Frances’ part:

CASE 16: Tenchavez v EscañoFacts:

On February 24, 1948 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their matchmaker and go-between who had an romantic relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after deciphering the said letter to Vicenta’s dad, he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Respondent Escaño applied for a passport saying that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then pursued for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

On July 30, 1955, petitioner Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against Vicenta and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.

Issues:

Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines

Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar

Held:

No, Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce

Yes. Both parties shall be awarded damages

Ratio:

At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided: “Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad ”. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

On the part of Tenchavez : His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’s parents encouraged their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1, 000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. The SC awarded P25, 000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño and not her parents. On the part of Escaño’s parents: It is true that the P1, 000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

CASE 20: NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN v. REYES

Facts:

While drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, Roberto Reyes (aka Amay Bisaya) was invited by an old friend, Dr. Violeta Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s former general manager. He agreed and carried the latter’s present. After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, petitioner Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary, stopped him and asked him to leave the premises. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.

Ms. Lim confessed having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Watchful of the wish of the celebrant to keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big scene. 

Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Hence, this instant petition for review. 

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party thus entitling him for damages

Held:

No, petitioners have not acted with abuse in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Any damage which Reyes might have suffered through Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith must be his to bear alone.

Ratio:

Art. 19 states “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” Art. 21. “Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”

The Court found no proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’ version of the story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Neither can Hotel Nikko be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employees. 

NCC 19 (principle of abuse of rights) is not for all human hurts and social grievances; NCC 19’s object is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties; its elements are the following: Legal right or duty, Exercised in bad faith, For the sole  intent of prejudicing or injuring another

NCC 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: There is an act which is legal but it is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, public policy And it is done with intent to injure. Common theme running through NCC 19 and 21 is that the act must be INTENTIONAL

CASE 24: CONTINENTAL STEEL v. MONTAÑO

Facts:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CB) due to the death of his unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while on the 38th week of her pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

Petitoner Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits. It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. Also, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

Continental Steel then argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code

Labor arbiter Montaño ruled in favor of Hortillano arguing that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die

Held:

No, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

Ratio:

Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a) Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a) Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)

The issue of civil personality is not relevant in the said articles.  Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality. Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.  

Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality.   One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.  Even a child inside the womb already has life.  No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother.  If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel. 

CASE 28: JOAQUIN v. NAVARRO

Facts:

When the battle of liberation of Manila occurred. Joaquin Navarro, Sr., wife Angela Joaquin, daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building.

The Building was set on fire and the Japanese men started shooting which hit the three daughters who all died. Joaquin Sr. decided to leave building but his wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his son, his son’s wife and their neighbor Francisco Lopez. While going out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground. The rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping countless of people presumably including Angela. Joaquin Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Joaquin Sr. and Adela Conde died three days later. The friend and former neighbor Lopez who escaped with Joaquin, Sr. from the building, survived to narrate the story

The RTC claims that the mother, natural child of petitioner Joaquin, survived the son; the son dying first before the mother. CA claimed the reverse. If the son died first, petitioner Joaquin would obtain the benefits of succession. If the mother died first, the respondent Antonio, son of Joaquin, Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit.

Issue:

Whether or not the mother died before her son Joaquin Jr.

Held:

Joaquin Jr. died before his mother.

Ratio:

Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other. (33)

According to the witness Francisco Lopez, Joaquin Jr. died before his mother.  The presumption that the mother Angela died before her son was based on assumptions, not evidence.  Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. 

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of Rules of Court does not require that the inference necessary to disregard the presumption provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which survivorship can be inferred" that are necessary to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule cannot mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." The evidence of survivorship need not be direct, it may be indirect, circumstantial or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence controls.

CASE 32: BRAGANZA v. VILLA-ABRILLE

Facts: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from respondent De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and

promised in writing to pay him P10,000 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. However, no payment has been made so Abrille sued them in March 1949. Both the Manila court of first instance and CA held the family is solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they signed.

The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract

Issue: Whether or not the boys, who were minors, are bound by the contract of loan they have signed

Held: No, the boys are not bound by the provisions of the contract but they are still liable to pay the actual amount they

have profited from the loan.

Ratio:

Art. 1340 states that “The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to know the

facts, are not in themselves fraudulent” Even if the written contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that

they may have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent to P1,166.67.

The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because the minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest. However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence – “in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive

CASE 36: CREWLINK v. TERINGTERING

Facts:

Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse of deceased Jacinto Teringtering, and in behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against petitioner Crewlink, Inc., and its foreign principal Gulf Marine Services for the payment of US$50,000.00 for death compensation, US$7,000.00 for the benefit for the minor child, burial assistance in the of US$1,000.00, damages and attorney's fees

Editha alleged that her husband entered into an overseas employment contract with Crewlink – he took a medical exam and was declared fit to work. On April 9, 2001 Jacinto died due to drowning. Editha claimed for compensation but was denied by Crewlink. She claimed it is enough that Jacinto died during the term of his contract and while still on board to get compensation. She asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or mood disorder bipolar type. She further alleged that the death was not deliberate and of his own will but as a result of a mental disorder

Crewlink alleged that Jacinto jumped off the ship twice. He was saved the first time and after that, someone was assigned to watch over him. When he jumped off a second time he was no longer saved. Crewlink asserted that Editha was not entitled to the benefits because Jacinto committed suicide. Despite the nonentitlement, however, Teringtering was even given burial assistance in the amount of P35,800.00 and P13,273.00. She also received the amount of US$792.51 representing donations from the GMS staff and crew. Petitioner likewise argued that Teringtering is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, because crewlink had nothing to do with her late husband's death as the same was due to his own doing.

Issue: Whether or not Jacinto Teringtering is insane

Held:

No, because respondent, other than Editha’s bare allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity

Ratio:

The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. No man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person’s mind can only be understood and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is quite close with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness’ own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert like a psychiatrist for example.

CASE 40: UMALE v. ASB REALTY

Facts:

This case involves a parcel of land identified as Lot 7, Block 5, Amethyst Street, Ortigas Center, Pasig City which was originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation (Amethyst Pearl), a company that is, in turn, wholly-owned by respondent ASB Realty Corporation (ASB Realty).  Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearl's outstanding capital stock from ASB Realty making ASB Realty the owner of the subject premises

Sometime in 2003, ASB Realty posted an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against petitioner Leonardo S. Umale. ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease contract with Umale for the period June 1, 1999-May 31, 2000. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720.00. Upon the contract’s expiration on May 31, 2000, Umale continued occupying the premises and paying rentals although at an increased monthly rent of P100, 000.00.  The last rental payment made by Umale to ASB Realty was for the June 2001 to May 2002 period.

On June 2003, ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 30, 2003. Umale failed to comply with ASB Realty's demands and continued in possession of the subject premises, even constructing commercial establishments.

In asserting his right to remain on the property based on the oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl. Umale also challenged ASB Realty's personality to recover the subject premises considering that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly appointed

MTC dismissed ASB Realty's complaint against Umale without prejudice. However, RTC reversed decision of the MTC. Umale filed a motion for reconsideration while ASB Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, the RTC denied reconsideration of its Decision and granted ASB Realty's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Umale then filed his appeal with the CA insisting that the parties did not enter into a lease contract. Pending the resolution thereof, Umale died and was substituted by his widow and legal heirs. CA affirmed RTC decision

Issue:

Whether or not a corporate officer of ASB Realty can file a suit to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation

Whether or not Umale is entitled to avail of the lease periods provided in Article 1687 of the Civil CodeHeld:

Yes, ASB Realty can file a suit because it is the owner of the leased premises, and it is the real party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer suit.

No, petitioners cannot avail Art 1687 of the Civil CodeRatio:

Article 1687. “If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. (1581a)”

Real party-in-interest is defined as “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Petitioners Umale, et al lost sight of the restriction provided in Article 1675 of the Civil Code.  It states that a lessee that commits any of the grounds for ejectment cited in Article 1673, including non-payment of lease rentals and devoting the leased premises to uses other than those stipulated, cannot avail of the periods established in Article 1687. Moreover, the extension in Article 1687 is granted only as a matter of equity.  The law simply recognizes that there are instances when it would be unfair to abruptly end the lease contract causing the eviction of the lessee.  

CASE 44: FUENTES v. ROCA

Facts:

Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses with the help of Atty. Plagata who prepared the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes couple there will be a Php60, 000 down payment and Php140, 000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained.

Atty. Plagata then went about to complete the tasks and asserted that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga. The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989.

As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses took possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action has already prescribed.

On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC because it has found sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. 

Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that the Civil Code under which the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction governed their property relations. The action of the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.

The sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot.

Issue:

Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed

Held: Yes, when Tarciano and Rosario died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs. As lawful

owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal

Ratio:

Art. 124. “In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”

 Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.

Opposing to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989; a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

The action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.

CASE 48: DE SANTIS v. INTESTATE ESTATE JALANDONI

Facts:

Rodolfo G. Jalandoni died intestate and without issue so Bernardino G. Jalandoni, the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s estate. 

Petitioner De Santis and siblings filed a Manifestation before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis who was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee with one John Desantis. The petitioner and her siblings assert that their grandmother Isabel was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the legal spouse of the latter therefore Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.

De Santis and siblings pray that they be allowed to interfere on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. At the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter

Respondent Jalandoni opposed the intervention on the ground that the petitioners (De Santis’) have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was married to Rodolfo. Isabel’s previous marriage made her marriage to Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio

The appellate court, siding with Jalandoni, held that Sylvia’s birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts which includes the civil status of her parents. Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.

Held:

No, CA did not err in nullifying the orders of the intestate courtRatio:

The birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child. In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents

The absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

CASE 52: WASSMER v. VELEZ

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on August 23, 1954. The wedding will take place on September 4, 1954. As expected, all the necessary preparations were undertaken for the said event. However, two days before the wedding, Francisco Velez left a note for Beatriz informing her that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed the union.

The following day, he sent her another note stating that the wedding will push through as planned. Francisco Velez never showed up and has not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently filed suit for damages. Judgment was rendered ordering Velez to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Defendant Velez now claims that the judgment against him is contrary to law, given that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.

Issue:

Whether or not Wassmer can file for damages for breach of promise to marry

Held:

Yes, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code, Beatriz can claim damages for the actions of Francisco Velez.

Ratio:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Petitioner Wassmer has already arranged everything for the wedding, such as wedding gowns, invitations, matrimonial bed, etc. The court ruled that just a case of mere breach of promise to marry for the groom just to walk out 2 days before the wedding day is contrary to good customs. Velez acted in a reckless and oppressive manner.

CASE 56: SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC

Facts

Rommel Jacinto Dante Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate Petitioner alleged his name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth

(birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual who underwent psychological examination, hormone

treatment and breast augmentation. Ultimately, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and is engaged to be married. The trial court rendered a decision

in favor of petitioner. RTC said that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. Court also believes that no harm or injury will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.

Office of the Solicitor General, then filed a petition asserting that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA ruled in favor of OSG.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Silverio’s petition hinges on under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Issue: Whether or not the entries in Silverio’s birth certificate can be changed and thus alter his status and capacity

to legally marry a person of same sex?Held:

No because there is no law allowing such thing.Ratio:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. For marriage purposes (and everything else for that matter) a male is defined as the sex that bears

spermatozoa, while the female is the sex that bears ova. A medical sex change does not change the these physical attributes.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed on the ground of Sex Reassignmenta. Court said that just because he acquired physical features of a female, doesn’t mean he’s entitled to the

changes he seeks. Laws control petitions like this. The court allows first name to be changed when 1) name is ridiculous, 2) new name has been continuously used, or he has been publicly known by that first name, and 3) change will avoid confusion

b. Silverio’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment which is not contemplated by any of the governing laws. A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.