beyond the russian reset

7/28/2019 Beyond the Russian Reset

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Beyond the Russian ResetBy Samuel Charap %

W i th the recent downturn inU.S.-Russian relations, observ-e r s i n bo th W a sh ing ton a ndMoscow have remarked upon the cyclicalnature of this key bilateral relationship. AsFyodor Lukyanov, a leading Russian com-mentator, noted in late 2012, "If we lookat the relationship since 1991, it's the samecycle all the time, between kind words andinspiration and deep crisis. Yeltsin, Clinton,Bush, Putin, Obama, it 's the same pattern."Indeed, the phases of high hopes and expec-tations in the years 1991-1994, 2000-2003and 2009-2011followed by deep disap-pointment in the intervening and subse-quent yearsdo seem to represent a cyclicalpattern.

But viewing U.S.-Russian re la t ions interms of cycles or patterns is misleading.It implies that the relationship is governedby immutable forces beyond the controlof policy makerslike the laws of physicsor the business cycle. But the problems inU.S.-Russian relations are man-made, andtherefore their resolution lies in the handsof the respective political establishmentsin Washington and Moscow. That is notto say it would be easy to fix them, or thatsuch a fix is likely anytime soon. In fact, theSamuel Charap is the senior fellow for Russiaand Eurasia at the International Institute forStrategic Studies, based at the iiss-us, the Institute'sWashington, DC, office. Previously he was aCouncil on Foreign Relations international-affairsfellow at the U.S. Department of State.

Opposite seems true. However, since agency,no t s t r uc tu r e , is t he ke y de t e r m ina n t ,policy makers bear the responsibility forimproving this state of affairs and have itwithin their power to do so.

To understand bet ter the reasons forthe ebbs and flows in bilateral relations,i t ' s important to recognize the peculiarway in which both s ides assess them.Officials and nongovernmental observersin both countries measure the relationshipbetween the two countries by looking atthe "del iverables" i t produces. In otherwords, when the two sides are forging newagreements or resolving global challenges,their relationship is seen to be improving.When they are not concluding new bilateraldeals and differ on significant global issues,the relationship is perceived as deteriorating.

T h e " re s et " p e r i o d ( 2 0 0 9 - 2 0 1 1 ) ,s o d u b b e d f o l l o w i n g V i ce P r e s i d e n tJoe Biden 's invocation of this metaphora t the Munich Secur i ty Confe rence inFebruary 2009, is a case in point. Thoseyears saw major deliverables produced atan impressive pace. T he key agreem entssigned in that period include: the landmarkNew Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NewSTART); the so-cal led 123 agreement oncivil nuclear cooperation; agreements onAfghanistan transit, including the rail-basedN or the r n D i s t r ibu t ion N e tw or k a nd a noverflight arrangement that as of January2013 allowed for more than 2,500 flightsacross Russian a ir space carrying morethan 460,000 U.S. mil i tary personnel ; an

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amendment to the Plutonium Managementand Disposition Agreement, providingfor the safe disposal of enough weapons-grade plutonium for seventeen thousandnuclear warheads; close cooperation in theeffort to rein in Iran's nuclear ambitions,including unprecedentedly comprehensiveUN Security Gouncil sanctions and worktoward a diplomatic solution; Russia'scancellation of its contract with Iran forthe s-300 surface-to-air missile systems,which, if delivered, would have been highlydestabilizing; Russian W TO membership,eighteen years after it initiated its bid, inlarge part due to significant progress onbilateral trade issues; and an agreement onvisas that makes it easier for Americans andRussians to visit and do business in eachother's countries. Gooperation increasedacross a wide range of issues addressed bythe nearly twenty working groups of theBilateral Presidential Gommission, whichwas created in mid-2009, including oncounterterrorism (such as joint exercisessimulating a hijacked plane over the BeringStrait), global health, energy efficiency andcounternarcotics measures. O utside thoseinstitutionalized channels, deliverables alsocame in the form of Russian helicoptersfor both the Afghan National Army andfor peacekeeping in Sudan; the positiveoutcome of the NATO-Russia Gouncil'ssummit at Lisbon in 2010; and the firstjoint Antarctic inspections.

Many of these deliverables were criticallyimportant for both U.S. and Russiannational security. Indeed, that was probablythe most productive period of cooperationbetween the two countries in the historyof their post-Soviet relationship. But theuse of deliverables as a gauge of bilateralties betrays the underlying fragility of therelationship itself. W hen the two capitalsare not focused on deliverables, morefundamental problems in the relationshiprise to the surface.

T he most corrosive of these is the realitythat elements within both countries 'national-security establishments continueto view each other as adversaries, almosttwenty-five years after the Gold W arended. T hese attitudes are most overtlymanifest in the persistence of "mutuallyassured destruction" (MAD) as the paradigmthat defines the nuclear relationship. T henotion that only guaranteed retaliationprevents one side from threatening theother's interests seems like an absurdanachronism in a world where the bipolarstandoff between the United States andthe Soviet Union is a distant memory. Butthe worst-case-scenario assumptions itcreates remain a persistent part of today'ssecurity dialogue. Take the current disputeover missile defense. If we strip away allthe coded rhetoric, Russia essentially isasking for guarantees that it can effectivelyannihilate the United States even afterW ashington a ttempts to take out Russia'sentire nuclear arsenal. U.S. officials issuerepeated reassurances to Moscow that itcould still destroy the United States evenif W ashington tried to neutralize Russia'shundreds of deployed strategic nuclearweapons through a "bolt from the blue"disarming first strike. T he mere existence ofthis kind of dialogue speaks volumes aboutmutual suspicion of intentions.

Without deliverables, both sides turntheir attention to the yawning gapbetween W ashington's expectations abo utRussia's post-Soviet political developmentand Russian realities that have not con-formed to those expectations. Many keyU.S. partners have far worse human-rightsrecords and not even the modicum ofdemocratic procedure that exists in RussiatodaySaudi Arabia and Ghina being justtwo examples. However, due to a combina-tion of Russia's own international commit-ments made in the 1990s and American


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and European expectations created by the"transition" paradigm that posited a smoothshift from Soviet Communism to marketdemocracy, Russia's democratic shortcom-ings have a far greater impact on its rela-tions with the United States. The com-mitments primarily stem fromRussia's membership in the Or-ganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a group-ing that grew out of the Hel-sinki accords, and the Councilof Europe, a regional human-rights body. Both created ad-ditional obligations regarding,and intensified oversight of,human rights and democracyin Russia.

In the absence of majornew deliverables, the U.S.-Russian rivalry in post-SovietEurasia also comes to thefore. Some U.S. discomfortwith Russia's relationships inits neighborhood is certainly warranted.Since 1991, Russia often has acted witha heavy hand. But it was clear by the endof the 1990s that Washington's nightmarescena r i oR uss i a ro l l i ng back t hesovereignty of the newly independent statesand forming a new anti-Western blocwas not going to materialize. Today, theU.S. objective of "bolstering sovereignty"in Russia's "near abroad" devolves at timesinto balancing games and outright paranoiaabout any degree of Russian influence inthe region. And Washington often seems tooperate on the assumption that, if nationsin the region cooperate with Moscow, theresult inevitably will be the imposition ofdecisions on Russia's neighbors against theirwill. Many in Moscow believe Washingtonlends i t s support to "ant i -Russian"politicians in order to limit Russianinfluence. In other words, Moscow sees thespecter of containment when Washington

thinks it is simply backing freely electedleaders.The reset, despite all the deliverablesoutlined above, did not address thesefundamental flaws in the relationship. Inretrospect, that period was remarkable in

that it demonstrated that the U.S.-Russianrelationship can produce a large numberof mutually beneficial agreements evenwithout any serious reconciliation effort.But i t is important to note whatbrought about the uptick in deliverablesin 20 09 -2 01 1. The term used here andelsewhere to describe the U.S.-Russianrelationship in that periodthe resetis really more accurately a description ofwhat the Obama administration did upontaking office: it significantly changedU.S. policy toward Russia. The GeorgeW. Bush administration's Russia policy,especially in the second term, reflected alack of interest in bilateral cooperation onthe international-security issues central tothe relationship, particularly arms control.During that period, the United Statesalso tried to influence Russian policiesby linking unrelated issues. For example,after the August 2008 war in Georgia, the


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administration pulled the 123 agreementout of the congressional review process.Also, the Bush administration, or elementswithin it , pursued policies seeminglydesigned to antagonize Russia gratuitously.The geopolitical gamesmanship followingthe "color revolut ions" in Georgiaand Ukraine that culminated in theNATO Buc harest Su m m it D ecla ratio nis probably the most significant case inpoint. That document, a product of directnegotiations among heads of state, declaredunequivocally that Ukraine and Georgia"will become" NATO members. It's easy tosee how Moscow read that as reflectingNATOS intent to impose membership onRussia's neighbors, regardless of theirpreparedness for membership or theirpopulations' support for it.

Upon t ak ing of f i ce , t he Obamaadministration promptly reversed thesetrends. The new president 's "Pragueagenda" of nuclear nonproliferation andarms control, as well as his determina tion topursue a multilateral solution to the Iraniannuclear problem, generated significantlymore engagement among senior decisionmakers of the two countries. The Obamateam also eschewed linkages of unrelatedissues, which were judged to have beencounterproductive based on Bush's trackrecord. In the case of the linkage betweenGeorgia and the 123 agreement notedabove, the outcome was no movement onRussia's actions in Georgia and no U.S.-Russian civilian nuclear cooperation. Sothe administration resolved that it wouldnot let disagreements over one set of issuespreclude cooperation on other issues. Butsenior officials also made clear they wouldnot bargain away unrelated issues merelyfor the sake of cooperation with Russia.Obama continued to articulate America'sinterest in Russia's democratic development,and he supported Russian civil society evenas his government worked with Russian

officials on key international-securityissues. The administration also, headlinesto the contrary notwithstanding, did notlet engagement with Russia affect relationswith U.S. allies or other partners in Europeand Eurasia.

Final ly, the Obama team was notinterested in playing "great games" orpursuing policies that were gratuitouslyconfrontational toward Russia. Regardingthe U.S. military facility at Kyrgyzstan'sM anas a irp ort , w hich is used as astopping-off point for U.S. soldiers andmatriel on their way to Afghanistan,the administration sought Russian buy-in, rather than treating the arrangementsas an exclusively bilateral issue with theKyrgyzstanis. Previously, this had ledMoscow to suspect that the United Statesintended to either stay there forever orto use Manas as part of an anti-Russiaencirclement strategy. Michael McFaul, whobecame U.S. ambassador to Moscow in late2011 after serving as senior director forRussia on the National Security Councilstaff following Obama's inauguration,recalled in an April 2011 speech that,during Obama's first meeting with Russianpresident Dmitri Medvedev, Obama madeclear he did not care to engage in great-power rivalry:

He said, "Help me understand. President Med-vedev, why you want us to leave Manas, be-cause what are our soldiers doing? They areflying into Afghanistan after a short amount oftime in Kyrgyzstan and they are fighting peoplethat if we weren't fighting them you wouldhave to be fighting them."The paradox of the "post-reset" periodis that the main factor that allowed for all

the deliverables of the resetthe Obamaadminist rat ion 's course correct ionremained unchanged while the relationshipitself deteriorated. Instead, other factors


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Elements within both countries' national-securityestablishments continue to view each other as adversaries,

almost twen ty-five years after the Cold W ar ended.

were to blame. First, the flood ofdeliverables slowed to a trickle. Givenhow many of them were achieved in thefirst few years of the reset, that pace couldnot be sustained. The agreements of thatperiod were anything but low-hanging fruit,despite some critics' claims. Many of themost significant ones resulted from monthsof hard work, and nearly all of themseemed impossible in 2008. Still, they were"lower hanging" than the issues on whichthe two sides are seeking agreement today,particularly missile defense and Syria.

Clearly, Vladimir Putin's return to thepresidency has had a negative impacton the relationship as well. Immediately fol-lowing his inauguration in May 2012, Putindid not take deliberate steps to worsen therelationship. But he demonstrated no inter-est in investing in it. Indeed, he signaled ina number of ways, most noticeably with hisno-show at the Camp David G-8 meetingthat month, that relations with the UnitedStates were not a foreign-policy priority.Putin's actions to slam shut the opening inRussian public life that had emerged inrecent years also dragged down the relation-ship. It is simply more complicated for anyU.S. administration to do business withRussia under these circumstances.Although his relationship with PresidentGeorge W. Bush, especially after 9/11,demonstrates that he is not ideologicallyopposed to U.S.-Russian cooperation,Putin is clearly fed up with certain aspectsof U.S. foreign policy, such as what heperceives as meddling in Russian domesticpolitics and a U.S. habit of toppling sitting

governments that disagree with it. And hehas signaled his frustration to Washingtonin no uncertain terms, through recentactions such as the ban on U.S. adoptionsof Russian children in retaliation for theMagnitsky legislation enacted by theU.S. Congress late last year. He furtherworsened the atmosphere in bilateralrelations by imposing additional restrictionson Americans working in Russian NGOSand through his apparent sanctioning ofgovernment-affiliated mouthpieces' andmedia outlets' virulent anti-Americanism.Putin's actions have called into questionone of the central tenets of the Obamaadministration's reset: that working onmul t iple agreements , increasing thenumber of contacts and broadening therelationship (including through the BilateralPresidential Commission) would allow thetwo countries to make progress on the long-standing disagreements outlined above. AsMcFaul stated in a speech at the CarnegieEndowment for International Peace inDecember 2010, "The trick is to be ableto have a longer horizon so that every move. . . is not seen as zero-sum, but you canplay a win-win over the long haul. . . . Andyou know, we're just midstream in what Ihope to be a long game, in terms of thisparticular policy." But this hope for a longgame has been dashed in recent months.So why did the long laundry list of reset-era deliverables fail to create conditions foraddressing the underlying problems in therelationship? The most important reasonis also the explanation for Putin's turn toanti-Americanism. Over the past twelve toeighteen months, the foundational pillar

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of the political system Putin constructedconsistently high levels of popular supportfor the leadershipbegan to crumble.Some astute analysts, particularly MikhailDmitriev and his colleagues at the Centerfor Strategic Research, saw the trend infocus groups as early as two years ago, butthe problem only became visible whenPutin announced that he had decided to runfor the presidency again in what Russiansdubbed a rokirovka or "castling move" onSeptember 24, 2011. That decision, whichmarked the complete personalization ofRussian politics, delegitimized both thepresidency and political institutions morebroadly in the eyes of Russia's most creativeand talented citizens, particularly the urbanmiddle class. Putin lost these voters, manyof whom had supported him because ofthe prosperity associated with his tenure.But these Russians think of themselves asEuropeans, not subjects of a personalistickleptocracy, and the rokirovka seemed to beleading to precisely that.

Instead of boosting stability, which seemsto have been the intent, the rokirovkatransformed the so-called Putin majorityacoali t ion comprised of economicallydynamic, middle-class Russians alongwith two more conservative social groups.

beneficiaries of the state(such as governmentemployees and pensioners)a n d r u r a l h e a r t l a n dvotersinto a much morereactionary, paternalisticPutin plurality. This shiftin domest i c po l i t i ca lalignments changed thecalculus of the Russianleadership; it now feltcompel led to employa n t i - A m e r i c a n i s m i norder to mobilize thisnarrower support base.This antagonism towardthe United States also is used to create asiege mentality in the public discourse,allowing the government to label its politicalopponents as traitors. This trope of theenemy at the gates" was used extensivelyin 2007-2008, at another low point inU.S.-Russian relations, and it is now

being used again. In short, as a result of itsincreasingly contested domestic politicalenvironment, the Russian leadership oftensees the bilateral relationship as a tool ofdomestic politics rather than an end in itselfor even a means of addressing Russia's globalchallenges. At those moments, the resetperiod's track record of cooperation does notaffect the decision-making equation.

B ut it was not just a change in the Rus-sian leadership's calculus that prevent-ed the joint work on reset-era deliverablesfrom transforming the relationship. In bothcountries, a small number of individu-alslargely concentrated in a handful ofexecutive-branch departmentswere re-sponsible for producing those deliverables.Their numbers were dwarfed by those onboth sides not involved in the reset andwho therefore did not become stakeholdersin its success or develop trust in the oppo-site side. In the United States, these nons-

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Imm ediately following his inauguration in May 2012,Putin did not take deliberate steps to worsen the relationship.

But he demonstrated no interest in investing in it.

problems discussed above: adversarialimpulses in the security establishmentsof both countries; disputes about Russia'sdomestic politics; and conflict in post-Soviet Eurasia. And, given many otherpressing priorities, such a reconciliationprocess is unlikely to be undertaken bysenior policy makers anytime soon. Butboth Moscow and Washington could takeimmediate steps to mitigate these problemsor set in motion processes that mightactually resolve them in the future.

While completely eliminating adversarialsentiment in the security establishmentsis not a short-term project, Russian andU.S. political leaders can initiate stepstoward that long-term goal. For example,both sides, and particularly the Russians,could signal publicly and privately thatthe excesses of "special services," such asthe harassment of Ambassador McFaul inMoscow, are unacceptable. In addition,senior decision makers, particularly defense-policy makers, could begin to sit downtogether and think seriously about a newframework for the nuclear relationshipthat will provide for their respectivecountries' security needs without stickingto the outdated MAD logic. Indeed, the talb'explicit goal should be to develop a roadmap aimed at overcoming the MAD logic.The steps need not come as a negotiatedtreaty, but rather as unilateral, coordinatedmoves toward a shared goal.

D isputes over Russian dom estic politicscould be mitigated or even eliminated,of course, were Russia's political systemto become more open and free. But evenunder the current conditions, policy makers

on both sides could manage this problemmuch better than they have in recent years.U.S. policy makers could move beyondthe pervasive Washington myth thatengagement with the Russian governmentimplies an endorsement of the Kremlin'slimits on domestic freedom and empowersa regime irreconcilably hostile to suchfreedom. While far from fully democratic,Russia is not a one-party dictatorship, andpolitical contestation is a fact of life. Thechoice is not between capitulation and all-out confrontation. The policy imperative isto foster Russian domestic trends leadingtoward a more open political system whilesubtly counteracting those that might takeit in the other direction. Russian policymakers, meanwhile, gain lit t le frompetulant bouts of "whatabout ism"responding to U.S. statements on humanrights in Russia with laundry lists ofpurported American shortcomings.Washington and Moscow can also domore to address conflictual approachesregarding post-Soviet Eurasia. Ratherthan seeking national advantage, thetwo countries should strive for mutuallyacceptable results. And such efforts shouldbe geared toward the creation of "win-win-win" outcomes for the United States,Russia and the countries of post-SovietEurasia. To reach that goal, Moscow andWashington can change the way they dobusiness in the region in several ways. First,they could provide significantly enhancedtransparency concerning their policies andactivities in the region. Second, Moscowand Washington should begin regularworking-level consultations on regional

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issues. Third, both governments shoulddial down their public rhetoric about theregion by several notches and instead seekways to signal positive-sum intentions.Most important, officials should rejectthe notion of "irreconcilable differences"between Moscow and Washington in post-Soviet Eurasia and make this position clearto officials of the states of the region.

D espite the recent downturn, bilateralties are still a far cry from their near-hostile state in 2008, following the Augustconfiict in Georgia. According to accountsthat first appeared in Ronald Asmus's 2010book A Little War That Shook the World:Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West,the U.S. National Security Council's "prin-cipals committee"which includes thepresident, vice president and other seniornational-security officialsconsidered theuse of military force to prevent Russia fromcontinuing its assault on Georgia. Officialsdiscussed (but ultimately rejected) the op-tion of bombing the tunnel used by Rus-sia to move troops into South Ossetia, aswell as other "surgicalstrikes." The fact that of-ficials at the highest levelsof decision making in theU.S. government evendiscussed military actionagainst the world's onlyother nuclear superpoweris profoundly disturbing.

Such a developmentseems divorced from therealities of today's U.S.-Russ ian re la t ionship ,which featured seventeenjoint bilateral militaryexercises last year. Andthere is little likelihood ofa return to the tensions of2008 in Obama's secondterm. Key international

priorities of the Obama team requireRussian cooperation. These include thesensitive negotiations between the so-calledP5+1 (the United States, Britain, France,Russia, China and Germany) with Iran overthe Islamic Republic's nuclear program, aswell as stabilization in Afghanistan as theU.S.-led International Security AssistanceForce approaches its 2014 departure. Also,at their June 2012 meeting during the LosCabos, Mexico, G-20 summit, both Obamaand Putin committed their governments tofocusing on boosting investment and trade,an issue that represents a clear win-win.F o r t h e O b a m a a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,advancing the president's Prague agendaremains a priority, so we should expect aU.S. proposal on one or more of the threecategories of nuclear weapons identifiedby the president in his letter to the Senatefollowing New START ratification: deployedstrategic weapons, nondeployed strategicweapons and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.Press reports in recent weeks suggestthe president is close to approving a keynuclear-policy-review document that would


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unlock the possibility for future reductions.The Russians have long made clear that aresolution to the missile-defense dispute isa sine qua non for further reductions. Buteven if the sides can find a solution to themissile-defense dilemma, the next bilateralarms-control deal could be significantlyharder to negotiate than New START,which was by no means easy. (The twonations' leaders reportedly had to resolveseveral issues themselves in direct talks.)The expiration of START I on December5, 2009, and with it the end of mutualverification and the crucial confidenceit builds, provided a powerful incentivefor both sides to reach a deal. With NewSTART'S verification regime now beingimplemented, the Russians have beenlukewarm at best about another bilateraldeal in the short term. Such a deal is notunimaginable. After all, going from theNew START limit of 1,550 deployed strategicwarheads to around 1,100, which is oneof the reported options being consideredin Washington, would not require a majorchange in doctrines. But the climate ofanti-Americanism and the imminent serialproduction of two new strategic missiles(the military-industrial complex remainsa powerful lobby in Russia) create strongdisincentives for Russian officials to engage.Still, the Prague agenda is not only aboutreductions, and on the nonproliferationfront, signs seem positive that a successorto the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat-reduction program will be agreed uponbefore its expiration this year.

But one should be wary of any list ofshared interests in an analysis of U.S.-Russian relat ions . Even when bothgovernments openly declare commonalityof goals on an issue, results can be elusive.The most vivid case in point is the U.S.-Russian Strategic Framework Declaration,also known as the Sochi Declaration,signed by Presidents Putin and Bush in

April 2008. That doc ument described along agenda of issues on which the twocountries' interests converge. It also declaredin striking language that both countrieshad definitively recognized that bilateraldisagreements were far outweighed bycommo n interests. The first parag raphdeclared:

We reject the zero-sum thinking of the ColdWar when "what was good for Russia was badfor America" and vice versa. Rather, we arededicated to working together and with othernations to address the global challenges of the21st century, moving the U.S.-Russia rela-tionship from one of strategic competition tostrategic partnership. We intend to cooperateas partners to promote security, and to jointlycounter rhe threats to peace we face, includinginternational terrorism and the proliferationof weapons of mass destruction. We are deter-mined to build a lasting peace, both on a bilat-eral basis and in international fora, recognizingour shared responsibility to the people of ourcountries and the global community of nationsto remain steadfast and united in pursuit of in-rernational security, and a peaceful, free world.Where we have differences, we will work toresolve them in a spirit of mutual respect.

S o m e c r i t i c s of the O b a m aadminis t rat ion have pointed to thatdocument to make the case that the resetwas nothing new. But that argument turnsthe real lesson of the Sochi Declaration onits head. The fact that only four monthsafter it was signed the United Statescontemplated an attack on Russian forcesin Georgia demonstrates that the documentamounted to mere words on paper. TheObama administration's reset producedmuch more than words. But until policymakers address the underlying problems inthe relationshipuntil brakes are installedon that carwe will continue to seedownswings like the one we have today, Q


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C o p y r i g h t o f N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t i s t h e p r o p e r t y o f C e n t e r f o r t h e N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t a n d i t s

c o n t e n t m a y n o t b e c o p i e d o r e m a i l e d t o m u l t i p l e s i t e s o r p o s t e d t o a l i s t s e r v w i t h o u t t h e

c o p y r i g h t h o l d e r ' s e x p r e s s w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . H o w e v e r , u s e r s m a y p r i n t , d o w n l o a d , o r e m a i l

a r t i c l e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l u s e .

beyond the russian reset

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