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    Question: Critical Analysis of NJAC

    The case of Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and another vs. Union of India,

    better known as the NJAC judgment, was aimed to replace the Collegium system of judicial

    appointment by providing a committee of individuals who would form an independent body. This

    committee would have members from the Judiciary, the Executive as well people from the

    society.

    Evaluate this on the basis of

    • Doctrine of revival of constitutional amendments.

    • Test for violation of basic structure.

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    Prior to the presentation of the collegium framework, judges were appointed by the executive

    under the direction of the judiciary. The thought of a collegium framework was presented after

    A.N.Ray's arrangement by the official was addressed as he circumvented two senior most

    Supreme Court judges to end up the Chief Justice of India. In a late Supreme Court choice, the

    99th amendment of the constitution along the National Judicial Appointments Commission

    (NJAC) act was struck down on the premise of being void and illegal. This decision restores the

    collegium framework for the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court. The court held that

    NJAC leads to altering of the basic structure of the constitution as the executive now interferes

    meddle with the autonomy of the judiciary while recognizing that the collegium is not sound and

    sufficiently straightforward. As indicated by the NJAC, legal arrangements are to be made by a

    collegium headed by Chief Justice of India, two senior most Supreme Court judges, the law and

     justice minister, and two eminent persons who are to be selected by a committee comprising the

    CJI, Prime Minister and leader of the opposition.

    Though the NJAC collegium system claimed to be more transparent than the previous system,yet there are a number of flaws in it. According to the Doctrine of revival of constitutional

    amendments, if there was a law, which was amended to the extent the first law didn’t hold any

    value, furthermore any amendments, which were made to the original law, would be held to be

    unconstitutional, in such a situation the original law should come back to power. Keeping the

    principle stated above in mind, Article 124 of the constitution stated the rule used for

    appointment of judges. Amendments A, B and C to this article added the provisions of the

    NJAC. However, the Supreme Court of India held these amendments to be unconstitutional.

    Now the question before us is whether the collegium system will be put back in the system?

    There were various views put forward regarding the above. Attorney general Mukul Rohatgi

    argued that to retain “public confidence”, judicial appointments “must be seen both in the contextof independence of the judiciary as also the need for checks and balances on it”. (1)

    Hence, It may be concluded from this that if the collegium system is not put back, it would lead

    to a lot of problems,hence creating a void in the law. In the case ofProperty Owners

     Association v. State of Maharashtra, the court was asked to check the constitutional validity of

    an amendment made to a certain Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976. This

    amendment to the statute sought to warrant the protection of Article 31C of the Constitution of

    India, which bars any sort of constitutional challenge on the grounds of Art. 19 or 14, provided

    the statute was enacted in furtherance of Art. 39 (b) or Art. 39 (c). With the coming of the 42nd

    Amendment Act, this constitutional protection was extended to cover any statute, which

    furthered any provision of the Part IV of our constitution. Afterwards, in the Minerva Mills case,

    this extension of protection, was deemed to be unconstitutional. Moreover, theMinerva Mills Ltd.

    v. Union of India case,Waman Rao v. Union of India andSanjeev Coke Manufacturing v. Bharat

    Coking Coal; all three were adjudicated upon whilst naturally assuming that the original Art.

    31C, prior to the 42nd Amendment, had naturally been revived.(2) However, Adv. Fali S.

    Nariman, the counsel for the petitioners in theProperty Owners Association case, stated that

    the contention of the doctrine of revival not being applicable to constitutional amendments was

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    never raised in any of the above mentioned cases. All of these cases proceeded on the

    assumption that the old provisions are spontaneously revived. In theProperty Owners

     Association case, the three judge bench explicitly stated that the question of the applicability of

    the doctrine of revival still remains to be contested. However, it is worth noting that, close

    scrutiny of the order of the three judge bench reveals that the only matter referred to a five judge

    bench was regarding the interpretation of Art. 39 (b) & (c). Currently, the matter lies before a

    nine judge bench, which is yet to be constituted. In a plethora of other cases too, it can be seen

    that courts are adopting what the three judge bench here did; assumed the old provision to

    rise(3). As a result, the current situation is very vague and only riddled with assumptions that the

    doctrine of revival should be applicable to constitutional amendments as well; there is clearly

    lack of adjudication on this matter. Hence, even in the current case at hand, the NJAC judgment,

    the court has continued this trend and has assumed that the collegium system should come

    back into play. I personally, am not arguing that the doctrine of revival should not apply to

    constitutional amendments, but am only highlighting the lack of precedents to support such a

    position, and the need to adjudicate on this matter.

    The fundamental structure of the constitution which safeguards the separation of powers and

    freedom of judiciary from the executive stays ensured under the NJAC , as the administrator of

    NJAC is the Chief Justice of India. NJAC is a good sign of democracy which ensures that no

    organ of the state enjoys supreme sovereignty. A major part of NJAC case is that the CJI would

    have the final word while appointing judges and one of the major contentions in the NJAC case

    was that whether CJI’s primacy became a fundamental part of the constitution which could not

    be changed by the Parliament. If the independence of judiciary is maintained, which the NJACdoes, then such changes in the conventions of the collegium system do not amount to a change

    in the basic structure of the constitution. In aim of protecting public confidence, Attorney General

    Mukul Rohatgi said that judicial appointments “must be seen both in the context of

    independence of the judiciary as also the need for checks and balances on it”. (4)In a recent

    debate ,where Justice Lodha was defending the collegium system, he admitted that 'the

    collegium system is opaque and secretive and has three faults which are lack of transparency,

    lack of an expert body like a standing committee to help the collegium and the executive's

    indifferent role in the participatory process.' Justice Kurian Joseph, having the majority while

    delivered the NJAC judgment, criticized the collegium system by stating that several deserving

    persons were ignored while many unworthy candidates were included in the past.(4)

    Articles 124A, B and C were added through the 99th amendment of the Constitution in which

    Article 124A talks about the structure of NJAC which would include two ‘eminent’ persons

    nominated by the CJI, Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition. In an abstract thought, to

    increase public confidence in the judiciary and fair appointment of judges eminent persons

    being on board seems to be a necessity than just a good idea, presence of eminent persons on

    NJAC would allow for diversity in the commission and ensure that selected judges would be

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    perceptive to people’s interests. Such independent individuals would come up with several

    different viewpoints and having no particular personal stand in the appointment process they

    would help in keeping a check against discretionary exercise of power by any other member of

    the NJAC. The majority opinion held that NJAC curbs the role of judiciary in the judicial

    appointments but if half the members of NJAC would be judges then it cannot be synonymous to

    reducing judiciary’s role.(5) Of course a two-member veto can prevent the judges from allowing

    their pick to not go through the appointment but the reverse is also true that any two persons be

    it judges, politicians, eminent persons or a combination consisting of a mix of any two members

    can hold a veto. There could be a deadlock if there are altercations between the members of

    NJAC but at least no one could force an appointment of a particular judge. The NJAC does not

    moderate the role of judiciary, instead it balances the executive and judiciary and allows the

    politicians some say in the process which was the original intention of Article 124.(6) Article

    124C gives powers to the Parliament to make ordinary laws in the future for smooth functioning

    of NJAC which in itself does not affect the separation of powers. Under the constitution, the

    Parliament has legislative supremacy, as result of which it was able to pass the 99thamendment which creates NJAC. It has been considered normal to redistribute powers in

    support of one of the organs of democracy with respect to separation of powers.

    Thus it may be concluded that, though the NJAC has a number of positive points about it, but if

    it is analyzed from the perspective of revival of constitutional amendments and basic structure

    doctrine, there are number of flaws in it, which need to be addressed to make it a better system

    for appointment. Though the NJAC may have its flaws, but it is a refreshment to the previous

    system of appointment, which had been going on in India, since many years. The introduction of

    a new system, like this one, is not only imperative to todays judicial system, it is also the need ofthe hour. I would like to conclude with "Reform that you may preserve", The parting words of the

    lone dissenting judge J Chelameswar, quoted from the speech of Macaulay.(7)

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    Bibliography

    (1) http://www.ijra.in/uploads/42013.3534633912FULLPAPER_Abhilasha.S.G.pdf.

    (2)http://www.indiacode.nic.in/acts2014/40_of_2014.pdf.

    (3)http://www.thehindu.com/specials/in-depth/njac-vs-collegium-the-debate-

    decoded/article7768919.ece

    (4)http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-verdict-on-njac-and-collegium-

    system/article7769266.ece

    (5)http://www.thestatesman.com/mobi/news/india/njac-unconstitutional-rules-sc/97482.html

    (6)http://journal.lawmantra.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/211.pdf.

    (7)http://www.firstpost.com/politics/njac-verdict-how-the-ill-defined-basic-structure-came-handy-

    for-the-judiciary-to-expand-its-power-2473344.html

    http://www.ijra.in/uploads/42013.3534633912FULLPAPER_Abhilasha.S.G.pdfhttp://www.ijra.in/uploads/42013.3534633912FULLPAPER_Abhilasha.S.G.pdfhttp://www.indiacode.nic.in/acts2014/40_of_2014.pdfhttp://www.thehindu.com/specials/in-depth/njac-vs-collegium-the-debate-decoded/article7768919.ecehttp://www.thehindu.com/specials/in-depth/njac-vs-collegium-the-debate-decoded/article7768919.ecehttp://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-verdict-on-njac-and-collegium-system/article7769266.ecehttp://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-verdict-on-njac-and-collegium-system/article7769266.ecehttp://www.thestatesman.com/mobi/news/india/njac-unconstitutional-rules-sc/97482.htmlhttp://journal.lawmantra.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/211.pdfhttp://www.firstpost.com/politics/njac-verdict-how-the-ill-defined-basic-structure-came-handy-for-the-judiciary-to-expand-its-power-2473344.htmlhttp://www.firstpost.com/politics/njac-verdict-how-the-ill-defined-basic-structure-came-handy-for-the-judiciary-to-expand-its-power-2473344.htmlhttp://www.ijra.in/uploads/42013.3534633912FULLPAPER_Abhilasha.S.G.pdfhttp://www.indiacode.nic.in/acts2014/40_of_2014.pdfhttp://www.thehindu.com/specials/in-depth/njac-vs-collegium-the-debate-decoded/article7768919.ecehttp://www.thehindu.com/specials/in-depth/njac-vs-collegium-the-debate-decoded/article7768919.ecehttp://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-verdict-on-njac-and-collegium-system/article7769266.ecehttp://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-verdict-on-njac-and-collegium-system/article7769266.ecehttp://www.thestatesman.com/mobi/news/india/njac-unconstitutional-rules-sc/97482.htmlhttp://journal.lawmantra.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/211.pdfhttp://www.firstpost.com/politics/njac-verdict-how-the-ill-defined-basic-structure-came-handy-for-the-judiciary-to-expand-its-power-2473344.htmlhttp://www.firstpost.com/politics/njac-verdict-how-the-ill-defined-basic-structure-came-handy-for-the-judiciary-to-expand-its-power-2473344.html