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BANDUNG AND THE ORIGINS OF THIRD WORLD SOVEREIGNTY

Antony Anghie

[DRAFT-PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE WITHOUR PERMISSION]

Introduction

It is surely tempting to treat the Bandung Conference, the historical meeting of Asian and

African states in 1955, as formulating a third world vision of sovereignty in much the same

way as Westphalia articulated an idea of sovereignty that dominated thereafter in relations

among Western states. This chapter sketches out the significance of Bandung and the concept

of sovereignty that emerged from the conference. First, the chapter studies the Bandung

version of sovereignty in terms of earlier efforts of non-European states to adapt to

international law and establish themselves within that system. This version of sovereignty,

which relied on the idea of Panchsheel or the “Five Principles of Coexistence,” was devised

to protect the interests of third world states in the external realm in relation to international

affairs. It was shaped by concerns about colonialism, self-determination, and development.

Next, the chapter assesses the impact of the Bandung moment on contemporary debates and

discussions relating to sovereignty and what might be termed the third world concept of

sovereignty. While the Bandung version of sovereignty can be seen as a crucial element of

the anti-colonial campaign of the Bandung states, it also needs to be understood as adopting a

particular idea of the nation-state. In this respect, the focus is on the impact of the Bandung

version of sovereignty in the internal sphere—that is, the internal political system of third

world states. The legacy of Bandung is the creation of a series of tensions—most generally

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between external and internal sovereignty—that continue to characterize the politics of

developing states.

The Background

The origins of Bandung can be traced to African and Asian countries’ fear that they were left

out of the major deliberations at San Francisco leading to the creation of the United Nations,

and that this inaugural omission could signal their ongoing exclusion from any major role in

the management of international affairs, and this despite decolonization and the emergence of

a new global order. Many of the attendees at Bandung were not part of the United Nations.

Of the fifty states at the San Francisco conference, only twelve were from the Afro-Asian

region.1 India was present, although still a British colony. Asian and African states were

concerned that the Great Powers would dominate the system via the Security Council, and

that they would also decide many of the most crucial international questions outside the

Security Council. As Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Sir John Kotelawala asserted, in the case of

the major issues of the time (such as conflicts in Korea and Southeast Asia), “negotiations for

settlement had to be carried on outside the framework of the United Nations.”2 Tension

among the Great Powers was the source of the greatest international instability, and yet, as a

result of the veto system in the Security Council, the United Nations was severely limited in

its ability to address this fundamental issue. Nehru argued that if the United Nations proved

ineffectual, Asian states might create an Asian Federation “for their own protection against

outside aggression.”3

This chapter is dedicated to the memory of my first teacher of development politics, Herb Feith-extraordinary teacher and champion of the Third World. 1 Godfrey Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian states, (Praeger, 1966), p. 41. 2 See Amitav Acharya, `Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism and Rule Making in the Third World' (2011) 55 International Studies Quarterly, 1, p. 109. 3 Jansen, p. 42.

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Kotelawala was to play a major role in suggesting the need for an “Asian Conference”

and in boldly declaring that Ceylon “has important a part as any to play in the conduct of

Asian affairs.”4 He followed up by hosting the Colombo Conference, held in April 1954 amid

significant world events that confirmed the need for Asian countries to unite and formulate a

common strategy. The Geneva Conference on Indochina began two days prior to the opening

of the Colombo Conference, and Dien Bien Phu fell two days after it ended. Participants in

the Geneva deliberations felt the need to keep the participants at the Colombo Conference

apprised of developments, as they realized that peace in Southeast Asia would have better

prospects for success with the support of the Asian countries gathered at Colombo. Whatever

the divisions and tensions between the Asian states in Colombo—regarding alliances and

communism, to name but two challenges—the value of meeting and discussing common

conerns with other Asian states survived, and it was unanimously agreed that Indonesia

should host a Conference of Asian and African states. Auspiciously, perhaps, the India-China

agreement that embodied the principles of Panchsheel was announced while the conference

was in session.5

Sovereignty, Civilization, and Panchsheel

By the end of the nineteenth century, international law, authored by the West, had established

the doctrine that only “civilized states” were sovereign. All states that failed to meet the

criteria of civilization lacked proper sovereignty; as a consequence, virtually all the states of

Africa and Asia, including China and Japan, were regarded as not fully sovereign and thus

incapable of participating on completely equal terms in the international system and in the

making of international law. Non-European states developed different strategies to be

4 Jansen, p. 144. 5 Ibid. at p. 147.

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accepted as sovereign, civilized members of the community of nations, and these efforts are

now well documented.

Japan made extensive internal reforms to modernize along Western lines, and fought

various wars in Asia while claiming to strictly observe the laws of war—an assertion not

always shared by the victims of these conflicts.6 China, burdened and humiliated by unequal

treaties, sought to establish itself by participating in various international conferences and in

the activities of the League of Nations.7 The King of Siam employed prominent European

and American lawyers to advise him on modernizing the Thai legal system and negotiating

the termination of unequal treaties. The Latin American states, which had acquired

sovereignty much earlier, argued that they were civilized and attempted to establish a

different “standard of civilization.” Whatever the private reservations they felt about the

validity and appropriateness of the Western norms, these nations were forced to comply in

order to establish that they were civilized. Few of these states really challenged the West in

this regard, but rather sought to reconfigure their own political institutions in order to win the

ultimate prize of sovereignty. Within this historical trajectory, Bandung, in its Final

Communiqué, sought to outline a third world vision of sovereignty that was devised to

protect the interests of both the Asian and African countries and, more generally, assert their

ambition to play a role in the management of international affairs.

This vision of sovereignty and international relations was largely based on the concept

of Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Coexistence. These principles are (1) mutual respect

for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) nonaggression; (3) noninterference in internal

affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence.8

6 Masaharu Yanagihara, ‘Japan’, in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 475-500; Ibid. Kinji Akashi, ‘Japan-Europe’, p. 724-744. 7 Ibid. Shin Kawashima, ‘China’, p. 451-475; Ibid. Chi-Huang Tang, `China-Europe’, p. 701-724. 8 Jansen p. 127; See also, George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, (Cornell University Press: 1956), p.8.

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Nehru first referred to these principles as Panchsheel in September 1954, purportedly

after a meeting with Indonesian Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo, who had visited India to

persuade Nehru to participate in the conference that would become Bandung. Sastroamidjojo

had mentioned the Sukarno’s five principles, Pantja Sila, which are the foundation of the

Indonesian states: “nationalism, humanism, freedom, social justice and faith in God.”9 Nehru

responded by propounding his own version of Panchsheel, which took on a different, more

historical, and even spiritual character—not by virtue of the content of the principles, but

because the very idea of five founding principles echoed the Five Precepts (Panca-sila, from

the Sanskrit, meaning five principles) that represent the minimum moral obligation of a lay

Buddhist.10 Nehru himself appeared to take different positions about the lineage of

Panchsheel, claiming at one time that there was nothing original in the principles themselves,

and later, that the principles are “as old as our thought and culture.”11 Reference is also made

to the famous rock edicts of Asoka.12

In more legal terms, Panchsheel was the basis of relations between China and India

with regard to Tibet. These principles acquired a more elevated and profound character when

they were presented in a joint statement by Nehru and Zhou Enlai on June 28, 1954, and

asserted to be fundamental: “If these principles are applied not only between various

countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for

peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a

feeling of confidence.”13 The five principles became the basis of the agreement between India

and China, meant to alleviate tensions caused by border disputes between the two countries.

However, the origins of these principles are not especially auspicious, given that war between

9 Jansen, p. 128. 10 See e.g., Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, (Sri Lanka: Buddhist Cultural Centre, 2006). 11 Jansen, p. 129. 12 For an account of Panchsheel and its ongoing significance, see External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Panchsheel’, (2004), available at http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191_panchsheel.pdf. 13 Jansen, p. 128.

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China and India broke out in 1962, and that many Indian commentators regarded the five

principles as a “tactic aimed at relaxing vigilance in the opponent by lulling him into a sense

of false security.”14 Nevertheless, the Panchsheel has been foundational for the Non-Aligned

Movement, and was reiterated at the 1961 Belgrade Conference.

The five principles correspond to some of the most established doctrines of classic

international law as found in the UN Charter. The ideas of noninterference and mutual

respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity correspond with principles found in Article

2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial sovereignty of a

state; Article 2(7), which prohibits interference by the United Nations in matters within the

domestic jurisdiction of a state; and Article 2(1), which holds that all sovereign states are

equal.

However, the representatives at Bandung were not especially concerned about the

originality or derivation of the principles they were asserting. Their emphasis on sovereignty

and nonintervention is understandable given that Asian and African countries were just

emerging from the humiliations of colonialism. Further, they believed these principles could

be used to articulate a new vision of international relations and reform international law, now

that they could participate in numbers within the international system as equal and sovereign

states. The states attending the Conference felt strongly that they were in a unique position to

contribute to international peace and security because they were not (at least officially)

involved in the Cold War that had so powerfully dominated international relations. These

nations believed they could relieve Cold War tensions by enabling and encouraging China to

enter the international arena. Further, the Bandung states thought they could facilitate the

ongoing process of decolonization, a project that was far from complete, given the ongoing

struggles of the people in Southeast Asia and Africa.

14 Ibid.

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Given Panchsheel’s heavy emphasis on noninterference, it may seem anomalous that

the Final Communiqué also included a section on human rights and self-determination that,

among other things, “affirmed full support for the fundamental principles of Human Rights”

and took note of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is clear, however, that this

support was based on the Bandung states’ view that human rights could be used (1) to

advance the cause of self-determination and (2) to protect colonized peoples from the

colonial violence. The Bandung states viewed self-determination, the acquisition of

sovereignty, as “a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights.”15

Further, it used human rights to condemn South African apartheid. It is interesting to note

that Charles Malik, one of the drafters of the Universal Declaration, was present at the

Conference even though he did not play a prominent role.

Sovereignty, Colonialism, and the Nation-State

President Sukarno succinctly stated Bandung’s greatest achievement in his opening speech. It

was the first meeting of African-Asian states in history, and it confronted those newly

sovereign states with the question of what they stood for, both individually and collectively.

Sukarno declaimed: “We were suddenly confronted with the necessity of giving content and

meaning to our independence when it was finally attained and secured…Not material content

and meaning only, but also ethical and moral content.”16

Racism, poverty, and colonialism were the major themes of the Conference.17

Sukarno warned that colonialism could take many different forms:

15 See Communique-Part C.1; for further discussion of this approach to human rights see generally, Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 16 See note 8 above, Kahin, p. 41. 17 Ibid. at p. 12.

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I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of

Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism

has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual

physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skillful and

determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily.

Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one

which must be eradicated from the earth.

He warns not only of the dangers of neo-colonialism—that is, colonialism in the economic

rather than purely political realm—but also, foreshadowing Fanon, hints that elites within the

new nation could be agents of this force. Sukarno’s concerns were well founded, for even as

the United Nations was promoting the cause of decolonization, real power was shifting to the

Security Council—and, more broadly, in the sphere of economic relations that were so

crucial to the third world—to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.18 The

newly independent states were hardly represented in these organizations. The United Nations

preserved and created its own inequalities.

It is understandable that Bandung discussed and reinforced norms of nonintervention

and noninterference. The Bandung states were highly sensitive to the problem of outright

aggression, but also indirect pressure affecting the states.19 As Acharya argues, furthermore,

these “standard norms”—which are found in the UN Charter, as mentioned earlier—acquire a

different significance in the particular context of the concerns of the Bandung states, which

were concerned about Western economic and political pressures, the instruments of neo-

colonialism, and communist infiltration. It is notable that the Final Communiqué calls for

18 For the broad argument that the UN essentially attempted to preserve the Empire, see Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 19 Acharya, p. 411–412.

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“abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries,” a principle on which

few comment but that is radical in its implications, given that the exertion of pressure is an

essential tool of classic diplomacy. This idea that international law should prohibit “pressure”

or “coercion” emerges again in the context of the sustained but unsuccessful attempts of the

developing countries to include this in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Questions about the meaning of colonialism and the character of sovereignty emerged

in a number of different contexts. Most immediately, Bandung took place at a time of

increasing anti-colonial resistance; the British and French empires were far from willing to

relinquish their imperial power, notwithstanding the emergence of countries such as Burma,

India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The French had made their intent clear by their ongoing

fighting in Indochina, overcome only by the determination of the Viet-minh. The British

continued to battle nationalist movements in various countries, such as Kenya, with a

ferocity, the startling character of which is now made rendered vivid by recent research and

litigation in the English courts.20 Disputes relating to race and self-determination were

ongoing in Palestine, West Irian, and French North Africa. The Bandung states affirmed the

right of self-determination of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.21 The issue of

colonialism, however, emerged in a more unexpected and ambiguous form, when Kotelawala

raised the question of “communist colonialism” referring to “those satellite states under

communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe.”22 Sir John, referring to states such as

Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania, demanded, “And if we are united in our

opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet

20 Nkidi Mutua & others v. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2012] EWHC 2678 (QB) No. HQ09X02666; See generally, Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005). 21 Kahin, p. 17. 22 James Austin Copland Mackie, in Didier Millet (eds.), ‘Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity’, (2005).

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colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?”23 The Conference was thrown into

disorder. Much debate exists as to whether in raising this issue Kotelawala, who was pro-

Western in many of his views even if ardently anti-colonial, was acting as an agent for the

Western powers, who were very concerned about Bandung and what it could represent. This

view, however underestimates his strong personality and staunchly ant-communist views.

The issues of sovereignty and self-determination raised a number of unexpected and

unresolved questions and problems. For example, while the Bandung rendition of sovereignty

was crucial to the external relations of third world states, it was equally important, in

retrospect, for the internal political arrangements and identity of those states. Commenting on

the earlier Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947, Itty Abraham argues that the

following findings emerge:

The first is the absolute acceptance of the nation-state mold by all the delegates

present at the Asian Relations Conference. The Asian political entities soon to be free

were uniformly represented as states composed as national majorities joined by ethnic

or cultural minorities. …Communities marked by difference from these national

majorities were being recast as aliens and outsiders, notwithstanding their long

residence in these countries.24

Bandung did little to question this trend. Indeed, it seemed to reinforce it. Participants

at Bandung upheld not only the Western model of sovereignty, but, more specifically, a

particular idea of the nation-state, as reflected by their deliberations and approaches to crucial

questions of population and territory.

23 Mackie, p. 87. 24 Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), p. 69.

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At Bandung, the question of population and the “alliance” of populations was

important to states such as Indonesia and Thailand, which were extremely uneasy about the

presence of ethnic Chinese, many of whom had lived for many generations within their

borders but who were feared for possessing divided loyalties. Under the laws of China, which

adhered to the principle of jus sanguinis as a basis of nationality, these peoples had Chinese

nationality. Indonesia was threatened by the potential spread of communism through these

populations, as a result of which it negotiated agreements with China. Zhou Enlai agreed that

ethnic Chinese could become citizens of Indonesia, and he urged these people to obey the

laws of the countries in which they were located.25 This initiative, and other reassurances that

Zhou provided, did not completely resolve the issue, but they offered some comfort to

Thailand and Cambodia, and suggested some degree of cooperation and the success of China

and Zhou Enlai in their diplomacy at Bandung. However, this episode also demonstrates the

great uncertainty Southeast Asian states experienced as they set about the task of creating

nation-states, understood to be relatively homogenous populations that were completely loyal

to the new postindependence state.

Scholars such as Clifford Geertz have analyzed the nationalist challenges confronting

these states.26 The problem was how the “new state” could present itself as an entity that

credibly represented the interests and protected the identities of the many different ethnic

communities it now sought to govern. Even more problematically, the Western nation-state

model of the sovereign state did not always correspond with indigenous visions of

sovereignty that had prevailed in Asia for long periods of time. As Thongchai Winichakul

argues, the Thai polity of the nineteenth century had a somewhat different idea of

sovereignty, territory, and people than those held by European powers that relied on their 25 Mackie, p. 84-85; See also, Itty Abraham, ‘Bandung and State Formation in Post-colonial Asia’ in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008) pp. 48-68, 58-64. 26 See generally, Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, (New York: Basic Books, 1973) vol. 5019.

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own versions of these concepts for the crucial purposes of international negotiation and treaty

making. As Winichakul points out, when discussing negotiations between the British and

Thailand in the mid-nineteenth century: “It is evident that Siam did not lack the terminology

and concepts for dealing with the British proposals for boundaries. But considering these

definitions closely, we can see that none of them meant exactly the boundary that the British

had in mind.”27 It is not difficult to imagine how the complex misunderstandings that led to

the ongoing dispute on the Temple of Preah Vihear/Pra Viharn may have arisen.28 Asian

societies had distinctive and highly developed traditions of governance and rule prior to the

arrival of the European powers. However the embrace and adoption of the Western concept

of the nation-state that was a prerequisite for becoming a sovereign state, a goal they all

yearned to achieve, inevitably demanded a transformation of these indigenous traditions, and

not all new states were successful in making these changes without experiencing ongoing

ethnic tensions and, in some cases, long and devastating civil wars. An understanding of the

legal efforts to address these challenges involves a study not only of the doctrine of self-

determination and international law, but constitution making—an issue that inevitably

involved, for most Asian and African states, a detailed analysis of how to manage potential

racial tensions legally.29 In more extreme cases, the effect of colonialism was not to transform

existing political entities but create entirely new ones, as in the case of Indonesia.

Many of these tensions emerged in debates about the scope and application of the

doctrine of self-determination. The complexities of the issue emerged most directly in the

case of West Irian, which was a topic at Bandung. The Conference expressed its support for

27 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), p. 75. 28 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) [1962] ICJ Rep 6; Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [2013] ICJ Rep 151, p.281; Simon Chesterman, ‘The International Court of Justice in Asia: Interpreting the Temple of Preah Vihear Case’, (2015) 5 Asian Journal of International Law, 1, p.1-6. 29 See eg., William Crawley, ‘A Political Legacy of the British Empire: Power and the Parliamentary System in Post-Colonial India and Sri Lanka’, (2013) 44 Asian Affairs, 2, p. 309-311.

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Indonesia’s position against the Netherlands in the dispute over West Irian.30 It was only over

a period of time, however, that the character and the extent of those complexities unfolded.

As Mackie points out, for Indonesia, the West Irian issue was “one of the most important

items on the Bandung agenda”31 and one of the principal reasons why Indonesia had sought

to host the Conference. Indonesia claimed that West Irian was part of the state of Indonesia,

as it had been part of the Dutch East Indies, of which Indonesia was the successor state.32 The

Dutch, for strategic and other reasons, claimed that people of West Irian were of a different

ethnicity and therefore not part of Indonesia. The Dutch and Indonesia had entered into an

agreement in 1949 that dealt with this issue, but the wording was vague enough for the Dutch

to retain possession of West Irian. The Dutch then claimed to be intent on fulfilling the

requirements of Article 73 of the United Nations, and guiding the people of West Irian

toward self-determination and independence. It is hard not to see the Dutch position as

calculated opportunism that had the potential for causing great instability.33 And the

argument that ethnicity should be the basis of statehood surely would have resulted in the

destruction of almost every postcolonial Asian and African state—not least Indonesia itself,

which comprises so many different ethnicities.

This dispute, as with so many in the region, originated with the activities of the Dutch

East India Company, which, in 1660, concluded a treaty with Tidore, a small island in the

Moluccas. Under the terms of the treaty, the “Papuans, or all of their islands” were

characterized as belonging to the king of Tidore.34 The Dutch made no real attempt to control

West New Guinea—whatever the ostensible rights they acquired through treaties with

Tidore—until the twentieth century, or very close to Indonesian independence. However, it is

30 See Communique, E.2. 31 Mackie, p. 86. 32 Ibid. 33 See generally, Kalana Senaratne, ‘Internal Self-Determination: A Critical Third World Perspective’, (2013) 3 Asian Journal of International Law, 2, p. 331-332. 34 Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization: the Dutch and West New Guinea, vol. 17 (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 23.

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very uncertain as to whether these treaties could have provided any sort of title, given, as a

Dutch administrator reported, that the population of West Papua had “never heard of

Tidore.”35

A large range of arguments canvassed questions such as whether Papua was “Malay”

or “Australian” in terms of its flora and fauna, and whether the population of Papua was

racially separate from the people of Indonesia. Inevitably, while distinctions could be made in

the abstract, the Dutch themselves had treated “Indonesians” and “Papuans” as part of the

Dutch Empire in the East Indies, and it seemed merely strategic to make these distinctions

precisely when the Indonesians were claiming independence and succession to Dutch

territories in the region. The agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia providing for

the transfer of power to the new state of Indonesia left the status of West Irian unresolved—

or, rather, the subject of dispute between the two parties. Indonesia claimed it had received

sovereignty over West Irian, whereas the Netherlands claimed that its status was unresolved.

The Dutch claimed that the “people” of West Irian were entitled to “self-determination.”36

The West Irian issue was among the most sensitive discussed at Bandung. Indonesia

had been careful not to explicitly include it in the agenda, confident that other states would do

so as part of a broader discussion of the central theme of colonialism.37 Prior to Bandung, the

United Nations had refused to support Indonesia’s call for a reopening of negotiations with

the Netherlands regarding the future of West Irian. Eventually, the Conference asserted that it

“supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West-Irian” and “expressed the earnest

hope that the United Nations would assist the parties concerned in finding a peaceful solution

to the dispute.”38

35 Lijphart, p. 24. 36 See generally the range of arguments are provided by Lijphart, p. 22-35. 37 See Roeslan Abdulgani, Bandung Spirit: Moving on the Tide of History, (Prapantja, 1964), p. 110. 38 Quoted in Abdulgani, p. 113.

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This was hardly the end of the matter. The status of West Irian remained unresolved,

and the New York Agreement of 1962 created a system by which Indonesia took on the role

of “full administrative responsibility” over West Irian until such time as a referendum could

be held in 1969.39 The choice presented on this occasion was limited, as the question was

whether the people wished Indonesia’s status to be transformed from “administrator” to

“sovereign.”

Indonesia argued that the people of West Iran were too “primitive” to exercise the

right of self-determination in a conventional way;40 the conditions were such that self-

determination in the Irian context required consulting the appropriate elders. Many African

states were disturbed by this argument, which echoed classic colonial sentiment regarding

primitiveness and the backward nature of the population, which GA Resolution 1514 had

sought to eliminate. Several African states, such as Sierra Leone, questioned Indonesia’s

position that the backwardness of the people and the difficulty of the terrain justified a

procedure that was more about consultation than self-determination.41 Some African states

accused Indonesia of behaving like a colonial power and betraying the sacred principles of

Bandung.42 This episode illustrates the challenge that continues to confront many developing

countries: creating coherent and stable nation-states in the aftermath of independence. The

theme of colonialism, a central preoccupation of the Bandung states, is now taken up by

minorities and ethnic groups that regard themselves as victims of “internal colonialism,” the

violence committed by the post-colonial state.43 The communities within those states now

assert their “right to self-determination.”

39 The Dutch had proposed a plebiscite supervised by the UN after a period of UN administration; See, Michla Pomerance, ‘Methods of Self-Determination and the Argument of “Primitiveness”’, (1974) 12 Canadian Yearbook of Int’l Law, 38, p. 47. 40 Pomerance, p. 51-52; see in particular p. 55 “In West Iran there exists, as is generally known, one of the most primitive and undeveloped communities in the world…” 41 Pomerance, p. 60. 42 Pomerance, at footnote 115. 43 See e.g., Mohammad Shahabuddin, ‘Liberal Self-determination, Postcolonial Statehood, and Minorities: The Chittagong Hill Tribes in Context’, (2013) 1 Jahangirnagar University Journal of Law, p.77-96.

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Bandung and the Development State

The Bandung states were inevitably concerned with development issues, but the economic

dimensions of the conference are often overlooked.44 However, economic cooperation was

the first issue in the Final Communiqué, which began with the assertion: “The Asian African

Conference recognized the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asia-African

region.”45

The Communiqué mentioned the “general desire for economic cooperation among the

participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty.” It

was very much outward looking, emphasizing that the proposals for cooperation among

Bandung states “do not preclude either the desirability or the need for co-operation outside

the region, including the investment of foreign capital.”46 Technical assistance was requested;

the World Bank was asked to allocate a greater part of its resources to Asian and African

countries, and the Conference recommended “the early establishment of the Special United

Nations Fund for Economic Development” and “the International Finance Corporation which

should in its activities the undertaking of equity investment.”47

All this suggests that the conference attendees believed that, as in the political sphere,

the developing countries’ needs and concerns were not properly reflected in the activities of

the existing international economic institutions. However, it also demonstrates that the

conference was eager to engage in international commerce. The theme of Permanent

Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, which was to be such a prominent part of the third

44 For a good overview of this dimension of Bandung, see Helen E.S. Nesadurai, ‘Bandung and State Formation in Post-colonial Asia’, in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), Bandung Revisited: the Legacy of the 1955 Asian African Conference for International Order, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), p. 68-105. 45 Communique, Art 1. 46 Communique A., Art 1. 47 Comunique, Art 3.

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world attempt to reform the international economic system from the 1960s onward, was not

mentioned at Bandung. This is true despite the fact that early resolutions focusing on that

topic had already been passed,48 and that many of the states at Bandung were soon to be

embroiled in conflicts over nationalization: for example, Indonesia nationalized parts of the

Dutch oil industry in 1963.

The need to stabilize commodity trade was a crucial aspect of the Bandung Economic

Program. Point 5 of the Communiqué focused on this issue, calling for collective action

among members directed at stabilizing commodity prices “through bilateral and multilateral

arrangements” and for the adoption of a unified approach on this issue in international

forums, including the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on International

Commodity Trade. The Conference also called for the diversification of the export trade of

the Asian and African countries through the processing of their raw materials prior to export,

where possible. The view that commodity price stability was crucial to the economic well-

being of developing countries, for example, was a central part of the UNCTAD initiative,

which would serve as the impetus for the New International Economic Order.

All these recommendations suggest that the Bandung states, while having different

affiliations, shared several common goals. All were intent on achieving “development” and,

far from being internally oriented, regarded participation in the international economic

system as a key aspect of their program. They were far from “inward looking,” seeking

instead to engage with the international economic system.

The Bandung states adopted a moderate49 and, as in the case of the Bandung vision of

sovereignty, fairly orthodox stance. They sought to participate on more equal terms within

the existing system, rather than to transform it completely. At this stage, development policy

had not become a fierce subject of controversy, and the Bandung states, while alarmed at the

48 General Assembly Res. 626, Right to exploit freely natural wealth and resources, 7th Session, (1952). 49 Nesadurai, p. 72.

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polarization resulting from the Cold War, believed the existing system could be suitably

adjusted. However, it is most evident that the Bandung states saw no contradiction or

difficulty in articulating a vision of sovereignty that powerfully asserted the importance of

noninterference, even while seeking to further global trade and investment. Further, if we

consider the issue of sovereignty and development together, we might see the beginnings of

what might be termed “developmental sovereignty” that was primarily focused on achieving

development and attempting to use the cause of development as a substitute for nationalism.

Conclusion

The term “Eastphalia,” coined by the South Korean scholar Kim Sung Won, describes a

model of sovereignty that is evident in the practice of East Asian states. It emphasizes

noninterference in internal affairs.50 Eastphalian sovereignty resembles the Bandung model in

important respects. It is somewhat anomalous that Eastphalian sovereignty is asserted so

forcefully even when human rights has assumed such global significance, and when

European, African, and Latin American states have (albeit in different ways) subscribed to

regional arrangements that impinge significantly on their sovereignty. It is clear that the

Eastphalian model does not preclude engagement with international economic affairs. While

very unwilling to compromise what they regard as their political sovereignty—as suggested

by ongoing territorial and maritime disputes in that region, and the reluctance of the

Association of South East Asian Nations to cede sovereignty to the a regional authority—

East Asian states have been most willing to participate in international economic relations

and indeed, are seen as the model for developing states to pursue.

50 See generally, Kim Sung Won, David Fidler and Sumit Ganguly, ‘Eastphalia Rising? Asian Influence and the Fate of Human Security’ (2009) 26 World Policy Journal, 53; Tom Ginsburg, ‘Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia’, (2010) 17 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 27, p. 147.

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The East Asian model of development combines a strong state with an outward-

oriented, market-friendly economic policy. We see this dual model of sovereignty tentatively

evident even in Bandung. This model is based on the idea that a clear distinction can be made

between political and economic sovereignty. China, Japan, and the states of ASEAN are

extremely sensitive to any possible encroachment of political sovereignty, which is associated

with territorial and maritime boundaries. This is suggested by the ongoing and apparently

intractable disputes among the East Asian and Southeast Asian states regarding maritime

boundaries in the South China Sea and disputes about the ownership of various islands. At

the same time, these states have inaugurated the East Asian model of development, which

involves entering into bilateral investment treaties, free trade agreements, and the whole

panoply of international instruments that further the globalized trade and investment

strategies that these countries have embraced.

In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice affirmed the prohibition

against intervention in resounding language, as the rule “forbids all States or groups of States

to intervene, directly or indirectly, in internal or external affairs of other states.”51 The

Bandung model of sovereignty continues to animate many developing countries and shapes

their response to human rights issues and debates about humanitarian intervention. Further,

Panchsheel continues to be invoked and celebrated as a doctrine that helps ensure a stable and

peaceful world order.52 The sixtieth anniversary of the “Five Principles of Peaceful

Coexistence” was celebrated by the Chinese Government in 2014 with much pomp and

circumstance.53 Further, China and Myanmar state that these basic principles govern their

51 Case Concering Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Around Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, para. 205. 52 For an account of how the five principles affected deliberations in the United Nations, and subsequent instruments such as General Assembly Resolution No. 2625, the “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning the Friendly Relations and Co-operation of States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” see Miguel de Serpa Soares, ‘Keynote Speech at the International Colloquium on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the Development of International Law’, (2014) 13 Chinese Journal of International Law, 3, p. 481-484. 53 See Ankit Panda, “Reflecting on China’s Five Principles, 60 Years Later”, The Diplomat, (June 26, 2014).

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foreign policies, and the Chinese government asserts that the principles are “diametrically

opposed to power politics” and “transcend social systems and ideologies.”54 Human rights

continue to be a component of the modern version of the five principles, which seems to be

hold, understandably, that it is the function of the state to protect human rights while also

suggesting that no external authority can intervene in the state’s activities in that sphere—

unless, of course, the state has consented to such intervention. The Five Principles have thus

resulted in powerful vision of sovereignty that extends beyond classic Westphalian

sovereignty in its absolutism. In his classis work on Westphalian sovereignty, Leo Gross

argues that it is mediated by the doctrine that sovereign states are under an obligation to

protect minorities. No such allowance is made in the Five Principles. Indeed, many

developing countries most fear the threat from within from minorities developing their own

nationalist aspirations and claims to self-determination. The West Irian question at Bandung

presaged a complex and as yet unresolved problem.

The question also arises as to how Panchsheel resolves disputes that arise from a

conflict over the extent of territorial or maritime sovereignty. Doctrines of nonintervention

were not only formulated against the West. Old conflicts between various precolonial entities

continued through the medium of the nation-state; rivalries between the old Kingdoms of the

Thais and Khmers now emerge in battles between the nation-states of Cambodia and

Thailand. In this sense the precolonial past endured, with ancient battles being replaced

through new political entities. When these rival states claim historical title to territory or

waters, the competing claims of sovereignty are the source of the conflict. A question arises

over whether the modern language of international law can comprehend and address these

54 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml (last visited May 31, 2015); for an important collection of essays commemorating the sixtieth anniversary which reflect on the development and ongoing importance of these principles, see the 2014 publication of the Chinese Journal of International Law.

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conflicts, which originate in a time that precedes the advent of European colonialism.55 At

least in Southeast Asia, these questions prove to be extremely difficult. The great

achievements of Bandung must be celebrated, for the Bandung states could only act within

the constraints and demands of their time.56 But in examining the origins of third world

sovereignty, we might already detect the possibility that among the most lasting inheritances

of Bandung is a series of tensions that the postcolonial state still struggles to resolve. There is

a tension generated by the presence of minorities in virtually all postcolonial states. The

postcolonial state must also assert its political sovereignty even while striving to achieve

development, a project that inevitably involves a loss of control over many of the most

important aspects of economic sovereignty.57 The complex interactions between sovereignty,

colonialism, and development thus continue to unfold.

56 For a superb meditation on the legacies of Bandung and how we should understand them, see Adil Khan, “Ghostly Visitations”, in this volume. 57 For a powerful analysis of these themes, seen from the perspective of environmental sustainability, See Prasenjit Duara, The Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian Traditions and a Sustainable Future, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).