bankruptcy scholars amicus brief

7/31/2019 Bankruptcy Scholars Amicus Brief

1/25

NO. 11-11071

IN RE: TOUSA, INC.

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECUREDCREDITORS OF TOUSA, INC., et al.,

PlaintiffAppellant,

v.

SENIOR TRANSEASTERN LENDERS,

DefendantsAppellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

BRIEF OFAMICI CURIAE BANKRUPTCY SCHOLARS

IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL

James B. Heaton, IIIAshley C. KellerBARTLIT BECK HERMAN PALENCHAR &SCOTT LLP54 W. Hubbard Street, Suite 300Chicago, Illinois 60654Tel: (312) 494-4400

Fax: (312) 494-4440

Counsel forAmici Curiae Bankruptcy Scholars

Case: 11-11071 Date Filed: 07/13/2011 Page: 1 of 25(390 of 503)


2/25

C-1 of 3

NO. 11-11071OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF TOUSA, INC.

v.SENIOR TRANSEASTERN LENDERS

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS, CORPORATE

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT, AND STATEMENT PURSUANT TO

FRAP 29(c)(5)

Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rules 26.1-1, 26.1-2, and 26.1-3, counsel

for amici hereby certifies that the following additional persons not listed in the

parties statements of interested persons have an interest in the outcome of this

case:

1. Baird, Douglas G. (Amicus. Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished ServiceProfessor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.)

2. Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP (Counsel forAmici.)3. Block-Lieb, Susan (Amicus. Cooper Family Professor of Law,

Fordham University School of Law.)

4. Cole, G. Marcus (Amicus. Wm. Benjamin Scott and Luna M. ScottProfessor of Law, Stanford Law School.)

5. Eisenberg, Thomas (Amicus. Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law,Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University.)

6. Gabel, Jessica (Amicus. Assistant Professor, Georgia State UniversityCollege of Law.)



3/25

C-2 of 3

NO. 11-11071OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF TOUSA, INC.

v.SENIOR TRANSEASTERN LENDERS

7. Georgakopoulos, Nicholas L. (Amicus. Harold R. Woodard Professorof Law, Indiana University School of Law Indianapolis.)

8. Heaton, III, James B. (Counsel forAmici. Bartlit Beck HermanPalenchar & Scott LLP.)

9. Huffman, Max (Amicus. Associate Professor of Law and DeansFellow, Indiana University School of Law Indianapolis.)

10. Kaplan, Steven N. (Amicus. Neubauer Family Professor ofEntrepreneurship and Finance, The University of Chicago Booth

School of Business.)

11. Keller, Ashley C. (Counsel forAmici. Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar& Scott LLP.)

12. Levitin, Adam J. (Amicus. Associate Professor of Law, GeorgetownUniversity Law Center.)

13. Lipson, Jonathan C. (Amicus. Foley & Lardner Professor of Law,University of Wisconsin Law School.)

14. Morrison, Edward R. (Amicus. Harvey R. Miller Professor of Lawand Economics at Columbia Law School.)



4/25



5/25

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS, CORPORATEDISCLOSURE STATEMENT, AND STATEMENT PURSUANT TOFRAP 29(c)(5) ........................................................................................................C-1TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... iTABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iiINTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OFAMICI.....................................................1ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 4

I. The District Court assumed that an opportunity to avoidbankruptcy constitutes reasonably equivalent value as a matterof law. ....................................................................................................4

II. A decrease in the odds of bankruptcy does not necessarilyjustify all transfers, no matter how large. ..............................................6

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................12CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a) ...................................... 14CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................15SERVICE LIST ........................................................................................................16



6/25

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASESIn re AppliedTheory Corp.,

330 B.R. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ........................................................................9

In re Investors Funding Corp. of New York Sec. Litig.,523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ..................................................................2

In re Rodriguez,895 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1990) .......................................................................11

Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Image Worldwide, Ltd.),139 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 1998) .................................................................... 9, 10

Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc.

(In re R.M.L., Inc.),92 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1996) ..........................................................................8, 9

Mukamal v. Bakes,378 F. Appx. 890 (11th Cir. 2010) ...............................................................12

Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co.,786 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1986) ......................................................................... 12

Rubin v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co.,661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981) ................................................................... 10, 11

Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP,906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006) .......................................................................12

STATUTES11 U.S.C. 548 ......................................................................................................4, 5

11 U.S.C. 548(d)(2)(A) ...........................................................................................9

OTHER AUTHORITIESGregor Andrade and Steven N. Kaplan,How Costly Is Financial (Not

Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions

That Become Distressed,53 J.FIN.1443 (1998) ..................................................................................6, 7



7/25

iii

J.B. Heaton,Deepening Insolvency,30IOWA J.CORP.L.465 (2005) .....................................................................13

Jerold B. Warner,Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence,32 J.FIN.337 (1977) ........................................................................................6

John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,95 COLUM.L.REV. 1343 (1995) ...................................................................... 2

Lawrence A. Weiss,Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation ofPriority Claims,27 J.FIN.ECON. 285 (1990) ............................................................................. 6

Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of ProfessionalFees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases,

1 J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.111 (2004) .........................................................6

Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees,82 AMER.BANKR.L.J. 77 (2008) .....................................................................6

Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 10 (1986). ...........12



8/25

1

INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OFAMICI

Amici are bankruptcy scholars. Douglas A. Baird is the Harry A.

Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law at The University of Chicago

Law School. Susan Block-Lieb is the Cooper Family Professor of Law at Fordham

University School of Law. G. Marcus Cole is the Wm. Benjamin Scott and Luna

M. Scott Professor of Law at Stanford Law School. Thomas Eisenberg is the

Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences at

Cornell University. Jessica Gabel is Assistant Professor of Law at Georgia State

University College of Law. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos is the Harold R.

Woodard Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law Indianapolis.

Max Huffman is the Associate Professor of Law and Deans Fellow at Indiana

University School of Law Indianapolis. Steven N. Kaplan is the Neubauer

Family Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at The University of Chicago

Booth School of Business. Adam J. Levitin is the Associate Professor of Law at

Georgetown University Law Center. Jonathan C. Lipson is the Foley & Lardner

Professor of Law at University of Wisconsin Law School. Edward R. Morrison is

the Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law and Economics at Columbia Law School.

Arnold S. Rosenberg is the Assistant Dean and Director, Graduate Program in

International Tax and Financial Services at Thomas Jefferson School of Law.

George G. Triantis is the Eli Goldston Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.



9/25

2

Amici submit this brief to address the District Courts holding that an

opportunity to avoid default, to facilitate the enterprises rehabilitation, and to

avoid bankruptcy necessarily constitutes reasonably equivalent value to a debtor

alleged to have made a fraudulent transfer. (District Court Opinion (Dist. Op.) at

73.) The District Courts holding is incorrect because it rests on the implicit

premise that the costs of bankruptcy are so high that a debtor can justify paying

any price to reduce the chance that it occurs. That premise is demonstrably false.

A corporation is not a biological entity for which it can be presumed

that any act which extends its existence is beneficial to it. In re Investors Funding

Corp. of New York Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). To think

otherwise is an anthropomorphic fallacy: Bankruptcy tends to be equated with

corporate death. In fact, however, Chapter 11 may be a far more flexible

instrument by which to rehabilitate a financially strained firm. John C. Coffee,

Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM.L.REV.

1343, 1458 (1995). The question whether the chance to avoid bankruptcy is

reasonably equivalent value for a transfer of an interest of a debtor in property

must start from the premise that bankruptcy is not, so to speak, the end of the

world. While bankruptcy can be costly, empirical evidence demonstrates that the

costs of bankruptcy are not so high that a court can dispense altogether with a



10/25

3

comparison of the amount of a challenged transfer and the value of the decreased

odds of bankruptcy that the transfer may have created.

Here, the District Court concluded that the value of the transfers at

issueliens on the property of the debtorswere reasonably equivalent to the

value to the debtors of being left in a better position to remain as going concerns

than they would have been otherwise, because the opportunity to avoid default

has immense economic value, and enormous economic benefit. (Dist. Op. at

80, 85.)

The District Court pointed to no evidence that justified its conclusions

with respect to the value of the opportunity to avoid bankruptcy. By contrast, the

Bankruptcy Court recognized that the Defendants failed to carry their burden of

producing evidence of indirect benefits that were tangible and concrete, and of

quantifying the value of those benefits with reasonable precision. Not a single

expert or fact witness for Defendants has even attempted to quantify the value of

the indirect benefits they claim were received by the [debtors]. (Bankruptcy

Court Opinion (Bankr. Op.) at 145-46.)

The District Courts assumption that a debtor receives reasonably

equivalent value for any transfer that decreases its odds of bankruptcy reflects a

fundamental misunderstanding of the actual costs of the bankruptcy process. That

misunderstanding, if left uncorrected by this Court, may encourage financially



11/25

4

distressed firms to engage in fraudulent transfers in the hope that they can justify

the transfer by invoking an un-quantified opportunity to avoid bankruptcy that

the transfer purportedly created.

Therefore, amici respectfully urge the Court to require what the law

long has mandated; namely, to consider the actual value of what a debtor received

in exchange for an allegedly fraudulent transfer.

ARGUMENT

I. The District Court assumed that an opportunity to avoid bankruptcyconstitutes reasonably equivalent value as a matter of law.This appeal involves the application of the Bankruptcy Codes

fraudulent conveyance provision, 11 U.S.C. 548. In relevant part, the provision

reads:

(a) (1) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the

debtor in property incurred by the debtor, that was made orincurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of thepetition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily--

****

(B) (i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchangefor such transfer or obligation .

11 U.S.C. 548. Here, the primary transfer at issue was the grant of property liens

by a set of debtors (the Conveying Subsidiaries, Dist. Op. at 3) that facilitated a

litigation settlement by affiliated companies. (Dist. Op. at 25-26.) The liens were

an interest of the debtor in property. The District Court determined that a debtor



12/25

5

receives value within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 548 if in exchange for the

transfer, the debtor received in return the continued opportunity to financially

survive, where, without the transfer, its financial demise would [have] been all but

certain. (Dist. Op. at 74.) By the opportunity to financially survive the District

Court apparently meant the opportunity to avoid default, to facilitate the

enterprises rehabilitation, and to avoid bankruptcy . (Id. at 73.)

The District Court made no factual finding that compared the value of

the interests (i.e., the liens) that the Conveying Subsidiaries transferred, with the

value of the opportunity to financially survive. Nevertheless, the District Court

characterized the opportunity to avoid default as having immense economic

value and enormous economic benefit. (Dist. Op. at 85, 80.)

By contrast, the Bankruptcy Court made the following observations:

Not a single expert or fact witness for [appellees] has even attempted to quantify

the value of the indirect benefits they claim were received by the Conveying

Subsidiaries. (Bankr. Op. at 146.) There is no reason to believe that the

replacement of a contingent litigation liability with a massive amount of secured

debt rendered TOUSA betterable to weather the extreme downturn in the housing

market. (Id. at 108.) To the extent [the Conveying Subsidiaries] received any

value at all, it was minimal and did not come anywhere near the $403 million of

obligations they incurred collectively, or the obligations that each incurred



13/25

6

individually. (Id. at 105.) [E]ven if there were a bankruptcy [of the Conveying

Subsidiaries], [debtor in possession] financing would likely have been available.

Although such refinancing might have resulted in some fees, those fees would have

been minimal in relation to the size of the new obligations that the Conveying

Subsidiaries incurred . (Id. at 111.)

II. A decrease in the odds of bankruptcy does not necessarily justify alltransfers, no matter how large.

The District Court erred in assuming that a decrease in the odds of

bankruptcy justifies any transfer, no matter how large.

First, there is no evidence, in this case or generally, that an increased

chance of avoiding bankruptcy has immense economic value. (Dist. Op. at 85.)

Academic lawyers and economists have studied the costs that financial distress can

inflict on a corporation. The relevant literature1 tends to demonstrate that the direct

costs of bankruptcy are low, on the order of 1-3% of the market value of the firm.

Empirical estimates of the broader costs of financial distress (including, but not

1See, e.g., Jerold B. Warner,Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337(1977); Gregor Andrade and Steven N. Kaplan,How Costly Is Financial (Not

Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Become

Distressed, 53 J.FIN. 1443 (1998); Lawrence A. Weiss,Bankruptcy Resolution:Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J.FIN.ECON. 285 (1990);Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees, 82 AMER.BANKR.L.J. 77 (2008); and Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, The

Determinants of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2004).



14/25

7

limited to, the direct costs of bankruptcy) rarely exceed 10-20% of the firms

market value.2

Second, any valuation of a chance to avoid the costs of financial

distress must consider both the amount of those costs and the probability that the

transfer will avoid or reduce them. Here, for example, the Bankruptcy Court found

that the asset value of the Conveying Subsidiaries was about $1.1 billion.

Applying 20% as an estimate of the costs of financial distress would give $220

million as a potential upper limit. If the transfer reduced the chances of entering

financial distress by a third (33%), then the expected value of the costs that the

transfer would avoid is 33% x $220 million = $73.3 million, or less than 20% of

the $403 million value that the Bankruptcy Court ascribed to the value of the

transferred liens.3 (Bankr. Op. at 105.)

The District Court made no effort to determine either the cost of

financial distress to the Conveying Subsidiaries, or the reduction in the likelihood

of incurring those costs after the challenged transfer. To the contrary, the District

Court concluded that it was enough that the transaction left the Conveying

2 Andrade and Kaplan, supra note 1.

3Of course, even if the transfer reduced the chances of entering financial distress

by 100%, the value of that transfer to the Conveying Subsidiaries would be $220million, or just 55% of the value of the transferred liens.



15/25

8

Subsidiaries in a better position to remain as going concerns than they would have

been without the settlement. (Dist. Op. at 80.) That conclusion is unreliable since

it is unsupported by any factual analysis.

The District Courts approach was also inconsistent with the cases the

District Court cited to support its position. For example, the District Court relied

heavily on the often-cited opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in

Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc. (In re

R.M.L., Inc.), 92 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1996). There, the Third Circuit observed that,

so long as there is some chance that a contemplated investment will generate a

positive return at the time of the disputed transfer, we will find that value has been

conferred. Id. at 152. ButIn re R.M.L. stresses that determining reasonably

equivalent value is a two-step inquiry. First, determine if the debtor received

value. Second, determine if the value is reasonably equivalent to the transfer. Id.

at 149. Notably, the Third Circuit upheld the Bankruptcy Courts finding that

value, while it existed (satisfying the first step), was not reasonably equivalent

(failing the second step):

The bankruptcy court concluded that while a debtor reasonably might

pay $ 390,000 in fees for a real chance to obtain a $ 53 million creditfacility, the commitment letter at issue in this case was so conditionalthat it provided Intershoe with little chance, if any, to obtain the loanit sought.



16/25

9

Id. at 154. The District Court also relied onIn re AppliedTheory Corp., 330 B.R.

362 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), for the proposition that case law recognizes as reasonably

equivalent value the opportunity to facilitate [a firms] rehabilitation, and to

avoid default and bankruptcy, including even if this breathing room may have

ultimately proved to be short-lived . (Dist. Op. at 83, quoting 330 B.R. at

364.) But the District Court simply misreadIn re AppliedTheory Corp. There, the

court did not claim that the chance to avoid bankruptcy provided reasonably

equivalent value. Rather, the court applied aper se rule that a security interest

granted to secure an antecedent debt created by a cash loan constitutes reasonably

equivalent value. 330 B.R. at 363. Here, the Conveying Subsidiaries did not grant

liens to secure a present or antecedent debt of the debtor. Id. at 364 (quoting 11

U.S.C. 548(d)(2)(A)). Rather, the liens were granted to secure a loan used to pay

off the debts of a related entity, even though the Conveying Subsidiaries were not

liable for that debt.

The District Court also citedLeibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co.

(In re Image Worldwide, Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 1998) for the proposition

that cross-stream guarantees may provide reasonably equivalent value when the

transaction strengthens the viability of the corporate group . (Dist. Op. at 83,

quoting 139 F.3d at 581.) But here the District Court omitted discussion of the

most relevant portion of the Seventh Circuit opinion it cited, which recognized that



17/25

10

the indirect benefits that such cross-stream guarantees may provide to other

members of a corporate group still must be evaluated for their reasonable

equivalence to the transfer made:

On the other hand, the circumstances of this case do notfit thecircumstances when indirect benefits from a guarantee are found toconstitute reasonably equivalent value.

****

In effect, by paying off IMs debts, IW kept IM out of bankruptcy bybankrupting itself. This shift of risk from the creditors of the debtor to

the creditors of the guarantor is exactly the situation that fraudulenttransfer law seeks to avoid when applied to guarantees. Thus, whileIW received an indirect benefit from the transaction, it did not receivereasonably equivalent value.

In re Image Worldwide, Ltd., 139 F.3d. at 581-82 (emphasis added) (footnote and

citation omitted). Similarly, the District Court citedRubin v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust

Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981) for the proposition that [w]hat is key in

determining reasonable equivalency then is whether, in exchange for the transfer,

the debtor received in return the continued opportunity to financially survive,

where, without the transfer, its financial demise would [have] been all but certain.

(Dist. Op. at 74.) But the District Court ignored that part ofRubin that found the

lower courts analysis unacceptable because it failed to consider whether the

benefits received were proportionate to the transfer:

The district court did not undertake such an analysis. The courtobserved that both USN and UMO had a vital interest in inducingMHT to make loans to (National, TWO, and Propper), and it



18/25

11

stated that the issuers receipt of indirect benefits because of (their)affiliation and identity of interest with the direct recipients of theloans was receipt of fair consideration; but it did not attempt toquantify the indirect benefits to either issuer or to compare thosebenefits with the obligations assumed by the issuers under theguarantees. Without such an analysis, it was impossible for the courtto determine whether the estate of either issuer had been conserved inaccordance with the principles of [section] 67(d), and it was thereforeerror for the court to conclude that those purposes had been satisfied.

Rubin, 661 F.2d. at 993. Consistent with these cases, this Courts leading case on

reasonably equivalent value in the context of indirect benefits also teaches the need

to evaluate whether a transferor receives reasonably equivalent value when it

makes transfers to benefit a related entity:

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Domino neither directlynor indirectly benefitted from the payments it made to GECC, and thatthe payments should be voided . [T]he payments drained assets thatwould otherwise have been available to Dominos creditors withoutproviding the creditors with reasonably equivalent value in return.

In re Rodriguez, 895 F.2d 725, 729 (11th Cir. 1990). These cases stand for an

obvious proposition: One cannot reliably determine whether the value of an

opportunity to avoid bankruptcy is reasonably equivalent to the price paid to obtain

that opportunity without a careful analysis of both the costs and benefits of

bankruptcy, and the chance that the transfer will help avoid it. The District Court

performed no such careful analysis here.

Finally, the District Courts view of bankruptcy overstates its costs

while also failing to consider its potential benefits. The basic problem that



19/25

12

bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a normative matter and as a positive

matter, is that the system of individual creditor remedies may be bad for the

creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go around. Thomas H.

Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 10 (1986). [T]here is no

reason to treat bankruptcy as a bogeyman, as a fate worse than death . The

bankruptcy process probably reduces rather than increases the cost of a

financial restructuring. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786

F.2d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).

CONCLUSION

The District Courts approach risks becoming the evil twin of the now

mostly-defunct (but long-litigated) deepening insolvency theory of liability and

damages. See, e.g., Mukamal v. Bakes, 378 F. Appx 890, 900 (11th Cir. 2010)

(citing Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168, 174, 204

(Del. Ch. 2006)) (The only injury alleged in the Amended Complaint was to the

Debtors creditors as a result of Far & Wide staying in business longer and

deepening its insolvency, when it would have been in the best interest of the

creditors for Far & Wide to cease business and liquidate. Delaware law, however,

does not recognize a cause of action for deepening insolvency.), cert. denied,

No. 10-939, 2011 WL 196327 (Mar. 28, 2011). In that theory, debtors have argued

that additional debt that prolongs the life of the company is always bad. See, e.g.,



20/25



21/25



22/25



23/25

16

SERVICE LIST

Patricia A. RedmondDavid C. PollackSTEARNS WEAVER MILLER

WESSLER ALHADEFF & SITTERSON, P.A.150 West Flagler Street, Suite 220Miami, FL 33130

Lawrence S. RobbinsDonald J. RussellMichael L. WaldmanROBBINS, RUSSELL, ENGLERT, ORSECK,

UNTEREINER & SAUBER LLP

1801 K Street, NW, Suite 411Washington, DC 20006

Andrew M. LeblancAtara MillerMILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & McCLOY LLP1 Chase Manhattan PlazaNew York, NY [email protected] [email protected]

Nancy A. CopperthwaiteAKERMAN SENTERFITTSunTrust International CenterOne S.E. Third Avenue, 25th FloorMiami, FL [email protected]

Michael I. GoldbergAKERMAN SENTERFITT

Las Olas Centre II, Suite 1600350 East Las Olas BoulevardFort Lauderdale, FL [email protected]



24/25

17

Ceci Culpepper Berman, Esq.Darren D. FarfanteFOWLER WHITE BOGGS P.A.501 E. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1700Tampa, FL [email protected]@fowlerwhite.com

Thomas J. Hall, Esq.Seven RiveraCHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP30 Rockefeller PlazaNew York, NY [email protected]

[email protected]

Richard C. Prosser, Esq.STRICHTER, RIEDEL, BLAIN & PROSSER, P.A.110 E. Madison Street, Suite 200Tampa, FL [email protected]

Scott L. BaenaMatthew I. KramerJeffrey I. SnyderBILZIN SUMBERG BAENA PRICE & AXELROD LLP1450 Brickell Avenue, 23rd FloorMiami, FL [email protected]@bilzin.com

[email protected]



25/25

18

Evan D. FlaschenGregory W. NyeDaynor M. CarmanBRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLPGoodwin Square225 Asylum Street, Suite 2600Hartford, CT [email protected]@[email protected]

Stephen M. MertzFAEGRE & BENSON, LLP2200 Wells Fargo Center

90 South Seventh StreetMinneapolis, MN [email protected]


bankruptcy scholars amicus brief

Documents