benchmark jan-june digest
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Digest of Supreme Court’s Benchmark
January – June 2007
Libertas et Iusticia
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Table of Contents
January………………………………………………………………….. 3 Two Lawyers Suspended for Misappropriating Client’s Vehicle
February………………………………………………………………….. 4 Love in the Words of the Court
Clerk of Court Gets One-Year Suspension for Missing Funds
Double-Dealing, Deceitful, and Immoral Lawyer Suspended for Three Years
Dishonest Notary’s Commission Revoked
Makati RTC Judge Fined
Utility Worker Disciplined for False DTR
SC Clarifies Rules on Initiating Contempt Proceedings; Absolves Lawyer
Judge Dismissed for Neglect of Duty, Inefficiency
March…………………………………………………………………….. 7 SC Bans Coterminous Employment of Justices’ Spouses
SC Designates Special Courts to Try and Decide Cases of Extrajudicial Killings
SC Affirms Reinstatement of Employee Dismissed on Account of Pregnancy
Negligent, Irresponsible Lawyer Suspended
Lawyer Suspended for Failure to Turn Over Client’s Money
Court Upholds Retainer Contract
SC Adopts Add’l Rules re TROs on Foreclosures of Real Estate Mortgages
Court Orders Release of Salaries, Benefits Earned But Fines Sheriff For
Improperly Serving Suspension
SC Directs Removal of Pandacan Oil Terminals
SC Dismisses Four CA Employees for “Case-Fixing”
MERALCO Ordered to Pay Damages to Subscriber
April……………………………………………………………………….. 13 Court Cleanses Judiciary
SC Upholds Suspension of BIR Official for Non-Disclosure of Wealth
Bail Can Be Granted to Potential Extraditee on Basis of Clear and Convincing
Evidence
SC Acquits Illiterate Fisherman of Double Murder
SC Settles LP Leadership Controversy
SC Clarifies Evidentiary Value of Duplicate Originals
SC OKs Graft Charge Against PIATCO Chairman and President
May………………………………………………………………………… 17 No Time Limit for Administrative Cases vs Lawyers
SCEA President Suspended
Judge, Staff Penalized for Spurious Bailbonds and Release Orders
June ………………………………………………………………………. 26 SC Disciplines More Judges, Court Personnel
SC Clarifies Conditions for Discharge of State Witness
SC Orders PEA to Pay Php94 Million in Just Compensation
Mercury Drug Liable for Selling Wrong Medication
Administrative Proceedings: Not Arena for Squabbling Lawyers
SC Orders Dismissal of Rebellion Charges against Beltran, et al.
SC Upholds Textbook Supply Deal
SC Allows OWWA to Proceed with Reorganization
CJ Enjoins Officials and Employees to Strictly Observe Gambling Prohibition in
Court
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January 2007
Two Lawyers Suspended for Misappropriating Client’s Vehicle By Joshua P. Lapuz
TWO LAWYERS were recently suspended by the Supreme Court for
misappropriating their client’s vehicle, allegedly as payment for their
services.
Attorneys Salvador and Nancy Quimpo were suspended for three
months for gross misconduct. The Court found that the Quimpos caused
the filling in of a signed blank Deed of Sale of Rosemarie Hsieh’s
Mitstubishi Eclipse without Hsieh’s consent and authority.
“If the Deed of Sale was originally intended to serve as security
for the payment of complainant’s outstanding account with respondents,
as claimed by the latter, why was not the name of the oblige for whom
the security was allegedly executed – respondents – not also printed out?
And why did not respondents bother to advise complainant of the
eventual sale of the car and account the proceeds thereof? It is on this
account that this Court finds the above-quoted ratiocination of the IBP
Investigator in holding respondents to have committed breach of
contract well-taken,” said the Court. (AC No. 6128, Rosemarie L. Hsieh vs. Atty.
Salvador Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo, December 19, 2006)
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February 2007
Love in the Words of the Court Compiled by Atty. Richard Pascual, Office of the Reporter
IN THIS MONTH OF HEARTS, we have compiled the following passages
from decisions of the Court throughout the decades that speak of that
mysterious thing called LOVE.
“Love of country should be something permanent and lasting,
ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth of offspring. The
outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented
or thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not
in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and
promptings of the spirit.” (GR No. L-409. Anastacio Laurel v. Eriberto Misa, January
30, 1947)
“There is nothing objectionable in her taking advantage of the law
to give tangible expression to her maternal love, which is, without any
doubt, universally considered the most sublime feeling nature has
infused in human hearts. The feeling is so elemental that it is not
unknown even to the lowest phyla of the animal kingdom. That even the
fiercest wild animals are not devoid of such feeling is a wonder that
cannot fail to move [the] most indifferent person.” (GR No. L- 1663,
Florentina Villahermosa v. The Commissioner of Immigration, March 31, 1948)
“Men may differ and do differ on religious beliefs and creeds,
government policies, the wisdom and legality of laws, even the
correctness of judicial decisions and decrees; but in the field of love of
country…they can hardly afford to differ, for these are matters in which
they are mutually and vitally interested, for to them, they mean national
existence and survival as a nation.” (GR No. L-13954, Genaro Gerona, et al. v. The
Honorable Sec. of Education, et al., August 12, 1959)
“The nuptial vows which solemnly intone the matrimonial
promise of love ‘(f)or better or for worse, for richer or for poorer, in
sickness and in health, till death do us part,‘ are sometimes easier said
than done, for many a marital union figuratively ends on the reefs of
matrimonial shoals. In the case now before us for appellate review, the
marriage literally ended under circumstances which the criminal law,
disdainful of romanticism, bluntly calls the felony of parricide.” (GR No.
102984. People of the Philippines v. Ruben Takbobo, June 30, 1993)
“Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in
each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way
in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love… respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise,
conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.” (GR No. 119190, Chi
Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Gina Lao- Tsoi, January 16, 1997)
“Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal
duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing, and
safeguard their best interest and welfare. Even when the parents are
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and
feeling for their offspring invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law
nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real,
grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.” (GR No. 114742,
Carlitos E. Silva v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Suzanne T. Gonzales, July 17, 1997)
”We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be
entered into because of love, not for any other reason.” (GR No. 97369,
Patricia Figueroa, v. Simeon Barranco, Jr., July 31, 1997)
“That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence; and therefore, all men are equally entitled to
the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience; and
that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love,
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and charity towards each other.” (AM P-02-1651, Estrada v. Escritor, August 4,
2003)
“The Court, like all well-meaning persons, has no desire to dash
romantic fancies, yet in the exercise of its duty, is all too willing when
necessary to raise the wall that tears Pyramus and Thisbe asunder.” (AM
No. P-02- 1564, Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, November 23, 2004)
Clerk of Court Gets One-Year Suspension for Missing Funds By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
A CLERK OF COURT was recently suspended for one year for failing to
account for funds entrusted to her in a civil case.
The Supreme Court found Clerk of Court Marissa Angeles of the
Pantabangan Municipal Trial Court of Nueva Ecija guilty of dishonesty and
conduct unbecoming of a clerk of court and ordered her to pay
complainant Beatriz Vilar Php75,000 for failing to remit funds that were
entrusted to her in a civil case involving the complainant.
In its decision, the Court reiterated that the “failure of a public
officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer constitutes
prima facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.” As Angeles failed to explain what she did with
the money entrusted to her, the Supreme Court suspended her “for one
year without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.”
Though Section 52 of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service called for the penalty of
dismissal, the Court adopted the recommendations of the Office of the
Court Administrator and decided to temper the penalty as Angeles was a
first-time offender and had been with the judiciary for 22 years. (AM No. P-
06-2276, Beatriz F. Vilar vs. Marissa Angeles, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, February 5, 2007)
Double-Dealing, Deceitful, and Immoral Lawyer Suspended for Three
Years By Gleo Sp. Guerra
THE SUPREME COURT recently suspended from the practice of law for
three years Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for misconduct and violation of
Canons 21, 10, and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Valencia was found to have violated Canon 21 stating that “a
lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after
the attorney-client relation is terminated” when he appeared as counsel
against a former client in a related action. The Court said that the rule is
“founded on the principles of public policy and good taste…for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.”
The Court also found that Atty. Valencia failed to comply with
Canon 10, which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice, when he presented as evidence in a
case a certificate of title that had already been cancelled.
Finally, the Court found Atty. Valencia to have sired three
illegitimate children in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 stating that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. However, it mitigated his liability considering that he eventually
married the mother of the said children after the death of his first wife
and that it was his first offense of that nature. (Adm. Case No. 5439, Clarita J.
Samala v. Atty. Luciano D. Valencia, January 22, 2007)
Dishonest Notary’s Commission Revoked By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
THE SUPREME COURT recently revoked the notarial commission of Atty.
Salud P. Beradio and suspended her for six months from the practice of
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law for having notarized a document which she knew contained a
material falsehood.
The Court found that Atty. Beradio violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she notarized the
affidavit of adjudication of a certain Alfonso Villanueva while she had
personal knowledge that his claim of being the sole heir to the estate
concerned was untrue. The affidavit stated Villanueva as the sole heir to
his parents’ estate even though there were other compulsory heirs living
at the time it was executed, a fact which Atty. Beradio admitted to the
Court.
“Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a
false statement or information contained in the instrument to be
notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court
must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the
circumstances of the case dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on
notarial documents diminished,” the Court said. (AC No. 6270, Heirs of
Spouses Villanueva vs. Atty. Salud P. Beradio, January 22, 2007)
Makati RTC Judge Fined
By Arcie M. Sercado
JUDGE REBECCA R. MARIANO of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 136, was fined Php40,000 by the Court for violating the Canons of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 4-2004 for making untruthful statements in her monthly reports.
The Court ruled that Judge Mariano intentionally misrepresented
the date of promulgation of the decision in the Amanet Inc. v. Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. case. The January 2005 monthly
report of Branch 136 included Amanet in its list of decided cases when
the decision had not yet been promulgated on the date of the submission
of the report on March 7, 2005.
Judge Mariano’s January 2005 monthly report also revealed that
there were cases submitted for decision that remained undecided
beyond the 90-day reglementary period despite the additional time she
was given to decide them. (AM No. RTJ-06-2010, Marissa R. Mondala v. Judge
Rebecca R. Mariano, January 25, 2007)
Utility Worker Disciplined for False DTR By Arcie M. Sercado
A UTILITY WORKER was reprimanded by the Supreme Court recently for
habitually making false entries in his daily time record (DTR).
Manuel Araya, Jr., utility worker of the Ozamiz City Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, was also warned that a more severe sanction
will be imposed on him should he repeat the said offense. The Court
noted that Araya only came to work for six hours and 45 minutes per
working day, instead of the mandated eight hours. Because of this, Araya
did not perform his responsibilities in the office.
The Court also reprimanded Ozamis Judge Rio Concepcion Achas
and Clerk of Court III Renato Zapatos for allowing Araya to come to work
on a flexi-time basis without prior authorization from the Court. (AM No. P-
05-1960, Concerned Litigants v. Manuel Z. Araya, Jr., Utility Worker, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, January 26, 2007)
SC Clarifies Rules on Initiating Contempt Proceedings; Absolves Lawyer By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
THE SUPREME COURT recently absolved Atty. Ma. Concepcion L.
Regalado of indirect contempt as the proceedings against her had been
improperly initiated.
The Court held that Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
provides for two ways to initiate indirect contempt proceedings: “(1)
motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon
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compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.” It found that
the contempt proceedings against Atty. Regalado were improperly
initiated by the filing of an unverified Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion.
“Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of
petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect contempt suffered a serious
procedural defect to which this Court cannot close its eyes without
offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules that we,
ourselves, had promulgated,” the Court said, even as it accorded respect
to the Court of Appeals’ factual findings that Atty. Regalado’s acts
constitute indirect contempt.
The Court of Appeals earlier had convicted Atty. Regalado of
indirect contempt and fined her Php5,000 for facilitating a compromise
agreement in an illegal dismissal case on appeal with the appellate court
without the presence of the opposing party’s counsel. (GR No. 167988, Ma.
Concepcion L. Regalado vs. Antonio S. Go, February 6, 2007)
Judge Dismissed for Neglect of Duty, Inefficiency By Arcie M. Sercado
A JUDGE WAS DISMISSED from the service recently by the
Supreme Court.
Judge Ramon R. Legaspi, Jr. of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Kinoguitan- Sugbongcogon, Misamis Oriental was found liable for gross
neglect of judicial duty for failing to decide or resolve within the
reglementary period 228 cases assigned to his sala. The Office of the
Court Administrator discovered this in an audit conducted in October
2002. Judge Legaspi was given several opportunities to decide the cases,
which stretched over more than two years, but he still failed to comply.
After more than three years, Judge Legaspi still had 89 cases left
to be decided, all of which have been submitted for decision since 1996
but were not stated in the judge’s Monthly Report of Cases for the third
and fourth quarters of 2004. The Court dismissed Judge Legaspi, saying,
“The wheels of justice would hardly move if respondent is allowed to
continue working in the judiciary.” (AM No. MTJ-06-1661, Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Ramon R. Legaspi, Jr., January 25, 2007)
March 2007
SC Bans Coterminous Employment of Justices’ Spouses By Jay B. Rempillo
STARTING APRIL 1, spouses of incumbent Justices are banned from
working as coterminous employees in the Judiciary.
Prohibited is the employment of spouses of Justices in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax
Appeals. Spouses presently employed and covered by the ban are
deemed resigned at the close of office hours on March 31.
The Court found it necessary to control and regulate the
employment of the spouses of Justices “to enforce the letter and the
spirit of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
calling for an ethical judiciary that is above suspicion. [That] is premised,
among others, on the fact that ‘public confidence in the judicial system
and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of utmost
importance in a modern democratic society; and…it is essential that
judges, individually and collectively, respect and honor judicial office as a
public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial
system.’” (AM No. 07-3-02-CA, In re: Rule Banning the Employment of Spouses of
Justices in the SC, CA, Sandiganbayan, and CTA as Coterminous Employees, March 6,
2007)
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SC Designates Special Courts to Try and Decide Cases of Extrajudicial
Killings By Jay B. Rempillo
THE SUPREME COURT has designated 99 Regional Trial Courts nationwide
to try and decide cases involving extrajudicial killings of political activists
and members of the media. Designated as Special Courts are 23 RTCs in
the National Judicial Capital Region (NCJR) and 76 RTCs in the 12 other
Judicial Regions.
Under Court-issued guidelines, to be considered in determining
whether a crime is a “political killing” are (1) political affiliation of the
victim; (2) method of attack; and (3) reports that state agents are
involved in the commission of the crime or have acquiesced in them.
All single-sala courts are considered Special Courts for the cases
involving killings of political ideologists and members of the media, which
shall be given priority in their respective trial calendars. In stations where
there are no designated Special Courts, the branches where the
concerned cases are raffled shall observe the guidelines.
The Special Courts shall conduct continuous trial for said cases, to
be terminated within 60 days from commencement of the hearing. A
judgment on said case shall be rendered within 30 days upon its
submission for decision unless a shorter period is provided by the law or
otherwise directed by the High Court.
Where trial has already begun, the same shall continue to be
heard by the respective branches to which they have been originally
assigned. A criminal case is considered begun when the accused had
already been arraigned.
The Special Courts are required to submit a report on the status
of the concerned cases which shall be attached to their respective
Monthly Report of Cases. Failure to submit such report shall be a ground
for withholding the salaries and allowances of the judges, clerks of court,
and branch clerks of court concerned without prejudice to whatever
administrative sanction the High Court may impose on them.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno has said that the creation of Special
Courts to resolve extrajudicial killings is high in the Judiciary’s priority list.
He made the announcement even before Malacañang made public the
findings of the Independent Commission to Address Media and Activists
Killings, headed by retired SC Justice Jose Melo, confirming the
extrajudicial killings of political activists and members of the media.
“The first and foremost of human rights is the right to life. It has
long been accorded universal status for the existence of all other rights is
premised on the preservation of life. The extrajudicial taking of life is the
ultimate violation of human rights. It cannot be allowed anywhere, and it
has to be resisted everywhere…Extrajudicial killings also constitute
brazen assaults on the rule of law. It is the constitutional duty of our
judiciary to protect the rule of law and we will link with all efforts to
prevent its erosion,” declared Chief Justice Puno.
SPECIAL COURTS FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
Manila RTC Branches 26, 39, 50;
Quezon City RTC Branches 95, 97, & 219;
Makati City RTC Branches 133, 148, & 150;
Pasay City RTC Branches 114 & 118;
Kalookan City RTC Branches 129 & 131;
Pasig City RTC Branches 157 & 265;
Taguig RTC Branch 271;
San Juan RTC Branch 160;
Malabon RTC Branch 73;
Marikina RTC Branch 263;
Mandaluyong RTC Branch 212;
Parañaque RTC Branch 260;
Las Piñas RTC Branch 255;
Muntinlupa RTC Branch 204
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SC Affirms Reinstatement of Employee Dismissed on Account of
Pregnancy By Arcie M. Sercado
IT IS ILLEGAL to terminate an employee on account of her pregnancy.
The Supreme Court found that Del Monte Philippines, Inc. illegally
terminated the employment of its field laborer Lolita Velasco after she
had been absent from work due to a urinary tract infection contracted
during pregnancy. It ruled that absences due to a justified cause cannot
be a ground for dismissal, even if the dates of her absences do not
correspond to those in her medical certificates because pregnancy is a
long-term condition accompanied by an assortment of related illnesses.
The Court found that Velasco was able to justify her absences in
accordance with company rules and policy. Prior to her absences, Velasco
consulted the company’s doctor, who advised her to have rest-in-
quarters for several days. Likewise, she attempted to file leaves of
absence, which Del Monte’s supervisor unjustifiably refused to receive.
The Court also ruled that Del Monte had no legal basis to
terminate Velasco on the ground that the latter had an alleged “long
history” of unauthorized absences committed several years beforehand
and that these absences should also be considered. The Court held that
Velasco’s last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently
explained. These cannot be considered together with her previous
infractions as gross and habitual neglect.
Article 137 of the Labor code states that “it is unlawful for any
employer to discharge a woman on account of her pregnancy, while on
leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy.” (GR No. 153477, Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. v. Lolita Velasco, March 6, 2007)
Negligent, Irresponsible Lawyer Suspended By Arcie M. Sercado
A LAWYER WAS RECENTLY SUSPENDED for six months from the practice
of law by the Supreme Court for lacking legal ethics and for falling short
of the diligence required of a lawyer entrusted with a case. He was also
directed to return with interest the attorney’s fee paid to him.
Atty. Manuel G. San Jose, from Libmanan, Camarines Sur, was
suspended for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which stresses that “when a lawyer takes a client’s cause,
he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s
rights.”
The Court found that Atty. San Jose failed to file a civil case
against a lessee of a client’s property who had defaulted in paying
monthly rentals, despite his receipt of attorney’s fees. He also refused to
return pertinent documents and failed to pay the salary of his client’s
daughter who was his employee after the client had withdrawn the case
from him. (AC No. 3569, Fidela vda. De Enriquez v. Atty. Manuel G. San Jose, February
23, 2007)
Lawyer Suspended for Failure to Turn Over Client’s Money By Gleo Sp. Guerra
THE COURT RECENTLY SUSPENDED Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez from the
practice of law for six months for violation of the attorney’s oath and of
serious professional misconduct. It also warned him that repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Court found that Atty. Hernandez refused to deliver to a
client a check representing a court award in the amount of Php1,060,800.
It was only after he had been ordered by the lower court to hand over
the check that Atty. Hernandez partially delivered the amount of
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Php502,838.79 to his client, while retaining Php557,961.21 as payment
for his attorney’s fees.
The Court held that a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate client’s money by the mere fact alone that the client owes
the said lawyer attorney’s fees. It said that Atty. Hernandez should have
provided his client with an accounting before deducting his attorney’s
fees and turned over the remaining balance to his client.
Pursuant to its power to supervise a contingent fee arrangement
as to its reasonableness, the Court held that a fee of 35% of the amount
awarded to his client is fair compensation for Atty. Hernandez’s services.
It thus ordered him to return Php290,109.21 to the latter with legal
interest from the date of finality of the Court’s judgment until full
payment. (GR No. 169079, Francisco Rayos v. Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez, February
12, 2007)
Court Upholds Retainer Contract
By Gleo Sp. Guerra
THE COURT UPHELD the validity of a retainer contact between Aurora B.
Camacho and Atty. Angelino Banzon whereby the former undertook to
convey 5,000 sq. m of her property as payment for the latter’s legal
services. It, however, ruled that Atty. Banzon is no longer entitled to an
additional 1,000 sq.m., it appearing that the parties had agreed upon
specific sums of money as attorney’s fees for their other cases.
The Court held that “Lawyers are…as much entitled to judicial
protection against injustice on the part of their clients as the clients are
against abuses on the part of the counsel. The duty of the court is not
only to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to
see to it that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. If lawyers are
entitled to fees even if there is no written contract, with more reason
that they are entitled thereto if their relationship is governed by a
written contract of attorney’s fees.” (GR No. 127520, Aurora Fe B. Camacho v.
Court of Appeals and Angelino Banzon, February 9, 2007)
SC Adopts Add’l Rules re TROs on Foreclosures of Real Estate Mortgages By Jay B. Rempillo
THE SUPREME COURT has issued additional guidelines on the issuance of
temporary restraining orders (TROs) or writs of preliminary injunctions
enjoining foreclosures of real estate mortgages, effective March 10,
2007.
The following guidelines are contained in the Court’s three-page
resolution adopting the following additional rules on Extrajudicial or
Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages as recommended by the SC
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court:
1. No TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the
allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not
delinquent unless the application is verified and supported by evidence
of payment;
2. No TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the
allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the
debtor pays the mortgagee at least 12 percent per annum interest on the
principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale,
which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending;
3. Where a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against
a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily
resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the SC, through
the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress
of the cases involving Php10 million and above;
4. All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of
a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction, such as the posting of a bond, which
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shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time
limitation for its effectivity, shall apply
as well to a status quo order. (AM No. 99-10-05-O, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial
Or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages, February 20, 2007)
Court Orders Release of Salaries, Benefits Earned But Fines Sheriff For
Improperly Serving Suspension By Arcie M. Sercado
THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered the release of the salaries and
benefits of a sheriff suspended for neglect of duty, but fined him
Php5,000 for having served his period of suspension during a different
period than that directed by the Court.
Joel Francis C. Camino, Sheriff III of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities in the Island Garden City of Samal, who was suspended by the
Court for two months for dereliction of duty, received a copy of the
resolution penalizing him on March 20, 2006. Although he should have
served the period of suspension from March 20 to April 20, 2006, he
continued reporting to work until he received the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, which prompted him to be absent from work from July
20 to September 20, 2006.
The Court found that Camino was entitled to his salaries and
benefits for the period of April 21 to July 19, 2006 as his supposed
suspension should have been lifted on April 21, 2006, entitling him to pay
for work rendered from that date. However, the Court said that Camino
should be fined for disobeying the directives of the Court and be
considered to have been on leave without pay during the period of his
unauthorized absences. (AM P-06-2115, Angeles Mangubat v. Joel Francis C.
Camino, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Island Garden City of Samal, February
22, 2007)
SC Directs Removal of Pandacan Oil Terminals By Jay B. Rempillo
THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered Manila City Mayor Jose L.
Atienza, Jr. to comply with his ministerial duty to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027, which reclassifies portions of the Manila districts of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial, by removing the
Pandacan Oil Terminals.
The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure enacted
pursuant to the delegated police power of local government units “to
promote the order, safety, and health, morals, and general welfare of the
society.” Approved by the Manila City Council on November 28, 2001 and
taking effect on December 28, 2001, the ordinance reclassifies portions
of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directs the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under it to cease and
desist from operating their businesses in the area concerned within six
months from its effectivity. Among the businesses in the area are the so-
called Pandacan Terminals being operated by Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
The Supreme Court said that “there is nothing that legally hinders
[Mayor Atienza] from enforcing Ordiinance No. 8027,” taking into
consideration a June 26, 2002 Memorandum of Understanding entered
into by the City of Manila, Department of Energy, and the oil companies
involved in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.”
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines,
along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of that September
11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New
York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of
a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
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protective measure should be delayed,” the Court said. (GR No. 156052,
Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., March 7, 2007)
SC Dismisses Four CA Employees for “Case-Fixing” By Katrina M. Martinez
FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT in a “case-fixing” incident, four Court of
Appeals (CA) employees were dismissed from service recently by the
Supreme Court.
Feliciano S. Calinga (Utility Worker I), Evelyn L. Caguitla (Court
Stenographer IV), Luis N. Gnilo (Utility Worker I), and Atty. Edwin Michael
P. Musico (Court Attorney IV) were found guilty of grave misconduct and
dismissed from service. The Court, however, dismissed the charges of
dishonesty and grave misconduct against Frankie N. Calabines (Utility
Worker I) for lack of sufficient evidence.
The Court adopted the report of Justice Martin Villarama stating
that “the evidence on record has satisfactorily established that
respondents Caguitla, Calinga, Atty. Musico, and Gnilo acted in
conspiracy and actively cooperated with one (1) another to defraud
complainant [Dolor] Catoc who was misled into believing that they can
‘facilitate’ the resolution or secure a favorable judgment in CV-73287,” a
case involving the registration of a property for which Catoc acted as the
broker. The Court agreed with Justice Villarama that respondents’
behavior “constitutes a serious violation of their sworn duties as
employees of this Court and which undermines the public’s faith and
trust in the administration of justice.” (A.M. No. 04-5-20-SC, In re: Affidavit of
Frankie N. Calabines, A Member of the Co-Terminous Staff of Justice Josefina Guevara-
Salonga, Relative to Some Anomalies Related to No. 73287 “Candy Maker Inc. v.
Republic of the Philippines,” March 14, 2007)
MERALCO Ordered to Pay Damages to Subscriber By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO) to desist from collecting an unjustified billing adjustment
from its subscriber Ma. Victoria Jose and to pay her moral and exemplary
damages.
MERALCO previously issued a differential billing adjustment after
alleging that defects caused Jose’s meter to register only 50% of her
actual electric consumption for a period of two years. Jose filed a petition
with the lower court seeking to permanently restrain the collection of the
adjustment, which amounted to Php232,385.20, and prevent MERALCO
from discontinuing electrical services.
The Supreme Court held that although MERALCO has the right to
collect on differential billings, it was unable to establish the factual basis
for arriving at the amount of the adjustment. The Court found that the
adjustment was merely based on MERALCO’s company policy, as testified
by its billing clerk, and its own records of Jose’s billings, which revealed
no dramatic increase nor decrease in electric consumption in the billing
cycles preceding, during, and succeeding the period concerned.
The Court also found that MERALCO was grossly negligent in
failing to conduct regular precautionary tests on its meters and, thus,
could not pass its liability for losses arising from defective meters onto
the consumer by issuing a differential billing and threatening
disconnection for non-payment.
MERALCO was thus ordered to pay Jose Php100,000 in moral
damages and Php50,000 in exemplary damages for “its callousness
toward its customers and its inattention to its duty of keeping its facilities
and equipment well maintained.” (GR No. 152769, Manila Electric Company v.
Ma. Victoria Jose, February 14, 2007)
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April 2007
Court Cleanses Judiciary By Anna Katrina M. Martinez
THE JUDICIARY MUST BE PURGED of corruption and incompetence so as
not to run the risk of losing public confidence.
Furthering its efforts to discipline its ranks, the Supreme Court
imposed sanctions on 10 erring members of the Judiciary in separate
administrative cases. Ordered dismissed from service, with forfeiture of
benefits and perpetual disqualification from office, were a Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) judge and a Regional Trial Court (RTC) process server, while
two sheriffs were suspended without pay. Three more judges and three
clerks of court were ordered to pay fines, with stern warnings that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.“We cannot overly emphasize our previous pronouncements
that, circumscribed as it is with a heavy burden of responsibility, the
official and nonofficial conduct required of court personnel – from the
presiding judge to the rank and file – must always be beyond reproach,”
stressed the Court in a per curiam resolution involving the dismissal from
service of Jaime C. Eugenio, Process Server of the RTC, Branch 123,
Caloocan City. Eugenio was found guilty of gross misconduct for having
solicited and received money from a complainant for the dismissal of a
criminal case.
The Court held that it is imperative upon its personnel “to
maintain the good name and standing of the court as a true temple of
justice, the administration of which is a sacred task. By the very nature of
their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it – from the highest
officials to the lower court employees – must faithfully adhere to and
hold inviolate the principle solemnly enshrined in our Constitution: that a
public office is a public trust.”
Also dismissed from service was Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas
of the MTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite, after the High Court, in a per curiam
resolution, found her guilty of gross ignorance of the law for the fourth
time.
The Court held that Judge Mupas’ practice of issuing orders
dubbed as “Detention Pending Investigation of Cases” in criminal cases
instead of requiring the accused to execute a written waiver of rights
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code falls short of the measure of
responsibility expected from a judge. “It is gross ignorance of the law,
pure and simple,” said the Court.
The Court lamented that “When the gross inefficiency springs
from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a
principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she
holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority.”
The Court also meted the penalty of suspension without pay to
Edmundo B. Barriga (Sheriff III of MTC, Branch 5, Cebu City), who was
suspended for one year without pay and fined Php 20,000 for grave
misconduct after he had insinuated to the complainants in a civil case
that a pay-off of Php 50,000 could defer the execution of a writ of
demolition, and after he had demolished the property subject of the
execution despite being informed of a court order enjoining said
demolition, and Samuel G. Basco (Sheriff IV, RTC, Branches 29 & 30,
Surigao City), who was suspended for six months for simple neglect of
duty after he had failed to implement a court order directing him to
proceed with the public sale of levied properties in a civil case.
The other court personnel who were disciplined by the High Court
are Atty. Romulo V. Paredes (former Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 2 of
Bangued, Abra), who was fined Php 5,000 for simple neglect of duty after
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failing to properly supervise and manage the financial transactions in his
court; Atty. Raquel G. Kho (Clerk of Court IV, RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar),
who was fined Php 5,000 for unlawful conduct after his failure to make a
timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody; Judge Benedicto G.
Cobarde (RTC, Branch 53 of Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu), who was fined Php
15,000, for undue delay in rendering a decision, and an additional
amount of Php 5,000, for his prolonged and repeated refusal to comply
with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator; Judge Edison
F. Quintin (Executive Judge, MTC, Branch 56 of Malabon City), who was
fined Php 3,000 for gross inefficiency after his delayed action in an order
of inhibition of a fellow judge; Alexander C. Rimando (Clerk of Court IV,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Olongapo City), who was fined Php
10,000 for having sent letters to a party to a civil case which “created the
impression that relief can be obtained from the courts without filing a
case”; and Judge Iluminada M. Ines (MTC of Sinait, Ilocos Sur), who was
fined Php 20,000 for gross ignorance of the law, after she failed to
properly apply the rule on bail bond application in accordance with the
Rules of Court. (AM No. RTJ-06-2216, Rodriguez v. Eugenio, April 20, 2007; AM No.
03-1462-MTJ, Español v. Toledo-Mupas, April 19, 2007; AM No. P-05-2016, Salazar v.
Barriga, April 19, 2007; AM No. P-07-2310, Sulapas v. Basco, April 19, 2007; AM No. P-
06-2103, Office of the Court Administrator v. Paredes, April 17, 2007; AM No. P-06-
2177, Re: Report on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Accounts of Atty.
Raquel G. Kho, Clerk of Court IV, RTC, Oras, Eastern Samar, April 13, 2007; AM No. RTJ-
07-2042, Paquing v. Cobarde, April 19, 2007; AM No. MTJ-07-1674, Kara-an v. Lindo,
April 19, 1977; AM No. P-04-1926, Spouses Inot v. Rimando, April 19, 2007; and AM No.
MTJ-07-1673, Savella v. Ines, April 19, 2007)
SC Upholds Suspension of BIR Official for Non-Disclosure of Wealth By Annie Rose A. Laborte
THE SUPREME COURT recently affirmed the preventive suspension of an
official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for failure to disclose his
ownership of several properties as well as certain business interests of
his wife in his sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALN).
In affirming the petition of the Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman to nullify and set aside the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which sought to clear
Nestor Valeroso of criminal and administrative charges, the Court said
Valeroso’s non-disclosure in his SALN from 1995 to 2002 “essentially
embraced or comprehended concealment of unexplained wealth”; a
violation of RA No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The Court explained that Section 8 of RA No. 3019 speaks of
“unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be suppressed and
avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in the
SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. ‘Unexplained’
matter normally results from ‘non-disclosure’ or concealment of vital
facts.”
The Court added that the CA, instead of saying that Valeroso was
denied due process, should have considered his “unexplained increase in
net worth,” a “superfluity that should bolster or strengthen the charge of
dishonesty rather than a reason to invalidate the preventive suspension
order.”
The SALN is the means to achieve the policy of accountability of
all public officers in the government, the Court stressed. (G.R. No. 167828,
The Ombudsman, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman, and
Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau, Office of the
Ombudsman v. Nestor S. Valeroso, April 2, 2007)
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Bail Can Be Granted to Potential Extraditee on Basis of Clear and
Convincing Evidence By Jay B. Rempillo
THE SUPREME COURT recently held that a potential extraditee may be
granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the person
is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
Citing the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, the Court saw the need to reexamine its
ruling in Government of United States of America v. Judge Purganan that
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings.
It said that while our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him or her
from filing a motion for bail, a right under the Constitution.
“The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that
the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty….However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided
that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met,” the Court said.
RP, being a signatory to the 1996 UN General Assembly which
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is “under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty,” the Court
held.
The case involved the petition of the Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region to nullify two orders by a Manila Regional
Trial Court (RTC) allowing potential extradite, Juan Antonio Muñoz, to
post bail. The RP and Hong Kong signed in 1995 an extradition treaty,
which became effective in 1997. Later, Muñoz was charged before the
Hong Kong Court with three counts of the offense of “accepting an
advantage as agent,” in violation of sec. 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Manila RTC, Branch
8 to determine whether Muñoz is entitled to bail on the basis of “clear
and convincing evidence.” If Muñoz is not entitled to such, the trial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch. (GR No. 153675, Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v.
Judge Olalia, Jr., April 19, 2007)
SC Acquits Illiterate Fisherman of Double Murder By Gleo Sp. Guerra
THE SUPREME COURT recently acquitted an unschooled fisherman, Jerry
Rapeza, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence leading to reasonable
doubt of two counts of murder, thereby reversing the latter’s conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
The Court held inadmissible the thumbmarked extrajudicial
confession executed in Filipino of Rapeza, as it was not sufficiently
established that Rapeza, who is not well-versed in Filipino, was assisted
by an interpreter during the execution thereof. It further held that
Rapeza’s confession was not made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel of his choice, as the only participation of the lawyer
concerned appears to be the notarization of the extrajudicial confession.
Thus, the Court ruled that the lack of legal assistance, along with the
circumstance that the confession contains facts and details appearing to
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have been supplied by the police investigators themselves, belies the
voluntariness of the confession. It also noted that the confession does
not dovetail with the autopsy report. Finally, the Court said that no
motive for the crimes can be ascribed to Rapeza.
“In conclusion, the overriding consideration in criminal cases is
not whether appellant is completely innocent, but rather whether the
quantum of evidence necessary to prove his guilt was sufficiently met.
With the exclusion of appellant’s alleged confession, we are left with no
other recourse but to acquit him of the offenses charged for the
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be
overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt,” the Court concluded.
(GR No. 169431, People v. Rapeza, April 4, 2007)
SC Settles LP Leadership Controversy By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
THE SUPREME COURT recently upheld Senator Franklin M. Drilon’s
leadership, over that of Mayor Jose “Lito” L. Atienza, Jr.’s, in the Liberal
Party (LP) claim, at the same time confirming the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC over the LP’s leadership issue and exercising its power of
judicial review over the contested COMELEC resolutions.
The Court upheld the COMELEC ruling voiding the elections held
by Atienza, but found that the Daza-Drilon amendments to the LP
Constitution, which effectively gave Drilon a fresh term as party
president, were validly ratified. Thus, it overturned the COMELEC’s
finding that Drilon’s position was merely hold-over in nature until it
conducted elections for a new president. Consequently, the Court held
that the issue as to whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to order the LP
to hold the election of its officers has become academic.
The rift in LP’s leadership began when Drilon’s camp withdrew
their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in July 2005,
causing Atienza’s camp to hold the invalidated elections for new party
leadership.
Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Dante O. Tinga, and Cancio C. Garcia
wrote separate opinions. Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no
part as he had previously participated in the subject LP Elections prior to
being appointed to the Judiciary. (Res., GR Nos. 174992 & 175546, The Liberal
Party v. COMELEC & Atienza v. COMELEC, April 17, 2007)
SC Clarifies Evidentiary Value of Duplicate Originals By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
ALL NOTARIZED COPIES of deeds of conveyance are duplicate originals,
which for all legal intents and purposes may be considered as the best
evidence of the transaction they embody.
The Supreme Court recently clarified the evidentiary value of such
duplicate originals when it corrected both the appellate and trial courts
for treating two copies of the same Absolute Deed of Sale as different
documents for the purpose of determining the genuineness of the
signatures therein. It held that the two copies presented in evidence
were duplicate originals as they were executed at or about the same time
and contained identical contents.
“Original does not mean the first paper written, in contrast to a
copy or transcript made later. The original depends upon the issue to be
proved. It is immaterial whether that document was written before or
after another, was copied from another, or was itself used to copy from,
as long as its contents are the subject of inquiry. Hence, one or some of
these copies are still considered as originals, and they have equal claims
to authenticity… As a matter of practice, deeds of conveyance are
prepared in several copies for notarization and record purposes. After
notarization, the notary public retains copies pursuant to the Rules on
Notarial Practice, one for his record and the other for transmittal to the
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court, through Clerk of Court concerned, where he secured his notarial
commission… All the notarized copies are originals,” the Court said.
The case involved a contested Deed of Absolute Sale, wherein an
expert witness was presented to testify on the genuineness of the
signatures contained therein. Differing factual findings of the appellate
and trial courts led the High Court to delve into the facts of the case.
Finding the testimony presented to be inconsistent and unconvincing, it
upheld the validity of the contested sale as there was no clear, positive,
and convincing evidence of forgery that would impugn the due execution
of the contested deed, which remains the best evidence of the
transaction. (GR No. 162864, Spouses Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, March 28, 2007)
SC OKs Graft Charge Against PIATCO Chairman and President By Gleo Sp. Guerra
THE SUPREME COURT recently upheld the information for violation of
Section 3(g) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, against Henry T. Go, Chairman and President of Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
Along with former Secretary of Transportation and
Communication Vicente C. Rivera, Go had been charged by the
Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan regarding the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA) for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III), alleged to be
“manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.”
The charge was a result of the May 5, 2003 ruling of the Court
declaring, among others, the ARCA null and void for being contrary to
public policy and that Paircargo, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, lacked
the requisite financial capacity to bid for the NAIA-IPT III project.
In a 20-page decision penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the
SC Third Division held that “private persons, like petitioner Go, when
conspiring with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held
liable for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.”
Citing as precedents the cases of Luciano v. Estrella, Singian, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, and Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that its
ruling “is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.” (GR No.
172602, Go v. Sandiganbayan, April 13, 2007)
May 2007
SC Continues Purging the Judiciary By Katrina M. Martinez
“ANY CONDUCT that would be a bane to the public trust and confidence
reposed in the Judiciary cannot be countenanced.”
Thus said the Supreme Court as it intensified its efforts in
cleansing the Judiciary by disciplining eight court officials and employees,
including a judge. Dismissed from service with forfeiture of all benefits
and privileges and with prejudice to re-employment in any government
agency were a Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Branch Clerk of Court,
an MCTC Junior Process Server, and a Regional Trial Court (RTC) Clerk III.
The High Court also suspended an interpreter for two months, ordered a
judge to pay a fine, forfeited all the retirement benefits of a retired RTC
clerk, and dropped from the rolls two other court employees.
“No position demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from its occupant than a judicial office,” the High Court
emphasized in a per curiam resolution concerning the dismissal from
service of Justafina Hope T. Laya, Clerk III of the Office of the Clerk of
Court RTC, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and the forfeiture of the
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retirement benefits of Benilda M. Maddela, former Clerk IV of the said
office. Both Laya and Maddela were found guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct for having appropriated for their personal use monies from
the Judiciary Development Fund, the Fiduciary Fund, the Clerk of Court
General Fund, and the Sheriff’s General Fund of the RTC of Bayombong
totalling Php4,009,351.09. Maddela and Laya were also ordered to jointly
and severally restitute the funds within 30 days from notice.
The Court stressed that “the nature and responsibilities of public
officers enshrined in the Constitution and oft-repeated in our case law
are not mere rhetoric to be taken as idealistic sentiments” as the same
are standards and objectives that should correspond with actual deeds.
Also dismissed from service were Jerry V. Adolfo, Junior Process
Server of the MCTC of Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur, and Darryl C.
Montealto, Branch Clerk of Court of the MCTC of Sapang Dalaga-
Concepcion, Misamis Occidental. Adolfo was found guilty of gross
inefficiency, habitual absenteeism, and failure to serve court processes,
while Montealto was found guilty of misconduct for his failure to turn
over to the police a pistol which formed part of the prosecution’s
evidence in a criminal case, having instead kept the said pistol in his
personal custody for more than three years from the termination of the
said case.
The Court also meted the penalty of two-month suspension
without pay to Jose Rene C. Vasquez, Interpreter III of RTC, Branch 42,
Bacolod City, for conduct unbecoming of a court employee, i.e.,
intentionally bumping a woman, hitting her left breast, and kicking the
said woman when she fought back.
Another court personnel disciplined by the Court was Judge
Evelyn L. Dimaculangan-Querijero, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 26,
Cabanatuan City, who was fined Php21,000 for gross ignorance of the
law. Among others, she dismissed a criminal complaint against two
accused in a rape case after the latter had paid their individual civil
liability, in violation of the well-established principle that payment of civil
liability does not extinguish criminal liability.
The High Court also dropped from the rolls Lolita B. Batadlan,
Court Stenographer III of RTC, Branch 26 of Surallah, South Cotabato, and
Fernandita B. Borja, Clerk of Court of MCTC, Branch 15 of Bilar Bohol.
Batadlan incurred an “unsatisfactory” performance rating for three
consecutive periods from January 2004 to June 2005 while Borja was
found to have been continuously absent from work without approved
leave since August 2004.
Statistics from the Office of the Court Administrator, the Office of
Administrative Services, and the Court of Appeals show that from January
to April this year, a total of 45 judicial employees, have been
administratively disciplined by the High Court, with actions taken ranging
from admonition to dismissal from service. This includes an Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), 14 judges, and 30 rank-and-file
employees of the 14 judges_seven belong to the second-level (RTC)
courts while the remaining seven are from the first-level (Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, MCTC)
courts.
Of the 30 rank-and-file personnel, two are from the Supreme
Court, seven are from the CA, and the remaining 21 are from the second-
and first-level courts. (AM No. 06-2-125-RTC, Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Ms.
Lolita B. Batadlan, April 13, 2007; AM No. 06-1-10-MCTC, Re: Absence Without Official
Leave (AWOL) of Ms. Fernandita B. Borja, April 13, 2007; AM No. P-04-1924, Office of
the Court Administrator v. Laya, April 27, 2007; AM No. P-06-2231, Clerk of Court
Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, April 27, 2007; AM No. 06-8-279-MCTC, Report on the Judicial
Audit Conducted at the MCTC-Sapang Dalaga-Concepcion, Misamis Occidental, April 27,
2007; AM No. P-07-2313, Nicopior v. Vasquez, April 27, 2007; and AM No. RTJ-02-1735,
Spouses Cabico v. Judge Dimaculangan-Querijero, April 27, 2007)
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CJ Puno to Special Court Judges: Protect the Right to Life By Jay B. Rempillo
CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO has urged the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
judges who will handle cases involving killings of political activists and
media members to always uphold the right to life, the most fundamental
of all rights, as “special court” judges.
Speaking during the closing ceremonies of the two-day Seminar-
Workshop for Judges on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances held at the Manila Pavilion Hotel, United Nations
Avenue, Manila last May 8, Chief Justice Puno stressed that political,
economic, and all other rights merely add quality to life and depend on
the pre-existence of life itself for their operation.
“It is with our checkered history, with our generous contribution
to humanity’s continuing struggle to enthrone human rights in the hearts
of all as backdrop, that you must view your distinct call as special judges
to decide extrajudicial killings. You are special judges because you are to
protect the most special, the most important right of man – the right to
life,” the Chief Justice said.
The Supreme Court, through its education arm the Philippine
Judicial Academy (PHILJA) in partnership with the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), conducted the extensive seminar-workshop for the first
batch of RTC judges who will handle extrajudicial killings. The first batch
came from the National Capital Judicial Region and the First and Second
Judicial Regions. Two other batches will undergo the same seminar
within the year.
The seminar is aimed at addressing the procedural concerns of
special court judges in identifying and deciding cases on extrajudicial
killings.
The lecturers in the seminar-workshop are experts in the fields of
International Law, Human Rights Law, and Humanitarian Law. They
include Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, CHR Chairperson Purificacion V.
Quisumbing, University of the Philippines Office of Legal Aid Director
Atty. Theodore O. Te, and PHILJA Professors Sedfrey M. Candelaria and
Herminio Harry L. Roque.
Ninety-nine RTCs nationwide have been designated as special
courts to handle cases of extrajudicial killings.
Intel Entitled to Tax Refund, Leniency in VAT Implementation
Imperative By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
THERE IS NO LAW, internal revenue rule, or regulation requiring a Value
Added Tax (VAT)-registered entity engaged in export sales to obtain
authority from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to print its sales
invoices or requiring such authority to be reflected or indicated therein.
Thus the Supreme Court held when it ordered the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) to determine and compute the tax credit or refund due to
Intel Technology Philippines (Intel) for its unutilized VAT input taxes on
domestic purchases of goods and services attributable to its zero-rated
sales.
Although finding Intel to be legally entitled to its claim for refund
or issuance of a tax credit certificate, the tax and appellate courts
previously denied its claim on the ground that it purportedly failed to
comply with invoicing requirements under Sections 113 and 237 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) since the Intel’s invoices do not
bear the BIR authority to print, and in some cases failed to indicate Intel’s
VAT-Registered Entity Tax Identification Number (TIN-V). This prompted
the High Court to declare that “law and revenue regulations do not
provide that failure to reflect or indicate in the invoices or receipts the
BIR authority to print, as well as the TIN-V, would result in the outright
invalidation of these invoices or receipts. Neither is it provided therein
that such omission or failure would result in the outright denial of a claim
for tax credit/refund.”
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“It bears reiterating that while the pertinent provisions of the Tax
Code and the rules and regulations implementing them require entities
engaged in business to secure a BIR authority to print invoices or receipts
and to issue duly registered invoices or receipts, it is not specifically
required that the BIR authority to print be reflected or indicated therein.
Indeed, what is important with respect to the BIR authority to print is
that it has been secured or obtained by the taxpayer, and that invoices or
receipts are duly registered… What applies to petitioner, as a PEZA-
registered export enterprise, is the Court’s pronouncement that leniency
in the implementation of the VAT is an imperative, precisely to spur
economic growth in the country and attain global competitiveness as
envisioned in our laws. The incentives offered to PEZA enterprises,
among which are tax exemptions and tax credits, ultimately redound to
the benefit of the national economy, enticing as they do more
enterprises to invest and do business within the zones, thus creating
more employment opportunities and infusing more dynamism to the
vibrant interplay of market forces,” the Court said.
Setting aside the Court of Appeals decision affirming the CTA’s
denial of Intel’s claim for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate in
the amount of Php11,770,181.70, the High Court found that Intel, as a
VAT-registered and Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)-registered
entity engaged in the export of advanced and large-scale integrated
circuits, is entitled to its claim representing the input taxes it has paid on
domestic purchases of goods and services for the period of April 1, 1998
to June 30, 1998, in accordance with the NIRC as amended by RA 9337.
(GR No. 166732, Intel Technology Philippines v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, April
27, 2007)
Less is More: Benchmark and CourtNews Merge By Jed M. Eva III
BEGINNING THIS MONTH, CourtNews will be
merged with Benchmark under the latter’s
new masthead.
CourtNews was introduced in
November 2003 as a special supplement to
Benchmark at the height of the attempt to
impeach then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. It featured in-depth articles explaining
the Court’s side in the Judiciary
Development Fund controversy.
In January 2004, CourtNews was
made a regular monthly publication to
complement Benchmark, which at that time
was released bi-monthly. The audiences of
the two publications were also redefined––
Benchmark would primarily cater to court employees, while CourtNews
would focus on the Court’s external publics.
In September 2005 in response to the fast clip of events and
activities of the valedictory year of then Chief Justice Davide, the
Benchmark began coming out monthly as a four-page spread. Since then,
the PIO has come out with two publications every month.
Staff members from both publications will now collaborate to
come out with one publication that will provide audiences, within and
outside the Court, with important and relevant information about the SC
and its programs and activities.
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Fixed Savings Deposit Subject to Documentary Stamp Tax By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
A PASSBOOK representing an interest- earning deposit account issued by
a bank qualifies as a certificate of deposit drawing interest and is
therefore subject to Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) under the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Affirming the Court of Tax Appeals, the Supreme Court has upheld
a deficiency assessment of Php71,005,757.77 against the International
Exchange Bank (IEB), representing deficiency DST on its Fixed Savings
Deposits (FSD) for the years 1996 and 1997. The Court found that sec.
179 (180) of the NIRC, as amended by RA 9243, specifically includes
“certificates or other evidences of deposits that are either drawing
interest significantly higher than the regular savings deposit taking into
consideration the size of the deposit and the risks involved or drawing
interest and having a specific maturity date” as one type of debt
instruments subject to DST, to which the FSD belongs.
The Court said that “not all certificates of deposit are negotiable.
A certificate of deposit may or may not be negotiable as gathered from
the use of the conjunction or, instead of and, in its definition. A
certificate of deposit may be payable to the depositor, to the order of the
depositor, or to some other person or his order… In any event, the
negotiable character of any and all documents under Section 180 is
immaterial for purposes of imposing DST.”
“To claim that time deposits evidenced by passbooks should not
be subject to DST is a clear evasion of the rule on equality and uniformity
in taxation that requires the imposition of DST on documents evidencing
transactions of the same kind, in this particular case, on all certificates of
deposits drawing interest,” the Court said. (GR No. 171266, International
Exchange Bank v. CIR, April 4, 2007)
SC Orders Comelec to Disclose Party-List Nominees’ Names By Jay B. Rempillo
UPHOLDING THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO INFORMATION on matters of public
concern, the Supreme Court has compelled the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) to disclose the names of the nominees of the accredited party-
list groups or organizations participating in the May 14 party-list
elections.
The Comelec, which initially refused to reveal said information,
had complied with the Court’s directive and released the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups before the May 14 polls.
In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia, the
Court En Banc said that the Comelec “commited grave abuse of
discretion when it refused the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a
list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective
positions.” It said that the Comelec “has a constitutional duty to disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.”
The Court cited section 7, Article III of the Constitution (the right
of people to information on matters of public concern) and section 28,
Article II of the Constitution (the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest) as its
basis in ordering the poll body to divulge the said names.
The Court noted that no national security or like concerns is involved in
the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in
question. It said that the prohibition imposed on the Comelec not to
disclose the names under section 7 of RA 7941 (Party-list System Act) is
limited in scope and duration as it extends only to the certified list which
the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. It further said that to stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the
absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. (GR No.
177271, BA-RA 7941 v. Comelec; GR No. 177314, Rosales v. Comelec, May 4, 2007)
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Award of Damages vs. Electric Cooperative Upheld By Gleo Sp. Guerra
THE SUPREME COURT has affirmed both the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Court in holding an electric cooperative liable for damages
for disconnecting an electric meter of one of its subscribers for alleged
tampering without notice to the latter.
In a decision penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the
Court’s Third Division, Samar Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO) was
ordered to pay jointly and severally with its inspector Baltazar Dacula a
total of Php37,000.00 in damages to Estrella Quijano and to immediately
reconnect the latter’s electric meter upon her request.
The Court held electricity to be “a basic necessity, the generation
and distribution of which is imbued with public interest, and its provider
is a public utility subject to strict regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. Failure to comply with these regulations will give rise to the
presumption of bad faith or abuse of right.” In this case, the Court noted
that under the law in force at the time of disconnection, PD 401,
SAMELCO should only resort to disconnection after notice of differential
billing to Quijano and affording her opportunity to settle the same, which
it had failed to do. It also failed to give her notice when it disconnected
her electric meter.
“The purpose of the notice requirement is to afford electric
consumers opportunity to witness the inspection and protect themselves
from contrived discovery of tampering. They must also be allowed to
dispute any accusation of electricity pilferage. This purpose is not served
by allowing inspection teams to swoop down on unsuspecting
consumers,” the Court ruled. (GR No. 144474, Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
Quijano, April 27, 2007)
SC Unseats Mabalacat, Pampanga Mayor By Jay B. Rempillo
THE SUPREME COURT has unseated Mabalacat Mayor Marino “Boking”
Morales whom it found ineligible to have run in the 2004 elections as
being a fourth-term candidate and ordered the vice-mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga to immediately head its local government until June 30, 2007.
The Court granted the petitions of lawyers Venancio Q. Rivera and
Normandick De Guzman to cancel Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) dated December 30, 2003.
The Court also dismissed the petition of mayoral candidate Anthony Dee
for being moot since Morales was disqualified from continuing to serve
as Mabalacat mayor.
The Court found that Morales had served as mayor for three
consecutive terms immediately preceding the 2004 elections. Citing Ong
v. Alegre, the Court said that the three-term limit rule as provided for in
RA 7160 or the Local Government Code applies to Morales, making him
ineligible to run for a fourth consecutive term.
Having found Morales ineligible, the Court said the former’s COC
for the 2004 elections should also be cancelled per sections 6 and 7 of RA
6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987). Morales ran as candidate for
mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007. (GR No. 167591, Rivera v. Comelec; GR No. 170577, Dee v. Comelec,
May 9, 2007)
Same Benefits for INP, PNP Retirees By Arcie M. Sercado
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE (INP) retirees should have the same
retirement benefits as those of Philippine National Police retirees (PNP).
Thus the Supreme Court held when it affirmed the Court of
Appeals, which declared that the INP retirees are entitled to the same
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retirement benefits accorded upon retirees of the PNP under RA 6975,
An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized
Department of the Interior and Local Government, as amended by RA
8551, The Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of
1998.
The Court ordered the Department of Budget and Management
and concerned government agencies to implement the proper
adjustments on the INP retirees’ retirement benefits. It found that the
INP was never abolished by RA 6975 but was, instead absorbed,
transferred, and/or merged, along with the other offices comprising the
Philippine Constabulary (PC)-INP, with the PNP. As the INP was merely
transformed into the PNP, its retirees cannot be excluded from the
retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees.
The Court likewise found that RA 6975 provides for its retroactive
application to those who had retired prior to its effectivity.
Prior to the Court’s decision in this case, INP retirees and PNP
retirees of the same rank had a disparity in their monthly pensions of as
high as Php10,628.
The PNP was created through RA 6975 on December 13, 1990, to
establish a police force that is national in scope and purely civilian in
character, and to erase the stigma spawned by the militarization of the
police force under the PC-INP structure. (GR No. 169466, Department of Budget
and Management v. Manila’s Finest Retirees Association, Inc., May 9, 2007)
P.I. Matters Held to be Privileged Communication By Arcie M. Sercado
MATERIALS PRESENTED during preliminary investigation cannot be used
as a basis for libel.
Thus the Supreme Court held when it upheld the lower court’s
order granting the withdrawal of the information for libel against an
estafa complainant on the ground that the newsletter, upon which the
complaint was based, was considered privileged communication.
Complainant Vicente C. Ponce previously filed an estafa case
against Nicasio I. Alcantara. Ponce submitted a newsletter to the
investigating prosecutor as an annex to his complaint-affidavit, discussing
how Alcantara defrauded him of his shares in the Iligan Cement
Corporation. This in turn prompted Alcantara to file a libel complaint
against Ponce.
The Court found that the newsletter was presented during the
preliminary investigation of the estafa case, thus making it a form of
privileged communication which consequently exempts it from libel.
Referring to the United States case of Borg v. Boas, the Court stressed
that “preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official nature have
been given absolute privilege.”
The Court explained that the controversial statements in the
newsletter were made in the context of a criminal complaint against
petitioner and were disclosed only to the official investigating the
complaint and thus, were relevant to the investigation.
Privileged communication is communication which takes place within the
context of a protected relationship, such as that between an attorney
and a client or in this case, between a complainant and a prosecutor and
cannot be used as basis for a libel case. (GR No. 156183, Alcantara v. Ponce,
February 28, 2007)
SC Disciplines 3 Lawyers By Maribeth C. Cruz
Fulfilling its duty to preserve the integrity of the Philippine Bar, the
Supreme Court recently suspended two lawyers and reprimanded
another for separate offenses.
The Court ordered Atty. Pablo C. Cruz’s one-year suspension from
the practice of law for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
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Responsibility when he entered into a second marriage while his first
marriage was still subsisting. Rule 1.01 states that “A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.”
Cruz was also found to have violated Canon 5 of the same Code,
which requires all lawyers to “keep abreast of legal developments.” He
had claimed ignorance of the fact that the Family Code was already in
effect when he entered into his second marriage in 1989.
Atty. Edgardo S. Arias for his part was slapped with a one-month
suspension for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
failed to inform his client, Luisito Balatbat, of the status of the latter’s
case, which had lost. The Court held that Arias’ actuations violated Rule
18.04, which mandates that a lawyer must keep the client informed of
the status of the case.
Likewise, Arias was found negligent for his failure to attend a
hearing of said case after he requested for its re-scheduling.
The Court also found that Arias did not properly withdraw as
counsel for his client. “The only way to be relieved as counsel is to have
either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court
relieving him of his duties as counsel, in accordance with Rule 138,
Section 26 of the Rules of Court,” the Court said.
Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez for his part was reprimanded for filing a
premature criminal complaint against another lawyer, Atty. George C.
Briones, in a move to compel the latter to deliver to his (Jimenez’s)
clients the residue of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson, which was
under Briones’ administration, as mandated by the testate Court.
The filing of the criminal complaint was in violation of Rule 19.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that “A lawyer
shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case or proceeding.”
The Court said that the filing of the complaint was premature
since the Regional Trial Court had yet to determine and define the
residue it was referring to in its order. (AC No. 6854, Dulalia, Jr., v. Cruz, April 27,
2007; AC No. 1666, Balatbat v. Arias, April 13, 2007; AC No. 6691, Briones v. Jimenez,
April 27, 2007)
A Must-Read re AWOL, Habitually Absent, and Tardy Employees By Albert N. Lavandero
ENSHRINED IN SECTION 1, Article XI of the Constitution is the credo for
people working in government: “Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
Thus, Supreme Court (SC) employees who are absent without
official leave (AWOL), incur habitual absenteeism, habitual tardiness, or
unauthorized absences should know the consequences of their
infractions.
AWOL. Section 35, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Leave of Absences) states that an
employee absent for at least 30 days without approved leave shall be
considered on AWOL and shall be dropped from the service after due
notice. However, the employee shall be informed, at the latter’s address
appearing on the 201 files or the latter’s last known written address, of
the employee’s separation from the service not later than five days from
its effectivity. However, when the exigencies of the service require the
employee’s immediate presence and the former fails/refuses to return to
the service, the head of office may drop the same from the service even
prior to the expiration of the 30-day period above stated.
An employee’s being AWOL will be reflected in the latter’s service
record. For unauthorized absences of less than 30 days, it has been the
procedure at the SC-Office of Administrative Services-Leave Division to
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inform the OAS-Complaints and Investigation Division of such
unauthorized absences by serving the employee at the latter’s last known
address on record a Return-to-Work Order signed by the Chief
Administrative Officer. “Failure on his part to report for work within the
period stated in the Order shall be a valid ground to drop him from the
rolls.” (2nd par. Sec. 63, amended by CSC MC Nos. 41, s. 1998 and 14, s.
1999.)
It must be noted that filing a letter of resignation by the
concerned employee does not automatically clear the latter, since the
resignation letter has to go through proper channels and must be with
the recommending approval of the employee’s immediate superior or
the Chief of Office. The resignation letter will then be forwarded to the
SC through the Clerk of Court for approval by the respective Chair of the
Court’s three divisions. While the employee concerned is awaiting action
on the letter of resignation by the SC, the employee must still report to
work in order that the government service may not be prejudiced,
otherwise the employee will be declared on AWOL.
In 2006, six SC employees were dropped from the rolls; one in
2005; and five in 2004.
Habitual Absenteeism. “An officer or an employee commits
habitual absenteeism if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the
allowable monthly leave credit of two and a half days under the leave law
for at least three months in a semester or at least three consecutive
months during the year.” [Sec. 22 (q), Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987) reiterated in Memorandum Circular No. 4, series of 1991; GALDO,
Ruben Q., CSC Resolution No. 97-1823, March 11, 1997]
In 2006, two employees were fined by the Court for habitual
absenteeism. In 2005, one employee was fined, while another was
suspended for six months. The year 2004 recorded no employee
penalized for the said offense.
Tardiness. When an employee fails to report on a time set as his
official time of arrival, he is considered tardy. “It is committed by an
employee if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten
(10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least
two (2) consecutive months during the year.” [HOMECILLO, Carmelito v.,
CSC Resolution No. 97-0791, January 28, 1997, MC No. 4, s. 1991] To
make sure that your half days are not considered tardiness or undertime,
file the corresponding leave.
“Where the position an employee holds not only requires the
latter to report for duty at a prescribed time, but more significantly, the
exigency of public service so requires it, the employee’s tardiness in
office irreparably prejudices the government service, taking into account
the frequency and regularity of its commission. An employee’s
unauthorized tardiness constitutes either a grave offense or a light
offense, depending on its depravity and effects on the government
service as defined by the agency head.” [Rule IV, Section 52, Paragraph
(A)/(C), No. 4; Parungao, Edelwina DG., CSC Resolution No. 00-1397, June
13, 2000]
Frequent unauthorized tardiness or habitual tardiness is penalized
with a reprimand for the 1st offense; suspension of one to 30 days for
the 2nd offense; and dismissal from the service for the third offense.
Moreover, Rule 17, sec. 8 (Government Office Hours) of the
Omnibus Rule Implementing Book 5 of #) No. 292 and Other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws states that “Officers and employees who have incurred
tardiness and undertime regardless of the number of minutes per day,
exceeding 10 times a month for two consecutive in a semester shall be
subject to disciplinary action.” (*Amended by CSC Memo Circular No. 19,
Series of 1999)
In year 2006, 13 were reprimanded; 12, severely reprimanded;
four, suspended; 21, sternly warned; and two, fined. Year 2005 saw 14
reprimanded and two suspended employees. Twenty-eight Court
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employees were reprimanded, 12 were suspended, and one was fined in
2004.
Unauthorized Absences. Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 [LEAVE OF ABSENCES]
also states that “An official/employee who is absent without approved
leave shall not be entitled to receive his salary corresponding to the
period of his unauthorized leave of absence. It is understood, however
that his absence shall no longer be deducted from his accumulated leave
credits, if there are any.”
The Rule also provides that “When ever the application for leave
of absence, including terminal leave, is not acted upon by the head of
agency or his duly authorized representative within five (5) working days
after receipt hereof, the application for leave of absences shall be
deemed approved (Amended by CSC MC No. 41., s. 1998).”
In 2006, one employee was dismissed for this offense. In 2005,
one employee was suspended, and another (1) was fined. In 2004, one
case was filed, but was dismissed.
(Editor’s Note: Atty. Lavandero is Court Attorney IV at the SC-OAS-Complaints and
Investigation Division.)
June 2007
SC Disciplines More Judges, Court Personnel By Katrina M. Martinez
“THE NATURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES of men and women in the
Judiciary…are neither mere jargons nor idealistic sentiments, but working
standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual
deeds.”
As its drive towards a corruption-free judiciary continues, the
Supreme Court recently subjected to disciplinary action five judges and
nine court personnel for various administrative offenses.
The Court suspended Judge Henry J. Trocino and Court
Stenographers Emezer Arellano and Evelyn Montoyo, all of the Bago City,
Negros Occidental Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, and Silvino R. Malana,
Jr., Sheriff IV of the Tuguegarao City RTC.
Judge Trocino was suspended for three months after he was
found guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions, aggravated by the fact
that he made untruthful statements in his Monthly Certificates of
Service.
An audit team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
found that Judge Trocino failed to decide 71 cases submitted for decision
in its first audit in July 2003, 33 of which remained undecided during a
second audit in July 2004. Nevertheless, Judge Trocino stated in each of
his Monthly Certificates of Service for the months of November 2004 to
February 2005 that he had decided “all special proceedings, applications,
petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which had been under
his submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety (90)
days or more.”
Arellano and Montoyo were both suspended for one month
without salaries and benefits after the High Court found them guilty of
simple neglect of duty for their failure to transcribe their respective
stenographic notes in a total of 97 cases.
The Court also suspended Sheriff Malana for one month and one
day for simple neglect of duty after the latter failed to make a return of
the writ of execution in a civil case as required by the Rules of Court.
Also subject to administrative sanctions were Judge Edgardo L.
Catilo, former Acting Presiding Judge of the Bago City RTC, Branch 62,
who was fined Php20,000 for undue delay in rendering decisions after it
was found that he failed to decide 50 cases in the July 2003 OCA audit, 43
of which remained undecided during the second audit in July 2005; Judge
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Godofredo G. Hernandez, Sr. of the Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), who was fined Php20,000 for gross
ignorance of the law and procedure after he issued warrants of arrests
notwithstanding the lack of both a preliminary investigation and probable
cause, and for violating the right to due process of the accused in a
number of related criminal cases; Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario of the
Patnongon, Antique Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), who was fined
Php20,000 for undue delay in the disposition of a civil case falling under
the Rules on Summary Procedure after it was found that he had rendered
a decision in the said civil case after the lapse of three years, which was
clearly beyond the 30-day period prescribed by the Rules; Judge
Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr. of the Ormoc City RTC, Branch 12, who was
reprimanded and fined Php5,000 for conduct unbecoming of a judge
after he was found to have embarrassed persons and used insulting and
insensitive language (i.e., “punyeta,” “animal,” “bakla,” and “bullshit”) in
his court; Atty. Josephine Mutia-Haggad, Clerk of Court of the Bago City
RTC, Branch 62, who was fined Php5,000 for simple neglect of duty after
she failed to supervise and follow-up other court employees of their
obligations; Peter A. De Vera, Clerk of Court III, and Alexander C.
Rimando, Clerk of Court IV, both of the Olongapo City MTC in Cities,
Office of the Clerk of Court, who were fined Php1,000 each for simple
misconduct after the two engaged in a shouting match, “with one even
cursing the other,” inside the premises of the court; Rodolfo V. Payumo,
Sheriff IV of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 93, who was fined Php5,000 for
violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees after the Court found that he had uttered statements to a
complainant in an ejectment case “which insinuated that he could have
spared the complainants from being ejected if they had approached
him”; Charlie S. Gatbunton, Sheriff IV of the Balanga, Bataan RTC, Branch
4, who was fined Php10,000 for gross ignorance of the law after he was
found to have conducted the auction sale of a mortgaged property
without publishing a new Notice of Sheriff’s Sale with the new auction
date as required by law, and Eusebio A. Oaferina, Accountant I of the
Accounting Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the
Supreme Court, who was dropped from the rolls for having been on
unauthorized absence since February 1, 2007.
The recent stream of imposition of administrative penalties and
disciplinary action on court personnel is part of the ongoing efforts of the
High Court to curb and punish corruption in the Judiciary.
Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock notes that “while we
have a very uncompromising Chief Justice, we also need the full
cooperation of other members of the Judiciary in eliminating the problem
of corruption.” (AM No. P-07-2290, Malsi v. Malana, Jr., May 25, 2007; AM No. RTJ-
05-1955, Re: Anonymous Complaint Dated February 18, 2005 of a “Court Personnel”
Against Judge Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr., RTC, Branch 12, Ormoc City, May 25, 2007; AM
No. P-06-2135, Paguyo v. Gatbunton, May 25, 2007; AM No. RTJ-05-1936, Office of the
Court Administrator v. Trocino, May 28, 2007; AM No. 2007-05-SC, Re: Dropping from
the Rolls of Mr. Eusebio A. Oaferina, June 5, 2007; AM No. MTJ-06-1628, Gutierrez v.
Hernandez, Sr., June 8, 2007; AM No. MTJ-07-1662, Balajedeong v. Del Rosario, June 8,
2007; AM No. P-03-1672, De Vera Jr. v. Rimando, June 8, 2007; AM No. P-05-2010,
Spouses Almacha v. Payumo, June 8, 2007)
SC Clarifies Conditions for Discharge of State Witness By Katrina M. Martinez
THE TESTIMONY OF A PROSPECTIVE state witness is not required to be
substantially corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who are not
among the accused in the same criminal case. Otherwise, the condition
that “there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state
witness” will be rendered nugatory.
Thus the Supreme Court First Division, through Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, clarified when it affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals discharging accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix
from the information in a murder case to become state witnesses.
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The Court held that the corroborative evidence required by rules
on the discharge of an accused to be a state witnesse does not have to
consist of the exact same evidence that will be testified on by the
anticipated state witnesses. “We have ruled that ‘a conspiracy is more
readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other
method…Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some
particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in
other respects.’ It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is
corroborated by some other witness or evidence,” the Court said. (GR No.
143093, Salvanera v. People, May 21, 2007)
SC Orders PEA to Pay Php94 Million in Just Compensation By Gleo Sp. Guerra
THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered the Public Estates Authority (PEA)
to pay Php94,380,000.00 as just compensation for the property on which
the southern abutment of the Zapote bridge of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road had been constructed.
In a decision penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, the
Court’s First Division reversed the Court of Appeals (CA) and reinstated
the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202 of Las Piñas
when it held that PEA should pay the property’s owner Julieta P. Tan the
said property’s zonal valuation at Php20,000 per square meter when PEA
filed its petition for expropriation in 2003. The Court said that the CA
erred in ruling that the PEA’s taking of the property occurred in 1985 and
that just compensation should be based on the zonal valuation in that
year (Php2,000 per square meter). It noted that PEA’s entry into the
property in 1985 was not for the purpose of expropriating the property
but on condition that it should pay a monthly rental of Php10,000.00 and
that, up to the present, no agreement had been reached for the sale of
the property to PEA.
The Court also held that the CA erred in not dismissing PEA’s
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for being the wrong
remedy since the RTC’s orders fixing the just compensation and denying
PEA’s motion for reconsideration, respectively, are final in nature and
should instead be appealed. (GR No. 170740, Tan v. Republic, May 25, 2007)
Mercury Drug Liable for Selling Wrong Medication By Arcie M. Sercado
THE SUPREME COURT recently ordered Mercury Drug Corporation
(Mercury Drug) to pay Php50,000 and Php25,000 in moral and exemplary
damages, respectively, due to its employee’s error in selling the wrong
medicine to a customer. As a result, the customer fell asleep on the
wheel and had an accident.
In a decision penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval-Guttierez, the
Court’s First Division found that respondent Sebastian M. Baking would
not have fallen asleep and lost control of his car had the employee of
Mercury Drug issued the correct medication. Thus, the Court found
Mercury Drug liable for the resulting injuries as its employee’s negligence
implies that there has also been negligence on its part.
Baking, who was diagnosed with high blood sugar and triglyceride
in November 1993 was sold Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, instead
of the prescribed Diamicron, in an Alabang branch of the Mercury Drug
Corporation because the latter’s sales representative had misread his
prescription. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking
took one pill of Dormicum for three consecutive days. On the third day,
he fell asleep on the wheel, causing his car to collide with another
vehicle. (GR No. 156037, Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking, May 25, 2007)
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Administrative Proceedings: Not Arena for Squabbling Lawyers By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
MUTUAL BICKERING and unjustified recriminations between attorneys
detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive
sympathy from the Court.
Thus the Supreme Court Special Third Division held in a resolution
penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia denying a motion for contempt and/or
disbarment against Attorney Justo Paras filed against him by his
estranged wife, Rosa Yap-Paras, for the former’s alleged violation of the
suspension order meted upon him by the Court.
“The Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the
instant case, as well as petitioner-movant’s counsels, to avoid further
squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each
other. An examination reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity
between Atty. Paras and petitioner’s counsels as evidenced by the
number of administrative cases between them… Lawyers should treat
each other with courtesy, fairness, candor, and civility,” the Court said.
The Court found no sufficient bases to support Yap-Paras’
allegation and, instead, found that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative
to inform the lower courts of his one-year suspension from law practice
for committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer’s oath. However,
the Court reprimanded Atty. Paras for his failure to observe the respect
due the Court in not promptly complying with its directive to comment
on Yap-Paras’ motion for contempt and/or disbarment. (AC No. 4947, Yap-
Paras v. Paras, June 7, 2007)
SC Orders Dismissal of Rebellion Charges against Beltran, et al. By Katrina M. Martinez
FOR WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE and due process, the Supreme Court
has ordered the dismissal of the criminal cases for rebellion against six
party-list representatives and four private individuals implicated in an
alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo administration on February
24, 2006 on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution.
In a decision penned by Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the Court’s
Second Division granted the consolidated petitions for the writs of
prohibition and certiorari to stop the prosecution for rebellion of
Representatives Liza L. Maza, Joel G. Virador, Saturnino C. Ocampo,
Teodoro A. Casiño, Rafael V. Mariano (known as the “Batasan 5”), Crispin
B. Beltran, and private individuals Vicente P. Ladlad, Nathanael S.
Santiago, Randall B. Echanis, and Rey Claro C. Casambre. The Court ruled
that the inquest proceeding against Beltran was void for failure of the
latter’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with the rules on
preliminary investigation in cases involving lawful warrantless arrests as
provided for by the Rules of Court and by DOJ Circular No. 61.
The High Court also alluded to “the obvious involvement of
political considerations in the actuations” of Secretary of Justice Raul M.
Gonzalez concerning the rebellion charges, stressing the partiality of the
prosecutors after the Secretary stated in an interview that “We [the DOJ]
will just declare probable cause, then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x
x.” The Court said “this clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to
file the Information even in the absence of probable cause.”
The Court found that in the case of Beltran, none of the arresting
officers saw him commit in their presence the crime of rebellion, nor did
the arresting officers have personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances sufficient to form probable cause to believe that Beltran
had committed rebellion. It also ruled that there was no probable cause
to indict him for rebellion as none of the affidavits executed by members
and some civilians presented as evidence before the panel of prosecutors
that conducted the inquest stated that Beltran committed specific acts of
rebellion.
The High Court also held that the preliminary investigation
conducted against the petitioners was tainted with irregularities for the
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failure of the respondent prosecutors to comply with the rule which
provides that the complaint be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in
their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. (GR Nos. 172070-72,
Ladlad v. Velasco, June 1, 2007)
SC Upholds Textbook Supply Deal By Katrina M. Martinez
VOTING UNANIMOUSLY, the Supreme Court En Banc recently upheld the
validity of the award of the Department of Education (DepEd) to Vibal
Publishing House, Inc. (Vibal) and Watana Phanit Printing and Publishing
Co., Ltd. (Watana) of the World Bank-funded supply and delivery of some
17.5 million copies of social studies textbook “Makabayan” and teachers’
manual.
In a 16-page decision penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia, the
Supreme Court nullified and set aside the order dated December 4, 2006
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, which granted a petition
for injunction filed by losing bidder Kolonwel Trading (Kolonwel) to enjoin
the DepEd and the Department of Budget and Management Procurement
Service (DBM-PS) from awarding the project to Vibal and Watana.
The Court said that Kolonwel failed to meet the requirements
prescribed by Section 55 of RA 9184, or the Government Procurement
Reform Act, which provides that decisions of the DBM’s Inter-Agency Bids
and Awards Committee (IABAC) may be protested by submitting a
verified petition paper to the head of the procuring entity and paying a
non-refundable protest fee. It stressed that Kolonwel “sought judicial
intervention even before completing the protest process. Hence, its filing
of SP Civil Case No. 06-116010 was precipitate. Or, as the law itself
would put it, cases that are filed in violation of the protest process ‘shall
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.’”
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales were
on leave, while Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part as he
participated in the case when he was still Solicitor General. (GR No. 175608,
Department of Budget and Management Procurement Service and the Inter-Agency
Bids and Committee v. Kolonwel Trading, June 8, 2007)
SC Allows OWWA to Proceed with Reorganization By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
THE SUPREME COURT recently gave the go-signal for the implementation
by the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) of a new
organizational structure to stabilize its internal organization and promote
careerism among its employees.
In a 23-page decision penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, the
Court’s Third Division set aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued
by Branch 117 of the Pasay City Regional Trial Court, which restrained
OWWA from implementing its new organizational structure as per its
Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004.
The Court found that injunctive writ improvidently issued as there
was no showing of a clear and unmistakeable legal right on the part of
the employees challenging Resolution No. 001 to warrant the writ’s
protection. “There was no showing that they are the employees who are
in grave danger of being displaced. [They] were similarly wanting in
proving that they… will allegedly suffer by reason of the reorganization,”
the Court said.
Likewise, the Court held that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting the assailed writ as it interrupted the
status quo instead of maintaining it. “What was preserved by the RTC
was the state of affairs before the issuance of Resolution No. 001… and
the subsequent administrative orders pursuant to its passing,” the Court
noted. (GR No. 169802, OWWA v. Chavez, June 8, 2007)
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CJ Enjoins Officials and Employees to Strictly Observe Gambling
Prohibition in Court By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado
CHIEF JUSTICE Reynato S. Puno has enjoined all officials and employees
of the Judiciary to strictly observe the prohibition against any form of
gambling regardless of whether or not it involves monetary bets within
Court premises “to maintain the highest level of ethical conduct and
morals in the Judiciary.”
As per Memorandum Circular No. 09-2007 dated June 18, 2007,
appropriate administrative disciplinary actions will be taken against any
court official or employee caught gambling within court premises,
whether such gambling activities occur during working days, weekends,
or holidays; or during office hours or beyond.
In the Supreme Court, the Chief of Staff of the Office of the Chief
Justice and the respective Judicial Staff Heads of the Offices of the
Associate Justices, the Court Administrator, the Clerk of Court and
Division Clerks of Court, the various Chiefs of Offices, the Philippine
Judicial Academy Chancellor, and the Judicial Bar and Council Executive
Committee Chair have been instructed to ensure compliance amongst
their personnel, adopting appropriate measures to such effect.
Implementation in the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax
Appeals, and the lower courts shall be seen to by their Presiding Justices
and the Court Administrator, respectively. (Memorandum Circular No. 09-
2007, Enjoining All Officials and Employees of the Judiciary to Strictly Observe the
Prohibition Against Gambling or Engaging in other Forms of Gambling within Court
Premises, June 18, 2007)