between 'los dos demonios': reconsidering argentine political violence, 1969 … ·...

"Between 'Los Dos Demonios': Reconsidering Argentine Political Violence, 1969-1974"1

Charles D. Brockett Political Science Department Sewanee: The University of the South [email protected]

In the field . . . of memories of recent political violence and state terrorism in conflict-ridden political scenarios, what we should find is a struggle among 'memory entrepreneurs,' who seek social recognition and political legitimacy of one (their own) interpretation or narrative of the past (Jelin 2003: 33-34).

In 1984 the Argentine Truth Commission released Nunca Más, its justly famous extensive portrayal of the state terrorism of the military regime of 1976-1983, as it had been charged by the country's new democratic president Raúl Alfonsín. Still, the report's prologue written under panel chair Ernesto Sabato also pointed to violence from the revolutionary left, beginning, "During the 1970s, Argentina was torn by terror from both the extreme right and the far left" (CONADEP 1986: 1).2 This doctrine of "two terrorisms" – or what is more frequently labeled "the theory of the two demons" – has remained controversial, even leading for some to discrediting the report itself. Three decades later the Argentine Human Rights Secretariat released a new edition of Nunca Más but with a new prologue that challenged that contentious sentence. Not surprisingly, this prologue provoked great controversy as well. The head of the secretariat, Eduardo Luis Duhalde, has been a long-time and well-known critic of la teoría de los dos demonios and he and his supporters were intransigent in their response. From many perspectives, any explanation that might suggest some equivalency between the violence of the Argentine government and its revolutionary opponents is absurd – and for many, reprehensible. Nunca Más documents "close to 9000" executions and disappearances by the military regime that seized power in March 1976 and suggests that "the true figure is much higher" (CONADEP 1986: 5). The human rights community usually suggests that total deaths and disappearances at the hands of the military regime were as high as 30,000, which is the figure used by the

1 Paper presented at Congress of Latin American Studies Association, Toronto, October 7-10, 2010. 2 This is the published English version; the original reads a little differently: "Durante la década del 70, la Argentina fue convulsionada por un terror que provenía tanto desde la extrema derecha como de la extrema izquierda" (La Nación, May 19, 2006).

Brockett, "Between Los Dos Demonios," p. 2

2006 edition of Nunca Más (CONADEP 2006: 8). In recent years the discovery of a formerly secret military document places the minimum killed at no less than 22,000 for 1975 through mid-1978 (Dinges 2003: 139-140). As has been repeatedly established, these were almost all victims of extrajudicial state violence as relatively few were killed in combat situations. In contrast, the number killed by the revolutionary left was so much less – perhaps just under 800 (García 1995: 54-55). If responsibility for the Argentine tragedy is allocated proportionally to direct responsibility for these deaths, then overwhelmingly that responsibility is properly placed on the state. Having made this incontrovertible and morally crucial point, critics of los dos demonios usually move on, acting as if the discussion is settled. But this lets the revolutionary left off far too easily. Given the enormity of this state violence, what often gets lost in the story has been the sequence: revolutionary violence in Argentina was less a response to state violence and more one of its precipitants. Justified by its critique of an unacceptable status quo and its belief in the greater viability of armed struggle, instead of producing a revolutionary outcome the revolutionary left provoked not just their own deaths but brought the rest of Argentina under the weight of one of Latin America’s most horrible reigns of state terror. From the second half of 1974 onward the magnitude of state violence swamped that coming from its adversaries. This massive extrajudicial response, however, followed five years of escalating revolutionary violence. As will be shown in the empirical section of this paper, for many periods during those five years, deaths caused by the revolutionary left exceeded those by the state. As would be the case for young leftists during the repressive years that followed, most of these victims – usually public officials – were killed outside of combat situations. Revolutionary movements have ideological, emotional, and mythic appeal, not just for citizens of their countries but often for those of us who write about them. Social science has long been enthralled by revolutions and revolutionary movements – and often by their idealistic promise. In the scholarly literature, though, there is a dearth of systematic empirical analyses of the revolutionary decision to employ violence against state actors and especially the costs that follow. In a previous work I examined the impact of state violence on mass political movements in Central America, especially whether repression will either deter or provoke further popular contention (Brockett 2005). Struck by how much revolutionary violence there had been in the periods prior to the escalation of state violence, it seemed to me that this subject was sufficiently important to warrant its own separate examination. This paper on Argentina is part of that subsequent project, which also includes the cases of Brazil and Guatemala (and to a lesser extent El Salvador) in a comparative study of the impact of revolutionary violence on state behavior.3

3 An earlier report on the Argentine dimension of this project was given at the last LASA Congress (Brockett 2009). That paper bypassed the dos demonios controversy. As will be explained in a later section, this paper also handles the data differently. A related paper discusses the Guatemalan case (Brockett 2010).


This paper begins with a consideration of the various viewpoints related to the dos demonios controversy. It then moves to its centerpiece, which is an analysis of deaths by political violence in Argentina for the 1968-1974 period utilizing an events database constructed by the author for this project primarily from Argentine sources. The data clearly establishes that state violence no matter how it might be measured overwhelmed revolutionary violence by the second half of 1974. The primary purpose of this paper is to offer a close analysis of the years before this threshold was reached. La Teoría de los Dos Demonios As a committed democrat, Raúl Alfonsín had been a staunch critic of the military regimes of both 1966-1973 and 1976-1983, as well as a vocal opponent of violent revolution. His position was one of consistent opposition against, as he stated in 1977, "whoever sustains that the end justifies the means" (quoted in Norden 1998: 84). Upon taking office in December 1983, Alfonsín immediately acted on this view, ordering the prosecution of not just nine top military leaders but also seven leaders associated with the revolutionary left. At the same time, he appointed the independent Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) to document the human rights violations of the prior military regime. After considerable work based on listening to the experiences of both prison survivors and families of the dead, CONADEP's detailed report was published the following November.4 Although its mandate and focus were centered on the violence of the military, Nunca Más's prologue did allocate a portion of blame to the revolutionary left -- to repeat the quotation introduced above, "During the 1970s, Argentina was torn by terror from both the extreme right and the far left." Having said that, however, the rest of the Prologue focuses on its condemnation of state violence. From the second paragraph to the end of the Prologue the emphasis shifts: "The armed forces responded to the terrorists' crimes with a terrorism far worse than the one they were combating," adding in the next paragraph, "we are convinced that the recent military dictatorship brought about the greatest and most savage tragedy in the history of Argentina" (CONADEP 1986: 1). Of the victims Nunca Más couldn't be more clear: "The vast majority of them were innocent not only of any acts of terrorism, but even of belonging to the fighting units of the guerrilla organizations" (p. 4). The position of Alfonsín and CONADEP has been criticized for a variety of reasons and not from just the left. Certainly the civilian Peronist administrations of 1973-1974 bear some of the responsibility for the escalating violence (Moyano 1995: 94-95).5 Accordingly, this paper defines this dimension of its subject as state as opposed to military violence. As numerous critics argue,6 at one important level there can be no equivalence drawn between state terrorism and subversion. It is the fundamental role of state actors to uphold the rule of law and to protect citizens. When state actors instead torture and kill citizens without even a pretense of upholding lawful procedures, the betrayal is fundamental and beyond any justification.

4 Brysk 1994a; Crenzel 2010; Jelin and Kaufman 2002; Ronigeer and Sznajder 1999. 5 Others such as Ollier (1986: 60-73) also highlight Juan Perón's responsibility during the prior years when as part of his strategy for regaining power he cultivated his relationship with the "special formations" of the Peronist revolutionary left, thereby serving to legitimate their violence. This in turn, as Ollier points out, also served to legitimate the violence of the non-Peronist revolutionary left. 6 For one important example, see Duhalde (1999: 167-178). Also see Amorín 2005: 316.


Otherwise, from my perspective probably the most significant of the criticisms that have been made is that la teoría de los dos demonios presents Argentine society itself as the victim – the victim of violence coming from extremists on both the right and left. However, this ignores the responsibility of broad sectors of that society who had been at least tolerant, if not supportive, of political violence from the late 1960s until thresholds were crossed at some point in the mid-1970s when tragic consequences spiraled to unexpected levels. As Moyano (1995: 96) states, "Above all, the 'two terrorisms' thesis exonerates a radicalized civil society, which first glorified violence as an agent of social change and then justified a ruthless repression as the only means of returning to the statu quo ante."7 This paper accepts this criticism of los dos demonios as legitimate and indeed as crucial for understanding Argentine political violence -- and more general political life -- during this period.8 The paper's focus is the narrower controversies associated with the purported culpability of the revolutionary left.9 Some reject this out of hand, continuing to portray the revolutionary cause as just and noble. Most famously this is true of Hebe de Bonafini, the president of the more radical of the two organizations of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, who dismisses any talk of dos demonios as "mierda" while affirming, "Nuestros hijos no eran demonios. Eran revolucionarios, guerrilleros, maravillosos y únicos que defendieron al Patria" (Galack 2006). One of the strongest attacks on la teoría de los dos demonios comes from Eduardo Luis Duhalde. Few potential critics would have greater standing. Duhalde was a leading defender of political prisoners until forced into exile following the 1976 coup. On October 9, 1973 the office of the newspaper that he edited along with his law partner Rodrigo Ortega Peña, Militancia peronista para la Liberación, was bombed with five injuries in what some have described as the first action of the notorious Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (AAA) death squad (Marquez 2006: 97).10 The following year the AAA murdered his friend Ortega Peña, who at that time was a national deputy, representing Peronismo de Base.11 In 1983 Duhalde published in Spain El estado terrorista argentino, which quickly became a best seller in Argentina during the year of its return to elected civilian government. Fifteen years later the book was reissued with additional material added (Duhalde 1999), including his strong argument against what he characterized as "La teoría de la satanización," which he said "transforma deliberadamente en un problema

7 See Moyano's (1995: 96-98) evidence for this position. For a strong statement of the culpability of civil society, see O’Donnell (1988: 309-310, 320-323); also see Gasparini (1999: 208-210). 8 This paper draws on the extensive literature on Argentina during these years, finding the following works particularly helpful: Andersen 1993, Hodges 1988, Lewis 2002, Marchak and Marchak 1999, Moyano 1995, O’Donnell 1988, Ollier 1986, Robbens 2005. 9 There is now a substantial literature on the Argentine revolutionary left of this period, with a growing number by participants themselves. Among those found useful for this study are: Amorín 2005, Gasparini 1999, Gillespie 1982, Giussani 1984, Ollier 1998, Pozzi and Schneider 2000. 10 Duhalde (1999: 42) himself gives the car bomb that seriously injured Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen a month and a half later as the first AAA action (La Nación November 22, 1973: 1). A year and half before, another powerful bomb also exploded at their law office, injuring two (La Nación January 22, 1974: 4). 11 La Nación August 1, 1974: 1. Duhalde (1999: 42) cites this as the first attack for which the AAA claimed credit.


metafísico que oculta sus motivaciones reales: los proyectos politicos." He is blunt about what he says the theory blurs: "los principales responsables: al gran capital multinacional, al Pentágono y al Departamento de Estado y a la oligarquia terrateniente y financiera" (p. 177). Where la teoría de los dos demonios presents "un problema de hombres endemoniados," Duhalde instead describes as the "verdadero objetivo del terrorismo de Estado . . . la eliminación de toda forma de resistencia al proyecto de reconversión del agotado modelo capitalista dependiente argentino" (p. 177). For Duhalde this is what makes sense of the sequence – the peak of the revolutionary left was 1970-1975 but the most terrible times of state terrorism did not commence until the military coup of March 1976 (p. 174). Whether his alternative explanation for the genesis and purpose of Argentine state terrorism is accurate is beyond the scope of this paper.12 Instead its focus is what Duhalde dismisses – the responsibility of the revolutionary left.13 It is notable that in his survey of the political violence from the late 1960s through the early 1970s, Duhalde ignores the many examples committed by the revolutionary left, giving passing reference to only one event.14 In contrast, he provides ample evidence of state violence as he attempts to build his case that "el aniquilamiento de los militantes populares fue su objectivo directo" even during this period (p. 41). He also spends many pages on what he sees as the responsibility of the United States government (pp. 220-233), building a strong implication that the U.S. was far more culpable for Argentine state violence than was the revolutionary left.15 Duhalde, then, had a long history with this subject prior to the 2006 reissue of Nunca Más – undoubtedly why former president Néstor Kirchner selected him to head the Human Rights Secretariat of the Ministry of Justice, Security, and Human Rights in the first place and current president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has kept him there since. The new prologue is only a little over two pages but it distills his prior position: by the time of the 1976 coup the guerrillas were defeated militarily. At the core of its project and violence was instead an economic mission: "La dictadura se propuso imponer un sistema económico de tipo neoliberal y arrasar con las conquistas sociales de muchas decadas, que la resistencia popular impedía fueran conculcadas" (CONADEP 2006: 8). In addition to rejecting this interpretation of the fundamental motivation of the military junta, critics of the new prologue also object to what they see as a mischaracterization of the original prologue and the broader perspective and purposes of the 1984 Nunca Más. The new prologue states: "Es preciso dejar claramente

12 I am dubious, finding more compelling the dismissal of such explanations by others such as Marchak and Marchak (1999: 322-331) based on their extensive interviews with a broad cross-section of Argentine society, including military officers. 13 Also see the interview with the subsecretary of Human Rights, Rodolfo Mattarollo, concurrent with the 2006 release where he states that portraying the military violence as a response to revolutionary violence is a "falsehood" (and therefore the 1984 Prologue is as well) (Ginzberg 2006). 14 Similarly in a more recent account of military violence in the years leading up to the 1976 coup, Wilson (2010) makes no mention of deaths by guerrillas until he reaches 1975. 15 Duhalde focuses on the role of Ambassador Robert Hill (1999: 232-33), whose position he grossly mischaracterizes; he would have done much better to direct his ire at Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Dinges 2004: 201-206). For more complete and accurate treatments of Argentine-U.S. relations during these years (and more generally) see Sheinin 2006 and Tulchin 1992.


establecido, porque lo requiere la construcción del futuro sobre bases firmes, que es inacceptable pretender justificar el terrorismo de Estado como una suerte de jego de violencias contrapuestas como si fuera possible buscar una simetría justificatoria en la accieon de particulares frente al apartamiento de los fines propios de la Nacieon y del Estadok, que son irrenunciables" (Galak 2006). In contrast, others such as journalist Magdalena Ruiz Guiñazú, one of the members of CONADEP, reacted against the 2006 prologue as "una grave falta histórica creer que el Nunca Más constituye una apologia de la teoría de los dos demonios" (Galak 2006). Indeed, it is notable that the term does not appear in the original prologue; nor, for that matter does any teoría de dos terrorismos. After the first sentence, the emphasis is fully on state violence.16 As best as I can tell, la teoría de dos demonios is an ambiguous label used largely by those caricaturizing the position of those with whom they disagreed. It then took on a life of its own. For example, note the definitions used in recent years by two reporters with La Nación. The first appears at the end of a news article when the reporter defines the theory for the reader as "aquella según la cual los actos de violencia perpetrados por las Fuerzas Armadas durante la denominada 'Guerra sucia' en la Argentina son comparables a las acciones de las organizaciones guerrilleras" (La Nación, November 1, 2007). The second appears in an interview with the noted scholar of the Montoneros, Richard Gillespie, when the reporter's question characterizes the theory as saying "que las acciones de los grupos guerrilleros y la repression military fueron igualmente perversas" (La Nación, July 5, 2008). I doubt that there are very many Argentines who believe in any such equivalency between the two violences. More likely they would agree with Luis Gregorich who, while indicting the 2006 prologue as "un mero panfleto," still strongly states that "la dictadura military fue un regimen asesino, cruel y estúpido . . . . Su perversidad no admite escala ni cotejo alguno" (La Nación, July 11, 2006). However, he goes on to add, this does not mean that the guerrillas did not add their own contribution to the bloodbath. How much so is the focus of the rest of this paper. Study Design There have been for some time several quantitative studies of revolutionary violence in Argentina (e.g., Marín 2003, Moyano 1995, and O’Donnell 1988). However, each dataset was compiled for its own purposes, none of which allow the analysis desired for this paper. Accordingly, like these other authors I too worked my way through the daily journalistic record. The period of this study begins with 1968, the year the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo's (ERP) founding organization, the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), pronounced its preference for armed struggle. Other groups that were to eventually merge into the Montoneros started appearing the next year, notably the Descamisados, the Fuerzas Armadas para Liberación (FAL), the Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP), and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) (Moyano 1995: 21-28). This study ends with 1974 because it was during that year that state violence overwhelmed revolutionary violence, and from by the end of that year at a level far beyond that of the revolutionaries. In

16 The director of the publishing house that brought out the 1984 Nunca Más, Luis Gregorich, makes the same point (La Nación, July 11, 2006).


comparison, O’Donnell’s data stops too early (the end of 1972) while Marín’s begins too late (May 1973). Moyano does cover this whole period but at least as published does not provide the appropriate measures for this study. The database created by this effort has 2767 records for this period. The focus of the study is violent acts but each record is capable of noting a broad array of contentious activities by challengers and actions by state actors. For each action recorded a determination was made as to whether it was by a state actor or challenger and as specifically as possible (e.g., police, military, death squad; which guerrilla organization, other activists, etc.); similar determinations were made for any victims of the action. In a number of cases even the most general determination of the actor’s identity was not possible and the relevant data was recorded under a third “unclear” category. Consequently, the total number of recorded actions, contentious and otherwise, is substantially more than the number of records. The primary source used to build the database is one of Buenos Aires’s long-standing preeminent daily papers, La Nación. Although several library collections were utilized,17 for some months copies of this paper were not available and a comparable leading daily, La Prensa, was substituted.18 One of the best known chroniclers of human rights abuses during these years was Jacobo Timerman’s La Opinión. All issues were read from its first appearance in May 1971 through the end of 1974. Another major journalistic source was three volumes produced by a writer for and eventually editor of the English-language paper, the Buenos Aires Herald. Graham-Yooll’s three volumes (1972, 1974, 1989) provide an exhaustive listing of the violent events on a daily basis from 1966 into 1976. Also valuable was an almost daily account of this period written by another journalist, Carlos M. Acuña (2000). The weekly news magazine Confirmado was also read from the beginning of the period until the magazine’s discontinuation in late 1972 (although unfortunately about half of its issues were missing). For deaths and disappearances by the state, the leading source is the Argentine truth commission. When Nunca Más was re-released in 2006, it included a two-volume annex with the names and dates of the victims who had been brought to its attention, not just for the period of the military regime but also extending back into the late 1960s (CONADEP 2006). Valuable for his work in documented the deaths of police and military officials has been Marquez (2004, 2006). Many other works were also consulted to provide valuable pieces of information, such as the identity of the actors for a particular event. Even with all of these sources, information for many events remains incomplete, including for key aspects such as the identity of actors and victims. Even some cases that might seem settled have controversies. One example will make the point. In May 1980 La Nación published a list of 790 deaths attributed to the guerrillas. Yet in his examination García (1995: 54-55) noted the inclusion of a number of individuals of whom “there is not the least doubt” that they were murdered by the security forces/AAA. One of the most notorious murders of 1974 was that of the charismatic 17 I am most grateful to the staffs of the following for their assistance: Biblioteca Nacional, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, and Biblioteca de la Legislatura de Buenos Aires. 18 Coverage seemed comparable between the two with perhaps a slight edge in comprehensiveness to La Nación.


activist priest Carlos Mujica. He had been a close mentor to several of the Montonero founders and not surprisingly it was widely assumed that he had been murdered by the AAA death squad. Yet Gasparini (1989: 85), himself a former Montonero and a victim of the regime’s repression, raises the claim that he was slain by Montoneros. And yet again, Mujica biographer De Biase (1998: 410-416) makes a good case for the AAA as the killers (though Mujica had been getting death threats from both sides). Given the prevalence of incomplete information, the approach taken by this study is to provide several measures for both state and revolutionary violence of increasing inference but of decreasing reliability. Reliability is enhanced, though, by the fact that the author performed all data entry and subsequent coding.19 Trends in Argentine Political Violence Figure 1 shows the data provided by CONADEP aggregated by quarters. This data is a helpful start but it is incomplete in both directions – it does not include a number of deaths at the hands of the state documented by other sources while including others that are questionable. Consequently, several other indicators of deaths by the state are provided here. Figure 1 includes the two most cautious of these through the first half of 1974 and Figure 2 adds two looser measures, extending the data through all of 1974. CONADEP includes some deaths whose inclusion is questionable. A half dozen are so much so that they are not even included in the "conadep" measure used here – these are persons who are identified as both citizens of other countries and as having been killed outside of Argentina. In addition, I excluded the September 30, 1974 death of Chilean General Carlos Prats. Although assassinated in Buenos Aires, the murder was committed by a U.S. citizen in the employ of the Chilean intelligence service (Dinges 2004: 63-81).20 Also confusing is CONADEP's treatment of the deaths of several of the early leaders of the Montoneros – Fernando Abal Medina, Carlos Ramus, and José Sabino Navarro, each of whom is listed as having been summarily executed. To the contrary, Abal Medina and Ramus – leaders in the execution the prior year of General Pedro Aramburu – were killed in a shootout on September 7, 1970 at a train station bar that left four policemen injured.21 Navarro was shot in a botched car hijacking in October 1971, escaped to the mountains of Córdoba and was last seen by a comrade declaring that he would shoot himself rather than be taken prisoner.22 There are other cases as well in the CONADEP data that include revolutionaries killed in armed conflicts with the police or military. Although these deaths are relevant for measures of total political violence, they are questionable indicators of illegitimate state violence. The indictor "state1" offers a cautious measure of state killings, including only those cases where the best evidence indicates an unprovoked killing or disappearance by the

19 For a good discussion of measurement issues involving Argentine state violence and the larger political context, see Brysk 1994b. 20 Additionally perplexing is that while Prats's murder was included that of his wife who was killed alongside him was not. 21 La Prensa. September 8, 1970: 11; September 9, 1970: 1. 22 La Opinión, September 5, 1971: 7; Chaves (1998: 138).


state (or an associated organization such as the AAA). If the first condition is met but the agent is unknown, the case is included if it is cited by CONADEP. "State2" uses the same rules for the agent but includes violent confrontations such as the 1970 deaths of Abal Medina and Ramus. "State3" includes what appear to be deaths in political violence not cited by CONADEP when the agent is unclear but the preponderance of evidence suggests the state/AAA or an ally (such as in the labor movement). Finally, "state4" includes a handful of cases when the agent might be known but whether it was political violence or not is in question, typically the death of young people by police who reported the victims as delinquents. Since we know that as state political violence escalated this was a common ploy, it seems important to include these cases when details raise questions.23 Deaths caused by the state reached such high levels in the last two quarters of 1974 that their inclusion pushes the vertical axis too high for a close look at the quarterly trends of earlier years, which is why Figure 1 stops at mid-1974. Although "state1" excludes some of the CONADEP deaths, it includes others not found in that source. Nonetheless, the two measures track fairly closely, alternating which shows the higher score. The major exception is "state1's" inclusion of the 16 deaths associated with the attempted Rawson prison break on August 22, 1972 and the associated Trelew Naval Base massacre of the revolutionary prisoners (Martínez 1973). As to be expected, "state2" indicates higher levels of deaths, especially starting from the end of 1971 but also with the glaring difference in the second quarter of 1969 when this measure adds the deaths associated with the massive popular mobilization associated with the late May Cordobazo and the resulting repression (as well as those of the parallel Viborazo of March 1971, also in Córdoba, and the Rosariazo of September 1969 and the Mendozazo of April 1972). Inclusion of deaths during disturbances might improperly inflate the state violence scores since the larger the disturbance, the less specific the information about individual victims and the agents of their deaths. Known security force personnel victims were subtracted; however, it is possible that some of the included deaths were actually caused by leftist snipers whose presence is documented.24 Figure 2 includes the last two quarters of 1974 when state violence sharply expands, shifting the scores of the vertical axis considerably and consequently flattening out the differences between the various indicators for the prior quarters. Nonetheless, the consistently higher death toll registered by "state3" and "state4" are evident, especially for the last six quarters (for the last five these two indicators have the same score). Similarly, for deaths caused by the revolutionary left25 several different measures are utilized, using from stricter to looser coding rules. Similarly too, Figure 3 does not include the last two quarters of 1974 so that trends for the prior years can be more clearly portrayed. "RL1" counts deaths when members of the revolutionary left were 23 The foremost example occurred on September 7, 1973 when the deaths at the hands of the police of eight delinquents in several events was reported, a unusually high number for this period (La Nación, September 8, 1973: 6). 24 For an interview with one sniper see Pozzi and Schneider 2000: 53. 25 Here I follow Ollier's (1998: 17) definition of the revolutionary left as those pursuing socialist transformation through either armed struggle or insurrectional violence.


identified as the agents of an attack they initiated. However, newspaper daily accounts contain many attacks on military and especially police personnel without indicating the identity of the agents. Indeed, it was a frequent practice of revolutionary organizations to attack small police posts or individual policemen. The motives were various: to obtain weapons and uniforms, to initiate new militants, and to make a statement about guerrilla capabilities to various audiences. "RL2" includes deaths of security personnel regardless of whether the attacker was known if other evidence suggested an unprovoked attack.26 If sources indicated, for example, that a police post was attacked, the police slain and their weapons and uniforms taken, these deaths were counted as committed by the revolutionary left in "RL2" even if the specific group identity was not known. By similar logic, assassinations of high-level government officials and mainstream union leaders were also included. Finally, revolutionaries kidnapped business executives for ransom during these years at a notorious level (Moyano 1995: 57-60). When such attempts resulted in the target’s death they were included in "RL2", again regardless of whether the attacker’s identity was known. However, if story details were minimal, perhaps just that a policeman was shot last night with no other information given, then the event was not coded as part of revolutionary violence but rather in an “unknown” category. Still, it is quite likely that in many of these cases when security force personnel were attacked that the agent actually was a revolutionary. These “unknown agent” deaths are included in the broader "RL3". Examining Figure 3, there actually is little difference between these last two measures, nor much between them and "RL1" until mid-1971 when they diverge, although their trends remain parallel until mid-1972 when these diverge as well. Figure 4 brings in the last two quarters of 1974; although certainly not reaching the same levels as for state violence, there is also a sharp escalation of revolutionary violence in this period as well. Also portrayed is a fourth measure of revolutionary violence, broadly defined. With "RL4" all violence attributed to revolutionary organizations is included whether initiated or not. Also included are attacks on state actors when sources identify the agents as probably non-political (e.g., "delinquents") but without giving specific identifying features. In contrast, a policeman killed by a known and named criminal would not be included. The results for this measure are not much different from the prior two until after the first quarter of 1973. Since the following period was when political violence was increasing there is good reason to believe that much of the additional deaths portrayed by "RL4" were as well. Comparisons to Other Studies There is some overlap between the data presented by this study and that compiled by other authors, which provides a context for assessing the reliability of this effort. The most complete data and therefore overlap is presented by Moyano (1991, 1995), notably for deaths caused by the guerrillas. Moyano gives a total of 129 deaths by the guerrillas for the 1969-1973 period, 66 of which are attributed to a specified group

26 In some cases these were private guards; they were included since at least in some cases they were off-duty or former policemen.


and 63 of which remain undetermined as to specific author (1991: 322; 1995: 56). I was able to identify the revolutionary organization identified with a total of 122 deaths during this period (74 of which were connected to the ERP). My "RL3" totals just slightly higher than Moyano while the broader "RL4" gives a substantially higher score. There is a more limited overlap with Marín’s study, which only examines the period of civilian government beginning May 25, 1973. Because of the way his data is presented, comparison is only possible for the first year through June 1974. For this period Marín gives 44 deaths by guerrillas (2003: 105), which is about mid-point between my very restricted RL1 measure and RL2.27 Table 1. Deaths Attributed to Argentine Left 5/23/73-6/30/74 1969-1973 RL 1 27 55 Marín 44 -- RL 2 59 116 Moyano -- 129 RL 3 61 133 RL 4 85 171 For deaths attributable to the Argentine security forces the only overlap is with the first year of the civilian government. For this period beginning in late June 1973, Marín identifies 97deaths by the security forces (2003: 100, 105), which is substantially more than my first two indicators (28 and 55 deaths) and a little more than the broadest measures used in this study (85 and 94 deaths). Although it is unfortunate that Moyano did not measure deaths by security forces, that project did examine deaths attributable to right-wing non-security forces, coming to a total of 34 for 1969 through May 24, 1973 (1995: 78). When the deaths attributed to security force personnel are removed from state#3 the score is a very similar 38. A third check is provided by the data compiled by O’Donnell (1988: 297). The only direct comparison possible is for the annual total of deaths in probable political violence. As summarized in Table 2, for the first three years the closest approximation from this study’s measures would be the highest estimates for both sides – RL#4 and State#4. However, all three combinations from this study give a higher score for 1972, even the more cautious RL#2/State#2. Table 2. Deaths in Probable Political Violence, 1969-1972 1969 1970 1971 1972 O’Donnell 39 41 64 68 RL#2+S#2 30 30 56 85 RL#3+S#3 34 36 60 100 RL#4+S#4 36 38 66 110

27 It is possible that Marín’s sympathies led to an undercounting of deaths by guerrillas. Polemic in its language, earlier tables in the book are divided between “subversivos” and “antisubversivos” but by the end they have become “el pueblo” and “el enemigo” (2003: 101).


This comparison to other studies should provide ample confidence in the reliability of this project’s measures of Argentine political violence. The comparison suggest that the more cautious indicators are probably too cautious with the third and fourth indicators for both sets more comparable to the results from these other studies. For the revolutionary left, the most comparable to Moyano is RL#3; for the state, the most comparable to Marín and O'Donnell is RL#4. However, the increasing gap beginning with 1972 between my indicators and O'Donnell's score suggests RL#3 is perhaps more appropriate. Accordingly, below I use RL#3 and State#3 as the "best estimates" for the comparison between the two forms of violence. I also compare both RL#1/State#1 and RL#4/State#4 to provide the lower and higher limits. Revolutionary and State Violence Compared State terrorism in Argentina from the early 1970s through the early 1980s was a great evil. From mid-1974 on state terrorism was at a level far exceeding that of violence from the revolutionary left, so much so that in the aggregate for the whole period revolutionary violence is minor in comparison to that from the state. However, for the period under examination here the story is quite different. Certainly for the years 1968 through 1974 state violence was greater than that from the left, with a total of 405 deaths by the state and 266 by the left as measured by the "best" indicators. The issue though is whether the violence by the two sides was close enough that Argentine society would feel besieged not by one but "two demons" in a conflict that persisted across the months and then across years. I think the data bares this out. Figure 5b vividly portrays the dramatic escalation of revolutionary violence in the last half of 1974 but also the much greater escalation by the state. If the comparison stops at mid-1974, however, then the totals are much closer: 235 for the state and 192 for the revolutionaries. As the year began they were even closer still: 183 for the state, 160 for the revolutionaries. It needs also to be remembered that the state totals include guerrillas killed in confrontations they initiated. It also includes two events with large death totals – the Cordobazo and the Trelew massacre. If those deaths are subtracted, then deaths by the left actually exceed those of the state through the end of 1973, almost five years after the first killings by revolutionaries (160 to 155). As Figure 5a shows, deaths by revolutionaries were no less than those caused by the state in many quarters. From 1970 through the third quarter of 1973, revolutionary killings equaled those by the state or were higher in nine out of fifteen quarters. Was violence by the revolutionary left at a consistently high enough level that other Argentines might believe that their actions constituted a threat to society? The revolutionary left killed eight people or more in every quarter except two going back to the last half of 1970 and in each quarter beginning a year later. The quarterly average of people killed by the left was sixteen from that point on, that is, the last half of 1971. For 1973-74 the average was twenty-one; for 1974 it was twenty-seven. Similar patterns emerge when the two forms of violence are measured using the low estimates for both (Figures 6a and 6b). Indeed, using this more cautious set of estimates revolutionary killings were actually higher than those by the state through mid-1974, even with the Trelew massacre (89 to 84 deaths). Certainly by year's end, though, the upswing in state violence once again leads to a higher state total (177 to 127). As with the "best" estimates this final score hides the frequency that


revolutionary violence was at least at the same levels of that from the state over the years of this study. Revolutionary killings were higher or equal to those by the state in fourteen of the sixteen quarters from the start of 1970 through the end of 1973 with this indicator. When the highest estimates are used (Figures 7a and 7b), state killings are now greater through mid-1974 – but not by very much (255 to 239). At the end of 1974 this indicator shows a large disparity between the two forms of violence but still a very high total for revolutionary violence (425 to 323). Despite this disparity, revolutionary killings were higher or equal to those by the state in twelve of the fifteen quarters from the start of 1970 through the third quarter of 1973. In two of the next three quarters, total deaths by revolutionaries were only seven less than the state's total of 48. Table 3 brings these three sets of comparisons together, showing the total deaths by both the state and the revolutionaries to both mid-1974 and through the end of 1974. Regardless of the measure used, the results are clear. The revolutionary left did not become a serious threat only following the death of President Juan Perón in July 1974 and the subsequent acceleration of the government's turn to the right. Beginning with the first revolutionary killings in April through June of 1969 Argentine society did face dos demonios. Most significantly, for the five years from mid-1969 until mid-1974, state killings in Argentina were not much higher than those committed by the revolutionary left. Table 3. Revolutionary and State Killings Compared 1968 to Mid-1974 1968 thru 1974 Estimate Revolutionary State Revolutionary State Low 89 84 127 177 Best 192 235 266 405 High 239 255 323 425 Conclusion There can be no justification for the barbaric state violence that responded to revolutionary violence in Argentina. But neither should excessive repression have been a surprise. Gasparini quotes a general who himself had lost several inches of his own leg in an earlier confrontation with the Montoneros. Questioning a captive Montonero leader about guerrilla strategy, the general responded: “Y ustedes, qué creían, que nos íbamos a quedar con los brazos cruzados mientras casi todas las promociones del Colegio Militar tenían bajas?” (1999: 127). Add to this that the very top guerrilla leadership did succeed in the 1972 Rawson prison escape, as the rest of the captives almost did. On the eve of the installation of the newly elected Peronist president in May 1973, the storming of the Bastille was virtually recreated at Buenos Aires’s Villa Devoto prison as hundreds of prisoners were released to the surrounding crowd. Congress then passed without opposition an amnesty for all political prisoners, including those held for cold-blooded murder of public officials (Acuna 2000: 669-677). The impact of the Devotazo and amnesty on the security forces was pronounced: “Not incarceration but annihilation would be the future objective of counterinsurgency” (Robbens 2005: 128-129).


Revolutionary violence in Argentina started not as self-defense nor as a desire for revenge because of the loss of family and/or friends. To the contrary, for a number of years, revolutionary murder of security force personnel, other government officials, and businesspeople often exceeded that of state murder of political activists. Some guerrilla killings occurred accidentally in the course of revolutionary actions but others were deliberate as part of revolutionary strategy. This strategy failed to appreciate the repressive capacity of the Argentine state. Perhaps more significantly (and extraordinary) was the failure to anticipate that in response to such attacks that there would develop a growing willingness to do whatever was necessary in order to extinguish the revolutionary challenge, a willingness stemming in particular from emotional responses to the loss of friends, family, and comrades and to the assault on pride and honor. When repression did escalated it eliminated not only revolutionaries and the revolutionary threat but took the lives of thousands of noncombatants as well as closing any possibility for nonviolent opposition to the regime for the better part of a decade, leaving Argentine society with a deep wound that still festers decades later. On November 8, 1974 Jacobo Timerman wrote a front page editorial in La Opinión lamenting, “La Guerra civil, esa cosa de otros paises que a nosotros, los argentinos, no nos puede ocurrir, ya nos esta ocurriendo.” This was two days after the Montoneros declared their return to clandestine armed struggle. It was one day after the AAA planted a bomb at the home of University of Buenos Aires rector Raul Laguzzi, injurying his wife and killing his four-month-old son. The same day as the editorial three Montoneros died in Rosario when a bomb they were carrying exploded in their car (there had been at least thirteen challenger bomb explosions in the prior two days). One of the dead was a twenty-two year-old woman who left behind her own four month-old baby. Timerman’s editorial carried the headline “La situacion argentina: entre dos fuegos.”

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