POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

stitution and possible power sharing.Far more troubling was the response ofextremists within the Methodist churchand Fijian nationalist movement.Opposed to both Ratu Mara and theConstitutional Inquiry and AdvisoryCommittee recommendations, theseextremists favored "solutions" similarto those proposed by the army officersin May. Their radicalism was demon­strated on 15 October when a Muslimmosque and three Hindu temples weregutted by firebombs in the western cityof Lautoka. These attacks were part ofa nation-wide campaign aimed ostensi­bly at opposing the relaxation of theSunday Observance Decree, but moregenerally at undermining the interimgovernment and perhaps at precipitat­ing military intervention.

To the Indo-Fijian population, theLautoka firebombings were violationsof immeasurable proportion. Commu­nal unity was forged. Shops, busi­nesses, and schools closed to demon­strate mourning and solidarity.University students stayed away fromclasses. Celebrations marking theHindu festival of light, Diwali, werecanceled. However, calm was main­tained and the feared spiral of violencefailed to materialize. Instead the coun­try was plunged into a different kind ofmourning by the death from cancer ofcoalition leader, Dr Timoci Bavadra,on 3 November.

No single event since the coup hashad such a momentous impact. DrBavadra's funeral at the chiefly villageofViseisei was witnessed by one of thelargest gatherings in Fiji's history. Upto sixty thousand people attended ortried to attend. The event was testa­ment to the strength of support for Dr

Bavadra as well as the cause withwhich he was identified.

The loss of Dr Bavadra's leadershipwas regarded as a major challenge andsetback for the coalition. However,within weeks Adi Kuini Bavadra, DrBavadra's widow and a high chief, wasnamed the movement's new leader.This bold and astute move promised toretain the coalition's multiracial fol­lowing and the loyalty that Dr Bavadrahad inspired.

If members of the interim govern­ment felt uncomfortable having torespect and accommodate the mourn­ing of the deposed prime minister itwas not evident. Both the presidentand the interim prime minister wereoverseas at the time. The army wasspared the embarrassing task of givinga state funeral to the prime minister itdeposed when Dr Bavadra's family andelders refused the cabinet's reluctantoffer.

The state funeral of the former gov­ernor general and Vunivalu (para­mount chief of Fiji), Ratu Sir GeorgeCakobau, preoccupied the army andthe government as the year drew to aclose. There were few murmurs of sur­prise when the interim government'sterm was extended another month (to 5January 1990) in deference to the pass­ing ofthe Vunivalu. Indeed, somewould recognize the move as the famil­iar political tactic of buying time.

SANDRA TARTE

NEW CALEDONIA

At the beginning of 1989 New Caledo­nia was more peaceful than it had beenfor many months. The Matignon

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1990

Accord, that had brought the pro-inde­pendence coalition, the Front de Liber­ation Nationale Kanake et Socialiste(FLNKS), and the "loyalist" Rassemble­ment pour la CaLedonie dans LaRepublique (RPCR) toward a tentativeagreement, had been signed andapproved in a national referendum;overt violence was no longer apparent;new financial benefits were tricklinginto the territory; and high worldnickel prices had rejuvenated the min­ing industry after years of depression.Both the FLNKS and the RPCR sought togain Melanesian support throughgreater economic development in ruralareas.

Inside New Caledonia, however, thestability was uncertain as there was dis­sidence within the FLNKS, notably fromYann-Celene Uregei's Front Uni deLiberation Kanake (FULK), and fromthe more radical Parti de LiberationKanake (PALIKA). The loyalist side wasalso under some pressure from theright-wing Front National, which hadexperienced renewed support in 1988.Early in the year the FLNKS stronglycriticized the French government's revi­sion of the electoral rolls, and objectedto the restricted roll being used only forthe 1998 referendum on independence,and not for intervening elections. Out­side New Caledonia there was strongsupport for the Matignon Accord.Vanuatu conceded that France had arole to play in the region. BothVanuatu and Australia drew closer toFrance, and France increased its aid tothe region, especially to Fiji. Forty­seven Kanak militants were releasedfrom jail, and New Caledonia entereda period of convalescence.

In the March municipal elections

there was increased support for thepro-independence parties and a setbackfor RPCR leader Jacques Lafleur inDumbea. The turnout was just under70 percent, rather higher than the 63percent for the previous year's referen­dum on the Matignon Accord. TheFLNKS improved on its performance inthe 1983 elections, winning twenty ofthe thirty-two municipalities. Althoughthe largest party in the FLNKS coalition,Jean-Marie Tjibaou's Union Caledo­nienne (UC), claimed about 53 percentof the pro-independence votes, itappeared to have lost ground toPALIKA, which emerged as the secondlargest party in the FLNKS. The FULK

scored poorly except in the LoyaltyIslands. The RPCR lost its monopoly inNoumea, with UC gaining a seat andthree right-wing parties gaining sevenseats (PR, 16 March 1989). DissidentWallisians and Futunans, who had usu­ally supported the RPCR, ran their owncandidates and did well in Paita. In theeast-coast towns of Poindimie andPonerihouen there were violent dis­putes between different parties withinthe FLNKS over the outcome of the elec­tions.

The prevailing mood of cautiousoptimism was rudely shattered by themurder of the president and vice-presi­dent of the FLNKS, Jean-Marie Tjibaouand Yeiwene Yeiwene, on 4 May 1989in Ouvea. They had gone to Ouvea fora custom ceremony to mark the end ofone year's mourning for the victims ofthe Ouvea violence. The two were shotby Djoubelli Wea, a local pro-indepen­dence leader, previously a member ofFULK and PALIKA, who was unhappywith the signing of the MatignonAccord and concerned that indepen-

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

dence had effectively been postponedindefinitely. He was shot and killed byTjibaou's bodyguards.

The assassinations struck the politi­cal movement a grievous blow. In NewCaledonia, as elsewhere in Melanesia,politics is very much about personali­ties. The Melanesian leader who abso­lutely dominated New Caledonia poli­tics throughout the turbulent 1980swas Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Even the dep­uty leader of FLNKS, Yeiwene Yeiwene,was largely unknown outside NewCaledonia. Tjibaou was also leader ofthe UC, the longest established politi­cal party in New Caledonia, and theonly party with support throughout theterritory. Perhaps two-thirds of all pro­independence Kanaks are members.Throughout the five-year existence ofthe FLNKS, and even when the stageseemed set for an independent Kanaky,there were regional and other divisionswithin the coalition. Tjibaou was ableto cope with dissent and division andforged a united front on most of theissues that were crucial to achieving thetimetable for independence.

Tjibaou was born in 1934 in theTiendanite valley, inland fromHienghene, where he later becamemayor. He went to a Catholic school atCanala, studied sociology at the Sor­bonne, and attended a seminary inPaita. After a decade he dropped out ofthe priesthood, married Marie-ClaudeWetta, and became leader of the UnionCaledonienne in 1977. He was brieflyvice-president of the Territorial Assem­bly in 1982. Yeiwene was born in 1945in Mare. He became a member of theTerritorial Assembly in 1977, was thedeputy leader of the UC, one-timechairman of the Loyalty Islands region,

and chairman of the domestic airline,Air Caledonie.

Both the UC and the FLNKS faced thechallenge of finding new leaders, andparticularly of uniting the FLNKS for thelong and difficult road to indepen­dence. It proved to be an arduous taskfor a coalition that had for too longassumed that Tjibaou would always bethere. By the end of 1989 no decisionhad been made regarding the FLNKS

leader. The FULK was further margina­lized when it failed to condemn themurders. There was dissent on when acongress should be held, and strongviews that the leadership of the FLNKS

should come from a party other thanthe uc. The always hesitant unity ofthe FLNKS was severely threatened, as ithad previously been by the MatignonAccord, the municipal elections, andthe frustration of waging a long andbitter struggle with so little reward.Leadership is likely to impose severeburdens; few of the potential candi­dates have the stature of Tjibaou, areknown to be as moderate, and appearto be capable of achieving consistentunity.

Two weeks after the murders theexecutive of the UC chose as its newleader Fran~ois Burck, the last survivorof the group that in 1977 had led theUC to demand independence. The oth­ers, Tjibaou, Eloi Machoro, and PierreDeclercq, have all died in tragic cir­cumstances. Burck was born inNoumea in 1939, the son of a part­Melanesian father and a Europeanmother, thus claiming "Kanak rootsand European branches" (Le Monde,22 May 1989). Like his close friend Tji­baou, he was a former Catholic priest,and he promised to continue the poli-

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL I990

cies of Tjibaou and Yeiwene. But bystressing that he sought "independencefor everyone," he distanced himselffrom the "Kanak independence" thathad previously been demanded.

New provincial elections were heldin June. Again nearly 70 percent of theelectorate took part in the poll, whichpredictably gave the RPCR an absolutemajority in the South (based onNoumea), and the FLNKS equally con­vincing majorities in the North and theLoyalty Islands. However, most of theprovincial seats were allocated to UCmembers, especially in the LoyaltyIslands, thus alienating members ofother parties in the FLNKS, principallyPALIKA. The presidents of the Northand Loyalty Islands, Leopold Joredieand Richard Kaloi, are both from theUC. With control of 27 of the 54 seats,the RPCR just failed to get an absolutemajority in the territorial congress.The FULK opposed the elections, but apromised active boycott failed to mate­rialize. The hard-line Front National,which had opposed the MatignonAccord, won three seats in the South;two other seats were won by theextreme right wing Caledonie Demain.Center parties had no impact, althougha new party, Union Oceanienne, repre­senting Wallis and Futuna Islanders,won two seats in the South, indicatingsupport for their view that migrantshad been ignored in the MatignonAccord.

The annual conference of the Uniondes Syndicats des Travailleurs etKanaks Exploites (USTKE) decided byan overwhelming majority to leave theFLNKS coalition, partly out of disap­pointment with the Matignon Accord,but primarily in order to focus on

industrial and employment issues.Since the Group des Femmes KanakesExploitees en Lutte (GFKEL) is nolonger active, and Liberation KanakeSocialiste (LKS) remains outside thecoalition, the FLNKS is now composedof UC, PALIKA, and the relatively smallUnion Progressiste Metanesienne(UPM) and Parti Socialiste de Kanaky(PSK). The FULK also remains a mem­ber, despite talk of expulsion becauseof its opposition to the Accord.

On the economic front, nickel min­ing expanded substantially as pricesremained at their highest levels for adecade, and the New Caledonian Con­gress introduced new fiscal measures toencourage the industry. Tourism con­tinued the revival that began in I988,but numbers were still well below therecord levels of I984. A large new hotelopened at Ouemo (Noumea), andother smaller hotels were completed inPoe (Bourail), and in the LoyaltyIslands. Under the provisions of theMatignon Accord there was progresstoward setting up a port city at Nepouiin the north, and expanding employ­ment and training in rural areas. Oneof the most surprising economic eventswas the purchase of the Banque d'!ndo­suez in both French Polynesia and NewCaledonia by the Australian bankWestpac. This expanded Westpac'sbanking interests in the Pacific substan­tially, and made it the first foreignbank in New Caledonia. There wereother facets of economic change. Anincrease in overt unemployment, espe­cially among young urban Melanesiansand Polynesians, was attributed to"galloping demography and an inade­quate job market" and resulted in a sig­nificant increase in juvenile delin-

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

quency and urban violence. The 1989census revealed that the populationhad grown to 164,000, with Melane­sians representing 45 percent of thetotal. There was little progress on landreform, despite repeated promises.

The year drew to a close with thepardoning of 26 Kanaks jailed after themurder of four gendarmes in April1988, the incident that had precipitatedthe Ouvea violence. Although opposedby the right wing, the amnesty indica­ted the further distancing of New Cale­donia from the violence of the immedi­ate past. The year ended as peacefullyas it had begun. But it had added onemore violent chapter to the recent his­tory of New Caledonia, and witnessedwhat apppeared to be the declining for­tunes of the FLNKS, despite its contin­ued electoral support.

JOHN CONNELL

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

This was Papua New Guinea's mostdifficult year since independence in1975. On Bougainville Island more thanfifty people died and many more wereinjured in clashes between securityforces and militant landowners nearthe giant Panguna copper and goldmine, and in outbursts of ethnic vio­lence between Bougainvilleans andmigrants from other provinces. Theforced closure of the mine in May 1989had serious economic consequences,especially for government revenues andthe country's balance of payments.More important, however, were thepolitical and social implications of theBougainville crisis. The national gov­ernment was unable to negotiate or

impose a solution, while the undisci­plined behavior of its security forcesserved to exacerbate existing ethnicand separatist tensions.

Growing dissatisfaction withBougainville Copper Limited'sresponse to certain long-standing griev­ances had led some landowners toadopt militant tactics in late 1988. Theinitial campaign of bombing and arsondirected against company property wasorchestrated by a group of landowners,led by a former mine employee, FrancisOna, who had become disenchantedwith the leadership and approach oftheir representative body, the PangunaLandowners Association. However,Ona's group, associated with the so­called new Panguna Landowners Asso­ciation, and based in Nasioi villagesclose to the mine, was not the only oneactive in 1989. Acts of violence werealso committed by individuals andgIOUpS in broad sympathy with Ona'santicompany and secessionist senti­ments, but pursuing their own particu­lar agendas (May 1989,23-25). Most ofthe action, which included the topplingof power pylons and shooting at trafficon the Port-Mine Access Road, wasdesigned to put the mine out of produc­tion.

While some landowners, notablythe officers of the trust fund set up in1980 to invest compensation paymentson behalf of landowners, the RoadMining Tailings Leases Trust (RMTL),were prepared to negotiate a settle­ment, Ona's group was still sticking toits original demands at the end of theyear. These included 50 percent of thetotal revenues generated by the minesince production commenced in 1972,and KIO billion to compensate for envi-