to convert Arica into a territory with shared sovereignty among the
three countries, Chile objected and again Bolivia remained landlocked. Finally in 2002 when
Bolivia was about to decide whether to use a Chilean or Peruvian port to export gas to North
America, Peruvian Ambassador in Bolivia Hernan Coutier offered Bolivia to extract gas in a
cooperation between the state-owned petrol company of Bolivia (Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales Bolivianos YPFB) and the Peruvian CAMISEA gas consortium utilizing a Peruvian port
for the exports, although for many experts this option was unviable due to the not yet developed
capacity of CAMISEA, the role of the Peruvian ambassador was to convenience the general
public in Bolivia that a Peruvian port was the best option. He stated in an interview that if Chile
wanted to do a better offer, Chile should offer Bolivia sovereign access to the sea.91
Part II: Policy Proposal
5. Discussion of policy options
For each of the alternatives described below the expected outcomes are going to be projected. 92
Outcomes that interest Bolivians can be grouped as:
1. Sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, widely explained in this document.
2. Improve the Bolivian “cualidad matitima”93
3. Improve interdependence; this outcome refers to the liberal and realist view of
interdependence and conflict. “Liberals argue that the natural effects of commerce lead to
91
Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia, 81-82. 92
See Annex 1 based on: Eugene Bardach’s Outcome Matrix, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, (Washington
DC: CQ Press, 2009), 50. 93
See definition of “cualidad maritima” in note 11
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
24
peace, two nations that trade together become mutually dependent: if one has an interest
in buying, the other has an interest in selling and all unions are based on mutual needs”94
Chile and Bolivia have trade agreements in place nevertheless Bolivia has a high deficit
in the balance of trade with Chile.95
Not only does Bolivia buy much more from Chile
than Chile from Bolivia, but the main products that Bolivia buys from Chile are strategic
products to guarantee stability in the country, which are fuel and medicines.96
In contrast
the main products that Chile buys from Bolivia are not relevant when it comes to
guarantying stability those products are soybean and sunflower cakes.97
Realists oppose the liberal view by saying that “gains from trade often do not accrue to
states proportionate and the distribution of these gains can affect interstate power
relations. If one partner depends on a trading relationship much more heavily than
another partner, the costs associated with attenuating or severing the relationship are
lower for the latter than for the former”98
. This is exactly the case of the trade relationship
between Chile and Bolivia. Consequently it is in Bolivia’s interest to be less dependent
on trade with Chile and to make Chile more dependent on trade with Bolivia. The policy
to be recommended will be the one that has more possibilities to secure this outcome.
5.1. Policy Option 1: Sovereign Access
5.1.1. Swap of territory
i) Chile exchange territories in north Arica: The success of this option will depend on
early negotiations with Peru and on the information provided to the public opinion of the
three countries. Also will depend on how public officials will convince the benefits to the
citizenry in Arica. A professional and well organized marketing campaign is needed.
ii) Chile exchange territories in former Bolivian areas: This is a more realistic option and
does not require the consent of Peru. The risk of this option is in the handling of the
Chilean public opinion since they are reluctant to divide Chilean territory. The proposed
94
Brian M. Pollins and Edward D. Mansfield, “The study of interdependence and conflict: Recent advances, open
questions, and directions for future research”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no.6 (2001): 836. 95
Relación Comercial Bolivia – Chile, Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, March 21, 2011
http://www.ibce.org.bo/ibcecifras/ed12_ibce_cifras_relacion_comercial_Bolivia_Chile.html (accessed March 28,
2011). 96
Ibid. 97
Ibid. 98
Pollins and Mansfield, “The study of interdependence and conflict: Recent advances, open questions, and
directions for future research”, 836.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
25
Bolivian territory would be located in between two Chilean areas. Similar as in the first
option the success will depend on how effective are Chilean and Bolivian authorities in
communicating to the general public on the benefits of this alternative. Those benefits
could be the regional integration, increased tourism, increased commerce, etc.
The risks on these alternatives for Bolivia are i) the backlash if natural resources should later be
found in the territory Bolivia will offer in exchange. Possible areas to be exchanged border with
Chile and are known for their richness in natural resources, such as water and minerals. ii) High
investments will be needed for Bolivia, the construction of a port, warehouses, rail and road
infrastructure.
Recent polls show that 45% of Bolivians would agree to swap territory with Chile in exchange
for an outlet to the Pacific Ocean99
.
Expected Outcomes
Sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean
Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”
5.1.2. Other compensations different than territory
This option intends to improve the model proposed in 1950 in which Chile was prepared to cede
territory in the north areas of Arica in exchange of water of the Titicaca Lake that would be used
to generate hydroelectric power.
For this alternative Bolivia could negotiate territories in Chile that are located in former Bolivian
areas in exchange for water or gas.
Currently there is already a dispute regarding the water resources of the Silala and the Lauka
River, Chile uses that water with no compensation to Bolivia and an arrangement of the use of
these and other water resources from the border department of Potosi could be met in exchange
for territory.
Bolivian Gas is another resource that interests Chile. Chile imports most of its gas from
Argentina100
. In 2010 Gas Atacama has proposed the Bolivian government to be a “strategic
partner” of Bolivia to transport Bolivian gas to Chile under Bolivian conditions.101
99
Un 45% de los bolivianos aceptaría cambiar tierra por mar a Chile, La Tercera, February 27, 2011.
http://latercera.com/noticia/politica/2011/02/674-347853-9-encuesta-45-de-los-bolivianos-aceptaria-cambiar-tierra-
por-mar-a-chile.shtml (accessed March 04, 2011). 100
British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, Natural Gas Section, 2010, 31.
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energ
y_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/natural_gas_section_2010.pdf (accessed March 25, 2011).
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
26
The risks on this alternative are i) the high investments needed to transport water or gas ii) the
political instability in Bolivia that can be a threat for foreign investors that may be needed for
the project.
Expected Outcomes
Sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean
Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”
Balance of interdependence
5.2. Policy Option 2: Quasi-sovereign access
5.2.1. Autonomous access
This option intends to gain similar conditions as the ones obtained for Ilo-Peru. The autonomous
area requested could be in former Bolivian territories; because infrastructure is already given in
Arica it would be in the interest of Chile that Bolivia invests in developing a port in areas where
there are no ports yet or where ports are not being utilized at their maximum capacity. The
autonomous port area will be granted a concession of operation for 99 years. With this option
Bolivia intends to improve free transit conditions, where Bolivians could store goods with no
restrictions, obtain a customs agency, a berth as well as eliminate the costs of passing the border.
All of these are high costs currently incurred by Bolivians.102
Chile has privatized the services in its ports103
, for this option Bolivia could negotiate to obtain
the administration of one of the ports that are not yet fully utilized such as the one of Tocopilla.
The benefits for Chile in this option could be that all infrastructures would remain in Chile, with
no need to cede sovereignty on its territories and as well as increase commerce and tourism in
the designated areas. In this option high costs in infrastructure are required. Another risk is the
decision of the Bolivian government in respect to which public or private entity would
administer the port and facilities.
Expected Outcomes
Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”
101
Gas Atacama muestra interés por entrar al mercado de gas Boliviano, La Tercera, November 19, 2011. http://latercera.com/noticia/negocios/2010/11/655-308689-9-gas-atacama-muestra-interes-por-entrar-al-mercado-
del-gas-boliviano-y-presenta.shtml (accessed February 09, 2011). 102
Libro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 23. 103
Ibid.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
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5.2.2. Zona Economica Especial (Special Economic Zone)
This option is based on a proposal elaborated by former Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gustavo Fernandez. He proposed to regain first “cualidad maritima” and with the time
sovereignty in two phases:
“Phase 1. Permit the Bolivian gas exports through a Chilean port in Patillos (former Peru) or
Mejillones (former Bolivia). Secure an exclusive territorial area with an area of 1,000 hectares
and 15 longitudinal km. In this area a treatment plant to liquefy gas would be installed. The
construction of port facilities and the construction of a complete petrochemical industry were
also part of the proposal. Bolivia would have “functional sovereignty”, and it would have its own
autonomous administration. Bolivian labor and tax legislation would be applicable, as well as
Bolivian police would protect the area.
Phase 2. Over time Bolivian presence would secure the sovereignty”104
In order for this option to be viable funding for infrastructure will need to be obtained in
advance. In addition the success of this option will depend on a marketing campaign in both
countries. The marketing campaign should be carefully elaborated for Bolivia, where the
“social-movements” prevented the exports of Bolivian gas in 2003.
Expected Outcomes
“Functional” sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean
Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”
Balance of interdependence
5.2.3. Shared sovereignty
i) Use the model of Ecuador and Peru conflict resolution of 1998: “The oldest
continuing border dispute in the hemisphere105
ended after an agreement was reached in
October of 1998. The peace making process of the Upper Cenepa Valley conflict
involved the work of guarantors who were representatives of four countries (Brazil,
Argentina, Chile and the United States). The Guarantor Presidents’ letter formulated a
proposal to end the conflict (Article 2) granting Ecuador one square kilometer of
Peruvian territory as private territory. The transfer took place free of charge; property
104
Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia, 80. 105
David Scott Palmer, “The Search for Conflict Resolution: The Guarantors and the Peace process in the Ecuador-
Peru dispute” in Security cooperation in the western hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru conflict, ed. Richard,
Downes and Marcella Gabriel, (Miami: North South Center Press, 1999), 21.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
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would not be subject to expropriation by the government of Peru. The Ecuador
Government, as owner, would enjoy all rights conferred under the laws of Peru for
private property excluding the right to transfer that property.”106
Applying this model Chile could grant territory to Bolivia in areas next to the Pacific
Ocean free of charge in exchange of non-territorial resources. Those territories could
enjoy all rights conferred under the laws of Chile for private property and Bolivia could
agree with Chile on conditions based on the Ecuador-Peru conflict resolution model.
ii) Use the model proposed by Peru to make Arica a tri-national area: In 1976 Peru’s
proposal included the idea of making Arica a tri-national area. The Arica Port should be
managed under tri-national administration, an example of regional integration. 107
. At that
time globalization108
was not as prevalent as it is today; Bolivian and Chilean markets
were just beginning to become more open. Probably if this proposal is further developed
in today’s context in which, for example Chile, Bolivia and Peru are members of regional
initiatives such as UNASUR this option can become feasible.
Expected Outcomes
Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”
5.3. Policy Option 3: Bolivia circumvents Chile as main access to the ocean (Ilo)
In order for this option to be real Bolivia needs large investments in Ilo. Currently Arica’s
infrastructure is better than the one in Ilo for Bolivia’s foreign trade. It is in Bolivia’s interest to
reduce the dependence of Chilean ports. For this reason the investments in Ilo would need to be
part of Bolivia’s trade policy even if Bolivia succeeds in improving its “cualidad maritima” via
Chilean territories. Additionally there is more interdependence between Bolivia’s foreign trade
and the northern part of Chile than Chile as a whole. Consequently if Bolivia would reduce the
use of the Port of Arica and the consumption in the free trade zone of Iquique, domestic pressure
could lead the Chilean government to consider the other formulated options.
Expected Outcomes
Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”
106
Appendix C. The Guarantor Presidents’ Letter in Security cooperation in the western hemisphere: Resolving the
Ecuador-Peru conflict, ed. Downes and Gabriel, 247. 107
Ricardo Anaya, Arica Trinacional, (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1987) 76. 108
“Globalization is often associated with a “borderless world” in which the old Westphalian order no longer
exists.” See: Ian Clark “Globalization and the post-cold war order” in The Globalization of World Politics: An
introduction to international relations, ed. Bayles and Owens, 569.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
29
Balance of interdependence
5.4. Policy Option 4: Status quo
This option intends to leave the situation as it is today; Bolivia keeps using Chilean Ports and
negotiates better conditions of free transit and trade, does not export strategic natural resources to
Chile and remains an active member of regional initiatives. Bolivia waits confident that
objectives of regional initiatives such as the ones of UNASUR become a reality.109
Over time
this could improve the foreign trade negative balance with Chile and the economic situation in
general.
Expected Outcomes
Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”
Balance of interdependence
6. Conlusion
Chile and Bolivia fought a War from 1879 to 1883. Both signed the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship in 1904, but in 2011 it is evident that “between these two nations there is Peace but
not Friendship”.110
One century of diplomatic efforts were not sufficient to solve the issue. Reasons for the failure
could be: i) Not informing Peru early on about the negotiations, ii) not preparing the general
public in the three nations before negotiations became public, iii) not defining what Bolivia
wants as a state policy (including the opinion of the opposition, press, business, as well as other
actors such as civil society), iv) strong nationalism in Bolivia and Chile. On one hand Bolivians
believe that because of the injustice that happened to them 132 years ago Chile should cede
territories with no compensation to repair the caused damaged. On the other hand Chile’s
unwillingness to review the Treaty of 1904, with which Bolivia became a landlocked country.
Chile also argues that ceding territories affects its sovereignty. But in times when globalization
is as prevalent as it is today, which countries have an absolute right to rule on its territories,
economy and society? The answer is definitively not Chile, because Chile needs the consent of
another state when it comes to territorial decisions in Arica.
109
South American Union of Nations Constitutive Treaty: UNASUR objective: Intends to build, an integration and
union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, prioritizing political dialogue, social
policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment and reduce asymmetries within the
framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/csn/treaty.htm (accessed April 16, 2011). 110
Carlos Mesa Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, 254.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
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For Bolivia strong nationalisms impedes the possibility to accept other options that could bring
more relevant outcomes than sovereignty in territories. Bolivia is one of the least developed
nations in the hemisphere and currently possesses sovereignty over areas reach of natural
resources such as gas, water, lithium, iron and others but cannot yet extract them and create
industries due to the lack of funding and capacity. Not only that, Bolivia obtained an area next to
the Pacific Ocean in Ilo-Peru almost 20 years ago and did very little to improve its “cualidad
martitima” because of the lack of resources. Therefore territories next to the see would not
immediately turn into economical development if high investments in infrastructure and in
human capital do not take place.
Additionally, considering both the liberal and realist view about interdependence and conflict, it
is in the interest of Bolivia’s national security, to provide Chile with strategic natural resources.
Doing that, Bolivia could reduce the negative balance in trade and create more Chilean
dependence on Bolivia. Those resources are not sunflower and soybean cakes, but gas and water.
For the reasons exposed, this paper recommends the Maritime Claim Commission to retake
conversations on the Special Economic Zone. The paper recommends that Bolivia provides Chile
with gas for the northern regions of that country. The proposal of Gas Atacama can be a first step
to begin negotiations.
The second foreign and trade policy recommended to the Bolivian government is to invest in Ilo,
the expected outcomes for this policy are the improvement in the “cualidad maritima” since Peru
has offered this areas free of charge, to be used for building ports, warehouses, touristic areas, as
well as for military presence, such as the Bolivian marines. Another outcome of this alternative
is that the Bolivian dependence of Chilean ports will be balanced between Chile and Peru. Chile
would see the reduced Bolivian foreign trade in the north and could reconsider to offer other
solutions to the Martime Claim.
All recommendations depend in a well elaborated and effective marketing campaign, targeting
citizens in the three countries. In particular younger generations, who should not only learn about
battles and who took what from whom?, but also why it did happened?, which were the
shortcomings?, and how to avoid them in the future?. More intercultural activities are needed so
that Chileans, Bolivians and Peruvians could learn from each other and could get better prepared
for the challenges that affect the world with no distinction of nationality.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
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ANNEX
Policy options
PROJECTED OUTCOMES
Regain
Sovereignty
Improve Maritime Quality Balance of
interdependence
Sovereign Access
by Swap of
Territory Yes. But
improvable
Maybe, highly depends on
Bolivia’s possibilities to invest
in infrastructure and human
capital
Maybe: Only if Bolivia
takes measurements in
order to sell a wider variety
of products especially
strategic ones
Sovereign Access
by other
compensations
different than
territory (based on
model of 1950)
Yes. But
improvable
Maybe, highly depends on
Bolivia’s possibilities to invest
in infrastructure and human
capital
Maybe: Only if Bolivia
accepts to give strategic
resources in exchange
Autonomous
access (based on
model of Ilo) no
Investments are needed, but
could be shared with Chile
Yes, because Bolivia will
be able to sell to other
markets can become
member of APEC
Special Economic
Zone (based on
model of 2003)
“Functional
sovereignty”.
Over time
Bolivia can
acquire full
sovereignty.
Investments are needed but
could be shared with Chile or
private companies interested to
export Bolivian gas
Yes, because Bolivia will
be able to sell to other
markets can become
member of APEC.
Additionally Bolivia will
sell Chile resources that
affect its security such as
gas and water
Shared
Sovereignty
(based on model of
Ecuador and Peru)
no
Depends on Bolivia’s
possibilities to invest in
infrastructure
Only if Bolivia takes
measurements in order to
sell a wider variety of
products especially strategic
ones
Shared
Sovereignty
Tri-national Arica
(based on model of
1976)
no
Depends on the conditions and
Bolivia’s possibilities to invest
in infrastructure and human
capital
Somewhat but still this
option does not secure the
possibility of Bolivia to
provide Chile with strategic
resources in this option Peru
could also sell gas to Chile
Circumvent Chile
and develop Ilo
(future)
no
Depends on Bolivia’s
possibilities to invest in
infrastructure and human
capital. But investments can be
shared with Peru
Yes, because Bolivia will
be able to sell to other
markets can become
member of APEC.
Additionally Bolivia will
become less dependent on
Chilean ports.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
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Status Quo no
Depends on the effectiveness of
regional initiatives
Too much dependence on
decisions of other nations
Depends on the
effectiveness of regional
initiatives
Too much dependence on
decisions of other nations Self elaboration based on: Eugene Bardach’s Outcome Matrix, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, 2009,
50.
Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
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Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II [email protected]
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