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April 28, 2017Animal Communication

Child Communication

Adult Communication

6 Wonders of Human Comm

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6 Wonders of Human Comm

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u 「パパ、うれちんでんの？」（4歳2ヶ月）u 「ごっつ食べる」（３歳８ヶ月）u （自分が座ろうとしたソファにある荷物が邪魔だったので、指差して）「これどいて」（３歳７ヶ月）

u 「いい匂いだよ、においでみ！」（4歳4ヶ月）u 「パパ、早く来て。きないと許さん！」(4歳10ヶ月）

u It’s fell.u It’s has wheels.u There it’s goes. (O’Grady,2005より）

uBehaviorismvs.

uUniversal Grammar （Nativism）

vs.

uUsage-Based Model (Cognitive/Developmental)

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u Skinner (1957)u Use of Language = Verbal Behavioru Operant Conditioning + Inductive

Reasoningu Problems:

uHow can we produce new sentences??

uChomsky (1959, 1968, 1980, 1986)

uHumans are born with abstract principles of language (universal grammar) that leads language acquisition （LAD: Language Acquisition Device）

uTomasello (1995, 1999, 2003,others)uChildren come to the process of

language acquisition (at around 1 year of age) with two sets of cognitive skillsuintention-readingupattern-finding

Animal CommunicationVS

Human Communication

uUse of SignalsuToward others’ behaviors and/or

motivation (drive)

uPhylogenetic (系統発生的)

u Use of Symbolsu Toward others’ “attention” and/or

“mind”

u Syntax in Languageu linguistic constructionugrammaticalization

uOntogenetic(個体発生的)

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Vervet Monkey（National Geographic: http://www.nationalgeographic.co.jp/index.php ）

u Vervet Monkey Alarm Calls (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, 他）u 4 (or more) distinctive Alarm Calls

uLeoparduEaglesuPythonsuBaboons

uAre the calls Referential??uMost likely, NouNo evidence that they are manipulating other individuals’ attention or mind

uAnimal Communication:

u Means to an endu 「ばんざい」→だっこの要求

u 「大人の体によじ登ろうとする行動」

u大人の反応（抱き上げる）

u大人による「きざし」としての理解と反応

u乳児による学習（「ばんさい」が大人の反応を引き起こすことの理解）

u様式化された「ばんざい」の使用

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u Declarative motivation (宣言的動機)??u生後二年目に宣言的指差しが出現しないことが自閉症かどうかの重要な診断基準となる(Baron-Cohen, 1995)

u Conclusion： yes/no ??

u Metonymic or Metaphorical Signs (両腕を広げて飛行機を、あえぐことで犬を、フーフー吹くことで熱いものを表す、といったもの)

u 乳児の伝達意図を最初に担うように思われるのは身振りである。そして初期の言語へといたる道を開くように見えるのはー少なくとも機能的観点からはー身振りである。u 習慣的な言語記号を習得し始めると、子どもの身振りの機能が伝達意図の主張な担い手から補助的な機能へと変化する（Iverson, Capirci, and Caseli, 1994; Marcos, 1991）

u 子どもが指差しする傾向とものの名前を使う傾向の間に強い相関がある（Harris, Barlow-Brown, and Chasin, 1995）

u 子どもの言語習得以前の記号的身振りの使用と初期の言語能力との間に強い相関(Goodwyn and Acredolo, 1993)

u 幼い盲児もコミュニケーションをする際に身振りをする(Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 1998)

u 完全に文法化した手話が存在し、聾児がそれをたやすく習得する。しかも、健聴児が音声言語を身につけるのと同じ一般的な習得スケジュールに沿って聾児が手話を習得していく。

uLanguage Acquisitionu Around the age of 1u Universal across culture; very much predictableu Require development in social cognitive skills:

Intention Reading Skillu Joint Attention Frameworku Understanding of Communicative Intentionu Cultural Learning (Role reversal imitation)

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u 3 cognitive skills necessary for Language/Comm Acquisition：

uJoint-Attention FrameworkuUnderstanding of Communicative Intention

uRole-reversal Imitation: Cultural Learning

u“Shared” focus of two individuals on an object

Dyadic〜 6 months old

u Child – Objectu If another person is around, they mostly

ignore them.u

u Child – Personu If an object is around, they mostly ignore

them.

variance associated with general cognition is controlled (e.g.,Morales et al., 2000; Mundy et al., 2007). Joint attention is also

associated with the depth of information processing in infants(Striano, Chen, Cleveland, & Bradshaw, 2006), as well as with

individual differences in childhood measures of IQ, self-regu-lation, and social competence (Mundy et al., 2007).

Clinical research indicates autism is characterized bychronic, pronounced impairments in IJA rather than RJA. ThisIJA impairment is described as ‘‘the lack of spontaneous sharing

experiences with others such as showing’’ (e.g., Fig. 1c) in thecurrent American and European psychiatric diagnostic systems

(Mundy, 2003). Moreover, individual differences in joint atten-tion are related to the intensity of social symptoms, respon-siveness to intervention, and long-term social outcomes in

children with autism.Comparative research also suggests that important distinc-

tions between humans and other primates involve joint attention.Chimpanzees show the capacity for RJA but little evidence of

IJA or spontaneous attempts to share experiences with membersof their own species (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). This sug-gests that a basic understanding of goal-directed perception and

action, manifested in RJA, might be common to advanced pri-mates but that a deeper facility and understanding of sharing

attention and intentions, as manifest in IJA, may be unique tohuman beings (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005).

Thus, experimental, clinical, and comparative research sug-gests that joint attention reflects vital aspects of human psy-chological development. Current models of joint attention

provide some insight into the nature of this development.

SOCIAL COGNITION AND JOINT ATTENTION

The social-cognitive model of joint attention proposes that, asinfants monitor and represent their own goal-related intentionalactivity, they also monitor and represent the goal-related be-

havior of others (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll,2005). The early development of social cognition, beginning at

about 9 to 12 months, allows infants to integrate these twosources of information; infants thereby become able to imputethe conditional proposition that if self-intentions lead to goal-

related behavior, then goal-related behavior in others must fol-low from their intentions. Thus, this model suggests that social

cognition is necessary for the development of functional jointattention in infancy. Furthermore, social cognition is thought to

be equally common to all types of joint attention. Therefore,initiating and responding to joint attention should be highlycorrelated in development.

Research supports elements of the social-cognitive model. Inone revealing study, testers presented gaze-following trials to 9-,

10-, and 11-month-olds. The testers turned their heads eitherwith their eyes open or with their eyes closed (Brooks & Meltzoff,

2005); the task for the infants was to respond to joint attentionand turn their attention in the direction of the gaze or head turn ofthe tester. All the children performed equally well in the ‘‘eyes

open’’ condition. However, in the ‘‘eyes closed’’ condition the10- and 11-month-old infants rarely followed the testers’ head

turns, but the 9-month-olds followed at a rate comparable to theirrate in the eyes-open condition (see Fig. 2). Thus, the 10-month-olds were able to inhibit following in this condition, presumably

Fig. 1. Illustrations of two expressions of joint attention development: responding to joint attention (a) and initiating jointattention (IJA; b, c1,2,3). Two types of IJA behavior are depicted: IJA involving a conventional gesture of pointing to shareattention regarding a room poster (b), and IJA involving alternating looking at a toy (c1, c3) with making eye contact withanother individual (c2), to share attention with respect to the object.

270 Volume 16—Number 5

Attention, Joint Attention, and Social Cognition

from Mundy & Newell (2007)

伝達意図の理解(Understanding Communicative Intentions)

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uUnderstanding of Intention：

VS.

uUnderstanding of Communicative Intention

u Once “Understanding of Intention” isestablished, now you can imitate others interms of their “intention.”u Early childhood： Dyadic imitation （mirroring）u 9 months ~： Intention Imitation

u成功例 vs. 非成功例の模倣u偶発的行動（しまった！） vs. 意図的行動（よし！）模倣

uDevelopment of “Inter-Subjectivity”

u Foundation of Language Acquisitionu Desire to communicate (interact) with othersu Desire to share “minds” with others

u Origin of Communicationu Biological adaptation unique to Humanu Human have developed skills in “cooperation,”

which in turn developed our cognitive skills in understanding others as the same being as ourselves: that is, we have Intention/Mind.