baiting the chinese dragon: sino-soviet relations after vladivostok

BAITING T H E C H I N E S E D R A G O N :

S I N O - S O V I E T R E L A T I O N S A F T E R

V L A D I V O S T O K

William deB. Mills

During Gorbachev's first year in office, Sino-Soviet political contacts and economic cooperation notably expanded. Figure 1, showing the rise in Sino-Soviet negotiating sessions between 1982 and 1987, gives one measure of how Sino-Soviet relations have improved. Nev- ertheless, Beijing maintained its longtime public stance that political relations could not be "normalized" until Moscow made substantive concessions on the security issues of Indochina, Afghanistan, and Soviet military deployments along China's northern border/

Beijing's use of public criticism to modulate the temperature of Sino- Soviet relations deprived Moscow of much of the public relations benefit it sought to gain from these very real improvements.

Apparently searching for a dramatic breakthrough, Gorbachev gave a landmark address on Soviet Asian policy on July 28, 1986, at Vladivostok, a speech replete with warmly phrased concessions and initiatives toward Asia and--in particular--toward China. 2 Remarks by Gorbachev relevant to China, listed in the Appendix, constituted a curious collection of seemingly pathbreaking steps concerning unilateral Soviet troop with- drawals from Afghanistan and Mongolia, proposals to further a Soviet- sponsored Asian collective security system, and a scattering of ideas on bilateral economic cooperation, some of which were already under discussion by the two sides. Gorbachev appears to have been probing for any opening he could find to improve relations with China at the same time as he sought to portray the Soviet Union to the rest of Asia as a cooperative potential partner.

Since Sino-Soviet relations emerged from diplomatic deep-freeze early in the 1980s, two seemingly contradictory trends have characterized dyadic interactions: incremental broadening of cultural exchanges, economic cooperation, and political contacts despite continued public Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union as a threat to Chinese security.

Gorbachev failed to resolve this contradiction with his conciliatory address at Vladivostok. Beijing's overall assessment of Soviet intentions re-

William deB. Mills is an analyst of Chinese politics for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. government.

4 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUD1ES/E4LL 1987

FIGURE 1 Sino-Soviet Talks, 1982-1987

(By Quarter)

J JJl 15

I0 r~

5 0

0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8; 9 1011121:}14151617 18192021 QUARTER

3 ) to l

ic~al

mains negative. Beijing repeatedly issued authoritative statements criticizing Soviet foreign policy in late 1986, and the number of signed commentaries in Chinese media criticizing Soviet foreign policy not only did not fall in the wake of Gorbachev's address but actually rose sharply.

Critical commentary on the Soviet Union in Chinese media had de- clined at the time of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1986, when Chinese media evinced great interest in Soviet economic and managerial reform plans. Critical commentary remained muted throughout the spring and early summer, and Beijing's initial reaction to Gorbachev's address at Vladivostok was very cautious.

In the fall, however, commentaries attacking Soviet foreign policy became notably more frequent. In addition, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's comments (usually delivered at the regular Wednesday press briefing the ministry has held in recent years) followed a similar pattern in their treatment of the Soviet Union. Figure 2, showing criticism of Soviet Asian policy by Foreign Ministry spokesmen, as well as in signed commentaries in the party daily Renmin Ribao or carried by the official news agency Xinhua in English, illustrated this shift in Beijing's overt position. Criticism dropped to a minimal level after the 27th Congress as China presumably began to evaluate the implications of Gorbachev's calls for domestic reform and his positive statements toward China in his political

MILLS 5

I MFA

FIGURE 2 Chinese Criticism of Soviet Asian Policy

O Renmin Ribao " -~,I Xinhua ---~10

tr.]

O

b J c M A M ~ J R '-~ 0 N D 3 F

DECEMBER 1985 - FEBRUARY 1987

report, only to rise sharply in the fall, as Chinese dissatisfaction with Soviet policy toward Vietnam and Afghanistan began to be bluntly reasserted once again at an authoritative level (by Chinese leaders and repeatedly in Foreign Ministry briefings).

As will be discussed later in this essay, media commentary cannot necessarily be equated with leadership perceptions. But at the very least, Figure 2 indicates that the Vladivostok initiatives not only failed to persuade Beij- ing to moderate its anti-Soviet rhetoric but actually provoked a rise in Chinese criticism. While it is theoretically conceivable that China inten- sified anti-Soviet rhetoric to conceal a step forward in relations, it is hard to imagine what advantage Moscow would have seen in going along with such a policy, for it is precisely the appearance of a movement by Beijing back to the Soviet side which seems to be of particular interest to Moscow. Thus, the abrupt stiffening of anti-Soviet rhetoric by China after the limits of the Vladivostok proposals became evident seems to be exactly the opposite effect from that Moscow hoped for.

In contrast to this sharp public Chinese line on security issues, however, Sino-Soviet cooperation in other arenas continued to broaden. Most dramatically, after several weeks of near-silence on the boundary issue following Gorbachev's address, Beijing announced in September agreement to resume boundary talks for the first time in nine years, and two businesslike sessions were held in 1987. Steady progress toward the joint economic

6 JOURNAL OFNORTHEASTASIANSTUDIES/E4LL 1987

development of the Amur River basin has also occurred since an October 1986 agreement to create a commission for this purpose and its first meeting two months later. 3

This art icle will track Sino-Soviet in teract ions flowing from the Vladivostok address in an effort to resolve the seeming contradiction between Beijing's increasing readiness to cooperate with the Soviet Union on bilateral issues even as it sharpens its anti-Soviet rhetoric on broader strategic questions.

BORDER TALKS. NORMALIZED NEGOTIATIONS

Gorbachev's seemingly offhand remark that the boundary could follow the Amur main channel evidently persuaded Beijing that it was time to resume the border talks ended in 1978. This first public Soviet offer to return territory to China suggested a Soviet readiness to compromise on an issue which Chinese propaganda had portrayed as a major area of disagreement in relations during the 1960s and 1970s. 4

Both sides endeavored to present the February 9-23, 1987, first round of renewed border talks as a businesslike engagement, in marked contrast to the secret meetings and harsh polemics of the 1970s. Chinese delegation head Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen promised upon his departure from Beijing Airport to "take an earnest and serious attitude. ''5 The obviously coordinated statements issued by each side at the end of the first round noted mutual "satisfaction" over their resumption and announced agreement to discuss the entire course of the boundary, beginning with the eastern region.

The August 7-21 second round was even more cooperative than the first, judging from the omission of "frank" from the characterization and the announcement that a working group of experts would be established to discuss delineation of the eastern frontier. 6

Although Beijing has discontinued its public needling of the Soviets on the "unequal" nature of the treaties on which their common boundary is based, the degree to which the two sides have actually come to terms remains unclear. The Chinese called for a "comprehensive and equitable [quanmian heli]" settlement of the dispute at the first round, a phrase which suggests rather more than the minor adjustments the Soviets have traditionally favored. 7 In contrast, former Vice Foreign Minister Kapitsa, who had recently transferred to become head of the Institute of Oriental Studies, described the boundary question as simply a result of"deviations" from its proper course as a result of"cer ta in natural phenomena. ''8 Such an interpretation would seem to leave little room for compromise on the ownership of strategic Heixiazi (Chimnaya and Tarabarovskiy, as well as several smaller islands) facing Khabarovsk and now under Soviet control.

M I L L S 7

Although Chinese commentary on the border issue has virtually disap- peared in recent years, discussion in the typically less-restrained pro-Chi- nese Hong Kong dailies at the time of the first round suggests that China's position may have changed little. One welcomed the talks by crowing "that the Soviet Union had finally acknowledged that its previous unreasonably stand of claiming that no border regions were in dispute was wrong . . . . It is now only too clear who was right and who was wrong in this dispute. ''9 A few days after the first round ended, another went farther, averring that China "demands to hold talks on and to deal with those occupied areas not included in the treaties. ''~~ The paper enumerated:

1. "more than 600 islands" in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, including Heixiazi, a 350 square mile land mass which "will be a test for the Soviet Union" due to its proximity to Khabarovsk, "a place of strategic importance and military significance to the Soviet Union:"

2. a region known as the 'L64 villages" area which the 1858 Aigun Treaty stipu- lated was to remain under Chinese administration in perpetuity because of its Manchu population: the paper implied this region might be negotiable, since "the area stands isolated on the northern shore of the boundary river and is located deep in Soviet territory:"

3. Manzhouli, an area at the eastern tripoint of Mongolia, the U.S.S.R., and the P.R.C. which was "invaded and occupied by the Russians in the early 20th century:"

4. an "undefined area" of over 20,000 square kilometers in the Pamirs.

These potentially troublesome issues have yet to interrupt the new mutual efforts to find a "'fair and reasonable solution" to this issue "left over from history, ''~J however. The border dispute is no longer Beijing's control rod for modulating the temperature of bilateral ties, as it was in the 1970s, when it was exploited for polemical purposes. Security issues--particularly Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia--have long since taken over this function. Indeed, the border issue has been publicly ignored in recent years.

The Slimuhts-Response Pattern

It is easy to visualize the bargaining process in Sino-Soviet relations as merely a matter of polemics, since polemics have played such an extraor- dinary role in their relations since the early 1960s. However, here is a case in which a public stimulus led rapidly to a bargaining process carried out almost totally in private--however one defines "normalization," certainly the ability to bargain in such a standard manner without either side break- ing faith and engaging in public recriminations must be part of that defini- tion.

Represented graphically in Figure 3 is the stimulus-response process

Ju l9 Z8: k e p t ZS: R6 o f f e r s + I B e i j i n 9

main ~mur -S -> ~9rees t o channel ~ a l k

JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES~FALL 1987

FIGURE 3 Boundary Talks

Feb 8: say~ Feb 19: ~_> qian + Rap i t sa C [PRC u i l l ~ a l k ] ~ > b e l i t t l e s

Learnesl~ j d i s p u t e

Feb 23: Auff 21: Round One ends o~ a _L> Round Two

ends; group c o n c i l i a t o r y S~C i o~ expe r t s

J note t o neet

_+_> 8,C

leading to the renewal of boundary negotiations. Double boxes enclose Soviet acts; single boxes--Chinese acts. The signs show whether the act preceding the sign was positive, neutral, or negative. Representing complex interstate interactions in a chart reveals response patterns, facilitating the generation of hypotheses, and underscores variations in response patterns across cases. Charting the stimulus-response process thus seems to be the logical initial step toward building a predictive model.

Even after only these initial stages in the bargaining process, the figure strongly suggests a mutual effort to make progress: a positive initiative evokes a positive response. Despite the inevitable oversimplicity of this graphic representation of a bargaining process which took place primarily in private, the figure's utility in underscoring the positive nature of the process will be evident when compared to the strikingly different processes that occurred on some other issues.

A key factor in determining the nature of Chinese responses in this case seems to be that Gorbachev's concession on the border, if taken at face value, goes beyond rhetoric to commit Moscow to give up Soviet-controlled territory. Second, Gorbachev made the offer in a nonpropagandistic manner. Combining these factors with the Chinese reaction as summarized in the chart, one can hypothesize that:

H~ = I f Moscow makes a substantive concession, Beijing will respond positively.

112 = I f Moscow makes a concession in a nonpropagandistic manner, Beijing will respond positively.

Future rounds of boundary talks will bear watching to see if the initial pattern holds as the two sides begin to deal with specifics. It is also worth

MILLS 9

noting that, judging from this public record, all Beijing offered in return for the Soviet concession was agreement to listen. Thus, even on this issue Moscow got little immediate return on its investment beyond a public relations victory, although the potential exists for a more significant longterm payoff

AFGHANISTAN." BEIJING R E J E C T S M I N O R C O N C E S S I O N S

In its initial reaction to Gorbachev's Vladivostok address, China adopted a cautiously hopeful stance in which the Afghan issue played only a minor role despite Gorbachev's apparent concession in announcing a unilateral withdrawal of six regiments.

Beijing appears to have been giving Moscow a real opportunity to prove its sincerity, turning harshly critical only as Soviet actions began to reveal how limited Gorbachev's promised concessions would be.

This reticence at authoritative levels notwithstanding, Chinese media commentary became harsher at this time:

Focusing on a Soviet military offensive which was described as being "continu- ously strengthened" and a "stubborn" Soviet insistence that several yeras would be required for a complete Soviet withdrawal, Renmin Ribao commentator Shi Zongxing wrote that "the Soviet Union's recent 'relaxation' toward the Afghan issue is unusually limited. ''~2 In a particularly harsh remark, Shi accused "the Soviet and Afghan armies" of strengthening "the military invasion of the Pakistani border areas and terrorist activities there," describing bombings in Pakistan as "the work of agents of the Soviet Union and Kabul authorities.., to force Pakistan to make concession in political negotiations."

Newly prominent international relations specialist Sai Bei reintroduced the theme of Soviet sincerity at the end of September, questioning the "Soviet Union's sincerity in its promise to coexist peacefully with the peoples in the Asia-Pacific region."~3 The theme of Soviet insincerity had figured prominently during the last period of heightened criticism of Soviet foreign policy--during January and February 1986--and its reemphasis suggested that the positive tone in relations engendered by Gorbachev's positive reference at the 27th CPSU Congress in March to the U.S.S.R.'s "great neighbor, socialist China ''~4 and by his Vladivostok address was dissipating rather than leading Sino-Soviet relations to a new stage.

As the time for the partial Soviet pullout neared, Sai Bei stressed Soviet desires to "maintain its strategic points in Afghanistan ''~5 and, on the eve of the withdrawal, noted the "insignificant" size of the projected withdrawal, the claims of "some" that new forces had already replaced those scheduled to leave, the ab- sence of any timetable for complete withdrawal, and the continuing Soviet military operations in Afghanistan.~6

Renmin Ribao's C o m m e n t a t o r - - a highly authoritative vehicle which only rarely addresses Soviet foreign policy--bluntly backed the commen-

10 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES~FALL 1987

tary the next week, '7 dismissing the partial Soviet withdrawal as a "facade" proving Moscow had "no sincerity in resolving the Afghan question." Commentator charged that the pullout "has not in the least reduced Soviet military strength in Afghanistan, neither did it show that the Soviet Union is sincere in resolving the Afghan question. It was precisely when the pullout began that the Soviet Union was stepping up its encirclement and suppression of the Afghan guerrilla forces and its barbarous act of slaugh- tering ordinary people."

Beijing had finally given its response to Gorbachev's July announcement of a partial troop withdrawal. In Beijing's eyes, Moscow had flunked the test of sincerity. As a December article concluded, "What worries the international community is the fact that there has been no apparent change in the Soviet stance on Afghanistan since Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's July 28 speech in Vladivostok? ''8

For the rest of the year and into 1987 both official and media commentary emanating from Beijing continued to accord an unusual degree of prominence to criticizing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, further demonstrating the failure of Gorbachev's initiative to impress the Chinese.'9

A December 17 year-end review accused Moscow of stepping up "armed incur- sions and terrorist sabotage operations against Pakistan" and, in another particularly somber note, saw "no change" in Moscow's "basic policy," claiming that the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan "to gain strategic advantage in the Gulf area" and would "not lightly abandon the Afghan springboard. ''2~ Al- though not new themes, neither was common in Chinese commentary on Afghanistan in 1986, nor did either appear in the 1985 year-ender. A Xinhau report on December 22 went even further, quoting diplomats in Islamabad claiming that "attempts to destabilize Pakistan are part of the long-term plans of the Soviet Union.

A high-level Chinese visit to Pakistan in December afforded another occasion for unusually pointed criticism of Moscow's role in Afghanistan. NPC Standing Committee Vice Chairman Geng Biao went beyond praising "Pakistan's prin- cipled stand" on the Afghan problem and assuring it of"China's support" to call on the Soviets to take "practical steps to show their sincerity" in a meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo. 2' At a meeting with Afghan refugees the next day, he pledged China's support against "outrageous" Soviet aggression? '22 Chi- nese media coverage of similar Chinese visits to Pakistan over the past two years had not reported such negative remarks by Chinese officials. 23

Further Soviet initiatives in early 1987 were also dismissed by China as publicity gestures. After Kabul proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire to begin on January 15, Chinese media derided it as an insincere effort to "attract the attention of the international community. ''24 In late February Beijing charged that Moscow considered control of Afghanistan essential to "its strategy of moving south to warm-water ports? '25 After the February round

M I L L S 11

of UN-sponsored indirect talks in Geneva failed to set a timetable for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, Beijing accused Moscow of pro- crastination to establish a Kabul regime that would be "nominally neutral but actually pro-Soviet "'26 Similarly, Beijing accused Moscow of holding the September 1987 round merely for propaganda purposes. 27

Beijing's response to Gorbachev's announcement of a partial troop pullout from Afghanistan thus evolved from caution to harsh denuncia- tion, with a steady series of attacks on Soviet policy appearing in China's party daily, Xinhua, and current affairs journals for several months after the October pullout. Despite a subsequent drop in the frequency of Chi- nese media critiques, Beijing continues to depict Moscow's stance on Afghanistan as insincere.

The St imulus-Response Pattern

The stimulus-response process, represented in Figure 4, is dramatically different from Chinese reaction to the boundary issue. In the Afghan case, instead of responding to a small Soviet concession with a similarly small positive move, Beijing harshly attacked these concessions as fraudulent. Almost uniformly positive Soviet moves were answered by almost uniformly negative Chinese moves, the exception being at the beginning, when an initial neutral Chinese response indicated Chinese hesitation. Moscow failed to back up its own initial concession with a further one at the August 1986 Geneva round, however, apparently losing whatever chance it may have had for eliciting a positive Chinese reaction. The con- sistently negative nature of subsequent Chinese moves indicated Beijing prefers continued fighting to a face-saving, paper agreement.

Beijing's reaction to Moscow's loudly proclaimed but suspect troop withdrawal suggests a further hypothesis:

H 3 --- I f Moscow makes a superficial concession designed to conceal continued disagreement on an issue Bei- ring defines as involving its security, Beijing will not only reject it but will intensify its anti-Soviet rhetoric.

The Chinese stance discourages further minor Soviet concessions, instead presenting Moscow with a choice between accepting continued Chi- nese opposition to its Afghan policy and making a major policy shift with implications extending far beyond Sino-Soviet relations. Beijing's hardline approach thus makes it unlikely that Moscow will significantly alter its Afghan policy for the purpose of improving relations with China.

12 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES/FALL 1987

FJul9 ZS: ][ [PRC uith- | Gorbacheu [J * I holds

It 1 ]) part ia l -S-> comment

r| pullo.t

Six So- . I RNRB c a l l s v iet regi - ~-> pullout a C - ) ~or [ CeasefireRabal ments go fraud ~roops

March: PBC blames Sept: discord [ + USSR for C- ) 8inor con-

ouev time- I S > fa i lure to cession b9 table cut I agree USSR

FIGURE 4 Afghan Pullout

I No chan~e media / C-> /in Souiet -~> c , it icism ~_,

[posit ion at JGeneua

Chinese media

c r i t i c i ze ceasefiPe

-~>

~RC media 1 * ) | terms -S- ~Soviets ~->

~nsinceee

M O N G O L I A

In his Vladivostok address, Gorbachev stated that "the question of withdrawing a considerable number of Soviet troops from Mongolia is being examined with the leadership of the Mongolian People's Republic, a statement Xinhua reported on July 28. Injecting a note of skepticism but es- chewing criticism when reporting Mongolian support for Gorbachev's remark on August 2, Xinhua noted that he had specified neither when nor how many would be withdrawn.

Late in the summer, numerous third-party indications of behind-the- scenes maneuvering suggested that Beijing's formal posture of reserve con- cealed a considerable degree of dissatisfaction over Moscow's stance on Mongolia.

When Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing held talks with his Mongolian coun- terpart Yondon, Xinhua described them as discussing "bilateral relations and some international issues, ''2s leaving it to pro-P.R.C. Hong Kong dailies to state that the talks "obviously" related to the troop issue 29 and to warn that the issue was Moscow's "first test? '3~

Sending an initial unofficial signal of Beijing's attitude, Ta Kung Pao's prominent commentator Shih Chun-yu reported on August 16 that Liu had said China hoped for a full pullout but noted that Moscow had made no such commit- ment. 3~

Making use of another time-honored Chinese method of sending unofficial signals, Deng indicated that even a complete removal of troops might not be deemed sufficient, telling a Japanese delegation that the forces could in any case be returned in a couple days since Soviet bases and facilities would remain. 32 In

MILLS 13

any case, Mongolian Foreign Minister Mangalyn Dugersuren seemed to put an end to this apparent unofficial bargaining by stating at a press conference that Gorbachev "had only promised to reduce Soviet troops in Mongolia. "33

The issue returned to Chinese media only after Moscow announced on January 15 that a division would be withdrawn by June 1987, with Xinhua promptly running a factual report but Beijing still giving no authoritative public response. Following a Moscow radio commentary beamed to China in Mandarin which concluded by describing the move as a "sincere step. � 9 conducive to improved stability and security in Asia and the world as a whole," Shih Chun-yu dismissed the pullout as "far from an adequate way to show that the Soviet Union is sincere about improving relations with China" Shih argued that while "the purpose of this withdrawal is to show that Gorbachev is sincere about improving relations with Beijing," it would amount to "only one-fifth" of the 70,000-plus Soviet force in Mongolia, and he compared it to the partial Afghan pullout.

Beijing continued officially to eschew comment, although Premier and Acting General Secretary Zhao Ziyang implied a degree of Chinese dissatisfaction on the 20th by reiterating in a meeting with visiting Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe the standard Chinese line on Sino-Soviet relations that despite improvement in economic ties "no substantial improvement" had occurred in Sino-Soviet political ties due to the three obstacles.

Moscow's portrayal of its plans for a partial pullout from Mongolia appeared consciously to be responding to standard Chinese criticism of Soviet foreign policy. Pravda lauded it as "another specific step" toward Asian security, 34 and TASS said it showed that the Soviet Union "backs up its calls [for peace] with concrete actions, ''35 both borrowing Chinese phrases�9

Beijing reacted negatively in early April when the pullout actually began, finally confirming officially and at an authoritative level the unofficial signals of the previous fall. At a press conference Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen disparaged Soviet plans for the pullout as concerning "only one division and some other small groups of troops deployed in the northern part of Mongolia, not from the Sino-Mongolian border.' '36

The Stimulus-Response Pattern

Following the pattern of Beijing's response to the Soviet announcement that it would withdraw troops from Afghanistan, Beijing suggested it had reservations about the scope of the withdrawal, becoming more explicit as Soviet troops actually began leaving. The short-term bargaining advan- tages of quietly asking for greater concessions without even approving of those already offered--and, needless to say, not offering concessions of

14

Jul9 28: Aug: 8C o f f e r s ]l § Be i j ing

pavtial Non9-I-s-Tluants f u l l l ian pullout pullout

Jan 28: [lApP - June: PRO - all 3 I -> l l pullout

obstacles re- -C- IIof Soviet main [[forces

JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES~FALL 1987

FIGURE 5 Mongolian Pullout

[[Sept: -C-> l/ 8ongolia

[[sags no

Apt 3: + qian he- -S') littles

pullout

Jan 15 : _~) Moscou -

1 div is ion ~o l eave

C-)

4-

-if>

one's own in return--are obvious, though beyond a certain point such an approach may discourage a suitor.

So far, the stimulus-response process appears to be as indicated in Figure 5. Initial similarities to the Afghan case existed: Moscow offered a concession; Beijing reacted with moderate criticism, awaiting implementation before committing itself even to a word of approval, much less a concession of its own. As implementation began, however, the Chinese line hardened in an effort to obtain the greatest possible Soviet concessions before responding. Once again, as in the Afghan case, positive moves are on the Soviet side, with Chinese responses negative or neutral.

Beijing's cautious pressuring for greater Soviet concessions without de- nouncing the ones already offered falls between the boundary and Afghan cases. Modifying Hi, it can be hypothesized that:

H 4 = I f Moscow makes a substantive concession on a security issue, Beijing will:

A. avoid rhetorical attacks; B. pressure Moscow gently for further

concessions; C. be slow to respond with concessions

of its own.

Moscow's propaganda about the significance of its Mongolian troop withdrawal does not appear to have significantly affected Beijing's response.

INDOCHINA: OBSTACLE #I

Beijing's initial response to Gorbachev's Vladivostok comments on In- dochina constituted a gentle invitation to the Soviets to fill in what Beijing saw as a blank in their list of concessions without prejudicing the atmosphere or making Beijing appear a spoilsport. The Chinese Foreign

MILLS 15

Ministry spokesman simply stated on August 6 that removal of the Cam- bodian "hot spot" was needed for Asian security. 37 Deng reportedly told a Japanese delegation that Gorbachev had done nothing to remove the obstacles, but Xinhua's August 5 report on Deng's meeting did not reprint this remark--once again sending a signal without making the type of formal statement which would risk a negative Soviet rejoinder. 38

Even as these events occurred, however, outspoken Soviet Deputy For- eign Minister and China specialist Kapitsa was holding a press conference in which he discussed several of Gorbachev's points. On the Indochina situation, Kapitsa went well beyond the cautious, friendly words of Gor- bachev, instead bluntly asserting that events in Cambodia were "irreversi- ble," a reference immediately reported by Chinese media 39 and promptly criticized by veteran international affairs commentator Tang Tianri. Tang, probably China's most prolific writer on Soviet foreign policy in the Chi- nese press over the last two years, complained that "not only did Kapitsa evade the question of Vietnam's troop withdrawal from Cambodia but he further propagated the notion that 'what has happened there is irreversi- ble.' Naturally, this is not satisfactory. ''4~

High level Sino-Soviet contacts took place during the next few days. Arkhipov, the man who had led the landmark December 1984 economic delegation to China, returned, ostensibly for medical reasons, but met top Chinese leaders. 4~ Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian met Soviet Embassy Charge d'Affaires ad Interim V.P. Fedotov on August 13. According to the Xinhua report of that meeting, Wu "stressed that what [Gorbachev] stated about some questions is still far from the removal of the three major obstacles and evades, in particular, the question of withdrawing Viet- namese troops from Kampuchea, and the Chinese side is not satisfied with this." Evidently, the Soviet diplomat was unable to rephrase Kapitsa's remark to Beijing's satisfaction.

Rather than offering Soviet concessions on the Indochina obstacle, as he did on the other two (Afghanistan and Soviet military forces along China's northern border), on Sino-Vietnamese relations, Gorbachev had only issued a bland call for bilateral talks (see Appendix). A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman gave Beijing's response in commenting on a standard call in the communique of the August Indochina Foreign Ministers' conference 42 for Sino-Vietnamese talks. The spokesman stated flatly that "so long as Vietnam refuses to give up its invasion and occupation of Kam- puchea and withdraw all its aggressive troops from Kampuchea, there is no point in holding talks. ''43

The steady hardening of Beijing's public stance on Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia reached its climax in early September when Deng Xiaoping dramatically went on U.S. television, granting an interview to Mike Wallace of "60 Minutes" in which he made clear that


reducing Soviet support for Vietnam had now been given top priority. Finally giving Beijing's response to Gorbachev's call for Sino-Vietnamese talks, Deng stated Beijing's new line, saying "the main obstacle in Sino- Soviet relations is Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia. Vietnamese troops stationed in Cambodia constitute a problem which has actually placed Sino-Soviet relations in a hot spot. Once this problem is resolved, I am willing to meet Gorbachev. ''44 Tang Tianri bluntly predicted that since Soviet support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia threatened China, pending resolution of the Cambodian issue, "Sino-Soviet relations will remain dominated by confrontation. ''45

This rhetorical peak did not, of course, terminate cooperative efforts in private. The ninth round of semiannual Sino-Soviet political consultations in fact demonstrated a small step forward on the Indochina issue, to the extent that it was publicly admitted for the first time that the subject had been discussed. 46 This represented a concession on the part of Moscow, which had for several years taken the public line that Vietnam was a "third country" whose affairs could not properly be discussed by Moscow and Beijing. However, the Chinese representative to the talks, Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, implicitly dismissed that concession, saying "so far we haven't seen any substantial change" in the Soviet position. Vice For- eign Minister Liu Shuqing echoed that view the same day in Kuala Lumpur, accusing the Soviets of being "obstinate on the Kampuchean issue."47

Soviet and Chinese lines on Indochina subsequently continued to be widely separated with little indication of progress in resolving their differences:

The Sino-Vietnamese border clash on October 19, which a pro-P.R.C. Hong Kong daily termed the first since Vladivostok 48 in a page one analysis, under- scored the seriousness with which Beijing viewed developments in Indochina. The paper bluntly blamed Moscow for the clash, saying that Vietnamese ar- rogance was tied to Soviet support, and described the clash as showing that substantial change in Sino-Soviet relations is a "remote future matter."

"When Hanoi held the Sixth Vietnamese Communist Party Congress in mid- December, the Soviet representative--Politburo member Ye. K. Ligachev-- made clear Soviet desires for improved Sino-Vietnamese relations. ''49 Xinhua noted in its report the same day that Ligachev had "reiterated that the development of Soviet-Chinese relations will never be at the expense of third countries. ''5~ Xinhua also noted that Ligachev had announced that Soviet aid to Vietnam for the 1986-90 period would double that of the previous five years, a reassertion of the primacy of Soviet-Vietnamese ties over Sino-Soviet ties whose message could not have been lost on Chinese leaders. Another pro-P.R.C. Hong Kong daily amplified, asking if Moscow "continues to supply weapons to Viet- nam" despite its call for improved Sino-Vietnamese relations, "does this not prove that the Soviet Union is merely adopting an insincere pose toward main- taining peace in Southeast Asia? "5~

MILLS 17

Beijing apparently felt the need to underscore its dissatisfaction in its own media, rather than leaving the explanations to unofficial Hong Kong sources, for the new year began with a Renmin Ribao commentary by Sai Bei harshly criticizing the Soviet daily lzvestiya for publishing an interview with Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Vo Dong Giang in which the Vietnamese official referred to "the long relationship of friendship and experience in anti-imperialist strug- gles between China and Vietnam" and called for its renewal. Sai Bei dismissed his remarks as showing "no sincerity" and accused lzvestiya of having "evaded China's position" in a "clumsy" effort to "shift the responsibility for the failure to normalize Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet relations onto China. ''52

Another Sino-Vietnamese border clash on January 7, which was followed by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's hardline explanation that China had counterattacked following Vietnamese provocations, heightened the impression given by these Chinese media criticisms of statements in the Soviet media that little progress had been achieved in narrowing Sino-Soviet differences over In- dochina in the five months since Gorbachev's speech. 53 Underscoring the point later in January when announcing the date for the boundary talks, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman took the opportunity to stress the need to remove "the three major obstacles, especially the one of Soviet support for the Viet- namese invasion of Kampuchea. T M

In March Shevardnadze toured Southeast Asia in a "peace" mission that fell flat in Chinese eyes when Shevardnadze ended up producing no substantive concessions. A RMRB commentary dismissed his trip, asserting Shevardnadze "made no attempt to accomplish anything on the Cambo- dian question. ''55

At the 10th round of semiannual Sino-Soviet political consultations in April, sensitivity over Vietnam reemerged with a clarity never before seen at that venue. The shadow over the proceedings was evident on both sides. Chinese delegation head Qian Qichen criticized Vietnamese "intrusion" during his obligatory meeting with Shevardnadze at the end of the session. 56 Pravda portrayed Shevardnadze as "striving to find compromise" but coldly noted that Qian had "set out the P.R.C.'s known approach to matters of Soviet-Chinese relations, connecting it with the conflict in In- dochina. ''57

After Vietnam launched a campaign to demonstrate flexibility on Cam- bodia in mid-1987 by accepting an Indonesian proposal for talks between the Cambodian factions and by having Phnom Penh announce a plan for "national reconciliation," Chinese leaders quickly denounced Moscow as well as Hanoi. In August talks with visiting Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi, Deng reiterated the primacy of the Vietnamese obstacle to Sino-Soviet normalization? 8 A week later, following announcement of Cambodia's reconciliation policy and subsequent Soviet voicing of support, Deng and Zhao Ziyang both criticized Soviet policy toward the region as unchanging despite the new language emanating from both capitals? 9

When the Soviet and Chinese foreign ministers held their fourth annual


meeting in New York on the eve of the fall UN General Assembly session, Beijing once again harped on Soviet policy toward Indochina, giving a caustic tone to its media treatment of a meeting that had previously been given low-keyed but positive coverage, starkly contrasting with the upbeat Soviet treatment. 6~

Hanoi's July acceptance of the Indonesian proposal for talks, which was followed in August by an ASEAN effort to change the terms of the proposed meeting in its favor, enabled Hanoi to take the diplomatic initiative. Beijing's subsequent negative tone no doubt was in part an effort to under- cut Hanoi's suddenly conciliatory image and buttress its own diplomatic position for the upcoming UN debate on Cambodia. As a Xinhua commentary warned just before the UN debate, "Vietnam has recently tried its utmost to publicize its readiness for a 'dialogue'" to "extricate itself from the pressure of world opinion. ''6~

Beyond this, however, Beijing's negative tone--unprecedented at the annual foreign ministerial meetings--fits a broader pattern since Deng's "60 Minutes" interview of repeated Chinese insistence on reiterating at every opportunity that Moscow bears responsibility for the Indochina conflict. Chinese dissatisfaction with Gorbachev's failure to lessen Soviet support for Vietnam either at or since his Vladivostok address seems to be the basic motivation for Beijing's stance.

The Stimulus-Response Pattern

The stimulus-response process from Gorbachev's vain effort to extricate Moscow from the Sino-Vietnamese dispute up to the beginning of 1987 is presented in Figure 6. Despite a complex series of formal statements, private contacts, and media commentaries, the signs demonstrate at a glance the disparity between Soviet moves--either neutral or positive--and the less forthcoming Chinese responses.

Beijing's signals varied, suggesting a willingness to listen to Soviet proposals, but repeatedly turned negative when Moscow failed to make significant concessions. China's initial neutral response to Gorbachev's neutral statement abruptly turned negative after Kapitsa's uncompromising statement. China also appears to have briefly taken a neutral stance, presumably signaling interest in seeing what Moscow had to offer, in response to Soviet willingness to discuss Vietnam at the political consultations, but when the Soviets once again, apparently, had nothing to offer, Beijing's line turned negative once more.

As it did on other security issues, Beijing offered no concessions of its own. In the case of Indochina, this was hardly surprising considering that Moscow itself conceded nothing except at the rhetorical level and in fact reinforced its ties to Hanoi by increasing aid. Nevertheless, it does suggest

MILLS 19

Jul9 28: Goebacheu o t te rs

p a r t i a l p u l l o u t

PRC u i t h - ~-> ho lds S c o m m e n t

FIGURE 6 Indochina

. u ~ ; change ~-> in SouietII~-> position at Geneva

Oct: Hou 2: ] Jan 15: Six So- + RMRB ca l l s i _~_> C e a s e s

u i e t Peg i - ~ - ) p u l l o u t al f o r Rabul ~ents 9o f raud ! tPoops

§ ~>

March: discord

over time- -~-> table cut

PRC blames USSR f o r

s to agree

Jan 7: ] PRC - a f t e r -

Uiet attack, -C -> ue attacked

hug 31: USSR favors ~_>

na t iona l r e - c o n c i l i a t i o n

Jan 21: PRC - USSR

should not a id Uietnam

Sep Z; PRC - USSR

s t a n c e same

on Uietnam

Hild Chinese media

c r i t i c i s m

Chinese ~ed ia

c r i t i c i z e ceasefire

Sept: PRC medla ~_> Minor con- _~_> terms

cession b9 S o v i e t s USSR i n s i n c e r e

H a t c h : Sheuardnadze _~_>

C-> to SE As ia , no n e u o f f e r s

S e p Z l :

Souiets are S- C-> conc i l i a t o r9 )

at ON t a l k s

S_> C

--_> C

PRC: S o v i e t FH made

no e f f o r t ~->

Sep ZI: Chinese at _ _

UN focus on -C -) Oietnam

that despite its powerful position in Indochina, Moscow is the more dissat- isfied party. The result was that by early 1987 Indochina appeared to be an even more serious obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations than it had been before Gorbachev's Vladivostok address.

The Indochina case supports H 3, which posits that Beijing will attack empty Soviet gestures. Moscow's empty gestures, such as advocating Sino- Vietnamese talks on December 29, stimulated more intense anti-Soviet Chinese rhetoric. But instances of neutral Chinese responses until Moscow clarified its position (July 28 and December 18) suggest a Chinese willingness to work for a compromise if Moscow makes a substantive concession that would indicate a genuine policy shift. Thus, the Vietnam case also gives some support to H 4, which posits that Beijing will eschew propaganda attacks in response to substantive Soviet concessions.

C O L L E C T I V E SECURITY . DEEDS, N O T WORDS

Beijing has evinced little interest in Gorbachev's proposal for "a Pacific Ocean conference along the lines of the Helsinki conference," instead re-


peatedly and authoritatively advocating practical steps to enhance security. Setting this tone clearly on August 6, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman commenting on Gorbachev's Pacific Conference proposal, ob- served that for Asian security "it is essential, first of all, to take concrete actions by greatly reducing nuclear weapons and missiles already deployed and easing the tension in the region and removing the hot spots of Afghanistan and Kampuchea." The Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterated this line in subsequent months, calling for a "drastic" reduction of Soviet missiles if Moscow were "genuinely" concerned with "peace and security in Asia ''62 and reacting to Gorbachev's speech on Asian security during his December trip to India by noting that "what are needed are practical actions to eliminate 'hot spots' in the region to maintain Asian peace and security. ''63

MINOR BILATERAL ISSUES

Beijing has also made little public reaction to several of Gorbachev's proposals specifically concerning bilateral issues. Although Ta Kung Pao termed Gorbachev's call for Sino-Soviet talks "at any time and at any level" to improve relations one of three points made by Gorbachev "at- tracting attention," authoritative Chinese reaction seemed to discount the significance of Gorbachev's offer. 64 The Foreign Ministry spokesman noted on August 6 that "China and the U.S.S.R. have already begun dialogues at a certain level, but the question is that the dialogues should be serious ones and substantive progress made." The spokesman also tersely addressed the issue of Sino-Soviet space cooperation on August 6, stating simply that that issue "remains to be studied." Yet another Gorbachev proposal, for joint construction of a railroad linking Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, has been virtually ignored in Chinese media, although a Shaanxi radio report on Oc- tober 3 did report that the Urumqi Railroad Bureau termed the construction of a railroad from Urumqi to the U.S.S.R. "essential," justify- ing it as capable of cutting freight costs 20% below the cost of shipping through the Suez Canal.

The issue of military bases in the Pacific received some media attention but, like the others, no known governmental action. Xinhua reported without comment on July 28 that Gorbachev had called for eliminating military blocs and bases in the Asia-Pacific region. Two months later a Renmin Ribao article by Sai Bei--commenting on a warning in Izvestiya of potential conflicts in the Pacific region resulting from U.S. bases there--implied that Beijing views Gorbachev's call with skepticism, asking why Izvestiya had not mentioned Moscow's "own network of bases which stretches from Vladivostok through Cam Ranh Bay to the Indian Ocean?' Sai continued that "Izvestiya exposes what the United States has done, but tries to ignore

MILLS 21

what the Soviet Union has itself done. Such an attitude can hardly convince others of the Soviet Union's sincerity in its promise to coexist peacefully with the peoples in the Asian Pacific region."

STIL4TEGIC ASSESSMENT. NO CHANGE

Beijing k Two- Track Policy

Gorbachev's Vladivostok address, which in essence signaled a Soviet intent to play a more active role in Asian affairs as an Asian power, inten- sified a trend in this direction already visible during his first year in office. Beijing's response as well remained consistent with Chinese policy during Gorbachev's first year in office: acceptance of the coexistence of cooperation and competition. ~

By the fall of 1986, Beijing had decided Gorbachev's address did not signal a fundamental shift in Soviet strategic plans. Beijing issued a number of authoritative criticisms of specific Soviet positions, and themes in Chinese media discussions of Soviet Asian policy once again began to underscore the longterm strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union, resur- recting, for example, the old theme of Soviet desires to expand southward from Afghanistan:

Reacting to an lzvestiya article describing U.S. basis in the Pacific as posing a hidden danger of conflict, Sai Bei accused the Soviet daily of ignoring the Soviet network of Asian bases and aseerbically stated that such an attitude "can hardly convince others of the Soviet Union's sincerity in its promise to coexist peacefully with the peoples in the Asian-Pacific region. ''66

Peng Di, former Xinhua bureau chief in the U.S. and currently a prominent international affairs commentator, wrote in a page one review of the world strategic situation on January 2, 1987 in the Chinese military daily, for example, that "'the Soviet Union is advancing south toward Asia and will not retreat. ''67

At a lower level but even more explicitly; an unusually blunt Radio Beijing broadcast to Korea reviewing Soviet diplomacy in 1986 described Soviet troops near China and Soviet policy toward Afghanistan and Vietnam as parts of "an attempt strategically to lay siege to China" and asserted that "the Soviet Union has not given up its attempt to obtain hegemony over the world. ''6s

Despite this negative view of Soviet strategy, Beijing allowed a broadening of Sino-Soviet contacts after Vladivostok, and it appears that this broadening of contacts will lead to further improvement in relations. The border issue has, at least for the moment, been substantially depoliticized. Joint economic development of the Amur basin has been launched. Sen- sitive political issues such as Indochina, Afghanistan, and disarmament are now being discussed with some regularity in bilateral meetings.


Analysis of the stimulus-response process as the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. bargained over Gorbachev's initiatives reveals patterns that make some sense of this apparently contradictory set of Chinese responses. As the mutually positive moves on the boundary issue indicate, the two sides are now quite capable of cooperating if they choose to; that is, domestic politics do not currently prevent either side from compromising.

However, on the key security issues, China clearly is in no hurry to reach agreement. Even on the boundary issue, China apparently conceded nothing of substance at the first round. Chinese responses on all the issues ranged between outright rejection of Soviet stimuli and neutral acceptance-never going the next logical step of responding in kind with a matching concession. The hypotheses generated from examination of the individual cases define the boundaries of likely Chinese responses. In ac- cordance with H l and H 2, the probability of evoking a positive Chinese response is low unless Moscow makes a substantive concession; in accor- dance with H3, a superficial Soviet gesture is likely to be counterproduc- tive, provoking more critical Chinese rhetoric.

While Moscow is clearly the suitor, it remains unwilling to make major changes in its policy, instead replacing the paper concessions it offered in the past (e.g., non-aggression pacts) with substantive concessions too minor significantly to affect Soviet capabilities. In sum, despite upgrading its China policy, ties to its allies still take priority in Moscow's eyes.

Beijing's unwillingness to match these minor concessions suggests that it in turn remains more concerned with obtaining a favorable resolution to the individual issues than with setting up a mutually reinforcing bargaining process leading toward a Sino-Soviet d6tente. For half a year following Gorbachev's address, Beijing did not even make concessions on the rhetorical front, instead heightening its demands in response to Soviet offers (e.g., the partial pullout from Mongolia is insufficient because the troops did not come from areas bordering on China). Beijing may feel that keep- ing at least one issue embroiled in controversy provides it with a useful means of reassuring friends and moderating the pace of normalization, but the hardline Chinese stance on this whole array of issues suggests a more profound motivation: that Beijing as well as Moscow gives higher priority to other foreign policy stances than to normalizing Sino-Soviet relations. If this preliminary pattern of post-Vladivostok events holds true, the implications for Moscow's "smile diplomacy" will be sobering, indeed: hence the importance of continuing to track the ongoing stimulus-response patterns of Sino-Soviet bargaining. While doing so, however, it is crucial that the assumptions on which the above analysis is based be kept in mind; the next section addresses that issue.

MILLS 23

Propaganda Versus Reality

It is quite rational for Beijing to oppose Moscow strategically but cooperate on judiciously selected bilateral economic programs. The less tense relations are, the less value as a bargaining tool Soviet military superiority has. ~ Limited cooperation can serve at least five goals:

1. project to the world a peaceful image: 2. lessen domestic pressures on the leadership to move away from the West by

showing Beijing can lower Sino-Soviet tensions and gain Soviet economic aid even while relying on U.S. strategic support:

3. affirm the correctness of the Dengist policy of limiting military expenditures in favor of economic growth by demonstrating that tensions are lessening;

4. give immediate benefit to China's economy: 5. encourage Moscow to make more substantive political concessions to China.

Taking advantage of these short-term benefits of cooperation with the Soviet Union in selected arenas does not preclude recognization of a longer-term threat or opposing Soviet strategic goals. Indeed, it may well enhance China's credibility on those issues where it does oppose the Soviet Union and leave China in a stronger position economically from which to do just that. Beijing's hostile reaction to the partial Soviet pullout from Afghanistan and pointed emphasis on the significance of Soviet policy toward Vietnam suggest that the perennial Chinese demand for "deeds, not words" is one the Soviets will have to come to terms with, that Beijing will not accept a papering over of disagreements, that Moscow will have to make considerably more substantive concessions than it has done so far to satsi~' Beijing's security concerns in order to achieve a marked improvement in the tone of Sino-Soviet relations.

However, it must be kept in mind that this conclusion rests on two assumptions, neither of which is beyond challenge:

I. that the dominant view from Zhongnanhai, the secluded site in Beijing from which the Chinese leadership operates, will remain constant:

2. that we can take Chinese rhetoric at face value as a valid representation of the dominant perceptions in Zhongnanhai.

The first assumption has seemed relatively safe for several years. The Dengist reform program 7~ has, despite repeated temporary retrenchments, taken tenacious hold and appears to be permanently altering China's political landscape with its emphasis on economic development under the leadership of technically competent officials with limited tenure in office and the promise of respectable retirement for officials no longer desired--all occurring within a less rigidly controlled political environment structured

24 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES~FALL 1987

by a developing legal system and informed by increasingly open debate. Granted continuation of the rapid economic growth seen over the last decade, it has seemed ever more likely that a growing popular and official consensus in favor of this program would sustain it for the foreseeable future. The harsh reaction of the leadership to the late 1986 student dem- onstrations and increasingly vocal criticisms by intellectuals of the con- straints of the Dengist reform program call into question this optimistic picture. 7~ Not only was General Secretary Hu Yaobang abruptly sacked, but perhaps more significantly the leadership responded to these calls for more relaxation of controls by tightening controls. The reform program remains in effect, and Hu's replacement was not a conservative but Premier Zhao Ziyang, Deng's other right-hand man. Nevertheless, the suddenness of these development underscores the dangers of assuming current trends in China will continue. Thirty years ago, it appeared that one could depend on the maintenance of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Thus cautioned, if we grant the assumption that Chinese policy will not change, there still remains the assumption that Chinese rhetoric represents Chinese leadership perceptions. Rhetorical attacks on Soviet foreign policy serve at least two purposes, either one of which might justify them even if they do not reflect Chinese leadership perceptions:

1. Rhetorical attacks on Soviet policy toward Vietnam and Afghanistan reassure Thailand and Pakistan of Chinese support for those two countries' opposition to Soviet policy. Similarly, Chinese rhetoric enhances China's reputation in Washington, smoothing the way for continued U.S. technical assistance and other forms of cooperation.

2. The rhetoric pressures Moscow toward further concessions on these issues in at least two ways: first, by stiffening the resolve of opponents elsewhere, it complicates Soviet efforts to gain global acceptance of its policies; second, the mere existence of such public criticism undercuts Moscow's efforts to portray Sino-Soviet relations as improving.

Thus, although Chinese rhetoric criticizing Soviet Asian policy appears to reflect genuine Chinese security concerns, it also serves other purposes and so is often temporarily muted or heightened for tactical considera- tions. Elsewhere I have discussed the price of overreliance on propaganda as a tool of foreign policy, resulting from commitments to provide rhetorical support to an ally which must be fulfilled at sensitive moments, undermining efforts to improve ties with a competitor. 72 Here we see the other side of the coin-- the value of propaganda as a foreign policy tool.

Conclusion

For the moment, the two tracks of Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union--strategic opposition and bilateral cooperat ion--run parallel. To

MILLS 25

shift the weight of Chinese policy onto the cooperative track, Moscow will probably need to make some of the fundamental changes in policy toward third countries that it has so far avoided. Raising the level and frequency of contacts and broadening the scope of issues discussed make possible improved relations but do not ensure that outcome. Greater familiarity may also expose the depth of disagreement. Indeed, the focus on Indochina at the April 1987 10th round of semiannual political consultations appears to have had precisely this effect. Moscow finally gave in to perennial Chinese demands last fall and agreed to discuss Indochina, only to see that atmosphere cooled by this contentious issue. 73

Over the long run, as Moscow becomes increasingly active in Asia and China gains both the ability and the self-confidence to deal with Moscow in an ever-broader array of venues, Moscow may come to rue the day it encouraged Chinese participation in regional affairs. If Gorbachev made a positive impression with his offer on the Amur, he appears to have pro- duced a very negative one by raising hopes with his Afghan withdrawal offer which ultimately proved insubstantial. If the Chinese now discuss disarmament with Soviet emissaries, they nevertheless continue to equate "the two superpowers" as to blame for the arms race and to demand the removal of Soviet SS-20s from Siberia. Despite the new polite Soviet propaganda depiction of the supposed common Asian security interests of "the two great socialist powers," China continues to view Soviet proposals for a security conference as a publicity stunt and to insist on the "indepen- dence" of its foreign policy. Depending on the issue, the effects of Vladivostok on Sino-Soviet relations have been both positive and nega- t i v e - b u t Beijing continues to perceive Soviet strategic intentions as threatening Chinese interests. In contrast to its spurning of Moscow in the 1970s, the Chinese dragon is now consuming Gorbachev's bait with rel- i s h - b u t so far without springing the trap Moscow has set with its depiction of common Soviet and Chinese interest in cooperating to defend world socialism.

NO TES

1. See William deB. Mills, "'Gorbachev and the Future of Sino-Soviet Relations," in Political Science Quarterly 4 (1986): 535-57, esp. 537-42 for a discussion of Sino-Soviet relations during the first year of Gorbachev's rule.

2. For the portions of Gorbachev's speech dealing with Asian policy, see Moscow TV, July 28, 1986. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report. Soviet Union (FB1S.SO~), Washington, D.C., July 29, 1986, R14-18.

3, Beijing Radio in Russian, October 23, 1986, reports the agreement; Xinhua, December 22, 1986, reports the conclusion of the committee's first meeting. This idea did not originate with the Vladivostok address. It was discussed at least as early as the December 1984 visit to China of Soviet Vice Premier Arkhipov (see Xinhua, December 28, 1984, in FBIS:CHI, December 31. 1984, CI-2).

4. After a brief, ineffective initial round of border talks in 1964, they resumed in 1969 following


large-scale border clashes and continued with little result until 1978. During that time Chinese media comment typically stressed the need to reconsider the borders established by the "unequal treaties" signed with tsarist regimes, while the Soviets tended to regard the treaties as legitimate, with the boundary line simply in need of more precise delineation at certain points. Despite indications of a private Soviet willingness to compromise on this issue in 1964 (see Xinhua, March 10, 1969) when the talks resumed in 1969, a Chinese Government statement on the boundary maintained that "the central line of the main channel" of border rivers should constitute the boundary line. See the Chinese government statement on the eve of the renewal of talks in Xinhua, October 8, 1969, in FBIS:CHI, October 9, 1969, AI-I 1.

5. Xinhua, February 8, 1987. 6. Xinhua, August 21, 1987, in FBIS:CHI, August 21, 1987, p. 3. 7. Xinhua, February 23, 1987. 8. TASS, February 19, 1987, in FB1S.'CHI, February 24, 1987, Bl. 9. Hsin Wan Pao, February 9, 1987,

10. Wen WeiPo, March 2, 1987. 11. Ban Yue Tan, no. 17 (September 10, 1987), p. 3, in FBIS.'CHI, September 23, 1987, p. 3. 12. Renmin Ribao, August 26, 1986. 13. Renmin Ribao, September 19, 1986, p. 6, in FBIS:CHI, September 30, 1986, C3. Sai Bei has

written very frequently on Soviet affairs and other issues in Renmin Ribao since mid-1986. His name appears to be a pseudonym: literally "north of the frontier," the connotation is "north of the Great Wall"--a play on the classical phrase sai wai ]outside the frontier], which meant beyond the Great Wall, i.e., in the land of the northern enemy.

14. Moscow TV, February 25, 1986, in FBIS.'SOV, February 26, 1986, 032-33, 15. Renmin Ribao, October 4, 1986, p. 7, in FBIS:CHI, October 6, 1986, A9-10. 16. Renmin Ribao, October 12, 1986, in FBIS:CHI, October 14, 1986, C3-4. 17. Renmin Ribao, November 2, 1986, in FBIS.'CHI, November 4, 1986, CI-2. The party daily's

Commentator is an official vehicle much more rarely used on foreign policy issues than signed commentaries, which purportedly represent the views of the authors.

18. Xinhua, December 6, 1986, in FBIS:CHI, December 8, 1986, FI-2. 19. Wire stories reporting events in Afghanistan, particularly anti-Soviet and anti-Kabul re-

marks by Pakistani authorities and Afghan rebels, are common in Chinese media. They appear to reflect events but are more than just reporting, for by not reporting pro-Soviet stories, they succeed in reflecting Beijing's positions. Signed commentaries, which even more closely follow the official Chinese line (and in fact often anticipate it), are markedly less frequent.

20. Renrnin Ribao overseas edition, December 17, 1986. 21. Xinhua, December 14, 1986. 22. Xinhua, December 15, 1986. 23. Xinhua, November 11, 1985. See also Xinhua's June 28, 1985 report on a trip by Defense

Minister Zhang Aiping and trips to China in August by Pakistan Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar and in September by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Rahimuddin Khan.

24. Liaowang, January 26, 1987, in FB1S:CHI, February 12, 1987, C1-2. For a report on the Kabul announcement, see Pravda, January 5, 1987,

25. Ban Yue Tan, February 25, 1987. 26. Renmin Ribao, March 21, 1987, in FB1S.CHI, March 23, 1987, A4-5. 27. Shi Zongxing, "For the Mere Purpose of Propaganda," Renmin Ribao, September 15, 1987,

p. 6, in FBIS.CHI, September 16, 1987, pp. 5-6. 28. Xinhua, August 8, 1986. 29. Hsin Wan Pao, August 10, 1986, in FBIS:CHI, August 11, 1986, W3-4. 30. Wen Wen Po, August I 1, 1986, in FBIS.CH1, August 14, 1986, W7-8. 31. Ta KungPao, August 16, 1986, in FBIS.'CHI, August 18, 1986, CI-2. 32. Kyodo, September 3, 1986, in FBIS.CHI, September 3, 1986, D1. Chinese leaders fre-

quently make controversial remarks to Japanese visitors which then appear in Japanese press reports but are omitted from the official Chinese reports.

33. Xinhua, September 4, 1986, in FBIS:CHI, September 5, 1986, AI. 34. Pravda, January 18, 1987, in FBIS:SOV, January 18, 1987, C1-2.

MILLS 27

35. TASS, January 16, 1987, in FBIS.SOV, January 16, 1987, C2-3. Similar language was used again in April. See Pravda, April 17, 1987, in FB1S:SOV, April 21, 1987, CI.

36. Xinhua, April 3, 1987, in FBIS.Ctll, April 3, 1987, K6. 37. Xinhua, August 6, 1986, in FB1S:CHI, August 6, 1986, AI. 38. Kyodo, August 6, 1986, in FBIS.CH1, August 6, 1986, D2; Xinhua, August 6, 1986, in

FB1S.CHI, August 6, 1986, DI. 39. Beijing radio's Vietnamese and Russian broadcasts both noted Kapitsa's remark, but

Xinhua's August 6 report, in FBIS:Cttl, August 7, 1986, C 1, curiously did not. Perhaps this was an effort to let Hanoi and Moscow know they had heard but still leave the door open for a less offensive restatement.

40. Liaowang, no. 34, August 25, 1986, p. 27. 41. Xinhua, August 20, 1986, in FBIS.Clll, August 23, 1986, D1, reports a Chinese Foreign

Ministry spokesman denying that their discussions covered politics. Kyodo reported on August 11 that "diplomatic sources" claimed Arkhipov had not just been meeting old friends (he had worked in China on the Soviet aid mission in the 1950s, so this was plausible) but had been holding discussions "centered on" Gorbachev's speech.

42. Such conferences of the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian foreign ministers have been held regularly in recent years.

43. Xinhua, August 20, 1986, in FBIS.CHI, August 20, 1986, A3. 44. Portions of the interview were widely published in Chinese media. See Renmin Ribao,

September 8, 1986. An inconsistent Chinese tendency to emphasize the lndochina obstacle at the expense of the other two security issues--Afghanistan and Soviet military deployments along China's northern border--had been increasingly visible for several years, particularly since Deng's April 1985 suggestion that Moscow pressure Hanoi to withdraw from Cambodia as the "easiest" initial step toward normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. (See Xinhua, April 17, 1985.)

45. Ban Yue Tan, October 10, 1986, in FBIS:CHI, October 20, 1986, CI-2. 46. Xinhua reported on October 15 that newly appointed Deputy Foreign Minister I.A.

Rogachev, Soviet representative at the talks, had publicly noted that the two sides "discussed the situation in lndochina?"

47. Xinhua, October 15, 1986. 48. Hsin Wan Pao, November 25, 1986. 49. lzvestiya, December 19, 1986, in FBIS:SOV, December 22, 1986, El-5. 50. Xinhua, December 18, 1986, in FBISCH1, December 18, 1986, C2. 51. Wen I, Vei Po, December 17, 1986, in FBIS.CHI, December 19, 1986, El-2. 52. Renmin Ribao, January 2, 1987. The lzvestiya interview was published on December 29. 53. Beijing radio in Vietnamese, January 7, 1986. 54. Xinhua, January 21, 1987. 55. Renmin Ribao, March 14, 1987, in I"~B1S.CHI, March 16, 1987, C1-2. 56. Xinhua, April 20, 1987. 57. Pravda, April 21, 1987, in FBIS:SOI', April 21, 1987, BI. 58. Xinhua, August 25, 1987, in FBIS.'CH1, August 26, 1987, p. 6. 59. Xinhua, August 31, 1987, in FBL~:CHI, September 1, 1987, p. 11; Xinhua, September 1,

1987, in FBIS:Ct11, September 1, 1987, p. 12. 60. Xinhua, September 20, 1987, in FBIS:CH1, September 21, 1987, p. 7; TASS, September 21,

1987, in FBIS:SOIZ, September 21. 1987, p. 10. 61. Xinhua, September 18, 1987. 62. Xinhua, November 19, 1986. in FBIS.Clll, November 19, 1986, A2. 63. Xinhua, December 3. 1986, in FB1SCtll, December 3, 1986, AI-2. 64. Ta Kung Pao, July 29, 1986, in FBIS.CH1, July 29, 1986. CI. 65. See Mills, PSQ, #4, 1986. p. 552-54. 66. Renrnin Ribao, September 19, 1986, in FBIS:CHI September 30, 1986, C3. 67. JieJ~mgjun bao, January 2. 1987. 68. Beijing Radio, December 31, 1986. The significance of putting this warning in Korean

remains unclear. So far, no Chinese concern over the improvement in Moscow-Pyongyang relations has been evident in Chinese media, though such suggestions have surfaced in pro- P.R.C. Hong Kong media. See tlsin Wan Pao, September 1 and October 26, 1986, in

28 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES/FALL 1987

FBIS:CHI, September 2, 1986, CI-2 and October 27, 1986, C3, respectively; Wen Wei Po, August 19, 1986, in FB1S:CHI, August 20, 1986, CI-2.

69. To illustrate this point, consider the relevance of U.S. ICBM's in Canadian-American negotiations on an issue like acid rain.

70. See William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," in Problems of Communism (POC), no. 32 (November 1983), pp. 16-35 on the initial consolidation of this program at the central level and "Leadership Change in China's Provinces," no. 34 (May 1985), pp. 24-40 on its expansion to the provinces. For an overview of the whole period, see A. Doak Barnett, "Ten Years After Mao," Foreign Affairs, no. 65 (Fall 86), pp. 36-65. An example of the very informative detailed studies now appearing is Jean C. Oi, "Commercializing China's Rural Cadres," POC, no. 35 (September 1986), pp. 1-15.

71. For a timely discussion of the implications of recent events, see Jonathan Mirsky, "Broken China," Foreign Policy no. 66 (Spring 87), pp. 57-76.

72. See William deB. Mills, "The Price of Propaganda in Sino-Soviet Relations," in Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, no. 3 (Winter 1984), pp. 43-60.

73. Since the 9th round, the official characterizations of the atmosphere have dropped the usual "calm," suggesting stronger discord. In addition, Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen issued a strongly worded comment on lndochina at his meeting with Shevardnadze--normally a pro-forma get-together at the end of each round. After returning to China, Qian also stated that discussions of issues such as Cambodian and Afghanistan were "more detailed" than usual. See Xinhua reports of 13, 20, 22 April 1987, in FBIS:CH1, 14, 21, 22 April 1987, CI, C l, C2, respectively.

APPENDIX Remarks by Gorbachev Related to the PRC

Mongolian Troop Withdrawal: "the question of withdrawing a considerable number of Soviet troops from Mongolia is being examined with the leadership of the Mongolian People's Republic"

Afghan Troop Withdrawal: "By the end of 1986, six regiments--one tank regiment, two motorized rifle regiments, and three antiaircraft regiments-- along with their established equipment and weapons--will be returned from Afghanistan to the motherland . . . . The response to it must be the curtai lment of outside interference in the affairs of Democrat ic Afghanistan.

Boundary Delineation: "The official border could pass along the main channel"

Sino-Vietnamese Relations: "The normalization of Chinese-Vietnamese re la t ions . . , is the sovereign affair of the governments and leaderships of the two countries. We can only express our interest in seeing the border between these socialist states again becoming a border of peace and good- neighborliness, and a comradely dialogue renewed, with unnecessary sus- picions and distrust removed . . . . Given goodwill and conditions of problems for the good of general Asian security"

Bilateral Talks: "History has entrusted the Soviet and Chinese peoples with an exceptionally important mission. A great deal in international development depends on the two largest socialist states, in recent years there has been a noticeable improvement in our relations and I want to confirm that the Soviet Union is ready at any time and at any level in the most serious way" to discuss with China matters concerning supplementary measures to create an atmosphere of good-neighborliness."

Economic Cooperation: "our priorities and those of China are similar--the acceleration of socioeconomic development, And why not support one another and cooperate in realizing our plans where this is evidently to the benefit of b o t h ? . . . We are convinced that the mutually complimentary nature of the Soviet and Chinese economies which has been historically established, offers big opportunities for the expansion of these ties;"

Border Deveh)pment: "We do n o t . . , want the Amur frontier to be regarded


as a water barrier. May the basin of this mighty river be a means of uniting the efforts of the Chinese and Soviet people to exploit the very rich re- sources and water engineering installations there, for the common benefit. An intergovernmental agreement on this matter is already being jointly drawn up."

Asian Security: "We would propose a Pacific Ocean conference along the lines of the Helsinki conference;"

Railroads: "The Soviet government is preparing a positive response on the issue of cooperation in building a railway to link the Xinjiang Uygur Au- tonomous Region and Kazakhstan."

Space. "We have proposed cooperation with the P.R.C. in space, which could include training of Chinese cosmonauts."

SS-20s: "We propose the liquidation in Europe both of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles--their liquidation and not their redeployment to any other place. Clearly that could not fail to ' serve the interests of the countries of Asia as well."

"the U.S.S.R. has bound itself not to increase its medium-range nuclear missiles in the Asian part of the country;"

Bases: "the Soviet Union is a convinced supporter of the disbandment of military groups, of the renunciation of foreign bases in Asia and in the Pacific Ocean, and the withdrawal of troops from others' territory."

"if the United States were to renounce a military presence, say, in the Philippines, we should not be found wanting of any response;"

Arrnedforces: "the U.S.S.R. is prepared to discuss with the P.R.C. specific steps aimed at a balanced reduction in the level of land forces."

baiting the chinese dragon: sino-soviet relations after vladivostok

Documents