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Bloody Beaches:The Marines at Peleliuby Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret)

n D-Day 15 September1944, five infantry bat-talions of the 1st Ma-rine Division's 1st, 5th,and 7th Marines, in

amphibian tractors (LVTs) lumberedacross 600-800 yards of coral reeffringing smoking, reportedlysmashed Peleliu in the Palau Islandgroup and toward five selected land-ing beaches. That westward anchorof the 1,000-mile-long Caroline ar-chipelago was viewed by some U.S.planners as obstacles, or threats, tocontinued advances against Japan'sPacific empire.

The Marines in the LVTs had beentold that their commanding general,Major General William H. Rupertus,believed that the operation would betough, but quick, in large part be-cause of the devastating quantity andquality of naval gunfire and divebombing scheduled to precede theirassault landing. On some minds werethe grim images of their sister 2d Ma-rine Division's bloody assault acrossthe reefs at Tarawa, many monthsearlier. But 1st Division Marines,peering over the gunwales of theirlanding craft saw an awesome sceneof blasting and churning earth alongthe shore. Smoke, dust, and the geys-ers caused by exploding bombs andlarge-caliber naval shells gave op-

On the Cover: "Down from BloodyRidge Too Late. He's Finished —WashedUp—Gone As we passed sick bay, stillin the shell hole, it was crowded withwounded, and somehow hushed in theevening light. I noticed a tattered Marinestanding quietly by a corpsman, staringstiffly at nothing. His mind had crum-bled in battle, his jaw hung, and his eyeswere like two black empty holes in hishead." Caption by the artist, Tom Lea.

timists some hope that the defenderswould become casualties from suchpreparatory fires; at worst, theywould be too stunned to respondquickly and effectively to thehundreds of on-rushing Marinesabout to land in their midst.

Just ahead of the first wave oftroops carrying LVTs was a wave ofarmored amphibian tractors (LVTAs)mounting 75mm howitzers. Theywere tasked to take under fire any

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surviving strongpoints or weaponswhich appeared at the beach as thefollowing troops landed. And justahead of the armored tractors, as thenaval gunfire lifted toward deepertargets, flew a line of U.S. Navyfighter aircraft, strafing north andsouth along the length of the beachdefenses, parallel to the assaultwaves, trying to keep all beachdefenders subdued and intimidatedas the Marines closed the defenses.

The Divisions and their Commandershe Peleliu operation was to be conducted by twodivisions, one Marine and one Army. In the Pacificarea since mid-1942, the 1st Marine Division was

a veteran, combat-tested organization which launched thefirst offensive landing in the Pacific War when it attackedGuadalcanal on 7 August 1942. After a period in Austra-lia of rest, recuperation, and training of newly joined Ma-rines, the division made its second amphibious assault on26 December 1943 at Cape Gloucester on New Britain Is-land. When the division landed on Peleliu, its regiments(1st, 5th, and 7th Marines, all infantry, and 11th Marines,artillery) contained officers and enlisted Marine veteransof both landings as well as new troops. Before World WarII ended, the 1st Division was to participate in one last bat-tle, the landing on Okinawa.

Major General William H. Rupertus, the 1st Divisioncommander, had been with the division since early 1942.As a brigadier general, he was the assistant division com-mander to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift duringthe Guadalcanal campaign. He took command of the divi-sion for the Cape Gloucester operation. General Rupertuswas commissioned in 1913 and served as commander ofa Marine ship's detachment in World War I. During subse-quent years, he was assigned duty in Haiti and China. Fol-lowing the Peleliu campaign, he was named Commandantof the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. General Ruper-tus died of a heart attack on 25 March 1945, while stillon active duty. MajGen William H. Rupertus

The Army's 81st Infantry Division — the Wildcats — was It saw action in France at the Meuse-Argonne in World Warformed in August 1917 at Camp Jackson, South Carolina. I, and was deactivated following the end of the war. The

division was reactivated in June 1942. It went to several

MajGen Paul I. Mueller USA Pacific training bases before its first combat assignment,the landing on Angaur. After securing Angaur, it relievedunits of the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu. When Peleliuwas secured, the Wildcats began training for OperationOlympic—the assault on Japan proper. The Japanese sur-rendered unconditionally after suffering two atomic bombattacks. As a result, instead of invading Japan, the 81st oc-cupied it. On 10 January, the 81st Infantry Division wasonce more deactivated.

Major General Paul J. Mueller, USA, the commander ofthe 81st Division, was a graduate of the famous West PointClass of 1915. He commanded an infantry battalion inFrance in World War I, and during the interwar period hehad a succession of assignments to infantry commands,staff billets, and schools. In August 1941 he assumed com-mand of the 81st Infantry Division at Fort Rucker, Alaba-ma, and moved his division during its training periodsuccessively from Florida to Tennessee to California beforeits commitment to the battle for Angaur and Peleliu. Gener-al Mueller served on active duty until 1954, when he re-

- tired. He died in 1964.

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Captions by the artist, Tom Lea"Going In—First Wave For an hour we plowed toward the beach, the sun aboveus coming down through the overcast like a silver burning ball Over thegunwale of a craft abreast of us I saw a Marine, his face painted for the jungle,his eyes set for the beach, his mouth set for murder, his big hands quiet now inthe last moments before the tough tendons drew up to kill."

Meanwhile, to blind enemy observa-tion and limit Japanese fire upon thelanding waves, naval gunfire wasshifted to the hill massif northeast ofthe landing beaches.

That "massif," later to be called theUmurbrogol Pocket, was the first oftwo deadly imponderables, as yetunknown to the division commanderand his planners. Although GeneralRupertus had been on temporaryduty in Washington during most ofhis division's planning for the Peleliulanding, he had been well briefed forthe operation.

The first imponderable involvedthe real character of Umurbrogol,which aerial photos indicated as arather gently rounded north-southhill, commanding the landingbeaches some 2,000-4,000 yards dis-tant. Viewed in these early photos,the elevated terrain appeared clothedin jungle scrub, which was almost en-tirely removed by the preparatorybombardment and then subsequentheavy artillery fire directed at it. In-stead of a gently rounded hill, theUmurbrogol area was in fact a com-plex system of sharply uplifted coralridges, knobs, valleys, and sinkholes.It rose above the level remainder ofthe island from 50 to 300 feet, andprovided excellent emplacements for

cave and tunnel defenses. TheJapanese had made the most of whatthis terrain provided during their ex-tensive period of occupation anddefensive preparations.

The second imponderable facingthe Marines was the plan developedby Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, theofficer who was to command theforce on Peleliu, and his superior,Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue,back on Koror. Their concept ofdefense had changed considerablyfrom that which was experienced byGeneral Rupertus at Guadalcanal andCape Gloucester, and, in fact, negat-ed his concept of a tough, but quickcampaign.

Instead of relying upon a pre-sumed moral superiority to defeat the

As seen from the air on D-Day, 15 September 1944, Beaches White 1 and 2, onwhich the 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, landed. Capt George P Hunt'sCompany K, 3/1, was on the extreme left flank of the 1st Marine Division.

Department of Defense Photo (USN) 253745

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attackers at the beach, and then touse bushido spirit and banzai tacticsto throw any survivors back into thesea, Peleliu's defenders would delaythe attacking Marines as long as theycould, attempting to bleed them asheavily as possible. Rather than de-pending upon spiritual superiority,they would combine the devilish ter-rain with the stubborn, disciplined,Japanese soldiers to relinquish Peleliuat the highest cost to the invaders.This unpleasant surprise for the Ma-rines marked a new and importantadjustment to the Japanese tacticswhich were employed earlier in thewar.

Little or nothing during the tripinto the beaches and the touchdownrevealed the character of the revisedJapanese tactical plan to the five Ma-rine assault battalions. Bouncingacross almost half a mile of coral

fronting the landing beaches (White1 and 2, Orange 1, 2, and 3), the trac-tors passed several hundred "mines,"intended to destroy any craft whichapproached or ran over them. These"mines" were aerial bombs, set to bedetonated by wire control from ob-servation points onshore. However,the preliminary bombardment hadso disrupted the wire controls, andso blinded the observers, that thedefensive mining did little to slow ordestroy the assaulting tractors.

As the tractors neared the beaches,they came under indirect fire frommortars and artillery. Indirect fireagainst moving targets generatesmore apprehension than damage,and only a few vehicles were lost tothat phase of Japanese defense. Suchfire did, however, demonstrate thatthe preliminary bombardment hadnot disposed of all the enemy's heavy

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fire capability. More disturbingly, asthe leading waves neared thebeaches, the LVTs were hit by heavyenfilading artillery and antiboat gunfire coming from concealed bunkerson north and south flanking points.

The defenses on the left (north)flank of Beach White 1, assaulted bythe 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieu-tenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol),were especially deadly and effective.They disrupted the critical regimen-tal and division left flank. Especial-iy costly to the larger landing plan,these guns shortly thereafter knockedout tractors carrying important ele-ments of the battalion's and the regi-ment's command and controlpersonnel and equipment. The bat-talion and then the regimental com-mander both found themselvesashore in a brutally vicious beachfight, without the means of commu-nication necessary to comprehendtheir situations fully, or to take theneeded remedial measures.

The critical mission to seize the"The Point" dominating the divisionleft flank had gone to one of the 1stRegiment's most experienced compa-fly commanders: Captain George P.Hunt, a veteran of Guadalcanal andNew Britain, (who, after the war, be-came a long-serving managing edi-tor of Life magazine). Hunt haddeveloped plans involving specific as-signments for each element of hiscompany. These had been rehearseduntil every individual knew his roleand how it fit into the company plan.Each understood his mission's criti-cality.

D-Day and H-Hour brought heav-ier than expected casualties. One ofthe company's platoons was pinneddown all day in the fighting at thebeach. The survivors of the rest ofthe company wheeled left, asplanned, onto the flanking point.Moving grimly ahead, they pressedassaults upon the many defensiveemplacements. Embrasures in thepiliboxes and casements wereblanketed with small-fire arms andsmoke, then attacked with demoli-

The Changing Nature of Japanese Tactics

Japan launched its December 1941 surpriseattacks in the expectation that its forces couldquickly seize a forward line of Pacific and Asian em-

pire. Thereafter, it expected to defend these territories stub-bornly enough to tire and bleed the Allies and then tonegotiate a recognition of Japanese hegemony.

This strategic concept was synchronized with the fanat-ic Japanese spirit of bushido. Faith in their army's moralsuperiority over lesser races led the Japanese to expect 19th-century banzai tactics to lead invariably to success. Expec-tations and experience meshed until their 1942 encounterswith the Allies, particularly with Americans in the Solo-mons. Thereafter, it took several campaigns to internalize

the lessons of defeat by modern infantry weapons in thehands of the determined Allies.

To Americans, these Japanese misconceptions werealarming, but cost-effective: It was easier, and less costly,to mow down banzai attacks than to dig stubborn defendersout of fortified positions.

By spring of 1944, the lessons had permeated to thehighest levels of Japan's army command. When GeneralHideki Tojo instructed General Inoue to defend the Palausdeliberately and conservatively, he was bringing Japanesetactics into support of Japanese strategy. Henceforth,Japanese soldiers would dig in and hunker down, to maketheir final defenses as costly as possible to the attackingAmericans.

tions and rifle grenades. A climaxcame at the principal casement, fromwhich the largest and most effectiveartillery fire had been hitting LVTs onthe flanks of following landingwaves. A rifle grenade hit the gunmuzzle itself, and ricocheted into thecasement, setting off explosions andflames. Japanese defenders ran outthe rear of the blockhouse, their

clothing on fire and ammunition ex-ploding in their belts. That flight hadbeen anticipated, and some of Hunt'sMarines were in position to cut themdown.

At dusk, Hunt's Company K heldthe Point, but by then the Marineshad been reduced to platoonstrength, with no adjacent units incontact. Only the sketchy radio com-

munications got through to bring insupporting fires and desperatelyneeded re-supply. One LVT got intothe beach just before dark, withgrenades, mortar shells, and water.It evacuated casualties as it depart-ed. The ammunition made the differ-ence in that night's furious struggleagainst Japanese determined to recap-ture the Point.

The skies over the landing beaches of Peleliu are blackenedwith smoke rising from the ground as the result of the corn-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94913bined naval and aerial prelanding bombardment, as amphib-ian tractors rush shoreward carrying the assault waves.

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The next afternoon, LieutenantColonel Raymond C. Davis' 1/1moved its Company B to establishcontact with Hunt, to help hang ontothe bitterly contested positions.Hunt's company also regained thesurvivors of the platoon which hadbeen pinned at the beach fightthroughout D-Day. Of equal' impor-tance, the company regained artilleryand naval gunfire communications,which proved critical during the se-cond night. That night, the Japaneseorganized another and heavier— twocompanies — counterattack directedat the Marines at the Point. It wasnarrowly defeated. By mid-morning,D plus 2, Hunt's survivors, togetherwith Company B, 1/1, owned thePoint, and could look out upon some500 Japanese who had died defend-ing or trying to re-take it.

To the right of Puller's struggling3d Battalion, his 2d Battalion, Lieu-tenant Colonel Russell E. Honsowetzcommanding, met artillery and mor-tar opposition in landing, as well asmachine-gun fire from still effectivebeach defenders. The same was truefor 5th Marines' two assault battal-ions, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W.Boyd's 1/5 and Lieutenant ColonelAustin C. Shofner's 3/5, whichfought through the beach defenses

and toward the edge of the clearinglooking east over the airfield area.

On the division's right flank,Orange 3, Major Edward H. Hurst's3/7 had to cross directly in front ofa commanding defensive fortificationflanking the beach as had Marines inthe flanking position on the Point.Fortunately, it was not as close as thePoint position, and did not inflictsuch heavy damage. Nevertheless, itsenfilading fire, together with somenatural obstructions on the beachcaused Company K, 3/7, to land leftof its planned landing beach, ontothe right half of beach Orange 2,3/5's beach. In addition to being outof position, and out of contact withthe company to its right, CompanyK, 3/7, became intermingled with

Marines and corpsmen scramble ashore and seek any cover they can to escape theincoming murderous enemy mortar and artillery fire. Behind them, smoking andabandoned, are amphibian tractors which were hit as they approached the beach.

Caption and photograph by Phillip D. OrrSituated in a cave overlooking the airfield is this heavy caliber Japanese antiboatgun. It had a field of fire which included the invasion beaches and the airfield.

Damaged heavily in the D-Day bombardment, this Japanese pillbox survives onthe southern promontory of White Beach. Now vacant, its gun lies on the beach.

Caption and photograph by Phillip D. Orr

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Company K, 3/5, a condition fraughtwith confusion and delay. MajorHurst necessarily spent time regroup-ing his separated battalion, using asa coordinating line a large anti-tankditch astride his line of advance. Hiseastward advance then resumed,somewhat delayed by his efforts toregroup.

Any delay was anathema to the di-vision commander, who visualizedmomentum as key to his success. Thedivision scheme of maneuver on theright called for the 7th Marines(Colonel Herman H. Hanneken) toland two battalions in column, bothover Beach Orange 3. As Hurst'sleading battalion advanced, it was tobe followed in trace by LieutenantColonel John J. Gormley's 1/7.

Gormley's unit was to tie into Hurst'sright flank, and re-orient southeastand south as that area was unco-vered. He was then to attacksoutheast and south, with his left onHurst's right, and his own right onthe beach. After Hurst's battalionreached the opposite shore, bothwere to attack south, defendingScarlet 1 and Scarlet 2, the southernlanding beaches.

At the end of a bloody first hour,all five battalions were ashore. Thecloser each battalion was to Umur-brogol, the more tenuous was itshold on the shallow beachhead. Dur-ing the next two hours, three of thedivision's four remaining battalionswould join the assault and press forthe momentum General Rupertus

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deemed essential.Following close behind Sabol's

3/1, the 1st Marines' Colonel Pullerlanded his forward command group.As always, he was eager to be closeto the battle, even if that locationdeprived him of some capacity to de-velop full supporting fires. Withlimited communications, and nowwith inadequate numbers of LVTs forfollow-on waves, he struggled toascertain and improve his regiment'ssituation. His left unit (Company K,3/1) had two of its platoons desper-ately struggling to gain dominance atthe Point. Puller's plan to land MajorDavis' 1st Battalion behind Sabol's3/1, to reinforce the fight for the leftflank, was thwarted by the H-hourlosses in LVTs. Davis' companies had

Naval Gunfire Support for Peleliun their earlier operations, especially at Guadalcanal,the primary experience of 1st Division Marines withnaval gunfire was at the receiving end. On New Bri-

tain, the character and disposition of Japanese defenses didnot call for extensive pre-landing fire support, nor did sub-sequent operations ashore. The naval gunfire to which theGuadalcanal veterans were exposed frequently and heavi-ly damaged planes and installations ashore. Its effect upondug-in Marines was frightening and sobering, but rarelydestructive.

During the planning for Peleliu, the division staff ini-tially had no trained naval gunfire (NGF) planner. Whenone arrived, he was hampered by the cumbersome com-munications link back to higher headquarters, LieutenantGeneral Holland M. Smith's Fleet Marine Force, Pacific(FMFPac), in Honolulu, which would provide the essen-tial targeting information for the division's NGF plan.FMFPac also would plan and allocate the available gunfireresources to the targets deemed important by the divisionstaff's planners. The preoccupation of FMFPac with the on-going Marianas campaigns, as well as illness on the staffof Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, Commander, NavalGunfire Support Group, further limited and constrained thepreparations. Heavy ammunition expenditures in the Man-anas reduced ammunition availability for Peleliu.

Surprisingly, during the delivery of U.S. preparatoryfires, there was no Japanese response. This prompted 01-dendorf to report all known targets destroyed, and to can-cel preparatory fires scheduled for D plus 3. Anunintentional benefit of this uncoordinated change in navalgunfire plan may have resulted in there being more shellsavailable for post-landing NGF support. But the costliest

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95115

effect of inadequate NGF was that the flanking positionsnorth and south of the landing beaches were not taken out.The selection of naval gunfire targets could certainly havebeen done with more careful attention. Colonel Lewis B.Puller, the 1st Marines commander, had specifically askedfor the destruction of the positions dominating his land-ing on the division left flanks. Failure to do so was paidfor in blood, courage, and time during the critical battlefor the Point.

Subsequent to D-Day there were numerous instances ofwell-called and -delivered naval gunfire support: night il-lumination during the night of 15-16 September, the des-truction of two major blockhouses earlier reported"destroyed," and effective support of the Ngesebus landingtoward the end of the battle.

to be landed singly and his battalioncommitted piecemeal to the action.On the regiment's right, Honsowetz'2/1 was hotly engaged, but makingprogress toward capture of the westedges of the scrub which looked outonto the airfield area. He was tied onhis right into Boyd's 1/5, which wassimilarly engaged.

In the beachhead's southern sector,the landing of Gormley's 1/7 wasdelayed somewhat by its earlier loss-es in LVTs. That telling effect of ear-ly opposition would be feltthroughout the remainder of the day.Most of Gormley's battalion landedon the correct (Orange 3) beach, but

a few of his troops were driven left-ward by the still enfilading fire fromthe south flank of the beach, andlanded on Orange 2, in the 5th Ma-rines' zone of action. Gormley's bat-talion was brought fully togetherbehind 3/7 however, and as Hurst'sleading 3/7 was able to advance east,Gormley's 1 / 7 attacked southeastand south, against prepared po-sitions.

Hanneken's battle against heavyopposition from both east and southdeveloped approximately as planned.Suddenly, in mid-afternoon, the op-position grew much heavier. Hurst's3/7 ran into a blockhouse, long on

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the Marines' map, which had beenreported destroyed by pre-landingnaval gunfire. As a similar situationlater met on Puller's inland advance,the blockhouse showed little evi-dence of ever having been visited byheavy fire. Preparations to attackand reduce this blockhouse furtherdelayed the 7th Marines' advance,and the commanding general frettedfurther about loss of momentum.

On the enemy's side, LieutenantGeneral Sadae Inoue, a fifth genera-tion warrior of stout military repu-tation, commanding the 14thInfantry Division, fresh from theKwangtung Army in China, met inTokyo in March 1944 with JapanesePremier Hideki Tojo, who was alsoMinister of War. Tojo had conclud-ed that Japan was no longer able tohold the Palaus against growing Al-lied naval dominance in the WesternPacific. Instead, he had decided to sellthe Palaus to the United States at thehighest possible cost to Americans inblood and time. He ordered Inoue totake his division to the Palaus, to takecommand of all Japanese forcesthere, and to defend the Palau Islandsas long as possible, denying its useto the Americans—and killing asmany as possible in the undertaking.

As his division sailed to the Palaus,Inoue flew ahead, reconnoitered hisnew locale by air for two days, andconcluded that Peleliu (with satelliteair strips on Angaur and Ngesebus)was the key to his defenses. EarlierU.S. attention to Peleliu during theTask Force 58 March strikes seemedto confirm that judgment. To defendPeleliu, Inoue immediately settledupon a commander, a mission, anda force level. Peleliu had for sometime been under occupation and ad-ministrative command of a rear ad-miral, who had used his forces'construction resources and capabili-ty to build blockhouses and manyreinforced concrete structures aboveground, while improving existing

D— DAYAfter Rectifying 3/5)

Front LinesRegimental BoundariesPhase LinesMain CounterattackSecondary Counterattacks

or Strong Pressure

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caves and tunnels under Peleliu's richconcealment of overlying jungle,scrub, and vines.

In these underground installations,the admiral's personnel had well sur-vived the Task Force 58 March at-tacks. Above ground, planes andinstallations were demolished. AsTask Force 58 departed, the Japaneseemerged, repaired what they could,but continued to focus upon under-ground installations. Together witha few Korean labor troops, theirnumbers totaled about 7,000, mostof them lacking training and leader-ship for infantry action.

Leadership arrived in the person ofColonel Nakagawa, with his6,500-man 2d Infantry Regiment(Rein forced). They had long battleexperience in China. They werearmed with 24 75mm artillery pieces,some 13-15 light tanks, about 100.50-cal. machine guns, 15 81mmheavy mortars, and about 30 dual-purpose antiaircraft guns. Alreadyon the island were a large number ofvery heavy (141mm) mortars, naval

antiaircraft guns, and rudimentaryrocket launchers for sending up large,unguided naval shells. Most signifi-cant, the regiment had ColonelNakagawa and his battle-disciplinedofficers and noncommissionedofficers. Nakagawa had already beenawarded nine medals for leadershipagainst the Chinese and was viewedas a "comer" within his officer corps.

Immediately upon arrival,Nakagawa reconnoitered hisprospective battle area from theground and from the air. He identi-fied the western beaches, the Ma-rines' White and Orange Beaches, asthe most probable landing sites. Heimmediately ordered his troops to digin and construct beach defenses. Atthis time, a bureaucratic conflictarose. Vice Admiral Seiichi Itou, whowas the senior officer and the seniornaval officer on Peleliu, resented be-ing subordinate to an Army officermuch junior to him.

From Koror, Lieutenant GeneralInoue dispatched Major GeneralKenjiro Murai to Peleliu, to assume

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island command and to maintain"liaison" with Colonel Nakagawa.Murai was young, highly regarded,and, as the personal representative ofLieutenant General Inoue, was con-sidered senior to the admiral. He leftNakagawa's operational missionfirmly in Nakagawa's hands, as In-oue intended. Throughout the cam-paign, Nakagawa exercisedoperational control, and was assist-ed and counseled, but not command-ed, by General Murai.

Nakagawa had a sound apprecia-tion of his mission, of the situation,and of American firepower. Heturned his attention to the fullest useof his principal advantage, the ter-rain. He so deployed and installed hisforces to inflict all possible damageand casualties during the anticipat-ed landing, and then to defend indepth for as long as possible. OnPeleliu, that offered a vertical as wellas a horizontal dimension to thedefense.

He surveyed and registered ar-tillery and mortar weapons over the

"The Beach . . . My First View as I Came Around From theRamp of our LVT We ground to a stop, after a thousand years,on the coarse coral. . . And we ran down the ramp and camearound the end of the LVL splashing ankle-deep up the surf tothe white beach. Suddenly I was completely alone. Each man

Caption by the artist, Tom Leadrew into himself when he ran down that ramp, into thatflame. Those Marines flattened in the sand on that beach weredark and huddled like wet rats in death as I threw my bodydown among them."

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width and depth of the reef off botheastern and western beaches, withplanned heavy concentrations alongthe fringe of the western reef. In thishe anticipated the American need totransfer follow-on waves from land-ing craft to the reef-crossing amphib-ian vehicles. He registered weaponson, and immediately inland from,the water's edge, to subject landingtroops to a hail of fire. Off-shore helaid 500 wire-controlled "mines."

Colonel Nakagawa directed con-struction of beach obstacles, using

rails and logs, and ordered anti-tankditches dug. He emplaced troops inmachine gun and mortar pits along,and inland from, the beaches, aug-mented by all the available barbedwire. On the north and south flanksof the beach, he constructed concreteemplacements to shelter and concealantitank and anti-boat artillery sit-ed to enfilade the expected waves oflanding craft.

Inland, he incorporated thealready-built blockhouse and adja-cent reinforced buildings into mutu-

ally supporting defensive complexes,with interconnecting communicationlines and trenches.

Although believing the westernbeaches to be the most probableroute of attack, he did not leave thesouthern (Scarlet) and eastern (Pur-ple) beaches undefended. He com-mitted one battalion to organizedefenses in each area. The PurpleBeaches were thoroughly organized,with contingent orders to thedefenders to move into central Peleliuif the battle developed from the west,as expected. But the battalion com-mitted to the south, Scarlet Beach,had orders to defend those stronger,more permanent emplacements tothe end. Nakagawa assigned about500 infantry and artillery to defendNgesebus and about 1,000 naval per-sonnel to defend northern Peleliu.Not under his command were the1,500 defenders of Angaur.

The major part of his force and ef-fort was committed to the 500 caves,tunnels, and firing embrasures in thecoral ridges of central Peleliu. Thenaval units' extensive earlier tunnel-ing into the limestone ridges renderedoccupants largely immune to gener-al bombardments. Only lucky hitsinto the mouths of caves, or point-blank direct fire could damage thehidden defenses and their troops.The tunnels were designed for, oradapted to, various purposes: bar-racks, command centers, hospitals,storage and ammunition magazines,cooking areas complete with freshwater springs and seepage basins,and of course firing embrasures withelaborate concealment and protectivedevices, including a few sliding steeldoors. Colonel Nakagawa expectedvery heavy prelanding bombard-ments. He expected his troops to sur-vive them, and then to carry out hismission of delaying and bleeding theAmericans.

On Koror, Lieutenant General In-oue was busy with the bulk of hisforces, preparing for expected attacksagainst Babeithuap. The Allied

Caption by the artist, Tom Lea"The Price Lying there in terror looking longingly up the slope to better cover, Isaw a wounded man near me, staggering in the direction of the LVTs. His face washalf bloody pulp and the mangled shreds of what was left of an arm hung downlike a stick, as he bent over in his stumbling, shock-crazy walk. The half of hisface that was still human had the most terrifying look of abject patience I haveever seen. He fell behind me, in a red puddle on the white sand."

"Stalemate" plan had indeed calledfor invasion of Babeithuap. As theanticipated invasion drew near, Inoueissued a proclamation to his troops,clearly reflecting Tojo's instructionsto delay and bleed. He pointed outthe necessities to anticipate and en-dure the naval bombardment and touse the terrain to inflict casualties onthe attackers. Without actually or-dering troops to die, he included thewords, "we are ready to die honora-bly:' He went on to say that dying,and losing the territory to the enemy,might contribute to the opening of anew phase of the war.

As the 1st Marines battled to se-cure the left flank, and as the 7th Ma-rines fought to isolate and thenreduce the Japanese defenses in thesouthern end of Peleliu, the 5th Ma-rines, Colonel Harold D. Harris com-manding, was charged to drive acrossthe airfield, cut the island in two, andthen re-orient north and drive to se-

cure the eastern half of the island.Shortly after the scheduled H plusone schedule, the 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, Major Gordon D. Gaylecommanding, landed over BeachOrange 2, in trace behind 3/5. It

moved directly east, through thedunes and scrub jungle, into and outof the antitank barrier, and to thewest edge of the clearing surround-ing the airfield. Passing through thelines of 3/5, Gayle's battalion at-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95253Engaged in the bitter struggle to establish the Peleliu beach- LVT, while other Marines atop the amphibian tractor fire athead, Marine riflemen get only momentary shelter behind an enemy targets. The name of the LVT was more than prophetic

Embrasures in this well-sited, heavily reinforced position, possibly in the Pocket,indicate the location of Japanese weapons which devastated attacking Marines.

Department of Defense Photo (!JSMC) 107934

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resistance from dug-outs and bombshelters near the southern end of theairfield, and through the scrub areaslightly farther south. The 3d Battal-ion's mission was to clear that scrub,maintaining contact with 3/7 on itsright, while 2/5 was to drive acrossthe open area to reach the far side ofthe island. Advancing in its centerand right, 2/5 battled completelyacross the island by mid-afternoon,echeloned its left rearward to keepcontact with 1/5, and moved to re-orient its attack northward. The 2dBattalion's right flank tied for a whileinto 3/5 in the woods to the south

of the airfield, but then lost contact.By this time, the antitank ditch

along the center and right of OrangeBeaches 1 and 2 was notable for thenumber of command posts locatedalong its length. Shofner's 3/5 wasthere, as was Harris' 5th Marinescommand post. Then an advance ele-ment of the division command postunder Brigadier General Oliver P.Smith, the assistant division com-mander, landed and moved into theantitank ditch within sight of the air-field clearing area. Simultaneously,important support weapons weremoving ashore.

The 1st Tank Battalion's M-48A1

12

Sherman medium tanks, one-third ofwhich had been left behind at the lastmoment because of inadequate ship-ping, were landed as early as possi-ble, using a novel technique to crossthe reef. This tank landing schemewas developed in anticipation of ear-ly Japanese use of their armor capa-bility.

Movement of this fire and logisti-cal support material onto a beach stillclose to, and under direct observationfrom, the commanding Umurbrogolheights was an inescapable risk man-dated by the Peleliu terrain. So longas the enemy held observation fromUmurbrogol over the airfield andover the beach activity, there was noalternative to driving ahead rapidly,using such fire support as could bemustered and coordinated. Continu-ing casualties at the beaches had tobe accepted to support the rapid ad-vance. The commanding general'sconcern for early momentum ap-peared to be eminently correct. Unitson the left had to assault toward thefoot of Umurbrogol ridges, andquickly get to the commandingcrests. In the center, the 5th Marineshad to make a fast advance to secureother possible routes to outflankUmurbrogol. In the south, the 7thMarines had to destroy immediatelythose now cut-off forces before be-coming freed to join the struggleagainst central Peleliu.

The movement of the 5th Marinesacross the airfield and to the westernedge of the lagoon separating the air-field area from the eastern peninsu-la (Beach Purple), created a line ofattacking Marines completely acrossthat part of the island oriented botheast and north, toward what was be-lieved to be the major center ofJapanese strength. The 7th Marines,pushing east and south, completedsplitting the enemy forces. ColonelHanneken's troops, fully engaged,were generally concealed against ob-servation from the enemy still northof the airfield and from the heightsof Umurbrogol. There was a gap be-

PURPLE

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tween the 5th's right and the 7th's left,but it did not appear to be in a criti-cal sector.

Nevertheless, it was by now appar-ent that the D-Day phase-line objec-tives were not going to be met ineither the south or the north.Alarmed at the loss of the desiredmomentum, General Rupertus begancommitting his reserve. First, he or-dered the division reconnaissancecompany ashore, then, pressing com-manders already on the island, heordered his one remaining uncom-mitted infantry battalion, LieutenantColonel Spencer S. Berger's 2/7, toland. No commander ashore felt aneed for 2/7, but Colonel Hannekensaid he could find an assembly area

where it would not be in the way.General Rupertus ordered it to land,remarking to his staff that he hadnow "shot his bolt!" Ashore, it wasapparent that what was needed onthis hectic beachhead was not moretroops, but more room in which tomaneuver and more artillery.

General Rupertus began to makeplans to land himself and the mainelements of his command group. Ad-vice from the ADC ashore, and hischief of staff, Colonel John T. Selden,convinced Rupertus to stay on theflagship. He compromised that deci-sion by ordering Colonel Seldenashore. By now, the shortage of LVTswas frustrating the timely landing offollowing waves. In consequence,

13

neither Selden's small CP group, norBerger's 2/7, could get past the trans-fer line in their landing craft, and hadto return to their ships despite theirorders to land.

Into this division posture, at about1650, Colonel Nakagawa launchedhis planned tank-infantry counterat-tack. All Marine commanders hadbeen alerted to the Japanese capabil-ity to make an armored attack on D-Day, and were well prepared. The at-tack emerged from the area north ofthe airfield and headed south, gener-ally across the front of the 1st Ma-rines' lines on the eastern edge of theairfield clearing. The attack moveddirectly into the 5th Marines' sectorwhere Boyd's 1/5 was set in, andstretched across the southern area ofthe airfield. Marines in 2/1 and 1/5took the attackers under fire, infan-try and tanks alike. A bazooka gun-ner in 2/i's front hit two of the tanks.The commanding officer of 1/5 hadhis tanks in defilade, just behind hisfront lines. They opened up on theJapanese armor, which ran throughthe front lines and virtually into hisforward command group. Boyd'slines held fast, taking the attackers,infantry and tanks alike, under firewith all available weapons.

Major John H. Gustafson, in 2/S'sforward command post mid-wayacross the airfield, had his tank pla-toon close at hand. Although theenemy had not yet come into his zoneof action, he launched the platoon oftanks into the melee. Accounts varyas to just who shot what, but in avery few minutes it was all over. Theattacking tanks were all destroyed,and the Japanese infantry literallyblown away.

Colonel Nakagawa's attack wascourageous, but proved to be a totalfailure. Even where the tanks brokethrough the Marine lines, they in-duced no Marine retreat. Instead, theJapanese armor became the focus ofantitank fire of every sort and caliber.The light Japanese tanks were liter-ally blown apart. More than 100

Deparmen of Defense Photo (USMC) 96745Cpl Peter P Zacharko stands by a captured Japanese 141mm mortar, which rainedshells down on the landing beaches and on the Marines as they proceeded inland.

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PELELIUSECOND OPERATIONAL

PHASE (D+I—D+8)

were reported destroyed. That figure,of course, reflected the amount of firedirected their way; each Marinegrenadier, antitank gunner, andtanker thought he had killed the tankat which he shot, and so reported.

With the counterattack over andthe Japanese in apparent disarray, 2/5immediately resumed its attack,moving north along the eastern halfof the airfield. The battalion ad-vanced halfway up the length of theairfield clearing before it stopped toorganize for the night. It was the

maximum advance of the day, overthe most favorable terrain in the di-vision front. It provided neededspace for artillery and logisticdeployment to support the continu-ation of the attack the next day.

However, that relatively advancedposition had an open right, south,flank which corresponded to a holein the regimental command struc-ture. At that stage, 3/5 was supposedto maintain the contact betweennorth-facing 2/5 and south-oriented3/7. But 3/5's battalion command

14

and control had been completelyknocked out by 1700. The battalionexecutive officer, Major Robert M.Ash, had been killed earlier in theday by a direct hit upon his landingLVT. About the time of the Japanesetank attack, a mortar barrage hit the3/5 CF in the antitank ditch near thebeach, killing several staff andprompting the evacuation of the bat-talion commander. As of 1700, thethree companies of 3/5 were not incontact with each other, nor with the

(Continued on page 16)

A Horrible Place

A mong the few civilian news correspondents whochose to share the fate of the Marines on shoreon Peleliu was Robert Tepper" Martin, of Time,

who furnished the following description of what it was likethere:

Peleliu is a horrible place. The heat is stifling andrain falls intermittently — the muggy rain that bringsno relief, only greater misery. The coral rocks soakup the heat during the day and it is only slightly cool-er at night. Marines are in the finest possible physi-cal condition, but they wilted on Pelellu. By the fourthday there were as many casualties from heat prostra-tion as from wounds .

Peleliu is incomparably worse than Guam in itsbloodiness, terror, climate and the incomprehensibletenacity of the Japs. For sheer brutality and fatigue,I think it surpasses anything yet seen in the Pacific,certainly from the standpoint of numbers of troopsinvolved and the time taken to make the island secure.

On the second day, the temperature reached 105 degreesin the shade and there was very little shade in most placeswhere the fighting was going on, and arguably no breezeat all anywhere. It lingered around that level of heat as thedays dragged by (temperatures as high as 115 were record-ed). Water supply presented a serious problem from theoutset. This had been anticipated and in actual fact the so-lution proved less difficult than expected; the engineers soon

discovered that productive wells could be drilled almostanywhere on the comparatively low ground, and person-nel semi-permanently stationed near the beach found thateven shallow holes dug in the sand would yield an onlymildly repulsive liquid which could be purified for drink-ing with halizone tablets. But it continued necessary to sup-ply the assault troops by means of scoured-out oil drumsand five-gallon field cans. Unfortunately, steaming out theoil drums did not remove all the oil, with the result thatmany or most of the troops drinking water from the drumswere sickened. When the captains of the ships in the trans-port area learned of this and of the shortage of water, theyrushed cases of fruit and fruit drinks to the beaches to easethe problem somewhat.

The water situation presented a problem even in the caseof troops operating on comparatively level and openground. Once the fighting entered the ridges, terraindifficult merely to traverse without having to fight, the de-bility rate shot upward so alarmingly that an emergencycall was sent to all the ships off-shore to requisition everyavailable salt tablet for issue to the 1st Marines.

The statement that heat prostrations equalled woundcasualties is apt to be misleading. Most of those evacuatedwere returned to duty after a day or two of rest and re-habilitation; hence, their absence from the frontlines didnot permanently impair the combat efficiency of their units.But such numerous cases did strain the already overbur-dened Medical Corps elements.

The antitank ditch dug by the Japanese along the center and the 5th Marines' and 3/5's CPs were located there, as was theright of Orange Beaches 1 and 2 soon after the landing be- 7th Marines shown here. BGen Oliver P Smith with the ad-came the locations of command posts of various units, Both vance element of the division CP set up in the ditch also.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94939

15

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(Continued from page 14)battalions to their right and left.

The 5th Marines commandingofficer ordered his executive officer,Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt,to take command of 3/5 and toredeploy so as to close the gap be-tween 5th and 7th Marines. MajorGayle moved 2/S's reserve companyto his right flank and to provide a tie-in position. Walt located and tied inhis 3/5 companies to build a morecontinuous regimental line. By 2230,he had effected the tie-in, just in time.Beginning then, the salient which the5th Marines had carved betweenPeleliu's central and southerndefenders came under a series ofsharp counterattacks that continuedthroughout the night. The attackscame from both north and south.None of them enjoyed any notable

success, but they were persistentenough to require resupply of ammu-nition to forward companies. Dawnrevealed scores of Japanese bodiesnorth of the Marine lines.

Elsewhere across the 1st Division'sfront there were more potentiallythreatening night counterattacks.None of them succeeded in drivingMarines back or in penetrating thelines in significant strength. The mostserious attack came against the Com-pany K, 3/1, position on the Point,at the 1st Marines' left.

In the south, the 7th Marines ex-perienced significant night attacksfrom the Japanese battalion oppos-ing it. But the Marines there were incomfortable strength, had communi-cations to bring in fire support, in-cluding naval gunfire illumination.They turned back all attacks without

16

a crisis developing.At the end of the first 12 hours

ashore, the 1st Marine Division heldits beachhead across the intendedfront. Only in the center did thedepth approximate that which hadbeen planned. The position wasstrong everywhere except on the ex-treme left flank. General Smith, fromhis forward command post was incommunication with all three regi-mental commanders. The report hereceived from Colonel Puller, on theleft, did not afford an adequate per-ception of 1st Marines' tenuous holdon the Point. That reflected ColonelPuller's own limited information.The other two regimental reportsreflected the situations adequately.

In addition to the three infantryregiments, the 1st Division hadalmost three battalions of light ar-

Special Reef-crossing Techniquesnasmuch as Peleliu's fringing reef would not permitlanding craft within 700 yards of the beach, suchcraft deposited tanks at the reef's edge. There the

depths permitted tanks to operate in most areas, withoutbeing submerged, but not in all. A plan was devised to formtanks into small columns, each to be led by an LVT So longas the LVT was grounded on the reef, the tanks could fol-low in trace. But when the LVT encountered a depth whichfloated it, tanks halted while the LVT literally "felt" out asuitable shallow path. Then the tanks followed, still insmall columns, and so arrived at the shore at the earliestpossible hour. The technique was one of the keys to time-ly employment of armor ashore before D-Day was over.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95624.

Two other reef-crossing innovations were used on D-Day.A large number of amphibious trailers were incorporatedinto the logistic plan, to be towed behind landing craft, andlater, at reef's edge they would be taken in tow by amphib-ian tractors. Ashore, trucks took them into tow, enablingcritical supplies to be moved well forward to supply pointsjust in rear of the fighting. Newly available crawler craneswere emplaced on barges near the reef's edge. They couldlift nets full of ammunition and other vital supplies fromboats to tractors at the transfer line. Other such crawlercranes were landed early and positioned by the shore partyto lift net-loads from L'VTs to trucks for expeditious deliv-ery forward.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95354.

9

I

—

Marines were battling to retain theposition.

Colonel Nakagawa, on the otherhand, had reported that the landingattempt by the Marines had been"put to route." Inconsistently, he hadalso reported that his brave counter-attack force had thrown the enemyinto the sea.

Caption by the artist, Tom Lea"This is Sad Sack Calling Charlie Blue We found the battalion commander [LtColEdward H. Hurst, CO, 3/7] sitting on a smashed wet log in the mud, marking posi-tions on his map. By him sat his radioman, trying to make contact with companycommands on the portable set propped up in the mud. There was an infinitely tiredand plaintive patience in the radioman's voice as he called code names, repeating timeand again, 'This is Sad Sack calling Charlie Blue. This is Sad Sack calling Charlie

tillery ashore and emplaced. All 30tanks were ashore. The shore partywas functioning on the beach, albeitunder full daylight observation bythe enemy and under intermittentenemy fire. The division necessarilyhad to continue at full press on Dplus 1. The objective was to capturethe commanding crests on the left, togain maneuver opportunities in thecenter, and to finish off the isolateddefenders in the south.

At least two colonels on Peleliuended their work day with firm mis-conceptions of their situations, andwith correspondingly inaccuratereports to their superiors. At day'send, when General Smith finally gota telephone wire into the 1st Marines'CP, he was told that the regiment hada firm hold on its beachhead, andwas approximately on the 0-1 objec-tive line. He was not told about, andColonel Puller was not fully awareof, the gaps in his lines, nor of thegravity of the Company K, 3/1,struggle on the Point, where only 38

With the dawn of a new day, thetwo opposing commanders at Peleliuawoke from whatever sleep they mayhave gotten to face immediate grimprospects.

General Rupertus, having beenfrustrated by his earlier effort to landhis division reserve into the southernsector of his beachhead, was nowaware that his northern sector stoodmost in need of help, specifically onthe extreme left flank. Rupertus or-dered 2/7 into Puller's sector for em-ployment there.

At division headquarters afloat,

Wary riflemen of the 5th Marines advance through a devastated Japanese bivouacarea to the northeast of the Peleliu airfield. The concealed enemy troops took full ad-vantage of the rocky terrain, forcing the Marines to clear out each nook and cranny.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96763

17

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more had been learned about the ex-tent of Marine D-Day casualties:1,111, of whom 209 were killed in ac-tion (KIA). While this was not ahefty percentage of the total rein-forced divisional strength, the num-ber was grim in terms of cutting-edgestrength. Most of those 1,111 casual-ties had been suffered in eight of thedivision's nine infantry battalions.Except in the center, Rupertus wasnot yet on the 0-1 line, the first ofeight planned phase lines.

Having received less than a com-prehensive view of the 1st Marines'situation, Rupertus was more deter-mined than ever to move ashorequickly, to see what he could, and todo whatever he could to re-ignite thelost momentum. That he would haveto operate with a gimpy leg from asandy trench within a beach area stillunder light but frequent fire, seemedless a consideration to him than hisneed to see and to know (GeneralRupertus had broken his ankle in apreassault training exercise, and hisfoot was in a cast for the entireoperation.).

Over on Colonel Nakagawa's side,despite the incredible reports beingsent out from his headquarters, hecould see from his high ground aquite different situation. The landingforce had not been "put to route."Ashore, and under his view, was adivision of American Marinesdeployed across two miles of beach-head. They had been punished on D-

Day, but were preparing to renew thefight. Predictably, their attack wouldbe launched behind a hail of navalgunfire, artillery, and aerial attacks.They would be supported by U.S.tanks which had so readily dis-patched the Japanese armor onD-Day.

In his own D-Day counterattack,Nakagawa had lost roughly one of

At about 1650 on D-Day, Col Nakagawa launched his tank-infantry attack from the north of the airfield and headed southacross the front of the 1st Marines' lines. The 1st Marine Di-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95921

vision had been prepared for such an eventuality, and the at-tack was a total failure. More than 100 enemy tanks and theircovering troops were reported as being literally blown apart.

Apparently covered by a returning 1st Marine Division veteran's graffiti,this Japanese light tank remains on the northwest corner of the Peleliu airfield. Itsturret blown off, it is the only one left from the failed enemy attack of 1944.

Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr

18

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his five infantry battalions. Elsewherehe had lost hundreds of his beachdefenders in fighting across the frontthroughout D-Day, and in his uni-formly unsuccessful night attacksagainst the beachhead. Nevertheless,he still had several thousand deter-mined warriors, trained and armed.They were deployed throughoutstrong and well-protected defensivecomplexes and fortifications, withample underground support facili-ties. All were armed with the dis-cipline and determination to killmany Americans.

As he had known from the start,Nakagawa's advantage lay in the ter-rain, and in his occupation and or-ganization of that terrain. For thepresent, and until that time when hewould be driven from the Umur-brogol crests which commanded theairfield clearing, he held a dominat-ing position. He had impressive ob-servation over his attackers, and

hidden fire to strike with dangerouseffect. His forces were largely invisi-ble to the Americans, and relativelyimpervious to their fire superiority.His prospects for continuing to holdkey terrain components seemedgood.

The Marines were attacking forti-fied positions, against which carefuland precise fire preparations wereneeded. They were, especially on theleft, under extreme pressure to assaultrapidly, with more emphasis uponspeed than upon careful preparation.With enemy observation andweapons dominating the entire Ma-rine position, staying in place was toinvite being picked off at the hiddenenemy's leisure. General Rupertus'concern for momentum remainedvalid.

This placed the burden of rapidadvance primarily upon the 1st Ma-rines on the left, and secondarilyupon the 5th in the airfield area. In

19

the south, the 7th Marines alreadyheld its edge of the airfield's terrain.The scrub jungle largely screened theregiment from observation and it wasopposed by defenses oriented towardthe sea, away from the airfield.

Puller's 1st Marines, which had al-ready suffered the most casualties onD-Day, still faced the toughest terrainand positions. It had to attack,relieve Company K, 3/1, on thePoint, and assault the ridges ofUmurbrogol, south to north. Sup-porting that assault, Honsowetz hadto swing his east-facing 2/1 leftward,and to capture and clear the built-uparea between the airfield and theridges. This his battalion did on Dplus 1 and 2, with the 5th Marinesassisting in its zone on the right. Butthen he was at the foot of the com-manding ridges, and joined in thedeadly claw-scratch-and-scramble at-tack of Davis' 1/1 against theJapanese on and in the ridges.

As Colonel Puller was able to closethe gaps on his left, and swing his en-tire regiment toward the north, hepivoted on Sabol's 3/1 on the left.Sabol, aided by Company B, 1/1, es-tablished contact with and reinforcedCompany K on the Point. Then heheaded north, with his left on thebeach and his right near the WestRoad along the foot of the western-most features of the Umurbrogolcomplex. In Sabol's sector, the terrainpermitted tank support, and offeredmore chances for maneuver thanwere afforded in the ridges further tothe right. Hard fighting was in-volved, but after D-Day, Sabol's bat-talion was able to move north fasterthan the units on his right. His ad-vance against the enemy was limit-ed by the necessity to keep contactwith Davis' 1/1 on his right.

The relative rates of movementalong the boundary between Sabol'sflatter and more open zone and Da-vis' very rough zone of action,brought the first pressing need forreserves. Tactically, there was clearnecessity to press east into and over

Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr."Sick Bay in a Shelihole: The Padre Read, 'I am the Resurrection and the Light'About thirty paces back of the lap trench a sick bay had been established in a bigshell crater made by one of our battleship guns . . . In the center of the craterat the bottom a doctor was working on the worst of the stretcher cases. Corps-men, four to a stretcher, came in continually with their bloody loads . . . . Thepadre stood by with two canteens and a Bible, helping. He was deeply and visiblymoved by the patient suffering and death. He looked very lonely, very close toGod, as he bent over the shattered men so far from home."

A Paucity of Reserves

P lanning for the seizure of the southern Palaus(Angaur and Peleliu-Ngesebus) had been theresponsibility of III Amphibious Corps (Major

General Roy S. Geiger). But General Geiger and his staffhad been fully occupied during the critical planning weeks,up to and including the capture of Guam, from 21 July to10 August. The Guam operation ended more than a monthlater than originally contemplated. Meanwhile, someoneelse had to fill the corps planning function for the Palauundertaking. A temporary headquarters, X-Ray Corps, un-der Major General Julian C. Smith was established. Thetwo major tactical tasks of the southern Palau operationwere assigned to the Army 81st Infantry Division (Angaur)and 1st Marine Division (Peleliu-Ngesebus). The 81st Di-vision was also tasked to set aside one RCT as corps reserve.

This partition of division level-planning effort was con-venient, but it slipped into a gross imbalance in force allo-cation which was neither recognized nor corrected as plans

progressed toward operations. The 1st Marine Division hadnine infantry battalions with which to attack more than10,000 defending Japanese on Peleliu. Major General PaulJ. Mueller's 81st Infantry Division had six infantry battal-ions with which to attack 1,500 (earlier reported as 2,500)Japanese defenders on Angaur. Terrain and circumstanceson the two objective islands were similarly imbalanced.Peleliu was considerably larger and had far more complexterrain. Its defensive fortifications were obviously far moredeveloped, and it offered fewer predictable landing beachesthan Angaur. Only the subsequent rapid shifting of plansand higher-level responsibilities can account for such forceallocation imbalance not having been corrected at Corpsor Expeditionary Troops level. The effect of all these im-balances was still further magnified between 13 and 17 Sep-

tember. Higher level changes in plans and naval decisionsstripped Ill Corps of all its reserves.

the rough terrain, and systematical-ly reduce the complex defenses. Thatjob Davis' 1/1, Honsowetz's 2/1, andBerger's 2/7 did. But more troopsthan Sabol had also were needed toadvance north through the open ter-rain to begin encirclement of therough Umurbrogol area, and to findavenues into the puzzle of thatrugged landscape. By 17 September,reserves were badly needed along the1st Division's left (west) axis of ad-vance. But on 17 September, neitherthe division nor III AmphibiousCorps had reserves.

As Sabol's 3/1 fought up the easi-er terrain on the 1st Marines' left, Da-vis' 1/1 drove into the center with hisleft on the break between coral ridgecountry and Sabol's more open flatzone. Among his early surprises, ashe approached the foot of the ridgearea, was another of the blockhousesAdmiral Oldendorf had reportedlydestroyed with pre-D-Day gunfire.Although it had been on the plan-ning map for weeks, those who firstencountered it, reported the emplace-ment as "not having a mark on it!"

The blockhouse was part of an im-pressive defense complex. It was con-nected to and supported by a web ofpillboxes and emplacements, which

it in turn supported. The walls werefour-feet thick, of reinforced con-crete. Happily, Davis was given anaval gunfire support team whichcalled in the fires of the the USS Mis-sissippi. Between them, they madefairly short work of the entire com-plex, and 1/1 could advance until itran into the far more insolubleJapanese ridge defense systems.

Major Davis, who was to earn aMedal of Honor in the Korean Warin 1950, said of the attack into andalong or across those ridges, "It wasthe most difficult assignment I haveever seen."

During the 1st Marines' action inthe first four days of the campaign,all three of its battalions battledalongside, and up onto Umurbrogol'sterrible, cave-filled, coral ridges.Berger's 2/7, initially in divisionreserve, but assigned to the 1st Ma-rines on D plus 1, was immediatelythrown into the struggle. Puller fedtwo separate companies of the bat-talion into the fight piecemeal. Short-ly thereafter, 2/7 was given a centralzone of action between ColonelPuller's 1st and 2d Battalions. The 1stMarines continued attacking on afour-battalion front about a 1,000yards wide, against stubborn and

20

able defenders in underground cavesand fortifications within an incredi-ble jumble of ridges and cliffs. Everyadvance opened the advancing Ma-rines to new fire from heretofore hid-den positions on flanks, in rear, incaves above or below newly wonground.

Nothing better illustrated the tac-tical dilemmas posed by Umurbrogolthan did the 19 September seizure of,then withdrawal from, Hill 100, aridge bordering the so-called Horse-shoe Valley at the eastern limit of thePocket. It lay in the sector of Lieu-tenant Colonel Honsowetz' 2d Bat-talion, 1st Marines, to whichCompany B of Major Ray Davis' 1stBattalion was attached. Company B,1/1, having landed with 242 men,had 90 men left when its commander,Captain Everett P. Pope, receivedHonsowetz' order to take what theMarines were then calling Hill 100.The Japanese called it Higashiyama(East Mountain).

Initially supported by tanks, Pope'scompany lost that support when thetwo leading tanks slipped off an ap-proach causeway. Continuing withonly mortar support, and into theface of heavy defending mortar andmachine-gun fire, Pope's Marines