beyond transparency: an analysis of the trade policy review of the european union

Beyond Transparency: An Analysis

of the Trade Policy Review of the

European Union

P.K.M. Tharakan

1. INTRODUCTION

W HILE the trade policies of all Members of the WTO are subject toperiodic review by the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, the frequency

of the review of individual Members varies. The policies of the four largesttrading entities in terms of world market share, including the European Union(EU), are reviewed every two years. Others are reviewed less frequently.

This article briefly and selectively analyses the fourth Trade Policy Review(TPR) of the European Union which was completed by the WTO in 1997, andpublished in 1998.1 The preceding TPR of the EU was analysed in considerabledetail by Pelkmans and Carzaniga inThe World Economyin 1996.2 The fourthTrade Policy Review of the European Union was conducted under the ‘interimreview’ framework agreed in 1996 by the Trade Policy Review Body. Hence itfocuses principally on the developments in the trade policy, and in the economyof the EU since the previous Review held in 1995. The sector coverage is moreselective than in earlier Reviews.

The Review (WTO, 1997) provides an analysis of: (a) the EconomicEnvironment; (b) Recent Developments in Trade Policies; (c) Trade Policy byInstruments; (d) Trade Policy by Sectors; and (e) the Outlook. In this article weshall deal selectively with the contents of (b), (c) and (d). A comprehensive

ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UKand 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 825

P.K.M. THARAKAN is from the University of Antwerp, UFSIA.1 This document which is the subject of the present paper is, as could be expected, repeatedlyreferred to in the following pages. In an effort to diminish the monotony of reiteration, it isinterchangeably referred to in this article as: WTO (1997); Trade Policy Review, TPR, or theReview. Note that the year of the completion of the Review (1997), rather than the year of itspublication (1998) is consistently used throughout this paper including the ‘references’.2 See Pelkmans and Carzaniga (1996).

analysis of the contents of the Trade Policy Review is outside the scope of thisshort article. Our aim is to focus attention on selected issues.

2. EU TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND THE QUESTION OF REGIONALISM

VERSUS MULTILATERALISM

During the period reviewed in WTO (1997), the focus of attention of theEU’s policies was mainly on the future enlargement of the Union, and theintroduction of the single currency. The latter is likely to figure prominently inthe next Trade Policy Review, and hence we shall not analyse that problemhere. As for the former, an important step was taken with the Commission’sproposal (‘Agenda 2000’) to admit to EU Membership, Cyprus, the CzechRepublic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia as a first group (WTO, 1997,p. 14). This period also saw numerous steps taken to strengthen the EU’seconomic links with the neighbouring countries. In this context there was theconclusion of a new generation of association agreements with the countries ofthe Mediterranean basin, and the acceleration of the pre-accession strategy forthe Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the Baltic States.Parallel to these ‘interregional efforts’, there were a number of bilateralinitiatives for the purpose of developing closer ties with other trading partners.For example, under the Trans-Atlantic Agenda, steps were taken for closer EU-US relations. A new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the FormerSoviet Union (FSU) countries was signed. Negotiations were also started withMexico and South Africa with a view to concluding new trade agreements.Moves were also made for developing closer trade relations with MERCOSUR,Chile and South-East Asian countries.

Steps taken towards the further enlargement of the EU, and the multiplicity ofregional and other preferential arrangements, raise certain important questions.Are they consistent with the relevant WTO rules? Are the WTO rules in questionadequate to deal with the proliferation of preferential and regional arrangements?Are the possible adverse effects of such arrangements on third parties sufficientlytaken into consideration? Are they aiding or hindering the move towardsmultilateral liberalisation? In short, here we are directly in a field where one ofthe most important controversies in the current economic literature rages.

As Lahiri (1998) has pointed out elsewhere, the controversy concerningregionalism which remained latent for nearly two decades has come back with avengeance because of the advent of ‘new’ regionalism, i.e. the rapid proliferationof PTAs (Preferential Trading Arrangements), often of a regional nature, usuallywith the explicit blessings of influential political forces. The simultaneouspresence of the forces of regionalism and multilateralism is at the core of thecurrent turbulence. It is useful to first briefly mention some elements of this

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controversy before reviewing the related developments in the EU trade policycovered by WTO (1997).3

While the analysis of the new regionalism tends to stress its importantdifferences with the old Vinerian comparative static approach (see, for example,Ethier, 1998), basic issues such as trade diversion generated by Regional TradeArrangements (RTAs) remain highly relevant. But this static welfare effectanalysis has to be supplemented by other considerations. RTAs have ‘systemic’implications. Preferential treatment requires the establishment of ‘rules of origin’which are usually determined on the basis of some arbitrarily established share ofcontent in the gross value of the product or service traded. Since there could bedifferent rules of origin for different products, and as RTAs might have non-synchronised preferential trading arrangements with other ‘regions’ or countries,the result is what Bhagwati (1995) has called the ‘spaghetti bowl’ phenomenon ofnumerous and criss-crossing pattern of ‘arrangements’ and rules of tariffs.

At a fundamental level Bhagwati’s (1992) argument that if RTAs can bringabout welfare gains, then the gains from multilateral liberalisation should be evengreater has remained largely unassailable. It has been argued that a multilateralliberalisation, by making geographic distance more important relative to tradebarriers, might be expected to cause a country’s trade to become more regional(Ethier, 1998). Seen this way, the new regionalism reflects the success ofmultilateralism not its failure. Another set of arguments in favour of regionalismis based on political feasibility considerations. Seen from this angle, completemultilateral liberalisation is unattainable in the short run, while complete regionalliberalisation might be politically feasible. Hence, at the practical level, theappropriate comparison might be between incomplete multilateral liberalisation,and far more complete RTAs.4 Further, the RTAs might make progress inmultilateral trade liberalisation easier, since it will reduce the number of ‘players’involved. Again, regional liberalisation is likely to strengthen the hands of pro-trade forces, and this in turn could positively influence multilateral liberalisationeffects.

Given the imminent further expansion of the EU, and the maze of bilateral andplurilateral initiatives which the Union is undertaking for the purpose ofdeveloping special economic links with a number of countries, WTO (1997)would have been an excellent forum to carry out (or restate the results of) an in-depth analysis and evaluation of the above question.5 As the Trade Policy Review

3 For the more detailed analysis of this problem, see Bhagwati, Greenaway and Panagariya (1998),Ethier (1998) and Bagwell and Staiger (1998).4 Stated differently, ‘the rationale for regional economic integration rests upon the existence ofconstraints on the use of first-best policy instruments’ (El-Agraa, 1996, p. 220).5 As mentioned in Laird (1999), an analysis of the problem of the increase in new agreements, aswell as the deepening and widening of the existing agreements (especially in Europe) was carriedout by WTO. That analysis sought to explain the surge in RTAs in terms of the shortcomings of the

TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF THE EU 827


(WTO, 1997, p. 22) points out, the existence of multiple levels of preferences andtheir internal and external impact has been the subject of considerable debatewithin the EU. As a result, the Council requested the Commission to conduct adetailed analysis on WTO conformity and on common policies for futurepreferential arrangements. The Commission’s study acknowledged that the sharpincrease in the number of preferential agreements has an increasing impact onworld trade, and made certain recommendations. Consequently, the Council ofMinisters of the EU decided in 1997 that in the future, proposals for entirely newpreferential agreements should be subject to particularly close scrutiny. TheTrade Policy Review (WTO, 1997, p. 22) feels that the Council implicitly has leftlittle scope for further expansion of the current network of agreements. The EUCouncil decision suggests at least that the ‘spaghetti bowl critique’ of RTAs ishaving some effect on the policy makers.

In fact, in the discussions in the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) meeting,some WTO Members voiced the concern whether the EU’s impressive networkof bilateral and regional agreements was distracting the Union from itsmultilateral objectives (WTO, 1997, pp. x, 160, 163). For example, therepresentative of Canada highlighted the potentially prejudicial effects ofbilateral arrangements on third parties, citing the example of a specific sector.In more general terms, the representative of Japan stressed that the enlargementof the EU should by no means distort the free trade practices, nor damage them.f.n. principles of the WTO. He also argued that the EU should start ArticleXXIV:8 negotiations (to compensate trading partners for changes in accessconditions due to enlargement) with third parties, and the results should bereflected in the outcome for enlargement.

The essential elements of the EU representative’s reaction to these remarksprovide some interesting insights.6 He made a distinction between the traditional‘free trade area’ and the more comprehensive concept of ‘regional integration’.Free trade was only one element of regional integration. He referred to thegeopolitical aspects of the EU’s network of regional and bilateral agreementssuch as those with Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the Mediterranean.He recognised that varying rules of origin could create problems. Hence, uniformrules of origin were proposed in the European Agreements and the ‘newgeneration’ of Mediterranean Agreements. While the EU Agreements hadstimulated increased trade by partners, more than 60 per cent of the imports into

GATT system, the change in the US position concerning the participation in RTAs, and the urge toprovide some kind of a safeguard against the possible failure of the Uruguay Round Negotiations.But the EU’s expansionary surge has continued to gather momentum even after the successfulconclusion of the Uruguay Round. Hence, an in-depth analysis of the type suggested above wouldhave been all the more appropriate in WTO (1997), which is directly concerned with the EU’s tradepolicy.6 See WTO (1997, pp. 169–73).

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the Community were not affected by preferential agreements, and that the overallperformance in the EU market of non-preferential partners had remained stable.As for Article XXIV negotiations, their timing and conclusion depended on thefinal decision to enlarge.

On the whole WTO (1997) sees the EU policy developments during the periodreviewed positively. This rather optimistic view is based mainly on the followingconsiderations:

While the Trade Policy Review acknowledges that the enlargement of theUnion and the expansion of the EU’s preferential network of free-tradeagreements are bound to give some concern to the ‘most-favoured-nation’trading partners in relation to trade diversion and the ‘systemic effects’, it alsonotes that the EU has shown the willingness to reassess in depth both the patternof its free-trade area relationships and their relationships with the WTOAgreements, and with m.f.n. partners.7

Secondly, the Union engaged firmly in the process of Uruguay Roundimplementation and promoted the use of WTO settlement procedures.8 It played akey role in the successful negotiations on basic telecommunications and oninformation technology products. The Agreement on Trade in InformationTechnology Products (ITA) is particularly important. It allows for the eliminationof customs duties and other charges on an m.f.n. basis, for well over 90 per centof world trade in information technology products. It could well be that thecompromise reached between the EU and the US over semi-conductors in theQuad Ministerial Meeting in September 1996 paved the way for the inclusion ofthe ITA on the agenda of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore and forthe final accord.

In addition, the EU expressed strong support at the Singapore MinisterialConference for the establishment of WTO work programmes for clarifying theconnections between trade and certain important issues, of which competitionpolicy deserves special mention. After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round theEuropean Commission invited a group of experts to consider the question ofinternational competition rules. Following their report, the Commission proposedthat the Community (EU) should ask the WTO to set up a working party toconsider the development of an international framework of rules (see Meiklejohn,1999). While there are sharp differences among WTO Members on this question,the EU has maintained its pressure to include competition policy in the WTOagenda for the proposed ‘Millennium Round’.

7 We have already referred to the decision of the EU Council of Ministers in this context.8 According to WTO (1997, p. 36), the EU has been involved in 38 of the 100 requests forconsultations received by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body since the creation of the WTO.



3. SOME INSTRUMENTS OF TRADE POLICY AND PRACTICE

The Trade Policy Review expresses the view that during the period covered,the EU has slowly, but steadily, moved towards a more liberal trade regime. Itascribed this trend to: WTO accord implementation in the area of tariffreductions; the dismantling of quotas and Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs);new multilateral agreements such as those concerning information technologyand telecommunications and financial services; and the progress made in theSingle Market process. On the negative side the Review mentions: the sizeablegovernment assistance to EU economies; the limited effect of the opening ofpublic procurement markets on external suppliers; and the survival of monopolyor duopoly structures in certain service markets.9 The Review does not expressany serious concern about the contingent protection measures of the EU.

In 1997, the EU’s simple average m.f.n. tariff across all products stood at 10.0per cent. Although the simple average tariff rate for industrial products had fallenfrom 6 per cent in 1995 to 4.9 per cent in 1997 and is scheduled to decline toabout 3 per cent by the year 2000, the picture is very different in the agriculturalsector. The overall simple average of m.f.n. tariff for agricultural products whichstood at 25 per cent in 1995, was still as high as 20.8 per cent in 1997. But as aresult of the Uruguay Round, all EU agricultural tariffs are now bound, againsttwo thirds previously.

The EU’s tariff structure has traditionally shown considerable escalation,favouring domestic processors in certain sectors. By the year 2000, suchescalation by stage of processing will still remain in textiles, clothing, leather,rubber and agricultural and food products, and would have disappeared only inpaper and iron and steel.

The Review (WTO, 1997, pp. 51–58) treats the contingent protection policy(‘Trade defence instruments’), particularly the anti-dumping (AD) measures ofthe EU very cautiously. The reason for this discretion is not difficult to guess.After all, this is a controversial area where some of the WTO-sanctionedmeasures have a number of conceptual and operational weaknesses. In fact theeconomic rationale of the AD Agreement itself is open to question. As Koulen(1995, p. 232) notes:

. . . as illustrated by the absence of preambular considerations on questions of fundamentalobjectives and principles of anti-dumping action, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Anti-dumping is an agreement to disagree. Sooner or later this debate is likely to be resumed in theWTO.

The criticisms concerning the AD regulations and practices have beenelaborated in a number of studies.10 Compared to the AD rules of some of the

9 See WTO (1997, p. 44).10 See Finger (ed.) (1993); Tharakan (1999).

830 P.K.M. THARAKAN


other Member Countries, those of the EU are claimed to be better in somerespects. EU’s AD provisions contain a ‘lesser duty rule’, and a ‘Communityinterest clause’. Under the former, the level of duty only to a level sufficient toremove the injury to EU industry should be imposed, if this amount will be lowerthan the dumping margin. But, it should be noted that the methods used by theCommission for determining the injury margin (‘price undercutting’ and‘underselling’) have some serious shortcomings.11 The pre-Uruguay Round ADregulation of the EU already contained a ‘Community interest clause’ which wassubsequently strengthened. Article 21(1) of the Basic Regulation12 speaks of theneed for:

An appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of thedomestic industry and users and consumers.

Article 21(2) provides the possibility for interested parties including therepresentative consumer organisations to provide, within the time limitsspecified, relevant information to the Commission. But the Bureau of theConsumers of the European Union (BEUC) protests about the restrictive nature ofthe Commission’s guidelines which limit the scope of its participation in ADcases. It is invited only for cases involving finished consumer goods currentlysold at the retail level.13 The Trade Policy Review (p. 53) states that in general,the expansion of the ‘Community interest’ clause has increasingly brought anti-dumping actions to the public eye. But it does not state how many (if any) ADcomplaints were rejected because they did not meet the ‘Community interest’requirement. The Review (p. 51) also states that the fears that the gradualdismantling of VERs would translate into a sharp increase in the use of anti-dumping measures have not been realised so far. If it is so, it does not seem tohave been due to lack of trying. The decision to impose anti-dumping duties in avery important case in the cotton sector collapsed after the majority of the EUCouncil Members publicly attacked it and twice rejected the Commission’sfindings, within 18 months.14

Figure 1 shows the AD investigations launched by three of the principal users(Australia, the EU and the USA) during the period 1987–1997. There have beenconsiderable, year-to-year fluctuations and it is not advisable to give too muchimportance to the figures concerning any particular year. WTO (1997, p. 55)notes that the number of AD investigations launched by the EU ‘seems to havediminished since the last TPR’. The representative of Norway wondered whetherthis reduction was a temporary phenomenon or the beginning of a long trend(WTO, 1997, p. 165). As can be seen from Figure 1, by 1997 the number of AD

11 See Tharakan (1993).12 OJL349 (1994).13 See Tharakan, Vermulst and Tharakan (1998).14 SeeFinancial Times(6 October, 1998, p. 4).



initiations by EU was practically at the same level as in 1994. The representativesof a number of WTO Members, particularly from the Newly IndustrialisedCountries (NICs) voiced serious concern about the EU’s anti-dumping policy.15

But a significant recent development in this field is that the NICs and thedeveloping countries are now launching more AD dumping actions than those bythe industrial countries. A few industrial powers, including the EU, have shownthe way for years. Now it is not going to be easy to persuade the NICs to tonedown their anti-dumping actions. Nevertheless, in view of the seriousshortcomings of the current WTO-sanctioned anti-dumping mechanism, theproliferation of its use, and the dangers it poses for multilateral tradeliberalisation,16 the EU would be well-advised to push for the inclusion of theAD system as an item for a thorough reassessment in the agenda for the proposed‘Millennium Round’.

FIGURE 1Anti-dumping Investigations by Reporting Country 1987–1997

Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division; Anti-dumping Mechanism Databank.

15 See WTO (1997, pp. 163–68).16 The number of AD actions initiated, or in force, does not in itself provide an adequate picture ofthe dimension of the problem. The import-incidence figures of AD measures can be alsomisleading, as WTO (1997, p. 55, footnote 31) correctly points out. Frequent investigations, even ifthe complaints are finally rejected, amount to a kind of harassment of the defendants because of theuncertainty and expenses such actions create. Low import incidence figures (total share of theimports covered by the measures) might be due to the restrictive effects of the measures.

832 P.K.M. THARAKAN


4. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES AT THE SECTORAL LEVEL

The period covered by WTO (1997) was one of implementation of WTOAgreements and of deepening of the Single Market rather than one of majorregulatory change. The Review treats at some length the developments inagriculture, certain manufacturing sectors and services.

According to WTO (1997), during the period covered by the Review,favourable market prices helped to promote the process of reform of the CommonAgricultural Policy (CAP), and the fulfilment of WTO commitments facilitatedthe sector’s exposure to competition in a gradual manner. It will be recalled thatthe EU was one of the most difficult negotiating partners in the Uruguay Roundon the question of agriculture. But the CAP reform, packaged as an internalprocess, and pushed through by Ray MacSharry provided the basis for theUruguay Round Agreement on agriculture. Building on the CAP reform, the EUstarted implementing the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Compared to thesituation and attitudes that prevailed during the beginning of this decade, this is asubstantial change indeed.

During the period covered by the Review, the EU provided for an overall 20per cent cut in assistance programmes, and a 36 per cent cut in export subsidies.The establishment of minimum access conditions by product group, and thereduction of average tariffs by 36 per cent were under way. Simple average tariffson agricultural products had fallen by 25 per cent. But as was mentioned inSection 3 of this paper, it still had a high rate of 20.8 per cent in 1997. WTO(1997, p. 83) points out that in nearly 280 tariff lines at HS ten-digit level carryrates whose ad valorem equivalents exceed 50 per cent.

In general, the EU does not appear to have faced serious difficulties in meetingthe market access commitments and the internal support agreements concerningthe agricultural sector it made in the Uruguay Round. But the situation could bedifferent in the case of export subsidies. Mainly due to the high world marketprices for cereals which prevailed in 1995 and 1996, the EU was able to exportcereals without subsidies. But according to some estimates,17 the subsidisedexport quantities and subsidy outlays for certain products were above the basicEU commitments for the period corresponding to the crop year 1996–1997.18 Infact, the situation is likely to get even more difficult as the quantities and theoutlays under export subsidy commitments decline over time. But the EU hasadopted another reform package within the context of ‘Agenda 2000’. Since theforthcoming multilateral round is certain to have the agricultural sector on itsagenda, the EU’s aim seems to be to enhance its negotiating stance by cutting

17 See Tangermann (1999).18 The products concerned are olive oil and beef (quantity only), as well as rice and wine (bothquantity and outlay)ibid. p. 8.



down border protection, reducing export subsidies and reshaping internal supportin agriculture. Even in the watered-down form as approved by the Council, theproposed reforms are likely to turn out to be a constructive move.

As mentioned in Section 3 above, simple average m.f.n. tariffs on imports ofmanufactures have continued to decline from 6 per cent in 1995 to 4.9 per cent in1997, as a result of the Uruguay Round commitments. WTO (1997) analyses insome detail the adjustment that took place in the ‘traditional’ industries such astextiles and clothing, steel and coal, and motor vehicles. It also looks at the EU’sperformance in some of the ‘new’ industries such as electronics. We shall nowbriefly analyse the problems faced by one ‘traditional’ industry, i.e. textiles andclothing.

The textiles and clothing industry of the EU has been facing major problems.Although the imports of textiles and clothing rose sharply between 1985 and1994, it seems to have stabilised in 1995 and 1996 (WTO, 1997, p. 94). The EUproducers have responded to the problems faced by sluggish domestic demandand strong import pressure by modernising the production process through theuse of capital-intensive and technology-based techniques; but not surprisingly,the industry has continued to suffer heavy job losses. In recent years, the EU’sbilateral trade with partners in the Central and Eastern European and Mediter-ranean region has seen a rapid increase. According to the Trade Policy Review,this is probably due to preferential agreements, elimination of tariffs, harmonisa-tion of rules of origin or the regular increase in outward-processing (WTO, 1997,pp. 29–30). The discussion at the Trade Policy Review Body brought out some ofthe frustrations felt by the developing countries concerning the EU policy in thissector. The absence of high value-added items in the list of the products forintegration on textiles and clothing in the GATT and the increasing imposition ofanti-dumping measures on textiles imports were highlighted by one discussant(WTO, 1997, p. 161). It is possible that the big European retailers who areincreasingly supplying the EU market from offshore production facilities and thedeveloping countries who suffer from the lingering protectionist policies mightjoin forces to ensure that liberalisation in this sector does not lose momentum.

In the EU, the services account for about two thirds of value added andemployment. WTO analyses the developments in telecommunication services,financial services, transport and audiovisual services. The Review’s overallappreciation of the EU’s liberalisation in services is a measured one. It states thatthe EU has adopted a ‘gradual and pragmatic approach’ towards liberalisation inservices, ‘possibly at a lower cost, but also at a lower pace than in goods markets’(WTO, 1997, p. 106). In most service areas the EU’s approach seems to be aimedat establishing common rules to guarantee the right of establishment, and opencompetition and access to networks. It is interesting to note that one of thediscussants expressed appreciation of the EU’s role in promoting the negotiationsin the areas of telecommunications and financial services, and felt that steps have

834 P.K.M. THARAKAN


been taken to open up ‘core’ public services such as electricity, gas and postalservices. He also suggested the possibility of ‘linkages’ of services negotiationswith other areas of interest to developing countries such as textiles or agriculturein future negotiations.19 Whether such a ‘linkage’ materialises or not, theliberalisation in services is certain to be an important item in the forthcomingmultilateral negotiations.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The WTO’s 1997 Trade Policy Review of the European Union is a carefullycompiled document which contains valuable information on policy-relateddevelopments in one of the world’s most important trading entities. Thecomprehensiveness of the information that is provided and the attention to detailthat is evident in the description of the trade policy measures by instrument andsector, makes it a highly useful source for all those who are interested in thissubject. It has clearly contributed to making the EU’s trade policy moretransparent.

Transparency is, of course, an important requirement for an evaluation of thefull range of individual WTO Members’ trade policies and practices. But such anevaluation needs to go a step beyond transparency, and make, where necessary,difficult judgements which might, of course, carry the risk of being contested.

The WTO’s 1997 Trade Policy Review of the European Union has continuedits tradition of cautious approach. On some questions such as the effect of theproliferation of the preferential arrangements, and the use of the anti-dumpingmechanism, it could have used sharper instruments of evaluation. One would liketo hope that having made a substantial contribution to transparency, the TradePolicy Review mechanism of the WTO will, in the coming years, choose to givemore importance to the evaluation content. Meanwhile, the authors of the Reviewdeserve credit for the very useful work they have done.

REFERENCES

Bagwell, K. and R.W. Staiger (1998), ‘Will Preferential Agreements Undermine the MultilateralTrading System?’,The Economic Journal, 108, 449, 1162–82.

Bhagwati, J. (1992), ‘Regionalism versus Multilateralism’,The World Economy, 15, 5, 535–55.Bhagwati, J. (1995), ‘U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas’, in J. Bhagwati and

A. Krueger (eds.),The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements(Washington DC, AEIPress) 1–18.

Bhagwati, J., D. Greenaway and A. Panagariya (1998), ‘Trading Preferentially: Theory and Policy’,The Economic Journal, 108, 449, 1128–48.

19 See WTO (1997, p. 161).



El-Agraa, A.M. (1996), ‘International Economic Integration’, in D. Greenaway (ed.),CurrentIssues in International Trade(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, and New York: St. Martin’s Press,Inc., second edition), 174–230.

Ethier, W.J. (1998), ‘The New Regionalism’,The Economic Journal, 108, 449, 1149–61.Financial Times(1998), (London, 6 October).Finger, J.M. (ed.) (1993),Anti-dumping: How it Works and Who Gets Hurt(Ann Arbor: The

University of Michigan Press).Koulen, M. (1995), ‘The New Anti-dumping Code Through its Negotiating History’, in J.H.J.

Bourgeois, F. Berrod and E.G. Fournier (eds.),The Uruguay Round Results: A EuropeanLawyers’ Perspective(Brussels: European Interuniversity Press), 151–246.

Lahiri, S. (1998), ‘Regionalism versus Multilateralism’,The Economic Journal, 108, 449, 1126–27.Laird, S. (1999), ‘Regional Trade Agreements: Dangerous Liaisons?’ (Geneva, mimeo).Meiklejohn, R. (1999), ‘An International Competition Policy: Do We Need It? Is It Feasible?’

(Brussels, mimeo).Official Journal of the European Communities, L Series 349 (1994).Pelkmans, J. and A.G. Carzaniga (1996), ‘The Trade Policy Review of the European Union’,The

World Economy, Global Trade Policy, S. Arndt and C. Milner (eds.), 81–100.Tangermann, S. (1999), ‘Europe’s Agricultural Policies and the Millennium Round’ (Institute of

Agricultural Economics, University of Go¨ttingen, mimeo).Tharakan, P.K.M. (1993), ‘Contingent Protection: The US and the EC Anti-dumping Actions’,The

World Economy, 16, 5, 575–600.Tharakan, P.K.M. (1999), ‘Is Anti-Dumping Here To Stay?’The World Economy, 22, 2, 179–206.Tharakan, P.K.M., E. Vermulst and J. Tharakan (1998), ‘Interface Between Anti-dumping Policy

and Competition Policy: A Case Study’,The World Economy, 21, 8, 1035–60.WTO (1997),Trade Policy Review: European Union 1997(Geneva: World Trade Organisation).

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beyond transparency: an analysis of the trade policy review of the european union

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