bar review material

7/24/2019 Bar Review Material

1/167

I. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Art. 26, NCC

The philosophy behind Art. 26, NCC underscores the necessity for its

inclusion in our Civil Law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertainterms that the human personality be exalted. Thus, under this article, the

rights of a person are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations

of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Further, the

violations mentioned in this codal provision are not exclusive but merely

examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts such as the one

involved in this case. (CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.

120706, January 31, 2000)

Prejudicial Question

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which

is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of

which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be

determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve

the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.

More simply, for the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial

question, the law requires the concurrence of two essential requisites, to wit:

a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately relatedto the issue raised in the criminal action; and

b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not thecriminal action may proceed. (CHING vs. C!"T # $%%&$'G.". No. **+,-- $pril / +++)

Pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a

prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage. The rationale behindthe principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. For a

civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the

suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it

must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon

which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution


2/167

of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence

of the accused would necessarily be determined. (BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R.

No. 137567, June 20, 2000)

Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Art. 148, FC); Support;

Retroactive Application of the Family Code

Actual contribution is required by Art. 148 of the Family Code, in

contrast to Art. 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of

the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of

common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.

The care given by one party [to] the home, children, and household, or spiritual

or moral inspiration provided to the other, is not included in Art.148. Hence, if

actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership

and no presumption of equal shares

The right to support (for shelter) of illegitimate children does not prevail

over the right of the spouses to eject them. Article 203 of the Family Code

expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from

the time the person who has the right to receive the same needs it formaintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of the judicial or

extra-judicial demand. (TUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 137650, April 12,

2000)

Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death of a Spouse

Since the marriage was contracted in 1958, the applicable provision is

Art. 83, NCC which provides that a subsequent marriage contracted during the

lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriageis first annulled or dissolved, except when the first spouse (1) has been absent

for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the

spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or (2) if absent for less

than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the

spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or (3) is


3/167

presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. For the

exception to apply, the subsequent marriage must have been made in good

faith. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary

as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. The marriage under these

exceptional cases is deemed to be valid until declared null and void by acompetent court. In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a

subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the

following conditions must concur: (a) the prior spouse of the contracting party

must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where the

danger of death under the circumstances in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the

time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the

absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial

declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spousepresent can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that

declaration. (ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO, G. R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000)

Validity of Marriage; Marriage License Required

A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the

marriage void ab initio. Absence any claim of an exceptional character, the

purported marriage between the parties could not be classified among thoseexempt from the marriage license requirement. (SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,

G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000)

Exemption from Marriage License; Declaration of Nullity of a Void Marriage

The five-year period provided by law in order to exempt the futurespouses from securing a marriage license should be computed on the basis of a

cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special

contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year

common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of

celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for


4/167

the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years

immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of

cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was

involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.

Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without anydistinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other

during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and

encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the

same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

The Family Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a

marriage. A void marriage can be attacked collaterally and can be questioned

even after the death of either party. That is why the action or defense for nullity

is imprescriptible. Any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

(NIAL vs. BAYADOG, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000)

Property Relations of Unions Without Marriage

The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and

woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriagemust not in any way be incapacitated to marry. If the property is acquired

during the time when the other party to the cohabitation has a subsisting

marriage, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it

pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. (ADRIANO vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, G.R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000)

II. PROPERTY

Property of Public Dominion


5/167

Like public street, public parks are beyond the commerce of man and,

thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract. (LANSANG vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000)

Builder in Good Faith

Both Article 448 and Article 546, NCC which allow full reimbursement of

useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is

made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with

the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a

realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.

Neither did the promise of the alleged owners that they were going to donate

the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the

time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet

fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be

realized. (VERONA PADA-KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 134329,

January 19, 2000)

Quieting of Title; Termination of Co-ownership by Prescription

An action to quiet title, under Art. 476, NCC, is a common-law remedy

for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real

property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an

equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of

the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being

alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or

inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by

prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of

the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner,

the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed

unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners;

(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-

owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. (ROBLES vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000)


6/167

Quieting of Title; Laches; Freedom to Enter into Contracts; Waiver of Rights

Persons having legal as well as equitable title to or interest in a real

property may bring an action for quieting of title and "title" here does notnecessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the

suit.

Moreover, if the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title is in possession

of the property being litigated, such action is imprescriptible. One who is in

actual possession of a land, claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his

possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate

his right because his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to

seek the aid of the courts to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim and its

effects on his title. Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts,

nonetheless in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the

action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law. Moreover, since

laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same

must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice. Laches operates

not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid

recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable

situation.

The act of registration of a voluntary instrument is the operative act

which conveys or affects registered land insofar as third persons are concerned.

Hence, even without registration, the contract (oral partition) is still valid as

between the parties. Neither a Transfer Certificate of Title nor a subdivision

plan is essential to the validity of an oral partition.

Quitclaims are valid contracts of waiver of property rights. The freedom

to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims, is protected by law and thecourts are not quick to interfere with such freedom unless the contract is

contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order.

Quitclaims, being contracts of waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with

knowledge of their existence and intent to relinquish them. The intent to waive

rights must be clearly and convincingly shown. Moreover, when the only proof


7/167

of intent is the act of a party, such act should be manifestly consistent and

indicative of an intent to voluntarily relinquish a particular right such that no

other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. ( MAESTRADO vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 133345 & 133324, March 9, 2000)

Preference of Possession; Ownership

Between the claimants, ownership shall be vested to the one who has

proven acquisitive prescription. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for

taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be

the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.

It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation.Unless it is hostile, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by

prescription or adverse possession. The tax declarations and receipts are only

prima facie, not conclusive, evidence of ownership in the absence of actual

public and adverse possession. (CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE, G. R. No. 137944,

April 6, 2000)

DonationInter Vivos; Repudiation Of Inheritance; Escheat

There are 3 essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the

patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c)

the intent to do an act of liberality oranimus donandi.When applied to a

donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation

be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof

made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document. In cases

where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that

the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in bothinstruments.

The inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation of the

inheritance valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as there was

already an acceptance and where there is no showing that such acceptance


8/167

was made thru any of the causes which vitiate consent or there is no proof of

the existence of an unknown will. Art. 1056 of the Civil Code provides The

acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance is irrevocable and cannot be

impugned except when it was made thru any of the causes that vitiate consent

or when and unknown will appears.

Nevertheless the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convertthe parcels of land into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. Therepudiation bein0 of no e1ect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to theirprivate owner who althou0h bein0 an $merican citi2en is 3uali4ed by hereditarysuccession to own the property sub5ect of the liti0ation. ("&%!6'IC vs. G!78$NG.". No.*9:- #eb. *,+++)

nows of the acceptance by the donee. $nd once a donationis accepted the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.(=&'$?!&7 vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *:: #ebruary *@+++)

%"&C"I%TIN

"eal actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. Good faith consists in thereasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thin0 wasits owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof. (&"$%I vs. C!"T #$%%&$' G.". No. *9@+ $pril , +++)

%rescription in $ction for "econveyance


9/167

%rescription cannot be invo>ed in an action for reconveyance when the claimant isin possession of the land to be reconveyed. (8I''&N$ vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.".No. *//:/ Aanuary 9* +++)

wnership Throu0h $c3uisitive %resciption

To0ether with actual possession of the land taB declarations constitute stron0evidence of ownership of the land occupied by a person. !ninterrupted adversepossession of the land for more than 9+ years could only ripen into ownership of theland throu0h ac3uisitive prescription which is a mode of ac3uirin0 ownership andother real ri0hts over immovable property. %rescription re3uires public peaceful

uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner forten (*+) years in case the possession is in 0ood faith and with a 5ust title. (


10/167

suspends but does not obli0ate; and the mode obli0ates but does not suspend. Tosome eBtent it is similar to a resolutory condition.

ubstitution is the desi0nation by the testator of a person or persons to ta>e theplace of the heir or heirs 4rst instituted. !nder substitutions in 0eneral the testator

may either (*) provide for the desi0nation of another heir to whom the propertyshall pass in case the ori0inal heir should die before himEher renounce theinheritance or be incapacitated to inherit as in a simple substitution or () leavehisEher property to one person with the eBpress char0e that it be transmittedsubse3uently to another or others as in a 4deicommissary substitution.

$ Fill is a personal solemn revocable and free act by which a person disposes ofhis property to ta>e e1ect after his death. ince the Fill eBpresses the manner inwhich a person intends how his properties be disposed the wishes and desires ofthe testator must be strictly followed. Thus a Fill cannot be the sub5ect of acompromise a0reement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of ma>in0 a

Fill. ("$6$ind of preterition in the absence ofproof and bad faith does not 5ustify a collateral attac> on the new TCT. The reliefinstead rests on $rt.**+- NCC to the e1ect that where the preterition is notattended by bad faith and fraud the partition shall not be rescinded but thepreterited heir shall be paid the value pertainin0 to her. (=I$


11/167

participated therein. The re3uirement of $rticle *9@, of the Civil Code that actswhich have for their ob5ect the creation transmission modi4cation oreBtin0uishment of real ri0hts over immovable property must appear in a publicinstrument is only for convenience noncompliance with which does not a1ect thevalidity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as amon0 themselves. $nd

neither does the tatute of #rauds under $rticle *-+9 of the New Civil Code applybecause partition amon0 heirs is not le0ally deemed a conveyance of real propertyconsiderin0 that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other butrather a con4rmation or rati4cation of title or ri0ht of property that an heir isrenouncin0 in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.(=&"N$ %$


12/167

$ 0ood measure for determinin0 whether a contract terminates upon the deathof one of the parties is whether it is of such character that it may be performed bythe promissors personal representative. #urthermore the sub5ect matter of thecontract is a lease which is a property ri0ht. The death of a party does not eBcusenonperformance of a contract which involves a property ri0ht and the ri0hts and

obli0ations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased.imilarly nonperformance is not eBcused by the death of the party when the otherparty has a property interest in the sub5ect matter of the contract. (e further royaltypayments.

The 8$ is an onerous contract wherein the contractin0 parties are obli0ed torender reciprocal prestations. &ntitlement to the royalty fee is wholly dependentupon the eBistence and subsistence of the ri0ht for which the royalty was 0ranted. Ifthe reason which 0ave rise to the contract has ceased to eBist the result is that theobli0ation too has ceased to eBist. (G'


13/167

The ri0ht to rescind a contract involvin0 reciprocal obli0ations is provided for in$rticle **:* of the Civil Code. The law spea>s of the ri0ht of the in5ured party tochoose between rescission or ful4llment of the obli0ation with the payment of

dama0es in either case. The parties should not be allowed to rescind the contractwhere they themselves did not perform their essential obli0ation thereunder. Itshould be emphasi2ed that a contract of sale involves reciprocity between theparties. (C&NT"$' 6$N # TH& %HI'I%%IN& vs. 6ICH$"$ G.". No. *9*+/- 8arch/ +++)

Contract to ell; "escission

$rticle **:*NCC on rescission spea>s of obli0ations already eBistin0. In a contractto sell the full payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition thefailure of which is not considered a breach casual or serious but simply an eventwhich prevented the obli0ation of the vendor to convey title from ac3uirin0 anyobli0atory force. There can be no rescission of an obli0ation that is noneBistentconsiderin0 that the suspensive condition therefor has not yet happened. (%$


14/167

6ad0es of #raud

!nder $rticle *9,*(9) of the Civil Code contracts which are underta>en in fraud ofcreditors when the latter cannot in any manner collect the claims due them arerescissible. The eBistence of fraud with intent to defraud creditor may either bepresumed in accordance with $rticle *9,/ NCC or duly proved in accordance withthe ordinary rules of evidence. Hence the law presumes that there is fraud ofcreditors whenJ a) There is alienation of property by 0ratuitous title by thedebtor who has not reserved suDcient property to pay his debts contracted beforesuch alienation; or b) There is alienation of property by onerous title made by adebtor a0ainst whom some 5ud0ment has been rendered in any instance or some

writ of attachment has been issued. The decision or attachment need not refer tothe property alienated and need not have been obtained by the party see>in0rescission.

In determinin0 whether or not a certain conveyance is fraudulent the 3uestion inevery case is whether the conveyance was a bona 4de transaction or a tric> andcontrivance to defeat creditors or whether it conserves to the creditor to the debtoror a special ri0ht. It is not suDcient that it is founded on 0ood considerations or ismade with bona 4de intent. It must have both elements. If defective in either ofthese althou0h 0ood between the parties it is voidable as to creditors. The3uestion as to whether or not the conveyance is fraudulent isJ does it pre5udice theri0hts of the creditorsK The mere fact that the conveyance was founded on valuableconsideration does not necessarily ne0ate the presumption of fraud under $rt.*9,/ NCC. There has to be a valuable consideration and the transaction must havebeen made bona 4de. (China 6an>in0 Corp. vs. Court of $ppeals G.". No. *:--8arch / +++)

=oid and =oidable Contracts

!nder $rt. *-+: ()NCC one type of contract which can be declared void andineBistent is that which is absolutely simulated or 4ctitious as when there areseveral bad0es of simulation provin0 that the sale between the parties was notintended to have any le0al e1ect between them..

Nonetheless a sale of the entire property by a coheir is unenforceable havin0been entered into in behalf of the coheirs who 0ave no authority or le0al


15/167

representation. However such a contract is susceptible of rati4cation. Fhere thereis a rati4cation then the sale is considered valid and bindin0. (&N % &8$"&TING C"%. vs. 8$"TIN&7 G.". No. *9-**/ #ebruary : +++)

Capacity to &nter into Contract

$ person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years of $G&or by reason of physical in4rmities. nly when such a0e or in4rmities impair hismental faculties to such eBtent as to prevent him from properly intelli0ently andfairly protectin0 his property ri0hts is he considered incapacitated. ('L'$ vs.C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. **@/9- #ebruary 9 +++)

!nenforceable Contract

$rticle *@: of the old Civil Code which was the prevailin0 law in *:-, and thus0overned the 3uestioned


16/167

appearance must have been intended by mutual a0reement; and (c) the purpose isto deceive third persons. ('L'$ vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. **@/9-#ebruary 9 +++)

'aches; %rescription

Fhile a review of the decree of re0istration is no lon0er available after theeBpiration of the oneyear period from entry thereof pursuant to the doctrine of res

5udicata an e3uitable remedy is still available. Those wron0fully deprived of theirproperty may initiate an action for reconveyance of the property. (=I''$N!&=$8IA$"& vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *+,:* $pril * +++)

The essence of laches is the failure or ne0lect for an unreasonable anduneBplained len0th of time to do that which by eBercisin0 due dili0ence could orshould have been done earlier; it is the ne0li0ence or omission to assert a ri0htwithin a reasonable time warrantin0 a presumption that the party entitled to assertit either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (G$TN vs. C!"T # $%%&$'G.". No. **9-+ Aune : +++)

T"!T

&Bpress Trust

Trust is the ri0ht to the bene4cial en5oyment of property the le0al title to which isvested in another. It is a 4duciary relationship that obli0es the trustee to deal withthe property for the bene4t of the bene4ciary. Trust relations between parties mayeither be eBpress or implied. $n eBpress trust is created by the intention of thetrustor or of the parties. $n implied trust comes into bein0 by operation of law.


17/167

!nder $rt. *--- NCC no particular words are re3uired for the creation of aneBpress trust it bein0 suDcient that a trust is clearly intended.

Fhile no time limit is imposed for the enforcement of ri0hts under eBpress trustsprescription may however bar a bene4ciarys action for recovery if a repudiation

of the trust is proven by clear and convincin0 evidence and made >nown to thebene4ciary. (&C!L$ vs. =


18/167

ption 8oney vs. &arnest 8oney

$n option contract is a preparatory contract in which one party 0rants to the otherfor a 4Bed period and under speci4ed conditions the power to decide whether or

not to enter into a principal contract it binds the party who has 0iven the option notto enter into the principal contract with any other person durin0 the perioddesi0nated and within that period to enter into such contract with the one towhom the option was 0ranted if the latter should decide to use the option. It is aseparate a0reement distinct from the contract to which the parties may enter uponthe consummation of the option. $n option contract is therefore a contract separatefrom and preparatory to a contract of sale which if perfected does not result in theperfection or consummation of the sale.

IN THI C$& $#T&" TH& %$L8&NT # TH& *+O %TIN 8N&L TH& ##&" T

%!"CH$& %"=I


19/167

place to a person named or upon his order. It does not evidence receipt of the 0oodsby the consi0nee or the person named in the bill of ladin0; rather it is evidence ofreceipt by the carrier of the 0oods from the shipper for transportation and delivery.'i>ewise a factory consi0nment invoice is not evidence of actual delivery of the0oods. $n invoice is nothin0 more than a detailed statement of the nature 3uantity

and cost of the thin0 sold. It is not proof that the thin0 or 0oods were actuallydelivered to the vendee or the consi0nee. ('$ vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No.-/+*9 +-/ P +:@,@: #ebruary */ +++)

ale with "i0ht of "epurchase

The mere fact that the price is inade3uate does not prove support the conclusionthat the contract was a loan or that the property was not at all sold. The price 4Bedin the sale with a ri0ht to repurchase is not necessarily the true value of the landsold. The rationale is that the vendor has the ri0ht to 4B a relatively reduced pricealthou0h not a 0rossly inade3uate one in order to a1ord the vendor a retro everyfacility to redeem the land. Thus inade3uacy of the price is not suDcient to setaside a sale unless it is 0rossly inade3uate or purely shoc>in0 to the conscience.($6$% vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G" No. *,// 8arch +++)

Consolidation of Title in %acto de "etro ale

$rt. *+/ NCC re3uirin0 a 5udicial order for the consolidation of the ownership inthe vendee a retro to be recorded in the "e0istry of %roperty is intended to minimi2ethe evils which the pacto de retro sale has caused in the hands of usurers. $ 5udicialorder is necessary in order to determine the true nature of the transaction and toprevent the interposition of buyers in 0ood faith while the determination is bein0made. Notwithstandin0 $rt. *+/ the recordin0 in the "e0istry of %roperty of theconsolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine 3ua non to thetransfer of ownership. The essence of the pacto de retro sale is that title andownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retrosub5ect to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within thestipulated period. #ailure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutorycondition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownershipover the property sold. $s title is already vested in the vendee a retro his failure to


20/167

consolidate his title under $rticle *+/ NCC does not impair such title or ownershipfor the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of re0isterin0 theconsolidated title. (C"!7 vs. '&I G.". No. *@99 8arch : +++)

nowled0e of the 4rst buyerdoes not bar him from availin0 of his ri0hts under the law amon0 them to re0ister4rst his purchase as a0ainst the second buyer. 6ut in converso >nowled0e 0ainedby the second buyer of the 4rst sale defeats his ri0hts even if he is 4rst to re0isterthe second sale since such >nowled0e taints his prior re0istration with bad faith.

This is the price eBacted by $rt. *@-- for the second buyer bein0 able to displacethe 4rst buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the 4rst hemust show that he acted in 0ood faith throu0hout (i.e. in i0norance of the 4rst saleand of the 4rst buyerQs ri0hts) R from the time of ac3uisition until the title istransferred to him by re0istration or failin0 re0istration by delivery of possession.

The second buyer must show continuin0 0ood faith and innocence or lac> of>nowled0e of the 4rst sale until his contract ripens into full ownership throu0h priorre0istration as provided by law. To merit protection under $rt. *@-- the secondbuyer must act in 0ood faith from the time of the sale until the re0istration of thesame. (6$"IC!$T" A". vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *+@:+ #ebruary :+++)

!nder $rticle *@-- of the Civil Code before the second buyer can obtain priority

over the 4rst he must show that he acted in 0ood faith throu0hout (i.e. ini0norance of the 4rst sale and of the 4rst buyerQs ri0hts) R from the time ofac3uisition until title is transferred to him by re0istration or failin0 re0istration bydelivery of possession. nowled0e 0ained by the second buyer of the 4rst saledefeats his ri0hts even if he is 4rst to re0ister the second sale since such>nowled0e taints his prior re0istration with bad faith. ($NG&' 6$!TIT$ vs. C!"T# $%%&$'


21/167

G.". No. *9@@ Aanuary *: +++)

'e0al "edemption

$ letter 0iven by the vendee notifyin0 the coowner of the sale of the coownedproperty cannot be considered compliance with the notice re3uirement of $rt.*9 NCC for purposes of le0al redemption. $rt. *9 of the Civil Code is clear inre3uirin0 that the written noti4cation should come from the vendor or prospectivevendor not from any other person. In the second place it ma>es sense to re3uirethat the notice re3uired in $rt. *9 be 0iven by the vendor and by nobody else.

The vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position to >now who are his co

owners who under the law must be noti4ed of the sale. It is the noti4cation from theseller not from anyone else which can remove all doubts as to the fact of the saleits perfection and its validity for in a contract of sale the seller is in the bestposition to con4rm whether consent to the essential obli0ation of sellin0 theproperty and transferrin0 ownership thereof to the vendee has been 0iven.(#"$NCIC vs. 6I&" G.". No. *9/// 8ay 9* +++)

=alidity of tipulations in a 'ease Contract

Aurisprudence supports the view that when parties to a contract eBpressly reservean option to terminate or rescind a contract upon the violation of a resolutorycondition notice of resolution must be 0iven to the other party when such ri0ht iseBercised. In 7ulueta vs. 8ariano the C ruled that resort to courts may benecessary when the ri0ht involves the reta>in0 of property which is not voluntarilysurrendered by the other party. The rationale for such rulin0 is based on the thesisthat no one should ta>e the law into his own hands. In this sense the stipulation isle0ally vulnerable. %ermittin0 the use of un3uali4ed force to repossess the propertyand without condition of notice upon the lessee is frau0ht with dan0erouspossibilities. uch a broad stipulation cannot be sanctioned for the reason that itwould allow the lessorEowner to ta>e the law into his own hands and undermine thephilosophy behind the remedy of forcible entry which is to prevent breach of thepeace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respectand resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims to be his. (C$8% $&TC"%. vs. C'!6 S. . C8%$NL G.". No. *9-:, 8arch */ +++)


22/167

Nature of 'ease of Chattels

In the lease of chattels the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leasedalthou0h the lessee cannot be rec>less in the use thereof otherwise he would beresponsible for the dama0es to the lessor. In the case of 5eepney ownersEoperatorsand 5eepney drivers the former eBercise supervision and control over the latter.

The mana0ement of the business is in the owners hands. The owner as holder ofthe certi4cate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows the routeprescribed by the franchisin0 authority and the rules promul0ated as re0ards itsoperations. This relationship may be applied by analo0y to taBi ownersEoperatorsand taBi drivers. (A$"


23/167

prero0ative to terminate the lease at its eBpiration. The continuance e1ectivity andful4llment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend eBclusively upon thefree and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuin0 the payment of therentals or not completely deprivin0 the owner of any say in the matter. 8utualitydoes not obtain in such a contract of lease and no e3uality eBists between the

lessor and the lessee since the life of the contract would be dictated solely by thelessee. (6!C& vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *9:*9 8ay * +++)

&Btension of 'ease

The provisions of a contract should not be read in isolation from the rest of the

instrument but on the contrary interpreted in the li0ht of the other relatedprovisions in order to 4B the meanin0 of any of its parts. #urthermore in areciprocal contract li>e a lease the period of the lease must be deemed to havebeen a0reed upon for the bene4t of both parties absent lan0ua0e showin0 that theterm was deliberately set for the bene4t of the lessee or lessor alone. (!NI=&"ITL%HLICI$N &"=IC& INC. vs. C$ G.". No. **@+-@ Aanuary 9* +++)

Concept of Implied New 'ease

The prescriptive period for an action of reformation should be counted from thedate of eBecution of the lease contract and not from the date of eBtension of thesame. #irst $rt. */+ spea>s of an implied new lease (tacita reconduccion) whereat the end of the contract the lessee continues to en5oy the thin0 leased with theac3uiescence of the lessor so that the duration of the lease is not for the periodof the ori0inal contract but for the time established in $rticle *, and *,/.Hence if the eBtended period of lease was eBpressly a0reed upon by the partiesthen the term should be eBactly what the parties stipulated not more not less.econd even if the supposed -year eBtended lease be considered as an impliednew lease under $rt. */+ the other terms of the ori0inal contract contemplatedin said provision are only those terms which are 0ermane to the lessees ri0ht ofcontinued en5oyment of the property leased. The prescriptive period of *+ yearsprovided for in $rt. **-- for reformation of an instrument applies by operation oflaw not by the will of the parties. ("&''6&NTI" vs. '&$N


24/167

=. T"T $N< e or burial of the victim will be reco0ni2ed by the court.

Civil indemnity (eB delicto) re3uires no proof other than the fact of death of thevictim and assailants responsibility therefor.

Compensation for lost income is in the nature of dama0es and as such re3uires dueproof of the dama0es su1ered; there must be unbiased proof of the deceasedsavera0e income. (%&%'& vs. &"& G.". *-/+ #eb. +++)

The award authori2ed by criminal law as civil indemnity (eB delicto) for the o1endedparty is mandatory upon the 4ndin0 of the fact of rape; it is distinct from andshould not be denominated as moral dama0es which are based on di1erent 5uralfoundation and assessed by the court in the eBercise of sound discretion. (%&%'&vs. 8&N


25/167

Indemnity for death is presently 4Bed at %@++++.++. $s to actual dama0es. $rt.*::NCC provides that eBcept as provided by law or by stipulation one is entitledto an ade3uate compensation only for such pecuniary loss su1ered by him as hehas duly proved.

The civil liability of accused for indemnity for death and actual and moral dama0esis solidary

!nder $rt. 9+NCC eBemplary dama0es as a part of the civil liability may beimposed when the crime was committed with one or more a00ravatin0circumstances. (%&%'& vs. 6$!TIT$ G.". No. *9*,-+ $pril / +++)

$s to the matter of moral dama0es the law clearly states that one may only recovermoral dama0es if they are the proBimate result of the other partys wron0ful act oromission. Two elements are re3uired. #irst the act or omission must be the

proBimate result of the physical su1erin0 mental an0uish fri0ht serious anBietybesmirched reputation wounded feelin0s moral shoc> social humiliation andsimilar in5ury. econd the act must be wron0ful. The rule has always been thatmoral dama0es cannot be recovered from a person who has 4led a complainta0ainst another in 0ood faith.

Fhere a party is not entitled to actual or moral dama0es an award of eBemplarydama0es is li>ewise baseless.

No premium should be placed on the ri0ht to liti0ate and not every winnin0 party isentitled to an automatic 0rant of attorneys fees. The party must show that he falls

under one of the instances enumerated in $rticle +, of the Civil Code. Fhere theaward of moral and eBemplary dama0es is eliminated so must the award forattorneys fees be deleted. ("$ vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G. ". No. ***+,+ $pril@ +++)

The amount of indemnity for loss of earnin0 capacity is based on the income at thetime of death and the probable life eBpectancy of the victim. It should be stressedthat the amount recoverable is not the entire earnin0s but only that portion whichthe bene4ciaries would have received. Thus indemnity for lost income refers to the

victimQs total earnin0s minus the necessary livin0 eBpenses. (%&%'& vs. C$6$N


26/167

The court cannot rely on speculation con5ectures or 0uesswor> as to the fact andamount of dama0es. To 5ustify a 0rant of actual or compensatory dama0es it isnecessary to prove with a reasonable de0ree of certainty the actual amount of loss.

8oral dama0es may be recovered in cases involvin0 acts referred to in $rt. * NCC.

$s a rule a public oDcial may not recover dama0es for char0es of falsehood relatedto his oDcial conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actualmalice. (6$U$ A". vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *+:/ #ebruary *+ +++)

The Court can only 0rant such amount for eBpenses if they are supported byreceipts. In the absence thereof no award for actual dama0es can be 0ranted.(%&%'& vs. $'$GN G.". Nos. *@99/ #ebruary *+ +++)

The heirs are also entitled to receive a compensation for the loss of earnin0 capacityof the victim. The formula for computin0 the same as established in decided casesis as followsJ

Gross Necessary

Net &arnin0 V 'ife B $nnual 'ivin0

Capacity &Bpectancy Income &Bpenses.

(%&%'& vs.

The adverse result of an action does not ma>e the prosecution thereof wron0fulneither does it sub5ect the action to payment of dama0es. The law does not impose


27/167

a penalty to the ri0ht to liti0ate. "esort to 5udicial processes by itself is not anevidence of ill will. $s the mere act of 4lin0 criminal complaint does not ma>e thecomplainant liable for malicious prosecution. There must be proof that the suit wasperformed by le0al malice an ineBcusable intent to oppress veB annoy orhumiliate. $ contrary rule would discoura0e peaceful resources to the court and

un5ustly penali2e the eBercise of a citi2ens ri0ht to liti0ate. Fhere the action is 4ledin 0ood faith no penalty should be imposed thereon. (=I''$N!&=$ vs. !NIT&nowled0e the cause naturally calculated to produce them would ma>e

the errin0 party liable. (!NI=&"ITL # TH& &$T vs. A$


29/167

=I. C"&


30/167

"i0hts of a 8ort0a0ee

$ mort0a0e is a contract entered into in order to secure the ful4llment of a principalobli0ation. It is constituted by recordin0 the document in which it appears with theproper "e0istry of %roperty althou0h even if it is not recorded the mort0a0e isnevertheless bindin0 between the parties. Thus the only ri0ht 0ranted by law infavor of the mort0a0ee is to demand the eBecution and the recordin0 of thedocument in which the mort0a0e is formali2ed. $s a 0eneral rule the mort0a0orretains possession of the mort0a0ed property since a mort0a0e is merely a lien andtitle to the property does not pass to the mort0a0ee. However even thou0h amort0a0ee does not have possession of the property there is no impairment of hissecurity since the mort0a0e directly and immediately sub5ects the property upon

which it is imposed whoever the possessor may be to the ful4llment of theobli0ation for whose security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay hisdebt the mort0a0e creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mort0a0ewhether 5udicially or eBtra5udicially whereby the mort0a0ed property will then besold at a public auction and the proceeds therefrom 0iven to the creditor to theeBtent necessary to dischar0e the mort0a0e loan. "e0ardless of its possessor themort0a0ed property may still be sold with the prescribed formalities in the event ofthe debtorQs default in the payment of his loan obli0ation. (I$G!I""& vs. nowled0e of the a0ricultural lessee the latter shall have the ri0ht toredeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration. %rovided that the entirelandholdin0 sold must be redeemed. %rovided further that where there are two ormore a0ricultural lessees each shall be entitled to said ri0ht of redemption only to

the eBtent of the area actually cultivated by him. The ri0ht of redemption under thissection may be eBercised within two () years from the re0istration of the sale andshall have priority over any other ri0ht of le0al redemption. (%HI'6$NC" #IN$NC&vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *:@/ Aune +++)


31/167

Concurrence and %reference of Credit

$rt. - NCC provides that the claims of contractors en0a0ed in the constructionreconstruction or repair of buildin0s or other wor>s shall be preferred with respect to

the speci4c buildin0 or other immovable property constructed. However thisprovision only 4nds application when there is a concurrence of credits i.e. when thesame speci4c property of the debtor is sub5ected to the claims of several creditorsand the value of such property of the debtor is insuDcient to pay in full all thecreditors. In such a situation the 3uestion of preference will arise that is there willbe a need to determine which of the creditors will be paid ahead of the others. Thisstatutory lien should only be enforced in the conteBt of some >ind of a procedurewhere the claims of all preferred creditors may be bindin0ly ad5udicated such as ininsolvency proceedin0s. (A.'. 6&"N$"


32/167

The burden of proof in land re0istration cases is incumbent on the applicant whomust show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land appliedfor. n him also rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the land sou0htto be re0istered forms part of the public domain considerin0 that the inclusion in atitle of a part of the public domain nulli4es the title.

The declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in thepossession of her predecessorininterest for a certain period does not constitutethe wellni0h incontrovertible and conclusive evidence re3uired in landre0istration. #urther it should be noted that taB declaration by itself is notconsidered conclusive evidence of ownership in land re0istration cases. "osarioshould have substantiated her claim with clear and convincin0 evidence speci4callyshowin0 the nature of her claim. The applicant must li>ewise prove the identity ofthe land. It must be borne in mind that what de4nes a piece of land is not the si2eor area mentioned in its description but the boundaries therein laid down asenclosin0 the land and indicatin0 its limits.

Considerin0 that the writ of possession was sou0ht by "osario a0ainst persons whowere in actual possession under claim of ownership the latterQs possession raisesa disputable presumption of ownership. This unrebutted presumption militatesa0ainst the claim of "osario especially considerin0 the evidentiary rule under$rticle -9- of the Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of land such as "osariomust rely on the stren0th of his title and not on the wea>ness of the defendantQsclaim. (8$"I$N T!"?!&$ &T $'. vs. "$"I =$'&"$ G.". No. /9/* Aanuary+ +++)

&vidence of wnership

$ Torrens Certi4cate of Title covers only the land described therein to0ether withimprovements eBistin0 thereon if any nothin0 more.

True taB declarations do not prove ownership. However taB declarations can bestron0 evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period

suDcient for prescription. ($NTI$G vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *+:***Aune , +++)

Grant of TitleECon4rmation of Imperfect Title on 'ands


33/167

!nder the "e0alian doctrine all lands of the public domain belon0 to the tate andthat the tate is the source of any asserted ri0ht to ownership in land and char0edwith conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states all lands not

otherwise appearin0 to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belon0to the tate. Hence the burden of proof in overcomin0 the presumption of tateownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applyin0 for re0istration.

The applicant must also show that the land sub5ect of the application is alienable ordisposable. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a 0rant of title orcon4rmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions ofthe public domain. (6"$C&F&'' vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *+/-/ Aanuary@ +++)

"emedies $vailable to $00rieved %arty in "e0istration %roceedin0s

In land re0istration proceedin0s the rule is that whoever 4rst ac3uires title to apiece of land shall prevail. This rule refers to the date of the certi4cate of title andnot to the date of 4lin0 of the application for re0istration of title. Hence eventhou0h an applicant precedes another he may not be deemed to have priority ofri0ht to re0ister title. $s such while his application is bein0 processed an applicantis dutybound to observe vi0ilance and to ta>e care that his ri0ht or interest is duly

protected.

$n applicant for re0istration has but a oneyear period from the issuance of thedecree of re0istration in favor of another applicant within which to 3uestion thevalidity of the certi4cate of title issued pursuant to such decree. nce the oneyearperiod has lapsed the title to the land becomes indefeasible. However thea00rieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to aninnocent purchaser for value an action for reconveyance is still available. If theproperty has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value the remedyis an action for dama0es a0ainst those who employed the fraud and if the latter areinsolvent an action a0ainst the Treasurer of the %hilippines for recovery a0ainst the$ssurance #und. "eco0ni2in0 the futility of these actions a00rieved applicantssou0ht protection under the provisions of the "ules of Court by an action for revivaland eBecution of 5ud0ment. However the provisions of the "ules are merelysuppletory to special laws 0overnin0 land re0istration proceedin0s and hencecannot prevail over the latter. (H&I" # %&


34/167

GrantETransfer of #riar 'ands

In case the holder of the certi4cate shall have sold his interest in the land beforehavin0 complied with all the conditions thereof the purchaser from the holder of thecerti4cate shall be entitled to all the ri0hts of the holder of the certi4cate uponpresentin0 his assi0nment to the Chief of the 6ureau of %ublic 'ands for re0istration.In order that a transfer of the ri0hts of a holder of a certi4cate of sale of friar landsmay be le0ally e1ective it is necessary that a formal certi4cate of transfer bedrawn up and submitted to the Chief of the 6ureau of %ublic 'ands for his approvaland re0istration. The law authori2es no other way of transferrin0 the ri0hts of aholder of a certi4cate of sale of friar lands. (


35/167

named in the title. ('I8 vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *-/*@ Aanuary -+++)

Tenancy

The re3uisites of a tenancy relationship areJ (*) the parties are the landowner andthe tenant; () the sub5ect is a0ricultural land; (9) there is consent by thelandowner; (-) there is personal cultivation; and (@) there is sharin0 of harvest.

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawfullandholder who is either the owner lessee usufructuary or le0al possessor of theland and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no ri0ht to the land

sub5ect of the tenancy. (6$!TIT$ vs. $"$N&T$ G.". No. *9@,: #ebruary +++)

$ tenant is de4ned under ection @ (a) of "epublic $ct No. **:: as a person whohimself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm householdcultivates the land belon0in0 to or possessed by another with the latterQs consentfor purposes of production sharin0 the produce with the landholder under the sharetenancy system or payin0 to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable inproduce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. 6rieXy stated for

this relationship to eBist it is necessary thatJ

*. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

. The sub5ect is a0ricultural land;

9. There is consent;

-. The purpose is a0ricultural production;

@. There is personal cultivation; and

. There is sharin0 of harvests.!pon proof of the eBistence of the tenancy relationship a tenant could avail of theri0ht of redemption under "$ 9,--. This ri0ht of redemption is validly eBercisedupon compliance with the followin0 re3uirementsJ a) the redemptioner must be ana0ricultural lessee or share tenant; b) the land must have been sold by the owner toa third party without prior written notice of the sale 0iven to the lessee or lesseesand the


36/167

cultivated by the a0ricultural lessee may be redeemed; d) the ri0ht of redemptionmust be eBercised within *,+ days from notice; and e) there must be an actualtender or valid consi0nation of the entire amount which is the reasonable price ofthe land sou0ht to be redeemed. ("!%$ ". vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. ,+*:

Aanuary @ +++)

The ri0ht of tenancy attaches to the landholdin0 by operation of law. The leaseholdrelation is not eBtin0uished by the alienation or transfer of the le0al possession ofthe landholdin0. (%HI'6$NC" #IN$NC& vs. C!"T # $%%&$' G.". No. *:@/

Aune +++)

"$ 9,-- allows only one heir to succeed to the tenancy of the deceased tenant inthe order of preference prescribed by ection : of the said law. However where

the land is not cultivated by one tenant alone (predecessor of the presentclaimants) but with other tenants who are li>ewise 3uali4ed and who are related tohim this provision does not apply. Thus it can be said that the entitlement of theother possessors is not by virtue of succession to the ri0hts of a predecessorininterest but in their individual capacity as tenants therein simultaneously with anascendant.

!nder ection of "$ @/ the Comprehensive $0rarian "eform 'aw thoseentitled to the award of the land areJ Yection . ?uali4ed 6ene4ciaries W thelands covered by the C$"% shall be distributed as much as possible to landlessresidents of the same baran0ay or in the absence thereof landless residents of thesame municipality in the followin0 order of priorityJ

a.) a0ricultural lessees and share tenants

b.) re0ular farm wor>ers

c.) seasonal farmwor>ers

d.) other farmwor>ers

e.) actual tillers or occupants of public lands

f.) collective or cooperatives of the above bene4ciaries

0.) others directly wor>in0 on the land.

(G"&&N#I&'< "&$'TL C"%. vs. C$"


37/167

%referential "i0hts of Tenants under %.


38/167


39/167

C$&


40/167

IssueJ Is there a le0al basis for the award of dama0esK

HeldJ Les. The incident char0ed of "odri0o was no less than an invasion on theri0ht of Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind $rt. NCC underscores the

necessity for its inclusion in our Civil 'aw. The Code Commission stressed in nouncertain terms that the human personality be eBalted. Thus under this article theri0hts of a person are amply protected and dama0es are provided for violations of apersons di0nity personality privacy and peace of mind. #urther the violationsmentioned in this codal provision are not eBclusive but merely eBamples and do notpreclude other similar or analo0ous acts such as the one involved in this case.

%re5udicial ?uestion

CHING vs. C!"T # $%%&$'G.". No. **+,-- $pril / +++

#actsJ n +- #ebruary *:: petitioner Chin0 was char0ed before the "TC of8a>ati with four counts of estafa punishable under $rticle 9*@ par. *(b) of the"evised %enal Code in relation to %residential nown as theTrust "eceipts 'aw. n +@ 8arch *:: Chin0 to0ether with %hilippine 6loomin0

8ills Co. Inc. 4led a case before the "TC of 8anila for declaration of nullity ofdocuments and for dama0es doc>eted as Civil Case No. :+++ entitled%hilippine 6loomin0 8ills Inc. et. al. vs. $llied 6an>in0 Corporation.

n +/ $u0ust *:: Chin0 4led a petition before the "TC8a>ati for the suspensionof the criminal proceedin0s on the 0round of pre5udicial 3uestion in a civil action.aid court denied the petition to suspend.


41/167

IssueJ


42/167

Therefore the civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and for dama0esdoes not constitute a pre5udicial 3uestion to the criminal cases for estafa 4leda0ainst petitioner.

6&'T"$N vs. %&%'&

G.". No. *9/@/ Aune + +++

#actsJ %etitioner 8eynardo 6eltran sou0ht a declaration of nullity of his marria0eon the 0round of psycholo0ical incapacity before the "TC of ?C. His wife

Charmaine #eliB alle0ed that it was petitioner who abandoned the con5u0al homeand lived with a certain woman named 8ila0ros altin0. 'ater on upon complaint ofCharmaine a criminal case for concubina0e was instituted before the 8etropolitan

TC of 8>ti. City a0ainst petitioner and his paramour. %etitioner moved to defer theproceedin0s ar0uin0 that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity ofhis marria0e posed a pre5udicial 3uestion to the determination of the criminal case.

IssueJ


43/167

In a case for concubina0e the accused li>e the herein petitioner need not present a4nal 5ud0ment declarin0 his marria0e void for he can adduce evidence in thecriminal case of the nullity of his marria0e other than proof of a 4nal 5ud0mentdeclarin0 his marria0e void. $rticle -+ of the #amily Code providesJ

The absolute nullity of a previous marria0e may be invo>ed for purposes ofremarria0e on the basis solely of a 4nal 5ud0ment declarin0 such previous marria0evoid.

In of bein0 prosecuted for concubina0e.

%roperty "e0ime of !nions Fithout 8arria0e ($rt. *-, #C); upport; "etroactive$pplication of the #amily Code

T!8' vs. #&"N$N


44/167

wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in 3uestion to0etherwith 8ario. The 8TC ruled for the spouses #ernande2. !pon appeal to the "TCGuillerma alle0ed that 8ario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and thatthey ac3uired the property in 3uestion as their love nest that they lived to0ether inthe apartment buildin0 sub5ect of the e5ectment suit with their children for around

*+ years and that Guillerma administered the property by collectin0 rentals fromthe lessees of the other apartments until she discovered that 8ario deceived her asto the annulment of his marria0e. The "TC ruled that Guillerma and 8ario ac3uiredthe property durin0 their cohabitation as husband and wife althou0h without thebene4t of marria0e it concluded that Guillerma Tumlos was a coowner of thesub5ect property and could not be e5ected therefrom.

IssuesJ *.


45/167

Audicial e1ect only on $u0ust 9 *:,,.$rticle @ of the #amily Code itself limited its retroactive application only to caseswhere it thereby would not pre5udice or impair vested or ac3uired ri0hts inaccordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Hence the applicable provision is $rt. ,9 NCC which provides that asubse3uent marria0e contracted durin0 the lifetime of the 4rst spouse is ille0al and


46/167

void ab initio unless the prior marria0e is 4rst annulled or dissolved eBcept whenthe 4rst spouse (*) has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of thesecond marria0e without the spouse present havin0 news of the absentee bein0alive or () if absent for less than seven years is 0enerally considered as dead andbelieved to be so by the spouse present at the time of contractin0 such subse3uent

marria0e or (9) is presumed dead accordin0 to $rticles 9:+ and 9:*of the CivilCode. #or the eBception to apply the subse3uent marria0e must have been madein 0ood faith. $ 5udicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is notnecessary as lon0 as the prescribed period of absence is met. The marria0e underthese eBceptional cases is deemed to be valid Yuntil declared null and void by acompetent court.M In contrast under the *:,, #amily Code in order that asubse3uent bi0amous marria0e may eBceptionally be considered valid thefollowin0 conditions must concurJ (a) the prior spouse of the contractin0 party musthave been absent for four consecutive years or two years where the dan0er ofdeath under the circumstances in $rticle 9:* of the Civil Code at the time ofdisappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well founded belief that the absentspouse is already dead; and (c) there is unli>e the old rule a 5udicial declaration ofpresumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present caninstitute a summary proceedin0 in court to as> for that declaration.

In the case at bar 8ariettas 4rst husband Aames 6ounds has been absent orhad disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a secondmarria0e with Teodorico. This second marria0e havin0 been contracted durin0 there0ime of the Civil Code should thus be deemed valid notwithstandin0 the absenceof a 5udicial declaration of presumptive death of Aames 6ound. 8oreover there isno 4ndin0 that the said second marria0e was contracted in bad faith.

=alidity of 8arria0e; 8arria0e 'icense "e3uired

L vs. C!"T # $%%&$'

G.". No. */9 $pril * +++

#actsJ #ilipina y 4led a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of hermarria0e to #ernando y on the 0round of psycholo0ical incapacity. To show themanifestations of her husbands psycholo0ical incapacity she presented thefollowin0 proofsJ *) 4nal 5ud0ment rendered in her favor in her previous petitions


47/167

for separation of property and le0al separation; ) #ernandoQs inXiction of physicalviolence on her which led to the previous conviction of her husband for sli0htphysical in5uries; 9) habitual alcoholism; -) refusal to live with her without fault onher part choosin0 to live with his mistress instead; and @) refusal to have seB withher performin0 the marital act only to satisfy himself. The petition was denied.

Hence the present petition whereby #ilipina raises for the 4rst time the nullity oftheir marria0e on the 0round of the lac> of marria0e license at the time of thecelebration of the marria0e.

IssueJ Is the marria0e between #ilipina and #ernando void from the be0innin0for lac> of a marria0e license at the time of the ceremonyK

HeldJ The documents (marria0e certi4cate photocopies of birth certi4cates oftheir children marria0e license) and pleadin0s submitted by #ilipina show theincon0ruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marria0e (November*@ *:/9) and the date of the issuance of their marria0e license (eptember */*:/-). The ineluctable conclusion is that the marria0e was indeed contractedwithout a marria0e license. $ marria0e license is a formal re3uirement its absencerenders the marria0e void ab initio.

There bein0 no claim of an eBceptional character the purported marria0e between#ilipina and #ernando could not be classi4ed amon0 those eBempt from themarria0e license re3uirement.

&Bemption from 8arria0e 'icense;


48/167

in her death on $pril - *:,@. ne year and ei0ht months thereafter %epito andNorma 6adayo0 0ot married without any marria0e license. In line thereof %epitoand Norma eBecuted an aDdavit statin0 that they have lived to0ether at least 4veyears and more thus eBempt for securin0 a marria0e license. %epito died in a caraccident. $fter their fathers death petitioners 4led a petition for declaration of

nullity of the marria0e of %epito and Norma alle0in0 that said marria0e was void forlac> of marria0e license. Norma 4led a motion to dismiss on the 0round that thepetitioners have no cause of action since they are not amon0 the persons who can4le action for annulment of marria0e under $rticle -/ of the #amily Code.

IssuesJ *. Fhat nature of cohabitation is contemplated by law to warrant thecountin0 of the 4veyear period in order to eBempt the future spouses from securin0a marria0e licenseK

. en period of at least 4ve years before the marria0e. There is no dispute thatthe marria0e of petitionersQ father to respondent Norma was celebrated without anymarria0e license. In lieu thereof they eBecuted an aDdavit statin0 that they haveattained the a0e of ma5ority and bein0 unmarried have lived to0ether as husbandand wife for at least 4ve years and that we now desire to marry each other.

For>in0 on the assumption that %epito and Norma have lived to0ether as husbandand wife for 4ve years without the bene4t of marria0e that 4veyear period shouldbe computed on the basis of a cohabitation as husband and wife where the onlymissin0 factor is the special contract of marria0e to validate the union. In otherwords the 4veyear commonlaw cohabitation period which is counted bac> fromthe date of celebration of marria0e should be a period of le0al union had it notbeen for the absence of the marria0e. This @year period should be the yearsimmediately before the day of the marria0e and it should be a period of


49/167

cohabitation characteri2ed by eBclusivity R meanin0 no third party was involved atany time within the @ years and continuity R that is unbro>en. therwise if thatcontinuous @year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whetherthe parties were capacitated to marry each other durin0 the entire 4ve years thenthe law would be sanctionin0 immorality and encoura0in0 parties to have common

law relationships and placin0 them on the same footin0 with those who livedfaithfully with their spouse.

. L&. %etitioners have the personality to 4le the petition. Havin0 determinedthat the second marria0e involved in this case is not covered by the eBception tothe re3uirement of a marria0e license it is void ab initio because of the absence ofsuch element. The #amily Code is silent as to who can 4le a petition to declare thenullity of a marria0e. $ void marria0e can be attac>ed collaterally and can be3uestioned even after the death of either party. That is why the action or defense

for nullity is imprescriptible. $ny proper interested party may attac> a voidmarria0e. Contrary to the trial courtQs rulin0 the death of petitionerQs fathereBtin0uished the alle0ed marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusionis erroneous and proceeds from a wron0 premise that there was a marria0e bondthat was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marria0e was voidhence it is deemed as if it never eBisted at all and the death of either eBtin0uishednothin0.

%roperty "elations of !nions Fithout 8arria0e

$


50/167

$fter the death of Gliceria in *:, 'ucio married =icenta. In *:,+ 'ucio eBecuted awill disposin0 of all his properties to his second wife =icenta and all his children byhis 4rst and second marria0es. Fhile estate settlement proceedin0s were pendin0before the "TC petitioners instituted an action for annulment of 'ucios will. In thecomplaint petitioners alle0ed that before the marria0e of 'ucio and their mother

=icenta the two lived to0ether as husband and wife and as such ac3uiredproperties which became the sub5ect of inventory and administration in the petitionfor probate of the will. %etitioners claimed that the properties be3ueathed in 'ucioQswill are undivided civil partnership andEor con5u0al properties of 'ucio and =icenta and thus the will sou0ht to be probated should be declared void and ine1ectiveinsofar as it disposes of the ri0htful share or properties of =icenta.

The trial court favored the evidence of private respondents which indicated that thepurchase money for the contested properties came from the earnin0s of 'uciodurin0 the subsistence of his marria0e to Gliceria.

IssueJ Is =icenta a coowner with respect to \ of the properties in 3uestion or doesthe entire property belon0 to the con5u0al partnership of 'ucio and GliceriaK

HeldJ N. %etitionersQ insistence that a coownership of properties eBistedbetween 'ucio and =icenta durin0 their period of cohabitation before their marria0ein *:, is without lawful basis considerin0 that 'ucioQs marria0e with Gliceria wasthen subsistin0. The coownership in $rticle *-- of the Civil Code re3uires that theman and woman livin0 to0ether as husband and wife without the bene4t ofmarria0e must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Considerin0 that theproperty was ac3uired in *:- or while 'ucioQs marria0e with Gliceria subsistedsuch property is presumed to be con5u0al unless it be proved that it pertainseBclusively to the husband or to the wife.

In 6elcodero vs. C$ the C held that property ac3uired by a man while livin0 with acommonlaw wife durin0 the subsistence of his marria0e is con5u0al property evenwhen the property was titled in the name of the commonlaw wife. In such cases aconstructive trust is deemed to have been created by operation of $rticle *-@ ofthe Civil Code over the property which lawfully pertains to the con5u0al partnership

of the subsistin0 marria0e.In =icentaQs case it is clear that her desi0nation as a coowner of the property in the

TCT is a mista>e which needs to be recti4ed by the application of the fore0oin0provisions of $rticle *-@ and the rulin0 in 6elcodero. The principle that a trusteewho ta>es a Torrens title in his or her name cannot repudiate the trust by relyin0 onthe re0istration is a well>nown eBception to the principle of conclusiveness of acerti4cate of title.


51/167

%"%&"TL

%roperty of %ublic throu0h an alle0ed Yverbal contract of leaseMawarded in *:/+ by the National %ar>s .


52/167

6uilder in Good #aith

=&"N$ %$


53/167

HeldJ No. %etitioner spouses eBplicitly admitted in their $nswer that they hadbeen occupyin0 the sub5ect property since *:+ without ever payin0 any rental asthey only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the %ada family. Considerin0 thatthey were in possession of the sub5ect property by sheer tolerance of its ownersthey >new that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Thus

they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in 0ood faith. It is wellsettledthat both $rticle --, and $rticle @- NCC which allow full reimbursement of usefulimprovements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applyonly to a possessor in 0ood faith i.e. one who builds on land with the belief that heis the owner thereof. =erily persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheertolerance of its owners are not possessors in 0ood faith. Neither did the promise ofthe alle0ed owners that they were 0oin0 to donate the premises to petitionersconvert them into builders in 0ood faith for at the time the improvements were builton the premises such promise was not yet ful4lled i.e. it was a mere eBpectancy ofownership that may or may not be reali2ed. $s such petitioner spouses cannot besaid to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.

6uilder in 6ad #aith

I$G!I""& vs.


54/167

n the basis of the Courts decision nown reason the taBdeclaration of the parcel of land in the name of ilvino was cancelled andtransferred to &Be3uiel 6allena. 6allena secured a loan from $ntipolo "ural 6an>usin0 the taB declaration as security. omehow the taB declaration was transferred


55/167

to the name of $ntipolo "ural 6an> and later was transferred to the name ofrespondent spouses Hilario and $ndrea "obles. $ndrea secured a loan fromCardona "ural 6an> usin0 the taB declaration as security. #or failure to pay themort0a0e debt the property was foreclosed with Cardona "ural 6an> emer0in0 asthe hi0hest bidder. The ban> sold the property to spouses =er0el and "uth antos.

In ept. *:,/ petitioners discovered the mort0a0e and attempted to redeem theproperty but was unsuccessful. In *:,, the spouses antos too> possession of thepropertry and was able to secure a #ree %atent. %etitioners then 4led an action for3uietin0 of title. "espondents 3uestioned their standin0 to sue for 3uietin0 of titlecontendin0 that petitioners no lon0er have any interest to the property in 3uestiondue to the mort0a0e e1ected by Hilario and the conse3uent foreclosure thereof bythe 6an>. "espondents ar0ued that Hilario had become the absolute owner of theproperty at the time he mort0a0ed the same. The C$ ruled that the severaltransfers of the taB declaration of the property in 3uestion from ilvino until to thespouses antos had the e1ect of divestin0 petitioners of their title by prescription toHilario.

IssuesJ *.


56/167

. N. Hilario e1ected no clear and evident repudiation of the coownership. It is afundamental principle that a coowner cannot ac3uire by prescription the share ofthe other coowners absent any clear repudiation of the coownership. In order that

the title may prescribe in favor of a coowner the followin0 re3uisites must concurJ(*) the coowner has performed une3uivocal acts of repudiation amountin0 to anouster of the other coowners; () such positive acts of repudiation have been made>nown to the other coowners; and (9) the evidence thereof is clear and convincin0.In the present case Hilario did not have possession of the sub5ect property; neitherdid he eBclude the petitioners from the use and the en5oyment thereof as they hadindisputably shared in its fruits. 'i>ewise his act of enterin0 into a mort0a0econtract with the ban> cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the coownership.$s absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land he had the ri0ht to alienatehis share as he in fact did. Neither should his payment of land taBes in his nameas a0reed upon by the coowners be construed as a repudiation of the co

ownership. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount torepudiation was belied by the continued occupation and possession of the disputedproperty by the petitioners as owners.

?uietin0 of Title; 'aches; #reedom to &nter into Contracts; Faiver of "i0hts

8$&T"$


57/167

after the eBecution of said 3uitclaim or in *:,9 respondents children of the otherheirs discovered that 'ot @,/ is still in the name of the deceased spouses Chaves.

They re3uested that the property be divided and distributed to the heirs. Inresponse petitioners 4led an action for 3uietin0 of title. "espondents ar0uedamon0 others that petitioners have no standin0 to sue for the 3uietin0 of title and

that their action is barred by laches. They li>ewise assailed the validity and dueeBecution of the 3uitclaim. The trial court declared that 'ot @,/ is still commonproperty and ordered its division amon0 the heirs.

IssuesJ *.


58/167

oral partition a0reed upon by the deceased spousesQ heirs sometime before *:@.That oral a0reement was con4rmed by the notari2ed 3uitclaims eBecuted by thesaid heirs. Nevertheless respondent court was convinced that 'ot No. @,/ is stillcommon property of the heirs of the spouses Chaves because the TCT coverin0 thesaid property is still re0istered in the name of the said spouses. !nfortunately

respondent court was oblivious to the doctrine that the act of re0istration of avoluntary instrument is the operative act which conveys or a1ects re0istered landinsofar as third persons are concerned. Hence even without re0istration thecontract is still valid as between the parties. Neither a Transfer Certi4cate of Titlenor a subdivision plan is essential to the validity of an oral partition. ince the oralpartition has been duly established the notari2ed 3uitclaims con4rmed such priororal a0reement as well as the petitionersQ title of ownership over the sub5ect 'ot No.@,/. 8ore importantly independent of such oral partition the 3uitclaims in theinstant case are valid contracts of waiver of property ri0hts. The freedom to enterinto contracts such as the 3uitclaims is protected by law and the courts are not3uic> to interfere with such freedom unless the contract is contrary to law morals0ood customs public policy or public order. ?uitclaims bein0 contracts of waiverinvolve the relin3uishment of ri0hts with >nowled0e of their eBistence and intent torelin3uish them. The intent to waive ri0hts must be clearly and convincin0ly shown.8oreover when the only proof of intent is the act of a party such act should bemanifestly consistent and indicative of an intent to voluntarily relin3uish a particularri0ht such that no other reasonable eBplanation of his conduct is possible. In theinstant case the terms of the sub5ect 3uitclaims are clear; and the heirsQ si0naturesthereon have no other si0ni4cance but their conformity thereto resultin0 in a validwaiver of property ri0hts.

%reference of %ossession; wnership

C&?!&N$ vs. 6'$NT&

G. ". No. *9/:-- $pril +++


59/167

#actsJ ince *: a parcel of land was declared in the name of inforoso8endo2a father of respondent 6olante. Fhen inforoso died in *:9+ his brother8ar0arito 8endo2a father of petitioners Ce3uena and 'irio too> possession of theland and cultivated it with his son 8i0uel (brother of petitioners). $t the same timerespondent and her mother continued residin0 in the lot. Fhen respondent came of

a0e in *:-, she paid realty taBes for the years *:9*:-, and thereafter. n thebasis of an aDdavit alle0edly si0ned by respondent and her mother the taBdeclaration in the name of inforoso of the contested lot was cancelled andsubse3uently declared in the name of 8ar0arito in *:@9 who paid its realty taBesbe0innin0 *:@. Fhen 8ar0arito died 8i0uel continued cultivatin0 the land until*:,@ when he was physically ousted by the respondent.

6ased on the fore0oin0 the trial court resolved the issue of lawful ownershipand possession favor of petitioners.

IssueJ $s between the claimants who is the preferred possessor and the lawfulowner of the sub5ect parcel of landK

HeldJ "espondent is the preferred possessor and lawful owner of the disputedland.


60/167

in the concept of owner W public peaceful and uninterrupted W had already ripenedinto ownership. #urthermore she herself declared and paid realty taBes for thedisputed land. TaB receipts and declarations of ownership for taBation whencoupled with proof of actual possession of the property can be the basis of a claimfor ownership throu0h prescription. In contrast petitioners did not ac3uire

ownership despite 9 years (*:@9*:,@) of farmin0 the sub5ect land. It is settledthat ownership cannot be ac3uired by mere occupation. !nless it is hostileoccupation and use however lon0 will not confer title by prescription or adversepossession. 8oreover the petitioners cannot claim that their possession waspublic peaceful and uninterrupted. $lthou0h their father and brother ar0uablyac3uired ownership throu0h eBtraordinary prescription because of their adversepossession of 9 years this supposed ownership can not eBtend to the entiredisputed lot but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed. The taBdeclarations and receipts of petitioners are only prima facie not conclusiveevidence of ownership in the absence of actual public and adverse possession.


61/167

became the owner of the parcels of land sub5ect of the $u0. : *:,:


62/167

element of animus donandi therefore was missin0. 'i>ewise the two ed theessential element of acceptance in the proper form re3uired by law to ma>e thedonation valid. The %$ does not 3ualify as an implied acceptance by nowled0es that e a contrary construction. 8oreover it ismandated that if an acceptance is made in a separate public writin0 the notice ofacceptance must be noted not only in the document containin0 the acceptance butalso in the


63/167

=&'$?!&7 vs. C!"T # $%%&$'

G.". No. *:: #ebruary *@ +++

#actsJ The spouses Cornelio $3uino and 'eoncia de Gu2man ac3uired siB pieces ofreal properties durin0 their marria0e. They were childless and died intestate.'eoncia de Gu2man was survived by her sisters $natalia and Tran3uilina. The heirsof $natalia 4led a complaint for partition of the siB properties a0ainst the heirs ofCesario =elas3ue2 (son of Tran3uilina). In their answer the heirs of Cesario wereable to adduce uncontroverted

documentary evidences showin0 that durin0 the lifetime of the spouses $3uinothey had already disposed of four of the siB properties in favor of theirpredecessorsininterest throu0h donation or conveyance.

IssueJ nows of the acceptance bythe donee. $nd once a donation is accepted the donee becomes the absoluteowner of the property donated. The donation of the 4rst parcel made by the $3uinospouses to petitioners Aose and $nastacia =elas3ue2 who were then minors wasaccepted throu0h their father Cesario =elas3ue2 and the acceptance wasincorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it and wassi0ned by the donor and the acceptor. 'e0ally spea>in0 there was delivery andacceptance of the deed and the donation eBisted perfectly and irrevocably. Thedonation inter vivos may be revo>ed only for the reasons provided in $rticles /+/- and /@ of the Civil Code. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario=elas3ue2 and Camila de Gu2man over the third and siBth parcels includin0 aportion of the second parcel became the properties of the spouses =elas3ue2 since*:*:. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revo>ed by the nonperformanceof the marria0e and the other causes mentioned in article , of the #amily Code.

The alle0ed reason for the repudiation of the deed i.e. that the $3uino spouses didnot intend to 0ive away all their properties since $natalia ('eonciaQs sister) had


64/167

several children to support is not one of the 0rounds for revocation of donationeither inter vivos or propter nuptias althou0h the donation mi0ht be inoDcious.

%"&C"I%TIN

&"$%I vs. C!"T # $%%&$'

G.". No. *9@+ $pril , +++

#actsJ 8arcelino "ecasa was the owner of two parcels of land. Inc. ("6I) on the security of the lands in 3uestion to 4nanceimprovements on the lands. However they failed to pay the loan for which reasonthe mort0a0e was foreclosed and the lands were sold to "6I as the hi0hest bidder.ubse3uently the lands were sold by "6I to 8anuel "ata brotherinlaw of ?uiricoeraspi. It appears that "ata as owner of the property allowed ?uirico eraspi toadminister the property.

In *:/- private respondent imeon "ecasa 8arcelinos child by his third wifeta>in0 advanta0e of the illness of ?uirico eraspi forcibly entered the lands in3uestion and too> possession thereof. In *:,9 the eraspis purchased the landsfrom 8anuel "ata and afterwards 4led a complaint a0ainst imeon "ecasa for

recovery of possession of the lands.

IssuesJ *. Is the action for recovery of possession ( accion publiciana) barred byeBtinctive prescriptionK

. Has imeon ac3uired the ownership of the land by prescriptionK


65/167

HeldJ *. N. $rt. **-* NCC provides that real actions over immovables prescribeafter thirty years. #rom *:/- to $pril * *:,/ when the action was 4led onlythirteen years has elapsed.

. N. imeon has no 5ust title or not in 0ood faith to ac3uire the land by ac3uisitiveprescription. %rivate respondent could not have ac3uired ownership over theproperty throu0h occupation since under $rt. /*- of the Civil Code the ownershipof a piece of land cannot be ac3uired by occupation. Nor can he base his ownershipon succession for the property was not part of those distributed to the heirs of thethird marria0e to which private respondent belon0s. It must be remembered that inthe partition of the intestate estate of 8arcelino "ecasa the properties were dividedinto three parts each part bein0 reserved for each 0roup of heirs belon0in0 to one

of the three marria0es 8arcelino entered into. ince the contested parcels of landwere ad5udicated to the heirs of the 4rst and second marria0es it follows thatprivate respondent as heir of the third marria0e has no ri0ht over the parcels ofland. Fhile as heir to the intestate estate of his father private respondent was coowner of all of his fathers properties such coownership ri0hts were e1ectivelydissolved by the partition a0reed upon by the heirs of 8arcelino "ecasa. Neithercan private respondent claim 0ood faith in his favor. Good faith consists in thereasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thin0 wasits owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof. %rivate respondent enteredthe property without the consent of the previous owner. #or all intents andpurposes he is a mere usurper.

%rescription in $ction for "econveyance

8I''&N$ vs. C!"T # $%%&$'

G.". N. *//:/ A$N!$"L 9* +++

#actsJ In *: a parcel of land in


66/167

%otenciana. The portion owned by Gre0oria was sold to Gaudencia Aacob whoentered the same and started harvestin0 the coconuts found therein. In *: theland was passed on to Gaudencias dau0hter #elisa Aacob by virtue of aneBtra5udicial settlement. ometime in *:,* #elisa discovered that %otencianas son(#lorencio) was able to ac3uire a free patent over the entire lot includin0 the portion

ad5udicated to her. Notwithstandin0 #elisas protest 4led before the 6ureau of'ands the heirs of #lorencio sold the entire lot to $le5andro 8illena. In *:: #elisa4led a complaint a0ainst $le5andro for annulment of title and reconveyance of theportion owned by the former. "TC ordered the reconveyance of the ] portion of theland. C$ aDrmed the TC.

IssueJ Is the action for reconveyance barred by prescriptionK

HeldJ N. %rescription cannot be invo>ed in an action for reconveyance when theclaimant is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. $pparently #elisa Aacob metthe re3uisite elements of possession. he eBercised control over the parcel of landin liti0ation throu0h her careta>er. 8oreover her declaration that the land was herproperty and the payment of real property taBes manifested clearly that she was inpossession of the land. Conse3uently $le5andro may not validly invo>e prescriptionas defense a0ainst #elisa.

wnership Throu0h $c3uisitive %resciption

7/24/2019 Bar Review Mate

bar review material

Documents