bedke, ethical intuitions- what they are, what they are not, and how they justify

8/13/2019 Bedke, Ethical Intuitions- What They Are, What They Are Not, And How They Justify

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North American Philosophical Publications

Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They JustifyAuthor(s): Matthew S. BedkeReviewed work(s):Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 2008), pp. 253-269Published by: University of Illinois Presson behalf of the North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20464416.

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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYVolume 45,Number 3, July 008

ETHICAL INTUITIONS:WHAT THEY ARE, WHAT THEY ARE NOT,AND HOW THEY JUSTIFYMatthew S. Bedke

In recent iteraturenmoral epistemologythere re two ascendant views that try toanswer the followingquestions:What areethical ntuitions?ow do they ustify? n aview defended yRobertAudi (1997, 1998,1999, 2004) andRuss Shafer-Landau 2003)intuitionsre understandingsf self-evidentpropositions,here such nderstandingloneissufficientorustification.n another iewdefendedbyMichael Huemer (2005, 2006,2007, 2008) intuitionsre sui generis seeming states,termed nitial intellectual eemings, hich are like therkinds of seemings(e.g., thosebased on sensory xperienceormemory) intheway they ustify.Assuming that there re undefeated, intuitivelyustified thical beliefs, thispaperargues that hesedominanttheories fwhatethical intuitions re and how they ustifyare inadequate. fter arguingthat uemer'sintellectual eemings ccount is an improvement over self-evidence heories n section1, section2 draws some distinctionsmongseemings.All agree thatwhen itseems toone thatp one is takingsome attitude toward content, mongotherthings erhaps.What has not been sufficientlyddressed,however, swhere to ocate the eeming. orany given seeming, ne should askwhetherit is locatedina special seemingish ttitude

taken toward ontent, hether it is locatedinthevery ontent nderconsideration andnot in a seemingish ttitude), hether it islocated somewhere lse entirely, erhaps asa phenomenologically alient haracter hatattendstheattitude-contentair (which byitself oesn'tmake anythingeem tobe thecase),whether theseeming features combinationof theseoptions,etc.A commonlyheld position-that all seemings consist inspecialattitudes aken oward propositional)contents-strains he acts pon examination.Some seemingsare located in thecontentsunder onsideration,he ery ontentshatreto e the ubject f justifiedelief, hile otherseemingsare located inphenomenologicalcharacteristicsattending attitude-contentpairs.Some so-called intellectual eemingsarecompetence-drivennd ill fitnyof thesecategories.The upshot is that ot all seemings re cut from he amecloth, nd this assome ramifications or hether, nd thewayinwhich, any given seeming ustifies elief.Section 3 argues thatseemings in ethics-ethical intuitions-are nomore thanpositive phenomenological qualities uponconsideringethicalpropositions. In thesecases the eeming uality f an intuitionsnotconstitutedy a special seemingish ttitude,nor is it featured n theverycontent nder

253


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254 /AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYconsideration. he more detailed theory fethical intuitionsn offerhas some implications for thestrengthf intuitive thicaljustification, nd the defeasibilityof suchjustification (implications thatmight notapply tootherskinds of intuitions).n somerespects, thical intuitions remore vulnerable todefeat than therkindsof seemings,but in therrespects heyre less vulnerable.Afterdiscussing some of these subtleties,section4 ends with a finalremarkon theevidentialstatusof intuitions nd seemingstatesmore broadly.

I. SELF-EVIDENCE THEORY ANDTHE MOVE TOINTELLECTUAL SEEMING THEORY

Both RobertAudi andRuss Shafer-Landaumaintain that thical intuitionsgrounded nself-evidentropositions. udi proposes thecanonicalviewofa self-evidentropositions"a truth"uch thatanadequateunderstandingof it s sufficientoth for eing ustifiedn elieving t nd for nowing t f nebelieves iton the asis of that nderstanding."2o makethis sufficientlylluminating heoryf selfevidence,more needs tobe said aboutwhat itisto dequately nderstandproposition,3ndwhat isspecial bout elf-evidentropositionssuch that hese anconferjustificationhroughunderstandinglone.Unfortunately,riendsfthe iew spendfarmore time elling swhatself-evidencesnot rather han ellingswhatit s. husAudi arguesthatelf-evidenceoesnotentail ndefeasibility,4hat he upport orself-evidentropositions anbe strengthenedorweakened vianon-intuitive odes of ustification,5hat suitably umble intuitionismdoes notrequire hatne see a proposition's,self-evidence,rhaveany ntuitivelyustifiedbeliefs about a proposition'sself-evidence,6and that ne can adequately understand aself-evidentroposition ndyetfailto ssentto it, rbelieve in it.7 hafer-Landaumakessimilar emarks2003: chap. 11).

Fair enough.But it s notyet clearwhat itis tounderstand proposition n way that ssufficientorustifiedlyelieving t. n agentcanunderstand he roposition hat ll crowsareblack, but that lone ishardly sufficientfor ustifiedly elieving it.How, then, recertain thicalpropositions ifferent,rhowis thenotionofunderstandingifferent,hatwould distinguish ntuitivelyustified thical beliefs?Analytic truths ightgetby onunderstandinglone, but ethical intuitionists(rightly) eny that ubstantive thical truthsareanalytic. ithout anyexplanation fhowthis ssupposed towork, the rasping f selfevident ropositions s inadequate s a theoryof intuitionsnd intuitiveustification.In additionto thisundischarged xplanatory urden, elf-evidence heory svulnerable toan objectionbased on the allibilityof intuitions.t is typically houghthat elfevidentpropositions re true, hich entailsthat thical ntuitionsanonlybe had for rueethicalpropositionswhich sconsistent ithdefeasibility). his is far too strong. o seewhy,consider a classic trolleyase.

Trolley:A trolleysoncourse tohit ndkillfive ndividuals n the rack head.You arestanding n a bridgeabove the track. heonlyway foryou to save thefive ndividuals is topush theman infrontfyou fromthebridgeonto thetrack, illinghim,butactivating the trolleybrakes so it stopsshort f thefive ndividuals. uestion: Is itpermissibletopush theman offthe ridge,killinghimbutsavingfive thers?Most have the ntuitionhat ushingthemanismorally impermissible.ven if eontologyis false,and consequentialismtrue, ne canhave this intuition. n adequate theory fintuitionseeds to ccount for his, nd selfevidence theory oes not.A self-evidencetheorist ight grantthe ointand claim thattruth s required,not tohave an intuition,but foran intuitionto conferprima faciejustification.his epistemic laim also seems


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ETHICAL INTUITIONS /255false-beliefs based onTrolley ntuitionsanbe prima facie justified. ection 3 containsa more detailed treatmentf intuitiveustification n cases like this, ut the mportantpointfornow is that elf-evidence heory sinadequate insofar s it introduces truthcondition nhaving an intuitiontall.At this oint,those ympatheticoself-evidence theory ight lodgea coupleofreplies.The firsteply sthat he rolley xampleis illchosen. Intuitionists,hethought s,proposecertainmid-level principles s the bjectsofintuitiveustification,nd theTrolley caseprovides only an intuition n a hypothetical particular.hat is true, ut any adequatetheory f intuitions ust incorporate ntuitions nparticularsike that iven n rolley,for hese eemepistemically robative f nyintuitionsre.Moreover,not all intuitionistswho endorsethe ntuitiveustificationfmidlevelprinciples eny ntuitiveustificationfparticulars. . D. Ross was aparticularistnthis ssue: "What comes firstn time s theapprehensionf the elf-evidentrimafacierightnessf an individual ct of a particulartype. rom this e comeby reflectionoapprehendthe elf-evident eneralprinciple fprimafacie duty" 1930, p. 33).In any event, thebasic point is that thetruth equirement eatured n self-evidencetheories s too strong, nd thispoint standswith respect tomid-level principles, too.Consider someonewho finds oss's primafacieduty f justice intuitive:revent istributionsof happiness that re not inaccordwithmerit.Surelyone can have an intuitionwhen considering he uty f ustice andcanhave justified eliefs based thereon) ven ifthere s no suchduty. ntuitions re not ustdefeasible.They aredeeply fallible, ndyetjustificationonferringor ll that.The secondcomplaintfrom hosesympathetic o self-evidence heorys that he ruthrequirementsnot essential to the iew.Whynotdrop it nd salvagethe ore of the heory?The short nswer is that here oesn't seem

tobe any theoretical ork for elf-evidencetheory o do. Alternative ccountsof justification explainall there s to explain.To seethis t elps to onsider he ival eeming tatetheory, ecently efendedbyMichael Huemer.Huemer classifies ll intuitionss a suigeneriskindof seeming tate or appearancestate)-one thats initialnd intellectual,utnot a belief (2005: 99). Ethical intuitions,then, re initial ntellectual eemingsaboutethicalmatters (2005: 102). And intuitionsjustify orresponding eliefs insofar s theyinstantiatehegeneralprinciple f phenomenal conservatism PC): "If it eemsto thatp, then,nthe bsence of defeaters, therebyhas at least somedegreeof justification orbelievingthat ."8As comparedto elf-evidenceheoryevenone that acksa truthequirement),eemingstate theorymore perspicuously identifiesandexplains ases of intuition.elf-evidencetheory arns itskeep only if there s sometheoretical ork for t to do. Here are threeobvious roles: 1) self-evidence ould helptocharacterizesome intuitions hat o notfeature eemingstatesat all; 2) itcould bethat nsome cases of intuitionelf-evidencetheoryaptures ome elementneeded in ddition to a seeming state;or 3) itcould bethat n some cases self-evidence ugmentsintuitionstherwise onstitutedy seemings.Itdoes noneof thesethings. irst,there oesnot seem tobe a good exampleof an intuitionthat oes not feature seeming tate andnogood exampleof an agentwho has intuitivejustification or some belief that that snot based on a seeming).The self-evidencetheorist eeds toproduce sucha case if elfevidence is totake p the lack.Second, it spossible that ome intuitionsreconstitutedby seemingsplus something lse that elfevidencetheory elps to apture. ere againthe nus isclearlyon advocatesof self-evidence theory oproduce examplesof ethicalintuitionshat annotbe fully nderstood nterms f seemings. r if ntuitions re fully


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256 /AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYconstituted y seemings, uttheyustify nlywhen they lso feature graspingof something elf-evident,he elf-evidence heoristmust saymore about the ositive accountofjustification.hird,are there ases inwhichunderstanding a self-evidentpropositionmight augment one's intuition,nderstoodas a seeming state,whichmight then ugmentone's intuitiveustification?hiswouldcertainly eave some room for elf-evidencetheory, ut again it is difficult o think fcases that feature some psychological orjustificatoryesidue left naccounted for yseeming theory, nd evenmore difficult osee how self-evidence ightfill he ap.Theonus ison the elf-evidence heorist.hus theprovisional onclusion is that twill bemorepromising topursue seeming statetheoryfone is tounderstand hat ethical intuitionsare and how they ustify.

2. DIFFERENT KINDS OF SEEMINGSSeeming state theory's perspicuity and

explanatory ower can be improved y examiningthenature f the eemings nvolvedindifferent inds of cases. ThoughHuemerdistinguishes ypes f seemings-intellectual,sensoryexperiential,memorial, etc.-hisview is thatthey re all constituted y attitude-(propositional)ontent airs,where thenature f the ropositional ttitude etermineswhich species of seeming is instantiatednanygivencase. In this ein he says:I take statementsof the form"it seems toS thatp" or "it appears toS that " todescribe a kindof propositional attitude,different frombelief,ofwhich sensoryexperience, apparentmemory,intuition, nd apparent introspective awarenessare species. This typeofmental statemay betermedan "appearance." PC [phenomenal conservatism] holds that it is by virtue of havingan appearance with a given content that ne hasjustification forbelieving thatcontent.9

(See alsoTolhurst 1998],who holds that llseemingsare intentional tateswith propositional ontent.) uemer ismore generally

concerned torebut he iew that nly certainclasses of seemings ustify. more nuancedquestion swhether ifferenteemings ustifyin differentays. On thenaturalreading fPC allvarieties f seemings ear on justification nthe ameway regardless fanydifferences between the pecies of seemings. hismerits critical ttention. nd a good place tostart swith thenature f variousseemings.2.1 Sensory ExperienceConsider firstsensory experience. OnHuemer's view, a sensory xperiencewouldfeaturene speciesof a seeming-typeropositional ttitude akentoward omepropositional ontent. houghothershave tended oagree, theview does not hold up on inspection. irstly, hat isperhapsaminor point,it squestionablethat he ontents f sensoryexperience repropositions. he contents fsensory xperiences re typically uite rich,and their ualitative ature oes not seem tobe the aturefpropositions. moremoderateview ispreferable-that omeof the ontentsofsensoryxperience reat least ropositionalizable.Primafacie this riendlymendmentdoes not threaten he ustificatoryork thatsensory xperiences re supposedtodo.Secondly, ndmore importantly,t sdubious that ensory xperiencefeatures seeming-typepropositional) ttitude,s opposedtocontents that n themselvesmake thingsseema certain ay.To see this hoiceclearly,consider case where a representativegent,Abraham, looks at a stickthat splaced insomewatercausing inhima sensory xpenencewhereby it seems toAbraham that hestick is bent.The questionhere iswhetherthe xperientialmental statefeatures nondoxastic attitude naddition to thebentishcontent, nd invirtueofwhich it seems toAbraham that he tick s bent. Importantly,thequestion is notwhetherAbraham canwithholddoxasticacceptancewhen itseemsthat he tick sbent-clearly, ifhebelievesthatthestickonly looks bentbecause it is


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ETHICAL INTUITIONS /257placed inwater he can fail to believe thatthe stick is bent.The question is whetherthe eeming s in some special attitude akentoward he ontent, r in the ontent tself.little eflection eveals the second option asthenatural ay tothinkbout the ase. If theseeming ere inthe ttitude hen t hould epossible for braham tohave thevery samebent-stickexperientialcontentbefore hismindwithout t eeming hat he tick sbent.Just oggle he eeming ttitude ff nd placesome other ttituden ts tead. et this snota genuine possibility.Even someone withideal imaginative apacities that an bringthe ent-stickxperientialontent eforehismind cannot o sowithout t herebyeemingtohim that he tick sbent.At most he canwithholddoxastic acceptanceof the ontent,buthe cannotwithhold the eemingness f ehas that ontent. he seeming,then, s builtinto the ontent f sensory xperience, s itwere, andnot tobe found nsome attitudinalstance toward he ontent.10

Ifso,and if seemingthat issufficientojustifyne's belief that (absentdefeaters)as the rinciple fphenomenal onservatismholds, then t s a character f the ontent fsensory xperience hatustifies eliefsbasedon that ensory xperience, ndnotanyattitude hat s involved.ndeed,this eemsright.WhenAbraham forms he eliefthat he tickisbent (without nowing that t isplaced inwater) based on his sensory xperience t isthe content f the sensoryexperience thatjustifies the belief-the bent stickishnessbeforehismind.This viewofexperiences an be challengedif tturnsut that ny given sensory xperience content can be held constantwhilevaryingwhether that ontent seems to bethecase. There are some interestingognitivedisorders thatmightbe probativehere.One disorder,known as faceblindness,orprosopagnosia, causes individuals to losetheir bilitytorecognizefaces.1' he disordercan come invarying egreesof severity,

though tcharacteristicallyeaves the abilityto recognizeotherobjects intact. omeprosopagnosics laim that acesdon't "makesense"tothem, nd they annotmake similarity udgments hen presented ith facesforcomparison. thers cannot dentifyacesthatthey ave seen in the ast, even thefaces offamily nd friends.What isgoingwronghere? It is interestingtonote that ubjectswho are unable tomakefamiliarityudgments hen givenwould-befamiliarndunfamiliar acesunconsciouslyexhibit motional esponses ofamiliar aces,asmeasuredphysiologically y skin onductance.'2hus, theirnabilityomake familiarity udgments hould not be attributedoadefect n motional rocessing. his leavesuswith two bvious alternatives or xplainingthe nability:ither heir ensory xperienceof faces acks certain ontent,r the ormalcontentsthere utprosopagnosics ail o takeup some characteristic ttitude toward thecontent hat nables them omake the imilarity udgments. f this econdexplanationis right, hen t looks like theseemingdoesnot inhere nthe ontent lone.The firstxplanationsmore plausible f hegoal is to account forthe inability omakesimilarityudgments.he second xplanationassumes that, or ubjectstomake similarityjudgments, ome attitude s required nadditiontotheway the aces look.There is noreasonto think hat his s the ase. Tomakea similarityudgment etween twofaces itwould seem that ll one needs are the twofaces efore hemind.Thingsmightbe different f he oal isto xplain n inabilityo orma beliefaboutwho thesepersons are. Thatplausibly requiresa doxastic attitude. utthe uestionhereconcernsprosopagnosics'inability omake similarityudgments, ndwithout some reason to doptthemore complicated xplanation hatncorporatespecialattitudes nto thestory, hesimplerhypothesis is tobe preferred. hough certainly otdecisive, the estworkinghypothesis s that


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258 /AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYprosopagnosics do not consciously experience faces n normalway. If this sright,t snot the ase that rosopagnosics ave sensoryexperiences ithpropositionalizable ontentP (havingtodowith individual aces) and yetitdoes not seem to them hat .Perhaps individualsthat xperienceCapgras delusion are more probative of thequestion. Subjectswith thisdisorder thinkthat therwisefamiliar amily embers andfriendshave been replaced with identicallooking mposters.13nlike prosopagnosics,these individualsdo not exhibit emotionalarousalupon seeingfamiliar aces,and it isthoughthat hismakes their ensory xperiences of familymembers and friends eelwrong in someway, which thenexplainswhy they elieve such familiars ave beenreplacedby imposters.14What isgoingwronghere?One explanation s that newithCapgras has experientialcontents hat nclude omepropositionalizedor propositionalizable contentP (wherePmight be something like 'myhusband isstandingeforeme') andyet t oes not seemtoher that . If so, the eemingisnot intheexperiential ontent. here is some supportfor his ypothesis, ike thefact hat ubjectsreport hat he elieved imposers ook identical to familiars. owever, the ubjects' lackofemotional, hysiological responses s alsotelling.or this uggests hat hat theyack snotanexperiential eeming, utan emotionalseeming-upon seeingsomeonewho shouldbe familiarsomethingdoes notfeel right,and this locks anotherwise atural oxasticacceptance of theexperiential seeming. Ifthis s roughly ight, hen ases ofCapgrasdelusionareconsistent ith thethoughthatexperiential ontents arry seemingnessontheir leeve. In these ases the ensory xperiential eeming ompeteswithan emotionalseeming, here the motional eeming eadsto a dogged refusaltoaccept that hings reas theyxperientiallyeem tobe.And absentthefunnymotionalseeming,their ensory

experienceswould have the equisite haracter ogenerate nd justify eliefswith somepropositionalized content of the sensoryexperience.The best explanation to date,which iscertainly pen tochange,does not impugntheview that he ontents fnormal sensoryexperiences re ladenwith seemingness.2.2 Intellectual SeemingsIntellectual eeming states resent striking contrast o seemingsof sensory xperience.The differentature fnon-experientialseemings ill leadto differentonceptionfhow intuitionsustify ven ifthey ll satisfythe rinciple fphenomenalconservatism.Consider the ase where itseems to someagent,Anne, that omedeductiveargumentis valid, perhaps afterdue reflection. t isnatural to say that, rior to theargumentseeming valid,Anne is doing somethinglike consideringwhether theargumentisvalid,or entertaining hether it isvalid,orperhapshypothesizinghat t s valid.So thecontent is a propositionabout thevalidityof the rgument. ocusing on just these twoelements-the attitude nd the ontent-it isnotyetthe ase that he rgumenteemsvalidtoAnne. Inparticular, heseemingisnot inthe ontent ike twas for he erceptual ase.And, as a result,merely hypothesizingorwondering bout a proposition snotenoughto ustify belief inthat roposition. or theargument o seemvalid and to ustify eliefsomething ore must be added.GeorgeBealermakes similar emarksboutlaws of logic: "[W]hen you first onsiderone ofDe Morgan's laws,"'5]ften tneitherseems tobe true or seems tobe false;aftera moment's reflection,owever,somethinghappens: itnow seems true;you suddenly"just see" that t s true. f course, this indof seeming is intellectual,not sensoryorintrospective or imaginative). he subjecthere isa priori orrational) ntuition"Bealer1996: 123).The same can be said for thical


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ETHICAL INTUITIONS/259intuitions.thical contents o not carry heirseemingness n their ace, nd considerationwhether isnotsufficiento ustify he eliefthat .What, then, s the ature f these therseemings, nd how do they ustify?Once sensory xperiential eemings re settoone side, it scommon to assume that llintellectual eemings re cut from he samecloth.Ross, for nstance, aid that ntuitionsofprimafacie uties re self-evidentjust s amathematical xiom,or the alidity f a formof inference,s evident" 1930, p. 29). AndHuemer frequently ppeals to non-ethicalintuitionso llustrate hat intellectual eemings re.This is amistake.There are distinctions tobemade within thebroad categoryof intellectual seemings between, e.g., itseemingtoone that ne of deMorgan's lawsis true ersus it seeming toone that ushingtheman offthebridge in thetrolley ase isimpermissible.he distinctionso notmerelyconcermontent, ut structure,nd thishasramifications or ustification.For instance,ome (butnot all) intellectualseemingshave something o dowith one'scompetent nderstandingndapplication feither proceduralrule r a concept.Reflection n thefamiliar xample that YZ isnotwater,andBealer's logicexample,will helpsharpenntellectualeemings elated o ompetence, nd itwill draw forth ther arietiesof intellectualeemingthat re not so relatedto ompetence. ecall, then, hatnPutnam'stwin arth there s awatery substance onethat allsfrom he kies, sclearandpotable,etc.) thatis not composed ofH20, but iscomposed fsomeother hemical ompound,abbreviated YZ.16Given that atery stuffaroundhere isH2O, on considering he twinearth ase it ure eems thatYZ isnotwater.Psychologically speaking,what itgoing onhere is somecompetence asedperformance,i.e.,when one judges that YZ isnotH20one competentlypplies the oncept 'water'(givensomepotentially allible nformationabout thewaterystuff f our acquaintance)

to a hypotheticalase. It is partof how thatconceptworks that, iven ertain ackgroundassumptions boutwhatwaterystuffroundhere is,XYZ on twin arth simply fails tomeet an application ondition f the oncept'water.' nd lackof the ppropriate ntuitionbelies a failure ograsp the oncept, r a failure to apply it ompetently.his intuitionstypically aken o upport arious ther iews:that ater isnecessarily 20, that he erm rconcept water' igidly esignates he tufffouracquaintance, nd so on.Something ikethis sgoingon in ealer'scase, too, albeit the competency involvedneed not be informed y empirical information.Nevertheless,when one considersone of deMorgan's laws and things click,"psychologically peaking, ne isbringing obear a certaincompetence (perhapspurelysyntactic)with the logical operators.Thissamerough ccount also captureswhatgoesonwhen amathematical xiomor theoremsintuitive,rwhen adeductivergumenteemsvalid,at least in the sual circumstances. nthesecases one bringsto bear a proceduralcompetence n pplying rule f logicmuchlikebringing obear linguistic nowledgetojudge a sentence rammatical.There ismore tosayabout the tructurefintuitionsn ases like these. hese seemingsdiffer rom hose n ensory xperience n thatthe ntellectual eemingthat is notpartofthe ontent , for n the ase of intellectualseemings it is possible to hold the contentfixed e.g.,one ofDeMorgan's laws,or thepropositionthat YZ iswater) and togglethe eeming n andoff, omething hat annotbe done in cases of sensory xperience.How about theotheroptionsmentioned atthe utset-locating the eeming n specialattitude oward ontent , or somephenomenologicalcharacter hat ttends he ttitudecontent air?Consider the atterptionfirst.In thecases underconsiderationthere s afelt ppropriateness rfelt eridicality henone considersthe ropositions n uestion. t


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260 /AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLYfeelsappropriate odeny that YZ iswaterand theformula (p A q) iff-p) v (-q) feelsright fter omereflection.o there ssomething f a phenomenologicalcharacterthatattendsconsiderationswhetherp, and thatmight constituteseemings in some cases.But there salso a sense inwhich one takesthese intuitiveudgmentstobe requiredbythe onceptor rulebeing applied.When oneofdeMorgan's aws"clicks," rwhen it eemsthat YZ isnotwater, these udgmentsfeelcompetence-driven,hich issomething orethan he isposition o pplythe oncept, ndwhich showsup inphenomenology s something ore than mere felt ppropriatenessor veridicality. onsider, for instance, thatAbraham finds hefollowingntuitive:iventhatthewatery stuff f our acquaintance isH20, 'water' ould refer osomething therthanH20.'7 Perhaps he hasn't heardof thetwin arth ase, orhasn't attendedto it sufficiently.nany vent, t swidely thoughthatAbraham is not ustmistaken,but that e isfailing o ompetentlyse the oncept water,'which suggeststhat he idespread intuitionthatYZ isnotwater iscompetence-driven.'8One can say thiswithoutdenying brahamhis intuition. e might have an intuition,but what likelyconstitutes t is some feltveridicalityrappropriateness.ither that rhe really sapplying ome differentonceptthan hose ersonshe disagreeswith.So themain suggestion ere is that, hen itappears, the henomenalqualityof takingjudgment o e competence-drivenonstitutes(perhapspartially)an intellectual eeming,or intuition,here therelevant henomenalquality ttends omerelevantttitude-contentpair like onsidering hetherp.Concerning theepistemic statusof suchintellectual eemings,there re a variety foptions.One option is to find hefeeling fbeing competence-drivenufficientoprimafacie justifybeliefs. One normally takessuch itemsto ustify ne's beliefs,and onenormallytakes them odelivergreater usti

fication hat hemere feeling f confidenceor appropriateness,or ponconsidering hetwin arth scenariowith sufficientttentionany prior ustificationonferred y an intuitionconstituted y feelingsof confidenceorappropriateness sdefeatedby the ompetence-drivenntuition hat YZ is notwater.This happens inothercases as well. Onemightfind certain athematical xiom to eintuitivensofar s theres a felt onfidence rveridicality o t, ut ifthings click"andone"sees" that s itfalse the ompetence-drivenintuitionpistemicallydefeats thepreviousjudgment.This storymight satisfy n accessibilistintemalist, utonemight think hat hefeeling fbeingcompetencedrivenhas superiorjustification-conferringower onlywhenitattends ctual competence (or indeed, itcounts s apsychological ntuitionnlywhencompetencedriven).On thisview thebestcase,epistemically peaking, s to xperiencethefeltveridicality r appropriateness f pupon consideration, ohave thefeelingthatone's judgment hat iscompetencedriven,and (what is notaccessible to the gent) forit tobe the ase that ne's judgment hat iscompetencedriven. ome of these lementsare phenomenological,but there s thefactofbeingdrivenby competence,which doesnot fitwell into thecategoriesof locatingtheseeming incontent, ttitude, r accompanyingquality. nstead, tmightbe best tothink f competencyas kind of successfulnon-inferentialerformance hat nables theextra ustificatoryowerof a seeming.Thistheoryetains he iew that he eeming tselfis ustificationonferringhile acknowledgingthe pistemic elevance fother actorssconditionsthat ust bemet forthe eemingtoconferustification.It isbeyond thepurviewof thispaper tothoroughlyefend positive ccount f intuitive ustification orthese ntellectual eemings. he importantoint is that ntuitionistsworkingwith theseexamples have a rich


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ETHICAL INTUITIONS /261setof resources n which tobuild a positivetheory, nd some element of competencedrivenness eems todeliver relatively trongjustification as compared to phenomenological qualities of felt ppropriateness ndveridicaltiy.ven if ll intuitions atisfy heprincipleof phenomenal conservatism, heintellectual eemings ust canvassed mightdo so in a verydifferent ay than eemingsof other orts.

3. ETHICAL INTUITIONSWith these distinctions inmind, whatstory houldbe told boutethical intuitions?What resourcesare available to the ethicalintuitionists?hile it spossible that thicalintuitions re a mixed bag without a unifiedepistemicaccount, this sectionarguesthat ll substantive thical intuitionsre ofthephenomenological sort nd they re notcompetencedriven. his result ervestodistinguishthical ntuitionsrom ther inds fintellectual eemings, nd itplaces a burdensquarely n ethical intuitionistsoprovideacompelling ccount of justificationith theresources vailable.There arevarious ossible objectsof ethicalintuitions.here are intuitionsboutparticular ases, such as themoral permissibilityfvarious actions in trolley ases. There areintuitions boutmid-levelmoral principles,suchasRoss's primafaciedutiesof fidelity,reparation, ratitude, ustice, beneficence,self-improvement, nd non-maleficence.And there re intuitionsoncerning hemostgeneralmoralprinciples, uchas actutilitarianism,or abstract ormal rinciples, uchassome superveniencethesis.Along anotherdimension,thevariousobjectsof intuitionscan feature hin thicalconcepts,likerightness, to thick oncepts, like cruelness.Thestrategy ere is toconsidersomeprobativecases alongbothdimensions, rguethat heyfeaturenlythe henomenological ariety fseemingwherebythe eeming s constitutedby felt ppropriateness, eridicality, r the

like, nd suggest hat he ccountgeneralizestocases notconsidered.For a particularistthical ntuitionecall theTrolley case,where one considerswhether tis right opush aman off bridge in front fan oncomingtrolley, illinghimbut savingfive thers urtherownthe ine. ithout aimingfor istorical ccuracy, upposeBenthamfinds t ntuitivelyermissible, ndKant findsin intuitivelympermissibleor fails to findit intuitivelyermissible). f the onceptualcompetence torypplieshere, t least ne ofthem ould have thefeeling hat he erdictiscompelled y the ompetentse of the onceptofpermission r impermission.fso, atleast neof them ust think he ther sfailingtograsp thesemoral concepts, r failingtocompetentlypply them. ut that oesn'tseem trueto the ntuitionsn this ase (andhere the eader s invited o ntrospectn anyintuitionse or shemighthave on the ase).That treatmentsfar ooheavy-handed. othpartiescan understand nd employthe oncepts frightpermission)ndwrong (impermission) perfectly ell, and simplymanifesta theoreticalisagreementboutwhat isrightandwhat iswrong. Indeed, f ne partyfailstocompetentlypply concepts there annotbe a genuinedisagreement ereatall, ustasthere snodisagreement etweenthosewhouse the oncept 'water'torefer oH20 andtwin arthers ho use the oncept 't-water'torefer oXYZ. But surely enuinedisagreement isapossibilitynthe thical ase,whichis evidence thatthe intuitions here re notcompetence riven. tmost, each side tothedisputehas somefelt eridicalityndappropriatenessaccompanyinghis considerationof the ase and his favored erdict.Of course, contemporary intuitionistsadvocatemid-levelprinciples s the bjectsof intuition.ut the amegeneralcomplaintshould pplytothese ases aswell as themoregeneral nd abstract rinciples. onsider firstthemid-levelprinciplethat ndividuals avesomeprimafaciedutytopromotepleasure.


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262 /AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYAgain,without imingfor istorical ccuracy,suppose that picurus finds t intuitive hatthere s reason topursuepleasure for ts wnsake,while Plato has the intuition hat nedoes not have reason topursuepleasure foritsown sake. If theconceptualcompetencetheory pplies here,one of themmust eitherfail to grasp the concept of a prima facieduty, r fail tocompetently pply it. ut thattreatmentsfar ooheavy-handednthis aseas well. Both can understand and employtheconceptof a reason perfectly ell, andsimplymanifesta theoretical isagreementaboutwhat duties or reasons) there re.Thisputative isagreement oes not entail that tleast ne of them acksnon-normativenformation,or the ery oncept f reason, r thatoneof them imply ncompetentlypplies theconcept to this ase. If itdid then hese twocould not have a genuinedisagreement.Perhapsthere re ethical ases that remoreplausibly competence-driven.onsider theprinciple that t is alwaysmorallywrong totorture thers forfun, r theweaker claimthat there s always a moral reason not totorture thersforfun."9twould be hard totake someone who denies theseprinciplesseriously, ut for ll thestrengthf conviction ncases likethis, hey ack certain haracteristics f the intuition,ay, that ne ofdeMorgan's laws is true. hen the ogicalformula clicks" the intuitionncludes thephenomenologyfbeing competence-driven,and that hosewithout the ntuitionust failto ompetentlypply oncepts r rules n thisparticular ccasion.There can be no genuinedisagreement.et those ho think t swrongto torturethersfor un an and dogenuinelydisagreewith a nihilist-one who does notbelieve there re anynormativepropertiesinstantiatedn the ctualworld. The nihilistrejectsthe rinciples, uthe neednot necessarily o so because he fails tounderstand rapply thevery conceptofmoralwrongnessor amoral reason.

Alternatively,onsider a consequentialistwho does not find It alwaysmorallywrongto torturethersfor un" ntuitive.20ust thisrare irdfailto nderstand hatmoralwrongness is?An evenstrangerharacter ightdenythatthere s always a moral reason againsttorture,or emight hold a conception f thegood andwhat there s reason to romote hatdoes not nclude r imply reasonnot to ausepain inevery ase. Does he not knowwhat amoral reason is?Here I think hemost onecan say, ndwhatpeopleusuallydo say abouthypothetical haracters ike this, s that heyexhibit corruptmind. This brings tobearone's normativeommitmentsn ondemningthesepeople.One mightnotwant toengagewith suchaperson, ndonemightnotbe ableto onvincehim,but t s toomuch tosay thatone cannotgenuinely isagreewith him.Theremight be something n the area ofcompetence-driven ntuition hen we turnto thickeroncepts, likecruelty. ow aboutthe intuitionthat torture or fun is cruel.Here theclear-headed thing to say is thatthere an be descriptive esiderata that ustbe met to apply theconcept of crueltytoa case, and failureto abide thedescriptivecriteriaexhibits incompetence. omethinglike thismight occur ifwe emphasizemoralinmoral duty-moral dutiesmightrefer oresemblance lass ofduties,where sufficientresemblance to theclass is needed to calla dutymoral. But on thecrucialnormativequestion, such aswhether there s alwaysreason not to torture,ompetency requiresno particularverdict.This explains why itmakes sense toask: I know torturescruel,but should I refrain rom oing it?When we turn o themost generalprinciples of ethics, such as act utilitarianism,it is fairly lear that ny intuitions ere arenot competence driven.All this suggeststhat ubstantive thical intuitionsf all sortsdo not include the henomenology fbeingcompetencedriven, ndcannotgarner ddedepistemic import n thatbasis. That said,


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ETHICAL INTUITIONS/263purelyformal, on-substantivethicalmightbe competence driven.Consider some thatHuemer lately efends:

1. If x is betterthany and y is better hanz, then isbetter han .2. If x andy arequalitatively dentical nnon-evaluativerespects,then and y arealsomorally indistinguishable.3. If it s permissible todo x, and it spermissible todo y given that ne does x, thenit spermissibletodo bothx and y.4. If it swrong todo x, and it swrong todo y,then t swrong todo bothx andy.5. If two states f affairs, and y, are sorelated thaty can be produced by addingsomething aluable tox,withoutcreatinganything ad, lowering hevalue of anything nx, or removing nythingf valuefrom , then is better han .6. The ethical status whether ermissible,wrong, obligatory, etc.) of choosing (xandy) over (x andz) is the ame as that fchoosingyoverz, giventhe nowledgethatx exists/occurs.21

One whose judgmentsonot onformo omesuperveniencef the thical n the on-ethical(judgingthat twoacts identical n all nonethicalrespects iffer thically, aptured yHuemer's (2)) is likely onceptuallyonfused.Even if ntuitionsn some suchprinciples regroundedn ompetence, owever,t sdoubtful that nysubstantivethicaltheoryanbesqueezeoutof such ntuitions.isagreementsthat atter n thics renot ikely o e settledonpurelyformal rounds.With substantivethical ntuitions,hen,hedevelopingpicture s that he eemingness swholly constitutedy a felt eridicality,ppropriateness, amiliarity,rconfidence ponconsideringan ethical proposition.Let usaccordingly pellout the thical ntuitionsspositivephenomenologicalfeatures hesis:

A's having a substantive thical intuitionthat isfully onstitutedya) A's consideringwhether p, and upondoing sob) A experiences positive phenomenologicalfeaturesttendinghe onsideration,suchas a felt eridicality,ppropriateness,confidence, amiliarityithp, etc.22

Thebestway to rticulate he ature f ethicalintuitions s in terms f sui generis, specialphenomenology thatdoes not attendmereconsiderations,nd that eednotattend erebelief.Ethical intuitionsre unlike sensoryexperiential seemings in that the seemingthat isnot locatedinthe ontent . And incontrast o laimsthatll seemings repropositionalattitudes,takenfrom uemer andTolhurst,t ould be odd to all these ositivefeatures hemanifestation f a special nondoxasticattitude aken oward . Inhaving nethical ntuitionll that eed be on the ceneis the ttitude f consideration oward withspecial positivephenomenologicalfeatures.And though he ositivefeatures ight giverisetodispositionstobelievep, they re notthemselves ispositions.On this iew,if thical ntuitionsustify,tis these henomenologicalharacteristicshatwould do all the pistemic ork.As with thecompetence-drivenntellectualeemings, heethical ntuitionistas options. ne optionistomaintain hat hese henomenologicalualities ttendinghe onsideration hether aretypically ufficient o support prima faciejustifiedeliefthat ,at least hen the elief sbaseduponpositive eaturesn the ight ay.23Reflectionon some of thecases consideredabove suggeststhat ome ethical intuitionsarevery sychologically ompelling,ndonenormally akes hem o onfer omedegree fjustification.erhaps nehasno reason o treatthem therwise. hiswould be amenable toepistemic ntemalism.notherpossibility stoborrow suggestion ivenfor ompetence


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ETHICAL INTUITIONS /265a disagreement ver whetherwater countsasH20, and each thinks he ther ompetentwith the concepts involved, thatproducesseriouspressurefor ach disputant oreconsiderhis or her udgment. ntuition riven ycompetence typically elivers strong ustification, ut if wodisputants ith disagreeingintuitionselieve that hey ach are informedand competent,hey ust believe thatt leastone personhas erred.This generatessomepressure todouble-check ne's intuition.ycontrast,f enuinedisagreement an happenwithout chargingone partywith incompetencethere s lesspressureon each partytoreconsider.Such disagreementswould bemore like theoretical isagreements n thevarious sciences.Each view has tobemeasured gainst thers o eewhich counts s thebesttheory,nd themere fact fdisagreementisno evidence that omeonehas erred exceptinfailing o render true udgment).

4. A FINAL REMARKONHow SEEMINGS JUSTIFYBefore losing t sworth onsideringotjustwhether ntuitionsre ustificationonferring,butwhether heyount s evidence. ntuitionistsratherniformlyeny thatntuitionsaveevidential status.Huemer explicitlydenies

that seemings thatp count as evidence that pina way that upports hebelief that , andthis laim he associateswith foundationalismmore generally: Phenomenal onservatismandmy version f intuitionismre forms ffoundationalism:heyold that e are ustifiedin omebeliefs ithout he eedfor upportingevidence."26udi espouses a similar ositionwhenhedistinguishesonclusionsf inference(non-intuitive),hich are"premisednpropositions oted s evidence," romonclusions freflectionintuitive),hichdonot merge rom"evidentialremises,"ras he otherwiseuts t,"propositionallyepresentednformation."27Itwill clarifymatterstonote that here sa verynaturalway tocharacterize vidence

according towhich intuitions,nd seemingstates generally, count as evidence. Thatnatural ay of thinkings this: vidence thatjust is a consideration hat pistemically upports p and provides some reason tobelievethat .Reading evidence this ay, if ntuitiveseemingsthat arenot evidence that , thenintuitiveeemings hat donotepistemicallysupport he elief that , and they o notprovide some reasontobelieve that . If ntuitivejustification equires intuition onetheless,justwhat isrelation he ntuitionears to thiskind of justification? t looks like theonlyanswer left s that ntuitionsre necessaryconditions n intuitiveustification ithoutactually ontributingo ntuitiveustificationby supporting ropositions and providingreasons tobelieve in those ropositions. allthis he ntuitionss conditions iew.Let us call the lternativehe ntuitionssevidenceview.Here are two arguments oraccepting the intuitions s evidence viewover the intuitionss conditionsview.Thefirst, heap argument s that the evidentialview of seemings is intuitively ight, hilethe ntuitionss conditions iew is intuitivelywrong. Ifso, intuitiontself rima facie ustifiesthe ntuitionss evidence view.To makethis ess cheap considerparticular ases ofintuition. he intuitionss conditionsviewlicensesparticular laims likethefollowing:"It looks likethere sa glass ofwateron thetable,but I have no evidence that here s aglass ofwateron thetable; indeed, havenoreasontobelieve there s a glass ofwater onthe able." t the evel fparticular xampleslikethis, tcertainly eems like the ntuitioncountsas evidence,and so constitutes reason to believe theglass is there. hen onejustifiedlyelieves theglass is there n thebasis of theseeming,it isnot just that thebeliefs ustified,ut hatheeemingustifiesthe elief.Thus reflectionnparticular asessupports he vidential iew of seemings.Second, if some particular seeming thatP is not evidence thatP, and so no reason


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266 /AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLYtobelieve that , it ishard to see why therewould be anythingpistemicallyrongwhenone fails tobelieve that in the face of theseeming, eterisparibus f course. f course,the ntuitionss conditionsview sayswhatis right bout thebelief should you have it,viz., it is ustified. ut why form he elief?To sharpen he omplaint, onsider sensoryexperiential eeming. t seems toAnne thata glass ofwater is on the table via a visualpercept)butAnne is on thephonewith herusually trustworthyoommate,nd the oommate tellsher that here sno glass ofwateron thetable becausehe remembers learinga glass on thetableearlierthat ay).On thebasis of theroommate'stestimonynne believesthat heresnoglass on the able. f theintuitionss conditions iew isright,nne'sseeming is not itself vidence, and shehasno evidence inconflict ithher roommate'stestimony,ndno reason tobelieve anythinginconsistentith theroommate'stestimony.Plainly, that s not right. nne has reason toreject erroommate's estimony,iz., it ookslikethere sa glass on the table.Why do intuitionists esist the evidential view of seemings? Huemer thinks thatsomething ike the evidentialview wouldconflict ith his positionon direct realism,accordingtowhich sensory xperiences ndintuitions constitute ur awarenessof external hings."28e thinks hat he videntialviewwould require hat eemings e internalstates,not awarenesses of external things,fromwhich one non-inferentially infersbeliefs about "extra-mentalreality." hisconnection etween evidenceand inferenceis also found nAudi. Audi thinks hat ntuitively ased conclusionsof reflectionrenotbased onevidencebecause that ould necessitatenon-intuitivenferenceobelief.Butwhydoes evidence entail nference?fHuemer isrightboutdirect ealism, hynotsay thefollowing.

Direct awareness of things providesevidence for, nd so a reason tobelieve in,propositions about those things. houghone's beliefmust be based on therequisiteintuition obe justified, he asing relationneed not be inferential.t can be merelycausal (thoughnot just any causal chainwill do).

And if udi is right hat ntuitionso not feature ropositionally epresentednformation,whynot say thefollowing.The non-propositional characterof intuitions gives us evidence for, and soreason to believe in,certainpropositions.Evidentially based justification oes notentail inference-based ustification, ndso intuitionistsaveno reasontodeny theevidential alue of intuition.

The view that vidence entails inference sundermotivated,and it ustdoesn't followfrom ne verynaturalway of thinkingboutevidence.5. CONCLUSION

In the nd,all ethicists ppeal to intuition.They can do no other. But it has been tooeasy togloss over thedetails of what thesethingsreandhow theyustify.hispaperhastried oremedy hat ituation ith the eginningsof a more detailed view about ethicalintuitions, ontrastingthemwith sensoryseemingsand competence-driveneemingsboth intermsf their tructurend how theyjustify eliefs.The hope is that his rovidesan improved tartingointfor urthernquiryin ethical epistemology.The views givenhereshed light n how ethical intuitionsanbe genuinelyevidentialof ethicalpropositionswithoutsupporting hosepropositionsthroughnference.nd theylso shed ightnthe trengthf substantive thical intuitionsandpotentialdefeaters.29UniversityfArizona


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ETHICAL INTUITIONS/267NOTES

1. For continuitywith the literature, hispaper takes thecontents of intuitions tobe propositions. Onecould take them tobe external things like objects and events as well. The literature does not do so,which is likelydue to an inclination tobe epistemic internalistshere.2. Audi 2004, p. 49. See also Audi 1999, p. 206; Audi 1998, p. 20; Audi 1996, p. 114.Note that udidoes not think that all intuitionshave self-evidentpropositions as theirobjects, thoughhe does arguethatethical intuitions have self-evidentpropositions as theirobjects. Because ethical intuition is theprimary focus here, this section only discusses his theory f intuitions insofaras it involves understanding the self-evident.3. For a startsee,Audi 2004, pp. 49-50.4. See, e.g.,Audi 2004, p. 44.5. Audi 2004, p. 54.6. Audi 2004, pp. 42^14.7. Audi 2004, pp. 49, 54.8. Huemer 2007, p. 30. For an earlier statement seeHuemer 2005, p. 99.9. Huemer 2007, p. 30 (footnotes omitted).10. The following objection isnot a good one: one's experiential seemings can change as one's doxastic

makeup changes; therefore,the seeming is inan attitude.Doxastic changes only affectan experientialseeming thatp by affecting thecontentof the seeming. In theMuller-Lyer illusion, for instance, ifoneline does not seem toyou tobe longer than theother, then the content of your experience must differfrom thatof others. Either thatorwhen you say 'I've learnedmy lesson - itdoesn't seem that ne lineis longer anymore' youmean thatyou've learned towithhold doxastic acceptance of thepropositionthatone line is longer.11. SeeWhiteley andWarrington 1977 fora classic study.12. See Bauer 1984.13. See Ellis,Whitley, and Luaute 1994.14. See Ellis andYoung 1990.15.An example of one such law is: ~(p a q) iff(~p) v (~q).16. See Putnam 1975.17. Huemer (2006) discusses a case like this,thoughhe is concerned to show thatintrospectivebeliefsabout thecontents of one's intuitionscan be false.18. The issuemight bemore complicated than indicated. Some argue that the concept 'water' is liketheconcept 'jade' in that itcan refertowatery stuff hat isnot of our acquaintance, was not part of thebaptism, doesn't regulate out use of the term,orwhat have you. Fortunately the taxonomy given andthe epistemic options discussed do not depend on theoutcome of thisdebate. If it turnsout that thejudgment that YZ isnotwater isnot competence-driven in theways discussed, then itwould not havethe epistemic status accorded competence-driven intuitions,and the logical and mathematical caseswould bemore apt.19. Thanks to an anonymous referee forpressingme toaddress an example like this.


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268 /AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY20. Note that consequentialist's moral theorymight influencehis intuitivereactions.What is importantis that the influencenot render the justification inferential. Intuitions aremeant tobe non-inferentialsources of justification.21. Huemer 2008, p. 386. For some of these principles there is theworry of overgeneralization. Forinstance, (1) articulates some form of transitivity or thebetter thanrelation.While many cases exhibittransitivity,ertain counterexamples seem tohold (see, e.g., Rachels 2006). Particularly telling is theatomist-holist debate, related to theparticularist-generalist debate, where holists argue that the valueof an itemX varies with X's context. If so, one can expect deviations from theunqualified transitivityprinciple in (1).22. A negative ethical intuition, r a case where ethical proposition p seems false, is a case where thereare negative features, such as felt doubt and concern, unfamiliarity,etc., or at least a case where thereare no positive features, attending the consideration whether p.23. Though thebasing relationship is absent fromHuemer's book, itdoes get included in some of hisotherwork (see, e.g.,Huemer 2007). Other ethical intuitionistsalso include a basing relationship. See,e.g.,Audi 1999, p. 220.24. A reviewer also suggested requirements of proper function, orAlstonian doxastic practice constraints,for these intuitions to justify.These are options, though theywould need tobe enablers of theintuitions themselves, rather thanfactors thatdirectly contribute to justification, tomaintain a robustlyintuitionist alternative to these views.25. See Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, chap. 9.26. Huemer 2005, p. 120.27. Audi 2004, p. 45.28. Huemer 2005, p. 121.29. Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer forhelpful comments on a previous draft.

REFERENCESAudi, R. 1996. "Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics," inMoral Knowledge? ed.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong andMark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 101-136._1998. "Moderate Intuitionism and theEpistemology ofMoral Judgment,"Ethical Theory

and Moral Practice, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 15^4._. 1999. "Self-Evidence," Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 13,pp. 205-228._2004. The Good in theRight (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press).Bauer, R. M. 1984. "Autonomie Recognition ofNames and Faces inProsopagnosia: A Neuropsychological Application of theGuilty Knowledge Test,"Neuropsychologia, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 457-469.Bealer, G. 1996. "APriori Knowledge and theScope of Philosophy," Philosophical Studies, vol. 81,pp. 121-142.Ellis, H. D., J.Whitley, and J.P. Luaute. 1994. "Delusional Misidentification. The Three Original Papers on theCapgras, Fr?goli and IntermetamorphosisDelusions" (Classic Text No. 17),History ofPsychiatry, vol. 5, no. 17,pp. 117-146.Ellis, H. D., andA. W. Young. 1990. "Accounting forDelusional Misidentifications," British Journalof Psychiatry, vol. 157, pp. 239-248.Hooker, B. 2002. "Intuitions andMoral Theorizing," in thical Intuitionism:Re-Evaluations, ed. PhilipStratton-Lake (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Huemer, M. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism (NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan).


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bedke, ethical intuitions- what they are, what they are not, and how they justify

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