boeing/mdc merger commission decision 97/816/ec 30 julij 1997
TRANSCRIPT
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BOEING/MDC MergerBOEING/MDC Merger
Commission Decision
97/816/EC
30 julij 1997
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RelevantRelevantnini trgtrg
Produktov– Trg velikih potniških
letal– Ne vsebuje letal z
vzhodnih trgov (e.g.Illushin)
– Trg rabljenih letal je ločen trg
Krajša življ. doba Višji stroški
vzdrževanja
Geografski– Svet
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Tržni deleži (obstoječe flote Tržni deleži (obstoječe flote letal)letal)
60%14%
24%2%
Boeing
Airbus
MDC
L'heed
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Tržni deleži (naročila)Tržni deleži (naročila)
64%
27%
6%
Boeing
Airbus
MDC
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Ekskluzivne pogodbeEkskluzivne pogodbe
American Airlines– Boeing ekskluzivni
dobavitelj letal do leta 2018– Naročena 104 letala– US $ 6,6 MRD– American – fiksne cene za
513 novih letal do 2018– Fiksne cene – v zameno za
obligacijo kupovanja zgolj Boeingovih letal
Delta Airlines– Boeing ekskluzivni
dobavitelj letal do leta 2013– Naročenih 106 letal do leta
2006
Continental Airlines– Naročenih 35 letal– Ekskluzivna nakupna
obveznost za vsa velika letala za 20 let.
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Ocena ekskluzivnih pogodbOcena ekskluzivnih pogodb
Dejstvo, da imajo 3 največje letalske družbe sklenjene (in “zaklenjene”) ekskluzivne
pogodbe za 20 let, kaže, da Boeing ŽE IMA prevladujoč položaj na trgu velikih
potniških letal!
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Ocena ekskluzivnih pogodbOcena ekskluzivnih pogodb
PROS– Potrošniki imajo manj
stroškov – enaki rezervni deli, popusti pri servisih…
CONS– “Lock-in” učinek– Rigidnost
pogodbenega odnosa– Konkurenčni
proizvajalci lahko v 20-ih letih znižajo cene – potrošniki ne morejo drugam
– Zaprtje trga
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Ocena gibanj na trguOcena gibanj na trgu
Boeing– Tržna moč je omejena
s povpraševanjem in ponudbo rabljenih letal
EU Komisija– Povpraševanje po
letalih naj bi se v 20 letih zvišalo za 80%
– Rabljena letala lahko zadovoljijo le delček takšnega povpraševanja
– Širitev trga zmanjševanje moči kupcev
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Potencialna konkurenca / moč Potencialna konkurenca / moč kupcevkupcev
Boeing– Potencialna
konkurenca je intenzivno umeščena v Rusiji, Indiji in na Daljnem vzhodu
– Priznavanje visokih vstopnih ovir
EU Komisija Potencialna konkurenca
ne zmore pritiska na trg v doglednem času
Visoke vstopne ovire Enormni stroški zagona Strogi varnostni
standardi
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BoeingBoeingov prevladujoči položajov prevladujoči položaj
Boeing ima PP na trgu velikih potniških letal
ZAKAJ?– Tržni deleži– Število letal v obstoječih flotah– Dolgoročne ekskluzivne pogodbe– Ni potencialne konkurence– Visoke vstopne ovire
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Povečanje Boeingovega Povečanje Boeingovega prevladujočega položajaprevladujočega položaja
2 glavna faktorja– Dodatek konkurenčnega potenciala MDC-ja– spill over učinki
Preliv sredstev MDC-jevih programov (NASA, USAF)
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Povečanje Boeingovega Povečanje Boeingovega prevladujočega položajaprevladujočega položaja
Neposredni učinki prevzema MDC– Povečanje skupnega tržnega deleža s 64% na 70%– Boeing ima le še enega konkurenta na svetovnem trgu– Povečanje deleža v obstoječih flotah s 60% na 80%– Povečanje kapacitet usposobljena delovna sila– Še večja moč pri sklepanju pogodb s potrošniki
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Povečanje Boeingovega Povečanje Boeingovega prevladujočega položajaprevladujočega položaja
Konkurenčni potencial MDC – No longer an active presence in the market
BUT its competitive potential can be significant when it merges with B because
if B decides to keep it alive it would arguably be able to stand in the market
if B decides to close it down, it gains preferential access to its customer base leverage factor
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Strengthening of Boeing’s Strengthening of Boeing’s Dominant PositionDominant Position
Competitive potential of MDC - low??– Contradictory Arguments:
DAC had a firm backlog of US$ 7 billion! DAC lost its core customers American, Northwest
Airlines, Delta and Continental, the four largest operators of DAC aircraft over the last nine months.
– Because they knew about the merger and signed exclusive deals with Boeing?
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Strengthening of Boeing’s Strengthening of Boeing’s Dominant PositionDominant Position
Lexecon Study – comparing 52 aircraft supply competitions from 1994 to 1996:– MDC presence led to a reduction of over 7 % in
the realized price as compared with the list price as far as orders placed with Airbus were concerned.
– No competitive potential???
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Strengthening of Boeing’s Strengthening of Boeing’s Dominant PositionDominant Position
Exclusive Deals easier to obtain after merger– Boeing able to offer MDC planes and spare
parts simultaneously– Boeing will offer “Full-family range” of planes
“lock-in” effect– Effects:
Blocking 40% of the world-wide market Competition only in smaller jets market
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Strengthening of Boeing’s Strengthening of Boeing’s Dominant PositionDominant Position
Effects from the defense & space business – increase of B’s overall financial resources– access to publicly funded R&D and IP portfolio– increase of bargaining power towards suppliers
- possibility of leveraging– “bundling deals” – Cross-subsidization
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RemediesRemedies
Behavioral, not structural remediesIncoherent with MR structural basisUsual remedies
– spin-off +– subsequent sale of consolidated companies
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Specific RemediesSpecific Remedies
DAC as a separate legal entity – Separate financial
accounts and statements
Transparency of DAC business
Not really effective– Unable to prevent
cross-subsidizing – Unable to prevent
future predatory behavior by Boeing
– Monitoring/ Enforcement??
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Specific RemediesSpecific Remedies
Boeing will not enforce the exclusive purchase deals
Prohibited from signing new exclusive deals for 10 yrs
Opening the market for a new competitor
However – many airlines are DAC customers
They will probably stay with DAC Boeing
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Specific RemediesSpecific Remedies
Obligatory Licensing of Patents (R&D)– Government Funded– Reasonable Royalty
Transparency of R&D Projects
Transfer of publicly funded R&D
Enforcement? Arbitration?
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Specific RemediesSpecific Remedies
Relationship With Suppliers– Boeing not to exert
improper influence on suppliers through leveraging (particularly of R&D)
Monitoring? Enforcement? Not effective