India struggle for freedom BIPIN CHANDRA:The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857

It was the morning of 11 May 1857. The city of Delhi had not yet woken up when a band of sepoysfrom Meerut , who had defied and ki l led the European officers the previous day, crossed the Jamuna,set the tol l house on fi re and marched to the Red Fort .Bahadur Shah vaci l lated as he was nei ther sure of the intent ions of the sepoys nor of hi s own abi l i ty to play an effect ive role. He was however persuaded, i f not coerced, to give in and was proclaimed the Shahenshah-e-Hindustan.Simon Fraser, the Pol i t ical Agent , and several other Engl i shmen were ki l led; the publ ic offices were ei ther occupied or dest royed.The Revol t at Meerut and the capture of Delhi was the precursor to a widespread mut iny by thesepoys and rebel l ion almost al l over North India, as wel l as Cent ral and Western India. South Indiaremained quiet and Punjab and Bengal were only marginal ly affected.Almost hal f the Company’s sepoy st rength of 2,32,224 opted out of thei r loyal ty to thei r regimental colours and overcame the ideology of the army.

The 19th Nat ive Infant ry at Berhampur, which refused to use the newly int roduced Enfield ri fle, wasdi sbanded in March 1857. A young sepoy of the 34th Nat ive Infant ry, Mangal Pande, went a stepfurther and fi red at the Sergeant Major of hi s regiment . He was overpowered and executed and hi sregiment too, was di sbanded. The 7th Oudh Regiment which defied i t s officers met wi th a simi lar fate.At Kanpur, the natural choice was Nana Saheb, the adopted son of the last Peshwa, Baj i Rao II. Hehad refused the fami ly t i t le and, bani shed from Poona, was l iving near Kanpur. Begum Hazrat Mahaltook over the reigns at Lucknow, where popular sympathy was overwhelmingly in favour of thedeposed Nawab. Her son, Bi rj i s Qadi r, was proclaimed the Nawab and a regular admini st rat ion wasorganized wi th important offices shared equal ly by Musl ims and Hindus.At Bariel ly, Khan Bahadur, a descendant of the former ruler of Rohi lkhand, was placed incommand.In Bihar, the Revol t was led by Kunwar Singh, the zamindar of Jagdi shpur, a 70-year-old man on thebrink of bankruptcy. He nursed a grudge against the Bri t i sh. He had been deprived of hi s estates bythem and hi s repeated appeal s to be ent rusted wi th thei r management again fel l on deaf ears. Eventhough he had not planned an upri sing, he unhesi tat ingly joined the sepoys when they reached Arrahfrom Dinapore.The most out standing leader of the Revol t was Rani Lakshmibhai , who assumed the leadership ofthe sepoys at Jhansi . Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General , had refused to al low her adopted son tosucceed to the throne after her husband died and had annexed the state by the appl icat ion of theDoct rine of Lapse.The Revol t was not confined to these major cent res. It had embraced almost every cantonment inthe Bengal and a few in Bombay. Only the Madras army remained total ly loyal . Why did the sepoys revol t? It was considered prest igious to be in the service of the Company; i t provided economicstabi l i ty. A proclamat ion i ssued at Delhi indicates the immediate cause: ‘It i s wel l known that in these days al l the Engl i sh have entertained these evi l designs — fi rst , to dest roy the rel igion of the whole Hindustani Army, and then to make the people by compul sion Chri st ians. Therefore, we, solely on account of our rel igion, have combined wi th the people, and have not spared al ive one infidel , and have re-establ i shed the Delhi dynasty on these terms.

It i s certainly t rue that the condi t ions of service in the Company’s army and cantonment sincreasingly came into confl ict wi th the rel igious bel iefs and prejudices of the sepoys, who werepredominant ly drawn from the upper caste Hindus of the North Western Provinces and Oudh.

Ini t ial ly, the admini st rat ion sought to accommodate the sepoys’ demands: faci l i t ies were provided to them to l ive according to the dictates of thei r caste and rel igion.

But , wi th the extension of the Army’s operat ion not only to various part s of India, but al so to count ries out side, i t was not possible to do so any more.

Moreover, caste di st inct ions and segregat ion wi thin a regiment were not conducive to the cohesiveness of a fight ing uni t .

To begin wi th, the admini st rat ion thought of an easy way out : di scourage the recrui tment of Brahmins; thi s apparent ly did not succeed and, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the upper castes predominated in the Bengal Army, for instance.

The unhappiness of the sepoys fi rst surfaced in 1824 when the 47th Regiment at Barrackpur wasordered to go to Burma. To the rel igious Hindu, crossing the sea meant loss of caste. The sepoys,therefore, refused to comply. The regiment was di sbanded and those who led the opposi t ion were hanged. The rel igious sensibi l i t ies of the sepoys who part icipated in the Afghan War were more seriously affected. When they returned to India, those at home correct ly sensed that they could not have observed caste st ipulat ions and, therefore, were hesi tant to welcome them back into the bi radi ri (caste fraterni ty).The prest ige of being in the pay of the Company was not enough to hold hi s posi t ion in society; rel igion and caste proved to be more powerful .The rumours about the Government ’s secret designs to promote conversions to Chri st iani ty furtherexasperated the sepoys. The official -mi ssionary nexus gave credence to the rumour. In somecantonment s, mi ssionaries were permi t ted to preach openly and thei r diat ribe against other rel igions angered the sepoys. The report s about the mixing of bone dust in at ta and the int roduct ion of theEnfield ri fle enhanced the sepoys’ growing di saffect ion wi th the Government . The cart ridges of thenew ri fle had to be bi t ten off before loading and the grease was reportedly made of beef and pig fat .The army admini st rat ion did nothing to al lay these fears, and the sepoys fel t thei r rel igion was in real danger.The sepoys’ di scontent was not l imi ted to rel igion alone. They were equal ly unhappy wi th thei remolument s.He was made to feel a subordinate at every step and was di scriminated against racial ly and in mat ters of promot ion and privi leges.The di scontent of the sepoys was not l imi ted to mat ters mi l i tary, they reflected the general di senchantment wi th and opposi t ion to Bri t i sh rule. The sepoy, in fact , was a ‘peasant in uni form,’whose consciousness was not divorced from that of the rural populat ion.The new land revenue system int roduced after the annexat ion and the confi scat ion of lands at tached to chari table inst i tut ions affected hi s wel l -being. A proclamat ion i ssued by the Delhi rebel s clearly reflected thesepoy’s awareness of the mi sery brought about by Bri t i sh rule. The mut iny in i t sel f, therefore, was a revol t against the Bri t i sh and, thus, a pol i t ical act . What imparted thi s character to the mut iny was thesepoy’s ident i ty of interest s wi th the general populat ion.The Revol t of the sepoys was accompanied by a rebel l ion of the civi l populat ion, part icularly in theNorth Western Provinces and Oudh, the two areas from which the sepoys of the Bengal army were

recrui ted. Except in Muzzafarnagar and Saharanpur, civi l rebel l ion fol lowed the Revol t of the sepoys.The act ion of the sepoys released the rural populat ion from fear of the state and the cont rol exerci sed by the admini st rat ion.The civi l rebel l ion had a broad social base, embracing al l sect ions of society— the terri torial magnates, peasant s, art i sans, rel igious mendicant s and priest s, civi l servant s,shopkeepers and boatmen. The Revol t of the sepoys, thus, resul ted in a popular upri sing.Reasons:

Under the burden of excessive taxes the peasant ry became progressively indebted and impoveri shed.

The t radi t ional landed ari stocracy suffered no less. In Oudh, which was a storm cent re of the Revol t ,the taluqdars lost al l thei r power and privi leges.About 21,000 taluqdars who see states were confi scated suddenly found themselves wi thout a source of income, ‘unable to work, ashamed to beg, condemned to penury.’

These di spossessed taluqdars smart ing under the humi l iat ion heaped on them,seized the opportuni ty presented by the Sepoy Revol t to oppose the Bri t i sh and regain what they had lost .

Bri t i sh rule al so meant mi sery to the art i sans and handicraft smen. The annexat ion of Indian states bythe Company cut off thei r major source of pat ronage.

Added to thi s, Bri t i sh pol icy di scouraged Indian handicraft s and promoted Bri t i sh goods. The highly ski l led Indian craft smen were deprived of thei r source of income and were forced to look for al ternate sources of employment that hardly exi sted, as

the dest ruct ion of Indian handicraft s was not accompanied by the development of modern indust ries.

The reforming zeal of Bri t i sh official s under the influence of ut i l i tariani sm had aroused considerable suspicion, resentment , and opposi t ion.

The orthodox Hindus and Musl ims feared that through social legi slat ion the Bri t i sh were t rying to dest roy thei r rel igion and cul ture.

Moreover, they bel ieved that legi slat ion was undertaken to aid the mi ssionaries in thei r quest for evangel izat ion. The orthodox and the rel igious, therefore, arrayed against the Bri t i sh.

Whether Nana Saheb and Maulvi Ahmad Shah of Faizabad had establ i shed l inks wi th various cantonment s and were inst rumental in inst igat ing Revol t i s yet to be proved beyond doubt . Simi larly, the message conveyed by the ci rculat ion of chappat i s and lotus flowers i s al so uncertain.Immediately after the capture of Delhi a let ter was addressed to the rulers of al l theneighbouring states and of Rajasthan sol ici t ing thei r support and invi t ing them to part icipate. In Delhi , a court of admini st rators was establ i shed which was responsible for al l mat ters of state. The court consi sted of ten members, six from the army and four from the civi l ian department s. Al l deci sions were taken by a majori ty vote.Bahadur Shah was recognized as the Emperor by al l rebel leaders. Coins were st ruck and orderswere i ssued in hi s name. At Barei l ly, Khan Bahadur Khan conducted the admini st rat ion in the name of the Mughal Emperor.For more than a year, the rebel s carried on thei r st ruggle against heavy odds.

They had no source of arms and ammuni t ion. They were often forced to fight wi th swords and pikes against an enemy suppl ied wi th the

most modern weapons. They had no quick system of communicat ion at thei r command and, hence, no coordinat ion

was possible.

Consequent ly, they were unaware of the st rength and weaknesses of thei r compat riot s and as a resul t could not come to each other’s rescue in t imes of di st ress.

The merchant s, intel l igent sia and Indian rulers not only kept aloof, but act ively supported the Bri t i sh. Meet ings were organized in Calcut ta and Bombay by them to pray for the success of the Bri t i sh.Despi te the Doct rine of Lapse, the Indian rulers who expected thei r future to be safer wi th the Bri t i sh l iberal ly provided them wi th men and material s.Almost hal f the Indian soldiers not only did not Revol t but fought against thei r own count rymen.Apart from some honourable except ions l ike the Rani of Jhansi , Kunwar Singh and MaulviAhmadul lah, the rebel s were poorly served by thei r leaders. Most of them fai led to real ize thesigni ficance of the Revol t and simply did not do enough. Bahadur Shah and Zeenat Mahal had no fai th in the sepoys and negot iated wi th the Bri t i sh to secure thei r safety. Most of the taluqdars t ried only to protect thei r own interest s. Some of them, l ike Man Singh, changed sides several t imes depending on which side had the upper hand.Apart from a commonly shared hat red for al ien rule, the rebel s had no pol i t ical perspect ive or adefini te vi sion of the future. They were al l pri soners of thei r own past , fight ing primari ly to regainthei r lost privi leges.The fi rst to fal l was Delhi on 20 September 1857 after a prolonged bat t le. Bahadur Shah, who took refuge in Humayun’s tomb, was captured, t ried and deported to Burma.Wi th that the back of the Revol t was broken, since Delhi was the only possible ral lying point .The Rani of Jhansi died fight ing on 17 June 1858. General Hugh Rose, who defeated her, paid high t ribute to hi s enemy when he said that here lay the woman who was the only man among therebel s.’ Nana Saheb refused to give in and final ly escaped to Nepal in the beginning of 1859, hoping torenew the st ruggle. Kunwar Singh, despi te hi s old age, was too quick for the Bri t i sh t roops and constant ly kept them guessing t i l l hi s death on 9 May 1858. Tant ia Tope, who successful ly carried on guerri l la warfare against the Bri t i sh unt i l Apri l 1859, was bet rayed by a zamindar, captured and put to death by the Bri t i sh.

Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisingspol igars (landed mi l i tary magnates in South India)

The scholarly and priest ly classes were al so act ive in inci t ing hat red and rebel l ion against foreignrule. The t radi t ional rulers and rul ing el i te had financial ly supported scholars, rel igious preachers,priest s, pandi t s and maulvi s and men of art s and l i terature. Wi th the coming of the Bri t i sh and the ruin of the t radi t ional landed and bureaucrat ic el i te, thi s pat ronage came to an end, and al l those who had depended on i t were impoveri shed.Di splaced peasant s and demobi l ized soldiers of Bengal led by rel igious monks and di spossessedzamindars were the fi rst to ri se up in the Sanyasi rebel l ion, made famous by Bankim ChandraChat terjee in hi s novel Anand Math, that lasted from 1763 to 1800. It was fol lowed by the Chuar upri sing which covered five di st rict s of Bengal and Bihar from 1766 to 1772 and then, again, from 1795 to 1816. Other major rebel l ions in Eastern India were those of Rangpur and Dinajpur, 1783;Bi shnupur and Bi rbhum, 1799; Ori ssa zamindars, 1804-17; and Sambalpur, 1827-40.In South India, the Raja of Vizianagram revol ted in 1794, the pol igars of Tami l Nadu during the1790’s, of Malabar and coastal Andhra during the fi rst decade of the 19th century, of Parlekamedi

during 1813-14. Dewan Velu Thampi of Travancore organized a heroic revol t in 1805. The Mysorepeasant s too revol ted in 1830-31. There were major upri sings in Vizagapatnam from 1830-34, Ganjamin 1835 and Kurnool in 1846-47.In Western India, the chiefs of Saurasht ra rebel led repeatedly from 1816 to 1832. The Kol i s ofGujarat did the same during 1824-28, 1839 and 1849. Maharasht ra was in a perpetual state of revol tafter the final defeat of the Peshwa. Prominent were the Bhi l upri sings, 1818-31; the Ki t tur upri sing,led by Chinnava, 1824; the Satara upri sing, 1841; and the revol t of the Gadkari s, 1844.Northern India was no less turbulent . The present states of WesternU.P. and Haryana rose up in arms in 1824. Other major rebel l ions were those of Bi laspur, 1805; thetaluqdars of Al igarh, 1814-17; the Bundelas of Jabalpur, 1842; and Khandesh, 1852. The secondPunjab War in 1848-49 was al so in the nature of a popular revol t by the people and the army.

These almost cont inuous rebel l ions were massive in thei r total i ty, but were whol ly local in thei r spread and i solated from each other.

They were the resul t of local causes and grievances, and were al so local ized in thei r effect s. They often bore the same character not because they represented nat ional or common effort s but because they represented common condi t ions though separated in t ime and space.

The suppression of the civi l rebel l ions was a major reason why the Revol t of 1857 did not spread to South India and most of Eastern and Western India. The hi storical signi ficance of these civi l upri sings l ies in that they establ i shed st rong and valuable local t radi t ions of resi stance to Bri t i sh rule.The t ribal s had cause to be upset for a variety of reasons.

The colonial admini st rat ion ended thei r relat ive i solat ion and brought them ful ly wi thin the ambi t of colonial i sm.

It recognized the t ribal chiefs as zamindars and int roduced a new system of land revenue and taxat ion of t ribal product s.

It encouraged the influx of Chri st ian mi ssionaries into the t ribal areas. Above al l , i t int roduced a large number of moneylenders, t raders and revenue farmers as

middlemen among the t ribal s. These middlemen were the chief inst rument s for bringing the t ribal people wi thin the vortex

of the colonial economy and exploi tat ion. The middlemen were out siders who increasingly took possession of t ribal lands and ensnared the t ribal s in a web of debt .

Colonial i sm al so t ransformed thei r relat ionship wi th the forest . Oppression and extort ion by pol icemen and other pet ty official s further aggravated di st ress

amongthe t ribal s. The revenue farmers and government agent s al so intensi fied and expanded the system of

begar — making the t ribal s perform unpaid labour.In t ime, the t ribal people increasingly lost thei r lands and were reduced to the posi t ion of agricul tural labourers, share-croppers and rack-rented tenant s on the land they had earl ier brought under cul t ivat ion and held on a communal basi s.

Al l thi s di ffered in intensi ty from region to region, but the complete di srupt ion of the old agrarianorder of the t ribal communi t ies provided the common factor for al l the t ribal upri singsThe colonial int rusion and the t riumvi rate of t rader, moneylender and revenue farmer in sumdi srupted the t ribal ident i ty to a lesser or greater degree. In fact , ethnic t ies were a basic feature of the t ribal rebel l ions.Fel low t ribal s were never at tacked unless theyhad col laborated wi th the enemy.At the same t ime, not al l out siders were at tacked as enemies. Often there was no violence againstthe non-t ribal poor, who worked in t ribal vi l lages in support ive economic roles, or who had social

relat ions wi th the t ribal s, such as tel i s, gwalas, lohars, carpenters, pot ters, weavers, washermen,barbers, drummers, and bonded labourers and domest ic servant s of the out siders. They were not onlyspared, but were seen as al l ies. In many cases, the rural poor formed a part of the rebel l ious t ribalbands.

Among the numerous t ribal revol t s, the Santhal hool or upri sing was the most massive. The Santhal s,who l ive in the area between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal , known as Daman-i -koh, rose in revol t ; made a determined at tempt to expel the out siders — the dikus — and proclaimed the complete ‘annihi lat ion’ of the al ien regime.‘Zamindars, the pol ice, the revenue and court alas have exerci sed a combined system of extort ions, oppressive exact ions, forcible di spossession of property, abuse and personal violence and a variety of pet ty tyrannies upon the t imid and yielding Santhal s. Usurious interest on loans of money ranging from 50 to 500 per cent ; fal se measures at the haut and the market ; wi l ful and unchari table t respass by the rich by means of thei r untethered cat t le, tat toos, ponies and even elephant s, on the growing crops of the poorer race; and such l ike i l legal i t ies have been prevalent .’1The Santhal s considered the dikus and government servant s moral ly corrupt being given to beggary,steal ing, lying and drunkenness.

The t ribal leaders cal led an assembly of nearly 6000 Santhal s, represent ing 400 vi l lages, at Bhaganidihi on 30 June 1855. It was decided to rai se the banner of revol t , get rid of the out siders and thei r colonial masters once and for al l , the usher in Satyug, ‘The Reign of Truth,’ and ‘True Just ice.’The Santhal s bel ieved that thei r act ions had the blessings of God. Sido and Kanhu, the principalrebel leaders, claimed that Thakur (God) had communicated wi th them and told them to take up armsand fight for independence.they at tacked the mahajans and zamindars and thei r houses, pol ice stat ions, rai lway const ruct ion si tes, the dak (post ) carriers — in fact al l the symbol s of diku exploi tat ion and colonial power.The Santhal insurrect ion was helped by a large number of non-t ribal and poor dikus. Gwalas(mi lkmen) and others helped the rebel s wi th provi sions and services; lohars (blacksmi ths)accompanied the rebel bands, keeping thei r weapons in good shape.The rebel l ion was crushed ruthlessly. More than 15,000 Santhal s were ki l led whi le tens of vi l lageswere dest royed. Sido was bet rayed and captured and ki l led in August 1855 whi le Kanhu was arrestedby accident at the tai l -end of the rebel l ion in February 1866.

three other major t ribal rebel l ions. The Kol s of Chhotanagpur rebel led from 1820 to 1837. Thousands of them were massacred

before Bri t i sh authori ty could be re-imposed. The hi l l t ribesmen of Rampain coastal Andhra revol ted in March 1879 against the depredat

ions of the government -supported mansabdar and the new rest rict ive forest regulat ions. the rebel s, numbering several thousands, could be defeated by the end of 1880.

The rebel l ion (ulgulan ) of the Munda t ribesmen, led by Bi rsa Munda, occurred during 1899-1900.For over thi rty years the Munda sardars had been st ruggl ing against the dest ruct ion of thei r system of common land holdings by the int rusion of jagi rdars, thikadars(revenue farmers) and merchant moneylenders.

OnChri stmas Eve, 1899, Bi rsa proclaimed a rebel l ion to establ i sh Munda rule in the land and encouraged

‘the ki l l ing of thikadars and jagi rdars and Rajas and Hakims (rulers) and Chri st ians.’ Satyug would beestabl i shed in place of the present -day Kalyug. The non-t ribal poor were not to be at tacked

Peasant Movements and Uprisings after 1857In Ryotwari areas, the Government i t sel f levied heavy land revenue.

The most mi l i tant and widespread of the peasant movement s was the Indigo Revol t of 1859-60.

The indigo planters, nearly al l Europeans, compel led the tenant s to grow indigo which they processed in factories set up in rural (mofussi l ) areas. From the beginning, indigo was grown under an ext remelyoppressive system which involved great loss to the cul t ivators. The planters forced the peasant s totake a meager amount as advance and enter into fraudulent cont ract s. The price paid for the indigoplant s was far below the market price.

The peasant was forced to grow indigo on the best land he had whetheror not he wanted to devote hi s land and labour to more paying crops l ike rice. At the t ime of del ivery, he was cheated even of the due low price. He al so had to pay regular bribes to the planter’s official s.He was forced to accept an advance. Often he was not in a posi t ion to repay i t , but even i f he could he was not al lowed to do so. The advance was used by the planters to compel him to go on cul t ivat ing indigo.Since the enforcement of forced and fraudulent cont ract s through the court s was a di fficul t andprolonged process, the planters resorted to a reign of terror to coerce the peasant s. Kidnapping, i l legalconfinement in factory godowns, flogging, at tacks on women and chi ldren, carrying off cat t le, loot ing, burning and demol i t ion of houses and dest ruct ion of crops and frui t t rees were some of the methods used by the planters. They hi red or maintained bands of lathiyal s (armed retainers) for the purpose.The beginning was made by the ryot s of Govindpur vi l lage in Nadia di st rict when, under theleadership of Digambar Bi swas and Bi shnu Bi swas, ex-employees of a planter, they gave up indigocul t ivat ion. And when, on 13 September, the planter sent a band of 100 lathiyal s to at tack thei rvi l lage, they organized a counter force armed wi th lathi s and spears and fought back.The indigo st rikes and di sturbances flared up again in the spring of 1860 and encompassed al l theindigo di st rict s of Bengal . Factory after factory was at tacked by hundreds of peasant s and vi l lage after vi l lage bravely defended i t sel f.Ul t imately, the planters could not wi thstand the uni ted resi stance of the ryot s, and they gradual lybegan to close thei r factories. The cul t ivat ion of indigo was vi rtual ly wiped out from the di st rict s ofBengal by the end of 1860.A major reason for the success of the Indigo Revol t was the t remendous ini t iat ive, cooperat ion,organizat ion and di scipl ine of the ryot s. Another was the complete uni ty among Hindu and Musl impeasant s. Leadership for the movement was provided by the more wel l -off ryot s and in some cases by pet ty zamindars, moneylenders and ex-employees of the planters.A signi ficant feature of the Indigo Revol t was the role of the intel l igent sia of Bengal whichorganized a powerful campaign in support of the rebel l ious peasant ry. It carried on newspapercampaigns, organized mass meet ings, prepared memoranda on peasant s’ grievances and supportedthem in thei r legal bat t les. Out standing in thi s respect was the role of Hari sh Chandra Mukherj i , edi tor of the Hindoo Pat riot .Din Bandhu Mi t ra’s play, Neel Darpan, was to gain great fame for vividly port raying the oppressionby the planters.

Mi ssionaries were another group which extended act ive support to the indigo ryot s in thei r st ruggle.The Government ’s response to the Revol t was rather rest rained and not as harsh as in the case ofcivi l rebel l ions and t ribal upri sings.It was al so able to see, in t ime, the changed temper of the peasant ryand was influenced by the support extended to the Revol t by the intel l igent sia and the mi ssionaries. It appointed a commi ssion to inqui re into the problem of indigo cul t ivat ion. Evidence brought before the Indigo Commi ssion and i t s final report exposed the coercion and corrupt ion underlying the ent i re system of indigo cul t ivat ion. The resul t was the mi t igat ion of the worst abuses of the system. The Government i ssued a not i ficat ion in November 1860 that ryot s could not be compel led to sow indigo and that i t would ensure that al l di sputes were set t led by legal means.Large part s of East Bengal were engul fed by agrarian unrest during the 1870s and early 1880s. Theunrest was caused by the effort s of the zamindars to enhance rent beyond legal l imi t s and to prevent the tenant s from acqui ring occupancy right s under Act X of 1859.In May 1873, an agrarian league or combinat ion was formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna di st rict to resi st the demands of the zamindars.The st ruggle gradual ly spread throughout Pabna and then to the other di st rict s of East Bengal . Everywhere agrarian leagues were organized, rent s were wi thheld and zamindars fought in the court s. The main form of st ruggle was that of legal resi stance. There was very l i t t le violence — i t only occurred when the zamindars t ried to compel the ryot s to submi t to thei r terms by force.In the course of the movement , the ryot sdeveloped a st rong awareness of the law and thei r legal right s and the abi l i ty to combine and formassociat ions for peaceful agi tat ion.The Government rose to the defence of the zamindars wherever violence took place. Peasant s werethen arrested on a large scale. But i t assumed a posi t ion of neut ral i ty as far as legal bat t les or peaceful agi tat ions were concerned.The Government al so promi sed to undertake legi slat ion to protect the tenant s from the worst aspect s of zamindari oppression, a promi se i t ful fi l led however imperfect ly in 1885 when the Bengal Tenancy Act was passedWhat persuaded the zamindars and the colonial regime to reconci le themselves to the movementwas the fact that i t s aims were l imi ted to the redressal of the immediate grievances of the peasant s and the enforcement of the exi st ing legal right s and norms. It was not aimed at the zamindari system. It al so did not have at any stage an ant i -colonial pol i t ical edge. The agrarian leagues kept wi thin the bounds of law, used the legal machinery to fight the zamindars, and rai sed no ant i -Bri t i sh demands.The leaders often argued that they were against zamindars and not the Bri t i sh. In fact , the leadersrai sed the slogan that the peasant s want ‘to be the ryot s of Her Majesty the Queen and of Her only.’

Once again the Bengal peasant s showed complete Hindu-Musl im sol idari ty, even though themajori ty of the ryot s were Musl im and the majori ty of zamindars Hindu. There was al so no effort tocreate peasant sol idari ty on the grounds of rel igion or caste.

In thi s case, too, a number of young Indian intel lectual s supported the peasant s’ cause. Theseincluded Bankim Chandra Chat terjea and R.C. Dut t . Later, in the early 1880s, during the di scussion ofthe Bengal Tenancy Bi l l , the Indian Associat ion, led by Surendranath Banerjea, Anand Mohan Boseand Dwarkanath Gangul i , campaigned for the right s of tenant s, helped form ryot ’ unions, andorganized huge meet ings of upto 20,000 peasant s in the di st rict s in support of the Rent Bi l l . The

Indian Associat ion and many of the nat ional i st newspapers went further than the Bi l l . They asked for permanent fixat ion of the tenant ’s rent . They warned that since the Bi l l would confer occupancy right s even on non-cul t ivators, i t would lead to the growth of middlemen — the jotedars — who would be as oppressive as the zamindars so far as the actual cul t ivators were concerned. They, therefore, demanded that the right of occupancy should go wi th actual cul t ivat ion of the soi l , that i s, in most cases to the under- ryot s and the tenant s-at -wi l l .

A major agrarian outbreak occurred in the Poona and Ahmednagar di st rict s of Maharasht ra in 1875.Here, as part of the Ryotwari system, land revenue was set t led di rect ly wi th the peasant who was al so recognized as the owner of hi s land. Like the peasant s in other Ryotwari areas, the Deccan peasant al so found i t di fficul t to pay land revenue wi thout get t ing into the clutches of the moneylender and increasingly losing hi s land.Three other development s occurred at thi s t ime. During the early 1860s, the American Civi l Warhad led to a ri se in cot ton export s which had pushed up prices. The end of the Civi l War in 1864brought about an acute depression in cot ton export s and a crash in prices. The ground sl ipped fromunder the peasant s’ feet . Simul taneously, in 1867, the Government rai sed land revenue by nearly 50per cent . The si tuat ion was worsened by a succession of bad harvest s.There was very l i t t le violence in thi s set t l ing of account s. Once the moneylenders’ inst rument s ofoppression — debt bonds — were surrendered, no need for further violence was fel t .As in the case of the Pabna Revol t , the Deccan di sturbances had very l imi ted object ives.Therewas once again an absence of ant i -colonial consciousness. It was, therefore, possible for the colonialregime to extend them a certain protect ion against the moneylenders through the DeccanAgricul turi st s’ Rel ief Act of 1879.Once again, the modern nat ional i st intel l igent sia of Maharasht ra supported the peasant s’ cause.Al ready, in 1873-74, the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, led by Just ice Ranade, had organized a successfulcampaign among the peasant s, as wel l as at Poona and Bombay, against the land revenue set t lement of 1867.The Sabha as wel l as many of the nat ional i st newspapers al so supported the D.A.R. Bi l l .The Kuka Revol t in Punjab was led by Baba Ram Singh and had element s of a messianic movement . It was crushed when 49 of the rebel s were blown up by a cannon in 1872.

There was a certain shi ft in the nature of peasant movement s after 1857. Princes, chiefs and landlordshaving been crushed or co-opted, peasant s emerged as the main force in agrarian movement s. Theynow fought di rect ly for thei r own demands, centered almost whol ly on economic i ssues,and againstthei r immediate enemies, foreign planters and indigenous zamindars and moneylenders. Thei rst ruggles were di rected towards speci fic and l imi ted object ives and redressal of part icular grievances.They did not make colonial i sm thei r target . Nor was thei r object ive the ending of the system of thei rsubordinat ion and exploi tat ion.The terri torial reach of these movement s was al so l imi ted. They were confined to part icularlocal i t ies wi th no mutual communicat ion or l inkages. They al so lacked cont inui ty of st ruggle or longterm organizat ion. Once the speci fic object ives of a movement were achieved, i t s organizat ion, as al sopeasant sol idari ty bui l t around i t , di ssolved and di sappeared. Thus, the Indigo st rike, the Pabnaagrarian leagues and the social -boycot t movement of the Deccan ryot s left behind no successors.He did not object to paying interest on the sums he had borrowed; he hi t backagainst fraud and chicanery by the moneylender and when the lat ter went against t radi t ion in depriving

him of hi s land. He did not deny the state’s right to col lect a tax on land but objected when the level oftaxat ion overstepped al l t radi t ional bounds. He did not object to the foreign planter becoming hi szamindar but resi sted the planter when he took away hi s freedom to decide what crops to grow andrefused to pay him a proper price for hi s crop.A major weakness of the 19th century peasant movement s was the lack of an adequateunderstanding of colonial i sm — of colonial economic st ructure and the colonial state — and of thesocial framework of the movement s themselves. Nor did the 19th century peasant s possess a newideology and a new social , economic and pol i t ical programme based on an analysi s of the newlyconst i tuted colonial society. Thei r st ruggles, however mi l i tant , occurred wi thin the framework of theold societal order. They lacked a posi t ive concept ion of an al ternat ive society — a concept ion whichwould uni te the people in a common st ruggle on a wide regional and al l -India plane and help developlong-term pol i t ical movement s.

Foundation of the Congress: The MythIndian Nat ional Congress was founded in December 1885 by seventy-two pol i t ical workers. It was the fi rst organized expression of Indian nat ional i sm on an al l -India scale. A.O. Hume, a ret i red Engl i sh ICS officer, played an important role in i t s format ion.The myth i s that the Indian Nat ional Congress was started by A.O. Hume and others under theofficial di rect ion, guidance and advice of no less a person than Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy, to providea safe, mi ld, peaceful , and const i tut ional out let or safety valve for the ri sing di scontent among themasses, which was inevi tably leading towards a popular and violent revolut ion.In hi s Young India publ i shed in 1916, the Ext remi st leader Lala Lajpat Rai used the safety-valvetheory to at tack the Moderates in the Congress.Blavat sky enabled Hume to get in touch wi th one of these mahatmas named ‘Koot Hoomi Lal Singh.’

Foundation of The Indian National Congress: The RealityFor example, the Bri t i sh Indian Associat ion of Bengal had increasingly ident i fied i t sel f wi th the interest s of the zamindars and, thus, gradual ly lost i t s ant i -Bri t i sh edge. The Bombay Associat ion and Madras Nat ive Associat ion had become react ionary and moribund. And so the younger nat ional i st s of Bengal , led by Surendranath Banerjea and Anand Mohan Bose, founded the Indian Associat ion in 1876. Younger men of Madras — M. Vi raraghavachariar, G. Subramaniya Iyer, P. Ananda Charlu and others — formed the Madras Mahajan Sabha in 1884. In Bombay, the more mi l i tant intel lectual s l ike K.T. Telang and Pherozeshah Mehta broke away from older leaders l ike Dadabhai Framj i and Dinshaw Pet i t on pol i t ical grounds and formed the Bombay Presidency Associat ion in 1885. Among the older associat ions only the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha carried on as before. But , then, i t was al ready in the hands of nat ional i st intel lectual s.A sign of new pol i t ical l i fe in the count ry was the coming into exi stence during these years ofnearly al l the major nat ional i st newspapers which were to dominate the Indian scene t i l l 1918 — The Hindu, Tribune, Bengalee, Mahrat ta and Kesari . The one except ion was the Amri ta Bazar Pat rika which was al ready edi ted by new and younger men. It became an Engl i sh language newspaper only in 1878.By 1885, the format ion of an al l -India pol i t ical organizat ion had become an object ive necessi ty, andthe necessi ty was being recognized by nat ional i st s al l over the count ry. Many recent scholars havefurni shed detai led informat ion on the many moves that were made in that di rect ion from 1877. These

moves acqui red a greater sense of urgency especial ly from 1883 and there was intense pol i t icalact ivi ty. The Indian Mi rror of Calcut ta was carrying on a cont inuous campaign on the quest ion. TheIndian Associat ion had al ready in December 1883 organized an Al l -India Nat ional Conference andgiven a cal l for another one in December 1885. (Surendranath Banerjea, who was involved in the Al l India Nat ional Conference, could not for that reason at tend the founding session of the Nat ionalCongress in 1885).Since 1875, there had been a cont inuouscampaign around cot ton import dut ies which Indians wanted to stay in the interest s of the Indiantext i le indust ry. A massive campaign had been organized during 1877-88 around the demand for theIndianizat ion of Government services. The Indians had opposed the Afghan adventure of Lord Lyt tonand then compel led the Bri t i sh Government to cont ribute towards the cost of the Second Afghan War.For example, P. Ananda Charlu in hi s president ial address to the Congress in 1891 described i t ‘as a mighty nat ional izer,’ and said that thi s was i t s most ‘glorious’ role.Among the three basic aims and object ives of the Congress laid down by i t s fi rst President , W.C. Bonnerj i , was that of ‘the ful ler development and consol idat ion of those sent iment s of nat ional uni ty.’In an effort to reach al l regions, i twas decided to rotate the Congress session among di fferent part s of the count ry. The President was to belong to a region other than where the Congress session was being held.To reach out to the fol lowers of al l rel igions and to remove the fears of the minori t ies, a rule wasmade at the 1888 session that no resolut ion was to be passed to which an overwhelming majori ty ofHindu or Musl im delegates objected.In 1889, a minori ty clause was adopted in the resolut ion demanding reform of legi slat ive counci l s. According to the clause, wherever Parsi s, Chri st ians, Musl ims or Hindus were a minori ty thei r number elected to the Counci l s would not be less than thei r proport ion in the populat ion.At i t s second session, the President of the Congress, Dadabhai Naoroj i , laid down thi s rule and said that ‘A Nat ional Congress must confine i t sel f to quest ions in which the ent i re nat ion has a di rect part icipat ion.’ Congress was, therefore, not the right place to di scuss social reforms. ‘We are met together,’ he said, ‘as a pol i t ical body to represent to our rulers our pol i t ical aspi rat ions.Dadabhai Naoroj i put i t , on ‘the new lesson that Kings are made for the people, not peoples for thei r Kings.’Simi larly, the early nat ional leaders made maintenance of civi l l ibert ies and thei r extension anintegral part of the nat ional movement . They fought against every infringement of the freedom of the Press and speech and opposed every at tempt to curtai l them. They st ruggled for separat ion of the judicial and execut ive powers and fought against racial di scriminat ion.To sum up: The basic object ives of the early nat ional i st leaders were to lay the foundat ions of asecular and democrat ic nat ional movement , to pol i t icize and pol i t ical ly educate the people, to form the headquarters of the movement , that i s, to form an al l -India leadership group, and to develop and propagate an ant i -colonial nat ional i st ideology.

Socio-Religious Reforms and the National AwakeningApart from the Brahmo Samaj , which has branches in several part s of the count ry, the Paramahansa Mandal i and the Prarthana Samaj in Maharasht ra and the Arya Samaj in Punjab and North India were some of the prominent movement s among the Hindus. There were several other regional and caste movement s l ike the Kayasth Sabha in Ut tar Pradesh and the Sarin Sabha in Punjab. The backward castes al so started the work of reformat ion wi th the Satya Sodhak Samaj in Maharasht ra and the Sri Narayana Dharma Paripalana Sabha in Kerala. The Ahmadiya and Al igarh movement s, the Singh Sabha

and the Rehnumai Mazdeyasan Sabha represented the spi ri t of reform among the Musl ims, the Sikhs and the Parsees respect ively.

Reject ing supernatural explanat ions, Raja Rammohan Roy affi rmed the principle of causal i ty l inking the whole phenomenal universe. To him demonst rabi l i ty was the sole cri terion of t ruth.In the Brahmo Samaj , i t led to the repudiat ion of the infal l ibi l i ty of the Vedas, and in theAl igarh Movement , to the reconci l iat ion of the teachings of Islam wi th the needs of the modern age.

In advocat ing widow marriage and opposing polygamy and chi ld marriage, Akshay Kumar was notconcerned about rel igious sanct ion or whether they exi sted in the past . Hi s argument s were mainlybased on thei r effect s on society. Instead of depending on the scriptures, he ci ted medical opinionagainst chi ld marriage.To Gopal Hari Deshmukh, popularly known as Lokahi tavadi , whether social reforms had thesanct ion of rel igion was immaterial . If rel igion did not sanct ion these, he advocated that rel igion i t sel f should be changed as i t was made by man and what was laid down in the scriptures need notnecessari ly be of contemporary relevance.Raja Rammohan Roy considered di fferent rel igions as nat ional embodiment s of universal thei sm. TheBrahmo Samaj was ini t ial ly conceived by him as a universal i st church. He was a defender of the basicand universal principles of al l rel igions — the monothei sm of the Vedas and the uni tariani sm ofChri st iani ty — and at the same t ime at tacked polythei sm of Hindui sm and the t rini tariani sm ofChri st iani ty. Syed Ahmed Khan echoed the same idea: al l prophet s had the same din (fai th) and every count ry and nat ion had di fferent prophet s.Ranade, Dayanand and Vivekananda denounced the exi st ing system of caste in no uncertain terms. Whi le the reform movement s general ly stood for i t s abol i t ion, Dayanand gave a utopian explanat ion for chaturvarna (four-fold varna divi sion of Hindu society) and sought to maintain i t on the basi s of vi rtue. ‘He deserves to be a Brahman who has acqui red the best knowledge and character,’ and an ignorant person i s fi t to be classed as a shudra,’ he argued.Understandably the most vi rulent opposi t ion to caste came from lower caste movement s.Jyot iba Phule and Narayana Guru were two unrelent ing cri t ics of the caste system and i t sconsequences. A conversat ion between Gandhi j i and Narayana Guru i s signi ficant . Gandhi j i , in anobvious reference to Chaturvarna and the inherent di fferences in qual i ty between man and man,observed that al l leaves of the same t ree are not ident ical in shape and texture. To thi s Narayana Guru pointed out that the di fference i s only superficial , but not in essence: the juice of al l leaves of a part icular t ree would be the same in content .

It was he who gave the cal l — ‘one rel igion, one caste and one God for mankind’ which one of hi s di sciples, Sahadaran Ayyapan, changed into ‘no rel igion, no caste and no God for mankind.’

But the reformers were aiming at modernizat ion rather than westernizat ion.the general resentment against the Lex Loci Act .(the Act proposed in 1845 and passed in 1850 provided the right to inheri t ancest ral property to Hindu convert s to Chri st iani ty).

An Economic Critique of Colonialism

It i s not that the early Indian nat ional i st s were unaware of the many pol i t ical , psychological and economic di sabi l i t ies of foreign dominat ion, but they st i l l supported colonial rule as they expected i t to rebui ld India as a spi t image of the Western met ropol i s.Three names stand out among the large number of Indians who ini t iated and carried out theeconomic analysi s of Bri t i sh rule during the years 1870-1905. The tal lest of the three was DadabhaiNaoroj i , known in the pre-Gandhian era as the Grand Old Man of India.. Hi s near contemporary, Just ice Mahadev Govind Ranade, taught an ent i re generat ion ofIndians the value of modern indust rial development . Romesh Chandra Dut t , a ret i red ICS officer,publ i shed The Economic Hi story of India at the beginning of the 20th century in which he examined inminute detai l the ent i re economic record of colonial rule since 1757.

The early nat ional i st s accepted wi th remarkable unanimi ty that the complete economic t ransformat ion of the count ry on the basi s of modern technology and capi tal i st enterpri se was the primary goal of al l thei r economic pol icies. or, in the words of Ranade, factories could ‘far moreeffect ively than School s and Col leges give a new bi rth to the act ivi t ies of the Nat ion.Surendranath Banerjea’s newspaper the Bengalee made the point on 18 January 1902: ‘The agi tat ion for pol i t ical right s may bind the various nat ional i t ies of India together for a t ime. The communi ty of interest s may cease when these right s are achieved. But the commercial union of the various Indian nat ional i t ies, once establ i shed, wi l l never cease to exi st .The early nat ional i st s di sagreed vehement ly wi th thi s view. They saw foreign capi tal as anunmi t igated evi l which did not develop a count ry but exploi ted and impoveri shed i t . Or, as Dadabhai Naoroj i popularly put i t , foreign capi tal represented the ‘despol iat ion’ and ‘exploi tat ion’ of Indian resources.Simi larly, the edi tor of the Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar described the use offoreign capi tal as ‘a system of internat ional depradat ion.’In essence, the early nat ional i st s asserted that genuine economic development was possible only i fIndian capi tal i t sel f ini t iated and developed the process of indust rial izat ion. Foreign capi tal wouldnei ther undertake nor could i t ful fi l l thi s task.To vi t iate thi s, they demanded the reduct ion of land revenue and abol i t ion of the sal t tax and supported the imposi t ion of income tax and import dut ies on product s which the rich and the middle classes consumed.On the expendi ture side, they pointed out that the emphasi s was on serving Bri tain’s imperial needswhi le the developmental and wel fare department s were starved. In part icular, they condemned thehigh expendi ture on the army which was used by the Bri t i sh to conquer and maintain imperial i stcont rol over large part s of Asia and Africa.The focal point of the nat ional i st cri t ique of colonial i sm was the drain theory.The nat ional i st leaders pointed out that a large part of India’s capi tal and weal th was being t ransferred or ‘drained’ to Bri tain in the form of salaries and pensions of Bri t i sh civi l and mi l i tary official s working in India, interest on loans taken by the Indian Government , profi t s of Bri t i sh capi tal i st s in India, and the Home Charges or expenses of the Indian Government in Bri tain.The drain took the form of an excess of export s over import s for which India got no economic ormaterial return. According to the nat ional i st calculat ions, thi s drain amounted to one-hal f ofgovernment revenues, more than the ent i re land revenue col lect ion, and over one-thi rd of India’s total savings. (In today’s terms thi s would amount to eight per cent of India’s nat ional income).R.C. Dut t , for example, made the drain the major theme of hi s Economic Hi story of India.

Dadabhai Naoroj i was the most advanced. Speaking on the drain at the Internat ional Social i st Congress in 1904, he put forward the demand for ‘sel f-government ’ and t reatment of India ‘l ike other Bri t i sh Colonies.’

A year later in 1905, in a message to the Benares session of the Indian Nat ional Congress, Dadabhai categorical ly asserted: ‘Sel f-government i s the only remedy for India’s woes and wrongs.’

And, then, as the President of the 1906 session of the Congress at Calcut ta, he laid down the goal of the nat ional movement as “sel f-government or Swaraj ,” l ike that of the Uni ted Kingdom or the Colonies.

The Fight to Secure Press FreedomInterest ingly, nearly one-thi rd of the founding fathers of the Congress in 1885 were journal i st s.Powerful newspapers emerged during these years under di st ingui shed and fearless journal i st s.These were the Hindu and Swadesami t ran under the edi torship of G. Subramaniya Iyer, Kesari andMahrat ta under B.G. Ti lak, Bengalee under Surendranath Banerjea, Amri ta Bazar Pat rika under Si si r Kumar Ghosh and Mot i lal Ghosh, Sudharak under G.K. Gokhale, Indian Mi rror under N.N. Sen, Voice of India under Dadabhai Naoroj i , Hindustani and Advocate under G.P. Varma and Tribune and Akhbar-i -Am in Punjab, Indu Prakash, Dnyan Prakash, Kal and Gujarat i in Bombay, and SomPrakash, Banganivasi and Sadharani in Bengal .The Amri ta Bazar Pat rika was started in 1868.The Vernacular Press Act of 1878, di rectedonly against Indian language newspapers, was conceived in great secrecy and passed at a single si t t ing of the Imperial Legi slat ive Counci l . The Act provided for the confi scat ion of the print ing press, paper and other material s of a newspaper i f the Government bel ieved that i t was publ i shing sedi t ious material s and had flouted an official warning.Indian nat ional i st opinion fi rmly opposed the Act . The fi rst great demonst rat ion on an i ssue ofpubl ic importance was organized in Calcut ta on thi s quest ion when a large meet ing was held in theTown Hal l . Various publ ic bodies and the Press al so campaigned against the Act . Consequent ly, i t was repealed in 1881 by Lord Ripon.The Act was in part icular aimed at the Amri ta Bazar Pat rikawhich came out at the t ime in both Bengal i and Engl i sh. The object ive was to take summary act ionagainst i t . But when the official s woke up the morning after the Act was passed, they di scovered tothei r di smay that the Pat rika had foxed them; overnight , the edi tors had converted i t into an Engl i sh newspaper!Surendranath Banerjea, one of the founding fathers of the Indian nat ional movement , was the fi rstIndian to go to jai l in performance of hi s duty as a journal i st .Born in 1856, Ti lak devoted hi s ent i re l i fe to the service of hi s count ry.In 1881, along wi th G.G. Agarkar, he founded the newspaper Kesari (in Marathi ) and Mahrat ta (inEngl i sh).Popular resentment against the official plague measures resul ted in the assassinat ion of Rand, the Chai rman of the Plague Commi t tee in Poona, and Lt . Ayerst by the Chaphekar brothers on 27 June 1898.Echoes of Ti lak’s t rial were to be heard in another not -so-di stant court when Gandhi j i , hi s pol i t ical successor, was t ried in 1922 for the same offence of sedi t ion under the same Sect ion 124A for hi sart icles in Young India.

Propaganda in the LegislaturesLegi slat ive Counci l s in India had no real official power t i l l 1920.The Indian Counci l s Act of 1861 enlarged the Governor-General ’s Execut ive Counci l for the purposeof making laws. The Governor-General could now add from six to twelve members to the Execut iveCounci l . At least hal f of these nominat ions had to be non-official s, Indian or Bri t i sh. Thi s counci lcame to be known as the Imperial Legi slat ive Counci l . It possessed no powers at al l . It could notdi scuss the budget or a financial measure or any other important bi l l wi thout the previous approval of the Government . It could not di scuss the act ions of the admini st rat ion.

The Government had decided to add them in order to represent Indian views, for many Bri t i sh official s and statesmen had come to bel ieve that one reason for the Revol t of 1857 was that Indian views were not known to the rulers. But in pract ice, the Counci l did not serve even thi s purpose.

Moreover, the Government invariably chose rulers of princely states or thei r employees, big zamindars, big merchant s or ret i red high government official s as Indian members. Only a handful of pol i t ical figures and independent intel lectual s such as Syed Ahmed Khan (1878-82), Kri stodas Pal (1883), V.N.Mandl ik (1884-87), K.L. Nulkar (1890-91) and Rash Behari Ghosh (1892) were nominated. Theoverwhelming majori ty of Indian nominees did not represent the Indian people or emergingnat ional i st opinion. It was, therefore, not surpri sing that they completely toed the official l ine.Ti l l 1892, thei r demand was l imi ted to the expansion and reform of the Legi slat iveCounci l s. They demanded wider part icipat ion in them by a larger number of elected Indian membersas al so wider powers for the Counci l s and an increase in the powers of the members to ‘di scuss anddeal wi th’ the budget and to quest ion and cri t icize the day-to-day admini st rat ion.

The nat ional i st agi tat ion forced the Government to make some changes in legi slat ive funct ioning by the Indian Counci l s Act of 1892. The number of addi t ional members of the Imperial and ProvincialLegi slat ive Counci l s was increased from the previous six to ten to ten to sixteen. A few of thesemembers could be elected indi rect ly through municipal commi t tees, di st rict boards, etc., but theofficial majori ty remained. The members were given the right to di scuss the annual budget but theycould nei ther vote on i t nor move a mot ion to amend i t . They could al so ask quest ions but were not al lowed to put supplementary quest ions or to di scuss the answers. The ‘reformed’ Imperial Legi slat ive Counci l met , during i t s tenure t i l l 1909Many leaders — for example, Dadabhai Naoroj i in 1904, G.K. Gokhale in 1905 andLokamanya Ti lak in 1906 began to put forward the demand for sel f government on the model of thesel f-governing colonies of Canada and Aust ral ia.Lord Dufferin, who had prepared the out l ine of the Act of 1892Born in 1845 in Bombay, Pherozeshah Mehta came under Dadabhai Naoroj i ’s influence whi lestudying law in London during the 1860s. He was one of the founders of the Bombay PresidencyAssociat ion as al so the Indian Nat ional Congress.Mehta’s fi rst major intervent ion in the Imperial Legi slat ive Counci l came in January 1895 on a Bi l lfor the amendment of the Pol ice Act of 1861 which enhanced the power of the local authori t ies toquarter a puni t ive pol ice force in an area and to recover i t s cost from selected sect ions of theinhabi tant s of the area.And when the Government insi sted on using i t s official majori ty to push through the Bi l l , Mehta along wi th Gokhale, G.K. Parekh, Balachandra Kri shna and D.A. Khare took the unprecedented step of organizing the fi rst walk-out in India’s legi slat ive hi story.

He got elected in hi s place thi rty-five-year-old Gokhale, who had al ready made hi s mark as the Secretary of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha and the edi tor of the Sudharak.Gopal Kri shna Gokhale was an out standing intel lectual who had been careful ly t rained in Indianeconomics by Just ice Ranade and G.V. Joshi .Gokhale was to be repaid in plenty by the love and recogni t ion of hi s own people. Proud of hi slegi slat ive achievement s, they were to confer on him the t i t le of ‘the leader of the opposi t ion.’Gandhi j i was to declare him hi s pol i t ical guru.

The Swadeshi Movement — 1903-1908Wi th the start of the Swadeshi Movement at the turn of the century, the Indian nat ional movementtook a major leap forward. Women, student s and a large sect ion of the urban and rural populat ion ofBengal and other part s of India became act ively involved in pol i t ics for the fi rst t ime.The Swadeshi Movement had i t s genesi s in the ant i -part i t ion movement which was started to oppose the Bri t i sh deci sion to part i t ion Bengal .The at tempt , in the words ofLord Curzon, the Viceroy, (1899-1905) was to ‘dethrone Calcut ta’ from i t s posi t ion as the ‘cent refrom which the Congress Party i s manipulated throughout Bengal , and indeed, the whole of India . . .The cent re of successful int rigue,’and ‘divide the Bengal i speaking populat ion.Thepart i t ion of the state intended to curb Bengal i influence by not only placing Bengal i s under twoadmini st rat ions but by reducing them to a minori ty in Bengal i t sel f as in the new proposal Bengalproper was to have seventeen mi l l ion Bengal i and thi rty-seven mi l l ion Oriya and Hindi speakingpeople! Al so, the part i t ion was meant to foster another kind of divi sion — thi s t ime on the basi s ofrel igion.The Indian nat ional i st s clearly saw the design behind the part i t ion and condemned i t unanimously. The ant i -part i t ion and Swadeshi Movement had begun.Even, the big zamindars who had hi thertobeen loyal to the Raj , joined forces wi th the Congress leaders who were most ly intel lectual s andpol i t ical workers drawn from journal i sm, law and other l iberal professions.Despi te the widespread protest voiced againstthe part i t ion proposal s, the deci sion to part i t ion Bengal was announced on 19 July 1905.It was in these meet ings that the pledge to boycot t foreign goods was fi rsttaken. In Calcut ta, student s organized a number of meet ings against part i t ion and for Swadeshi .The formal proclamat ion of the Swadeshi Movement was, made on the 7 August 1905, in a meet ingheld at the Calcut ta town hal l . The movement , hi therto sporadic and spontaneous, now had a focus anda leadership that was coming together. At the 7 August meet ing, the famous Boycot t Resolut ion waspassed. Even Moderate leaders l ike Surendranath Banerjea toured the count ry urging the boycot t ofManchester cloth and Liverpool sal t .In Calcut ta a hartal was declared.People took out processions and band after band walked barefoot , bathed in the Ganges in the morningand then paraded the st reet s singing Bande Mataram which, almost spontaneously, became the themesong of the movement . People t ied rakhi s on each other’s hands as a symbol of the uni ty of the twohalves of Bengal . Later in the day Anandamohan Bose and Surendranath Banerjea addressed two hugemass meet ings which drew crowds of 50,000 to 75,000 people. These were, perhaps, the largest mass

meet ings ever to be held under the nat ional i st banner thi s far. Wi thin a few hours of the meet ings, a sum of Rs. 50,000 was rai sed for the movement .The message of Swadeshi and the boycot t of foreign goods soon spread to the rest of the count ry:Lokamanya Ti lak took the movement to di fferent part s of India, especial ly Poona and Bombay; Aj i tSingh and Lala Lajpat Rai spread the Swadeshi message in Punjab and other part s of northern India;Syed Haidar Raza led the movement in Delhi ; Rawalpindi , Kangra, Jammu, Mul tan and Hardwarwi tnessed act ive part icipat ion in the Swadeshi Movement ; Chidambaram Pi l lai took the movement tothe Madras presidency, which was al so galvanized by Bipin Chandra Pal ’s extensive lecture tour.The Indian Nat ional Congress took up the Swadeshi cal l and the Banaras Session, 1905, presidedover by G.K. Gokhale, supported the Swadeshi and Boycot t Movement for Bengal . The mi l i tantnat ional i st s led by Ti lak, Bipin Chandra Pal , Lajpat Rai and Aurobindo Ghosh were, however, infavour of extending the movement to the rest of India and carrying i t beyond the programme of justSwadeshi and boycot t to a ful l fledged pol i t ical mass st ruggle. The aim was now Swaraj and theabrogat ion of part i t ion had become the ‘pet t iest and narrowest of al l pol i t ical object s.’TheModerates, by and large, were not as yet wi l l ing to go that far. In 1906, however, the Indian Nat ional Congress at i t s Calcut ta Session, presided over by Dadabhai Naoroj i , took a major step forward. Naoroj i in hi s president ial address declared that the goal of the Indian Nat ional Congress was ‘sel f- government or Swaraj l ike that of the Uni ted Kingdom or the Colonies.’The di fferences between the Moderates and the Ext remi st s, especial ly regarding the pace of the movement and the techniques of st ruggle to be adopted, came to a head in the 1907 Surat session of the Congress where the party spl i t wi th serious consequences for the Swadeshi Movement .The technique of ‘extended boycot t ’ was to include, apart from boycot t of foreign goods,boycot t of government school s and col leges, court s, t i t les and government services and even theorganizat ion of st rikes. The aim was to ‘make the admini st rat ion under present condi t ions impossibleby an organized refusal to do anything which shal l help ei ther the Bri t i sh Commerce in theexploi tat ion of the count ry or Bri t i sh officialdom in the admini st rat ion of i t .Corps of volunteers (or sami t i s as they were cal led) were another major form of mass mobi l izat ionwidely used by the Swadeshi Movement . The Swadesh Bandhab Sami t i set up by Ashwini KumarDut t , a school teacher, in Bari sal was the most wel l -known volunteer organizat ion of them al l .The sami t i s took the Swadeshi message to the vi l lages through magic lanternlectures and swadeshi songs, gave physical and moral t raining to thei r members, did social workduring famines and epidemics, organized school s, t raining in swadeshi craft and arbi t rat ion court s.Another important aspect of the Swadeshi Movement was the great emphasi s given to sel f-rel ianceor ‘Atmasakt i ’ as a necessary part of the st ruggle against the Government .The Swadeshi period al so saw the creat ive use of t radi t ional popular fest ival s and melas as a meansof reaching out to the masses. The Ganapat i and Shivaj i fest ival s, popularized by Ti lak, became amedium for Swadeshi propaganda not only in Western India but al so in Bengal .Another important aspect of the Swadeshi Movement was the great emphasi s given to sel f-rel ianceor ‘Atmasakt i ’ as a necessary part of the st ruggle against the Government .Taking a cue from Tagore’s Shant iniketan, the Bengal Nat ional Col lege was founded, wi th Aurobindo as the principal . Scores of nat ional school s sprang up al l over the count ry wi thin a short period. In August 1906, the Nat ional Counci l of Educat ion was establ i shed. The Counci l , consi st ing of vi rtual ly al l the di st ingui shed persons of the count ry at the t ime, defined i t s object ives in thi s way . . . ‘to organize a system of Educat ion Li terary, Scient i fic and Technical — on Nat ional l ines and under Nat

ional cont rol ’from the primary to the universi ty level . The chiefmedium of inst ruct ion was to be the vernacular to enable the widest possible reach. For technicaleducat ion, the Bengal Technical Inst i tute was set up and funds were rai sed to send student s to Japan for advanced learning.some others such as Acharya P.C. Ray’s Bengal Chemical s Factory, became successful and famous.Nandalal Bose, who left a majorimprint on Indian art , was the fi rst recipient of a scholarship offered by the Indian Society of OrientalArt founded in 1907.Rabindranath’s Amar Sonar Bangla,wri t ten at that t ime, was to later inspi re the l iberat ion st ruggle of Bangladesh and was adopted as the nat ional anthem of the count ry in 1971.The social base of the nat ional movement was now extended to include a certain zamindari sect ion,the lower middle class in the ci t ies and smal l towns and school and col lege student s on a massivescale. Women came out of thei r homes for the fi rst t ime and joined processions and picket ing.Thi s i s so because the peasant part icipat ion in theSwadeshi Movement marked the very beginnings of modern mass pol i t ics in India.The main drawback of the Swadeshi Movement was that i t was not able to garner the support of themass of Musl ims and especial ly of the Musl im peasant ry.Thi s was the period when the Al lIndia Musl im League was set up wi th the act ive guidance and support of the Government . Morespeci fical ly, in Bengal , people l ike Nawab Sal imul lah of Dacca were propped up as cent res ofopposi t ion to the Swadeshi Movement . Mul lahs and maulvi s were pressed into service and,unsurpri singly, at the height of the Swadeshi Movement communal riot s broke out in Bengal .

By mid-1908, the open movement wi th i t s popular mass character had al l but spent i t sel f. Thi s wasdue to several reasons. Fi rst , the government , seeing the revolut ionary potent ial of the movement ,came down wi th a heavy hand. Repression took the form of cont rol s and bans on publ ic meet ings,processions and the press.

Second, the internal squabbles, and especial ly, the spl i t , in 1907 in me Congress, the apex al l -Indiaorganizat ion, weakened the movement . Al so, though the Swadeshi Movement had spread out sideBengal , the rest of the count ry was not as yet ful ly prepared to adopt the new style and stage ofpol i t ics. Both these factors st rengthened the hands of the Government . Between 1907 and 1908, ninemajor leaders in Bengal including Ashwini Kumar Dut t and Kri shna Kumar Mi t ra were deported,Ti lak was given a sentence of six years impri sonment , Aj i t Singh and Lajpat Rai of Punjab weredeported and Chidambaram Pi l lai and Hari sarvot tam Rao from Madras and Andhra were arrested.Bipin Chandra Pal and Aurobindo Ghosh ret i red from act ive pol i t ics, a deci sion not unconnected wi th the repressive measures of the Government . Almost wi th one st roke the ent i re movement wasrendered leaderless.

Thi rd, the Swadeshi Movement lacked an effect ive organizat ion and party st ructure. The movementhad thrown up programmat ical ly almost the ent i re gamut of Gandhian techniques such as passiveresi stance, non-violent non-cooperat ion, the cal l to fi l l the Bri t i sh jai l s, social reform, const ruct ive work, etc. It was, however, unable to give these techniques a cent ral ized, di scipl ined focus, carry the bulk of pol i t ical India, and convert these techniques into actual , pract ical pol i t ical pract ice, asGandhi j i was able to do later.

However, the decl ine of the open movement by mid-1908 engendered yet another t rend in theSwadeshi phase i .e., the ri se of revolut ionary terrori sm.

The movement made a major cont ribut ion in taking the idea of nat ional i sm, in a t ruely creat ive fashion, to many sect ions of the people, hi therto untouched by i t .

The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary TerrorismThe Indian Nat ional Congress spl i t in December 1907. Almost at the same t ime revolut ionaryterrori sm made i t s appearance in Bengal . The two event s were not unconnected.The new pol icy, known as the pol icy of the carrot and the st ick, was to be a three pronged one. It may be described as a pol icy of repression-conci l iat ion-suppression. The Ext remi st s, as we shal l refer to the mi l i tant nat ional i st s from now on, were to be repressed, though mi ldly in the fi rst stage, the purpose being to frighten the Moderates. The Moderates were then to be placated through some concessions and promi ses and hint s were to be given that further concessions would be forthcoming i f they di sassociated themselves from the Ext remi st s. The ent i re object ive of the new pol icy was to i solate the Ext remi st s. Once the Moderates fel l into the t rap, the Ext remi st s could be suppressed through the use of the ful l might of the state. The Moderates, in turn, could then he ignored. Unfortunately for the nat ional movement , nei ther the Moderates nor the Ext remi st s were able to understand the official st rategy and consequent ly suffered a number of reverses.⋆The Government of India, headed by Lord Minto as Viceroy and John Morley as the Secretary ofState, offered a bai t of fresh reforms in the Legi slat ive Counci l s and in the beginning of 1906 begandi scussing them wi th the Moderate leadership of the Congress. The Moderates agreed to cooperatewi th the Government and di scuss reforms even whi le a vigorous popular movement , which theGovernment was t rying to suppress, was going on in the count ry. The resul t was a total spl i t in thenat ional i st ranks.Before we take up thi s spl i t at some length, i t i s of some interest to note that the Bri t i sh were tofol low thi s tact ic of dividing the Moderates from the mi l i tant s in later years al so — for example in1924, vi s-a-vi s Swaraj i st s, in 1936, vi s-a-vi s Nehru and the left i st s, and so on.TheExt remi st s wanted to extend the Swadeshi and the Boycot t Movement from Bengal to the rest of the count ry. They al so wanted to gradual ly extend the boycot t from foreign goods to every form ofassociat ion or cooperat ion wi th the colonial Government . The Moderates wanted to confine theboycot t part of the movement to Bengal and were total ly opposed to i t s extension to the Government .Mat ters nearly came to a head at the Calcut ta Congress in 1906 over the quest ion of i t sPresident ship. A spl i t was avoided by choosing Dadabhai Naoroj i , who was respected by al l thenat ional i st s as a great pat riot . Four compromi se resolut ions on the Swadeshi , Boycot t , Nat ionalEducat ion, and Sel f-Government demands were passed. Throughout 1907 the two sides fought overdi ffering interpretat ions of the four resolut ions. By the end of 1907, they were looking upon each other as the main pol i t ical enemy. The Ext remi st s were convinced that the bat t le for freedom had begun as the people had been roused. They fel t i t was t ime for the big push and in thei r view the Moderates were a big drag on the movement .The Congress session was held on 26 December, 1907 at Surat , on the banks of the river Tapt i . TheExt remi st s were exci ted by the rumours that the Moderates wanted to scut t le the four Calcut taresolut ions.The Ext remi st s wanted a guarantee that the four resolut ions would be passed. To force the

Moderates to do so they decided to object to the duly elected President for the year, Rash BehariGhose.The Government immediately launched amassive at tack on the Ext remi st s. Ext remi st newspapers were suppressed. Ti lak, thei r main leader,was sent to Mandalay jai l for six years. Aurobindo Ghose, thei r ideologue, was involved in arevolut ionary conspi racy case and immediately after being judged innocent gave up pol i t ics andescaped to Pondicherry to take up rel igion. B.C. Pal temporari ly ret i red from pol i t ics and Lajpat Rai ,who had been a helpless onlooker at Surat , left for Bri tain in 1908 to come back in 1909 and then to gooff to the Uni ted States for an extended stay. The Ext remi st s were not able to organize an effect ive al ternat ive party or to sustain the movement .In 1914, Ti lak was released and he picked up the threads of the movement .The Moderates and the count ry as a whole were di sappointed by the ‘const i tut ional ’ reforms of 1909.The Indian Counci l s Act of 1909 increased the number of elected members in the Imperial Legi slat iveCounci l and the provincial legi slat ive counci l s. Most of the elected members were st i l l electedindi rect ly. An Indian was to be appointed a member of the Governor-General ’s Execut ive Counci l . Ofthe sixty-eight members of the Imperial Legi slat ive Counci l , thi rty-six were official s and five werenominated non-official s. Out of twenty-seven elected members, six were elected by big landlords andtwo by Bri t i sh capi tal i st s. The Act permi t ted members to int roduce resolut ions; i t al so increased thei r power to ask quest ions. Vot ing on separate budget i tems was al lowed. But the reformed counci l s st i l l enjoyed no real power and remained mere advi sory bodies. They al so did not int roduce an element of democracy or sel f-government . The undemocrat ic, foreign and exploi tat ive character of Bri t i sh rule remained unchanged.The real purpose of the Morley-Minto Reforms was to divide the nat ional i st ranks and to check thegrowing uni ty among Indians by encouraging the growth of Musl im communal i sm. To achieve thelat ter object ive, the Reforms int roduced the system of separate electorates under which Musl ims could only vote for Musl im candidates in const i tuencies special ly reserved for them. Thi s was done toencourage the not ion that the pol i t ical , economic and cul tural interest s of Hindus and Musl ims were separate and not common. The inst i tut ion of separate electorates was one of the poi sonous t rees which was to yield a bi t ter harvest in later years.The Yugantar, a newspaper echoing thi s feel ing of di saffect ion, wrote in Apri l 1906,after the pol ice assaul t on the peaceful Bari sal Conference: ‘The thi rty crores of people inhabi t ingIndia must rai se thei r sixty crores of hands to stop thi s curse of oppression. Force must be stopped byforce.’In 1904, V.D. Sarvarkar organized Abhinav Bharat as a secret society of revolut ionaries. After 1905several newspapers openly (and a few leaders secret ly) began to advocate revolut ionary terrori sm. In1907, an unsuccessful at tempt was made on the l i fe of the Lieutenant -Governor of Bengal . In Apri l1908, Praful la Chaki and Khudi ram Bose threw a bomb at a carriage which they bel ieved wasoccupied by Kingsford, the unpopular judge at Muzzafarpur.Very soon secret societ ies of revolut ionaries came upal l over the count ry, the most famous and long last ing being Anushi lan Sami ty, and Jugantar. Thei ract ivi t ies took two forms — the assassinat ion of oppressive official s and informers and t rai tors fromthei r own ranks and dacqi t ies to rai se funds for purchase of arms, etc. The lat ter came to be popularlyknown as Swadeshi dacoi t ies! Two of the most spectacular revolut ionary terrori st act ions of the period were the unsuccessful at tempt under the leadership of Rash Behari Bose and Sachin Sanyal to ki l l the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge who was wounded by the bomb thrown at him whi le he was riding an elephant in a state procession — and the assassinat ion of Curzon-Wyl ie in London by Madan Lal Dhingra.

The revolut ionary terrori st s al so establ i shed cent res abroad. The more famous of them were Shyamj i Kri shnavarma, V.D. Savarkar and Har Dayal in London and Madame Cama and Aj i t Singh in Europe.

1 2 World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar

The outbreak of the Fi rst World War in 1914 gave a new lease of l i fe to the nat ional i st movementwhich had been dormant since the heady days of the Swadeshi Movement . Bri tain’s di fficul ty wasIndia’s ‘opportuni ty.’ Thi s opportuni ty was seized, in di fferent ways and wi th varying success, by theGhadar revolut ionaries based in North America and by Lokamanya Ti lak, Annie Besant and thei rHome Rule Leagues in India. The Ghadari tes at tempted a violent overthrow of Bri t i sh rule, whi le the Home Rule Leaguers launched a nat ion-wide agi tat ion for securing Home Rule or Swaraj .The combined pressure resul ted in an effect ive rest rict ion on Indian immigrat ion into Canada in 1908. Tarak Nath Das, an Indian student , and one of the fi rst leaders of the Indian communi ty in North America to start a paper (cal led Free Hindustan) real ized that whi le the Bri t i sh government was keen on Indians going to Fi j i to work as labourers forBri t i sh planters, i t did not want them to go to North America where they might be infected by ideas ofl iberty.The di scriminatory pol icies of the host count ries soon resul ted in a flurry of pol i t ical act ivi ty amongIndian nat ional i st s. As early as 1907, Ramnath Puri , a pol i t ical exi le on the West Coast , i ssued aCi rcular-e-Azadi (Ci rcular of Liberty) in which he al so pledged support to the Swadeshi Movement ;Tarak Nath Das in Vancouver started the Free Hindustan and adopted a very mi l i tant nat ional i st tone;G.D. Kumar set up a Swadesh Sevak Home in Vancouver on the l ines of the India House in Londonand al so began to bring out a Gurmukhi paper cal led Swadesh Sevak which advocated social reformand al so asked Indian t roops to ri se in revol t against the Bri t i sh. In 1910, Tarak Nath Das and G.D.Kumar, by now forced out of Vancouver, set up the Uni ted India House in Seat t le in the US, whereevery Saturday they lectured to a group of twenty-five Indian labourers. Close l inks al so developedbetween the Uni ted India House group, consi st ing mainly of radical nat ional i st student s, and theKhal sa Diwan Society, and in 1913 they decided to send a deputat ion to meet the Colonial Secretary inLondon and the Viceroy and other official s in India. The Colonial Secretary in London could not findthe t ime to see them even though they wai ted for a whole month, but in India they succeeded inmeet ing the Viceroy and the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. But , more important , thei r vi si tbecame the occasion for a series of publ ic meet ings in Lahore, Ludhiana, Ambala, Ferozepore,Jul lundur, Amri t sar, Lyal lpur, Guj ranwala, Sialkot and Simla and they received enthusiast ic supportfrom the Press and the general publ ic.The fi rst fi l l ip to the revolut ionary movement was provided by the vi si t to Vancouver, in early 1913, of Bhagwan Singh, a Sikh priest who had worked in Hong Kong and the Malay States. He openlypreached the gospel of violent overthrow of Bri t i sh rule and urged the people to adopt Bande Mataram as a revolut ionary salute. Bhagwan Singh was externed from Canada after a stay of three months.The cent re of revolut ionary act ivi ty soon shi fted to the US, which provided a relat ively freepol i t ical atmosphere. The crucial role was now played by Lala Har Dayal , a pol i t ical exi le from India.Har Dayal arrived in Cal i fornia in Apri l 1911, taught briefly at Stanford Universi ty, and soonimmersed himsel f in pol i t ical act ivi ty.Hi s fai th in the possibi l i ty of a revolut ionary overthrow of the Bri t i sh regime in India was

renewed, and he i ssued a Yugantar Ci rcular prai sing the at tack on the Viceroy.Soon the Hindi Associat ion was set up in Port land in May 1913.Har Dayal set forth hi splan of act ion: ‘Do not fight the Americans, but use the freedom that i s avai lable in the US to fight the Bri t i sh; you wi l l never be t reated as equal s by the Americans unt i l you are free in your own land; the root cause of Indian poverty and degradat ion i s Bri t i sh rule and i t must be overthrown, not by pet i t ions but by armed revol t ; carry thi s message to the masses and to the soldiers in the Indian Army; go to India in large numbers and enl i st thei r support .’ Har Dayal ’s ideas found immediate acceptance. A Working Commi t tee was set up and the deci sion was taken to start a weekly paper, The Ghadar, for free ci rculat ion, and to set up a headquarters cal led Yugantar Ashram in San Franci sco. A series of meet ings held in di fferent towns and cent res and final ly a representat ives’ meet ing in Astoria confi rmed and approved the deci sions of the fi rst meet ing at Port land. The Ghadar Movement had begun.On 1 November 1913, the fi rst i ssue of Ghadar, in Urdu, was publ i shed and on 9 December, theGurmukhi edi t ion. The name of the paper left no doubt s as to i t s aim. Ghadar meant Revol t . And i fany doubt remained, they were to be di spel led by the capt ions on the masthead. Angrezi Raj kaDushman or ‘An Enemy of Bri t i sh Rule.’ On the front page of each i ssue was a feature t i t led AngreziRaj Ka Kacha Chi t tha or ‘An Expose of Bri t i sh Rule.’ Thi s Chi t tha consi sted of fourteen point senumerat ing the harmful effect s of Bri t i sh rule, including the drain of weal th, the low per capi taincome of Indians, the high land tax, the cont rast between the low expendi ture on heal th and the highexpendi ture on the mi l i tary, the dest ruct ion of Indian art s and indust ries, the recurrence of faminesand plague that ki l led mi l l ions of Indians, the use of Indian tax payers’ money for wars inAfghani stan, Burma, Egypt , Persia and China, the Bri t i sh pol icy of promot ing di scord in the IndianStates to extend thei r own influence, the di scriminatory lenient t reatment given to Engl i shmen whowere gui l ty of ki l l ing Indians or di shonouring Indian women, the pol icy of helping Chri st ianmi ssionaries wi th money rai sed from Hindus and Musl ims, the effort to foment di scord betweenHindus and Musl ims: in sum, the ent i re cri t ique of Bri t i sh rule that had been formulated by the Indiannat ional movement was summarized and presented every week to Ghadar readers. The last two point sof the Chi t tha suggested the solut ion: (1) The Indian populat ion numbers seven crores in the IndianStates and 24 crores in Bri t i sh India, whi le there are only 79,614 officers and soldiers and 38,948volunteers who are Engl i shmen. (2) Fi fty-six years have lapsed since the Revol t of 1857; now there i surgent need for a second one.Besides the powerful simpl ici ty of the Chi t tha, the message was al so conveyed by serial izingSavarkar’s The Indian War of Independence — 1857. The Ghadar al so contained references to thecont ribut ions of Lokamanya Ti lak, Sri Aurobindo, V.D. Savarkar, Madame Cama, Shyamj i Kri shnaVarma, Aj i t Singh and Sufi Amba Prasad, as wel l as highl ight s of the daring deeds of the Anushi lanSami t i , the Yugantar group and the Russian secret societ ies.But , perhaps, the most powerful impact was made by the poems that appeared in The Ghadar, sooncol lected and publ i shed as Ghadar di Goonj and di st ributed free of cost . These poems were marked as much by thei r secular tone as by thei r revolut ionary zeal ,

Final ly, in 1914, three event s influenced the course of the Ghadar movement : the arrest and escape of Har Dayal , the Komagata Mart i incident , and the outbreak of the Fi rst World War

Har Dayal was arrested on 25 March 1914 on the stated ground of hi s anarchi st act ivi t ies though

everybody suspected that the Bri t i sh Government had much to do wi th i t . Released on bai l , he used the opportuni ty to sl ip out of the count ry. Wi th that , hi s act ive associat ion wi th the Ghadar Movement came to an abrupt end.

Meanwhi le, in March 1914, the ship, Komagatu Maru had begun i t s fateful voyage to Canada.Canada had for some years imposed very st rict rest rict ions on Indian immigrat ion by means of a lawthat forbade ent ry to al l , except those who made a cont inuous journey from India. Thi s measure hadproved effect ive because there were no shipping l ines that offered such a route. But in November1913, the Canadian Supreme Court al lowed ent ry to thi rty-five Indians who had not made a cont inuousjourney. Encouraged by thi s judgement , Gurdi t Singh, an Indian cont ractor l iving in Singapore,decided to charter a ship and carry to Vancouver, Indians who were l iving in various places in Eastand South-East Asia. Carrying a total of 376 Indian passengers, the ship began i t s journey toVancouver. Ghadar act ivi st s vi si ted the ship at Yokohama in Japan, gave lectures and di st ributedl i terature. The Press in Punjab warned of serious consequences i f the Indians were not al lowed ent ryinto Canada. The Press in Canada took a di fferent view and some newspapers in Vancouver alerted thepeople to the ‘Mount ing Oriental Invasion.’ The Government of Canada had, meanwhi le, plugged thelegal loopholes that had resul ted in the November Supreme Court judgement . The bat t le l ines wereclearly drawn.When the ship arrived in Vancouver, i t was not al lowed into the port and was cordoned off by thepol ice. To fight for the right s of the passengers, a ‘Shore Commi t tee’ was set up under the leadershipof Husain Rahim, Sohan Lal Pathak and Balwant Singh, funds were rai sed, and protest meet ingsorganized. Rebel l ion against the Bri t i sh in India was threatened. In the Uni ted States, under theleadership of Bhagwan Singh, Barkatul lah, Ram Chandra and Sohan Singh Bhakna, a powerfulcampaign was organized and the people were advi sed to prepare for rebel l ion.Soon the Komagata Maru was forced out of Canadian waters. Before i t reached Yokohama, WorldWar I broke out , and the Bri t i sh Government passed orders that no passenger be al lowed to di sembarkanywhere on the way — not even at the places from where they had joined the ship — but only atCalcut ta. At every port that the ship touched, i t t riggered off a wave of resentment and anger amongthe Indian communi ty and became the occasion for ant i -Bri t i sh mobi l izat ion. On landing at BudgeBudge near Calcut ta, the harassed and i rate passengers, provoked by the host i le at t i tude of theauthori t ies, resi sted the pol ice and thi s led to a clash in which eighteen passengers were ki l led, and202 arrested. A few of them succeeded in escaping.The thi rd and most important development that made the Ghadar revolut ion imminent was theoutbreak of the World War I. The Ai lan-e-Jung or Proclamat ion of Warof the Ghadar Party was i ssued and ci rculated widely. Mohammed Barkatul lah, Ram Chandra andBhagwan Singh organized and addressed a series of publ ic meet ings to exhort Indians to go back toIndia and organize an armed revol t .But Punjab in 1914 was very di fferent from what the Ghadari tes had been led to expect — theyfound the Punjabi s were in no mood to join the romant ic adventure of the Ghadar. The mi l i tant s from abroad t ried thei r best , they toured the vi l lages, addressed gatherings at melas and test ival s, al l to no avai l . The Chief Khal sa Diwan proclaiming i t s loyal ty to the sovereign, declared them to be ‘fal len’ Sikhs and criminal s, and helped the Government to t rack them down.Frust rated and di si l lusioned wi th the at t i tude of the civi l ian populat ion, the Ghadari tes turned thei r

at tent ion to the army and made a number of naive at tempt s in November 1914 to get the army uni t s to mut iny. But the lack of an organized leadership and cent ral command frust rated al l the Ghadar’seffort s.Frant ical ly, the Ghadar made an at tempt to find a leader; Bengal i revolut ionaries were contactedand through the effort s of Sachindranath Sanyal and Vi shnu Ganesh Pingley, Rash Behari Bose, theBengal i revolut ionary who had become famous by hi s daring at tack on Hardinge, the Viceroy, final lyarrived in Punjab in mid-January 1915 to assume leadership of the revol t .But the Criminal Invest igat ion Department (CID)had succeeded in penet rat ing the organizat ion, from the very highest level down, and the Governmentsucceeded in taking effect ive pre-empt ive measures. Most of the leaders were arrested, though Boseescaped. For al l pract ical purposes, the Ghadar Movement was crushed.Some Indian revolut ionaries who were operat ing from Berl in, and who had l inks wi th the Ghadarleader Ram Chandra in America, cont inued, wi th German help, to make at tempt s to organize a mut inyamong Indian t roops stat ioned abroad. Raja Mahendra Pratap and Barkatul lah t ried to enl i st the helpof the Ami r of Afghani stan and even, hopeful ly, set up a Provi sional Government in Kabul , but theseand other at tempt s fai led to record any signi ficant success. It appeared that violent opposi t ion toBri t i sh rule was fated to fai l .

1 3 The Home Rule Movement and Its FalloutOn 16 June 1914, Bal Gangadhar Ti lak was released after serving a pri son sentence of six years, mostof which he had spent in Mandalay in Burma. He further assured the Government of hi s loyal ty to the Crown and urged al lIndians to assi st the Bri t i sh Government in i t s hour of cri si s. Further, they were under considerable pressurefrom Mrs. Annie Besant , who had just joined the Indian Nat ional Congress and was keen to arousenat ional i st pol i t ical act ivi ty, to admi t the Ext remi st s.In1914, she decided to enlarge the sphere of her act ivi t ies to include the bui lding of a movement forHome Rule on the l ines of the Iri sh Home Rule League. For thi s, she real ized i t was necessary both toget the sanct ion of the Congress, as wel l as the act ive cooperat ion of the Ext remi st s. She devoted herenergies, therefore, to persuading the Moderate leaders to open the doors of the Congress to Ti lak andhi s fel low-Ext remi st s.But the annual Congress session in December 1914 was to prove a di sappointment — PherozeshahMehta and hi s Bombay Moderate group succeeded, by winning over Gokhale and the BengalModerates, in keeping out the Ext remi st s. Ti lak and Besant thereupon decided to revive pol i t icalact ivi ty on thei r own, whi le maintaining thei r pressure on the Congress to re-admi t the Ext remi stgroup.In early 1915, Annie Besant launched a campaign through her two papers, New India andCommonweal , and organized publ ic meet ings and conferences to demand that India be granted sel fgovernment on the l ines of the Whi te colonies after the War.Hi s effort s and those of Annie Besant were soon to meet wi th success, and at the annual session ofthe Congress in December 1915 i t was decided that the Ext remi st s be al lowed to rejoin the Congress

But Annie Besant did not succeed in get t ing the Congress and the Musl im League to supporther deci sion to set up Home Rule Leagues. She did manage, however, to persuade the Congress tocommi t i t sel f to a programme of educat ive propaganda and to a revival of the local level Congresscommi t tees. Knowing that the Congress, as const i tuted at the t ime, was unl ikely to implement thi s,she had inserted a condi t ion by which, i f the Congress did not start thi s act ivi ty by September 1916,she would be free to set up her own League.Ti lak, not bound by any such commi tment , and having gained the right of readmi ssion, now tookthe lead and set up the Home Rule League at the Bombay Provincial Conference held at Belgaum inApri l 1916. Annie Besant ’s impat ient fol lowers, unhappy wi th her deci sion to wai t t i l l September,secured her permi ssion to start Home Rule groups. Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Shankerlal Banker andIndulal Yagnik set up a Bombay paper Young India and launched an Al l India Propaganda Fund topubl i sh pamphlet s in regional languages and in Engl i sh. In September 1916, as there were no signs ofany Congress act ivi ty, Annie Besant announced the format ion of her Home Rule League, wi th GeorgeArundale, her Theosophical fol lower, as the Organizing Secretary. The two Leagues avoided anyfrict ion by demarcat ing thei r area of act ivi ty: Ti lak’s League was to work in Maharasht ra, (excludingBombay ci ty), Karnataka, the Cent ral Provinces and Berar, and Annie Besant ’s League was givencharge of the rest of India.Ti lak declared: ‘If a God were to tolerate untouchabi l i ty, I would not recognize him as God at al l

Ti lak’s League was organized into six branches, one each in Cent ral Maharasht ra, Bombay ci ty,Karnataka, and Cent ral Provinces, and two in Berar.Ti lak was defended by a team of lawyers led by Mohammed Al i Jinnah. He lost the case in theMagi st rate’s Court but was exonerated by the High Court in November. The victory was hai led al lover the count ry. Gandhi j i ’s Young India summed up the popular feel ing: ‘Thus, a great victory hasbeen won for the cause of Home Rule which has, thus, been freed from the chains that were sought tobe put upon i t .Meanwhi le, Annie Besant had gone ahead wi th the formal founding of her League in September 1916.The organizat ion of her League was much looser than that of Ti lak’s, and three members could form abranch whi le in the case of Ti lak’s League each of the six branches had a clearly defined area andact ivi t ies. Two hundred branches of Besant ’s League were establ i shed, some consi st ing of a town andothers of groups of vi l lages. And though a formal Execut ive Counci l of seven members was electedfor three years by thi rty-four ‘founding branches,’ most of the work was carried on by Annie Besantand her l ieutenant s — Arundale, C.P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, and B.P. Wadia — from her headquarters atAdyar. Nor was there any organized method for passing on inst ruct ions — these were conveyedthrough individual members and through Arundale’s column on Home Rule in New India. Themembership of Annie Besant ’s League increased at a rate slower than that of Ti lak’s. By March 1917,her League had 7,000 members. Besides her exi st ing Theosophical fol lowers, many others includingJawaharlal Nehru in Al lahabad and B. Chakravart i and J. Banerjee in Calcut ta joined the Home RuleLeague.Many Moderate Congressmen, who were di ssat i sfied wi th the inact ivi ty into which the Congresshad lapsed, joined the Home Rule agi tat ion. Members of Gokhale’s Servant s of India Society, thoughnot permi t ted to become members of the League, were encouraged to add thei r weight to the demandfor Home Rule by undertaking lecture tours and publ i shing pamphlet s.Ti lak’s Home Rule League establ i shed a t radi t ion that was to become an essent ial part of later Congress annual sessions — a special t rain, known variously as the ‘Congress Special ’ and the ‘Home Rule Special ,’ was organized to carrydelegates from Western India to Lucknow.

Ti lak and hi s men were welcomed back into the Congress by the Moderate president , AmbikaCharan Mazumdar

The Lucknow Congress was signi ficant al so for the famous Congress League Pact , popularly knowas the Lucknow Pact . Both Ti lak and Annie Besant had played a leading role in bringing about thi sagreement between the Congress and the League, much against the wi shes of many important leaders, including Madan Mohan Malaviya. The Lucknow Congress al so demanded a further dose of const i tut ional reforms as a step towardssel f-government . Though thi s did not go as far as the Home Rule Leaguers wi shed, they accepted i t in the interest s of Congress uni ty. Another very signi ficant proposal made by Ti lak — that the Congress should appoint a smal l and cohesive Working Commi t tee that would carry on the day to day affai rs of the Congress and be responsible for implement ing the resolut ions passed at the annual sessions, a proposal by which he hoped to t ransform the Congress from a del iberat ive body into one capable of leading a sustained movement — was unfortunately quashed by Moderate opposi t ion. Four years later, in 1920, when Mahatma Gandhi prepared a reformed const i tut ion for the Congress, thi s was one of the major changes considered necessary i f the Congress was to lead a sustained movement .The turning point in the movement came wi th the deci sion of the Government of Madras in June 1917to place Mrs. Besant and her associates, B.P. Wadia and George Arundale, under arrest . Thei rinternment became the occasion for nat ion-wide protest . In a dramat ic gesture, Si r S. SubramaniaAiyar renounced hi s knighthood.Those who had stayed away, including many Moderate leaders l ikeMadan Mohan Malaviya, Surendranath Banerjea and M.A. Jinnah now enl i sted as members of theHome Rule Leagues to record thei r sol idari ty wi th the internees and thei r condemnat ion of theGovernment ’s act ion. At a meet ing of the AICC on 28 July, 1917, Ti lak advocated the use of theweapon of passive resi stance or civi l di sobedience i f the Government refused to release the internees.At Gandhi j i ’s instance, ShankerlalBanker and Jamnadas Dwarkadas col lected signatures of one thousand men wi l l ing to defy theinternment orders and march to Besant ’s place of detent ion. They al so began to col lect signatures of a mi l l ion peasant s and workers on a pet i t ion for Home Rule.The new Secretary of State, Montagu, made a hi storic declarat ion in the House of Commons, on 20August , 1917 in which he stated: ‘The pol icy of Hi s Majesty’s Government . . . i s that of theincreasing associat ion of Indians in every branch of the admini st rat ion, and the gradual developmentof sel f-governing inst i tut ions, wi th a view to the progressive real izat ion of responsible government in India as an integral part of the Bri t i sh Empi re.’Thi s statement was in marked cont rast to that ofLord Morley who, whi le int roducing the Const i tut ional Reforms in 1909, had stated categorical ly that these reforms were in no way intended to lead to sel f-government . The importance of Montagu’sDeclarat ion was that after thi s the demand for Home Rule or sel f-government could no longer bet reated as sedi t ious.Annie Besant was at the height of her populari ty and, at Ti lak’s suggest ion, waselected President at the annual session of the Congress in December 1917.or one, the Moderates who had joined the movement after Besant ’s arrest werepaci fied by the promi se of reforms and by Besant ’s release. They were al so put off by the talk of civi ldi sobedience and did not at tend the Congress from September 1918 onwards. The publ icat ion of thescheme of Government reforms in July 1918 further divided the nat ional i st ranks. Some wanted to

accept i t out right and others to reject i t out right , whi le many fel t that , though inadequate, they should be given a t rial . Annie Besant hersel f indulged in a lot of vaci l lat ion on thi s quest ion as wel l as on the quest ion of passive resi stance. At t imes she would di savow passive resi stance, and at other t imes, under pressure from her younger fol lowers, would advocate i t . Simi larly, she ini t ial ly, along wi th Ti lak, considered the reforms unworthy of Bri tain to offer and India to accept , but later argued infavour of acceptance. Ti lak was more consi stent in hi s approach, but given Besant ’s vaci l lat ions, and the change in the Moderate stance, there was l i t t le that he could do to sustain the movement on hi s own. Al so, towards the end of the year, he decided to go to England to pursue the l ibel case that he had fi led against Valent ine Chi rol , the author of Indian Unrest , and was away for many cri t ical months.Wi th Annie Besant unable to give a fi rm lead, and Ti lak away in England, the movement was leftleaderless.The t remendous achievement of the Home Rule Movement and i t s legacy was that i t created agenerat ion of ardent nat ional i st s who formed the backbone of the nat ional movement in the coming years when, under the leadership of the Mahatma, i t entered i t s t ruly mass phase.he stage was thus set for the ent ry of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi , a man who had al ready made a name for himsel f wi th hi s leadership of the st ruggle of Indians in South Africa and by leading the st ruggles of Indian peasant s and workers in Champaran, Ahmedabad and Kheda. And in March 1919, when he gave a cal l for a Satyagraha to protest against the obnoxious ‘Rowlat t ’ Act , he was the ral lying point for almost al l those who had been awakened to pol i t ics by the Home Rule Movement .

1 4Gandhiji’s Early Career and Activism

When Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi cal led for a nat ion-wide Satyagraha against the Rowlat t Act inMarch 1919, hi s fi rst at tempt at leading an al l -India st ruggle, he was al ready in hi s fi ft ieth year.The young barri ster who landed at Durban in 1893 on a one-year cont ract to sort out the legalproblems of Dada Abdul lah, a Gujarat i merchant , was to al l appearances an ordinary young man t ryingto make a l iving. But he was the fi rst Indian barri ster, the fi rst highly-educated Indian, to have cometo South Africa. But young Mohandas Gandhi was not used to swal lowing racial insul t s in order to carry on wi th thebusiness of making a l iving. He was theson ofa Dewan (Mini ster) of an Indian state whose fami ly,though in st rai tened economic ci rcumstances, was widely respected in hi s nat ive Kathiawad.Gandhi j i prepared to leave for India. But on the eve of hi s departure from Durban, he rai sed the i ssue of the bi l l to di senfranchi se Indians which was in the process of being passed by the Natal legi slature. The Indians in South Africa begged Gandhi j i to stay on for a month and organize thei r protest as they could not do so on thei r own, not knowing even enough Engl i sh to draft pet i t ions, and so on. Gandhi j i agreed to stay on for a month and stayed for twenty years. He was then only twenty-five; when he left , he was forty-five.Gandhi j i ’s experience, the fi rst of a westernized Indian in South Africa, demonst ratedclearly, to him and to them, that the real cause lay el sewhere, in the assumpt ion of racial superiori tyby the Whi te rulers.He bel ieved that i f al l the fact s of the case were presented to the Imperial Government , theBri t i sh sense of just ice and fai r play would be aroused and the Imperial Government would interveneon behal f of Indians who were, after al l , Bri t i sh subject s. Hi s at tempt was to uni te the di fferentsect ions of Indians, and to give thei r demands wide publ ici ty. Thi s he t ried to do through the set t ing

up of the Natal Indian Congress and by start ing a paper cal led Indian Opinion. Gandhi j i ’s abi l i t ies as an organizer, as a fund-rai ser, as a journal i st and as a propagandi st , al l came to the fore during thi s period. But , by 1906, Gandhi j i , having ful ly t ried the ‘Moderate’ methods of st ruggle, was becoming convinced that these would not lead anywhere.The second phase of the st ruggle in South Africa, which began in 1906, was characterized by the useof the method of passive resi stance or civi l di sobedience, which Gandhi j i named Satyagraha. It wasfi rst used when the Government enacted legi slat ion making i t compul sory for Indians to take outcert i ficates of regi st rat ion which held thei r finger print s. It was essent ial to carry these on person at al lt imes. The fear of jai l had di sappeared, and i t was popularly cal led King Edward’s Hotel .General Smut s cal led Gandhi j i for talks, and promi sed to wi thdraw the legi slat ion i f Indiansvoluntari ly agreed to regi ster themselves. Gandhi j i accepted and was the fi rst to regi ster. But Smut shad played a t rick; he ordered that the voluntary regi st rat ions be rat i fied under the law. The Indiansunder the leadership of Gandhi j i retal iated by publ icly burning thei r regi st rat ion cert i ficates.The funds for support ing the fami l ies of theSatyagrahi s and for running Indian Opinion were fast running out . Gandhi j i ’s own legal pract ice hadvi rtual ly ceased since 1906, the year he had started devot ing al l hi s at tent ion to the st ruggle. At thi spoint , Gandhi j i set up Tol stoy Farm, made possible through the generosi ty of hi s German archi tectfriend, Kal lenbach, to house the fami l ies of the Satyagrahi s and give them a way to sustainthemselves. Tol stoy Farm was the precursor of the later Gandhian ashrams that were to play soimportant a role in the Indian nat ional movement . Funds al so came from India — Si r Ratan Tata sentRs. 25,000 and the Congress and the Musl im League, as wel l as the Nizam of Hyderabad, made thei rcont ribut ions.In 1911, to coincide wi th the coronat ion of King George V, an agreement was reached between theGovernment and the Indians which, however, lasted only t i l l the end of 1912. Meanwhi le, Gokhalepaid a vi si t to South Africa, was t reated as a guest of the Government and was made a promi se that al ldi scriminatory laws against Indians would be removed. The promi se was never kept , and Satyagrahawas resumed in 1913.Thi s t ime the movement was widened further to include resi stance to the pol l tax of three poundsthat was imposed on al l ex-indentured Indians. The inclusion of the demand for the abol i t ion of thi stax, a part icularly heavy charge on poor labourers whose wages hardly averaged ten shi l l ings a month,immediately drew the indentured and ex-indentured labourers into the st ruggle, and Satyagraha couldnow take on a t ruly mass character. Further fuel was added to the al ready raging fi re by a judgementof the Supreme Court which inval idated al l marriages not conducted according to Chri st ian ri tes andregi stered by the Regi st rar of Marriages. By impl icat ion, Hindu, Musl im and Parsi marriages werei l legal and the chi ldren born through these marriages i l legi t imate. The Indians t reated thi s judgementas an insul t to the honour of thei r women and many women were drawn into the movement because ofthi s indigni ty. Gandhi j i decided that the t ime had now come for the final st ruggle into which al l the resi sters’resources should be channel led. The campaign was launched by the i l legal crossing of the border by agroup of sixteen Satyagrahi s, including Kasturba, Gandhi j i ’s wi fe, who marched from PhoenixSet t lement in Natal to Transvaal , and were immediately arrested.Eventual ly, through a series of negot iat ions involving Gandhi j i , the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, C.F.

Andrews and General Smut s, an agreement was reached by which the Government of South Africaconceded the major Indian demands relat ing to the pol l tax, the regi st rat ion cert i ficates and marriagessolemnized according to Indian ri tes, and promi sed to t reat the quest ion of Indian immigrat ion in asympathet ic manner.Gandhi j i returned to India, in January 1915, and was warmly welcomed. Hi s work in South Africa waswel l -known, not only to educated Indians, but , as he di scovered on hi s vi si t to the Kumbh Mela atHardwar, even to the masses who flocked to him for hi s ‘darshan.’ Gokhale had al ready hai led him asbeing ‘wi thout doubt made of the stuff of which heroes and martyrs are made.’ The veteran Indianleader not iced in Gandhi j i an even more important qual i ty: ‘He has in him the marvel lous spi ri tualpower to turn ordinary men around him into heroes and martyrs.On Gokhale’s advice, and in keeping wi th hi s own style of never intervening in a si tuat ion wi thoutfi rst studying i t wi th great care, Gandhi j i decided that for the fi rst year he would not take a publ ic stand on any pol i t ical i ssue. He spent the year t ravel l ing around the count ry, seeing things for himsel f, and in organizing hi s ashram in Ahmedabad where he, and hi s devoted band of fol lowers who had come wi th him from South Africa, would lead a communi ty l i fe. The next year as wel l , he cont inued to maintain hi s di stance from pol i t ical affai rs, including the Home Rule Movement that was gathering momentum at thi s t ime. Hi s own pol i t ical understanding did not coincide wi th any of the pol i t ical current s that were act ive in India then. Hi s fai th in ‘Moderate’ methods was long eroded, nor did he agree wi th the Home Rulers that the best t ime to agi tate for Home Rule was when the Bri t i sh were in di fficul ty because of the Fi rst World War.

During the course of1917 and early 1918, he was involved in three signi ficant st ruggles — in Champaran in Bihar, inAhmedabad and in Kheda in Gujarat . The common feature of these st ruggles was that they related tospeci fic local i ssues and that they were fought for the economic demands of the masses. Two of these st ruggles, Champaran and Kheda, involved the peasant s and the one in Ahmedabad involved indust rial workers.

CHAMAPARANThe story of Champaran begins in the early nineteenth century when European planters had involvedthe cul t ivators in agreement s that forced them to cul t ivate indigo on 3/20th of thei r holdings (known as the t inkathia system). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, German synthet ic dyes forcedindigo out of the market and the European planters of Champaran, keen to release the cul t ivators fromthe obl igat ion of cul t ivat ing indigo, t ried to turn thei r necessi ty to thei r advantage by securingenhancement s in rent and other i l legal dues as a price for the release. Resi stance had surfaced in 1908as wel l , but the exact ions of the planters cont inued t i l l Raj Kumar Shukla, a local man, decided tofol low Gandhi j i al l over the count ry to persuade him to come to Champaran to invest igate theproblem. Raj Kumar Shukla’s deci sion to get Gandhi j i to Champaran i s indicat ive of the image he hadacqui red as one who fought for the right s of the exploi ted and the poor.The Government ofIndia, not wi l l ing to make an i ssue of i t and not yet used to t reat ing Gandhi j i as a rebel , ordered thelocal Government to ret reat and al low Gandhi j i to proceed wi th hi s enqui ry.He and hi s col leagues, who now included Bri j Ki shore, Rajendra Prasad and

other members of the Bihar intel l igent sia, Mahadev Desai and Narhari Parikh, two young men fromGujarat who had thrown in thei r lot wi th Gandhi j i , and J.B. Kripalani , toured the vi l lages and fromdawn to dusk recorded the statement s of peasant s, interrogat ing them to make sure that they weregiving correct informat ion.Meanwhi le, the Government appointed a Commi ssion of Inqui ry to go into the whole i ssue, andnominated Gandhi j i as one of i t s members. Armed wi th evidence col lected from 8,000 peasant s, hehad l i t t le di fficul ty in convincing the Commi ssion that the t inkathia system needed to be abol i shedand that the peasant s should be compensated for the i l legal enhancement of thei r dues. As acompromi se wi th the planters, he agreed that they refund only twenty-five per cent of the money they had taken i l legal ly from the peasant s. Answering cri t ics who asked why he did not ask for a ful lrefund, Gandhi j i explained that even thi s refund had done enough damage to the planters’ prest ige and posi t ion. As was often the case, Gandhi j i ’s assessment was correct and, wi thin a decade, the planters left the di st rict al together.

AHMEDABAD MILLA di spute was brewing between them and the mi l l owners over the quest ion of a ‘plague bonus’ the employers wanted to wi thdraw once the epidemic had passed but the workers insi sted i t stay, since the enhancement hardly compensated for the ri se in the cost of l iving during the War. The Bri t i sh Col lector, who feared a showdown, asked Gandhi j i to bring pressure on the mi l l owners and work out a compromi se. Ambalal Sarabhai , one of the leading mi l l owners of the town, was a friend of Gandhi j i , and had just saved the Sabarmat I Ashram from ext inct ion by a generous donat ion. Gandhi j i persuaded the mi l l owners and the workers to agree to arbi t rat ion by a t ribunal , but the mi l l owners, taking advantage of a st ray st rike, wi thdrew from the agreement . They offered a twenty per cent bonus and threatened to di smi ss those who did not accept i t .The breach of agreement was t reated by Gandhi j i as a very serious affai r, and he advi sed theworkers to go on st rike. He further suggested, on the basi s of a thorough study of the product ion cost sand profi t s of the indust ry as wel l as the cost of l iving, that they would be just i fied in demanding athi rty-five per cent increase in wages.He brought out a dai ly news bul let in, and insi sted that no violence be used against employers orblacklegs. Ambalal Sarabhai ’s si ster, Anasuya Behn, was one of the main l ieutenant s of Gandhi j i inthi s st ruggle in which her brother, and Gandhi j i ’s friend, was one of the main adversaries.After some days, the workers began to exhibi t signs of weariness. The at tendance at the dai lymeet ings began to decl ine and the at t i tude towards blacklegs began to harden. In thi s si tuat ion,Gandhi j i decided to go on a fast to ral ly the workers and st rengthen thei r resolve to cont inue. Al so, he had promi sed that i f the st rike led to starvat ion he would be the fi rst to starve, and the fast was a ful fi lment of that promi se. The fast , however, al so had the effect of put t ing pressure on the mi l lowners and they agreed to submi t the whole i ssue to a t ribunal . The st rike was wi thdrawn and thet ribunal later awarded the thi rty-five per cent increase the workers had demanded.

KHEDAThe di spute in Ahmedabad had not yet ended when Gandhi j i learnt that the peasant s of Kheda di st rict were in ext reme di st ress due to a fai lure of crops, and that thei r appeal s for the remi ssion of land revenue were being ignored by the Government . Enqui ries by members of the Servant s of IndiaSociety, Vi thalbhai Patel and Gandhi j i confi rmed the val idi ty of the peasant s’ case. Thi s was that as the crops were less than one-fourth of the normal yield, they were ent i t led under the revenue code to a total remi ssion of the land revenue.The Gujarat Sabha, of which Gandhi j i was the President , played a leading role in the agi tat ion.Appeal s and pet i t ions having fai led, Gandhi j i advi sed the wi thholding of revenue, and asked thepeasant s to ‘fight unto death against such a spi ri t of vindict iveness and tyranny.

The cul t ivators were asked to take a solemn pledge that they would not pay; those who could afford to pay were to take a vow that they would not pay in the interest s of the poorer ryot s who would otherwi se panic and sel l off thei r belongings or incur debt s in order to pay the revenue. However, i f the Government agreed to suspend col lect ion of land revenue, the ones who could afford to do so could pay the whole amount .The peasant s of Kheda, al ready hard pressed because of plague, high prices and drought , werebeginning to show signs of weakness when Gandhi j i came to know that the Government had i ssuedsecret inst ruct ions di rect ing that revenue should be recovered only from those peasant s who could pay.A publ ic declarat ion of thi s deci sion would have meant a blow to Government prest ige, since thi s was exact ly what Gandhi j i had been demanding. In these ci rcumstances, the movement was wi thdrawn.

ROWLATT SATYAGRAHIt was thi s reservoi r of goodwi l l , and of experience, that encouraged Gandhi j i , in February 1919, tocal l for a nat ion-wide protest against the unpopular legi slat ion that the Bri t i sh were threatening toint roduce. Two bi l l s, popularly known as the Rowlat t Bi l l s after the man who chai red the Commi t tee that suggested thei r int roduct ion, aimed at severely curtai l ing the civi l l ibert ies of Indians in the nameof curbing terrori st violence, were int roduced in the Legi slat ive Counci l . One of them was actual lypushed through in indecent haste in the face of opposi t ion from al l the elected Indian members. Thi sact of the Government was t reated by the whole of pol i t ical India as a grievous insul t , especial ly as i t came at the end of the War when substant ial const i tut ional concessions were expected.Const i tut ional protest having fai led, Gandhi j i stepped in and suggested that a Satyagraha belaunched. A Satyagraha Sabha was formed, and the younger members of the Home Rule Leagues whowere more than keen to express thei r di senchantment wi th the Government flocked to join i t . The old l i st s of the addresses of Home Rule Leagues and thei r members were taken out , contact s establ i shed and propaganda begun. The form of protest final ly decided upon was the observance of a nat ion-wide hartal (st rike) accompanied by fast ing and prayer. In addi t ion, i t was decided that civi l di sobedience would be offered against speci fic laws. The sixth of Apri l was fixed as the date on which the Satyagraha would be launched. The movement that emerged was very di fferent from the one that had been ant icipated or planned.On 13 Apri l , Bai sakhi day, a large crowd of people, many of whom were vi si tors from neighbouring vi l lages who had come to the town to at tend the Bai sakhi celebrat ions, col lected in the Jal l ianwala Bagh to at tend a publ ic meet ing. General Dyer, incensed that hi s orders were di sobeyed, ordered hi s t roops to fi re upon the unarmed crowd. The shoot ing cont inued for ten minutes. General Dyer had not thought i t necessary to i ssue any warning to the people nor was he deterred by the fact that the ground was total ly hemmed in from al l sides by high wal l s which left l i t t le chance for escape.For the moment , repression was intensi fied, Punjab placed undermart ial law and the people of Amri t sar forced into indigni t ies such as crawl ing on thei r bel l ies beforeEuropeans. Gandhi j i , overwhelmed by the total atmosphere of violence, wi thdrew the movement on 18 Apri l .That did not mean, however, that Gandhi j i had lost fai th ei ther in hi s non-violent Satyagraha or inthe capaci ty of the Indian people to adopt i t as a method of st ruggle. A year later, he launched another nat ion-wide st ruggle, on a scale bigger than that of the Rowlat t Satyagraha. The wrong infl icted on Punjab was one of the major reasons for launching i t . The Mahatma’s ‘Indian Experiment ’ had begun.

1 5The Non-Cooperation Movement — 1920-22

The Rowlat t Act , the Jal l ianwala Bagh massacre and mart ial law in Punjab had bel ied al lthe generous wart ime promi ses of the Bri t i sh. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, announced towardsthe end of 1919, wi th thei r i l l -considered scheme of dyarchy sat i sfied few. The Indian Musl ims wereincensed when they di scovered that thei r loyal ty had been purchased during the War by assurances ofgenerous t reatment of Turkey after the War — a promi se Bri t i sh statesman had no intent ion offul fi l l ing. The Musl ims regarded the Cal iph of Turkey as thei r spi ri tual head and were natural ly upsetwhen they found that he would retain no cont rol over the holy places i t was hi s duty as Cal iph toprotect . Even those who were wi l l ing to t reat the happenings at Jal l ianwala Bagh and other places inPunjab as aberrat ions, that would soon be ‘corrected’, were di si l lusioned when they di scovered thatthe Hunter Commi t tee appointed by the Government to enqui re into the Punjab di sturbances was aneye wash and that the House of Lords had voted in favour of General Dyer’s act ion, and that theBri t i sh publ ic had demonst rated i t s support by helping the Morning Post col lect 30,000 pounds forGeneral Dyer.By the end of the fi rst quarter of 1920, al l the excuses in favour of the Bri t i sh Government were fastrunning out . The Khi lafat leaders were told qui te clearly that they should not expect anything moreand the Treaty of Sevres signed wi th Turkey in May 1920 made i t amply clear that thedi smemberment of the Turki sh Empi re was complete. Gandhi j i , who had been in close touch wi th theKhi lafat leaders for qui te some t ime, and was a special invi tee to the Khi lafat Conference inNovember 1919, had al l along been very sympathet ic to thei r cause, especial ly because he fel t theBri t i sh had commi t ted a breach of fai th by making promi ses that they had no intent ion of keeping. InFebruary 1920, he suggested to the Khi lafat Commi t tee that i t adopt a programme of non-violent noncooperat ion to protest the Government ’s behaviour. On 9 June 1920, the Khi lafat Commi t tee atAl lahabad unanimously accepted the suggest ion of non-cooperat ion and asked Gandhi j i to lead themovement . Meanwhi le, the Congress was becoming scept ical of any possibi l i ty of pol i t ical advance throughconst i tut ional means. It was di sgusted wi th the Hunter Commi t tee Report especial ly since i t was apprai sed of brutal i t ies in Punjab by i t s own enqui ry commi t tee. In the ci rcumstances, i t agreed to consider non-cooperat ion.The movement was launched formal ly on 1 August 1920, after the expi ry of the not ice that Gandhi j ihad given to the Viceroy in hi s let ter of 22 June, in which he had asserted the right recognized ‘fromt ime immemorial of the subject to refuse to assi st a ruler who mi srules.’Lokamanya Ti lak passedaway in the early hours of 1 August , and the day of mourning and of launching of the movementmerged as people al l over the count ry observed hartal and took out processions. Many kept a fast and offered prayers.The Congress met in September at Calcut ta and accepted non-cooperat ion as i t s own. The mainopposi t ion, led by C.R. Das, was to the boycot t of legi slat ive counci l s, elect ions to which were to beheld very soon. But even those who di sagreed wi th the idea of boycot t accepted the Congressdi scipl ine and wi thdrew from the elect ions. The voters, too, largely stayed away.By December, when the Congress met for i t s annual session at Nagpur, the opposi t ion had mel tedaway; the elect ions were over and, therefore, the boycot t of counci l s was a non-i ssue, and i t was C.R.

Das who moved the main resolut ion on non-cooperat ion. The programme of non-cooperat ion includedwi thin i t s ambi t the surrender of t i t les and honours, boycot t of government affi l iated school s andcol leges, law court s, foreign cloth, and could be extended to include resignat ion from governmentservice and mass civi l di sobedience including the non-payment of taxes. Nat ional school s and col legeswere to be set up, panchayat s were to be establ i shed for set t l ing di sputes, hand-spinning and weavingwas to be encouraged and people were asked to maintain Hindu-Musl im uni ty, give up untouchabi l i tyand observe st rict non-violence. Gandhi j i promi sed that i f the programme was ful ly implemented,Swaraj would be ushered in wi thin a year. The Nagpur session, thus, commi t ted the Congress to aprogramme of ext ra-const i tut ional mass act ion. Many groups of revolut ionary terrori st s, especial ly inBengal , al so pledged support to the movement .To enable the Congress to ful fi l l i t s new commi tment , signi ficant changes were int roduced in i t screed as wel l as in i t s organizat ional st ructure. The goal of the Congress was changed from theat tainment of sel f-government by const i tut ional and legal means to the at tainment of Swaraj bypeaceful and legi t imate means. The new const i tut ion of the Congress, the handiwork of Gandhi j i ,int roduced other important changes.The Congress was now to have a Working Commi t tee of fi fteen members to look after i t s day-today affai rs. Thi s proposal , when fi rst made by Ti lak in 1916, had been shot down by the Moderateopposi t ion. Gandhi j i , too, knew that the Congress could not guide a sustained movement unless i t hada compact body that worked round the year. Provincial Congress Commi t tees were now to beorganized on a l ingui st ic basi s, so that they could keep in touch wi th the people by using the locallanguage. The Congress organizat ion was to reach down to the vi l lage and the mohal la level by theformat ion of vi l lage and mohal la or ward commi t tees. The membership fee was reduced to four annasper year to enable the poor to become members. Mass involvement would al so enable the Congress tohave a regular source of income. In other ways, too, the organizat ion st ructure was both st reaml inedand democrat ized. The Congress was to use Hindi as far as possible.The adopt ion of the Non-Cooperat ion Movement (ini t iated earl ier by the Khi lafat Conference) by the Congress gave i t a new energy and, from January 1921, i t began to regi ster considerable success al l over the count ry.The educat ional boycot t was part icularly successful in Bengal , where the student s inCalcut ta t riggered off a province-wide st rike to force the management s of thei r inst i tut ions todi saffi l iate themselves from the Government . C.R. Das played a major role in promot ing themovement and Subhas Bose became the principal of the Nat ional Congress in Calcut ta. The Swadeshispi ri t was revived wi th new vigour, thi s t ime as part of a nat ion-wide st ruggle.Punjab, too, respondedto the educat ional boycot t and was second only to Bengal , Lala Lajpat Rai playing a leading part here despi te hi s ini t ial reservat ions about thi s i tem of the programme. Others areas that were act ive were Bombay, U.P., Bihar, Ori ssa and Assam, Madras remained lukewarm.The boycot t of law court s by lawyers was not as successful as the educat ional boycot t , but i t wasvery dramat ic and spectacular. Many leading lawyers of the count ry, l ike C.R. Das, Mot i lal Nehru,M.R. Jayakar, Sai fuddin Ki tchlew, Val labhbhai Patel , C. Rajagopalachari , T. Prakasam and Asaf Al igave up lucrat ive pract ices, and thei r sacri fice became a source of inspi rat ion for many.

But , perhaps, the most successful i tem of the programme was the boycot t of foreign cloth.The value ofimport s of foreign cloth fel l from Rs. 102 crore in 1920-21 to Rs. 57 crore in 1921-22. Another featureof the movement which acqui red great populari ty in many part s of the count ry, even though i t was not part of the original plan, was the picket ing of toddy shops. Government revenues showed considerable decl ine on thi s count and the Government was forced to actual ly carry on propaganda to bring home to the people the heal thy effect s of a good drink.The AICC, at i t s session at Vi jayawada in March 1921, di rected that for the next three monthsCongressmen should concent rate on col lect ion of funds, enrolment of members and di st ribut ion ofcharkhas. As a resul t , a vigorous membership drive was launched and though the target of one croremembers was not achieved, Congress membership reached a figure roughly of 50 lakhs. The Ti lakSwaraj Fund was oversubscribed, exceeding the target of rupees one crore. Charkhas were popularizedon a wide scale and khadi became the uni form of the nat ional movement . There was a complaint at a student s meet ing Gandhi j i addressed in Madurai that khadi was too cost ly. Gandhi j i retorted that the answer lay in wearing less clothes and, from that day, di scarded hi s dhot i and kurta in favour of a langot .For the rest of hi s l i fe, he remained a ‘hal f-naked faki r.In July 1921, a new chal lenge was thrown to the Government . Mohammed Al i , at the Al l IndiaKhi lafat Conference held at Karachi on 8 July, declared that i t was ‘rel igiously unlawful for theMusl ims to cont inue in the Bri t i sh Army’ and asked that thi s be conveyed to every Musl im in theArmy.As a resul t , Mohammed Al i , along wi th other leaders, was immediately arrested. In protest ,the speech was repeated at innumerable meet ings al l over the count ry. On 4 October, forty-sevenleading Congressmen, including Gandhi j i , i ssued a mani festo repeat ing whatever Mohammed Al i had said and added that every civi l ian and member of the armed forces should sever connect ions wi th the repressive Government . The next day, the Congress Working Commi t tee passed a simi lar resolut ion, and on 16 October, Congress commi t tees al l over the count ry held meet ings at which the same resolut ion was adopted. The Government was forced to ignore the whole incident , and accept the blow to i t s prest ige.The next dramat ic event was the vi si t of the Prince of Wales which began on 17 November, 1921.The day the Prince landed in Bombay was observed as a day of hartal al l over the count ry.Riot s fol lowed, in which Parsi s, Chri st ians, Anglo-Indians became specialtarget s of at tack as ident i fiable loyal i st s. There was pol ice fi ring, and the three-day turmoi l resul ted in fi fty-nine dead. Peace returned only after Gandhi j i had been on fast for three days. The wholesequence of event s left Gandhi j i profoundly di sturbed and worried about the l ikel ihood of recurrence of violence once mass civi l di sobedience was sanct ioned.The Congress Volunteer Corps emerged as a powerful paral lel pol ice, and the sight of i t smembers marching in format ion and dressed in uni form was hardly one that warmed the Government ’s heart . The Congress had al ready granted permi ssion to the PCCs to sanct ion mass civi l di sobedience wherever they thought the people were ready and in some areas, such as Midnapur di st rict in Bengal , which had started a movement against Union Board Taxes and Chi rala-Pi rala and Pedanandipadu taluqa in Guntur di st rict of Andhra, no-tax movement s were al ready in the offing.The Non-Cooperat ion Movement had other indi rect effect s as wel l . In the Avadh area of U.P., whereki san sabhas and a ki san movement had been gathering st rength since 1918, Non-cooperat ionpropaganda, carried on among others by Jawaharlal Nehru, helped to fan the al ready exi st ing ferment ,and soon i t became di fficul t to di st ingui sh between a Non-cooperat ion meet ing and a ki san meet ing.

In Assam, labourers on tea plantat ions went on st rike. When the fleeing workers were fi red upon,there were st rikes on the steamer service, and on the Assam-Bengal Rai lway as wel l . J.M. Sengupta,the Bengal i nat ional i st leader, played a leading role in these development s. In Midnapur, a cul t ivators’ st rike against a Whi te zamindari company was led by a Calcut ta medical student . Defiance of forest laws became popular in Andhra. Peasant s and t ribal s in some of the Rajasthan states beganmovement s for securing bet ter condi t ions of l i fe. In Punjab, the Akal i Movement for wrest ing cont rol of the gurdwaras from the corrupt mahant s (priest s) was a part of the general movement of Noncooperat ion, and the Akal i s observed st rict non-violence in the face of t remendous repression.In September 1920, at thebeginning of the movement , the Government had thought i t best to leave i t alone as repression wouldonly make martyrs of the nat ional i st s and fan the spi ri t of revol t . In May 1921, i t had t ried, throughthe Gandhi -Reading talks, to persuade Gandhi j i to ask the Al i brothers to wi thdraw from thei rspeeches those passages that contained suggest ions of violence; thi s was an at tempt to drive a wedgebetween the Khi lafat leaders and Gandhi j i , but i t fai led. By December, the Government fel t that thingswere real ly going too far and announced a change of pol icy by declaring the Volunteer Corps i l legal and arrest ing al l those who claimed to be i t s members.C.R. Das was among the fi rst to be arrested, fol lowed by hi s wi fe Basant idebi , whose arrest soincensed the youth of Bengal that thousands came forward to court arrest .In mid-December, there was an abort ive at tempt at negot iat ions, ini t iated by Malaviya, but the condi t ions offered were such that i t meant sacri ficing the Khi lafat leaders, a course that Gandhi j i would not accept . In any case, the Home Government had al ready decided against a set t lement and ordered the Viceroy, Lord Reading, to wi thdraw from the negot iat ions. Repression cont inued, publ ic meet ings and assembl ies were banned, newspapers gagged, and midnight raids on Congress and Khi lafat offices became common.Gandhi j i had been under considerable pressure from the Congress rank and fi le as wel l as theleadership to start the phase of mass civi l di sobedience. The Ahmedabad session of the Congress inDecember 1921 had appointed him the sole authori ty on the i ssue. The Government showed no signsof relent ing and had ignored both the appeal of the Al l -Part ies Conference held in mid-January 1922as wel l as Gandhi j i ’s let ter to the Viceroy announcing that , unless the Government l i fted the ban oncivi l l ibert ies and released pol i t ical pri soners, he would be forced to go ahead wi th mass civi ldi sobedience. The Viceroy was unmoved and, left wi th no choice, Gandhi j i announced that mass civi ldi sobedience would begin in Bardol i taluqa of Surat di st rict , and that al l other part s of the count ryshould cooperate by maintaining total di scipl ine and quiet so that the ent i re at tent ion of the movementcould be concent rated on Bardol i . But Bardol i was dest ined to wai t for another six years before i tcould launch a no-tax movement . It s fate was decided by the act ion of members of a Congress andKhi lafat procession in Chauri Chaura in Gorakhpur di st rict of U.P. on 5 February 1922. Irri tated by thebehaviour of some pol icemen, a sect ion of the crowd at tacked them. The pol ice opened fi re. At thi s,the ent i re procession at tacked the pol ice and when the lat ter hid inside the pol ice stat ion, set fi re to the bui lding. Pol icemen who t ried to escape were hacked to pieces and thrown into the fi re. In al l twentytwo pol icemen were done to death. On hearing of the incident , Gandhi j i decided to wi thdraw themovement . He al so persuaded the Congress Working Commi t tee to rat i fy hi s deci sion and thus, on 12 February 1922, the Non-Cooperat ion Movement came to an end.

12 February 1922 popularly known as the Bardol i resolut ion which whi le announcing thewi thdrawal , asked the peasant s to pay taxes and tenant s to pay rent s.The other argument that the real mot ive for wi thdrawal was the fear of the growth of radical forcesand that Chauri Chaura was proof of the emergence of preci sely such a radical sent iment i s on eventhinner ground.In fact , one of the i tems of the oath that was taken by peasant s who joined the Eka movement was that they would ‘pay rent regularly at Khari f and RabiThe Congress had at no stage during the movement sanct ioned non-payment of rent or quest ioned the right s of zamindars; the resolut ion was merely a rei terat ion of i t s posi t ion on thi s i ssue. Non-payment of taxes was obviously to cease i f the movement as a whole was being wi thdrawn.The Non-Cooperat ion Movement had in fact succeededon many count s. It certainly demonst rated that i t commanded the support and sympathy of vastsect ions of the Indian people. After Non-cooperat ion, the charge of represent ing a ‘microscopicminori ty,’ made by the Viceroy, Dufferin, in 1888, could never again be hurled at the IndianNat ional Congress. It s reach among many sect ions of Indian peasant s, workers, art i sans, shopkeepers, t raders, professional s, whi te-col lar employees, had been demonst rated. The spat ial spread of the movement was al so nat ion-wide. Some areas were more act ive than others, but there were few that showed no signs of act ivi ty at al l .The t remendous part icipat ion of Musl ims in the movement , and the maintenance of communaluni ty, despi te the Malabar development s, was in i t sel f no mean achievement .The fraternizat ion that was wi tnessed between Hindus and Musl ims, wi th Gandhi j i andother Congress leaders speaking from mosques, Gandhi j i being al lowed to address meet ings ofMusl im women in which he was the only male who was not bl ind-folded, al l these began to look l ikeromant ic dreams in later years.Gandhi j i , in an art icle wri t ten in Young India on 23 February 1922 af ter the wi thdrawal of the movement , repl ied: ‘It i s high t ime that the Bri t i sh people were made to real ize that the fight that was commenced in 1920 i s a fight to the fini sh, whether i t last s one month or one year or many months or many years and whether the representat ives of Bri tain re-enact al l the indescribable orgies of the Mut iny days wi th redoubled force or whether they do not .

1 6Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s

But in the twent ieth century, the movement s that emerged out of thi s di scontent were marked by a newfeature: they were deeply influenced by and in thei r turn had a marked impact on the ongoing st ruggle for nat ional freedom. To i l lust rate the complex nature of thi s relat ionship, we wi l l recount the story of three important peasant st ruggles that emerged in the second and thi rd decade of the count ry: The Ki san Sabha and Eka movement s in Avadh in U.P., the Mappi la rebel l ion in Malabar and the Bardol I Satyagraha in Gujarat .Fol lowing the annexat ion of Avadh in 1856, the second hal f of the nineteenth century had seen thest rengthening of the hold of the taluqdars or big landlords over the agrarian society of the province.Thi s had led to a si tuat ion in which exorbi tant rent s, i l legal levies, renewal fees or nazrana, andarbi t rary ejectment s or bedakhl i had made l i fe mi serable for the majori ty of the cul t ivators. The high price of food and other necessi t ies that accompanied and fol lowed World War I made the oppression al l the more di fficul t to bear, and the tenant s of Avadh were ripe for a message of resi stance.It was the more act ive members of the Home Rule League in U.P. who ini t iated the process of theorganizat ion of the peasant s of the province on modern l ines into ki san sabhas . The U.P. Ki san Sabhawas set up in February 1918 through the effort s of Gauri Shankar Mi sra and Indra Narain Dwivedi ,

and wi th the support of Madan Mohan Malaviya. The U.P. Ki san Sabha demonst rated considerableact ivi ty, and by June 1919 had establ i shed at least 450 branches in 173 tehsi l s of the province. Aconsequence of thi s act ivi ty was that a large number of ki san delegates from U.P. at tended the Delhiand Amri t sar sessions of the Indian Nat ional Congress in December 1918 and 1919.Towards the end of 1919, the fi rst signs of grass-root s peasant act ivi ty were evident in the report s of a nai -dhobi band (a form of social boycot t ) on an estate in Pratapgarh di st rict . By the summer of 1920, in the vi l lages of taluqdari Avadh, ki san meet ings cal led by vi l lage panchayat s became frequent . Thenames of Jhinguri Singh and Durgapal Singh were associated wi th thi s development . But soon another leader, who became famous by the name of Baba Ramchandra, emerged as the ral lying point .In June 1920, Baba Ramchandra led a few hundred tenant s from the Jaunpur and Pratapgarhdi st rict s to Al lahabad. There he met Gauri Shankar Mi sra and Jawaharlal Nehru and asked them tovi si t the vi l lages to see for themselves the l iving condi t ions of the tenant s. The resul t was that ,between June and August , Jawaharlal Nehru made several vi si t s to the rural areas and developed close contact s wi th the Ki san Sabha movement .Meanwhi le, the Congress at Calcut ta had chosen the path of non-cooperat ion and many nat ional i st sof U.P. had commi t ted themselves to the new pol i t ical path. But there were others, including MadanMohan Malaviya, who preferred to st ick to const i tut ional agi tat ion. These di fferences were reflectedin the U.P. Ki san Sabha as wel l , and soon the Non-cooperators set up an al ternat ive Oudh Ki san Sabha at Pratapgarh on 17 October 1920. Thi s new body succeeded in integrat ing under i t s banner al l the grassroot s ki san sabhas that had emerged in the di st rict s of Avadh in the past few months; through the effort s of Mi sra, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mata Badal Pande, Baba Ramchandra, Deo Narayan Pande and Kedar Nath, the new organizat ion brought under i t s wing, by the end of October, over 330 ki san sabhas. The Oudh Ki san Sabha asked the ki sans to refuse to t i l l bedakhl i land, not to offer hari andbegar (forms of unpaid labour), to boycot t those who did not accept these condi t ions and to solve thei r di sputes through panchayat s. A marked feature of the Ki san Sabha movement was that ki sans belonging to the high as wel l as the low castes were to be found in i t s ranks.A series of incident s, smal l and big, but simi lar in character, occurred. Some, such as the onesat Munshiganj and Karhaiya Bazaar in Rae Barel i , were sparked off by the arrest s or rumours of arrestof leaders. The lead was often taken not by recognized Ki san Sabha act ivi st s, but by local figures —sadhus, holy men, and di sinheri ted ex-proprietors.The Government , however, had l i t t le di fficul ty in suppressing these outbreaks of violence. Crowdswere fi red upon and di spersed, leaders and act ivi st s arrested, cases launched and, except for a coupleof incident s in February and March, the movement was over by the end of January i t sel f. In March, the Sedi t ious Meet ings Act was brought in to cover the affected di st rict s and al l pol i t ical act ivi ty came to a standst i l l . Nat ional i st s cont inued to defend the cases of the tenant s in the court s, but could do l i t t le el se. The Government , meanwhi le, pushed through the Oudh Rent (Amendment ) Act , and though i t brought l i t t le rel ief to the tenant s, i t helped to rouse hopes and in i t s own way assi sted in the decl ine of the movement .

EKATowards the end of the year, peasant di scontent surfaced again in Avadh, but thi s t ime the cent reswere the di st rict s of Hardoi , Bahraich, and Si tapur in the northern part of the province. The ini t ialthrust here was provided by Congress and Khi lafat leaders and the movement grew under the name of

the Eka or uni ty movement . The main grievances here related to

the ext ract ion of a rent that was general ly fi fty per cent higher than the recorded rent the oppression of thekedars to whom the work of

rent -col lect ion was farmed out the pract ice of share-rent s

The Eka meet ings were marked by a rel igious ri tual in which a hole that represented the riverGanges was dug in the ground and fi l led wi th water, a priest was brought in to preside and theassembled peasant s vowed that they would pay only the recorded rent but pay i t on t ime, would not leave when ejected, would refuse to do forced labour, would give no help to criminal s and abide by the panchayat deci sions.The Eka Movement , however, soon developed i t s own grass-root s leadership in the form of MadariPasi and other low-caste leaders who were not part icularly incl ined to accept the di scipl ine of nonviolence that the Congress and Khi lafat leaders urged . As a resul t , the movement ’s contact wi th the nat ional i st s dimini shed and i t went i t s own way. However, unl ike the earl ier Ki san Sabha movement that was based almost solely on tenant s, the Eka Movement included in i t s ranks many smal l zamindars who found themselves di senchanted wi th the Government because of i t s heavy land revenue demand. By March 1922, however, severe repression on the part of the authori t ies succeededin bringing the Eka Movement to i t s end.

MOPILLA

In August 1921, peasant di scontent erupted in the Malabar di st rict of Kerala. Here Mappi la (Musl im) tenant s rebel led. Thei r grievances related to lack of any securi ty of tenure, renewal fees, high rent s,and other oppressive landlord exact ions. In the nineteenth century as wel l , there had been cases ofMappi la resi stance to landlord oppression but what erupted in 1921 was on a di fferent scale together.The change was signi ficant because earl ier the landlords hadsuccessful ly prevented the Congress from commi t t ing i t sel f to the tenant s’ cause.Simul taneously, the Khi lafat Movement was al so extending i t s sweep. In fact , there was hardly anyway one could di st ingui sh between Khi lafat and tenant s’ meet ings, the leaders and the audience were the same, and the two movement s were inext ricably merged into one. The social base of themovement was primari ly among the Mappi la tenant s, and Hindus were qui te conspicuous by thei rabsence, though the movement could count on a number of Hindu leaders.Angered by repression and encouraged by rumours that the Bri t i sh, weakened as a resul t of theWorld War, were no longer in a posi t ion to take st rong mi l i tary act ion, the Mappi las began to exhibi tincreasing signs of turbulence and defiance of authori ty. But the final break came only when theDi st rict Magi st rate of Eranad taluq, E.F. Thomas, on 20 August 1921, accompanied by a cont ingent ofpol ice and t roops, raided the mosque at Ti rurangadi to arrest Al i Musal iar, a Khi lafat leader and ahighly respected priest . They found only three fai rly insigni ficant Khi lafat volunteers and arrestedthem. However the news that spread was that the famous Mambrath mosque, of which Al i Musal iarwas the priest , had been raided and dest royed by the Bri t i sh army. Soon Mappi las from Kot takkal ,Tanur and Parappanagadi converged at Ti rurangadi and thei r leaders met the Bri t i sh officers to secure the release of the arrested volunteers. The people were quiet and peaceful , but the pol ice

opened fi re on the unarmed crowd and many were ki l led. A clash ensued, and Government offices were dest royed, records burnt and the t reasury looted. The rebel l ion soon spread into the Eranad, Wal luvanad and Ponnani taluqs, al l Mappi la st rongholds.In the fi rst stage of the rebel l ion, the target s of at tack were the unpopular jenmies (landlords),most ly Hindu, the symbol s of Government authori ty such as kutcheri s (court s), pol ice stat ions,t reasuries and offices, and Bri t i sh planters. Lenient landlords and poor Hindus were rarely touched.Rebel s would t ravel many mi les through terri tory populated by Hindus and at tack only the landlordsand burn thei r records. Some of the rebel leaders, l ike Kunhammed Haj i , took special care to see that Hindus were not molested or looted and even puni shed those among the rebel s who at tacked the Hindus. Kunhammed Haj i al so did not di scriminate in favour of Musl ims: he ordered the execut ion and puni shment of a number of pro-government Mappi las as wel l.But once the Bri t i sh declared mart ial law and repression began in earnest , the character of therebel l ion underwent a defini te change. Many Hindus were ei ther pressurized into helping theauthori t ies or voluntari ly gave assi stance and thi s helped to st rengthen the al ready exi st ing ant i –Hindu sent iment among the poor i l l i terate Mappi las who in any case were mot ivated by a st rong rel igious ideology. Forced conversions, at tacks on and murders of Hindus increased as the sense of desperat ion mounted. What had been largely an ant i -government and ant i -landlord affai r acqui red st rong communal overtones.The Mappi las’ recourse to violence had in any case driven a wedge between them and the NonCooperat ion Movement which was based on the principle of non-violence. The communal izat ion ofthe rebel l ion completed the i solat ion of the Mappi las. Bri t i sh repression did the rest and by December 1921 al l resi stance had come to a stop.But the tol l was in fact even heavier, though in a very di fferent way. From then onwards,the mi l i tant Mappi las were so completely crushed and demoral ized that t i l l independence thei rpart icipat ion in any form of pol i t ics was almost ni l . They nei ther joined the nat ional movement nor the peasant movement that was to grow in Kerala in later years under the Left leadership.The peasant movement s in U.P. and Malabar were thus closely l inked wi th the pol i t ics at the nat ionallevel . In U.P., the impetus had come from the Home Rule Leagues and, later, from the NonCooperat ion and Khi lafat movement . In Avadh, in the early months of 1921 when peasant act ivi ty wasat i t s peak, i t was di fficul t to di st ingui sh between a Non-cooperat ion meet ing and a peasant ral ly. Asimi lar si tuat ion arose in Malabar, where Khi lafat and tenant s’ meet ings merged into one. But in bothplaces, the recourse to violence by the peasant s created a di stance between them and the nat ionalmovement and led to appeal s by the nat ional i st leaders to the peasant s that they should not indulge inviolence. Often, the nat ional leaders, especial ly Gandhi j i , al so asked the peasant s to desi st from takingext reme act ion l ike stopping the payment of rent to landlords.

BARDOLI SATYAGRAHThe no tax movement that was launched in Bardol i taluq of Surat di st rict in Gujarat in 1928 was al so in many ways a chi ld of the Non-cooperat ion days.Stung by Gandhi j i ’s rebuke in 1922 that they had done nothing forthe upl i ftment of the low-caste untouchable and t ribal inhabi tant s— who were known by the name of Kal iparaj (dark people) to di st ingui sh them from the high caste or Ujal iparaj (fai r people) and whoformed sixty per cent of the populat ion of the taluq — these men, who belonged to high castes started

work among the Kal iparaj through a network of six ashrams that were spread out over the taluq. These ashrams, many of which survive to thi s day as l iving inst i tut ions working for the educat ion of the t ribal s, did much to l i ft the taluq out of the demoral izat ion that had fol lowed the wi thdrawal of 1922.Kunverj i Mehta and Keshavj i Ganeshj i learnt the t ribal dialect , and developed a ‘Kal iparaj l i terature’ wi th the assi stance of the educated members of the Kal iparaj communi ty, which contained poems and prose that aroused the Kal iparaj against the Hal i system under which they laboured as heredi tary labourers for upper-caste landowners, and exhorted them to abjure intoxicat ing drinks and high marriage expenses which led to financial ruin. Bhajan mandal i s consi st ing of Kal iparaj andUjal iparaj members were used to spread the message. Night school s were started to educate theKal iparaj and in 1927 a school for the educat ion of Kal iparaj chi ldren was set up in Bardol i town.Annual Kal iparaj conferences were held in 1922 and, in 1927, Gandhi j i ,who presided over the annual conference, ini t iated an enqui ry into the condi t ions of the Kal iparaj ,who he al so now renamed as Raniparaj or the inhabi tant s of the forest in preference to the derogatory term Kal iparaj or dark people. Many leading figures of Gujarat including Narhari Parikh and Jugat ram Dave conducted the inqui ry which turned into a severe indictment of the Hal i system,exploi tat ion by money lenders and sexual exploi tat ion of women by upper-castes. As a resul t of thi s,the Congress had bui l t up a considerable base among the Kal iparaj , and could count on thei r supportin the future.Therefore, when in January 1926 i t became known that Jayakar, the officer charged wi th the duty of reassessment of the land revenue demand of the taluq, had recommended a thi rty percent increase over the exi st ing assessment , the Congress leaders were quick to protest against the increase and set up the Bardol i Inqui ry Commi t tee to go into the i ssue. It s report , publ i shed in July 1926, came to the conclusion that the increase was unjust i fied. Thi s was fol lowed by a campaign in the Press, the lead being taken by Young India and Navj ivan edi ted by Gandhi j i .The const i tut ional i st leaders of the area, including the members of the Legi slat ive Counci l , al so took up the i ssue. In July 1927, the Government reduced the enhancement to 21.97 per cent .But the concessions were too meagre and came too late to sat i sfy anybody. The const i tut ional i stleaders now began to advi se the peasant s to resi st by paying only the current amount and wi thholding the enhanced amount . The ‘Ashram’ group, on the other hand, argued that the ent i re amount must be wi thheld i f i t was to have any effect on the Government . However, at thi s stage, the peasant s seemed more incl ined to heed the advice of the moderate leaders.‘Ashram’ group of Congress leaderson thei r part , had in the meanwhi le contacted Val labhbhai Patel and were persuading him to take on the leadership of the movement .On 12 February, Patel returned to Bardol i and explained the si tuat ion, including the Government ’scurt reply, to the peasant s’ representat ives. Fol lowing thi s, a meet ing of the occupant s of Bardol i taluq passed a resolut ion advi sing al l occupant s of land to refuse payment of the revi sed assessment unt i l the Government appointed an independent t ribunal or accepted the current amount as ful l payment . Peasant s were asked to, take oaths in the name of Prabhu (the Hindu name for god) and Khuda (the Musl im name for god) that they would not pay the land revenue. The resolut ion was fol lowed by the reci tat ion of sacred text s from the Gi ta and the Koran and songs from Kabi r, who symbol ized HinduMusl im uni ty. The Satyagraha had begun.Val labhbhai Patel was ideal ly sui ted for leading the campaign. A veteran of the Kheda Satyagraha,the Nagpur Flag Satyagraha, and the Borsad Puni t ive Tax Satyagraha, he had emerged as a leader ofGujarat who was second only to Gandhi j i . Hi s capaci t ies as an organizer, speaker, indefat igablecampaigner, inspi rer of ordinary men and women were al ready known, but i t was the women ofBardol i who gave him the t i t le of Sardar.The Sardar divided the taluq into thi rteen workers’camps or Chhavani s each under the charge of an

experienced leader. One hundred pol i t ical workers drawn from al l over the province, assi sted by 1,500 volunteers, many of whom were student s, formed the army of the movement . A publ icat ions bureau that brought out the dai ly Bardol i Satyagraha Pat rika was set up. Thi s Pat rika contained report s about the movement , speeches of the leaders, pictures of the jabt i or confi scat ion proceedings and other news.The members of the intel l igence wing would shadow them night and day to see that they did not pay thei r dues, secure informat ion about Government moves, especial ly of the l ikel ihood of jabt i (confi scat ion) and then warn the vi l lagers to lock up thei r houses or flee to neighbouring Baroda.Special emphasi s was placed on the mobi l izat ion of women and manywomen act ivi st s l ike Mi thuben Pet i t , a Parsi lady from Bombay, Bhakt iba, the wi fe of DarbarGopaldas, Maniben Patel , the Sardar’s daughter, Shardaben Shah and Sharda Mehta were recrui ted forthe purpose. As a resul t , women often outnumbered men at the meet ings and stood fi rm in thei rresolve not to submi t to Government threat s.Those who showed signs of weakness were brought into l ine by means of social pressure and threat sof social boycot t . Caste and vi l lage panchayat s were used effect ively for thi s purpose and those whoopposed the movement had to face the prospect of being refused essent ial services from sweepers,barbers, washermen, agricul tural labourers, and of being social ly boycot ted by thei r kinsmen andneighbours. These threat s were usual ly sufficient to prevent any weakening. Government official sfaced the worst of thi s form of pressure. They were refused suppl ies, services, t ransport and found i talmost impossible to carry out thei r official dut ies. The work that the Congress leaders had doneamong the Kal iparaj people al so paid dividends during thi s movement and the Government wastotal ly unsuccessful in i t s at tempt s to use them against the upper caste peasant s.By July 1928, the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, himsel f began to doubt the correctness of the Bombay Government ’s stand and put pressure on Governor Wi l son to find a way out .The face-saving device was provided by the Legi slat ive Counci l members from Surat who wrote alet ter to the Governor assuring him that hi s pre-condi t ion for an enqui ry would be sat i sfied. The let tercontained no reference to what the pre-condi t ion was (though everyone knew that i t was ful l payment of the enhanced rent ) because an understanding had al ready been reached that the ful l enhanced rentwould not be paid. Nobody took the Governor seriously when he declared that he had secured an ‘uncondi t ional surrender.’ It was the Bardol i peasant s who had won.The enqui ry, conducted by a judicial officer, Broomfield, and a revenue officer, Maxwel l , came tothe conclusion that the increase had been unjust i fied, and reduced the enhancement to 6.03 per cent .The New Statesman of London summed up the whole affai r on 5 May 1929: ‘The report of theCommi t tee const i tutes the worst rebuff which any local government in India has received for manyyears and may have far-reaching resul t s . . . It would be di fficul t to find an incident qui te comparable wi th thi s in the long and cont roversial annal s of Indian Land Revenue.

1 7The Indian Working Class and the National Movement

Towards the end of the 19th century, there were several agi tat ions, including st rikes by workers in thetext i le mi l l s of Bombay, Calcut ta, Ahmedabad, Surat , Madras, Coimbatore, Wardha, and so on, in therai lways and in the plantat ions. However, they were most ly sporadic, spontaneous and unorganizedrevol t s based on immediate economic grievances, and had hardly any wider pol i t ical impl icat ions.There were al so some early at tempt s at organized effort to improve the condi t ion of the workers.These effort s were made as early as the 1870s by phi lanthropi st s. In 1878, Sorabjee Shapoorj iBengalee t ried unsuccessful ly to int roduce a Bi l l in the Bombay Legi slat ive Counci l to l imi t theworking hours for labour. In Bengal , Sasipada Banerjee, a Brahmo Social reformer, set up a

Workingmen’s Club in 1870 and brought out a monthly journal cal led Bharat Sramjeebi (IndianLabour), wi th the primary idea of educat ing the workers. In Bombay, Narayan Meghajee Lokhandaybrought out an Anglo-Marathi weekly cal led Dina-Bandhu (Friend of the Poor) in 1880, and startedthe Bombay Mi l l and Mi l lhands’Associat ion in 1890. Al l these effort s were admi t tedly of a phi lanthropic natureand did not represent the beginnings of an organized working class movement . Moreover, these phi lanthropi st s did not belong to the mainst ream of the contemporary nat ional movement .The mainst ream nat ional i st movement in fact was as yet , by and large, indi fferent to the quest ion of labour. The early nat ional i st s in the beginning paid relat ively l i t t le at tent ion to the quest ion of workers despi te the t ruly wretched condi t ions under which they exi sted at that t ime. Al so, they had a st rikingly, though perhaps understandably, di fferent ial at t i tude towards the workers employed inEuropeans enterpri ses and those employed in Indian enterpri ses.At thi s stage, however, the nat ional i st s were unwi l l ing to take up the quest ion of labour versus theindigenous employer. Most of the nat ional i st newspapers, in fact , denied the need for any Government legi slat ion to regulate working condi t ions and act ively opposed the Factories Act of 1881 and 1891.Simi larly, st rikes in Indian text i les mi l l s were general ly not supported. Apart from the desi re not to create any divi sions in the fledgl ing ant i -imperial i st movement , there were other reasons for thenat ional i st stance. The nat ional i st s correct ly saw the Government ini t iat ive on labour legi slat ion as dictated by Bri t i sh manufacturing interest s which, when faced wi th growing Indian compet i t ion and a shrinking market in India, lobbied for factor legi slat ion in India which would, for example, byreducing the working hours for labour, reduce the compet i t ive edge enjoyed by Indian indust ry.Further, the early nat ional i st s saw rapid indust rial i sat ion as the panacea for the problems of Indianpoverty and degradat ion and were unwi l l ing to countenance any measure which would impede thi sprocess. Labour legi slat ion which would adversely affect the infant indust ry in India, they said, wasl ike ki l l ing the goose that laid the golden eggs. But there was al so the nat ional i st newspaper,Mahrat ta, then under the influence of the radical thinker, G.S. Agarkar, which even at thi s stagesupported the workers’ cause and asked the mi l lowners to make concessions to them. Thi s t rend was,however, st i l l a very minor one.The scenario completely al tered when the quest ion was of Indian labour employed in Bri t i sh-ownedenterpri ses. Here the nat ional i st s had no hesi tat ion in giving ful l support to the workers.The Indian Nat ional Congress and the nat ional i st newspapers began a campaign against the mannerin which the tea plantat ion workers in Assam were reduced to vi rtual slavery, wi th European plantersbeing given powers, through legi slat ion to arrest , puni sh and prevent the running away of labour. Anappeal was made to nat ional honour and digni ty to protest against thi s unbridled exploi tat ion byforeign capi tal i st s aided by the colonial state.It was not fortui tous, then, that perhaps the fi rst organized st rike by any sect ion of the working class should occur in a Bri t i sh-owned and managed rai lway. Thi s was the signal lers’ st rike in May 1899 in the Great Indian Peninsular (GIP) Rai lway and the demands related to wages, hours of work and other condi t ions of service. Almost al l nat ional i st newspapers came out ful ly in support of the st rike, wi th Ti lak’s newspapers Mahrat ta and Kesari campaigning for i t for months.The Swadeshi upsurge of 1903-8 was a di st inct landmark in the hi story of the labour movement .Four prominent names among the Swadeshi leaders who dedicated themselves to labour st ruggles were Aswinicoomar Bannerj i , Prabhat Kumar Roy Chowdhuri , Premtosh Bose and Apurba Kumar Ghose.They were act ive in a large number of st rikes but thei r greatest success, both in set t ing up workers’organizat ions and in terms of popular support , was among workers in the Government Press, Rai lways

and the jute indust ry . The fi rst tentat ive at tempt s to form al l India unions were al so made at thi s t ime, but these were unsuccessful . The di fferent ial at t i tude towards workers employed in European enterpri ses and those in Indian ones, however, persi sted throughout thi s period.Beginning wi th the Home Rule Leagues in 1915 and cont inuing through the Rowlat t Satyagraha in1919, the nat ional movement once again reached a crescendo in the Non-Cooperat ion and Khi lafatMovement in 1920-22. It was in thi s context that there occurred a resurgence of working class act ivi ty in the years from 1919 to 1922. The working class now created i t s own nat ional -level organizat ion to defend i t s class right s.The most important development was the format ion of the Al l India Trade Union Congress(AITUC) in 1920. Lokamanya Ti lak, who had developed a close associat ion wi th Bombay workers,was one of the moving spi ri t s in the format ion of the AITUC, which had Lala Lajpat Rai , the famousExt remi st leader from Punjab, as i t s fi rst president and Dewan Chaman Lal , who was to become amajor name in the Indian labour movement , as i t s general secretary.Lajpat Rai was among the fi rst in India to l ink capi tal i sm wi th imperial i sm and emphasize thecrucial role of the working class in fight ing thi s combinat ion.Simi larly at the second session of the AITUC, Dewan Chaman Lal whi le moving a resolut ion infavour of Swaraj pointed out that i t was to be a Swaraj , not for the capi tal i st s but for the workers.In November 1921, at the t ime of the vi si t of the Prince of Wales, the workers responded to theCongress cal l of a boycot t by a count rywide general st rike.Any di scussion of these years would remain incomplete wi thout ment ioning the founding in 1918by Gandhi j i of the Ahmedabad Text i le Labour Associat ion (TLA) which, wi th 14,000 workers on i t srol l s, was perhaps the largest single t rade union of the t ime.Communi st influence in the t rade unionmovement , marginal t i l l early 1927, had become very st rong indeed, by the end of 1928. In Bombay,fol lowing the hi storic six-month-long general st rike by the text i le workers (Apri l -September 1928),the Communi st -led Gi rni Kamgar Union (GKU) acqui red a pre-eminent posi t ion.The AITUC in November1927 took a deci sion to boycot t the Simon Commi ssion and many workers part icipated in the massiveSimon boycot t demonst rat ions.The Government , nervous at the growing mi l i tancy and pol i t ical involvement of the working class,and especial ly at the coming together of the nat ional i st and the Left t rends, launched a two-pronged at tack on the labour movement . On the one hand, i t enacted repressive laws l ike the Publ ic Safety Act and Trade Di sputes Act s and arrested in one swoop vi rtual ly the ent i re radical leadership of the labour movement and launched the famous Meerut Conspi racy Case against them. On the other hand, i t at tempted, not wi thout some success, to wean away through concessions (for example the appointment of the Royal Commi ssion on Labour in 1929) a substant ial sect ion of the labour movement and commi t i t to the const i tut ional i st and corporat i st mouldabout the end of 1928, the Communi st sreversed thei r pol icy of al igning themselves wi th and working wi thin the mainst ream of the nat ionalmovement . Thi s led to the i solat ion of the Communi st s from the nat ional movement and great lyreduced thei r hold over even the working class. The membership of the GKU fel l from 54,000 inDecember 1928 to about 800 by the end of 1929. Simi larly, the Communi st s got i solated wi thin theAITUC and were thrown out in the spl i t of 1931. On 6 July, Gandhi Day was declared bythe Congress Working Commi t tee to protest against large scale arrest s, and about 50,000 people took part in the hartal that day wi th workers from forty-nine factories downing thei r tool s. The day Gandhi j i breached the sal t law, 6 Apri l , a novel form of Satyagraha was launched by the workers of GIP Rai lwaymen’s Union.

Nei ther did the workers take an act ive part in the Civi l Di sobedience Movement of 1932-34. The next wave of working class act ivi ty came wi th provincial autonomy and the format ion of popular mini st ries during 1937-1939. The Communi st s had, in the meant ime, abandoned thei r suicidal sectarian pol icies and since 1934re-enacted the mainst ream of nat ional i st pol i t ics. They al so rejoined the AITUC in 1935.World War II began on 3 September 1939 and the working class of Bombay was amongst the fi rstin the world to hold an ant i -war st rike on 2 October, 1939.However, wi th the Nazi at tack on the Soviet Union in 1941, the Communi st s argued that thecharacter of the War had changed from an imperial i st war to a people’s war. It was now the duty of the working class to support the Al l ied powers to defeat Fasci sm which threatened the social i st fatherland.Because of thi s shi ft in pol icy, the Communi st party di ssociated i t sel f from the Qui t India Movement launched by Gandhi j i in August 1942. They al so successful ly fol lowed a pol icy of indust rial peace wi th employers so that product ion and war-effort would not be hampered.The Qui t India Movement , however, did not leave the working class untouched, despi te theCommuni st indi fference or opposi t ion to i tTowards the end of 1945, the Bombay and Calcut ta dock workers refused to load ships going toIndonesia wi th suppl ies for t roops meant to suppress the nat ional l iberat ion st ruggles of South-EastAsia. Perhaps the most spectacular act ion by the workers in thi s period was the st rike and hartal by the Bombay workers in sol idari ty wi th the mut iny of the naval rat ings in 1946.

1 8The Struggles for Gurdwara Reform and Temple Entry

The Akal i Movement developed on a purely rel igious i ssue but ended up as a powerful epi sode ofIndia’s freedom st ruggle. The movement arose wi th the object ive of freeing the Gurdwaras (Sikh temples) from the cont rol ofignorant and corrupt mahant s (priest s). The Gurdwaras had been heavi ly endowed wi th revenue-freeland and money by Maharaja Ranj i t Singh, Sikh chieftains and other devout Sikhs during the 18th and19th centuries. These shrines came to be managed during the 18th century by Udasi Sikh mahant s whoescaped the wrath of Mughal authori t ies because they did not wear thei r hai r long. (Many ignorantpeople therefore bel ieve that these mahant s were Hindus. Thi s i s, of course, not t rue at al l ). In t ime corrupt ion spread among these mahant s and they began to t reat the offerings and other income of the Gurdwaras as thei r personal income. Many of them began to l ive a l i fe of luxury and di ssipat ion.Apart from the mahant s, after the Bri t i sh annexat ion of Punjab in 1849, some cont rol over theGurdwaras was exerci sed by Government -nominated managers and custodians, who often col laborated wi th mahant s.The Government gave ful l support to the mahant s. It used them and the managers to preachloyal i sm to the Sikhs and to keep them away from the ri sing nat ional i st movement . The Sikhreformers and nat ional i st s, on the other hand, wanted a thorough reformat ion of the Gurdwaras bytaking them out of the cont rol of the mahant s and agent s of the colonial regime. The nat ional i st s were especial ly horri fied by two incident s — when the priest s of the Golden Temple at Amri t sar i ssued a Hukamnama (di rect ive from the Gurus or the holy seat s of the Sikh authori ty) against the Ghadari tes,declaring them renegades, and then honoured General Dyer, the butcher of Jal l ianwala massacre, wi th a saropa (robe of honour) and declared him to be a Sikh.A popular agi tat ion for the reform of Gurdwaras developed rapidly during 1920 when the reformers

organized groups of volunteers known as jathas to compel the mahant s and the Government –appointed managers to hand over cont rol of the Gurdwaras to the local devotees. The reformers won easy victories in the beginning wi th tens of Gurdwaras being l iberated in the course of the year. Symbol ic of thi s early success was the case of the Golden Temple and the Akal Takht . The reformers demanded that ‘thi s foremost seat of Sikh fai th should be placed in the hands of a representat ive body of the Sikhs,’ and organized a series of publ ic meet ings in support of thei r demand. The Government did not want to antagonize the reformers at thi s stage and decided to stem the ri sing t ide of di scontent on such an emot ional rel igious i ssue by appeasing the popular sent iment . It , therefore, permi t ted the Government -appointed manager to resign and, thus, let the cont rol of the Temple pass effect ively into the reformers’ hands.To cont rol and manage the Golden Temple, the Akal Takht and other Gurdwaras, a representat iveassembly of nearly 10,000 reformers met in November 1920 and elected a commi t tee of 175 to beknown as the Shi romani Gurdwara Prabhandak Commi t tee (SGPC). At the same t ime, the need wasfel t for a cent ral body which would organize the st ruggle on a more systemat ic basi s. The Shi romaniAkal i Dal was establ i shed in December for thi s purpose. It was to be the chief organizer of the Akal ijathas whose backbone was provided by Jat peasant ry whi le thei r leadership was in the hands of thenat ional i st intel lectual s. Under the influence of the contemporary Non-Cooperat ion Movement — and many of the leaders were common to both the movement s — the Akal i Dal and the SGPC accepted complete non-violence as thei r creed.The Akal i movement faced i t s fi rst bapt i sm by blood at Nankana, the bi rth place of Guru Nanak, inFebruary 1921. The Government now changed i t s pol icy. Seeing the emerging integrat ion of the Akal i movementwi th the nat ional movement , i t decided to fol low a two-pronged pol icy. To win over or neut ral ize theModerates and those concerned purely wi th rel igious reforms, i t promi sed and started working forlegi slat ion which would sat i sfy them. It decided to suppress the ext remi st or the ant i -imperial i stsect ion of the Akal i s in the name of maintaining law and order.he Akal i s, too, changed thei r pol icy. Heartened by the support of nat ional i st forces in the count ry,they extended the scope of thei r movement to completely root out Government interference in thei rrel igious places. They began to see thei r movement as an integral part of the nat ional st ruggle.Consequent ly, wi thin the SGPC, too, the non-cooperator nat ional i st sect ion took cont rol . In May 1921,the SGPC passed a resolut ion in favour of non-cooperat ion, for the boycot t of foreign goods andl iquor, and for the subst i tut ion of panchayat s for the Bri t i sh court s of law. A major victory was won by the Akal i s in the ‘Keys Affai r’ in October 1921. The Government madean effort to keep possession of the keys of the Toshakhana of the Golden Temple. The Akal i simmediately reacted, and organized massive protest meet ings; tens of Akal i jathas reached Amri t sarimmediately. The SGPC advi sed Sikhs to join the hartal on the day of the arrival of the Prince ofWales in India. The Government once again decided not to confront Sikhs on arel igious i ssue. It released al l those arrested in the ‘Keys Affai r’ and surrendered the keys of theToshakhana to Baba Kharak Singh, head of the SGPC. Mahatma Gandhi immediately sent a telegramto the Baba: ‘Fi rst bat t le for India’s freedom won. Congratulat ions. The culminat ion of the movement to l iberate the Gurdwaras came wi th the heroic non-violent st rugglearound Guru-Ka-Bagh Gurdwara which shook the whole of India. In September 1923, the SGPC took up the cause of the Maharaja of Nabha whohad been forced by the Government to abdicate. Thi s led to the famous morcha at Jai to in Nabha. Butthe Akal i s could not achieve much success on the i ssue since i t nei ther involved rel igion nor was there much support in the rest of the count ry. In the meanwhi le, the Government had succeeded in

winning over the moderate Akal i s wi th the promi se of legi slat ion which was passed in July 1925 and which handed over cont rol over al l the Punjab Gurdwaras to an elected body of Sikhs which al so came to be cal led the SGPC. Apart from i t s own achievement , the Akal i Movement made a massive cont ribut ion to the pol i t ical development of Punjab. It awakened the Punjab peasant ry. Thi s movement was al so a model of a movement on a rel igious i ssue which was ut terly non-communal .It was thi s idea of l iberat ion of the count ry from a foreign Government that uni tedal l sect ions of the Sikh communi ty and brought the Hindus, the Musl ims and the Sikhs of the province into the fold of the Akal i movement .’The Akal i Movement al so awakened the people of the princely states of Punjab to pol i t ical consciousness and pol i t ical act ivi ty. The Akal i Movement soon divided into three st reams because i t represented three di st inct pol i t icalst reams, which had no reasons to remain uni ted as a di st inct Akal i party once Gurdwara reform hadtaken place. One of the movement ’s st reams consi sted of moderate, pro-Government men who werepul led into the movement because of i t s rel igious appeal and popular pressure. These men went backto loyal i st pol i t ics and became a part of the Unioni st Party. Another st ream consi sted of nat ional i stpersons who joined the mainst ream nat ional i st movement , becoming a part of the Gandhian or left i stKi rt i -Ki san and Communi st wings. The thi rd st ream, which kept the t i t le of Akal i , al though i t was notthe sole hei r of the Akal i Movement , used to the ful l the prest ige of the movement among the ruralmasses, and became the pol i t ical organ of Sikh communal i sm, mixing rel igion and pol i t ics andinculcat ing the ideology of pol i t ical separat ion from Hindus and Musl ims. In pre-1947 pol i t ics theAkal i Dal constant ly vaci l lated between nat ional i st and loyal i st pol i t ics. Ti l l 1917, the Nat ional Congress had refused to take up social reform i ssues lest the growing pol i t icaluni ty of the Indian people got di srupted. It reversed thi s posi t ion in 1917 when i t passed a resolut ion urging upon the people ‘the necessi ty, just ice and righteousness of removing al l di sabi l i t ies imposed by custom upon the depressed classes.’At thi s stage, Lokamanya Ti lak al so denounced untouchabi l i ty and asked for i t s removal . But they did not take any concrete steps in the di rect ion. Among the nat ional leaders, i t was Gandhi who gave top priori ty to the removal of untouchabi l i ty and declared that thi s was no less important than the pol i t ical st ruggle for freedom.In 1923, the Congress decided to take act ive steps towards the eradicat ion of untouchabi l i ty. Thebasic st rategy i t adopted was to educate and mobi l ize opinion among caste Hindus on the quest ion.The problem was part icularly acute in Kerala where the depressed classes or avarnas (those wi thoutcaste, later known as Hari jans) were subjected to degrading and de-humani sing social di sabi l i t ies. Forexample, they suffered not only from untouchabi l i ty but al so theendal or di stance pol lut ion — theEzhavas and Pulayas could not approach the higher castes nearer than 16 feet and 72 feet respect ively.St ruggle against these di sabi l i t ies was being waged since the end of 19th century by several reformersand intel lectual s such as Sri Narayan Guru, N. Kumaran Asan and T.K. MadhavanImmediately after the Kakinada session, the Kerala Provincial Congress Commi t tee (KPCC) tookup the eradicat ion of untouchabi l i ty as an urgent i ssue. i t wasdecided to launch an immediate movement to open Hindu temples and al l publ ic roads to the avarnasor Hari jans. A beginning was made in Vaikom, a vi l lage in Travancore. There was a major temple there whosefour wal l s were surrounded by temple roads which could not be used by avarnas l ike Ezhavas and

PulayasThe KPCC decided to use the recent ly acqui red weapon of Satyagraha to fight untouchabi l i tyand to make a beginning at Vaikom by defying the unapproachabi l i ty rule by leading a procession ofsavarnas (caste Hindus) and avarnas on the temple roads on 30 March 1924. Many savarna organizat ions such as the Nai r Service Society, Nai r Samajam and Kerala Hindu Sabhasupported the Satyagraha. Yogakshema Sabha, the leading organizat ion of the Namboodi ri s (highestBrahmins by caste), passed a resolut ion favouring the opening of temples to avarnas. E.V. Ramaswami Naicker(popularly known as Periyar later) led a jatha from Madurai and underwent impri sonment . In hi s Kerala tour, Gandhi did not vi si t a single temple because avarnas were kept out of them.The KPCC decided to make a beginning by organizing a temple ent rySatyagraha at Guruvayur on 1st November 1931.A jatha of sixteen volunteers, led by the poet Subramanian Ti rumambu, who became famous as the‘Singing Sword of Kerala,’ began a march from Cannanore in the north to Guruvayur on 21 October.The Satyagraha entered a new phase on 21 September 1932 when K. Kelappan went on a fast untodeath before the temple unt i l i t was opened to the depressed classes. The main weakness of the temple ent ry movement and the Gandhian or nat ional i st approach infight ing caste oppression was that even whi le arousing the people against untouchabi l i ty they lacked ast rategy for ending the caste system i t sel f. The st rength of the nat ional movement in thi s respect wasto find expression in the Const i tut ion of independent India which abol i shed caste inequal i ty, out laweduntouchabi l i ty and guaranteed social equal i ty to al l ci t izens i rrespect ive of thei r caste.

1 9The Years of Stagnation — Swarajists, No-changers and

GandhijiThe wi thdrawal of the Non-Cooperat ion Movement in February 1922 was fol lowed by the arrest ofGandhi j i in March and hi s convict ion and impri sonment for six years for the crime of spreadingdi saffect ion against the Government . C.R. Das and Mot i lal Nehru. They suggested that the nat ional i st s should end theboycot t of the legi slat ive counci l s, enter them, expose them as ‘sham parl iament s’ and as ‘a maskwhich the bureaucracy has put on,’ and obst ruct ‘every work of the counci l .’ Thi s, they argued, wouldnot be giving up non-cooperat ion but cont inuing i t in a more effect ive form by extending i t to thecounci l s themselves.C.R. Das as the President of the Congress and Mot i lal as i t s Secretary put forward thi s programmeof ‘ei ther mending or ending’ the counci l s at the Gaya session of the Congress in December 1922.Another sect ion of the Congress, headed by Val labhbhai Patel , Rajendra Prasad and C.Rajagopalachari , opposed the new proposal which was consequent ly defeated by 1748 to 890 votes.Das and Mot i lal resigned from thei r respect ive offices in the Congress and on 1 January 1923announced the format ion of the Congress-Khi lafat Swaraj Party bet ter known later as the SwarajParty. Das was the President and Mot i lal one of the Secretaries of the new party. The adherent s of thecounci l -ent ry programme came to be popularly known as ‘pro-changers’ and those st i l l advocat ingboycot t of the counci l s as ‘no-changers.’The Swaraj Party accepted the Congress programme in i t s ent i rety except in one respect — i t wouldtake part in elect ions due later in the year. It declared that i t would present the nat ional demand for

sel f-government in the counci l s and in case of i t s reject ion i t s elected members would adopt ‘a pol icyof uni form, cont inuous and consi stent obst ruct ion wi thin the counci l s, wi th a view to make theGovernment through the counci l s impossible. The Swaraj i st s said that work inthe counci l s was necessary to fi l l in the temporary pol i t ical void. Even wi thout Congressmen, said the Swaraj i st s, the counci l s would cont inue to funct ion and,perhaps, a large number of people would part icipate in vot ing. Thi s would lead to the weakening of thehold of the Congress. Moreover, non-Congressmen would capture posi t ions of vantage and use themto weaken the Congress. Why should such ‘vantage point s in a revolut ionary fight be left in the handsof the enemy?’ By joining the counci l s and obst ruct ing thei r work, Congressmen would preventundesi rable element s from doing mi schief or the Government from get t ing some form of legi t imacyfor thei r laws.The no-changers opposed counci l -ent ry mainly on the ground that parl iamentary work would lead tothe neglect of const ruct ive and other work among the masses, the loss of revolut ionary zeal andpol i t ical corrupt ion. The legi slators who would go into the counci l s wi th the aim of wrecking themwould gradual ly give up the pol i t ics of obst ruct ion, get sucked into the imperial const i tut ionalframework, and start cooperat ing wi th the Government on pet ty reforms and piecemeal legi slat ion.Const ruct ive work among the masses, on the other hand, would prepare them for the next round ofcivi l di sobedience.Both groups of leaders began to pul l back from the brink and move towards mutual accommodat ion.Thi s t rend was helped by several factors. Fi rst , the need for uni ty was fel t very st rongly by al l theCongressmen. Secondly, not only the no-changers but al so the Swaraj i st s real ized that however usefulparl iamentary work might be, the real sanct ions which would compel the Government to acceptnat ional demands would be forged only by a mass movement out side the legi slatures — and thi swould need uni ty. Last ly, both groups of leaders ful ly accepted the essent ial i ty of Gandhi j i ’sleadership.Consequent ly, in a special session of the Congress held at Delhi in September 1923, the Congresssuspended al l propaganda against counci l -ent ry and permi t ted Congressmen to stand as candidates and exerci se thei r franchi se in forthcoming elect ions.Gandhi j i was released from jai l on 5 February 1924 on heal th grounds. He was completely opposed tocounci l -ent ry as al so to the obst ruct ion of work in the counci l s which he bel ieved was inconsi stent wi th non-violent non-cooperat ion.Perceiving a di rect threat to the nat ional movement , Gandhi j i ’s fi rst react ion was anger. He wrote inYoung India on 31 October: ‘The Rowlat t Act i s dead but the spi ri t that prompted i t i s l ike anevergreen. So long as the interest of Engl i shmen i s antagoni st ic to that of Indians, so long must therebe anarchic crime or the dread of i t and an edi t ion of the Rowlat t Act in answer. As an answer to the Government ’s offensive against the Swaraj i st s, he decided to show hi ssol idari ty wi th the Swaraj i st s by ‘surrendering’ before them. As he wrote in Young India: ‘I wouldhave been fal se to the count ry i f I had not stood by the Swaraj Party in the hour of i t s need . . . I must stand by i t even though I do not bel ieve in the efficacy of Counci l -ent ry or even some of the methods of conduct ing Counci l -Warfare.On 6 November 1924, Gandhi j i brought the st ri fe between the Swaraj i st s and no-changers to an end, by signing a joint statement wi th Das and Mot i lal that the Swaraj i st Party would carry on work in the legi slatures on behal f of the Congress and as an integral part of the Congress. Thi s deci

sion was endorsed in December at the Belgaum session of the Congress over which Gandhi j i presided. He al so gave the Swaraj i st s a majori ty of seat s on hi s Working Commi t tee.In the Cent ral Legi slat ive Assembly, the Swaraj i st s succeeded in bui lding a common pol i t ical frontwi th the Independent s led by M.A. Jinnah, the Liberal s, and individual s such as Madan MohanMalaviya. They bui l t simi lar coal i t ions in most of the provinces. And they set out to infl ict defeatafter defeat on the Government .The legi slatures, reformed in 1919, had a ‘semblance’ of power wi thout any real authori ty. Thoughthey had a majori ty of elected members, the execut ive at the cent re or in the provinces was out sidethei r cont rol , being responsible only to the Bri t i sh Government at home. Moreover, the Viceroy or theGovernor could cert i fy any legi slat ion, including a budgetary grant , i f i t was rejected in thelegi slature. The Swaraj i st s forced the Government to cert i fy legi slat ion repeatedly at the cent re aswel l as in many of the provinces, thus exposing the t rue character of the reformed counci l s. In March1925, they succeeded in elect ing Vi thalbhai Patel , a leading Swaraj i st , as the President of the Cent ralLegi slat ive Assembly.Though intervening on every i ssue and often outvot ing the Government , the Swaraj i st s took up atthe cent re three major set s of problems on which they del ivered powerful speeches which were ful lyreported in the Press and fol lowed avidly every morning by the readers. One was the problem ofconst i tut ional advance leading to sel f-Government ; second of civi l l ibert ies, release of pol i t icalpri soners, and repeal of repressive laws; and thi rd of the development of indigenous indust ries.In the very fi rst session, Mot i lal Nehru put forward the nat ional demand for the framing of a newconst i tut ion, which would t ransfer real power to India. Thi s demand was passed by 64 votes to 48. Itwas rei terated and passed in September 1925 by 72 votes to 45. The Government had al so to facehumi l iat ion when i t s demands for budgetary grant s under di fferent heads were repeatedly voted out .On one such occasion, Vi thalbhai Patel told the Government : ‘We want you to carry on theadmini st rat ion of thi s count ry by veto and by cert i ficat ion. We want you to t reat the Government ofIndia Act as a scrap of paper which I am sure i t has proved to be.’ The Swaraj i st s suffered a major loss when C.R. Das died on 16 June 1925.In Bengal , the majori ty in the Swaraj Party fai led to support thetenant s’ cause against the zamindars and, thereby, lost the support of i t s pro-tenant , most ly Musl im,members. Nor could the Swaraj Party avoid the int rusion of communal di scord in i t s own ranks.Very soon, a group of Responsivi st s arose in the party who wanted to work the reforms and to holdoffice wherever possible. The Responsivi st s joined the Government in the Cent ral Provinces. Thei rranks were soon swel led by N.C. Kelkar, M.R. Jayakar and other leaders. Lajpat Rai and MadanMohan Malaviya too separated themselves from the Swaraj Party on Responsivi st as wel l ascommunal grounds.To prevent further di ssolut ion and di sintegrat ion of the party, the spread of parl iamentary‘corrupt ion,’ and further weakening of the moral fibre of i t s members, the main leadership of the party rei terated i t s fai th in mass civi l di sobedience and decided to wi thdraw from the legi slatures in March 1926.Gandhi j i , too, had resumed hi s cri t ique of counci l -ent ry. He wrote to Srinivasa Iyengar in Apri l1926: ‘The more I study the Counci l s’ work, the effect of the ent ry into the Counci l s upon publ ic l i fe, i t s repercussions upon the Hindu-Musl im quest ion, the more convinced I become not only of thefut i l i ty but the inadvi sabi l i ty of Counci l -ent ry.

The Swaraj Party went into the elect ions held in November 1926 as a party in di sarray — a muchweaker and demoral ized force. Once again the Swaraj i st s passed a series of adjournament mot ions and defeated the Government ona number of bi l l s. Noteworthy was the defeat of the Government on the Publ ic Safety Bi l l in 1928.Frightened by the spread of social i st and communi st ideas and influence and bel ieving that the crucialrole in thi s respect was being played by Bri t i sh and other foreign agi tators sent to India by theCommuni st Internat ional , the Government proposed to acqui re the power to deport ‘undesi rable’ and‘subversive’ foreigners. Nat ional i st s of al l colours, from the moderates to the mi l i tant s, uni ted inopposing the Bi l l . Even the two spokesmen of the capi tal i st class, Purshot tamdas Thakurdas and G.D. Bi rla, fi rmly opposed the Bi l l. The Swaraj i st s final ly walked out of the legi slatures in 1930 as a resul t of the Lahore Congress resolut ion and the beginning of civi l di sobedience.Thei r great achievement lay in thei r fi l l ing the pol i t ical void at a t ime when the nat ional movementwas recouping i t s st rength. And thi s they did wi thout get t ing co-opted by the colonial regime. AsMot i lal Nehru wrote to hi s son: ‘We have stood fi rm.’ Whi le some in thei r ranks fel l by the waysideas was inevi table in the parl iamentary framework, the overwhelming majori ty proved thei r met t le andstood thei r ground. They worked in the legi slatures in an orderly di scipl ined manner and wi thdrewfrom them whenever the cal l came. Above al l , they showed that i t was possible to use the legi slaturesin a creat ive manner even as they promoted the pol i t ics of sel f-rel iant ant i -imperial i sm. They al sosuccessful ly exposed the hol lowness of the Reform Act of 1919 and showed the people that India wasbeing ruled by ‘lawless laws.’

2 0Bhagat Singh, Surya Sen and the Revolutionary Terrorists

Gradual ly two separate st rands of revolut ionary terrori sm developed — one in Punjab, U.P. andBihar and the other in Bengal . Both the st rands came under the influence of several new social forces.One was the upsurge of working class t rade unioni sm after the War. They could see the revolut ionarypotent ial of the new class and desi red to harness i t to the nat ional i st revolut ion. The second majorinfluence was that of the Russian Revolut ion and the success of the young Social i st State inconsol idat ing i t sel f. The youthful revolut ionaries were keen to learn from and take the help of theyoung Soviet State and i t s rul ing Bol shevik Party. The thi rd influence was that of the newly sprout ing Communi st groups wi th thei r emphasi s on Marxi sm, Social i sm and the proletariat .The revolut ionaries in northern India were the fi rst to emerge out of the mood of frust rat ion andreorganize under the leadership of the old veterans, Ramprasad Bi smi l , Jogesh Chat terjea andSachindranath Sanyal whose Bandi Jiwan served as a textbook to the revolut ionary movement . Theymet in Kanpur in October 1924 and founded the Hindustan Republ ican Associat ion (or Army) toorganize armed revolut ion to overthrow colonial rule and establ i sh in i t s place a Federal Republ ic of the Uni ted States of India whose basic principle would be adul t franchi se.The most important‘act ion’ of the HRA was the Kakori Robbery. On 9 August 1925, ten men held up the 8-Down t rain atKakori , an obscure vi l lage near Lucknow, and looted i t s official rai lway cash. The Governmentreact ion was quick and hard. It arrested a large number of young men and t ried them in the KakoriConspi racy Case. Ashfaqul la Khan, Ramprasad Bi smi l , Roshan Singh and Rajendra Lahi ri were

hanged, four others were sent to the Andamans for l i fe and seventeen others were sentenced to longterms of impri sonment . Chandrashekhar Azad remained at large.The Kakori case was a major setback to the revolut ionaries of northern India; but i t was not a fatalblow. Younger men such as Bejoy Kumar Sinha, Shiv Varma and Jaidev Kapur in U.P., Bhagat Singh,Bhagwat i Charan Vohra and Sukhdev in Punjab set out to reorganize the HRAunder the overal lleadership of ChandrashekharAzad. Simul taneously, they were being influenced by social i st ideas.Final ly, nearly al l the major young revolut ionaries of northern India met at Ferozeshah Kot la Groundat Delhi on 9 and 10 September 1928, created a new col lect ive leadership, adopted social i sm as thei r official goal and changed the name of the party to the Hindustan Social i st Republ ican Associat ion(Army).Even though, as we shal l see, the HSRA and i t s leadership was rapidly moving away from individualheroic act ion and assassinat ion and towards mass pol i t ics, Lala Lajpat Rai ’s death, as the resul t of abrutal lathi -charge when he was leading an ant i -Simon Commi ssion demonst rat ion at Lahore on 30October 1928, led them once again to take to individual assassinat ion. The death of thi s great Punjabileader, popularly known as Sher-e-Punjab, was seen by the romant ic youthful leadership of the HSRAas a di rect chal lenge. And so, on 17 December 1928, Bhagat Singh, Azad and Rajguru assassinated, atLahore, Saunders, a pol ice official involved in the lathi -charge of Lala Lajpat Rai .Bhagat Singh and B.K. Dut t were asked to throw a bomb in the Cent ralLegi slat ive Assembly on 8 Apri l 1929 against the passage of the Publ ic Safety Bi l l and the TradeDi sputes Bi l l which would reduce the civi l l ibert ies of ci t izens in general and workers in part icular.Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and Rajguru were sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried out on 23 March 1931.They cooperated wi th C.R.Das in hi s Swaraj i st work. After hi s death, as the Congress leadership in Bengal got divided into twowings, one led by Subhas Chandra Bose and the other by J.M. Sengupta, the Yugantar group joinedforces wi th the fi rst and Anushi lan wi th the second. Among the several ‘act ions’ of the reorganized groups was the at tempt to assassinate Charles Tegart , the hated Pol ice Commi ssioner of Calcut ta, by Gopinath Saha in January 1924. By an error, another Engl i shman named Day was ki l led.Another reason for stagnat ion in revolut ionary terrori st act ivi ty lay in the incessant fact ional andpersonal quarrel s wi thin the terrori st groups, especial ly where Yugantar and Anushi lan rival ry wasconcerned. But very soon younger revolut ionaries began to organize themselves in new groups,developing fraternal relat ions wi th the act ive element s of both theAnushi lan and Yugantar part ies.Among the new ‘Revol t Groups,’ the most act ive and famous was the Chi t tagong group led by SuryaSen.Surya Sen had act ively part icipated in the Non-Cooperat ion Movement and had become a teacher ina nat ional school in Chi t tagong, which led to hi s being popularly known as Masterda. Hewas fond of saying: ‘Humani sm i s a special vi rtue of a revolut ionary.’ He was al so very fond ofpoet ry, being a great admi rer of Rabindranath Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam.Thei ract ion plan was to include occupat ion of the two main armouries in Chi t tagong and the seizing of thei r arms wi th which a large band of revolut ionaries could be formed into an armed detachment ; thedest ruct ion of the telephone and telegraph systems of the ci ty; and the di slocat ion of the rai lwaycommunicat ion system between Chi t tagong and the rest of Bengal . The act ion was careful ly plannedand was put into execut ion at 10 o’clock on the night of 18 Apri l 1930.In al l , sixty-five were involved in the raid, whichwas undertaken in the name of the Indian Republ ican Army, Chi t tagong Branch.Al l the revolut ionary groups gathered out side the Pol ice Armoury where Surya Sen, dressed in

immaculate whi te khadi dhot i and a long coat and st i ffly i roned Gandhi cap, took a mi l i tary salute,hoi sted the Nat ional Flag among shout s of Bande Mataram and Inqui lab Zindabad, and proclaimed aProvi sional Revolut ionary Government .A remarkable aspect of thi s new phase of the terrori st movement in Bengal was the large-scalepart icipat ion of young women. Under Surya Sen’s leadership, they provided shel ter, acted asmessengers and custodians of arms, and fought , guns in hand. Pri t i lata Waddedar died whi leconduct ing a raid, whi le Kalpana Dut t (now Joshi ) was arrested and t ried along wi th Surya Sen andgiven a l i fe sentence. In December 1931, two school gi rl s of Comi l la, Sant i Ghosh and Suni t iChowdhury, shot dead the Di st rict Magi st rate. In February 1932, Bina Das fi red point blank at theGovernor whi le receiving her degree at the Convocat ion.A real breakthrough in terms of revolut ionary ideology and the goal s of revolut ion and the forms ofrevolut ionary st ruggle was made by Bhagat Singh and hi s comrades. Rethinking had, of course, startedon both count s in the HRA i t sel f. It s mani festo had declared in 1925 that i t stood for ‘abol i t ion of al lsystems which make the exploi tat ion of man by man possible. It s founding counci l , in i t s meet ing inOctober 1924, had decided ‘to preach social revolut ionary and communi st ic principles.’It s main organ, The Revolut ionary, had proposed the nat ional izat ion of the rai lways and other means of t ransport and large-scale indust ries such as steel and ship bui lding. The HRA had al so decided ‘to start labour and peasant organizat ions’and to work for ‘an organized and armed revolut ion.The Phi losophy of the Bomb, was wri t ten by Bhagwat I Charan Vohra at the instance of Azad and after a ful l di scussion wi th him. That i s why Bhagat Singh helped establ i sh the Punjab Naujawan Bharat Sabha in 1926 (becoming i t s founding Secretary), as the open wing of the revolut ionaries.Bhagat Singh and Sukhdev al so organized the Lahore Student s Union for open, legal work among the student s. Bhagat Singh and hi s comrades al so made a major advance in broadening the scope and defini t ion of revolut ion. Revolut ion was no longer equated wi th mere mi l i tancy or violence. It s fi rst object ive was nat ional l iberat ion — the overthrow of imperial i sm. But i t must go beyond and work for a new social i st social order, i t must ‘end exploi tat ion of man by man.’The Phi losophy of the Bomb, wri t ten by Bhagwat i Charan Vohra, Chandrashekhar Azad and Yashpal , defined revolut ion as ‘Independence, social , pol i t ical and economic’ aimed at establ i shing ‘a new order of society in which pol i t ical and economic exploi tat ion wi l l be an impossibi l i ty’.In Apri l 1928, at the conference of youth where Naujawan Bharat Sabha was reorganized, BhagatSingh and hi s comrades openly opposed the suggest ion that youth belonging to rel igious-communalorganizat ions should be permi t ted to become members of the Sabha. Rel igion was one’s privateconcern and communal i sm was an enemy to be fought , argued Bhagat Singh. Signi ficant ly, two of the six rules of the Naujawan Bharat Sabha, drafted by Bhagat Singh, were:‘To have nothing to do wi th communal bodies or other part ies which di sseminate communal ideas’and ‘to create the spi ri t of general tolerat ion among the publ ic considering rel igion as a mat ter ofpersonal bel ief of man and to act upon the same ful ly.’

2 1The Gathering Storm 1927-1929

In the years fol lowing the end of the Non-Cooperat ion Movement in 1922, the torch of nat ional i smhad been kept al ive by the Gandhian const ruct ive workers who dug thei r root s deep into vi l lage soi l , by the Swaraj i st s who kept the Government on i t s toes in the legi slatures, by the Koya t ribal s inAndhra who heroical ly fought the armed might of the colonial state under the leadership ofRamachandra Raju from 1922-24, by the Akal i s in Punjab, by the Satyagrahi s who flocked to defendthe honour of the nat ional flag in Nagpur in 1923, and count less others who engaged themselves inorganizat ional , ideological and agi tat ional act ivi t ies at a variety of level s. As wi th the Rowlat t Bi l l s in 1919, i t was the Bri t i sh Government that provided a catalyst and a ral lying ground by an

announcement on 8 November 1927 of an al l -Whi te commi ssion to recommend whether India was ready for further const i tut ional progress and on which l ines.The cal l for a boycot t of theCommi ssion was endorsed by the Liberal Federat ion led by Tej Bahadur Sapru, by the IndianIndust rial and Commercial Congress, and by the Hindu Mahasabha; the Musl im League even spl i t onthe i ssue, Mohammed Al i Jinnah carrying the majori ty wi th him in favour of boycot t .It was the Indian Nat ional Congress, however, that turned the boycot t into a popular movement . TheCongress had resolved on the boycot t at i t s annual session in December 1927 at Madras, and in theprevai l ing exci table atmosphere, Jawaharlal Nehru had even succeeded in get t ing passed a snapresolut ion declaring complete independence as the goal of the Congress. But protest could not beconfined to the passing of resolut ions, as Gandhi j i made clear in the i ssue of Young India of 12January 1928: ‘It i s said that the Independence Resolut ion i s a fi t t ing answer . . . The act ofappointment (of the Simon Commi ssion) needs for an answer, not speeches, however heroic they maybe, not declarat ions, however brave they may be, but corresponding act ion . . .’Jawaharlal Nehru had returnedfrom Europe in 1927 after represent ing the Indian Nat ional Congress at the Brussel s Congress of theLeague Against Imperial i sm. He al so vi si ted the Soviet Union and was deeply impressed by social i stideas. It was wi th the youth that he fi rst shared hi s evolving perspect ive. Al though Jawaharlal Nehru’swas undoubtedly the most important role, other groups and individual s too played a crucial part in thepopularizat ion of the social i st vi sion. Subhas Bose was one such individual , though hi s not ion ofsocial i sm was nowhere as scient i fic and clear as Jawaharlal ’s. Among groups, the more importantones were the Naujawan Bharat Sabha in Lahore, and the smal l group of Communi st s who had formedthe Workers’ and Peasant s’ Part ies wi th the speci fic aim of organizing workers and peasant s andradical izing the Congress from wi thin.Lord Bi rkenhead, the Conservat ive Secretary of State responsible for the appointment of the SimonCommi ssion, had constant ly harped on the inabi l i ty of Indians to formulate a concrete scheme ofconst i tut ional reforms which had the support of wide sect ions of Indian pol i t ical opinion. Thi schal lenge, too, was taken up and meet ings of the Al l -Part ies Conference were held in February, Mayand August 1928 to final ize a scheme which popularly came to be known as the Nehru Report afterMot i lal Nehru, i t s principal author. Thi s report defined Dominion Status as the form of governmentdesi red by India. It al so rejected the principle of separate communal electorates on which previousconst i tut ional reforms had been based. Seat s would be reserved for Musl ims at the Cent re and inprovinces in which they were in a minori ty, but not in those where they had a numerical majori ty. TheReport al so recommended universal adul t suffrage, equal right s for women, freedom to form unions,and di ssociat ion of the state from rel igion in any form. A sect ion of the Musl im League had in anycase di ssociated i t sel f from these del iberat ions, but by the end of the year i t became clear that even thesect ion led by Jinnah would not give up the demand for reservat ion of seat s for Musl ims especial ly inMusl im majori ty provinces. The di lemma in which Mot i lal Nehru and other secular leaders foundthemselves was not one that was easy to resolve: i f they conceded more to Musl im communal opinion,then Hindu communal i st s would wi thdraw support and i f they sat i sfied the lat ter, then Musl im leaders

would be est ranged. In the event , no further concessions were forthcoming and Jinnah wi thdrew hi ssupport to the report and went ahead to propose hi s famous ‘Fourteen Point s’ which were basical ly arei terat ion of hi s object ions to the Nehru Report .Young and radical nat ional i st s led by Jawaharlal Nehru had thei r own, very di fferent , object ions to theNehru Report . They were di ssat i sfied wi th i t s declarat ion of Dominion Status on the l ines of the sel fgoverning dominions as the basi s of the future const i tut ion of India. Thei r slogan was ‘CompleteIndependence.’ And i t was in December 1928, at the annual session of the Congress at Calcut ta, thatthe bat t le was joined. Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose and Satyamurthi , backed by a large number ofdelegates, pressed for the acceptance of ‘Purna Swaraj ’ or complete independence as the goal of theCongress. Gandhi j i , Mot i lal Nehru and many other older leaders fel t that the nat ional consensusachieved wi th such great di fficul ty on Dominion Status should not be abandoned in such haste and aperiod of two years be given to the Government for accept ing thi s. Under pressure, the grace of periodfor the Government was reduced to a year and, more important , the Congress decided that i f theGovernment did not accept a const i tut ion based on Dominion Status by the end of the year, theCongress would not only adopt complete independence as i t s goal , but i t would al so launch a civi ldi sobedience movement to at tain that goal . A resolut ion embodying thi s proposal won over themajori ty of the delegates, and further amendment s seeking immediate adopt ion of completeindependence were defeated.On 8 Apri l , 1929, Bhagat Singh and Batukeswar Dut t of the Hindustan Social i stRepubl ican Army (HSRA) threw harmless bombs in the Cent ral Legi slat ive Assembly and werearrested. In jai l , the members of the HSRA went on a prolonged hunger st rike demanding bet tert reatment for pol i t ical pri soners, and in September the death of one of them, Jat in Das, on the 64th dayof the hunger st rike led to some of the biggest demonst rat ions the count ry had ever wi tnessed.Meanwhi le, in May 1929, a Labour Government headed by Ramsay MacDonald took power inBri tain and Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, was cal led to London for consul tat ions. The sequel was anannouncement on 31 October: ‘I am authorized on behal f of Hi s Majesty’s Government to stateclearly that in thei r judgement i t i s impl ici t in the Declarat ion of 1917 that the natural i ssue of India’s progress as there contemplated, i s the at tainment of dominion status.He al so promi sed a Round Table Conference as soon as the Simon Commi ssion submi t ted i t s report . Two days later, a conference of major nat ional leaders met and i ssued what came to be known as the Delhi mani festo, in which they demanded that i t should be made clear that the purpose of the Round Table Conference was not to di scuss when Dominion Status should be granted, but to formulate a scheme for i t s implementat ion. A debate in the House of Lords on 5 November, 1929 on thi s quest ion had al ready rai sed serious doubt s about Bri t i sh intent ions; and, final ly, on 23 December Irwin himsel f told Gandhi j i and the others thathe was in no posi t ion to give the assurance they demanded. The stage of negot iat ions was over and the stage of confrontat ion was about to begin.The honour of host ing what was, perhaps, the most memorable of the Congress annual sessions wentto Lahore, the capi tal ci ty of Punjab, and the honour of declaring ‘Purna Swaraj ’ as the onlyhonourable goal Indians could st rive for went to the man who had done more than any other topopularize the idea — Jawaharlal Nehru. It was Gandhi j i again who was the deci sive voice ininvest ing Jawaharlal Nehru wi th the office of President in what was to be a cri t ical year of massst ruggle. On the banks of the river Ravi , at midnight on 31 December 1929, the t ricolour flag of Indian independence was unfurled amidst cheers and jubi l iat ion. Amidst the exci tement , there was al so a grim resolve, for the year to fol low was to be one of hard st ruggle.

The fi rst task that the Congress set i t sel f and the Indian people in the new year was that of organizing al l over the count ry, on 26 January, publ ic meet ings at which the Independence Pledge would be read out and col lect ively affi rmed. Thi s programme was a huge success, and in vi l lages and towns, at smal l meet ings and large ones, the pledge was read out in the local language and the nat ional flag was hoi sted.

2 2Civil Disobedience 1930-1931

The Lahore Congress of 1929 had authorized the Working Commi t tee to launch a programme of civi ldi sobedience including non-payment of taxes. It had al so cal led upon al l members of legi slatures toresign thei r seat s. In mid-February, 1930, the Working Commi t tee, meet ing at Sabarmat i Ashram,invested Gandhi j i wi th ful l powers to launch the Civi l Di sobedience Movement at a t ime and place of hi s choice. The acknowledged expert on mass st ruggle was al ready ‘desperately in search of aneffect ive formula.’Hi s ul t imatum of 31 January to Lord Irwin, stat ing the minimum demands in the form of 11 point s, had been ignored, and there was now only one way out : civi l di sobedience.The plan was bri l l iant ly conceived though few real ized i t s signi ficance when i t was fi rst announced.Gandhi j i , along wi th a band of seventy-eight members of the Sabarmat i Ashram, among whom weremen belonging to almost every region and rel igion of India, was to march from hi s headquarters inAhmedabad through the vi l lages of Gujarat for 240 mi les.On 6 Apri l 1930, by picking up a handful of sal t , Gandhi j i inaugurated the Civi l Di sobedienceMovement , a movement that was to remain unsurpassed in the hi story of the Indian nat ionalmovement for the count ry-wide mass part icipat ion i t unleashed.In Tami l Nadu, C. Rajagopalachari , led a sal t march from Trichinopoly toVedaranniyam on the Tanjore coast . By the t ime he was arrested on 30 Apri l he had col lected enoughvolunteers to keep the campaign going for qui te some t ime. In Malabar, K. Kelappan, the hero of theVaikom Satyagraha, walked from Cal icut to Payannur to break the sal t law. A band of Satyagrahi swalked al l the way from Sylhet in Assam to Noakhal i on the Bengal Coast to make sal t . In Andhra, anumber of sibi rams (mi l i tary-style camps) were set up in di fferent di st rict s to serve as theheadquarters of the sal t Satyagraha, and bands of Satyagrahi s marched through vi l lages on thei r wayto the coastal cent res to defy the law.On 23 Apri l , the arrest of Congress leaders in the North West Front ier Province led to a massdemonst rat ion of unprecedented magni tude in Peshawar. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan had been act ive for several years in the area, and i t was hi s mass work which lay behind the format ion of the band of nonviolent revolut ionaries, the Khudai Khidmatgars, popularly known as the Red Shi rt s — who were to play an ext remely act ive role in the Civi l Di sobedience Movement . The atmosphere created by thei r pol i t ical work cont ributed to the mass upsurge in Peshawar during which the ci ty was vi rtual ly in the hands of the crowd for more than a week. The Peshawar demonst rat ions are signi ficant because i t was here that the soldiers of the Garhwal i regiment s refused to fi re on the unarmed crowd.But i t was non-violent heroi sm that stole the show as the sal t Satyagraha assumed yet another, evenmore potent form. On May 21, wi th Saroj ini Naidu, the fi rst Indian woman to become President of theCongress, and Imam Saheb, Gandhi j i ’s comrade of the South African st ruggle, at the helm, andGandhi j i ’s son, Mani lal , in front ranks, a band of 2000 marched towards the pol ice cordon that hadsealed off the Dharasana sal t works.Eastern India became the scene of a new kind of no-tax campaign — refusal to pay the chowkidara

tax.In Assam, a powerful agi tat ion led by student s was launched against the infamous ‘Cunninghamci rcular’ which forced student s and thei r guardians to furni sh assurances of good behaviour.U.P. was the set t ing of another kind of movement — a no-revenue, no-rent campaign. The norevenue part was a cal l to the zamindars to refuse to pay revenue to the Government , the no-rent a cal lto the tenant s not to pay rent to the zamindars. In effect , since the zamindars were largely loyal to the Government , thi s became a no-rent st ruggle.Meanwhi le, the publ icat ion of the report of theSimon Commi ssion, which contained no ment ion of Dominion Status and was in other ways al so aregressive document , combined wi th the repressive pol icy, further upset even moderate pol i t icalopinion. Madan Mohan Malaviya and M.S. Aney courted arrest . In a conci l iatory gesture, the Viceroyon 9 July suggested a Round Table Conference and rei terated the goal of Dominion Status. He al soaccepted the suggest ion, made by forty members of the Cent ral Legi slature, that Tej Bahadur Sapruand M.R. Jayakar be al lowed to explore the possibi l i t ies of peace between the Congress and theGovernment . In pursuance of thi s, the Nehrus, father and son, were taken in August to Yeravada jai l tomeet Gandhi j i and di scuss the possibi l i t ies of a set t lement . Nothing came of the talks, but the gesture did ensure that some sect ions of pol i t ical opinion would at tend the Round Table Conference in London in November. The proceedings in London, the fi rst ever conducted between the Bri t i sh and Indians as equal s, at which vi rtual ly every delegate rei terated that a const i tut ional di scussion to which the Congress was not a party was a meaningless exerci se, made i t clear that i f the Government ’s st rategy of survival was to be based on const i tut ional advance, then an ol ive branch to the Congress was imperat ive. The Bri t i sh Prime Mini ster hinted thi s possibi l i ty in hi s statement at the conclusion of the Round Table Conference. He al so expressed the hope that the Congress would part icipate in the next round of del iberat ions to be held later in the year. On 25 January, the Viceroy announced the uncondi t ional release of Gandhi j i and al l the other members of the Congress Working Commi t tee, so that might be to respond to the Prime Mini ster’s statement ‘freely and fearlessly.’the Congress Working Commi t tee authorized Gandhi j i to ini t iate di scussions wi th theViceroy. The fortnight -long di scussions culminated on 5 March 1931 in the Gandhi -Irwin Pact , whichwas variously described as a ‘t ruce’ and a ‘provi sional set t lement .’he terms of the agreement included the immediate release of al lpol i t ical pri soners not convicted for violence, the remi ssion of al l fines not yet col lected, the return of confi scated lands not yet sold to thi rd part ies, and lenient t reatment for those government employees who had resigned. The Government al so conceded the right to make sal t for consumpt ion to vi l lages along the coast , as al so the right to peaceful and non-aggressive picket ing. The Congress demand for a publ ic inqui ry into pol ice excesses was not accepted, but Gandhi j i ’s insi stent request for an inqui ry was recorded in the agreement . The Congress, on i t s part , agreed to di scont inue the Civi l Di sobedience Movement . It was al so understood that the Congress would part icipate in the next Round Table Conference.Import s of cloth from Bri tain had fal len by hal f; other import s l ike cigaret tes had suffered a simi lar fate. Government income from l iquor exci se and land revenue had been affected. Elect ions to theLegi slat ive Assembly had been effect ively boycot ted.The part icipat ion of Musl ims in the Civi l Di sobedience Movement was certainly nowhere near thatin 1920-22. The appeal s of communal leaders to stay away, combined wi th act ive Governmentencouragement of communal di ssension to counter the forces of nat ional i sm, had thei r effect .For Indian women, the movement was the most l iberat ing experience to date and can t ruly be saidto have marked thei r ent ry into the publ ic space.

2 3From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932-1934

The Congress met at Karachi on 29 March 1931 to endorse the Gandhi -Irwin or Delhi Pact . BhagatSingh, Sukhdev and Rajguru had been executed six days earl ier. The Congress endorsed the Delhi Pact and rei terated the goal of Purna Swaraj .The Karachi session became memorable for i t s resolut ion on Fundamental Right s and the Nat ionalEconomic Programme.The resolut ion guaranteed the basic civi l right s of free speech, free press, free assembly, and freedom ofassociat ion; equal i ty before the law i rrespect ive of caste, creed or sex; neut ral i ty of the state in regardto al l rel igions; elect ions on the basi s of universal adul t franchi se; and free and compul sory primary educat ion. It promi sed substant ial reduct ion in rent and revenue, exempt ion from rent in case of uneconomic holdings, and rel ief of agricul tural -indebtedness and cont rol of usury; bet ter condi t ions for workers including a l iving wage, l imi ted hours of work and protect ion of women workers; the right to organize and form unions to workers and peasant s; and state ownership or cont rol of key indust ries, mines and means of t ransport . It al so maintained that ‘the cul ture, language and script of the minori t ies and of the di fferent l ingui st ic areas shal l be protected.’Gandhi j i sai led for London on 29 August 1931 to at tend the Second Round Table Conference. In India, Irwin was replaced by Wi l l ingdon as the Viceroy. In Bri tain, after December 1931, the Labori te Ramsay MacDonald headed a Conservat ive-dominated Cabinet wi th the weak and react ionary Samuel Hoare as the Secretary of State for India. Apart from a few able individual s, the overwhelming majori ty of Indian delegates to the Round Table Conference (RTC), hand-picked by the Government , wereloyal i st s, communal i st s, careeri st s, and place-hunters, big landlords and representat ives of the princes.They were used by the Government to claim that the Congress did not represent the interest s of al lIndians vi s-a-vi s imperial i sm, and to neut ral ize Gandhi j i and al l hi s effort s to confront the imperial i st rulers wi th the basic quest ion of freedom. The Bri t i sh Government refusedto concede the basic Indian demand for freedom. Gandhi j i came back at the end of December 1931 toa changed pol i t ical si tuat ion.The Bri t i sh pol icy was now dominated by three major considerat ions: (a) Gandhi j i must not bepermi t ted to bui ld up the tempo for a massive and prot racted mass movement , as he had done in 1919, 1920-1 and 1930. (b) The Government funct ionaries — vi l lage official s, pol ice and higher bureaucrat s — and the loyal i st s — ‘our friends’ — must not feel di sheartened that Gandhi j i was being ‘resurrected as a rival authori ty to the Government of India,’ and that the Government was losing the wi l l to rule. As the Home Member, H.G. Haig, put i t : ‘We can, in my view, do wi thout the goodwi l l of the Congress, and in fact I do not bel ieve for a moment that we shal l ever have i t , but we cannot afford to do wi thout the confidence of those who have supported us in the long st ruggle against the Congress.’(c) In part icular, the nat ional i st movement must not be permi t ted to gather force andconsol idate i t sel f in rural areas, as i t was doing al l over India, especial ly in U.P., Gujarat , Andhra,Bihar, Bengal and NWFP.The people fought back. But Gandhi j i and other leaders had no t ime to bui ld up the tempo of themovement and i t could not be sustained for long. The movement was effect ively crushed wi thin a few months. In August 1932, the number of those convicted came down to 3,047 and by August 1933 only 4,500 Satyagrahi s were in jai l . However, the movement cont inued to l inger t i l l early Apri l 1934 when the inevi table deci sion to wi thdraw i t was taken by Gandhi j i .The Bri t i sh pol icy of ‘Divide and Rule’ found another expression in the announcement of the

Communal Award in August 1932. The Award al lot ted to each minori ty a number of seat s in thelegi slatures to be elected on the basi s of a separate electorate, that i s Musl ims would be elected onlyby Musl ims and Sikhs only by Sikhs, and so on. Musl ims, Sikhs and Chri st ians had al ready beent reated as minori t ies. The Award declared the Depressed Classes (Scheduled Castes of today) al so tobe a minori ty communi ty ent i t led to separate electorate and thus separated them from the rest of the Hindus.But the idea of a separate electorate for Musl ims had been accepted by the Congress as far back as 1916 as a part of the compromi se wi th the Musl im League. Hence, the Congress took the posi t ion that though i t was opposed to separate electorates, i t was not in favour of changing the Award wi thout the consent of the minori t ies.Consequent ly, though st rongly di sagreeing wi th the Communal Award, i t decided nei ther to accept i t nor to reject i t .Gandhi j i , in Yeravada jai l at the t ime, in part icular, reacted very st rongly.He saw the Award as an at tack on Indian uni ty and nat ional i sm, harmful to both Hindui sm and the Depressed Classes, for i t provided no answers to the social ly degraded posi t ion of the lat ter. Once the Depressed Classes were t reated as a separate communi ty, the quest ion of abol i shing untouchabi l i ty would not ari se, and the work of Hindu social reform in thi s respect would come to a hal t .He went on afast unto death on 20 September 1932 to enforce hi s demand. In a statement to the Press, he said: ‘Myl i fe, I count of no consequence. One hundred l ives given for thi s noble cause would, in my opinion, bepoor penance done by Hindus for the at rocious wrongs they have heaped upon helpless men andwomen of thei r own fai th.’Whi le many pol i t ical Indians saw the fast as a diversion from the ongoing pol i t ical movement , al lwere deeply concerned and emot ional ly shaken. Mass meet ings took place almost everywhere. The20th of September was observed as a day of fast ing and prayer. Temples, wel l s, etc., were thrown opento the Depressed Classes al l over the count ry. Rabindranath Tagore sent a telegraphic message toGandhi j i : ‘It i s worth sacri ficing precious l i fe for the sake of India’s uni ty and her social integri ty . . .Our sorrowing heart s wi l l fol low your subl ime penance wi th reverence and love.’ Pol i t ical leaders ofdi fferent pol i t ical persuasions, including Madan Mohan Malaviya, M.C. Rajah and B.R. Ambedkar,now became act ive. In the end they succeeded in hammering out an agreement , known as the PoonaPact , according to which the idea of separate electorates for the Depressed Classes was abandoned butthe seat s reserved for them in the provincial legi slatures were increased from seventy-one in theAward to 147 and in the Cent ral Legi slature to eighteen per cent of the total .After hi s release frompri son, he had shi fted to Satyagraha Ashram at Wardha after abandoning Sabarmat i Ashram atAhmedabad for he had vowed in 1930 not to return to Sabarmat i t i l l Swaraj was won.The protesters offered theGovernment ful l support against the Congress and the Civi l Di sobedience Movement i f i t would not support the ant i -untouchabi l i ty campaign. The Government obl iged by defeat ing the Temple Ent ry Bi l l in the Legi slat ive Assembly in August 1934.Gandhi j i ’s ent i re campaign was based on the grounds of humani sm and reason. But he al so arguedthat untouchabi l i ty, as pract i sed at present , had no sanct ion in the Hindu Shast ras. But even i f thi s was

not so, the Hari jan worker should not feel daunted. Truth could not be confined wi thin the covers of abook. The Shast ras should be ignored i f they went against human digni ty.Gandhi j i was not in favour of mixing up the i ssue of the removal of untouchabi l i ty wi th the i ssuesof inter-dining and inter-marriage. Rest rict ion on the lat ter should certainly go, for ‘dining andmarriage rest rict ions stunt Hindu society.’ But they were al so pract i sed by caste Hindus amongthemselves as al so the Hari jans among themselves. The present al l -India campaign, he said, had to bedi rected against the di sabi l i t ies which were speci fic to the Hari jans. Simi larly, he di st ingui shedbetween the abol i t ion of caste system and the abol i t ion of untouchabi l i ty. He di sagreed wi th Dr.Ambedkar when the lat ter asserted that ‘the outcaste i s a by-product of the caste system. There wi l l beoutcastes as long as there are castes. And nothing can emancipate the outcaste except the dest ruct ionof the caste system. On the cont rary, Gandhi j i said that whatever the ‘l imi tat ions and defect s’ of theVarnashram, ‘there i s nothing sinful about i t , as there i s about untouchabi l i ty.’ He bel ieved thatpurged of untouchabi l i ty, i t sel f a product of ‘the di st inct ion of high and low’ and not of the castesystem, thi s system could funct ion in a manner that would make each caste ‘complementary of theother and none inferior or superior to any other.’ In any case, he said, both the bel ievers and the cri t icsof the Varna system should join hands in fight ing untouchabi l i ty, for opposi t ion to the lat ter wascommon to both.Gandhi j i ’s Hari jan campaign included a programme of internal reform by Hari jans: promot ion ofeducat ion, cleanl iness and hygiene, giving up the eat ing of carrion and beef, giving up l iquor and theabol i t ion of untouchabi l i ty among themselves. But i t did not include a mi l i tant st ruggle by theHari jans themselves through Satyagraha, breaking of caste taboos, mass demonst rat ions, picket ing,and other forms of protest s. At the same t ime, he was aware that hi s Hari jan movement ‘must cause dai ly increasing awakening among the Hari jans’ and that in t ime ‘whether the savarna Hindus l ike i t or not , the Hari jans would make good thei r posi t ion.’Gandhi j i repeatedly st ressed that the Hari jan movement was not a pol i t ical movement but amovement to puri fy Hindui sm and Hindu society. But he was al so aware that the movement ‘wi l lproduce great pol i t ical consequences; ’ just as untouchabi l i ty poi soned ‘our ent i re social and pol i t ical fabric.’ In fact , not only did Hari jan work, along wi th other i tems of const ruct ive work, enable the Congress cadre to keep busy in i t s non-mass movement phases, i t al so gradual ly carried the message of nat ional i sm to the Hari jans, who al so happened to be agricul tural labourers in most part s of the count ry, leading to thei r increasing part icipat ion in the nat ional as wel l as peasant movement s.

2 4The Rise of the Left-Wing

A powerful left -wing group developed in India in the late 1920s and 1930s cont ribut ing to theradical izat ion of the nat ional movement . Social i st ideas acqui red root s in the Indian soi l ; and social i sm became the acceptedcreed of Indian youth whose urges came to be symbol ized by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas ChandraBose. Gradual ly there emerged two powerful part ies of the Left , the Communi st Party of India (CPI)and the Congress Social i st Party (CSP). Seminal in thi s respect was the impact of the Russian Revolut ion. On 7 November 1917, the Bol shevik(Communi st ) party, led by V.I. Lenin, overthrew the despot ic Czari st regime and declared theformat ion of the fi rst social i st state. The new Soviet regime elect ri fied the colonial world byuni lateral ly renouncing i t s imperial i st right s in China and other part s of Asia.In Bombay, S.A. Dange publ i shed a pamphlet Gandhi and Lenin and

started the fi rst social i st weekly, The Social i st ; in Bengal , Muzaffar Ahmed brought out Navayug and later founded the Langal in cooperat ion wi th the poet Nazrul Islam; in Punjab, Ghulam Hussain and others publ i shed Inqui lab; and in Madras, M. Singaravelu founded the Labour-Ki san Gazet te.Social i st ideas became even more popular during the1930s as the world was engul fed by the great economic depression. Unemployment soared al l over thecapi tal i st world. The world depression brought the capi tal i st system into di srepute and drew at tent iontowards Marxi sm and social i sm. Wi thin the Congress the left -wing tendency found reflect ion in theelect ion of Jawaharlal Nehru as president for 1936 and 1937 and of Subhas Bose for 1938 and 1939and in the format ion of the Congress Social i st Party.It was above al l Jawaharlal Nehru who imparted a social i st vi sion to the nat ional movement and whobecame the symbol of social i sm and social i st ideas in India after 1929. The not ion that freedom couldnot be defined only in pol i t ical terms but must have a socio-economic content began increasingly tobe associated wi th hi s name.In hi s books (Autobiography and Gl impses ofWorld Hi story), art icles and speeches, Nehru propagated the ideas of social i sm and declared thatpol i t ical freedom would become meaningful only i f i t led to the economic emancipat ion of themasses.In 1927, he at tended the Internat ional Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperial i sm, held at Brussel s, and came into contact wi th communi st s and ant i -colonial fighters from al l over the world.In 1928, Jawaharlal joined hands wi th Subhas to organize the Independence for India League tofight for complete independence and ‘a social i st revi sion of the economic st ructure of society.’ At the Lahore session of the Congress in 1929, Nehru proclaimed: ‘I am a social i st and a republ ican, and am no bel iever in kings and princes, or in the order which produces the modern kings of indust ry, whohave a greater power over the l ives and fortunes of men than even the kings of old, and whose methods are as predatory as those of the old feudal ari stocracy.’Nehru developed a complex relat ionship wi th Gandhi j i during thi s period. He cri t icized Gandhi j i forrefusing to recognize the confl ict of classes, for preaching harmony among the exploi ters and theexploi ted, and for put t ing forward the theories of t rusteeship by, and conversion of, the capi tal i st s and landlords.At t racted by the Soviet Union and i t s revolut ionary commi tment , a large number of Indianrevolut ionaries and exi les abroad made thei r way there. The most wel l -known and the tal lest of them was M.N. Roy, who along wi th Lenin, helped evolve the Communi st Internat ional ’s pol icy towards the colonies. Seven such Indians, headed by Roy, met at Tashkent in October 1920 and set up a Communi st Party of India. Independent ly of thi s effort , as we have seen, a number of left -wing and communi st groups and organizat ions had begun to come into exi stence in India after 1920. Most of these groups came together at Kanpur in December 1925 and founded an al l -India organizat ion under the name the Communi st Party of India (CPI).The main form of pol i t ical work by the early Communi st s was to organize peasant s’ and workers’part ies and work through them. The fi rst such organizat ion was the Labour-Swaraj Party of the IndianNat ional Congress organized by Muzaffar Ahmed, Qazi Nazrul Islam, Hemanta Kumar Sarkar, andothers in Bengal in November 1925. In late 1926, a Congress Labour Party was formed in Bombay anda Ki rt i -Ki san Party in Punjab. A Labour Ki san Party of Hindustan had been funct ioning in Madrassince 1923. By 1928 al l of these provincial organizat ions had been renamed the Workers’ andPeasant s’ Party (WPP) and kni t into an al l -India party, whose uni t s were al so set up in Rajasthan, UP

and Delhi . Al l Communi st s were members of thi s party. The basic object ive of the WPPs was to workwi thin the Congress to give i t a more radical orientat ion and make i t ‘the party of the people’ andindependent ly organize workers and peasant s in class organizat ions, to enable fi rst the achievement ofcomplete independence and ul t imately of social i sm. The WPPs grew rapidly and wi thin a short periodthe communi st influence in the Congress began to grow rapidly, especial ly in Bombay. Moreover,Jawaharlal Nehru and other radical Congressmen welcomed the WPPs’ effort s to radical ize theCongress. Along wi th Jawaharlal and Subhas Bose, the youth leagues and other Left forces, the WPPsplayed an important role in creat ing a st rong left -wing wi thin the Congress and in giving the Indiannat ional movement a leftward di rect ion. The WPPs al so made rapid progress on the t rade union frontand played a deci sive role in the resurgence of working class st ruggles during 1927-29 as al so inenabl ing in Communi st s to gain a st rong posi t ion in the working class.The rapid growth of communi st and WPP influence over the nat ional movement was, however,checked and vi rtual ly wiped out during 1929 and after by two development s. One was the severerepression to which Communi st s were subjected by the Government . Al ready in 1922-24, Communi st st rying to enter India from the Soviet Union had been t ried in a series of conspi racy cases at Peshawarand sentenced to long periods of impri sonment .In 1924, the Government had t ried to cripple thenascent communi st movement by t rying S.A. Dange, Muzaffar Ahmed, Nal ini Gupta and ShaukatUsmani in the Kanpur Bol shevik Conspi racy Case. Al l four were sentenced to four years ofimpri sonment. In a sudden swoop, in March 1929, i tarrested thi rty-two radical pol i t ical and t rade union act ivi st s, including three Bri t i sh Communi st s —Phi l ip Sprat t , Ben Bradley and Lester Hutchinson — who had come to India to help organize the t radeunion movement . The basic aim of the Government was to behead the t rade union movement and toi solate the Communi st s from the nat ional movement . The thi rty-two accused were put up for t rial atMeerut . The Meerut Conspi racy Case was soon to become a cause celebre. The defence of thepri soners was to be taken up by many nat ional i st s including Jawaharlal Nehru, M.A. Ansari and M.C.Chagla.As i f the Government blow was not enough, the Communi st s infl icted a more deadly blow onthemselves by taking a sudden lurch towards what i s described in left i st terminology as sectarianpol i t ics or ‘left i st deviat ion’.Guided by the resolut ions of the Sixth Congress of the Communi st Internat ional , the Communi st sbroke thei r connect ion wi th the Nat ional Congress and declared i t to be a class party of thebourgeoi sie. Moreover, the Congress and the bourgeoi sie i t supposedly represented were declared tohave become supporters of imperial i sm. Congress plans to organize a mass movement around theslogan of Purna Swaraj were seen as sham effort s to gain influence over the masses by bourgeoi sleaders who were working for a compromi se wi th Bri t i sh imperial i sm. In 1931, the Gandhi -Irwin Pact was described as a proof of the Congress bet rayal of nat ional i sm.The Government took furtheradvantage of thi s si tuat ion and, in 1934, declared the CPI i l legal .The Communi st movement was, however, saved from di saster because, on the one hand, many ofthe Communi st s refused to stand apart from the Civi l Di sobedience Movement (CDM) and

part icipated act ively in i t , and, on the other hand, social i st and communi st ideas cont inued to spread in the count ry. Consequent ly, many young persons who part icipated in the CDM or in Revolut ionary Terrori st organizat ions were at t racted by social i sm, Marxi sm and the Soviet Union, and joined the CPI after 1934.The si tuat ion underwent a radical change in 1935 when the Communi st Party was reorganized underthe leadership of P.C. Joshi . Faced wi th the threat of fasci sm the Seventh Congress of the Communi stInternat ional , meet ing at Moscow in August 1935, radical ly changed i t s earl ier posi t ion and advocatedthe format ion of a uni ted front wi th social i st s and other ant i -fasci st s in the capi tal i st count ries andwi th bourgeoi s-led nat ional i st movement s in colonial count ries. The Indian Communi st s were to onceagain part icipate in the act ivi t ies of the mainst ream of the nat ional movement led by the Nat ionalCongress. The theoret ical and pol i t ical basi s for the change in communi st pol i t ics in India was laid inearly 1936 by a document popularly known as the Dut t -Bradley Thesi s. According to thi s thesi s, theNat ional Congress could play ‘a great part and a foremost part in the work of real izing the ant i imperial i st people’s front .The Communi st Party now began to cal l upon i t s members to join the Congress and enrol l themasses under thei r influence to the Congress. In 1938, i t went further and accepted that the Congresswas ‘the cent ral mass pol i t ical organizat ion of the Indian people ranged against imperial i sm.’And,in 1939, P.C. Joshi wrote in the party weekly, Nat ional Front , that ‘the greatest class st ruggle today i sour nat ional st ruggle’ of which Congress was the ‘main organ.The move towards the format ion of a social i st party was made in the jai l s during 1930-31 and 1932-34by a group of young Congressmen who were di senchanted wi th Gandhian st rategy and leadership andat t racted by social i st ideology.At t racted by Marxi sm,communi sm and Soviet Union, they did not find themselves in agreement wi th the prevalent pol i t icall ine of the CPI. Many of them were groping towards an al ternat ive. Ul t imately they came together andformed the Congress Social i st Party (CSP) at Bombay in October 1934 under the leadership ofJayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Dev and Minoo Masani . From the beginning, al l theCongress social i st s were agreed upon four basic proposi t ions: that the primary st ruggle in India wasthe nat ional st ruggle for freedom and that nat ional i sm was a necessary stage on the way to social i sm;that social i st s must work inside the Nat ional Congress because i t was the primary body leading thenat ional st ruggle and, as Acharya Narendra Dev put i t in 1934, ‘i t would be a suicidal pol icy for us tocut ourselves off from the nat ional movement that the Congress undoubtedly represent s; that theymust give the Congress and the nat ional movement a social i st di rect ion; and that to achieve thi sobject ive they must organize the workers and peasant s in thei r class organizat ions, wage st ruggles forthei r economic demands and make them the social base of the nat ional st ruggle.’As the Meerut Thesi s of the CSP put i t in 1935, the task was to ‘wean the ant i -imperial i stelement s in the Congress away from i t s present bourgeoi s leadership and to bring them under theleadership of revolut ionary social i sm.’

From the beginning the CSP leaders were divided into three broad ideological current s: theMarxian, the Fabian and the current influenced by Gandhi j i . Despi te the ideological diversi ty among the leaders, the CSP as a whole accepted a basic ident i ficat ionof social i sm wi th Marxi sm.Subhas Bose and hi s left -wing fol lowers founded the Forward Bloc in 1939 after Bose was compel led to resign from the President ship of the Congress. The Hindustan Social i st Republ ican Associat ion, the Revolut ionary Social i st Party, and various Trot skyi st groups al so funct ioned during the 1930s. There were al so certain prest igious left -wing individual s, such as Swami Sahajanand Saraswat i , Professor N.G. Ranga, and Indulal Yagnik, who worked out side the framework of any organized left -wing party.Despi te the fact that the Left cadres were among the most courageous, mi l i tant and sacri ficing offreedom fighters, the Left fai led in the basic task i t had taken upon i t sel f — to establ i sh the hegemony of social i st ideas and part ies over the nat ional movement . It al so fai led to make good the promi se i t held out in the 1930s. Thi s i s, in fact , a major enigma for the hi storian.Unl ike the Congress right wing, the Left fai led to show ideological and tact ical flexibi l i tyIt chose to fight not on quest ions of ideology but on methods of st ruggle and on tact ics.Organizat ional ly, the Left was able to command influence over nearlyone-thi rd of the votes in the Al l -India Congress Commi t tee on important i ssues. Nehru and Bose were elected Congress president s from 1936 to 1939. Nehru was able to nominate three prominentSocial i st s, Acharya Narendra Dev, Jayaprakash Narayan and Achyut Patwardhan, to hi s WorkingCommi t tee. In 1939, Subhas Bose, as a candidate of the Left , was able to defeat Pat tabhi Si taramayya in the president ial elect ion by a majori ty of 1580 to 1377.The impact of the Left on the nat ional movement wasreflected in the resolut ion on Fundamental Right s and Economic Pol icy passed by the Karachi sessionof the Congress in 1931, the resolut ions on economic pol icy passed at the Faizpur session in 1936, theElect ion Mani festo of the Congress in 1936, the set t ing up of a Nat ional Planning Commi t tee in 1938,and the increasing shi ft of Gandhi j i towards radical posi t ions on economic and class i ssues.The foundat ion of the Al l -India Student s’ Federat ion and the Progressive Wri ters’ Associat ion and the convening of the fi rst Al l -India States’ People’s Conference in 1936 were some of the other majorachievement s of the Left . The Left was al so very act ive in the Al l -India Women’s Conference. Aboveal l , two major part ies of the Left , the Communi st Party and the Congress Social i st Party, had beenformed, and were being bui l t up.

2 5The Strategic Debate 1934-1937

Gandhi Hence, in October 1934, he announced hi s resignat ion from the Congress ‘only toserve i t bet ter in thought , word and deed.In August 1935, the Bri t i sh Parl iament passed the Government of India Act of 1935. The Actprovided for the establ i shment of an Al l -India Federat ion to be based on the union of the Bri t i shIndian provinces and Princely States. The representat ives of the States to the federal legi slature wereto be appointed di rect ly by the Princes who were to be used to check and counter the nat ional i st s. Thefranchi se was l imi ted to about one-sixth of the adul t s. Defence and foreign affai rs would remainout side the cont rol of the federal legi slature, whi le the Viceroy would retain special cont rol over othersubject s.The provinces were to be governed under a new system based on provincial autonomy under whichelected mini sters cont rol led al l provincial department s. Once again, the Governors, appointed by the

Bri t i sh Government , retained special powers. They could veto legi slat ive and admini st rat ivemeasures, especial ly those concerning minori t ies, the right s of civi l servant s, law and order andBri t i sh business interest s. The Governor al so had the power to take over and indefini tely run theadmini st rat ion of a province. Thus both pol i t ical and economic power remained concent rated inBri t i sh hands; colonial i sm remained intact .Provincial autonomy, i t was further hoped, would create powerful provincial leaders in theCongress who would wield admini st rat ive power in thei r own right , gradual ly learn to safeguard thei r admini st rat ive prerogat ives, and would, therefore, gradual ly become autonomous cent res of pol i t ical power. The Congress would, thus, be provincial ized; the authori ty of the cent ral al l -India leadership would be weakened i f not dest royed. As Linl i thgow wrote in 1936, ‘our best hope of avoiding a di rect clash i s in the potency of Provincial Autonomy to dest roy the effect iveness of Congress as an Al l India inst rument of revolut ion.’

The Act of 1935 was condemned by nearly al l sect ions of Indian opinion and was unanimouslyrejected by the Congress. The Congress demanded instead, the convening of a Const i tuent Assemblyelected on the basi s of adul t franchi se to frame a const i tut ion for an independent India.The second stage of the debate over st rategy occurred among Congressmen over the quest ion of officeacceptance. The Bri t i sh, after imposing the Act of 1935, decided to immediately put into pract iceprovincial autonomy, and announced the holding of elect ions to provincial legi slatures in early 1937.Even i f the Congress rejected office, there were other groups and part ies whowould readi ly form mini st ries and use them to weaken nat ional i sm and encourage react ionary andcommunal pol icies and pol i t ics. Last ly, despi te thei r l imi ted powers, the provincial mini st ries couldbe used to promote const ruct ive work especial ly in respect of vi l lage and Hari jan upl i ft , khadi ,prohibi t ion, educat ion and reduct ion of burden of debt , taxes and rent on the peasant s.The Congress decided at Lucknow in early 1936 and at Faizpur in late 1936 to fight the elect ions andpostpone the deci sion on office acceptance to the post -elect ion period.The Congress went al l out to win the elect ions to the provincial assembl ies held in February 1937.It s elect ion mani festo reaffi rmed i t s total reject ion of the 1935 Act . It promi sed the restorat ion of civi l l ibert ies, the release of pol i t ical pri soners, the removal of di sabi l i t ies on grounds of sex anduntouchabi l i ty, the radical t ransformat ion of the agrarian system, substant ial reduct ion in rent andrevenue, scal ing down of the rural debt s, provi sion of cheap credi t , the right to form t rade unions and the right to st rike.

2 6Twenty-eight Months of Congress Rule

After a few months’ tussle wi th the Government , the Congress Working Commi t tee decided to acceptoffice under the Act of 1935. During July, i t formed Mini st ries in six provinces: Madras, Bombay,Cent ral Provinces, Ori ssa, Bihar and U.P.. Later, Congress Mini st ries were al so formed in the NorthWest Front ier Province and Assam.To guide and coordinate thei r act ivi t ies and to ensure that theBri t i sh hopes of the provincial izat ion of the Congress did not material ize, a cent ral cont rol boardknown as the Parl iamentary Sub-Commi t tee was formed, wi th Sardar Patel , Maulana Abul KalamAzad and Rajendra Prasad as members. Thus began a novel experiment — a party which wascommi t ted to l iquidate Bri t i sh rule took charge of admini st rat ion under a const i tut ion which wasframed by the Bri t i sh and which yielded only part ial state power to the Indians; thi s power couldmoreover be taken away from the Indians whenever the imperial power so desi red. As Gandhi j i wrote on the meaning of office acceptance in Hari jan on 7 August 1937: ‘These offices

have to be held l ight ly, not t ight ly. The Congress Mini sters set an example in plain l iving. They reduced thei r own salaries drast ical lyfrom Rs. 2000 to Rs. 500 per month. They were easi ly accessible to the common people. And in a veryshort t ime, they did pass a very large amount of amel iorat ive legi slat ion, t rying to ful fi l many of the promi ses made in the Congress elect ion mani festo.Al l emergency powers acqui red by the provincial government s during1932, through Publ ic Safety Act s and the l ike, were repealed; bans on i l legal pol i t ical organizat ionssuch as the Hindustan Seva Dal and Youth Leagues and on pol i t ical books and journal s were l i fted.Though the ban on the Communi st Party remained, since i t was imposed by the Cent ral Governmentand could only be l i fted on i t s orders, the Communi st s could in effect now funct ion freely and openlyin the Congress provinces. Al l rest rict ions on the press were removed. Securi t ies taken fromnewspapers and presses were refunded and pending prosecut ions were wi thdrawn. The blackl i st ing ofnewspapers for purposes of government advert i sing was given up. Confi scated arms were returned andforfei ted arms l icenses were restored.One of the fi rst act s of the Congress Government was to release thousands of pol i t ical pri soners anddetenus and to cancel internment and deportat ion orders on pol i t ical workers. Many of therevolut ionaries involved in the Kakori and other conspi racy cases were released. But problemsremained in U.P. and Bihar where several revolut ionaries convicted of crimes involving violenceremained in jai l s. Most of these pri soners had earl ier been sent to kala pani (Cel lular Jai l inAndamans) from where they had been t ransferred to thei r respect ive provinces after they had gone ona prolonged hunger st rike during July 1937. In February 1938, there were fi fteen such pri soners inU.P. and twenty-three in Bihar. Thei r release requi red consent by the Governors which was refused.But the Congress Mini st ries were determined to release them. The Mini st ries of U.P. and Biharresigned on thi s i ssue on 15 February. The problem was final ly resolved through negot iat ions. Al l thepri soners in both provinces were released by the end of March.The di fference between the Congress provinces and the non-Congress provinces of Bengal andPunjab was most apparent in thi s realm. In the lat ter, especial ly in Bengal , civi l l ibert ies cont inued tobe curbed and revolut ionary pri soners and detenus, kept for years in pri son wi thout t rial , were notreleased despi te repeated hunger st rikes by the pri soners and popular movement s demanding thei rrelease.In Bombay, the Government al so took steps to restore to the original owners lands which had beenconfi scated by the Government as a resul t of the no-tax campaign during the Civi l Di sobedienceMovement in 1930.The Congress could not at tempt a complete overhaul of the agrarian st ructure by completelyel iminat ing the zamindari system. Thi s, for two reasons. According to the const i tut ional st ructure ofthe 1935 Act , the provincial Mini st ries did not have enough powers to do so. They al so suffered froman ext reme lack of financial resources, for the l ion’s share of India’s revenues was appropriated by theGovernment of India. The Congress Mini st ries could al so not touch the exi st ing admini st rat ivest ructure, whose sanct i ty was guarded by the Viceroy’s and Governor’s powers. What i s moreimportant , the st rategy of class adjustment al so forebade i t . A mul t i -class movement could developonly by balancing or adjust ing various, mutual ly clashing class interest s. To uni te al l the Indian

people in thei r st ruggle against colonial i sm, the main enemy of the t ime, i t was necessary to makesuch an adjustment . The pol icy had to be that of winning over or at least neut ral izing as large a part ofthe landlord classes as possible so as to i solate the enemy and deprive him of al l social support wi thinIndia. Thi s was even more necessary because, in large part s of the count ry, the smal ler landlords wereact ive part icipant s in the nat ional movement .Further, nearly al l the Congress-run states (that i s, U.P., Bihar, Bombay, Madras and Assam) hadreact ionary second chambers in the form of legi slat ive counci l s, which were elected on a very narrowfranchi se — whi le the number of voters for the assembl ies in these states was over 17.5 mi l l ion, i t wasless than 70 thousand for the second chambers. These were, therefore, dominated by landlords,capi tal i st s and moneylenders, wi th the Congress forming a smal l minori ty. As a majori ty in the lowerhouse was not enough, in order to get any legi slat ion passed through the second chamber, the Congresshad to simul taneously pressuri se thei r upper class element s and conci l iate them.In U.P. a tenancy act waspassed in October 1939 which gave al l statutory tenant s both in Agra and Oudh ful l heredi tary right sin thei r holdings whi le taking away the landlord’s right to prevent the growth of occupancy.Al l i l legal exact ions such as nazrana (forced gi ft s) and begar(forced unpaid labour) were abol i shed. In Bihar, the new tenancy legi slat ion was passed mainly in1937 and 1938, that i s, more quickly than in U.P.. More radical than that of U.P. in most respect s, i t smain provi sions were: Al l increases in rent made since 1911 were abol i shed; thi s was est imated tomean a reduct ion of about twenty-five per cent in rent . The rent was al so reduced i f the prices hadfal len, during the currency of the exi st ing rent , the deteriorat ion of soi l and the neglect of i rrigat ion bythe landlord. Occupancy ryot s were given the absolute right to t ransfer thei r holding on the payment ofa nominal amount of two per cent of rent to the landlord. A point of radical departure was the grant tounder-ryot s of occupancy right s i f they had cul t ivated the land for twelve years. Exi st ing arrears ofrent were substant ial ly reduced and the rate of interest on arrears was reduced from 12.5 to 6.25 percent . The landlord’s share in case of share-cropping was not to exceed 9/20 of the produce. Landswhich had been sold in the execut ion of decrees for the payment of arrears between 1929 and 1937(bakasht land) were to be restored to previous tenant s on payment of hal f the amount of arrears. Thelandlord’s power to real ize rent was great ly reduced — the tenant could no longer be arrested orimpri soned on thi s account , nor could hi s immovable property be sold wi thout hi s consent . Landlordswere forbidden from charging i l legal dues; any violat ion would lead to six months’impri sonment .Occupancy tenant s could no longer be ejected from thei r holdings for non-payment of rent . In fact , theonly right that the landlord retained was the right to get hi s rent which was reduced signi ficant ly.The agrarian legi slat ion of the Congress Mini st ries thus improved and secured the status ofmi l l ions of tenant s in zamindari areas. The basic system of landlordi sm was, of course, not affected.Furthermore, i t was, in the main, statutory and occupancy tenant s who benefi ted. The interest s of the

sub-tenant s of the occupancy tenant s were overlooked. Agricul tural labourers were al so not affected.Thi s was part ial ly because these two sect ions had not yet been mobi l ized by the ki san sabhas, nor hadthey become voters because of the rest ricted franchi se under the Act of 1935. Consequent ly, theycould not exert pressure on the Mini st ries through ei ther elect ions or the peasant movement .Except for U.P. and Assam, the Congress Government passed a series of st ringent debtors’ rel iefact s which provided for the regulat ion of the moneylenders’ business — provi sions of the act sincluded measures such as the cancel lat ion or drast ic reduct ion of accumulated interest ranging from6.25 per cent in Madras to 9 per cent in Bombay and Bihar.The Congress Mini st ries adopted, in general , a pro-labour stance.Immediately after assuming office, the Bombay Mini st ry appointed a Text i le Enqui ry Commi t teewhich recommended, among other improvement s, the increase of wages amount ing to a crore ofrupees. Despi te mi l lowners protest ing against the recommendat ions, they were implemented. InNovember 1938, the Government s passed the Indust rial Di sputes Act which was based on thephi losophy of ‘class col laborat ion and not class confl ict ,’ as the Premier B.G. Kher put i t . Theemphasi s in the Act was on conci l iat ion, arbi t rat ion and negot iat ions in place of di rect act ion. The Actwas al so designed to prevent l ightning st rikes and lock-out s. The Act empowered the Government torefer an indust rial di spute to the Court of Indust rial Arbi t rat ion. No st rike or lock-out could occur foran interim period of four months during which the Court would give i t s award. The Act was st ronglyopposed by Left Congressmen, including Communi st s and Congress Social i st s, for rest rict ing thefreedom to st rike and for laying down a new compl icated procedure for regi st rat ion of t rade unions,which, they said, would encourage unions promoted by employers. In Madras, too, the Governmentpromoted the pol icy of ‘internal set t lement ’ of labour di sputes through government sponsoredconci l iat ion and arbi t rat ion proceedings. In U.P., Kanpur was the seat of serious labour unrest as theworkers expected act ive support from the popularly elected Government . A major st rike occurred inMay 1938. The Government set up a Labour Enqui ry Commi t tee, headed by Rajendra Prasad. TheCommi t tee’s recommendat ions included an increase in workers’ wages wi th a minimum wage of Rs.15 per month, format ion of an arbi t rat ion board, recrui tment of labour for al l mi l l s by an independentboard, materni ty benefi t s to women workers, and recogni t ion of the Left -dominated Mazdur Sabha bythe employers. But the employers, who had refused to cooperate wi th the Commi t tee, rejected thereport . They did, however, in the end, because of a great deal of pressure from the Government , adopti t s principal recommendat ions. A simi lar Bihar Labour Enqui ry Commi t tee headed by RajendraPrasad was set up in 1938. It too recommended the st rengthening of t rade union right s, animprovement in labour condi t ions, and compul sory conci l iat ion and arbi t rat ion to be t ried before a st rike was declared.The Congress Government s al so joined the effort to develop planning through the Nat ional Planning Commi t tee appointed in 1938 by the Congress President Subhas Bose.Even though i t was under a Cent ral Government ban, the Communi st Party was able to bring out i t s weekly organ, The Nat ional Front , from Bombay. The CSP brought out The Congress Social i st andseveral other journal s in Indian languages. Of part icular interest i s the example of Ki rt i Lehar whichthe Ki rt i Communi st s of Punjab brought out from Meerut , U.P., because they could not do so inUnioni st -ruled Punjab.

Even thoughpeasant agi tat ions usual ly took the form of massive demonst rat ions and spectacular peasant marches, in Bihar, the ki san movement often came into frontal confrontat ion wi th the Mini st ry, especial ly when the Ki san Sabha asked the peasant s not to pay rent or to forcibly occupy landlords’ lands. There were al so cases of physical at tacks upon landlords, big and smal l , and the loot ing of crops. Ki san sabha workers popularized Sahajanand’s mi l i tant slogans: Lagan Lenge Kai se, Danda Hamara Zindabad.Consequent ly, there was a breach in relat ions between the Bihar ki san sabha and the provincial Congress leadership.The Congress Mini st ries resigned in October 1939 because of the pol i t ical cri si s brought about byWorld War II. But Gandhi j i welcomed the resignat ions for another reason — they would help cleansethe Congress of the ‘rampant corrupt ion.’

2 7Peasant Movements in the 1930s and ’40s

The 1930s bore wi tness to a new and nat ion-wide awakening of Indian peasant s to thei r own st rengthand capaci ty to organize for the bet terment of thei r l iving condi t ions. Thi s awakening was largely aresul t of the combinat ion of part icular economic and pol i t ical development s: the great Depression that began to hi t India from 1929-30 and the new phase of mass st ruggle launched by the Indian Nat ional Congress in 1930.The Depression which brought agricul tural prices crashing down to hal f or less of thei r normallevel s deal t a severe blow to the al ready impoveri shed peasant s burdened wi th high taxes and rent s. The Government was obdurate in refusing to scale down i t s own rates of taxat ion or in askingzamindars to bring down thei r rent s. The prices of manufactured goods, too, didn’t regi stercomparable decreases.The Civi l Di sobedience Movement was launched in thi s atmosphere of di scontent in 1930, and inmany part s of the count ry i t soon took on the form of a no-tax and no-rent campaign.Thi sconsol idat ion of the Left acted as a spur to the format ion of an al l -India body to coordinate the ki sanmovement , a process that was al ready under way through the effort s of N.G. Ranga and other ki sanleaders. The culminat ion was the establ i shment of the Al l -India Ki san Congress in Lucknow in Apri l1936 which later changed i t s name to the Al l -India Ki san Sabha. Swami Sahajanand, the mi l i tantfounder of the Bihar Provincial Ki san Sabha (1929), was elected the President , and N.G. Ranga, thepioneer of the ki san movement in Andhra and a renowned scholar of the agrarian problem, the GeneralSecretary. The fi rst session was greeted in person by Jawaharlal Nehru. Other part icipant s includedRam Manohar Lohia, Sohan Singh Josh, Indulal Yagnik, Jayaprakash Narayan, Mohanlal Gautam,Kamal Sarkar, Sudhin Pramanik and Ahmed Din. The Conference resolved to bring out a Ki sanMani festo and a periodic bul let in edi ted by Indulal Yagnik.A Ki san Mani festo was final ized at the Al l -India Ki san Commi t tee session in Bombay and formal lypresented to the Congress Working Commi t tee to be incorporated into i t s forthcoming mani festo forthe 1937 elect ions. The Ki san Mani festo considerably influenced the agrarian programme adopted bythe Congress at i t s Faizpur session, which included demands for fi fty per cent reduct ion in landrevenue and rent , a moratorium on debt s, the abol i t ion of feudal levies, securi ty of tenure for tenant s,a l iving wage for agricul tural labourers, and the recogni t ion of peasant unions.Bihar was another major area of peasant mobi l izat ion in thi s period. Swami Sahajanand, the founderof the Bihar Provincial Ki san Sabha and a major leader of the Al l India Ki san Sabha, was joined bymany other left -wing leaders l ike Karyanand Sharma, Rahul Sankri tayan, Panchanan Sharma, andYadunandan Sharma in spreading the ki san sabha organizat ion to the vi l lage of Bihar.

The Congress Mini st ry had ini t iated legi slat ion for the reduct ion of rent and the restorat ion ofbakasht lands. Bakasht lands were those which the occupancy tenant s had lost to zamindars, most lyduring the Depression years, by vi rtue of non-payment of rent , and which they often cont inued tocul t ivate as share-croppers. The Bihar Provincial Ki san Sabha effect ively used meet ings, conferences, ral l ies, and massdemonst rat ions, including a demonst rat ion of one lakh peasant s at Patna in 1938, to popularize theki san sabha programme. The slogan of zamindari abol i t ion, adopted by the Sabha in 1935, waspopularized among the peasant s through resolut ions passed at these gatherings The movement on the bakasht i ssue reached i t s peak in late 1938 and 1939, butby August 1939 a combinat ion of concessions, legi slat ion and the arrest of about 600 act ivi st ssucceeded in quietening the peasant s. The movement was resumed in certain pocket s in 1945 andcont inued in one form or another t i l l zamindari was abol i shed. Punjab was another cent re of ki san act ivi ty. Here, too, the ki san sabhas that had emerged in theearly 1930s, through the effort s of Naujawan Bharat Sabha, Ki rt i Ki san, Congress and Akal i act ivi st s, were given a new sense of di rect ion and cohesion by the Punjab Ki san Commi t tee formed in 1937.

But in Bri t i sh India, i t was the tebhaga st ruggle in Bengal that held the l imel ight . In late 1946, theshare-croppers of Bengal began to assert that they would no longer pay a hal f share of thei r crop to the jotedars but only one-thi rd and that before divi sion the crop would be stored in thei r khamars(godowns) and not that of the jotedars. They were no doubt encouraged by the fact that the BengalLand Revenue Commi ssion, popularly known as the Floud Commi ssion, had al ready made thi srecommendat ion in i t s report to the government . The Hajong t ribal s were simul taneously demandingcommutat ion of thei r kind rent s into cash rent s. The tebhaga movement , led by the Bengal ProvincialKi san Sabha, soon developed into a clash between jotedars and bargadars wi th the bargadarsinsi st ing on storing the crop in thei r own khamars.The movement received a great boost in late January 1947 when the Musl im League Mini st ry led bySuhrawardy publ i shed the Bengal Bargadars Temporary Regulat ion Bi l l in the Calcut ta Gazet te on 22 January 1947. Encouraged by the fact that the demand for tebhaga could no longer be cal led i l legal , peasant s in hi therto untouched vi l lages and areas joined the st ruggle. In many places, peasant s t ried to remove the paddy al ready stored in the jotedars’ khamars to thei r own, and thi s resul ted ininnumerable clashes. The jotedars appealed to the Government , and th pol ice came in to suppress the peasant s. Repression cont inued and by the end of February the movement was vi rtual ly dead. A fewincident s occurred in March as wel l , but these were only the death pangs of a dying st ruggle.The Musl im League Mini st ry fai led to pursue the bi l l in the Assembly and i t was only in 1950 thatthe Congress Mini st ry passed a Bargadars Bi l l which incorporated, in substance, the demands of themovement .Wi th the experience of the spl i t of 1942, the ki san movement found that i f i t diverged too far and too clearly from the path of the nat ional movement , i t tended to lose i t s mass base, as wel l as create a spl i t wi thin the ranks of i t s leadership.

2 8The Freedom Struggle in Princely India

.A much more powerful influence was exerci sed by the Non-Cooperat ion and Khi lafat Movement launched in 1920; around thi s t ime and under i t s impact , numerous local organizat ions of the States’ people came into exi stence. Some of the States in which praja mandal s or States’ People’s Conferences were organized were Mysore, Hyderabad, Baroda, the Kathiawad States, the Deccan States, Jamnagar, Indore, and Nawanagar. Thi s process came to a head in December 1927 wi th the convening of the Al l India States’ People’s Conference (AISPC) which was at tended by 700 pol i t ical workers from the

States. The men chiefly responsible for thi s ini t iat ive were Balwant rai Mehta, Maniklal Kothari and G.R. Abhayankar.The pol icy of the Indian Nat ional Congress towards the Indian states had been fi rst enunciated in1920 at Nagpur when a resolut ion cal l ing upon the Princes to grant ful l responsible government inthei r States had been passed.Fi rst , the Government of India Act of 1935 projected a scheme of federat ion inwhich the Indian States were to be brought into a di rect const i tut ional relat ionship wi th Bri t i sh Indiaand the States were to send representat ives to the Federal Legi slature. The catch was that theserepresentat ives would be nominees of the Princes and not democrat ical ly elected representat ives ofthe people. They would number one-thi rd of the total numbers of the Federal legi slature and act as asol id conservat ive block that could be t rusted to thwart nat ional i st pressures. The Indian Nat ionalCongress and the AISPC and other organizat ions of the States’ people clearly saw through thi simperial i st manoeuvre and demanded that the States be represented not by the Princes’ nominees butby elected representat ives of the people. Thi s lent a great sense of urgency to the demand forresponsible democrat ic government in the States.Fol lowing upon thi s, the Congress at Tripuri in March 1939 passed a resolut ion enunciat ing i t s newpol icy: ‘The great awakening that i s taking place among the people of the States may lead to arelaxat ion, or to a complete removal of the rest raint which the Congress imposed upon i t sel f, thusresul t ing in an ever increasing ident i ficat ion of the Congress wi th the States’ peoples’.

Al so in 1939,the AISPC elected Jawaharlal Nehru as i t s President for the Ludhiana session, thus set t ing the seal onthe fusion of the movement s in Princely India and Bri t i sh india.The outbreak of the Second World War brought about a di st inct change in the pol i t ical atmosphere.Congress Mini st ries resigned, the Government armed i t sel f wi th the Defence of India Rules, and in the States as wel l there was less tolerance of pol i t ical act ivi ty. Things came to a head again in 1942 wi th the launching of the Qui t India Movement . Thi s t ime the Congress made no di st inct ion between Bri t i sh India and the Indian States and the cal l for st ruggle was extended to the people of the States.The people of the States thus formal ly joined the st ruggle for Indian independence, and in addi t ion tothei r demand for responsible government they asked the Bri t i sh to qui t India and demanded that the States become integral part s of the Indian nat ion.

RAJKOTIn a meet ing wi th Dewan Vi rawala, Patel , on behal f of the Pari shad, demanded acommi t tee to frame proposal s for responsible government , a new elect ion to the Prat inidhi Sabha,reduct ion of land revenue by fi fteen percent , cancel lat ion of al l monopol ies or i jaras, and a l imi t onthe ruler’s claim on the State t reasury. The Durbar, instead of conceding the demands, asked theResident to appoint a Bri t i sh officer as Dewan to deal effect ively wi th the si tuat ion, and Cadel l tookover on 12 September. Meanwhi le, Vi rawala himsel f became Private Advi ser to the Thakore, so thathe could cont inue to operate from behind the scenes.The Satyagraha now assumed major proport ions and included wi thhold of land revenue, defiance ofmonopoly right s, boycot t of al l goods produced by the State, including elect rici ty and cloth. There wasa run on the State Bank and st rikes in the state cot ton mi l l and by student s. Al l sources of income of

the state, including exci se and custom dut ies, were sought to be blocked.Sardar Patel , though most of the t ime not physical ly present in Rajkot , kept in regular touch wi ththe Rajkot leaders by telephone every evening. Volunteers began to arrive from other part s ofKathiawad, from Bri t i sh Gujarat and Bombay. The movement demonst rated a remarkable degree oforganizat ion: a secret chain of command ensured that on the arrest of one leader another took chargeand code numbers publ i shed in newspapers informed each Satyagrahi of hi s arrival date andarrangement s in Rajkot .By the end of November, the Bri t i sh were clearly worried about the impl icat ions of a possibleCongress victory in Rajkot .The Mahatma decided that he, too, must goto Rajkot . He had al ready made i t clear that he considered the breach of a solemn agreement by theThakore Sahib a serious affai r and one that was the duty of every Satyagrahi to resi st . He al so fel t that he had st rong claims on Rajkot because of hi s fami ly’s close associat ion wi th the State and theThakore’s fami ly, and that thi s just i fied and prompted hi s personal intervent ion.In accordance wi th hi s wi shes, mass Satyagraha was suspended to prepare the way for negot iat ions.But a number of di scussions wi th the Resident , the Thakore and Dewan Vi rawala yielded no resul t sand resul ted in an ul t imatum by Gandhi j i that i f, by 3 March, the Durbar did not agree to honour i t s agreement wi th the Sardar, he would go on a fast unto death. The Thakore, or rather Vi rawala, whowas the real power behind the throne, stuck to hi s original posi t ion and left Gandhi j i wi th no choice but to begin hi s fast .The fast was the signal for a nat ion-wide protest . Gandhi j i ’s heal th was al ready poor and anyprolonged fast was l ikely to be dangerous. There were hartal s, an adjournment of the legi slature andfinal ly a threat that the Congress Mini st ries might resign. The Viceroy was bombarded wi th telegramsasking for hi s intervent ion. Gandhi j i himsel f urged the Paramount Power to ful fi l i t s responsibi l i ty tothe people of the State by persuading the Thakore to honour hi s promi se. On 7 March, the Viceroysuggested arbi t rat ion by the Chief Just ice of India, Si r Maurice Gwyer, to decide whether in fact theThakore had violated the agreement . Thi s seemed a reasonable enough proposi t ion, and Gandhi j ibroke hi s fast .The Chief Just ice’s award, announced on 3 Apri l , 1939, vindicated the Sardar’s posi t ion that theDurbar had agreed to accept seven of hi s nominees. The bal l was now back in the Thakore’s court . But there had been no change of heart in Rajkot . Vi rawala cont inued wi th hi s pol icy of propping upRajput , Musl im and depressed classes’claims to representat ion and refused to accept any of theproposal s made by Gandhi j i to accommodate thei r representat ives whi le maintaining a majori ty of the Sardar’s and the Pari shad’s nominees.The si tuat ion soon began to take an ugly turn, wi th host i le demonst rat ions by Rajput s and Musl imsduring Gandhi j i ’s prayer meet ings, and Mohammed Al i Jinnah’s and Ambedkar’s demand that theMusl ims and depressed classes be given separate representat ion. The Durbar used al l thi s to cont inueto refuse to honour the agreement in ei ther i t s let ter or spi ri t . The Paramount Power, too, would notintervene because i t had nothing to gain and everything to lose from securing an out right Congressvictory. Nor did i t see i t s role as one of promot ing responsible government in the States.At thi s point , Gandhi j i , analyzing the reasons for hi s fai lure to achieve a ‘change of heart ’ in hi sopponent s, came to the conclusion that the cause lay in hi s at tempt to use the authori ty of the

Paramount Power to coerce the Thakore into an agreement . Thi s, for him, smacked of violence; nonviolence should have meant that he should have di rected hi s fast only at the Thakore and Vi rawala, and rel ied only on the st rength of hi s suffering to effect a ‘change of heart ’. Therefore, he released the Thakore from the agreement , apologized to the Viceroy and the Chief Just ice for wast ing thei r t ime, and to hi s opponent s, the Musl ims and the Rajput s, and left Rajkot to return to Bri t i sh India.The Rajkot Satyagraha brought into clear focus the paradoxical si tuat ion that exi sted in the Statesand which made the task of resi stance a very complex one. The rulers of the States were protected bythe might of the Bri t i sh Government against any movement s that aimed at reform and popularpressure on the Bri t i sh Government to induce reform could always be resi sted by pleading the legalposi t ion of the autonomy of the States. Thi s legal independence, however, was usual ly forgot ten by the Bri t i sh when the States desi red to fol low a course that was unpalatable to the Paramount Power. It was, after al l , the Bri t i sh Government that urged the Thakore to refuse to honour hi s agreement wi th the Sardar. But the legal separat ion of power and responsibi l i ty between the States and the Bri t i shGovernment did provide a convenient excuse for resi st ing pressure, an excuse that did not exi st inBri t i sh India. Thi s meant that movement s of resi stance in the States operated in condi t ions that were very di fferent from those that provided the context for movement s in Bri t i sh India. Perhaps, then, the Congress had not been far wrong when for years i t had urged that the movement s in Princely India and Bri t i sh India could not be merged. It s hesi tat ion to take on the Indian States was based on a comprehension of the genuine di fficul t ies in the si tuat ion, di fficul t ies which were clearly shown up by the example of Rajkot .Despi te the apparent fai lure of the Rajkot Satyagraha, i t exerci sed a powerful pol i t icizing influenceon the people of the States, especial ly in Western India. It al so demonst rated to the Princes that theysurvived only because the Bri t i sh were there to prop them up, and thus, the st ruggle of Rajkot , alongwi th others of i t s t ime, faci l i tated the process of the integrat ion of the States at the t ime ofindependence.In 1937, the other two regions of the State al so set up thei r own organizat ions — the Maharasht raPari shad and the Kannada Pari shad. And, in 1938, act ivi st s from al l three regions came together anddecided to found the Hyderabad State Congress as a state-wide body of the people of Hyderabad. Thi swas not a branch of the Indian Nat ional Congress, despi te i t s name, and despi te the fact that i t smembers had close contact s wi th the Congress. But even before the organizat ion could be formal lyfounded, the Nizam’s government i ssued orders banning i t , the ostensible ground being that i t was acommunal body of Hindus and that Musl ims were not sufficient ly represented in i t . Negot iat ions wi th the Government bore no frui t , and the deci sion was taken to launch a Satyagraha.The leader of thi s Satyagraha was Swami Ramanand Ti rtha, a Marathi -speaking nat ional i st who hadgiven up hi s studies during the Non-Cooperat ion Movement , The two cent res of the Satyagraha wereHyderabad ci ty and Aurangabad ci ty in the Marathwada area.Gandhi j i himsel f took a keen personal interest in the development s, and regularly wrote to Si rAkbar Hydari , the Prime Mini ster, pressing him for bet ter t reatment of the Satyagrahi s and for achange in the State’s at t i tude. And i t was at hi s instance that , after two months, in December 1938, the Satyagraha was wi thdrawn.The reasons for thi s deci sion were to be primari ly found in an accompanying development — theSatyagraha launched by the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Civi l Libert ies Union at the same t ime as theState Congress Satyagraha. The Arya Samaj Satyagraha, which was at t ract ing Satyagrahi s from al lover the count ry, was launched as a protest against the rel igious persecut ion of the Arya Samaj , and i t

had clearly rel igious object ives. It al so tended to take on communal overtones. The State Congress and Gandhi j i increasingly fel t that in the popular mind thei r clearly secular Satyagraha wi th di st inctpol i t ical object ives were being confused wi th the rel igious-communal Satyagraha of the Arya Samajand that i t was, therefore, best to demarcate themselves from i t by wi thdrawing thei r own Satyagraha.The authori t ies were in any case lumping the two together and seeking to project the State Congress as a Hindu communal organizat ion.Simul taneously, there was the emergence of what came to be known as the Vande MataramMovement . Student s of col leges in Hyderabad ci ty organized a protest st rike against the authori t ies’ refusal to let them sing Vande Mataram in thei r hostel prayer rooms.The State Congress, however, cont inued to be banned, and the regional cul tural organizat ionsremained the main forums of act ivi ty.A symbol ic protest against the cont inuing ban was againregi stered by Swami Ramanand Ti rtha and six others personal ly selected by Gandhi j i . They werearrested in September 1940 and kept in detent ion t i l l December 1941. A resumpt ion of the st rugglewas ruled out by Gandhi j i since an al l -India st ruggle was in the offing and now al l st ruggles would be part of that .The Qui t India Movement was launched in August 1942 and i t was made clear that now there wasno di st inct ion to be made between the people of Bri t i sh India and the States: every Indian was topart icipate. The meet ing of the AISPC was convened along wi th the AICC session at Bombay thatannounced the commencement of st ruggle. Gandhi j i and Jawaharlal Nehru both addressed the AISPCStanding Commi t tee, and Gandhi j i himsel f explained the impl icat ions of the Qui t India Movementand told the Commi t tee that henceforth there would be one movement . The movement in the Stateswas now to be not only for responsible government but for the independence of India and theintegrat ion of the States wi th Bri t i sh India.But the Qui t India Movement al so sealed the ri ft that had developed between the Communi st andnon-Communi st radical nat ional i st s after the Communi st Party had adopted the slogan of People’sWar in December 1941. Communi st s were opposed to the Qui t India Movement as i t mi l i tated against thei r understanding that Bri tain must be supported in i t s ant i -Fasci st War.The case of Hyderabad, and that of Rajkot , are good examples of how methods of st ruggle evolved tosui t the condi t ions in Bri t i sh India, such as non-violent mass civi l di sobedience or Satyagraha, did not have the same viabi l i ty or effect iveness in the India States. The lack of civi l l ibert ies, and ofrepresentat ive inst i tut ions, meant that the pol i t ical space for hegemonic pol i t ics was very smal l , even when compared to the condi t ions prevai l ing under the semi -hegemonic and semi -repressive colonial state in Bri t i sh India. The ul t imate protect ion provided by the Bri t i sh enabled the rulers of the States to wi thstand popular pressure to a considerable degree, as happened in Rajkot . As a resul t , there was a much greater tendency in these States for the movement s to resort to violent methods of agi tat ion thi s happened not only in Hyderabad, but al so in Travancore, Pat iala, and the Ori ssa States among others. In Hyderabad, for example, even the State Congress ul t imately resorted to violent methods of at tack, and, in the final count , the Nizam could only be brought into l ine by the Indian Army.Thi s al so meant that those such as the Communi st s and other Left groups, who had less hesi tat ionthan the Congress in resort ing to violent forms of st ruggle, were placed in a more favourable si tuat ionin these States and were able to grow as a pol i t ical force in these areas. Here, too, the examples ofHyderabad, Travancore, Pat iala and the Ori ssa States were qui te st riking.

2 9Indian Capitalists and

the National MovementFi rst , the Indian capi tal i st class grew from about the mid 19th century wi th largely an independent capi tal base and not as junior partners of foreign capi tal or as compradors. Second, the capi tal i st class on the whole was not t ied up in a subservient posi t ion wi th pro-imperial i st feudal interest s ei ther economical ly or pol i t ical ly. In fact , a wide cross sect ion of the leaders of the capi tal i st class actual ly argued, in 1944-45, in thei r famous Bombay plan (the signatories to which were Purshot tamdas Thakurdas, J.R.D. Tata, G.D. Bi rla, Ardeshi r Dalal , Sri Ram, Kasturbhai Lalbhai , A.D. Shroff and John Mathai ) for comprehensive land reform, including cooperat ivizat ion of product ion, finance and market ing.Thi rd, in the period 1914-1947, the capi tal i st class grew rapidly, increasing i t s st rength and sel fconfidence. Thi s was achieved primari ly through import subst i tut ion; by edging out or encroachingupon areas of European dominat ion, and by establ i shing almost exclusive cont rol over new areas thus account ing for the bulk of the new investment s made since the 1920s. Close to independence,indigenous enterpri se had al ready cornered seventy two to seventy three per cent of the domest icmarket and over eighty per cent of the deposi t s in the organized banking sector.Since the early 1920s, effort s were being made by various capi tal i st s l ike G.D. Bi rla andPurshot tamdas Thakurdas to establ i sh a nat ional level organizat ion of Indian commercial , indust rialand financial interest s (as opposed to the al ready relat ively more organized European interest s inIndia) to be able to effect ively lobby wi th the colonial government . Thi s effort culminated in theformat ion of the Federat ion of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Indust ry (FICCI) in 1927, wi th alarge and rapidly increasing representat ion from al l part s of India. The FICCI was soon recognized bythe Bri t i sh government as wel l as the Indian publ ic in general , as represent ing the dominant opinion aswel l as the overal l consensus wi thin the Indian capi tal i st class.The leaders of the capi tal i st class al so clearly saw the role of the FICCI as being that of ‘nat ionalguardians of t rade, commerce and indust ry,’ performing in the economic sphere in colonial India thefunct ions of a nat ional government . G.D. Bi rla and S.P. Jain were talking of unequal exchange as early as the 1930s.However, as ment ioned earl ier, the Indian capi tal i st class had i t s own not ions of how the ant i imperial i st st ruggle ought to be waged. It was always in favour of not completely abandoning theconst i tut ional path and the negot iat ing table and general ly preferred to put i t s weight behindconst i tut ional forms of st ruggle as opposed to mass civi l di sobedience. Thi s was due to severalreasons.Fi rst , there was the fear that mass civi l di sobedience, especial ly i f i t was prolonged, would unleashforces which could turn the movement revolut ionary in a social sense (i .e., threaten capi tal i sm i t sel f).As Lal j i Naranj i wrote to Purshot tamdas in March 1930, ‘private property,’ i t sel f could be threatenedand the ‘di sregard for authori ty’ created could have ‘di sast rous after effect s’ even for the ‘futuregovernment of Swaraj .’9Whenever the movement was seen to be get t ing too dangerous in thi s sense,the capi tal i st s t ried thei r best to bring the movement back to a phase of const i tut ional opposi t ion.Second, the capi tal i st s were unwi l l ing to support a prolonged al l -out host i l i ty to the government of

the day as i t prevented the cont inuing of day-to-day business and threatened the very exi stence of the class.Further, the Indian capi tal i st s’ support to const i tut ional part icipat ion, whether i t be in assembl ies, conferences or even joining the Viceroy’s Execut ive Counci l , i s not to be understood simply as thei r get t ing co-opted into the imperial system or surrendering to i t . They saw al l thi s as a forum formaintaining an effect ive opposi t ion fearing that boycot t ing these forums completely would help‘black legs’ and element s who did not represent the nat ion to, wi thout any opposi t ion, easi ly passmeasures which could severely affect the Indian economy and the capi tal i st class. However, there was no quest ion of uncondi t ional ly accept ing reforms or part icipat ing in conferences or assembl ies. The capi tal i st s were to ‘part icipate on (thei r) own terms,’ wi th ‘no compromi se on fundamental s,’ fi rmly reject ing offers of cooperat ion which fel l below thei r own and the minimum nat ional demands.It was on thi s ground that the FICCI in 1934 rejected the ‘Report of the Joint Parl iamentary Commi t tee on Const i tut ional Reforms for India’ as ‘even more react ionary than the proposal s contained in the Whi te paper.’The Indian capi tal i st s’ at t i tude had undergone signi ficant changes on thi s i ssue over t ime. Duringthe Swadeshi Movement (1905-08), the capi tal i st s remained opposed to the boycot t agi tat ion. Evenduring the Non-Cooperat ion Movement of the early ‘20s, a smal l sect ion of the capi tal i st s, includingPurshot tamdas, openly declared themselves enemies of the Non-Cooperat ion Movement . However,during the 1930s’ Civi l Di sobedience Movement , the capi tal i st s largely supported the movement andrefused to respond to the Viceroy’s exhortat ions (in September 1930) to publ icly repudiate theCongress stand and hi s offer of ful l guarantee of government protect ion against any harrassment fordoing so. urther, whi le the capi tal i st class on the whole stayedwi thin the nat ional i st camp (as opposed to l ining up wi th the loyal i st s), i t did so on the mostconservat ive end of the nat ional i st spect rum, which certainly did not cal l the shot s of the nat ionalmovement at any stage. Simi larly,in 1928, the capi tal i st s refused to support the Government in int roducing the Publ ic Safety Bi l l , which was intended to contain the Communi st s, on the ground that such a provi sion would be used to at tack the nat ional movement .Itwas wi th thi s reform perspect ive that the ‘Post War Economic Development Commi t tee,’ set up by the capi tal i st s in 1942, which eventual ly drafted the Bombay Plan, was to funct ion. It s at tempt was to incorporate ‘whatever i s sound and feasible in the social i st movement ’ ana see ‘how far social i stdemands could be accommodated wi thout capi tal i sm surrendering any of i t s essent ial features.Bombay Plan, therefore, seriously took up the quest ion of rapid economic growth and equi tabledi st ribut ion, even arguing for the necessi ty of part ial nat ional izat ion, the publ ic sector, land reformand a series of workers’ wel fare schemes. One may add that the basic assumpt ion made by theBombay planners was that the plan could be implemented only by an independent nat ionalGovernment .Clearly the Indian capi tal i st class was ant i -social i st and bourgeoi s but i t was not pro-imperial i st .

3 0The Development of a Nationalist Foreign Policy

After the War, the nat ional i st s further developed thei r foreign pol icy in the di rect ion of opposi t ionto pol i t ical and economic imperial i sm and cooperat ion of al l nat ions in the cause of world peace. As part of thi s pol icy, at i t s Delhi session in 1919, the Congress demanded India’s representat ion at the Peace Conference through i t s elected representat ives.Indians al so cont inued to voice thei r sympathy for the freedom fighters of other count ries. The Iri sh

and Egypt ian people and the Government of Turkey were extended act ive support . At i t s Calcut tasession in 1920, the Congress asked the people not to join the army to fight in West Asia. In May1921, Gandhi j i declared that the Indian people would oppose any at tack on Afghani stan. The Congress branded the Mandate system of the League of Nat ions as a cover for imperial i st greed. In 1921, the Congress congratulated the Burmese people on thei r st ruggle for freedom. Burma was at that t ime a part of India, but the Congress announced that free India favoured Burma’s independence from India.Gandhi j i wrote in thi s context in 1922: ‘I have never been able to take pride in the fact that Burma has been made part of Bri t i sh India. It never was and never should be. The Burmese have a civi l izat ion of thei r own.’ In 1924, the Congress asked the Indian set t lers in Burma to demand no separate right s at the cost of the Burmese people.In January 1927, S. Srinavasa Iyengar moved an adjournment mot ion in the Cent ral Legi slat iveAssembly to protest against Indian t roops being used to suppress the Chinese people. The st rongIndian feel ings on the quest ion were repeatedly expressed by the Congress during 1927 (including ati t s Madras session). The Madras Congress advi sed Indians not to go to China to fight or work againstthe Chinese people who were fel low fighters in the st ruggle against imperial i sm. It al so asked for thewi thdrawal of Indian t roops from Mesopotamia and Iran and al l other foreign count ries. In 1928, theCongress assured the people of Egypt , Syria, Palest ine, Iraq, and Afghani stan of i t s ful l support inthei r nat ional l iberat ion st ruggles.In 1926-27, Jawaharlal Nehru t ravel led to Europe and came into contact wi th left -wing Europeanpol i t ical workers and thinkers. Thi s had an abiding impact on hi s pol i t ical development , including in the field of foreign affai rs. Thi s was, of course, not the fi rst t ime that major Indian pol i t ical leaders had made an effort to establ i sh l inks wi th, and get the support of, the ant i -imperial i st sect ions ofBri t i sh and European publ ic opinion. Dadabhai Naoroj i was a close friend of the social i st H.M.Hyndman. He at tended the Hague session of the Internat ional Social i st Congress in August 1904 and after describing imperial i sm as a species of barbari sm declared that the Indian people had lost al l fai th in Bri t i sh pol i t ical part ies and parl iament and looked for cooperat ion only to the Bri t i sh working class. Lajpat Rai al so establ i shed close relat ions wi th American social i st s during hi s stay in the US from1914-18. In 1917, he opposed US part icipat ion in the World War because of the War’s imperial i st iccharacter. Gandhi j i al so developed close relat ions wi th out standing European figures such as Tol stoy and Romain Rol land.The highl ight of Jawaharlal ’s European vi si t was hi s part icipat ion as a representat ive of theCongress in the Internat ional Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperial i sm held in Brussel s in February 1927. The basic object ive of the Conference was to bring together the colonial people ofAfrica, Asia and Lat in America st ruggl ing against imperial i sm and the working people of thecapi tal i st count ries fight ing against capi tal i sm. Nehru was elected one of the honorary president s of the Conference along wi th Albert Einstein, Romain Rol land, Madame Sun Yat -Sen and GeorgeLansbury. In hi s speeches and statement s at the Conferences, Nehru emphasized the close connect ionbetween colonial i sm and capi tal i sm and the deep commi tment of Indian nat ional i sm tointernat ional i sm and to ant i -colonial st ruggles the world over.The Brussel s Conference decided to found the League Against Imperial i sm and for Nat ionalIndependence. Nehru was elected to the Execut ive Counci l of the League. The Congress al so affi l iated to the League as an associated member. At i t s Calcut ta session, the Congress declared that the Indian st ruggle was a part of the worldwide st ruggle against imperial i sm. It al so decided to open a Foreign Department to develop contact s wi th other peoples and movement s fight ing against imperial i sm.

The Congress declared 9May to be Ethiopia Day on which demonst rat ions and meet ings were held al l over India expressingsympathy and sol idari ty wi th the Ethiopians. On hi s way back from Europe, Jawaharlal refused tomeet Mussol ini , despi te hi s repeated invi tat ions, lest the meet ing was used for fasci st propaganda.At Tripuri , in early 1939, theCongress passed a resolut ion di ssociat ing i t sel f ‘ent i rely from the Bri t i sh foreign pol icy, which hasconsi stent ly aided the fasci st Powers and helped the dest ruct ion of the democrat ic count ries.’In 1937, Japan launched an at tack on China. The Congress passed a resolut ion condemning Japanand cal l ing upon the Indian people to boycot t Japanese goods as a mark of thei r sympathy wi th theChinese people.As an expression of i t s sol idari ty wi th the Chinese people, 12 June was celebrated throughout India as China Day. The Congress al so sent a medical mi ssion, headed by Dr. M. Atal , to work wi th the Chinese armed forces. One of i t s members, Dr. Kotni s, was to lay down hi s l i fe working wi th the Eighth Route Army under Mao Ze-Dong’s command.

3 1The Rise and Growth of Communalism

Above al l , communal i sm was one of the by-product s of the colonial character of Indian economy, ofcolonial underdevelopment , of the incapaci ty of colonial i sm to develop the Indian economy. Theresul t ing economic stagnat ion and i t s impact on the l ives of the Indian people, especial ly the middleclasses, produced condi t ions which were conducive to divi sion and antagoni sm wi thin Indian societyas al so to i t s radical t ransformat ion.Throughout the 20th century, in the absence of modern indust rial development and the developmentof educat ion, heal th and other social and cul tural services, unemployment was an acute problem inIndia, especial ly for the educated middle and lower middle classes who could not fal l back on land andwhose socio-economic condi t ions suffered constant deteriorat ion. These economic opportuni t iesdecl ined further during the Great Depression after 1928 when large scale unemployment prevai led.In thi s social si tuat ion, the nat ional i st and other popular movement s worked for the long-termsolut ion to the people’s problems by fight ing for the overthrow of colonial i sm and radical socialt ransformat ion. In fact , the middle classes formed the backbone both of the mi l i tant nat ionalmovement from 1905 to 1947 and the left -wing part ies and groups since the 1920s. Unfortunatelythere were some who lacked a wider social vi sion and pol i t ical understanding and looked to thei rnarrow immediate interest s and short -term solut ions to thei r personal or sect ional problems such ascommunal , caste, or provincial reservat ion in jobs or in municipal commi t tees, legi slatures, and so on.Gradual ly, the spread of educat ion to wel l -off peasant s and smal l landlords extended the boundariesof the job-seeking middle class to the rural areas. The newly educated rural youth could not besustained by land whether as landlords or peasant s, especial ly as agricul ture was total ly stagnantbecause of the colonial impact . They flocked on the towns and ci t ies for opening in government jobsand professions and t ried to save themselves by fight ing for jobs through the system of communalreservat ions and nominat ions. Thi s development gradual ly widened the social base of communal i smto cover the rural upper st rata of peasant s and landlords.Thus, the cri si s of the colonial economy constant ly generated two opposing set s of ideologies andpol i t ical tendencies among the middle classes. When ant i -imperial i st revolut ion and social changeappeared on the agenda, the middle classes enthusiast ical ly joined the nat ional and other popularmovement s. They then readi ly advocated the cause and demands of the ent i re society from the

capi tal i st s to the peasant s and workers. Individual ambi t ions were then sunk in the wider social vi sion.But when prospect s of revolut ionary change receded, when the ant i -imperial i st st ruggle entered amore passive phase, many belonging to the middle classes shi fted to short -term solut ions of thei rpersonal problems, to pol i t ics based on communal i sm and other simi lar ideologies. Thus wi th thesame social causat ion, large sect ions of the middle classes in several part s of the count ry constant lyosci l lated between ant i -imperial i sm and communal i sm or communal -type pol i t ics. But there was acrucial di fferent in the two cases. In the fi rst case, thei r own social interest s merged wi th the interest sof general social development and thei r pol i t ics formed a part of the broader ant i -imperial i st st ruggle.In the second case, they funct ioned as a narrow and sel fi sh interest group, accepted the socio-pol i t icalstatus quo and object ively served colonial i sm.To sum up thi s aspect : communal i sm was deeply rooted in and was an expression of the interest sand aspi rat ions of the middle classes in a social si tuat ion in which opportuni t ies for them were grosslyinadequate. The communal quest ion was, therefore a middle class quest ion par excel lence. The mainappeal of communal i sm and i t s main social base al so lay among the middle classes. It i s, however,important to remember that a large number of middle class individual s remained, on the whole free ofcommunal i sm even in the 1930s and 1940s. Thi s was, in part icular, t rue of most of the intel lectual s,whether Hindu, Musl im or Sikh. In fact , the typical Indian intel lectual of the 1930s tended to be bothsecular and broadly left -wing.There was another aspect of the colonial economy that favoured communal pol i t ics. In the absence of openings in indust ry, commerce, educat ion and other social services, and the cul tural andentertainment fields, the Government service was the main avenue of employment for the middleclasses. Much of the employment for teachers, doctors and engineers was al so under governmentcont rol . As late as 1951, whi le 1.2 mi l l ion persons were covered by the Factory Act s, 3.3 mi l l ions got employment in government service. And communal pol i t ics could be used to put pressure on theGovernment to reserve and al locate i t s jobs as al so seat s in professional col leges on communal andcaste l ines. Consequent ly, communal pol i t ics t i l l 1937 was organized around government jobs,educat ional concessions, and the l ike as al so pol i t ical posi t ions — seat s in legi slat ive counci l s,municipal bodies, etc. — which enabled cont rol over these and other economic opportuni t ies. It mayal so be noted that though the communal i st s spoke in the name of thei r ‘communi t ies,’ thereservat ions, guarantees and other ‘right s’ they demanded were vi rtual ly confined to these twoaspect s. They did not take up any i ssues which were of interest to the masses.At another plane, communal i sm often di storted or mi sinterpreted social tension and class confl ictbetween the exploi ters and the exploi ted belonging to di fferent rel igions as communal confl ict .Both the communal i st s and the colonial admini st rators st ressed the communal asagainst the class aspect s of agrarian exploi tat ion and oppression.In the Pabna agrarian riot sof 1873, both Hindu and Musl im tenant s fought zamindars together. Simi larly, as brought out inearl ier chapters, most of the agrarian st ruggles after 1919 stayed clear of communal channel s.Fi rst , by consi stent ly t reat ing Hindus, Musl ims andSikhs as separate communi t ies and socio-pol i t ical ent i t ies which had l i t t le in common. India, i t wassaid, was nei ther a nat ion or a nat ion-in-the-making, nor did i t consi st of nat ional i t ies or local

societ ies, but consi sted of st ructured, mutual ly exclusive and antagoni st ic rel igion-basedcommuni t ies. Second, official favour and pat ronage were extended to the communal i st s. Thi rd, thecommunal Press and persons and agi tat ions were shown ext raordinary tolerance. Fourth, communaldemands were readi ly accepted, thus pol i t ical ly st rengthening communal organizat ions and thei r hold over the people. For example, whi le the Congress could get none of i t s demands accepted from 1885-1905, the Musl im communal demands were accepted in 1906 as soon as they were presented to the Viceroy. Simi larly, in 1932, the Communal Award accepted al l the major communal demands of the t ime. During World War II, the Musl im communal i st s were given a complete veto on any pol i t ical advance. Fi fth, the Bri t i sh readi ly accepted communal organizat ions and leaders as the realspokesperson for thei r ‘communi t ies,’ whi le the nat ional i st leaders were t reated as represent ing amicroscopic minori ty — the el i te. Sixth, separate electorates served as an important inst rument for the development of communal pol i t ics. Last ly, the colonial government encouraged communal i smthrough a pol icy of non-act ion against i t . Certain posi t ive measures which the state alone couldundertake were needed to check the growth of communal i sm. The fai lure to undertake them served as an indi rect encouragement to communal i sm.The Government refused to take act ion against thepropagat ion of vi rulent communal ideas and communal hat red through the Press, pamphlet s, leaflet s, l i terature, publ ic plat form and rumours. Thi s was in sharp cont rast wi th the frequent suppression of the nat ional i st Press, l i terature, civi l servant s, propaganda, and so on. On the cont rary, theGovernment freely rewarded communal leaders, intel lectual s and government servant s wi th t i t les,posi t ions of profi t , high salaries, and so on. The Bri t i sh admini st rators al so fol lowed a pol icy ofrelat ive inact ivi ty and i rresponsibi l i ty in deal ing wi th communal riot s. When they occurred, they were not crushed energet ical ly. The admini st rat ion al so seldom made proper preparat ions or tookprevent ive measures to meet si tuat ions of communal tension, as they did in case of nat ional i st andother popular protest movement s.To sum up: So long as the colonial state supported communal i sm, a solut ion to the communalproblem was not easi ly possible whi le the colonial state remained; though, of course, the overthrow of the colonial state was only the necessary but not a suf f icient condi t ion for a successful st ruggle againstcommunal i sm. and the ant i -part i t ion of Bengal agi tat ion was ini t iated wi th dips inthe Ganges. What was much worse, Bankim Chandra Chat terjea and many other wri ters in Bengal i ,Hindi , Urdu and other languages often referred to Musl ims as foreigners in thei r novel s, plays, poems,and stories, and tended to ident i fy nat ional i sm wi th Hindus.A communal and di storted unscient i fic view of Indian hi story, especial ly of i t s ancient and medievalperiods, was a major inst rument for the spread of communal consciousness as al so a basic const i tuentof communal ideology. The teaching of Indian hi story in school s and col leges from a basical lycommunal point of view made a major cont ribut ion to the ri se and growth of communal i sm.A beginning was made in the early 19th century by the Bri t i sh hi storian, James Mi l l , who describedthe ancient period of Indian hi story as the Hindu period and the medieval period as the Musl imperiod.

3 2Communalism —The Liberal Phase

At the end of 1907, the Al l India Musl im League was founded by a group of bigzamindars, ex-bureaucrat s and other upper class Musl ims l ike the Aga Khan, the Nawab of Dacca andNawab Mohsin-ul -Mulk, Founded as a loyal i st , communal and conservat ive pol i t ical organizat ion, the League supported the part i t ion of Bengal , rai sed the slogan of separate Musl im interest s, demanded

separate electorates and safeguards for Musl ims in government services, and rei terated al l the majorthemes of communal pol i t ics and ideology enunciated earl ier by Syed Ahmed and hi s fol lowers.Viqar-ul -Mulk, for example, said: ‘God forbid, i f the Bri t i sh rule di sappears from India, Hindus wi l llord over i t ; and we wi l l be in constant danger of our l i fe, property and honour. The only way for the Musl ims to escape thi s danger i s to help in the cont inuance of the Bri t i sh rule.’He al so expressed the fear ‘of the minori ty losing i t s ident i ty.’ One of the major object ives of the Musl im League was to keep the emerging intel l igent sia among Musl ims from joining the Congress. It s act ivi t ies were di rected against the Nat ional Congress and Hindus and not against the colonial regime.The Punjab Hindu Sabha was founded in 1909. It s leaders, U.N. Mukerj i and Lal Chand, were to laydown the foundat ions of Hindu communal ideology and pol i t ics. They di rected thei r anger primari lyagainst the Nat ional Congress for t rying to uni te Indians into a single nat ion and for ‘sacri ficing Hindu interest s’ to appease Musl ims.The fi rst session of the Al l -India Hindu Mahasabha was held in Apri l 1915 under the president shipof the Maharaja of Kasim Bazar.The younger Musl im intel lectual s were soon di ssat i sfied wi th the loyal i st , ant i -Hindu and slavi shmental i ty of the upper class leadership of the Musl im League. They were increasingly drawn tomodern and radical nat ional i st ideas. The mi l i tant ly nat ional i st Ahrar movement was founded at thi s t ime under the leadership of Maulana Mohammed Al i , Hakim Ajmal Khan, Hasan Imam, Maulana Zafar Al i Khan, and Mazhar-ul -Haq. In thei r effort s, they got support from a sect ion of orthodox ulama (scholars), especial ly those belonging to the Deoband school . Another orthodox scholar to be at t racted to the nat ional movement was the young Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who was educated at the famous Al Azhar Universi ty at Cai ro and who propagated hi s rat ional i st and nat ional i st ideas in hi s newspaper Al Hi lal which he brought out in 1912 at the age of twenty-four. After an intense st ruggle, the nat ional i st young Musl ims came to the fore in the Musl im League. They al so became act ive in the Congress. In 1912, the bri l l iant Congress leader, M.A. Jinnah, was invi ted to join the League which adopted sel f-government as one of i t s object ives. In the same year, the Aga Khan resigned as the President of the League. From 1912 to 1924, the young nat ional i st s began to overshadow the loyal i st s in the League which began to move nearer to the pol icies of the Congress. Unfortunately, thei r nat ional i sm was flawed in so far as i t was not ful ly secular (except wi th rare except ions l ike Jinnah). It had a st rong rel igious and pan-Islamic t inge. Instead of understanding and opposing the economic and pol i t ical consequences of modern imperial i sm, they fought i t on the ground that i t threatened the Cal iph (khal i fa) and the holy places. Qui te often thei r appeal was to rel igious sent iment s.The posi t ive development wi thin the Congress — di scussed in an earl ier chapter — and wi thin theMusl im League soon led to broad pol i t ical uni ty among the two, an important role in thi s being played by Lokamanya Ti lak and M.A. Jinnah. The two organizat ions held thei r sessions at the end of 1916 at Lucknow, signed a pact known as the Lucknow Pact , and put forward common pol i t ical demands before the Government including the demand for sel f-government for India after the war. The Pact accepted separate electorates and the system of weightage and reservat ion of seat s for the minori t ies in the legi slatures. Whi le a step forward in many respect s — and i t enthused the pol i t ical Indian — the Pact was al so a step back. The Congress had accepted separate electorates and formal ly recognized communal pol i t ics. Above al l , the Pact was taci t ly based on the assumpt ion that India consi sted of di fferent communi t ies wi th separate interest s of thei r own. It , therefore, left the way open to the future resurgence of communal i sm in Indian pol i t ics.The Swaraj i st s were spl i t by communal i sm. A group knownas ‘responsivi st s’ offered cooperat ion to the Government so that the so-cal led Hindu interest s mightbe safeguarded. Lajpat Rai , Madan Mohan Malaviya and N.C. Kelkar joined the Hindu Mahasabha and

argued for Hindu communal sol idari ty. The less responsible ‘responsivi st s’ and Hindu Mahasabhai tescarried on a vi rulent campaign against secular Congressmen. They accused Mot i lal Nehru of let t ingdown Hindus, of being ant i -Hindu and an Islam-lover, of favouring cow-slaughter, and of eat ing beef.Many old Khi lafat i st s al so now turned communal . The most dramat ic shi ft was that of MaulanasMohammed Al i and Shaukat Al i who now accused the Congress of t rying to establ i sh a HinduGovernment and Hindus of want ing to dominate and suppress Musl ims. The most vicious expressionof communal i sm were communal riot s which broke out in major North Indian ci t ies during 1923-24.The most wel l -known of such effort s was made during 1928. As an answer to the chal lenge of theSimon Commi ssion, Indian pol i t ical leaders organized several al l -India conferences to set t lecommunal i ssues and draw up an agreed const i tut ion for India. A large number of Musl im communalleaders met at Delhi in December 1927 and evolved four basic demands known as the Delhi Proposal s. These proposal s were: (1) Sind should be made a separate province; (2) the North-West Front ierProvince should be t reated const i tut ional ly on the same foot ing as other provinces; (3) Musl ims should have 33 1/3 per cent representat ion in the cent ral legi slature; (4) in Punjab and Bengal , the proport ion of representat ion should be in accordance wi th the populat ion, thus guaranteeing a Musl im majori ty, and in other provinces, where Musl ims were a minori ty, the exi st ing reservat ion of seat s for Musl ims should cont inue.The Congress proposal s came in the form of the Nehru Report drafted by an al l -part ies commi t tee.The Report was put up for approval before an Al l -Party Convent ion at Calcut ta at the end of December1928. Apart from other aspect s, the Nehru Report recommended that India should be a federat ion on the basi s of l ingui st ic provinces and provincial autonomy, that elect ions be held on the basi s of joint electorates and that seat s in cent ral and provincial legi slatures be reserved for rel igious minori t ies in proport ion to thei r populat ion. The Report recommended the separat ion of Sind from Bombay and const i tut ional reform in the North-West Front ier Province.The Report could not be approved unanimously at the Calcut ta Convent ion. Whi le there were widedi fferences among Musl ims communal i st s, a sect ion of the League and the Khi lafat i st s were wi l l ingto accept joint electorates and other proposal s in the Report provided three amendment s, moved byM.A. Jinnah, were accepted. Two of these were the same as the thi rd and fourth demands in the DelhiProposal s, the fi rst and the second of these demands having been conceded by the Nehru Report . Thethi rd was a fresh demand that residuary powers should vest in the provinces. A large sect ion of theLeague led by Mohammed Shafi and the Aga Khan and many other Musl im communal groups refusedto agree to these amendment s; they were not wi l l ing to give up separate electorates. The HinduMahasabha and the Sikh League rai sed vehement object ions to the part s of the Report deal ing wi thSind, North-West Front ier Province, Bengal and Punjab. They al so refused to accept the Jinnahamendment s. The Congress leaders were not wi l l ing to accept the weak cent re that the Jinnahproposal s envi sioned.Jinnah’s Fourteen Point s. The Fourteen Point s basical ly consi sted of the fourDelhi Proposal s, the three Calcut ta amendement s and demands for the cont inuat ion of separateelectorates and reservat ion of seat s for Musl ims in government services and sel f-governing bodies.The Fourteen Point s were to form the basi s of al l future communal propaganda in the subsequentyears.The communal leaders got a chance to come into the l imel ight during the Round Table Conferencesof the early 1930s. At these conferences, the communal i st s joined hands wi th the most react ionarysect ions of the Bri t i sh rul ing classes. Both the Musl im and Hindu communal i st s made effort s to win

the support of Bri t i sh authori t ies to defend thei r so-cal led communal interest s. In 1932, at a meet ing in the House of Commons, the Aga Khan, the poet Mohammed Iqbal and the hi storian Shafaat Ahmad Khan st ressed ‘the inherent impossibi l i ty of securing any merger of Hindu and Musl im, pol i t ical , or indeed social interest s’ and ‘the impract icabi l i ty of ever governing India through anything but a Bri t i sh agency.’Moreover, in 1932, in an effort to bol ster the sagging Musl im communal i sm, the Bri t i shGovernment announced the Communal Award which accepted vi rtual ly al l the Musl im communaldemands embodied in the Delhi Proposal s of 1927 and Jinnah’s Fourteen Point s of 1929.

3 3Jinnah, Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism

Liberal communal i sm was t ransformed into ext remi st communal i sm for several reasons. As aconsequence of the growth of nat ional i sm and in part icular, of the Civi l Di sobedience Movement of1930-34, the Congress emerged as the dominant pol i t ical force in the elect ions of 1937. Variouspol i t ical part ies of landlords and other vested interest s suffered a drast ic decl ine. Moreover, as wehave seen, the youth as al so the workers and peasant s were increasingly turning to the Left , and thenat ional movement as a whole was get t ing increasingly radical ized in i t s economic and pol i t icalprogramme and pol icies. The zamindars and landlords — the jagi rdari element s — finding that opendefence of landlords’ interest s was no longer feasible, now, by and large, swi tched over tocommunal i sm for thei r class defence. Thi s was not only t rue in U.P. and Bihar but al so in Punjab andBengal . In Punjab, for example, the big landlords of West Punjab and the Musl im bureaucrat ic el i tehad supported the semi -communal , semi -castei st and loyal i st Unioni st Party. But they increasinglyfel t that the Unioni st Party, being a provincial party, could no longer protect them from Congressradical i sm, and so, during the years 1937-45, they gradual ly shi fted thei r support to the Musl imLeague which eagerly promi sed to protect thei r interest s. Very simi lar was the case of Musl imzamindars and jotedars in Bengal .He said that our principle of separate electorates was dividing the nat ion against i t sel f.’From 1906 onwards, Jinnah propagated the theme of nat ional uni ty in the meet ings that he addressed, earning from Saroj ini Naidu the t i t le ‘Ambassador of Hindu-Musl im Uni ty.’But he al so started assuming the role of a spokesperson of the Musl im ‘communi ty’ as a whole. These dual roles reached the height of thei r effect iveness in the Lucknow Congress-League Pact of which he and Ti lak were the joint authors. Act ing as the spokesperson of Musl im communal i sm, he got the Congress to acceptseparate electorates and the system of communal reservat ions. But he st i l l remained ful ly commi t ted to nat ional i sm and secular pol i t ics.He resigned from the Legi slat ive Counci l as a protest against the passing of the Rowlat t Bi l l .

3 4The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission

Subhas Bose had been a unanimous choice as the President of the Congress in 1938. In 1939, hedecided to stand again — thi s t ime as the spokesperson of mi l i tant pol i t ics and radical groups. Put t ing forward hi s candidature on 21 January 1939,On 24 January, Sardar Patel , Rajendra Prasad, J.B.Kripalani and four other members of the Congress Working Commi t tee i ssued a counter statement ,declaring that the talk of ideologies, programmes and pol icies was i rrelevant in the elect ions of aCongress president since these were evolved by the various Congress bodies such as the AICC and theWorking Commi t tee, and that the posi t ion of the Congress President was l ike that of a const i tut ional head who represented and symbol ized the uni ty and sol idari ty of the nat ion.

Wi th the blessings of Gandhi j i , these and other leaders put up Pat tabhi Si taramayya as a candidate for the post . Subhas Bose was elected on 29 January by 1580 votes against 1377. Gandhi j i declared that Si taramayya’s defeat was ‘more mine than hi s.’But the elect ion of Bose resolved nothing, i t only brought the brewing cri si s to a head at the Tripurisession of the Congress. There were two major reasons for the cri si s. One was the l ine of propagandaadopted by Bose against Sardar Patel and the majori ty of the top Congress leadership whom hebranded as right i st s. He openly accused them of working for a compromi se wi th the Government onthe quest ion of federat ion, of having even drawn up a l i st of prospect ive cent ral mini sters andtherefore of not want ing a left i st as the president of the Congress ‘who may be a thorn in the way of a compromi se and may put obstacles in the path of negot iat ions.’ He had, therefore, appealed toCongressmen to vote for a left i st and ‘a genuine ant i -federat ioni st .’Subhas Bose bel ieved that the Congress was st rong enough to launch an immediate st ruggle and thatthe masses were ready for such st ruggle. He was convinced, as he wrote later, ‘that the count ry wasinternal ly more ripe for a revolut ion than ever before and that the coming internat ional cri si s wouldgive India an opportuni ty for achieving her emancipat ion, which i s rare in human hi story.’He,therefore, argued in hi s president ial address at Tripuri for a programme of immediately giving theBri t i sh Government a six-months ul t imatum to grant the nat ional demand for independence and oflaunching a mass civi l di sobedience movement i f i t fai led to do so.The internal st ri fe reached i t s cl imax at the Tripuri session of the Congress, held from 8 to 12 March1939. Bose had completely mi sjudged hi s support and the meaning of hi s majori ty in the president ialelect ion. Congressmen had voted for him for diverse reasons, and above al l because he stood formi l i tant pol i t ics, and not because they wanted to have him as the supreme leader of the nat ionalmovement . They were not wi l l ing to reject Gandhi j i ’s leadership or that of other older leaders whodecided to bring thi s home to Subhas. Govind Bal labh Pant moved a resolut ion at Tripuri expressingful l confidence in the old Working Commi t tee, rei terat ing ful l fai th in Gandhi j i ’s leadership of themovement and the Congress pol icies of the previous twenty years, and asking Subhas to nominate hi sWorking Commi t tee ‘in accordance wi th the wi shes of Gandhi j i .’ The resolut ion was passed by a bigmajori ty, but Gandhi j i did not approve of the resolut ion and refused to impose a Working Commi t tee on Subhas. He asked him to nominate a Commi t tee of hi s own choice.Subhas Bose refused to take up the chal lenge. He had placed himsel f in an impossible si tuat ion.But Bose would not resi le from hi s posi t ion. On the one hand, he insi stedthat the Working Commi t tee should be representat ive of the new radical t rends and groups which hadelected him, on the other, he would not nominate hi s own Working Commi t tee. He preferred to presshi s resignat ion. Thi s led to the elect ion of Rajendra Prasad in hi s place. The Congress had weatheredanother storm. Bose could al so not get the support of the Congress Social i st s and the Communi st s at Tripuri orafter for they were not wi l l ing to divide the nat ional movement and fel t that i t s uni ty must bepreserved at al l cost s. Subsequent ly, in May, Subhas Bose and hi s fol lowers formed the Forward Bloc as a new partywi thin the Congress. And when he gave a cal l for an al l -India protest on 9 July against an AICCresolut ion, the Working Commi t tee took di scipl inary act ion against him, removing him from thepresident ship of the Bengal Provincial Congress Commi t tee and debarring him from holding anyCongress office for three years.The react ion of the Indian people and the nat ional leadership was sharp. The angriest react ion camefrom Gandhi j i who had been advocat ing more or less uncondi t ional support to Bri tain. Point ing outthat the Bri t i sh Government was cont inuing to pursue ‘the old pol icy of divide and rule,’ he said: ‘The

Indian declarat ion (of the Viceroy) shows clearly that there i s to be no democracy for India i f Bri taincan prevent i t . . . The Congress asked for bread and i t has got a stone.’ Referring to the quest ion ofminori t ies and special interest s such as those of the princes, foreign capi tal i st s, zamindars, etc.,Gandhi j i remarked: ‘The Congress wi l l safeguard the right s of every minori ty so long as they do notadvance claims inconsi stent wi th India’s independence.’ But , he added, ‘independent India wi l l nottolerate any interest s in confl ict wi th the t rue interest s of the masses.’The Working Commi t tee, meet ing on 23 October, rejected the Viceregal statement as a rei terat ionof the old imperial i st pol icy, decided not to support the War, and cal led upon the Congress mini st riesto resign as a protest . Thi s they did as di scipl ined soldiers of the nat ional movement . But the Congressleadership st i l l stayed i t s hand and was reluctant to give a cal l for an immediate and a massive ant i imperial i st st ruggle. In fact , the Working Commi t tee resolut ion of 23 October warned Congressmenagainst any hasty act ion.Near the end of 1940, the Congress once again asked Gandhi j i to takecommand. Gandhi j i now began to take steps which would lead to a mass st ruggle wi thin hi s broadst rategic perspect ive. He decided to ini t iate a l imi ted satyagraha on an individual basi s by a fewselected individual s in every local i ty. The demand of a satyagrahi would be for the freedom of speechto preach against part icipat ion in the War. The satyagrahi would publ icly declare: ‘It i s wrong to helpthe Bri t i sh war-effort wi th men or money. The only worthy effort i s to resi st al l war wi th non-violentresi stance.’ The satyagrahi would beforehand inform the di st rict magi st rate of the t ime and placewhere he or she was going to make the ant i -war speech. The careful ly chosen satyagrahi s — VinobaBhave was to be the fi rst satyagrahi on 17 October 1940 and Jawaharlal Nehru the second — weresurrounded by huge crowds when they appeared on the plat form, and the authori t ies could often arrest them only after they had made thei r speeches. And i f the Government did not arrest a satyagrahi , he or she would not only repeat the performance but move into the vi l lages and start a t rek towards Delhi ,thus part icipat ing in a movement that came to be known as the ‘Delhi Chalo’ (onwards to Delhi )movement .Thus, the Individual Satyagraha had a dual purpose — whi le giving expression to the Indianpeople’s st rong pol i t ical feel ing, i t gave the Bri t i sh Government further opportuni ty to peaceful lyaccept the Indian demands. Gandhi j i and the Congress were, because of thei r ant i -Nazi feel ings, st i l l reluctant to take advantage of the Bri t i sh predicament and embarrass her war effort by a massupheaval in India. More important ly, Gandhi j i was beginning to prepare the people for the comingst ruggle. As the war si tuat ion worsened, President Roosevel t of the USA and President Chiang Kai -Shek ofChina as al so the Labour Party leaders of Bri tain put pressure on Churchi l l to seek the act ivecooperat ion of Indians in the War. To secure thi s cooperat ion the Bri t i sh Government sent to India inMarch 1942 a mi ssion headed by a Cabinet mini ster Stafford Cripps, a left -wing Labouri te who hadearl ier act ively supported the Indian nat ional movement . Even though Cripps announced that the aimof Bri t i sh pol icy in India was ‘the earl iest possible real izat ion of sel f-government in India,’ the DraftDeclarat ion he brought wi th him was di sappoint ing. The Declarat ion promi sed India Dominion Statusand a const i tut ion-making body after the War whose members would be elected by the provincialassembl ies and nominated by the rulers in case of the princely states. The Paki stan demand was

accommodated by the provi sion that any province which was not prepared to accept the newconst i tut ion would have the right to sign a separate agreement wi th Bri tain regarding i t s future status. For the present the Bri t i sh would cont inue to exerci se sole cont rol over the defence of the count ry.Negot iat ions between Cripps and the Congress leaders broke down. The Congress objected to theprovi sion for Dominion Status rather than ful l independence, the representat ion of the princely statesin the const i tuent assembly not by the people of the states but by the nominees of the rulers, and aboveal l by the provi sion for the part i t ion of India. The Bri t i sh Government al so refused to accept thedemand for the immediate t ransfer of effect ive power to the Indians and for a real share in theresponsibi l i ty for the defence of India.

3 5The Quit India Movement and the INA

‘Qui t India,’ ‘Bharat Choro’. Thi s simple but powerful slogan launched the legendary st ruggle whichal so became famous by the name of the ‘August Revolut ion.’ In thi s st ruggle, the common people ofthe count ry demonst rated an unparal leled heroi sm and mi l i tancy. Moreover, the repression that theyfaced was the most brutal that had ever been used against the nat ional movement .For one, the fai lure of the Cripps Mi ssion in Apri l 1942 made i t clear that Bri tain was unwi l l ing tooffer an honourable set t lement and a real const i tut ional advance during the War, and that she wasdetermined to cont inue India’s unwi l l ing partnership in the War effort .A fortnight after Cripps’ departure,Gandhi j i drafted a resolut ion for the Congress Working Commi t tee cal l ing for Bri tain’s wi thdrawaland the adopt ion of non-violent non-cooperat ion against any Japanese invasion.Apart from Bri t i sh obduracy, there were other factors that made a st ruggle both inevi table andnecessary. Popular di scontent , a product of ri sing prices and war-t ime shortages, was gradual lymount ing. High-handed government act ions such as the commandeering of boat s in Bengal and Ori ssato prevent thei r being used by the Japanese had led to considerable anger among the people.The popular wi l l ingness to give expression to thi s di scontent was enhanced by the growing feel ingof an imminent Bri t i sh col lapse. The news of Al l ied reverses and Bri t i sh wi thdrawal s from South-EastAsia and Burma and the t rains bringing wounded soldiers from the Assam-Burma border confi rmedthi s feel ing.Combined wi th thi s was the impact of the manner of the Bri t i sh evacuat ion from Malaya andBurma. It was common knowledge that the Bri t i sh had evacuated the whi te resident s and general ly left the subject people to thei r fate. Let ters from Indians in South-East Asia to thei r relat ives in India were ful l of graphic account s of Bri t i sh bet rayal and thei r being left at the mercy of the dreaded Japanese.Was i t not only to be expected that they would repeat the performance in India, in the event of aJapanese occupat ion? In fact , one major reason for the leadership of the nat ional movement thinking i t necessary to launch a st ruggle was thei r feel ing that the people were becoming demoral ized and, that in the event of a Japanese occupat ion, might not resi st at al l . In order to bui ld up thei r capaci ty to resi st Japanese aggression, i t was necessary to draw them out of thi s demoral ized state of mind and convince them of thei r own power. Gandhi j i , as always, was part icularly clear on thi s aspect .Though Gandhi j i himsel f had begun to talk of the coming st ruggle for some t ime now, i t was at the

Working Commi t tee meet ing at Wardha on 14 July, 1942 that the Congress fi rst accepted the idea of a st ruggle. The Al l -India Congress Commi t tee was then to meet in Bombay in August to rat i fy thi sdeci sion.The hi storic August meet ing at Gowal ia Tank in Bombay was unprecedented in the popularenthusiasm i t generated.Gandhi j i ’s speech al so contained speci fic inst ruct ions for di fferent sect ions of the people.Government servant s would not yet be asked to resign, but they should openly declare thei r al legianceto the Congress, soldiers were al so not to leave thei r post s, but they were to ‘refuse to fi re on our ownpeople.’ The Princes were asked to ‘accept the sovereignty of your own people,’ instead of payinghomage to a foreign power.’And the people of the Princely States were asked to declare that they‘(were) part of the Indian nat ion and that they (would) accept the leadership of the Princes, i f the lat tercast thei r lot wi th the People, but not otherwi se.’ Student s were to give up studies i f they were surethey could cont inue to remain fi rm t i l l independence was achieved. On 7 August , Gandhi j i had placedthe inst ruct ions he had drafted before the Working Commi t tee, and in these he had proposed thatpeasant s ‘who have the courage, and are prepared to ri sk thei r al l ’ should refuse to pay the landrevenue. Tenant s were told that ‘the Congress holds that the land belongs to those who work on i t andto no one el se.’ Where the zamindari system prevai l s . . . i f the zamindar makes common cause wi ththe ryot , hi s port ion of the revenue, which may be set t led by mutual agreement , should be given tohim. But i f a zamindar want s to side wi th the Government , no tax should be paid to him.The Government had beenpreparing for the st rike since the outbreak of the War i t sel f, and since 1940 had been ready wi th anelaborate Revolut ionary Movement Ordinance.The Government responded by gagging thepress. The Nat ional Herald and Hari jan ceased publ icat ion for the ent i re durat ion of the st ruggle,others for shorter periods.Di sseminat ion ofnews was a very important part of the act ivi ty, and considerable success was achieved on thi s score,the most dramat ic being the Congress Radio operated clandest inely from di fferent locat ions inBombay ci ty, whose broadcast could be heard as far as Madras. Ram Manohar Lohia regularlybroadcast on thi s radio, and the radio cont inued t i l l November 1942 when i t was di scovered andconfi scated by the pol ice.In February 1943, a st riking new development provided a new burst of pol i t ical act ivi ty. Gandhi j icommenced a fast on 10 February in jai l . He declared the fast would last for twenty-one days. Thi swas hi s answer to the Government which had been constant ly exhort ing him to condemn the violenceof the people in the Qui t India Movement . Gandhi j i not only refused to condemn the people’s resort toviolence but unequivocal ly held the Government responsible for i t .Theseverest blow to the prest ige of the Government was the resignat ion of the three Indian members ofthe Viceroy’s Execut ive Counci l , M.S. Aney, N.R. Sarkar and H.P. Mody, who had supported theGovernment in i t s suppression of the 1942 movement , but were in no mood to be a party to Gandhi j i ’s

death.A signi ficant feature of the Qui t India Movement was the emergence of what came to be known asparal lel government s in some part s of the count ry. The fi rst one was proclaimed in Bal l ia, in EastU.P., in August 1942 under the leadership of Chi t tu Pande, who cal led himsel f a Gandhian. Though i tsucceeded in get t ing the Col lector to hand over power and release al l the arrested Congress leaders, i tcould not survive for long and when the soldiers marched in, a week after the paral lel government wasformed, they found that the leaders had fled.In Tamluk in the Midnapur di st rict of Bengal , the Jat iya Sarkar came into exi stence on 17December, 1942 and lasted t i l l September 1944. Tamluk was an area where Gandhian const ruct ivework had made considerable headway and i t was al so the scene of earl ier mass st ruggles. The Jat iyaSarkar undertook cyclone rel ief work, gave grant s to school s and organized an armed Vidyut Vahini . Ital so set up arbi t rat ion court s and di st ributed the surplus paddy of the wel l -to-do to the poor. Beinglocated in a relat ively remote area, i t could cont inue i t s act ivi t ies wi th comparat ive ease.14Satara, in Maharasht ra, emerged as the base of the longest -last ing and effect ive paral lelgovernment . From the very beginning of the Qui t India Movement , the region played an act ive role. In the fi rst phase from August 1942, there were marches on local government headquarters, the ones on Karad, Tasgaon and Islampur involving thousands. Thi s was fol lowed by sabotage, at tacks on postoffices, the loot ing of banks and the cut t ing of telegraph wi res. Y.B. Chavan, who had contact s wi thAchyut Patwardhan and other underground leaders, was the most important leader. But by the end of1942, thi s phase came to an end wi th the arrest of about two thousand people. From the very beginning of 1943, the underground act ivi st s began to regroup, and by the middle of the year, succeeded in consol idat ing the organizat ion. A paral lel government or Prat i Sarkar was set up and Nani Pat i l was i t s most important leader. Thi s phase was marked by at tacks on Government col laborators, informers and talat i s or lower-level official s and Robin Hood-style robberies. Nyayadan Mandal s or people’s court s were set up and just ice di spensed. Prohibi t ion was enforced, and ‘Gandhi marriages’ celebrated to which untouchables were invi ted and at which no ostentat ion was al lowed. Vi l lage l ibraries were set up and educat ion encouraged. The nat ive state of Aundh, whose ruler was pro-nat ional i st and had got the const i tut ion of hi s state drafted by Gandhi j i , provided invaluable support by offering refuge and shel ter to the Prat i Sarkar act ivi st s. The Prat i Sarkar cont inued to funct ion t i l l 1945.Women, especial ly col lege and school gi rl s, played avery important role. Aruna Asaf Al i and Sucheta Kripalani were two major women organizers of theunderground, and Usha Mehta an important member of the smal l group that ran the Congress Radio.In fact ,the erosion of loyal ty to the Bri t i sh Government of i t s own officers was one of the most st rikingaspect s of the Qui t India st ruggle. Al so, there was a total absence of any communal clashes, a sure sign that though the movement may not have aroused much support from among the majori ty of the Musl im masses, i t did not arouse thei r host i l i ty ei ther.A st rict watch was kept on these development s, but no repressive act ion was contemplatedand the Viceroy’s energies were di rected towards formulat ing an offer (known as the Wavel l Offer orthe Simla Conference) which would pre-empt a st ruggle by effect ing an agreement wi th the Congressbefore the War wi th Japan ended. The Congress leaders were released to part icipate in the SimlaConference in June 1945. That marked the end of the phase of confrontat ion that had exi sted sinceAugust 1942.

INA

The idea of the INAwas fi rst conceived in Malaya by Mohan Singh, an Indian officer of the Bri t i sh Indian Army, when hedecided not to join the ret reat ing Bri t i sh army and instead went to the Japanese for help.Indian pri soners of war were handed over by the Japanese to Mohan Singh who then t ried to recrui tthem into an Indian Nat ional Army. The fal l of Singapore was crucial , for thi s brought 45,000 IndianPOWs into Mohan Singh’s sphere of influence. By the end of 1942, forty thousand men expressedthei r wi l l ingness to join the INA. It was repeatedly made clear at various meet ings of leaders of theIndian communi ty and of Indian Army officers that the INA would go into act ion only on theinvi tat ion of the Indian Nat ional Congress and the people of India. The INA was al so seen by many as a means of checking the mi sconduct of the Japanese against Indians in South-East Asia and a bulwark against a future Japanese occupat ion of India.The outbreak of the Qui t India Movement gave a fi l l ip to the INA as wel l . Ant i -Bri t i shdemonst rat ions were organized in Malaya. On 1 September 1942, the fi rst divi sion of the INA wasformed wi th 16,300 men. The Japanese were by now more amenable to the idea of an armed Indianwing because they were contemplat ing an Indian invasion. But , by December 1942, serious di fferencesemerged between the Indian army officers led by Mohan Singh and the Japanese over the role that theINA was to play. Mohan Singh and Ni ranjan Singh Gi l l , the senior-most Indian officer to join theINA, were arrested. The Japanese, i t turned out , wanted only a token force of 2,000 men, whi le Mohan Singh wanted to rai se an Indian Nat ional Army of 20,000.The second phase of the INA began when Subhas Chandra Bose was brought to Singapore on 2 July1943, by means of German and Japanese submarines. He went to Tokyo and Prime Mini ster Tojodeclared that Japan had no terri torial designs on India. Bose returned to Singapore and set up theProvi sional Government of Free India on 21 October 1943. The Provi sional Government then declared war on Bri tain and the Uni ted States, and was recogni sed by the Axi s powers and thei r satel l i tes.Subhas Bose set up two INA headquarters, in Rangoon and in Singapore, and began to reorganize theINA. Recrui t s were sought from civi l ians, funds were gathered, and even a women’s regiment cal ledthe Rani Jhansi regiment was formed. On 6 July 1944, Subhas Bose, in a broadcast on Azad HindRadio addressed to Gandhi j i , said: ‘India’s last war of independence has begun . . . Father of ourNat ion! In thi s holy war of India’s l iberat ion, we ask for your blessing and good wi shes.’One INA bat tal ion commanded by Shah Nawaz was al lowed to accompany the Japanese Army tothe Indo-Burma front and part icipate in the Imphal campaign. But the di scriminatory t reatment whichincluded being denied rat ions, arms and being made to do menial work for the Japanese uni t s,completely demoral ized the INA men. The fai lure of the Imphal campaign, and the steady Japaneseret reat thereafter, quashed any hopes of the INA l iberat ing the nat ion.

3 6Post-War National Upsurge

the Tebhaga Movement , the Warl i s Revol t , the Punjab ki san morchas, theTravancore people’s st ruggle (especial ly the Punnapra-Vayalar epi sode) and the TelenganaMovement . These movement s had an ant i -imperial i st edge — as the di rect oppressors they chal lenged were al so the vested interest s that const i tuted the social support of the Raj — but they did not come into di rect confl ict wi th the colonial regime.The defence of the INA pri soners was taken up by the Congress and BhulabhaiDesai , Tej Bahadur Sapru, K.N. Kat ju, Nehru and Asaf Al i appeared in court at the hi storic Red Fortt rial s. The Congress organi sed an INA Rel ief and Enqui ry Commi t tee, which provided smal l sums ofmoney and food to the men on thei r release, and at tempted, though wi th marginal success, to secure

employment for these men. The Congress authorized the Cent ral INA Fund Commi t tee, the Mayor’sFund in Bombay, the AICC and the PCC offices and Sarat Bose to col lect funds.The growing nat ional i st sent iment , that reached a crescendo around the INA t rial s, developed intoviolent confrontat ions wi th authori ty in the winter of 1945-46. There were three upsurges — one on 21 November 1945 in Calcut ta over the INA t rial s; the second on 11 February 1946 in Calcut ta to protest against the seven year sentence given to an INA officer, Rashid Al i ; and the thi rd in Bombay of 18 February 1946 when the rat ings of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) went on st rike.The RIN revol t started on 18 February when 1100 naval rat ings of HMIS Talwar st ruck work atBombay to protest against the t reatment meted out to them — flagrant racial di scriminat ion,unpalatable food and abuses to boot . The arrest of B.C. Dut t , a rat ing, for scrawl ing ‘Qui t India’ on theHMIS Talwar, was sorely resented. The next day, rat ings from Cast le and Fort Barracks joined thest rike and on hearing that the HMIS Talwar rat ings had been fi red upon (which was incorrect ) leftthei r post s and went around Bombay in lorries, holding aloft Congress flags, threatening Europeansand pol icemen and occasional ly breaking a shop window or twoIn the RIN revol t , Karachi was a major cent re,second only to Bombay. The news reached Karachi on 19 February, upon which the HMIS Hindustanalongwi th one more ship and three shore establ i shment s, went on a l ightning st rike.The RIN revol t remains alegend to thi s day. When i t took place, i t had a dramat ic impact on popular consciousness. A revol t inthe armed forces, even i f soon suppressed, had a great l iberat ing effect on the minds of people. TheRIN revol t was seen as an event which marked the end of Bri t i sh rule almost as final ly asIndependence Day, 1947. When we examine these upsurges closely we find that the form they took, that of an ext reme, di rectand violent confl ict wi th authori ty, had certain l imi tat ions. Only the most mi l i tant sect ions of societycould part icipate. There was no place for the l iberal and conservat ive groups which had ral l ied to theINA cause earl ier or for the men and women of smal l towns and vi l lages who had formed thebackbone of the mass movement s in earl ier decades. Besides, these upsurges were short -l ived, as thet ide of popular fury surged forth, only to subside al l too quickly.The communal uni ty wi tnessed was more organizat ional uni ty than uni ty of the people. Moreover,the organizat ions came together only for a speci fic agi tat ion that lasted a few days, as was the case inCalcut ta on the i ssue of Rashid Al i ’s t rial . Calcut ta, the scene of ‘the almost revolut ion’ in February1946, according to Gautam Chat topadhaya, became the bat t le ground of communal frenzy only sixmonths later, on 16 August 1946. The communal uni ty evident in the RIN revol t was l imi ted, despi te the Congress, League and Communi st flags being joint ly hoi sted on the ships’ mast s. Musl im rat ings went to the League to seek advice on future act ion, whi le the rest went to the Congress and theSocial i st s; Jinnah’s advice to surrender was addressed to Musl im rat ings alone, who duly heeded i t .The view that communal uni ty forged in the st ruggles of 1945-46 could, i f taken further, have avertedpart i t ion, seems to be based on wi shful thinking rather than concrete hi storical possibi l i ty. The ‘uni ty at the barricades’ did not show thi s promi se.Event s in November 1945 in Calcut ta had the t roops standing by, but the Governor of Bengalpreferred to and was able to cont rol the si tuat ion wi th the pol ice. Troops were cal led in on 12 February1946 in Calcut ta and thi rty-six civi l ians were ki l led in the fi ring. Simi larly, during the RIN revol t ,rat ings were forced to surrender in Karachi and six of them were ki l led in the process. Cont rary to the

popular bel ief that Indian t roops in Bombay had refused to fi re on thei r count rymen, i t was a Marathabat tal ion in Bombay that rounded up the rat ings and restored them to thei r barracks.The Amri t Bazaar Pat rika referred to the vi rtual steel ring aroundBombay. Two hundred and twenty eight civi l ians died in Bombay whi le 1046 were injured.The Secretaryof State’s New Year statement and the Bri t i sh Prime Mini ster’s announcement of the deci sion to senda Cabinet Mi ssion on 19 February 1946 spoke of Indian independence coming soon.

3 7Freedom and Partition

But after the Cripps Offer of 1942, there was l i t t le left to be offered as a concession exceptt ransfer of power — ful l freedom i t sel f.Bri t i sh pol icy in 1946 clearly reflected thi s preference for a uni ted India, in sharp cont rast to earl ierdeclarat ions. At t lee’s 15 March 1946 statement that a ‘minori ty wi l l not be al lowed to place a veto onthe progress of the majori ty’ was a far cry from Wavel l ’s al lowing Jinnah to wreck the SimlaConference in June-July 1945 by hi s insi stence on nominat ing al l Musl ims. The Cabinet Mi ssion wasconvinced that Paki stan was not viable and that the minori t ies’ autonomy must somehow besafeguarded wi thin the framework of a uni ted India. The Mi ssion Plan conceived three sect ions, A —compri sing Madras, Bombay, Ut tar Pradesh, Bihar, C.P. and Ori ssa; B — consi st ing of Punjab, NWFPand Sind; and C — of Bengal and Assam — which would meet separately to decide on groupconst i tut ions. There would be a common cent re cont rol l ing defence, foreign affai rs andcommunicat ions. After the fi rst general elect ions a province could come out of a group. After tenyears a province could cal l for a reconsiderat ion of the group or union const i tut ion. Congress wantedthat a province need not wai t t i l l the fi rst elect ions to leave a group, i t should have the opt ion not tojoin i t in the fi rst place. It had Congress-ruled provinces of Assam and NWFP (which were in Sect ionsC and B respect ively) in mind when i t rai sed thi s quest ion. The League wanted provinces to have theright to quest ion the union const i tut ion now, not wai t for ten years. There was obviously a problem inthat the Mi ssion Plan was ambivalent on whether grouping was compul sory or opt ional . It declaredthat grouping was opt ional but sect ions were compul sory. Thi s was a cont radict ion, which rather thanremoving, the Mi ssion del iberately quibbled about in the hope of somehow reconci l ing thei rreconci leable.The Congress and League interpreted the Mi ssion Plan in thei r own way, both seeing i t as aconfi rmat ion of thei r stand. Thus, Patel maintained that the Mi ssion’s Plan was against Paki stan, thatthe League’s veto was gone and that one Const i tuent Assembly was envi saged. The League announcedi t s acceptance of the Plan on 6 June in so far as the basi s of Paki stan was impl ied in the Mi ssion’s planby vi rtue of the compul sory grouping. Nehru asserted the Congress Working Commi t tee’s part icularinterpretat ion of the plan in hi s speech to the AICC on 7 July 1946: ‘We are not bound by a singlething except that we have decided to go into the Const i tuent Assembly.’The impl icat ion was that the

Assembly was sovereign and would decide rules of procedure. Jinnah seized the opportuni ty providedby Nehru’s speech to wi thdraw the League’s acceptance of the Mi ssion Plan on 29th July, 1946.The di lemma before the Government was whether to go ahead and form the Interim Governmentwi th the Congress or awai t League agreement to the plan. Wavel l , who had opted for the secondcourse at the Simla Conference an year earl ier, preferred to do the same again. But Hi s Majesty’sGovernment , especial ly the Secretary of State, argued that i t was vi tal to get Congress cooperat ion.Thus, the Interim Government was formed on 2nd September 1946 wi th Congress members alone wi th Nehru as de facto head. Thi s was against the League’s insi stence that al l set t lement s be acceptable toi t . The Bri t i sh in 1946, in keeping wi th thei r st rategic interest s in the post -independence Indiansubcont inent , took up a stance very di fferent from thei r earl ier posture of encouraging communalforces and denying the legi t imacy of nat ional i sm and the representat ive nature of the Congress.They were frightened into appeasing the League by Jinnah’sabi l i ty to unleash civi l war. Wavel l quiet ly brought the League into the Interim Government on 26October 1946 though i t had not accepted ei ther the short or long term provi sions of the CabinetMi ssion Plan and had not given up i t s pol icy of Di rect Act ion. The Secretary of State argued thatwi thout the League’s presence in the Government civi l war would have been inevi table. Jinnah hadsucceeded in keeping the Bri t i sh in hi s grip.The League’s demand for the di ssolut ion of the Const i tuent Assembly that had metfor the fi rst t ime on 9th December 1946 had proved to be the last st raw. Earl ier i t had refused to jointhe Const i tuent Assembly despi te assurances from Hi s Majesty’s Government in thei r 6th December1946 statement that the League’s interpretat ion of grouping was the correct one. A di rect bid forPaki stan, rather than through the Mi ssion Plan, seemed to be the card Jinnah now sought to play.Thi s developing cri si s was temporari ly defused by the statement made by At t lee in Parl iament on20 February, 1947. The date for Bri t i sh wi thdrawal from India was fixed as 30 June 1948 and theappointment of a new Viceroy, Lord Mountbat ten, was announced. The hope was that the date wouldshock the part ies into agreement on the main quest ion and avert the const i tut ional cri si s thatthreatened. Besides, Indians would be final ly convinced that the Bri t i sh were sincere about concedingindependence, however, both these hopes were int roduced into the terminal date not ion after i t hadbeen accepted. The basic reason why the At t lee Government accepted the need for a final date wasbecause they could not deny the t ruth of Wavel l ’s assessment that an i rreversible decl ine ofGovernment authori ty had taken place. They could di smi ss the Viceroy, on the ground that he waspessimi st ic, which they did in the most di scourteous manner possible.Jenkins’ prophecy took immediate shape wi th the League launching civi l di sobedience inPunjab and bringing down the Unioni st Akal i - Congress coal i t ion mini st ry led by Khizr Hayat Khan.Wavel l wrote in hi s diary on 13th March 1947 — ‘Khizr’s resignat ion was prompted largely by thestatement of February 20.’The idea of a fixed date was original ly Wavel l ’s, 31 March 1948 being the date by which heexpected a stage of responsibi l i ty wi thout power to set in. At t lee thought mid-1948 should be the dateaimed at . Mountbat ten insi sted i t be a calendar date and got 30th June 1948.The Mountbat ten Plan, as the 3rd June, 1947 Plan came to be known, sought to effect an earlyt ransfer of power on the basi s of Dominion Status to two successor states, India and Paki stan.Congress was wi l l ing to accept Dominion Status for a whi le because i t fel t i t must assume ful l powerimmediately and meet boldly the explosive si tuat ion in the count ry.

The early date, 15th August 1947, andthe delay in announcing the Boundary Commi ssion Award, both Mountbat ten’s deci sions,compounded the t ragedy that took place. The BoundaryCommi ssion Award was ready by 12th August , 1947 but Mountbat ten decided to make i t publ ic afterIndependence Day, so that the responsibi l i ty would not fal l on the Bri t i sh.The acceptance of Part i t ion in 1947 was, thus, only the final act of a process of step by stepconcession to the League’s int ransigent champioining of a sovereign Musl im state. Autonomy ofMusl im majori ty provinces was accepted in 1942 at the t ime of the Cripps Mi ssion. Gandhi j i went astep further and accepted the right of sel f-determinat ion of Musl im majori ty provinces in hi s talkswi th Jinnah in 1944. In June 1946, Congress conceded the possibi l i ty of Musl im majori ty provinces(which formed Group B and C of the Cabinet Mi ssion Plan) set t ing up a separate Const i tuentAssembly, but opposed compul sory grouping and upheld the right of NWFP and Assam not to jointhei r groups i f they so wi shed. But by the end of the year, Nehru said he would accept the rul ing of theFederal Court on whether grouping was compul sory or opt ional . The Congress accepted wi thoutdemur the clari ficat ion by the Bri t i sh Cabinet in December, 1946 that grouping was compul sory.Congress official ly referred to Part i t ion in early March 1947 when a resolut ion was passed in theCongress Working Commi t tee that Punjab (and by impl icat ion Bengal ) must be part i t ioned i f thecount ry was divided. The final act of surrender to the League’s demands was in June 1947 whenCongress ended up accept ing Part i t ion under the 3rd June Plan.

3 9The Indian National Movement — The Ideological

DimensionAt the Lahore Congress in 1929, a resolut ion sponsored by Gandhi j i condemning the Revolut ionary Terrori st s’ bomb at tack on the Viceroy’s t rain was passed by a narrow majori ty of 942 to 794. In 1942, thi rteen Communi st members of the AICC voted against the famous Qui t India resolut ion.The resolut ion on fundamental right s, passed by the Karachi Congress in 1931 and drafted by him, guaranteed the right s of free expression of opinion through speech and the Press and the freedom of associat ion. In August 1936, as a resul t of hi s effort s, the Indian Civi l Libert ies Union was formed on non-party, non-sectarian l ines to mobi l ize publ ic opinion against al l encroachment s on civi l l ibert ies. From 1921, the Congress organized i t s provincial or area commi t tees along l ingui st ic l ines and not according to the Bri t i sh-created mul t i -l ingual provinces.Gandhi j i was to some extent an except ion to thi sunanimous opinion, but not whol ly so. Nor did he counterpose hi s opinion to that of the rest of thenat ional leadership. Moreover, hi s stand on the use of machines and large-scale indust ry has beengrossly di storted. He was opposed to machines only when they di splaced the labour of the many orenriched the few at the expense of the many. On the other hand, he repeatedly said that he would‘prize every invent ion of science made for the benefi t of al l .’ He repeatedly said that he was notopposed to modern large-scale indust ry so long as i t augmented, and l ightened the burden of, humanlabour and not di splaced i t . Moreover, he laid down another condi t ion: Al l large-scale indust ry should be owned and cont rol led by the state and not by private capi tal i st s.The nat ional i st s were ful ly commi t ted to the larger goal of independent , sel f-rel iant economicdevelopment to be based on independence from foreign capi tal , the creat ion of an indigenous capi talgoods or machine-making sector and the foundat ion and development of independent science andtechnology. Ever since the 1840s, Bri t i sh economi st s and admini st rators had argued for the investment of foreign capi tal as the major inst rument for the development of India.

The Indian nat ional i st s, from Dadabhai Naoroj i and Ti lak to Gandhi j i and Nehru, di sagreed vehement ly. Foreign capi tal , they argued, did not develop a count ry but underdeveloped i t . It suppressed indigenous capi tal and made i t s future growth di fficul t . It was al so, the nat ional i st s said, pol i t ical ly harmful because, sooner or later i t began to wield an increasing and dominat ing influence over the admini st rat ion.Start ing wi th Dadabhai Naoroj i and Ranade, the nat ional i st s vi sual ized a crucial role for the publ icsector in the bui lding of an independent and modern economy. In the 1930s, Jawaharlal Nehru,Gandhi j i , and the left -wing al so argued for the publ ic sector, especial ly in large-scale and keyindust ries, as a means of prevent ing the concent rat ion of weal th in a few hands. In the late 1930s, theobject ive of economic planning was al so widely accepted. In 1938, the Congress, then under thepresident ship of Subhas Chandra Bose, set up the Nat ional Planning Commi t tee under thechai rmanship of Nehru, to draw up a development plan for free India. During World War II, severalother plans were devi sed, the most important being the Bombay Plan drawn up by the big three of theIndian capi tal i st world — J.R.D. Tata, G.D. Bi rla and Sri Ram. Thi s plan too vi sual ized far-reachingland reforms, a large publ ic sector and massive publ ic and private investment .Final ly, in 1945, the Congress Working Commi t tee accepted the pol icy of the abol i t ion of landlordi smand of land belonging to the t i l ler when i t declared: ‘The reform of the land system involves theremoval of intermediaries between the peasant and the state.’Gandhi j i did not accept a class analysi s of society and the role of class st ruggle.He was al so opposed to the use of violence even in defence of the interest s of the poor. But hi s basicout look was that of social t ransformat ion. He was commi t ted to basic changes in the exi st ing systemof economic and pol i t ical power. Moreover, he was constant ly moving in a radical di rect ion during the 1930s and 1940s. In 1933, he agreed wi th Nehru that ‘wi thout a material revi sion of vested interest s the condi t ion of the masses can never be improved.’He was beginning to oppose private propertyand thus radical ize hi s theory of t rusteeship. He repeatedly argued for the nat ional izat ion of largescale indust ry. He condemned the exploi tat ion of the masses inherent in capi tal i sm and landlordi sm.He was highly cri t ical of the socio-economic role played by the middle classes.Hi s emphasi s on the removal of di st inct ion and di scriminat ion between physical and mental labour, hi s overal l emphasi s on social and economic equal i ty and on the sel f-act ivi ty of the masses, hi s opposi t ion to caste inequal i ty and oppression, hi s act ive support to women’s social l iberat ion, and the general orientat ion of hi s thought and wri t ing towards the exploi ted, the oppressed and the downt rodden tended in general to impart a radical ideological di rect ion to the nat ional movement .The most remarkable development was Gandhi j i ’s shi ft towards agrarian radical i sm.