beyer p. religions in global society

Religions in Global Society: Transnational Resource and Globalized Category

Peter BeyerUniversity of Ottawa

Paper presented to the conference on ARe-Inventing Society in a Changing Global Economy@,University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, March 8-10, 2001

Abstract:

In most discussions of globalization, religion is a neglected category. The exceptions to thisrule mostly treat religion as a reaction against or corrective of globalization and its effects.This paper argues that religion does indeed occupy a place like this in contemporary globalsociety, but as an integral expression of the development of global society, not as somethingthat pre-existed this development and is now merely being transformed. To this end, the paperoutlines religion=s relatively recent construction as a worldwide social system, itsorthogonality with respect to the dominant mechanisms for inclusion as determined by themore powerful such systems, its role as an identifier of difference, its global as opposed tomerely local relevance and reach, its character as a domain of contestation that other notablypolitical forces seek to control, and its basic normality as a social domain in global society.

Introduction:

With its antecedents in the later 1960s and 1970s, the social-scientific debate about

globalization has since the mid-1980s taken on a substantial life of its own. In many ways it has

superceded discussions about modernization and those centred on the difference between capitalism

and socialism. The dominant popular meaning of the term is in fact roughly equivalent to global

economy or global capitalism. Following Robertson, Luhmann, Meyer, and several others, I would,

however, insist on a significantly wider sense of the term, primarily because what has been

globalizing over the past few centuries (if not millennia) is not just economy, mass media, or any

other subset of social relations, but society as such. Most of us in the world now live in a global

society, even though it still makes sense to use the word society in a more localized sense as well.

Religions in Global Society B Peter Beyer

In the context of this paper, a main advantage of adopting this position is that it permits less obvious,

but still important, aspects of the process of globalization to become more visible. This is especially

the case with religion.

One of the more peculiar features of the literature on globalization, transnationalism, world

society, world polity, world system, and other cognate terms is that religion, especially

institutionalized religion, receives relatively little attention.1 At the theoretical level, when the topic

is not wholly absent, either religion tends to appear as a minor theme under a larger heading like

culture; or the word is used in a broad functional sense (see Meyer et al., 1997). With regard to

empirical studies, while there are many studies of relevance to the role of religion in the development

of global society, relatively few adopt this perspective explicitly. There are, however, two revealing

sorts of exception to this neglect: religion that impinges significantly on institutional domains that

are the focus of attention, in particular the state;2 and more or less theological studies of

globalization. In the first case, certain topics receive more consistent attention, especially Islamic

religio-political movements and so-called [email protected] In the second case, what is notable

in most such studies is that they share the view that the global and transnational is predominantly

economic; that religion somehow stands in opposition to the global (see Stackhouse, 2000 for

diverse perspectives). The global or transnational character of religion itself only sometimes receives

1 There are of course exceptions and there are some signs that they may be increasing. See, as

examples, Beyer 1994, van der Veer, 1996, Rudolph & Piscatori 1997, Geschiere, 1999, Coleman, 2000.2 See, for instance, Juergensmeyer, 1994; Beyer, 1994; Haynes, 1998.3 In this regard, probably one of the more significant contributions to the literature on religion and

globalization is Scott Appleby and Martin Marty=s five-volume compilation on Afundamentalism@, TheFundamentalism Project (1991). Significantly, as with other works in this field, the range of thephenomenon treated is global, but its theorization is not. See also, among many others, Juergensmeyer,1994; Lawrence, 1989; Stump, 2000.


explicit thematization. In either literature, however, what is of note is the emphasis on the conflictual

role of religion, on its oppositional character with respect above all to the state and the economy.

This association of religion with conflict can serve as a point of departure for a closer examination

of how religion has been and still is a significant element in the constitution of global society.

Global/Local and Inclusion/Exclusion in Global Society

Whether implicitly or explicitly, one of the constants in discussions about globalization, the

global economy, and global society is the paradoxical relation between two levels of observation,

namely the global and the local (see Beyer, 1998a). I say paradoxical because on the one hand, the

global and local appear in opposition to one another and even in a kind of zero-sum relation. We see

this, for instance, in studies that focus on how the global economy is inimical to the quality of local

and national life, undermining the exercise of power and control at these levels (see, e.g. Beck,

2000). Alternatively, referring to Arjun Appadurai=s theoretical efforts as an example (Appadurai,

1996), it may be the imposition of modern nation-state projects themselves that represents the global

in a struggle against localities and neighbourhoods. On the other hand, however, there is the

concomitant realization in much of the literature that the global and the local construct themselves

in terms of each other, in Roland Robertson=s expression that globalization consists in the

simultaneous particularization of universalism and the universalization of particularism (see esp.

Robertson, 1992: 97ff.) Robertson and others have also adopted the term Aglocal@ as a way of

underlining this mutual relationship (Robertson, 1995; Brenner, 1998; Bauman, 1998: 70ff.). From

a slightly different perspective, the idea that Adeterritorialization@ is a prominent feature of today=s


global social realities points in a similar direction in the sense that the particular is not necessarily

in a particular location, that the local can be and often is also global (see Tomlinson, 1999: 106ff.)

Connected to the issue of the global and the local is that of inclusion and exclusion. One of

the more consistent critiques and worries with regard to globalization is that the process does not just

create comparative Awinners@ and Alosers@, the dominant and the subaltern, but that it excludes an

ever larger number of people and ways of life from any significant participation or presence in the

power structures of world society whatsoever. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it, the mutually

interdependent construction of the global and the local, or Aglocalization@, results in the division of

the world into two classes of people: those who benefit, have choices, and global mobility; and those

who are outside the global/local loop altogether and thereby rigidly tied to local places without

possibilities (Bauman, 1998). While one may question whether humanity can be divided neatly into

only two such starkly different groups, there is no doubt that the incidence of such radical exclusion

is highly problematic in a society that has institutionalized Aequality@ (inclusion) as an almost

globally accepted and self-evident value. In the context of this valuation two questions present

themselves: first, what determines inclusion in today=s global society? And second, when do we

know that someone is included? In other words, what are the mechanisms and standards of

inclusion?

From the perspective of the dominant popular meaning of globalization, inclusion would be

primarily economic: those who are included live above the Apoverty level@, however defined

precisely. Money is then the measure and the mechanism of inclusion. Although it would be hard

to gainsay this argument entirely, a more multi-dimensional approach to globalization shows that


matters are not quite that simple. To take an example, the United Nations Development Program=s

AHuman Development Index@ (UNDP, 2000), by looking at more than income, in effect recognizes

several standards of inclusion, and thereby implicitly points to other aspects of the mechanisms of

inclusion. At the core of the index are measures of wealth, health, and education. The annual report

also considers other factors such as degree of political freedom and security, and the effects of

technological innovations. As concerns the three core measures, the reports consistently show that

there is significant independent variation of the three from country to country4, but that by and large

rich countries B with very few exceptions5 B tend to score high on all three. This combination of

dependence and independence suggests that there are indeed several constituents of inclusion that

are nonetheless interdependent in important ways, and thus tend to be mutually reinforcing.

4 To take some clear examples, Tajikistan and Cuba score high on education and health, but

comparatively low on income; Saudi Arabia is exactly the reverse. AIDS has created enormous disparitiesbetween education/income and health in many sub-Saharan African countries. Health (life expectancy) inTunisia, Belize, and Jamaica is comparable to South Korea, but the former are on average significantly lesseducated and much poorer. See UNDP, 2000: backmatter1.pdf.

5 The most striking exceptions are oil-rich countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which tend toscore comparatively low on educational measures. UNDP, 2000: backmatter1.pdf.

Adapting a theoretical framework from the work of Niklas Luhmann (1995; 1997), one can

analyze the structural basis of globalization and current global society in terms of a series of societal

function systems, above all systems of capitalist economy, academic education, medicalized health,

positive law, empirical science, mass media, art, sport, sovereign political states, and religions. These


systems arose historically in the European and Western sphere but have since spread their modalities

to cover the entire globe, initially almost entirely through imperial imposition, since the 19th century

also through non-Western appropriation. Although by themselves they are not all that makes society

global, these systems do represent the dominant frameworks for generating and distributing social

power. In consequence, access to them in effect constitutes inclusion, thus making it multi-

dimensional because the criteria of one system are not the same as those of the others. In light of

their functional specialization, however, the systems are nonetheless interdependent. For example,

capitalist economy requires or at least must be able to assume relatively stable political and legal

contexts, mass media, and educated workers; hospitals need trained professionals and money; mass

media need scientifically generated technologies, money, and artists or sports stars; and so forth.

Therefore, in spite of the differentiation of these systems, people who have Acapital@ in one are at a

corresponding advantage for gaining Acapital@ in many if not all of the others. Highly educated

people have an easier time making money, gaining political power, or becoming scientists. People

with money have easier access to political power, education, art, or mass media; and so forth. The

different dimensions of inclusion roughly reinforce one another without thereby being reducible to

one of their number. This dependence/interdependence relation is precisely what the UNDP Human

Development measures also show.

One of the clearest examples of this reinforcement in the contemporary world is the effective

exclusion of vast segments of the populations in countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Indicative of this

dubious status is the position these lands occupy on the Human Development Index: out of 174

countries ranked in the year 2000 report, 23 of the 25 poorest are in this region. This does not mean


that they have escaped incorporation into the global systems I have just mentioned; but they are so

for the most part to a significantly lesser extent, featuring weak states, poor economies, limited

education systems, inadequate health facilities, and comparatively low penetration of mass media.

Correspondingly, the majority of the people in these countries count among the world=s excluded.

There is, however, one relative exception to this general pattern, and this concerns the presence, role,

and power of religion in this region (cf. Gifford, 1998). From a religious perspective, sub-Saharan

Africa seems comparatively Aadvanced@. In fact, an HDI measure of religious involvement such as

activity/membership in religious groups or level of cultic practice would undoubtedly show this

region as one of the more developed in the world, or at least not as seriously underdeveloped. This

tells us much not only about sub-Saharan Africa but also about the place of religion in global society.

Religion, it seems, is far less interdependent with the other globalized systems, and with

respect to inclusion/exclusion runs orthogonally to these.6 This orthogonality points to a peculiar

status for religion in global society, one that presents a mirror image to most of the other systems:

where the global features of economy, the system of states, science, and mass media are perhaps

more obvious than the local, with religion the opposite is the case. Where other systems more clearly

epitomize the systemic face of globalization, religion is in many ways more suited to representing

its anti-systemic aspect (see Beyer, 1992; 1997). Yet just as the global and the local are not so much

zero-sum opposites as obverse and reverse, so anti-systemicity in global society is itself an aspect

of systemicity, a constitutive moment rather than an excluded contradiction. Anti-systemicity is

6 See Luhmann, 2000. Arguably the systems for art and sport also exhibit a measure of

orthogonality, which is to say that religion is not entirely unique in this respect.


typically no more the realm of the excluded than is the local. Religion, therefore, would in its own

ways be just as constitutive of the globality of global society as any other globalized structure.

In the sections that follow, I offer an analysis of religion and religions in contemporary global

society that focuses on this somewhat peculiar characteristic. Religion is a system that sits

uncomfortably with systematization, but through its systemicity nonetheless constitutes a globalizing

structure of some importance. Speaking metaphorically, one might say that it constitutes a

transnational resource and transnational structures that run somewhat below the radar screen of the

more obviously globalizing systems like politics and economy.

The Modern and Global Construction of Religion and Religions

Religion in today=s global society is a highly contested category, and this from several

perspectives. One dimension of disagreement has to do with the restriction of religion to its Aproper

sphere@. On many occasions, religious people protest that their religion is not limited to matters

spiritual, but that it provides the foundation for all aspects of social and human life. The privatization

of religion and the secularization of the non-religious systems are at issue here. Alternatively,

conflicts arise over what movements or systems of belief and practice are to count as religion, either

in the form of wishing to exclude from the category or to be excluded from it. Scientology and Falun

Gong serve to illustrate the first. Protests by New Agers, Wiccans, and many aboriginal groups that

insist that theirs is not a religion are examples of the second. Both these varieties concern

contestations over the boundary between religion and non-religion. Similarly, the boundary between


religions can also be an area of dispute, such as in the attempt by Hindu nationalists to include Sikhs

within the orbit of Hindus, or the claim by Baha=is that they are a different religion and not an Islamic

heresy. Related to such questions are conflicts over orthodoxy in one religion or another and

differing valuations around the world of the category itself: does it designate the necessary basis of

all sound social and human order, is it a worthy pursuit provided that it remains a private concern

of individuals or voluntary groups, or is it a suspect endeavour that smacks of Western imperial

imposition, infantile illusion, or anti-social withdrawal from the pursuit of the collective good?

Many of these disputes have their foundation in the global dominance of the function systems

that I introduced in the previous section. In this regard, it is important to understand that religion,

far from being left out of the historical process of global function system formation, is more usefully

seen as an example of it. Religion=s orthogonal status vis-à-vis the other systems is not so much

because it is unlike them, but rather precisely because it is very much like them. Semantic

contestation around the category of religion is then symptomatic of the formation of a global

religious system, not of its absence.

Here cannot be the place for a thorough defence of the idea that a global religious system has

been forming more or less in tandem with such systems as for capitalist economy and sovereign

states. A brief summation of arguments I have made elsewhere will, however, suffice (see Beyer,

1997; 1998b; 1998c; forthcoming). Like the other systems, the origins of the religious system are in

late medieval and early modern European society. By the beginning of this period, Western Europe

already had a relatively differentiated religious system centred on the Roman Catholic church. Yet

this organization was still highly multi-functional and thoroughly interwoven with the predominantly


stratified structures of that society. Only with the gradual differentiation of some of the other

embryonic systems, notably for economy, politics and science, does one witness the progressive

isolation of religion as a clearly distinct domain, a development that reaches one of its critical stages

with the Protestant Reformation and its conflictual aftermath. In the wake of Reformation and

Counter-Reformation, religion among Europeans came to be seen not only as a distinct domain but

also as something plural. The semantic correlate of this process was the imagining, beginning in the

later16th and early 17th centuries, for the first time in European history, of a corresponding concept

of religion. Henceforth, to have religion meant for most people to have Aa@ religion, implying both

identifiable distinctness and plurality (see Despland, 1979; Harrison, 1990). The notion corresponded

well to a situation in which religious differences were highly institutionalized, seemed intractable,

fundamentally conflictual, and in which non-religious institutions were progressively asserting their

independence. Moreover, as these Europeans gradually extended their influence around the world

over these and subsequent centuries, they came to Adiscover@ other religions as well, notably those

that are now generally referred to as the Aworld religions@ (see Almond, 1988; Dalmia & von

Stietencron, 1995; Jensen, 1997; Kopf, 1969; Marshall, 1970). Correspondingly, local elites in

regions as diverse as East and South Asia appropriated the European category in various ways as part

of their efforts to respond to the European challenge and imperial onslaught. In the case of Buddhism

and Hinduism, they frequently collaborated in the reconstruction of indigenous religious traditions

as religions (Dumoulin & Maraldo, 1976; Frykenberg, 1989; Gold, 1991;Welch, 1968). In other

instances, such as Shinto and Chinese religion, the response was far more ambiguous (Beyer, 1999;

Hardacre, 1989; Jensen, 1997). The net result has been the construction and reconstruction on a


global and regional basis of a whole series of Aold@ and Anew@ religions which together form the core

of a global religious system.

Orthogonality and Marginalized Concerns

The global religious system is thus a typical structural expression of the modernization and

globalization of contemporary society. It bears similarities to some of the other systems, but it also

has its unique features, especially those that lead to the orthogonality discussed above. Perhaps the

principal of these is what one might label religion=s Aotherworldliness@. By this I do not mean that

religions are only concerned with some other, supraempirical level of reality, but rather the

comparative difficulty that religious practices have in demonstrating technical, Athis-worldly@ effect.

As long as what we now call religion existed in a social context of low technical development and

in one that correspondingly exhibited a low level of technically specialized differentiation, religious

techniques, especially ritual and ritual-like practices (e.g. meditation, divination, trance), could

appear as both efficacious and necessary. Once that is no longer the case, as neither of those features

characterizes contemporary society, the practical utility of religious practice and belief fades in

comparison. This does not at all mean the irrelevance of religion, but it does imply a reassessment

of what religion essentially does, a reassessment that mostly steers religion away from open

competition with the technically powerful modalities typical of many of the other systems, especially

science, economy, politics, and health. In consequence, and as a direct reflection of the dominance

of function systems in contemporary global society, religion comes to be seen as Aabout@ something

else than the other systems, whether that be styled as salvation or enlightenment, the provision of


foundational meaning or belonging, access to ecstatic experience, source of moral norms, or the basis

of cultural identification. Nonetheless, for people who are largely excluded from the benefits of the

more dominant, technical, and mutually reinforcing systems, religion still offers an alternative route

to inclusion, if not exactly a refuge. The highly diverse ways in which it can be constructed B a

feature that contributes to the increasing pluralization of religions in today=s world B also means a

relative ease of construction. Participation and therefore inclusion in religion is not necessarily

difficult or restricted to only the Atalented@ few, let alone the educated, the rich, the powerful, or the

healthy. Thus, contemporary society witnesses the greatest areas of religious growth and strength not

in Avirtuoso@ and specialized forms such as those identified with shamans, priests, mystics, prophets,

monks, nuns, and magicians. All these Aprofessional@ possibilities still exist, but the bulk of religion

is easily accessible, for the common person, in a word, lay. It is mass religion.

Good illustrations of this tendency are not hard to find. Pentecostal Christianity is probably

one, if not the, fastest growing segment of that religion. One of its most notable features is the

accessibility of ecstatic, Aspecialized@ religious experience to the mass of followers, not just the

leadership elite (Cox, 1995; Coleman, 2000). The (re)construction of Hinduism over the last century

has consistently emphasized maximizing the number of people that count as Hindus, often thereby

explicitly sacrificing elitist renunciatory and Brahmin-centred images (see, for example, Gold, 1991;

Jaffrelot, 1996). The lay Japanese Buddhist organization, the Soka Gakkai, is much stronger and

eclipses its erstwhile monastic and far more ancient counterpart, the Nichiren Shoshu (Métraux,

1994). And in general, it seems that for many religious organizations and movements, the number

of church plantings, mosque buildings, temple constructions, conversions or even demonstrations


of interest serve as a prime indicator of the strength, and indirectly even of the validity, of a religious

tradition.

Religion=s character as an orthogonally constructed, alternative system further gives it its

peculiar status as a system that seems more local than global, and more non-systemic or even anti-

systemic than systemic. Accordingly, religions, especially in the forms of religious organizations and

religious movements, tend to locate themselves largely in the gaps left by the more dominant

systems. They found oppositional movements, they take critical stands toward the dominant systems,

often locating the roots of local and global problems in the operation of these systems. They gravitate

in their operation toward the marginalized people and regions of the world. They create opportunities

for sectarian flight from the world of the dominant systems. They have been peculiarly suited for

founding movements that define and assert the exclusive difference of particular groups and cultures

in the face of the seemingly homogenizing and imperialistic tendencies of the dominant systems.

And they are among the most important institutions for helping the more marginalized, but not

excluded, people structure rapid changes such as those that typically occur with migration.

Examples of these sorts of role for religions are not hard to find. The Christian World

Council of Churches and various divisions of the Roman Catholic church involve themselves heavily

in environmental issues, in peace issues, in population issues, and in issues of poverty and exclusion,

often styling themselves as among the few consistent voices for the poor and the voiceless (see

Beyer, 1994: 206ff.; 1995; 1997). Islamic movements such as certain Black Muslim groups in the

United States or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt see it as their role to provide support services in


health, education, and welfare for the marginalized within their countries. In several countries of sub-

Saharan Africa, religious organizations are among the only effective ones in providing these sorts

of service to entire populations. Most of the so-called religious Afundamentalisms@ are not so much

movements to preserve threatened religious and cultural traditions as they are neo-traditional but

innovative movements that seek to establish a particular region or culture as clearly different from

all others, and above all from those in their own territories and outside it that seek to succumb to the

relativizing and even homogenizing influence of the dominant systems. Religions offer very suitable

resources for asserting such differences, especially in the form of modes and codes of behaviour that

are solidly rooted in the very differently structured societies of the past and therefore liable to appear

as sharply contrasting today. In this regard, forms of dress and sharply patriarchal gender roles are

frequently used symbols of such difference, being prominent in Islamic, Christian, Judaic, Sikh, and

Hindu forms of such identifying religious movements (see Riesebrodt, 1990). Finally, whether one

is looking at rural/urban migrations or global migrations from one part of the world to another,

religious institutions and above all reconstructed religious institutions are notoriously among the

most important ways in which migrants establish continuity in the face of fairly radical change. It

is under this heading that one might include movements as diverse as the Soka Gakkai and other new

religious movements in post-war Japan, the Buddha Light International in North America, and the

countless temples, mosques, churches, and gurdwaras that have sprung up in Europe, Australia,

Canada, and the United States as expressions of new and recent immigrants.

All these examples, however, only show the degree to which religious institutions are also

suitable for filling in various gaps and running counter to dominant trends. Overall, however, such


activity is only the minor part of what religion does. Most religious formations, organizations,

activity, and movements around the world are much more a part of normal everyday life, reproducing

themselves like the typical action of any other social system. In other words, the bulk of religious

activity around the world simply reproduces the religious system and does not concern itself

consistently or directly with such compensatory applications. Nonetheless, given the frequency of

such roles for religion, it should not be surprising that religion is often a category of contestation and

a target of control.

Religious Contestation

The quality of religion as something both Anormal@and Aabnormal@, systemic and counter-

systemic, has both advantages and disadvantages. To the degree that religion is not subject to the

expectation of convergence B as exists, for instance in the global economy, polity, law, science,

education, and health B it will be deemed as a matter of Ataste@, Achoice@ or Aculture@, as an area in

which there should be Afreedom@. Accordingly, most contemporary state constitutions

symptomatically guarantee Afreedom of religion@ in principle and isolate religions more or less as

an item of non-discrimination. From this perspective, one should be able to do religion as one sees

fit without negative consequences for inclusion in the benefits of other systems. This quality or view

of religion is the reverse side of its orthogonality. At the same time, such special status for what we

deem to be religion also tends to make it, by itself, irrelevant to the dominant structures for inclusion

as represented in the other systems. In other words, freedom of religion implies privatization of

religion and secularization of the other systems.


If religion as a social modality in today=s world were indeed constructed in this passive,

privatized, and non-systemic fashion, then such a status would probably obviate contestation over

the category. Such is not the case, however. As I have tried to outline briefly, religion has been

constructed systemically in global society, albeit somewhat ambiguously. Moreover, as noted above,

this construction has oriented religion in non-technical directions so as to avoid futile competition

with the other systems. In its construction as a function system, therefore, religion has come to

present itself and think of itself as that which is concerned with the whole or, alternatively, as that

which specializes in the conditions for the possibility of everything else. It concerns itself with the

spiritual whole as opposed to the technical and material parts. This orientation makes it suitable,

among other things, for addressing problems not addressed elsewhere (whether effectively or not is

a separate question) and for identifying cultural and personal wholes that claim to be beyond

technical control and disposition.

In this light, far from being a benign and unifying category, religion has in fact become a

prime area of contestation. On the basis of religion, one can claim relevance in all other domains,

including that of other religions. This possibility incites more than one religious movement to contest

its restriction to a differentiated, let alone privatized, domain. It can also make the boundaries

between religions problematic. On the other side, however, other systems may wish to control

religion and what counts as religion in an attempt to limit this sort of holistic bursting of religion of

its supposed boundaries. Thus, to take a prime example, in today=s world one sees the frequent

politicization of religion as religious instances seek to concretize the holistic authority that religion

can assert for itself. But one also sees consistent efforts by political instances to counter such claims


by seeking to control religions and especially to limit what counts as religion to those religious

institutions that accept such control. As a result, therefore, the guarantee of the Afreedom of religion@

just mentioned so often appears as something honoured more in the breech than the observance.

Illustrations of this perceived necessity to control religion are to be found in various countries

around the world. In Western countries as diverse as Argentina, the United States, Russia, and

France, new and not so new religious movements are often perceived to be a threat to the local

culture, to social order, or to personal well-being. Official, government sponsored efforts to control

new religions and to limit what of older religions can legitimately count as religion in a particular

country are not infrequent (see, from among an immense literature, Wilson & Cresswell, 1999). A

similar situation prevails in some non-Western countries, notably Japan. In countries such as China

and Indonesia, government policy and legislation determines precisely what religions are legitimate,

all other claimants being relegated to other categories or being considered potentially dangerous.

Thus, in Indonesia indigenous religious traditions that are not part of the five official religions are

less protected and are subsumed under the heading of Aculture@ (adat) rather than Areligion@ (agama)

(see Schiller, 1997). Similarly, the current Chinese government officially limits its recognition to five

religions (zongjiao), reserving the label of Acult@ or Aevil teaching@ (xiejiao) for religions over which

it has insufficient control, most recently, Falun Gong (cf. .

And, as a final example, the legitimacy of different religions is at the heart of Hindu nationalist

debates and conflicts in India, a country that also recognizes a limited set of religions or, perhaps

better, religious communities in its constitution and even its legal system, centrally Hindus, Muslims,

Christians, and Parsis. In all of these countries, and others besides, explicit or implicit models of


legitimate religion operate, models that allow a circumscribing of what the domain of religion itself

does not restrict, namely the many possible ways of doing religion and claiming Anon-discrimination@

on its basis.

Conclusion

Contestation about religion and contestations in the name of religion are in this way

somewhat of a constant in contemporary global society. As a system fraught with a significant

amount of ambiguity, it constitutes a resource for both complementing and opposing the other

systems. Religion can appear as quintessentially local and yet also be a prime way of generating

transnational and therefore global links that can hope to avoid nation-state control. The Pentecostal

congregation in Ottawa may appear as the strictly local creation of a group of Ethiopian migrants;

but looked at from a distance, it is also part of a vast transnational network that constitutes global

Pentecostalism and that helps define an Ethiopian diaspora (see Wilkinson, 1999; Coleman, 2000).

The Sikh temple in Vancouver may appear as much the same sort of thing, but it can also be an

integral moment in a very focused Sikh nationalism in Punjab. These and many other examples that

could be cited show religion to be a critical structure in global society. As such, however, religion

also demonstrates aspects of how that global society is constructed that escape views which

concentrate too heavily on the globality of the dominant function systems, notably the political, the

economic, and the mass media. Religion in fact shows that the systemicity of the global system

carries within itself an anti-systemic component which is not at all simply outside those dominant

structures. Religion exemplifies how anti-systemicity is itself an aspect of how the global system


constructs itself. In this sense, what we have constructed and are still constructing as religion in

contemporary global society constitutes an abnormal normality, different from the other systems in

is specific structures and processes, but also very much like them.

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