bail self incrimination

7/26/2019 Bail Self Incrimination

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A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131. November22, 2010.*(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 0-22!1-RTJ"#ORNA M. $I##AN%&$A,'oml)+)+, v. J%/&APO#INARIO M. %AA,reo+e+.

Administrative Law; Judges;Desistance; Administrative actionscannot depend on the will or pleasureof the complainant who may, forreasons of his own, accept andcondone what is otherwise detestable;Desistance cannot divest the Court ofits jurisdiction to investigate anddecide the complaint against the

respondent.!he complainant"sdesistance is li#ewise not legallysigni$cant. %e reiterate the settledrule that administrative actions cannotdepend on the will or pleasure of thecomplainant who may, for reasons ofhis own, accept and condone what isotherwise detestable. &either can theCourt be bound by the unilateral act ofthe complainant in a matter relating toits disciplinary power. Desistance

cannot divest the Court of itsjurisdiction to investigate and decidethe complaint against the respondent.%here public interest is at sta#e andthe Court can act on the propriety andlegality of the conduct of judiciaryo'cials and employees, the Courtshall act irrespective of anyintervening private arrangementsbetween the parties.

(ame; (ame; Judges are called uponto e)hibit more than just a cursoryac*uaintance with statutes andprocedural rules, to be conversantwith the basic law, and to maintain thedesired professional competence.+nmany occasions, we have impressedupon judges that they owe it to thepublic and the legal profession to#now the very law they are supposedto apply in a given controversy. !heyare called upon to e)hibit more than

just a cursory ac*uaintance withstatutes and procedural rules, to beconversant with the basic law, and tomaintain the desired professionalcompetence.

(ame; (ame; ules outlining theduties of a judge in case anapplication for bail is $led.-asco v.apatalo, /0 (CA 1 230045, laiddown the rules outlining the duties ofa judge in case an application for bailis $led6 235 &otify the prosecutor of thehearing of the application for bail orre*uire him to submit hisrecommendation ) ) ); 25 Conduct ahearing of the application for bail

regardless of whether or not theprosecution refuses to presentevidence to show that the guilt of theaccused is strong for the purpose ofenabling the court to e)ercise itsdiscretion ) ) ); 275 Decide whetherthe evidence of guilt of the accused isstrong based on the summary ofevidence of the prosecution ) ) );8and9 2:5 f the guilt of the accused isnot strong, discharge the accused

upon the approval of the 8bail bond9. )) ) +therwise, petition should bedenied.

(ame; (ame; e did this without the re*uired noticeand hearing. >e justi$ed his action onthe e)=parte motion by arguing thatthe o?ense charged against theaccused was a bailable o?ense; ahearing was no longer re*uired sincebail was a matter of right.


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longer necessary. ven assuming,however, that the previous order ofthe investigating @!C judge wascorrect in granting bail to the accused,reliance on a previous order grantingbail does not justify the absence of ahearing in a subse*uent petition forbail.

(ame; (ame; A judge owes the publicand the Court the duty to be pro$cientin the law and is e)pected to #eepabreast of laws and prevailing

jurisprudence.+ne who accepts thee)alted position of a judge owes thepublic and the Court the duty tomaintain professional competence atall times. %hen a judge displays an

utter lac# of familiarity with the rules,he erodes the con$dence of the publicin the courts. A judge owes the publicand the Court the duty to be pro$cientin the law and is e)pected to #eepabreast of laws and prevailing

jurisprudence. gnorance of the law bya judge can easily be the mainspringof injustice.

AD@&(!A!B @A!! in the

(upreme Court. ross gnorance of theLaw and Abuse of Authority.

!he facts are stated in the opinionof the Court.

-+&, J.6

n a veri$ed a'davit=complaint3 dated@arch 3E, 11E,complainant Lorna @.Billanueva, assisted by her father

Fantaleon Billanueva, chargedrespondent Acting Fresiding JudgeApolinario @. -uaya of the egional

!rial Court 2!C5, -ranch 34, ofFalompon, Leyte, with ross gnoranceof the Law and Abuse of Authority.

n an a'davit=complaint e)ecuted onJune E, 11:, Billanueva accused

then Bice=@ayor Constantino (. !upaof Falompon, Leyte, 2of the crime ofGuali$ed (eduction. (he later $ledanother complaint against the sameaccused for violation of (ection E,paragraph 2b5, Article of epublicAct 2.A.5 &o. 4/31 2otherwise #nownas the (pecial Frotection of Childrenagainst Abuse, )ploitation and

Discrimination Act57 with the@unicipal !rial Court 2@!C5 ofFalompon, Leyte.

@!C Judge Delia &oel=-ertulfoforwarded the case to the +'ce of theAssistant Frovincial Frosecutor after$nding probable cause for two countsof violation of (ection E, paragraph 2b5, Article of .A. &o. 4/31,allegedly committed on +ctober 0,

11 and December 3/, 11. Judge&oel=-ertulfo allowed !upa to post bailin the amount of one hundredthousand pesos 2F311,111.115 foreach case.

+n (eptember 4, 11:, AssistantFrovincial Frosecutor Frudencio +.-orgueta, Jr. issued a Joint esolutionon eview,: recommending the $lingof two separate informations for

violation of (ection E2b5 in relationwith (ection 73,E of .A. &o. 4/31against the accused. >e li#ewiserecommended the cancellation of thebail bond of F311,111.11 2per case5posted by !upa as, under (ection 73,Article H of .A. &o. 4/31, if theo?ender is a public o'cer oremployee, the penalty provided in(ection E, Article of .A. &o. 4/31/is imposed in the ma)imum period,i.e., reclusion perpetua. !hus, bail isnot a matter of right. >e also addedthat the cancellation of the bail bondwas all the more appropriate sincethere was strong evidence of guiltagainst the accused based onBillanueva"s a'davit=complaint and

her material declarations during thepreliminary investigation. !he accuseddid not refute these declarations and,in fact, even admitted the allegedse)ual acts in his counter=a'davit andthrough his statements during theclari$catory hearing.

-ased on the above recommendation,the Frovincial Frosecutor of Leyte $ledtwo separate nformations4 for

violation of (ection E 2b5, Article of.A. &o. 4/31, in relation with (ection73, Article H of the same law, against

!upa before !C, -ranch 34, ofFalompon, Leyte. &o bail wasrecommended in both cases.

Judge ric I. @enchave, thenFresiding Judge of the !C, -ranch 34,of Falompon, Leyte, issued a warrantfor the arrest of !upa.K >owever, the


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warrant was not served because !upawent into hiding and could not belocated. @eanwhile, Judge @enchavewas reassigned to the !C in CebuCity. !his led to the designation of

Judge Apolinario @. -uaya as ActingFresiding Judge of the !C, -ranch 34on December K, 11:.

+n the very same day 2December K,11:5, !upa allegedly surrenderedvoluntarily to (F+ Charito Daau ofthe +rmoc City Folice (tation and $ledwith the !C, -ranch 34 an e argued that the crimecharged against !upa was a bailableo?ense; when bail is a matter of right,no hearing of the motion to grant bailis re*uired. !hus, he stood by his ordergranting the accused temporaryliberty, through bail, without ahearing. >is assailed order, reiterated

in his comment, held that a hearingwould be superuous and unnecessarygiven the peculiar and specialcircumstances attendant to the case.During the preliminary e)amination,the investigating judge already passedupon and $)ed the amount of bail forthe temporary liberty of the accused.n fact, the accused had availed of ande)ercised his constitutional right tobail by posting the necessary bond. n

his view, the prosecution, in cancelingthe bail bond in its joint resolution forreview, acted to the prejudice of theaccused"s paramount right to liberty.

Judge -uaya, therefore, as#ed for thedismissal of the present administrativecomplaint for lac# of merit.

Billanueva $led a eply3E contendingthat Judge -uaya"s assailed order onthe e)=parte motion was contrary to

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the ules of Court re*uirement that amotion to grant bail must be set forhearing to a?ord the (tate and theprosecutor their day in court. (hefurther accused Judge -uaya of beingmanifestly partial as evidenced by thetwo temporary restraining orders2!+s5 he issued in favor of theaccused in another case for *uowarranto,3/ then pending before the!C, -ranch 34. (he observed that the$rst !+ read more li#e a decision onthe merits even though the case hadnot yet reached the pre=trial stage.

!he second !+, on the other hand,was allegedly issued without a hearingand was antedated.

Frior to the +'ce of the CourtAdministrator"s 2+CA"s5 action on theadministrative complaint, the Court ofAppeals 2CA5, in CA=.. (F &o.11::0,34 rendered its decision3K onthe bail issue, granting the petition forcertiorari and prohibition $led byBillanueva, thus annulling and settingaside Judge -uaya"s order grantingbail to !upa. Billanueva furnished the+CA with a copy of the CA decision.

+n @ay 0, 11K, then CourtAdministrator Menaida &. lepaNofurther evaluated the merits of thecase and opined that the issue ofwhether or not bail was a matter ofright in the present case is judicial innature. (he preferred not to resolvethe administrative complaint based onthe CA decision 2which found theo?ense non=bailable5 since the

decision was not yet $nal ande)ecutory at that time. >owever, shefound Judge -uaya"s precipitate hastein granting the accused bail to beunjust. (he reasoned out that sincethere was doubt on whether theo?ense was bailable, basicconsiderations of fair play should havecompelled Judge -uaya, at theminimum, to consult with theprosecution and the other judge 2whoissued the warrant of arrest5 on thereason for not recommending bail.Court Administrator lepaNo,therefore, recommended that thepresent administrative complaint bere=doc#eted as a regularadministrative case and that Judge

-uaya, for lac# of prudence, bereprimanded, with a warning that arepetition of the same or similar actsin the future would be dealt with moreseverely.

-y esolution of July 0, 11K,30 thisCourt re*uired the parties to manifest,within ten days from notice, whetherthey were submitting the matter forresolution on the basis of the

pleadings $led.n his @anifestation,1 Judge -uayamaintained his position that theo?ense at issue is a bailable o?ense,therefore, bail is a matter of right anda hearing is not re*uired. >e furtheralleged that the investigatingprosecutor 2who recommended that nobail should be granted to !upa5 waspressured to reverse the investigating@!C judge"s recommendation for bail

during the preliminary investigationstage. !he prosecutor allegedly as#edfor a transfer of assignment fromFalompon, Leyte to !acloban, but hisre*uest was denied, prompting him toresign and wor# in a private ban#.

As added proof of the lac# of merit ofthe present administrative case $ledagainst him, Judge -uaya furnishedthis Court with the A'davit ofDesistance and Declaration Againstnterest3 e)ecuted by Billanueva,together with the !ranscript of(tenographic &otes of her +ctober33, 114 testimony before Fresiding

Judge Celso L. @antua of the !C,-ranch 34, of Falompon, Leyte. n both

documents, Billanueva retracted heraccusations against !upa and totallydenied the occurrence of the allegedacts of lasciviousness committedagainst her by the accused. Judge-uaya alleged that Billanueva wasmerely used by certain political $guresin their locality, and was pressured to$le the criminal cases against theirformer vice=mayor and the presentadministrative case against him.

!he Court"s uling

As a preliminary matter, we cannotgive any weight to Judge -uaya"sunsubstantiated allegation that theprosecutor who had recommendedbail was only pressured to ma#e hisrecommendation. !his allegation,aside from being unsubstantiated, istotally irrelevant to the case whose

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issue is the propriety of the action ofthe judge in granting bail e)=parte,not the action of the prosecutor inrecommending that no bail begranted.

!he complainant"s desistance isli#ewise not legally signi$cant. %ereiterate the settled rule thatadministrative actions cannot dependon the will or pleasure of thecomplainant who may, for reasons ofhis own, accept and condone what isotherwise detestable. &either can theCourt be bound by the unilateral act ofthe complainant in a matter relating toits disciplinary power. Desistancecannot divest the Court of its

jurisdiction to investigate and decidethe complaint against the respondent.%here public interest is at sta#e andthe Court can act on the propriety andlegality of the conduct of judiciaryo'cials and employees, the Courtshall act irrespective of anyintervening private arrangementsbetween the parties.7

+n many occasions, we have

impressed upon judges that they oweit to the public and the legalprofession to #now the very law theyare supposed to apply in a givencontroversy.: !hey are called upon toe)hibit more than just a cursoryac*uaintance with statutes andprocedural rules, to be conversantwith the basic law, and to maintain thedesired professional competence.E

%ith the numerous cases alreadydecided on the matter of bail, we feel

justi$ed to e)pect judges to diligentlydischarge their duties on the grant ordenial of applications for bail. -asco v.apatalo/ laid down the rulesoutlining the duties of a judge in casean application for bail is $led6

235 &otify the prosecutor of thehearing of the application for bail orre*uire him to submit hisrecommendation ) ) );

25 Conduct a hearing of theapplication for bail regardless ofwhether or not the prosecution refusesto present evidence to show that the

guilt of the accused is strong for thepurpose of enabling the court toe)ercise its discretion )));

275 Decide whether the evidence ofguilt of the accused is strong based onthe summary of evidence of theprosecution ) ) ); 8and9

2:5 f the guilt of the accused is notstrong, discharge the accused upon

the approval of the 8bail bond9. ) ) )+therwise, petition should be denied.

n the present case, Judge -uayagranted the e)=parte motion to grantbail on the same day that it was $ledby the accused. >e did this withoutthe re*uired notice and hearing. >e

justi$ed his action on the e)=partemotion by arguing that the o?ensecharged against the accused was a

bailable o?ense; a hearing was nolonger re*uired since bail was amatter of right.


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in petitions for bail. %here bail is amatter of discretion, the grant or thedenial of bail hinges on the issue ofwhether or not the evidence on theguilt of the accused is strong and thedetermination of whether or not theevidence is strong is a matter of

judicial discretion which remains withthe judge. n order for the judge toproperly e)ercise this discretion, hemust $rst conduct a hearing todetermine whether the evidence ofguilt is strong.71 !his discretion liesnot in the determination of whether ornot a hearing should be held, but inthe appreciation and evaluation of theweight of the prosecution"s evidenceof guilt against the accused.

n any event, whether bail is a matterof right or discretion, a hearing for apetition for bail is re*uired in order forthe court to consider the guidelinesset forth in (ection 0, ule 33: of theules of Court in $)ing the amount ofbail.73 !his Court has repeatedly heldin past cases that even if theprosecution fails to adduce evidencein opposition to an application for bail

of an accused, the court may stillre*uire the prosecution to answer*uestions in order to ascertain, notonly the strength of the (tate"sevidence, but also the ade*uacy of theamount of bail. 7

+ne who accepts the e)alted positionof a judge owes the public and theCourt the duty to maintainprofessional competence at all

times.77 %hen a judge displays anutter lac# offamiliarity with the rules, he erodesthe con$dence of the public in thecourts. A judge owes the public andthe Court the duty to be pro$cient inthe law and is e)pected to #eepabreast of laws and prevailing

jurisprudence. gnorance of the law bya judge can easily be the mainspringof injustice.7:

%>I+, we $nd respondentActing Fresiding Judge Apolinario @.-uaya of the egional !rial Court,-ranch 34, of Falompon, Leyte,


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Constitutional Law; &ature of theConstitution; (uperior orders in caseat bar cannot countermand theConstitution6 Iact that petitioners weresuspected of the Climaco #illing didnot e)cuse the constitutionalshortcuts.P(uperior ordersQ cannot,of course, countermand theConstitution. !he fact that thepetitioners were suspected of theClimaco #illing did not e)cuse theconstitutional short=cuts therespondents too#. As elo*uentlya'rmed by the


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where the petitioners were. !hey hadevery opportunity to get a searchwarrant before ma#ing the raid, f theywere worried that the weapons insidethe compound would be spirited away,they could have surrounded thepremises in the meantime, as apreventive measure. !here wasabsolutely no reason at all why theyshould disregard the orderly processesre*uired by the Constitution andinstead insist on arbitrarily forcingtheir way into the petitioner"spremises with all the menace of amilitary invasion.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame; (ame;(earch and seiure made althoughincidental to a legal arrest, not valid;eason.Conceding that the searchwas truly warrantless, might not thesearch and seiure be nonethelessconsidered valid because it wasincidental to a legal arrestS (urely not,f all the law=enforcement authoritieshave to do is force their way into anyhouse and then pic# up anything theysee there on the ground that theoccupants are resisting arrest, then we

might as well delete the -ill of ightsas a fussy redundancy.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame; (ame;Frohibition that one cannot just forcehis way into any man"s house on theillegal orders of a superior; Ancientrule that a man"s house is his castle.%hen the respondents could haveeasily obtained a search warrant fromany of the !& civil courts then open

and functioning in Mamboanga City,they instead simply barged into thebeleaguered premises on the verbalorder of their superior o'cers. +necannot just force his way into anyman"s house on the illegal orders of asuperior, however lofty hisran#. ndeed, even the humblest hovelis protected from o'cial intrusionbecause of the ancient rule, revered inall free regimes, that a man Rs house ishis castle.

(ame; (ame; (ame; CriminalFrocedure; Arrest not in connectionwith a crime about to be committed,being committed, or just committedunder (ec. E, ule 337 of the ules ofCourt; Fersonal #nowledge re*uired ofthe o'cer who ma#es the arrest underule 337.f the arrest was madeunder ule 337, (ection E, of the ulesof Court in connection with a crimeabout to be committed, beingcommitted, or just committed, whatwas that crimeS !here is no allegationin the record of such a justi$cation.Farenthetically, it may be observedthat under the evised ule 337,

(ection E2b5, the o'cer ma#ing thearrest must have personal #nowledgeof the ground therefor as stressed inthe recent case of Feople v. -urgos.

(ame; (ame; (ame; vidence,admissibility of; (earch on petitioner"spremises being violative of theConstitution, all $rearms andammunition ta#en from the raidedcompound are inadmissible in

evidence in any of the proceedingsagainst the petitioner; Fendingdetermination of the legality of thearticles, they shall remain in custodialegis subject to court disposition.ffollows that as the search of thepetitioners" premises was violative ofthe Constitution, all the $rearms andammunition ta#en from the raidedcompound are inadmissible inevidence in any of the proceedingsagainst the petitioners. !hese articlesare Pfruits of the poisonous tree.Q As

Judge Learned >and observed, P+nlyin case the prosecution which itselfcontrols the seiing o'cials, #nowsthat it cannot pro$t by their wrong,will the wrong be repressed.Q Fendingdetermination of the legality of sucharticles, however, they shall remain incustodia legis, subject to suchappropriate disposition as thecorresponding courts may decide,

(ame; (ame; (ame; ight against self=incrimination applies to testimonialcompulsion only.!he objection to thephotographing, $ngerprinting andpara'n=testing of the petitioners

deserves slight comment. !heprohibition against self=incriminationapplies to testimonial compulsion only.As Justice >olmes put it in >olt v.


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e)clusion of his body as evidencewhen it may be material.Q

F!!+& to review the decision of theegional !rial Court of MamboangaCity, -r. 3:. Amin, J.

!he facts are stated in the opinion ofthe Court.

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!he respondents, while admitting theabsence of the re*uired searchwarrant, sought to justify their act onthe

ground that they were acting undersuperior orders.K !here was also thesuggestion that the measure wasnecessary because of the aggravationof the peace and order problemgenerated by the assassination of@ayor Cesar Climaco.0

P(uperior ordersQ cannot, of course,countermand the Constitution. !hefact that the petitioners weresuspected of the Climaco #illing didnot e)cuse the constitutional short=cuts the respondents too#. Aselo*uently a'rmed by the


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they could have surrounded thepremises in the meantime, as apreventive measure. !here wasabsolutely no reason at all why theyshould disregard the orderly processesre*uired by the Constitution andinstead insist on arbitrarily forcingtheir way into the petitioner"spremises with all the menace of amilitary invasion.

Conceding that the search was trulywarrantless, might notthe search and seiure be nonethelessconsidered valid because it wasincidental to a legal arrestS (urely not.f all the lawenforcement authoritieshave to do is force their way into anyhouse and then pic# up anything theysee there on the ground that theoccupants are resisting arrest, then wemight as well delete the -ill of ightsas a fussy redundancy.

%hen the respondents could haveeasily obtained a search warrant fromany of the !& civil courts then openand functioning in Mamboanga City,3they instead simply barged into the

beleaguered premises on the verbalorder of their superior o'cers. +necannot just force his way into anyman"s house on the illegal orders of asuperior, however lofty his ran#.ndeed, even the humblest hovel isprotected from o'cial intrusionbecause of the ancient rule, revered inall free regimes, that a man"s house ishis castle.

Pt may be frail; its roof may sha#e;the wind may enter; the rain mayenter. -ut the Ting of ngland may notenter. All the forces of the Crown darenot cross the threshold of the ruinedtenement.Q37

f the arrest was made under ule 337,(ection E, of the ules of Court inconnection with a crime about to becommitted, being committed, or justcommitted, what was that crimeS

!here is no allegation in the record ofsuch a justi$cation. Farenthetically, itmay be observed that under theevised ule 337, (ection E2b5, theo'cer ma#ing the arrest must havepersonal #nowledge of the groundtherefor as stressed in the recent caseof Feople v. -urgos.3:

f follows that as the search of thepetitioners" premises was violative ofthe Constitution, all the $rearms andammunition ta#en from the raidedcompound are inadmissible inevidence in any of the proceedingsagainst the petitioners. !hese articlesare Pfruits of the poisonous tree.Q3E As

Judge Learned >and observed, P+nlyin case the prosecution which itselfcontrols the seiing o'cials, #nowsthat it cannot pro$t by their wrong,will the wrong be repressed.Q3/Fending determination of the legalityof such articles, however, they shallremain in custodia legis, subject tosuch appropriate disposition as thecorresponding courts may decide.34

!he objection to the photographing,$ngerprinting and para'n=testing ofthe petitioners deserves slightcomment. !he prohibition against self=incrimination applies to testimonialcompulsion only. As Justice >olmes putit in >olt v.


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%>I+, the search of thepetitioners" premises on &ovember E,30K:, is hereby declared LLAL andall the articles seied as a resultthereof are inadmissible in evidenceagainst the petitioners in anyproceedings. >owever, the saidarticles shall remain in custodia legispending the outcome ofthe criminal cases that have been ormay later be $led against thepetitioners.

(+ +DD. Alih vs. Castro, 3E3(CA 40, &o. L=/0:13 June 7, 30K4

No. #-4368. Febr5)ry 11, 148.*P&OP#& OF T& PI#IPPIN&9,l)+=-)ellee, v. NIANICANRO y $ARMA, )''5e-)ell)+.

Criminal Law; vidence; FrohibitedDrugs; Frosecution"s evidence leavesmuch to be desired as its soleeyewitness is not certain whether hesaw that marijuana was actually soldby the ac=cused.Fat. Joves was not

certain as to what he saw. At $rst, hesaid that after the police informanthad paid appellant, the latter handedto the former Pone small plastic bagcontaining suspected marijuanaleaves.Q !hen he corrected himself bysaying6 P thin# it was four stic#s ofmarijuana cigarettes sir. t is not aplastic bag sir.Q t is probable that Fat.

Joves really did not see either thealleged delivery of the marijuana

cigarettes or the supposed paymenttherefor. After all, according to him,the transaction was e?ectedPsecretlyQ. +n the other hand, if thesale was made within the view of Fat.

Joves and his companions, there wouldhave been no need for them to waitfor a signal from the police informantto indicate that the transaction hadbeen completed, before closing in andarresting appellant.

Constitutional Law; CriminalFrocedure; vidence; !he duty toinform a suspect of his constitutionalrights should not be a mereceremonial e)ercise; !he police o'cermust e)plain their practical e?ects.%hen the Constitution re*uires aperson under investigation Pto beinformedQ of his right to remain silentand to counsel, it must be presumedto contemplate the transmission ofmeaningful information rather than

just the ceremonial and perfunctoryrecitationof an abstract constitutional principle.As a rule, therefor, it would not besu'cient for a police o'cer just to

repeat to the person underinvestigation the provisions of (ection1, Article B of the Constitution. >e isnot only duty=bound to tell the personthe rights to which the latter isentitled; he must also e)plain theire?ects in practical terms, e.g., whatthe person under interrogation may ormay not do, and in a language thesubject fairly understands. 2(ee Feoplevs. amos, 3 (CA 73; Feople vs.

Caguioa, 0E (CA .5 n other words,the right of a person underinterrogation Pto be informedQ impliesa correlative obligation on the part ofthe police investigator to e)plain, andcontemplates an e?ectivecommunication that results inunderstanding what is conveyed.(hort of this, there is a denial of theright, as it cannot truly be said thatthe person has been PinformedQ of hisrights. &ow, since the right Pto beinformedQ implies comprehension, thedegree of e)planation re*uired willnecessary vary, depending upon theeducation, intelligence and otherrelevant personal circumstances of theperson under investigation. (u'ce itto say that a simpler and more lucide)planation is needed where thesubject is unlettered.

(ame; (ame; (ame; %aiver of rightagainst self=incrimination is note?ective unless made #nowingly andintelligently.Li#e other constitutionalrights, the right against self=incrimination, including the right of aperson under investigation to remain

silent and to counsel, and to beinformed of such right, may bewaived. !o be valid, however, a waiverof the right must not only bevoluntary; it must be made #nowinglyand intelligently 2Feople vs. Caguioa,supra5, which presupposes anawareness or understanding of what isbeing waived. t stands to reason thatwhere the right has not beenade*uately e)plained and there are

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serious doubts as to whether theperson interrogated #new andunderstood his relevant constitutionalrights when he answered the*uestions, it is idle to tal# of waiver ofrights.

(ame; (ame; (ame; !he $scal has theduty to adduce evidence that therewas compliance with the duties of aninterrogating o'cer.As it is theobligation of the investigating o'certo inform a person under investigationof his right to remain silent and tocounsel, so it is the duty of theprosecution to a'rmatively establishcompliance by the investigating o'cerwith his said obligation. Absent sucha'rmative showing, the admission orconfession made by a person underinvestigation cannot be admitted inevidence.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame.!hus, inFeople vs. amos, supra, the Courtruled that the verbal admission of theaccused duringcustodial investigation wasinadmissible, although he had been

apprised of his constitutional rights tosilence and to counsel, for the reasonthat the prosecution failed to showthat those rights were e)plained tohim, such that it could not be said thatPthe apprisal was su'cientlymanifested and intelligentlyunderstoodQ by the accused.

AFFAL from a judgment of the Courtof Iirst nstance of @anila, -r. B.

!he facts are stated in the opinion ofthe Court.

FLA&A, J.6

!his is an appeal from a judgment ofthe then Court of Iirst nstance of@anila, -ranch B, convicting theaccused &elia &icandro y Belarma ofviolation of (ection :, Article , inrelation to (ection 2e5, 2f5, 2l5, 2m5,and 2o5, Article , of epublic Act /:E,as amended 2Dangerous Drugs Act5,upon an information which reads6

P!hat on or about &ovember /, 30K3,in the City of @anila, Fhilippines, thesaid accused, not having beenauthoried by law to sell, deliver, giveaway to another or distribute anyprohibited drug, did then and therewillfully, unlawfully, and #nowingly sellor o?er for sale four 2:5 stic#s ofmarijuana cigarettes, marijuanaowering tops wrapped in a piece ofnewspaper, one 235 roach marijuanacigarette and marijuana seeds andashes contained in a white plastic bag,

which are prohibited drugs.Q

!he Feople"s version of the facts is asfollows6

P&ot long before &ovember /, 30K3,the Drug nforcement ouse, sellingmarijuana to drug users 2pp. /, 7=77,tsn, ibid5. mmediately Cpl. (alvador

uitan, Fat. Froceso Iederes, Fat.Aurora ome and Ffc. omeo Jovesproceeded to the said Com=modoreFension >ouse and met the femalecon$dential informant at the corner ofAr*uia (treet and @.>. del Filar(treet, rmita, @anila 2pp. /, 7, 77,tsn, Dec. K, 30K3; pp. 3E=3/, tsn. Dec.0, 30K35. Ffc. Joves gave the informanttwo 25 FE.11 bills, mar#ed )hibitsPDQ and PQ, with his initial thereon,

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mar#ed )hibits PD=3Q, and P=3Q2)hs. PDQ, PD=3Q, PQ and P=3Q, pp. 7=:, Iolio of )hs.; pp. /, K, 7E, tsn, Dec.K, 30K3; p. 3/, tsn, Dec. 0, 30K35.

!hey instructed her to follow them tothe Commodore Fension >ouse 2p. 77,tsn, Dec. K, 30K35.

PIollowing later, the informant went toroom 713 of the Com=modore Fension>ouse 2p. /, tsn, Dec. K, 30K3; p. 34,tsn, Dec. 0, 30K35.


15/66

PG

Oou also conducted the investigationof this accused and con$scation of thearticles of the crimeS

A

Oes, sir.

G

>ow did you conduct theinvestigationS

A

!he $rst thing did was informed theaccused of her constitutional rights.

G

%hat ne)tS

A

!hen *uestioned her about themarijuana cigarettes and leaves thatwere con$scated and also the mar#edmoney and she verbally admitted thatshe sold the four stic#s of suspectedmarijuana cigarettes and possessionandownership of the other marijuana

leaves which was conf iscated fromher possession.

G

Did you place that in writingS

A

!he accused refused to place herstatement in writing, sir.Q 2bid., pp.3=37.5

) ) )

C+(( HA@&A!+&

PG

And who were your companions inapprehending the accusedS

A

was with Folice Cpl. (alvador uitan,

Fat. Iederis and Folicewoman Auroraome, sir.

G

%hen you posted yourselves andother companions at the third oor ofCommodore Fensione >ouse, werethere any other persons present in thepremises, Fat. JovesS

A

!here were other persons passing byor wal#ing in the place from where wewere posted sir.

G

n fact, there were several or manypersons in that place because there isa lodging house Fat. Joves when youposted yourselves thereS !here wereseveral persons present thereS

A

!here are several persons present butthey are just passing by or wal#ingtowards their rooms, sir.

G

And you want this Court to believethat in spite of the presence of these

people wal#ing and passing to theplace where you made theapprehension, you want this Courttobelieve that the accused was thenselling the alleged marij uana stic#sS

%!&((6

3E


16/66

Flease repeat the *uestionsS

A!!O. CA&AL6

G

Oou want the Court to believe that the

accused was selling the prohibiteddrug in public because according toyou there were several personspresent thenS

A

!here were several persons passing bysir at that place.

G

Oou testi$ed a while ago Fat. Jovesthat you have seen the accusedhanding a plastic bag to yourcon$dential inf ormant. >ow big is thatplastic bagS

A

t was not a plastic bag, sir but fourstic#s of marijuana cigarettes, sir.

G

Do you want to impress this >onorableCourt that the accused was selling thismarijuana cigarette in the openS

A

!he accused sold marijuana cigarettesalso in a way that she will not benoticed by other persons sir.

0E

B+L. 3:3, I-ow were you able to say that thethings handed by the accused to yourcon$dential informant were four stic#sof marijuana cigarettes when you have

just said that the transactions wasdone secretlyS

A

(he was handing the marijuanacigarette secretly, sir.

G

>ow were you able to say and howwere you able to determine that thethings handed to your con$dential

informant were four stic#s ofmarijuana cigarettesS

A

%e saw and observed that theaccused handed stic#s of suspected

marijuana cigarettes and we also havea prearranged signal from thecon$dential informant that themarijuana was already sold by theaccused, sir.Q 2bid., pp. 7=E.5

Folicewoman Aurora ome alsotesti$ed but her testimony was limitedto events subse*uent to the allegedsale of marijuana cigarettes. (he didnot witness the sale. 2!(&, Dec. 0,30K3, pp. 34=3K, 3.5 &either did Cpl.uitan or Fat. Iederis.

After trial, the trial court convicted theaccused as aforesaid and imposed thepenalty of reclusion perpetua and a$ne of F1,111.11.

n the instant appeal, defendant=appellant has assigned the following

errors6

!> C+


17/66

!> C+ A >A(AO.

!> C+!(.

B

!> C+&(!!!( +I !>ACC! !+ C+&I+&!A!+& A&D !+C+((=HA@& %!&(( AA&(!> >A( -& B+LA!D.

&umerous factors combine to ma#ethe appeal meritorious. !heprosecution evidence leaves much tobe desired. t is at best uncertainwhether any prosecution witnessreally saw the alleged sale ofmarijuana cigarettes. Fatrolman Jovesallegedly was an eyewitness. >etesti$ed that he saw the ap=pellant sellmarijuana cigarettes to the policeinformant, as the transaction too#place openly just outside room 713, inthe presence of several personsPpassing by or wal#ing in the placeQ.-ut when his attention was called tothe improbability that an illegal

merchandise would openly be sold, he*uali$ed his story by saying thatappellant handed the marijuanacigarettes to appellant PsecretlyQ.

Fat. Joves was not certain as to whathe saw. At $rst, he said that after thepolice informant had paid appellant,

the latter handed to the former Ponesmall plastic bag containing suspectedmarijuana leaves.Q !hen he correctedhimself by saying6 P thin# it was fourstic#s of marijuana cigarettes sir. t isnot a plastic bag sir.Q

t is probable that Fat. Joves really didnot see either the alleged delivery ofthe marijuana cigarettes or thesupposed payment therefor. After all,according to him, the transaction wase?ected PsecretlyQ. +n the other hand,if the sale was made within the view ofFat. Joves and his companions, therewould have been no need for them towait for a signal from the policeinformant to indicate that thetransaction had been completed,before closing in and arrestingappellant.

%ith the testimony of Fat. Jovesseriously placed in doubt, there is notmuch left of the prosecution evidence.&ote that the police informant was notpresented as a witness, prompting theaccused to invo#e with reason thepresumption that evidence willfullysuppressed would be adverse ifproduced. 8ules of Court, ule 373,(ec. E2e5.9

n convicting the appellant, the trialcourt relied partly on her alleged oraladmission during custodialinvestigation, as testi$ed to by Fat.

Joves. !his reliance is assailed asviolative of (ection 1 of Article B ofthe Constitution which reads6

P&o person shall be compelled to be awitness against himself. Any personunder investigation for thecommission of an o?ense shall havethe right to remain silent and tocounsel, and to be informed of suchright. &o force, violence, threat,intimidation, or any other meanswhich vitiates the free will shall beused against him. Any confessionobtained in violation of this sectionshall be inadmissible in evidence.Q

!he above provision is an e)pandedversion of the guarantee against self=incrimination, formally incorporatingthe doctrine in the landmar# Americancase of @iranda vs. Ariona

P) ) ) +ur holding will be spelled outwith some speci$city in the pageswhich follow, but briey stated, it isthis6 the prosecution may not usestatements, whether e)culpatory orinculpatory, stemming from custodialinterrogation of the defendant unlessit demonstrates the use of proceduralsafeguards e?ective to secure theprivilege against self=incrimination. -ycustodial interrogation, we mean*uestioning initiated by law

34


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enforcement o'cers after a personhas been ta#en into custody orotherwise deprived of his freedom ofaction in any signi$cant way. As forthe procedural safeguards to beemployed, unless other fully e?ectivemeans are devised to inform accusedpersons of their right of silence and to

assure a continuous opportunity toe)ercise it, the following measures arere*uired. Frior to any *uestioning, theperson must be warned that he has aright to remain silent, that anystatement he does ma#e may be usedas evidence against him, and that hehas a right to the presence of anattorney, either retained or appointed.

!he defendant may waive e?ec=tuation of those rights, provided thewaiver is made voluntarily, #nowinglyand intelligently. f, however, heindicates in any manner and at anystage of the process that he wishes toconsult with an attorney beforespea#ing, there can be no *uestioning.Li#ewise, if the individual is alone andindicates in any manner that he doesnot wish to be interrogated, the policemay not *uestion him. !he mere factthat he may have answered some*uestions or volunteered somestatements on his own does notdeprive him of the right to refrain fromanswering any further in*uiries untilhe has consulted with an attorney andthereafter consents to be *uestioned.Q87K:


19/66

investigation to remain silent and tocounsel, and to be informed of suchright, may be waived. !o be valid,however, a waiver of the right mustnot only be voluntary; it must be made#nowingly and intelligently 2Feople vs.Caguioa, supra5, which presupposesan awareness or understanding of

what is being waived. t stands toreason that where the right has notbeen ade*uately e)plained and thereare serious doubts as to whether theperson interrogated #new andunderstood his relevant constitutionalrights when he answered the*uestions, it is idle to tal# of waiver ofrights.

oing to the instant case, Fat. Jovestesti$ed that he conducted thecustodial investigation of appellant. Asto the manner of investigation, hetersely testi$ed6

PG

>ow did you conduct theinvestigationS

A

!he $rst thing did was informed theaccused of her constitutional rights.

G

%hat ne)tS

A

!hen *uestioned her about themarijuana cigarettes and leaves thatwere con$scated and also the mar#edmoney and she verbally admitted that

she sold the four stic#s of suspectedmarijuana cigarettes and possessionand ownership of the other marijuanaleaves which was conf iscated fromher possession.Q 2!(&, December K,30K3, pp. 3=37.5

According to Fat. Joves, he informedappellant of her constitutional rightswhen she was under custodialinvestigation. %hat speci$c rights hementioned to appellant, he did notsay.&either did he state the manner inwhich the appellant was advised of herconstitutional rights so as to ma#e herunderstand them. !his is particularlysigni$cant in the instant case becauseappellant is illiterate and cannot bee)pected to be able to grasp thesigni$cance of her right to silence andto counsel upon merely hearing anabstract statement thereof.

As it is the obligation of theinvestigating o'cer to inform a personunder investigation of his right toremain silent and to counsel, so it isthe duty of the prosecution toa'rmatively establish compliance bythe investigating o'cer with his saidobligation. Absent such a'rmative

showing, the admission or confessionmade by a person under investigationcannot be admitted in evidence. Asbroadly stated in the @iranda case and*uoted with approval by the thenChief Justice nri*ue @. Iernando inFeople vs. Caguioa, supra,

P. . . the prosecution may not usestatements, whether e)culpatory orinculpatory, stemming from custodialinvestigation of the defendant unlessit demonstrates the use of proceduralsafeguards e?ective to secure theprivilege against self=incrimination.Q20E (CA , 0. mphasis supplied.5

!he reason is not di'cult to see. Aconstitutional guarantee should beliberally construed with a view topromoting its object.

P) ) ) %here rights secured by theConstitution are involved, there can beno rule ma#ing or legislation whichwould abrogate them.

) ) )

Pn dealing with custodialinterrogation, we will not presume thata defendant has been e?ectivelyapprised of his rights and that hisprivilege against self=incrimination hasbeen ade*uately safeguarded on arecord that does not show that anywarnings have been given or that anye?ective alternative has beenemployed. &or can a #nowing andintelligent waiver of these rights be

30


20/66

assumed on a silent record. ) ) )Q2@iranda case, 7K:


21/66

. Feople vs Cabral

Criminal Frocedure; -ail; !hegrant or denial of an applicationfor bail is dependent on whetherthe evidence of guilt is strong

which the lower court shoulddetermine in a hearing calledfor the purpose.n this case,accused=respondent was beingcharged with rape *uali$ed bythe use of a deadly weaponpunishable by reclusionperpetua to death. As such, bailis discretionary and not amatter of right. !he grant ordenial of an application for bailis, therefore, dependent onwhether the evidence of guilt isstrong which the lower courtshould determine in a hearingcalled for the purpose. !hedetermination of whether theevidence of guilt is strong, inthis regard, is a matter of

judicial discretion. %hile thelower court would never bedeprived of its mandatedprerogative to e)ercise judicialdiscretion, this Court wouldunhesitatingly reverse the trialcourt"s $ndings if found to belaced with grave abuse ofdiscretion.

(ame; (ame; ven though thereis a reasonable doubt as to theguilt of accused, if on an

e)amination of the entire recordthe presumption is great thataccused is guilty of a capitalo?ense, bail should be refused.-y judicial discretion, the lawmandates the determination ofwhether proof is evident or thepresumption of guilt is strong.

PFroof evidentQ or PvidentproofQ in this connection hasbeen held to mean clear, strongevidence which leads a well=guarded dispassionate

judgment to the conclusion thatthe o?ense has been committedas charged, that accused is theguilty agent, and that he willprobably be punished capitally ifthe law is administered.PFresumption greatQ e)istswhen the circumstancestesti$ed to are such that theinference of guilt naturally to bedrawn therefrom is strong,clear, and convincing to anunbiased judgment ande)cludes all reasonableprobability of any otherconclusion. ven though there isa reasonable doubt as to theguilt of accused, if on ane)amination of the entire recordthe presumption is great thataccused is guilty of a capitalo?ense, bail should be refused.

(ame; (ame; t must beremembered that the discretionto be e)ercised in granting ordenying bail, according to -asco

v. apatalo is not absolute norbeyond control.t is thusindicative from the aboveobservations that the lowercourt abused its discretion andshowed manifest bias in favor ofaccused=respondent indetermining which

circumstances are to beconsidered in supporting itsdecision as to the guilt ofaccused=respondent. n thisregard, it must be rememberedthat the discretion to bee)ercised in granting or denyingbail, according to -asco v.apatalo Pis not absolute norbeyond control. t must besound, and e)ercised withinreasonable bounds. Judicialdiscretion, by its very nature,involves the e)ercise of the

judge"s individual opinion. t isbecause of its very nature thatthe law has wisely provided thatits e)ercise be guided by well=#nown rules which, whileallowing the judge rationallatitude for the operation of hisown individual views, preventthem from getting out ofcontrol. An uncontrolled oruncontrollable discretion on thepart of a judge is a misnomer. tis a fallacy. Lord @ans$eld,spea#ing of the discretion to bee)ercised in granting or denyingbail said6 R-ut discretion whenapplied to a court of justice,means sound discretion guided

3


22/66

by law. t must be governed byrule, not by rumour; it must notbe arbitrary, vague and fanciful;but legal and regular." Q

(ame; (ame; P&o bailQrecommendation constitutesclear and strong evidence of

guilt of the accused.Lendingcredence to petitioner"s case isthe fact that after the conductof two 25 preliminaryinvestigations, Pno bailQ wasrecommended in theinformation. According to -aylon v. (ison, suchrecommendation constitutesclear and strong evidence ofguilt of the accused.

(ame; (ame; Jurisprudentialguidelines in the e)ercise ofdiscretion.Aside from theapparent abuse of discretion indetermining whichcircumstances and pieces ofevidence are to be considered,the lower court also did notstrictly comply with

jurisprudential guidelines in thee)ercise of discretion. Asreiterated in Carpio v.@aglalang, discretion is guidedby6 $rst, the applicableprovisions of the Constitutionand the statutes; second, by therules which this Court maypromulgate; and third, by thoseprinciples of e*uity and justice

that are deemed to be part ofthe laws of the land.

(ame; (ame; Duties of a judgein case an application for bail is$led.ecently, this Court laiddown the following rules in-asco v. Judge apatalo which

outlined the duties of a judge incase an application for bail is$led6 P235 &otify the prosecutorof the hearing of the applicationfor bail or re*uire him to submithis recommendation; 25Conduct a hearing of theapplication for bail regardless ofwhether or not the prosecutionrefuses to present evidence toshow that the guilt of theaccused is strong for thepurpose of enabling the court toe)ercise its discretion; 275Decide whether the evidence ofguilt of the accused is strongbased on the summary ofevidence of the prosecution;2talics supplied5 2:5 f the guiltof the accused is not strong,discharge the accused upon theapproval of the bailbond.+therwise, petition should bedenied.Q

B!


23/66

discretion is not evident in hisaction, the aforesaide)ceptional remedies are notwarranted. Feople vs. Cabral,717 (CA 7/3, .. &o. 373010Iebruary 3K, 3000

7. Billanueva vs -uaya!. ) v CA

Criminal Frocedure; -ail; mposing bailin an e)cessive amount could rendermeaningless the right to bail.!heprohibition against re*uiring e)cessivebail is enshrined in the Constitution.

!he obvious rationale, as declared inthe leading case of De la Camara vs.nage, is that imposing bail in an

e)cessive amount could rendermeaningless the right to bail. !hus, inBillaseNor vs. Abano, this Court madethe pronouncement that it will nothesitate to e)ercise its supervisorypowers over lower courts should thelatter, after holding the accusedentitled to bail, e?ectively deny thesame by imposing a prohibitory sumor e)acting unreasonable conditions.

(ame; (ame; Iactors to be consideredin the setting of the amount of bail.At the same time, (ection 0, ule 33:of the evised ules of CriminalFrocedure advises courts to considerthe following factors in the setting ofthe amount of bail6 2a5 Iinancial abilityof the accused to give bail; 2b5 &atureand circumstances of the o?ense; 2c5Fenalty for the o?ense charged; 2d5

Character and reputation of theaccused; 2e5 Age and health of theaccused; 2f5 %eight of the evidenceagainst the accused; 2g5 Frobability ofthe accused appearing at the trial; 2h5Iorfeiture of other bail; 2i5 !he factthat the accused was a fugitive from

justice when arrested; and 2j5

Fendency of other cases where theaccused is on bail.

(ame; (ame; Court $nds that thesetting of the amount atFE,E11,111.11 is unreasonable,e)cessive, and constitutes an e?ectivedenial of petitioner"s right to bail.


24/66

amount higher than F:1,111.112based on the -ail -ond uide5 whereit perceives that an appropriateincrease is dictated by thecircumstances.

(ame; (ame; Discretion to e)tend bailduring the course of the appeal should

be e)ercised with grave caution andfor strong reasons, considering thatthe accused had been in factconvicted by the trial court.tmilitates emphasis that petitioner issee#ing bail on appeal. (ection E, ule33: of the evised ules of CriminalFrocedure is clear that although thegrant of bail on appeal in non=capitalo?enses is discretionary, when thepenalty imposed on the convicted

accused e)ceeds si) years andcircumstances e)ist that point to theprobability of ight if released on bail,then the accused must be denied bail,or his bail previously granted shouldbe cancelled. n the same vein, theCourt has held that the discretion toe)tend bail during the course of theappeal should be e)ercised with gravecaution and for strong reasons,considering that the accused had beenin fact convicted by the trial court.

Oap, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 7EK (CAE/:, .. &o. 3:3E0 June /, 113

. #eve v Alme)

Judgments; @oot and Academicssues; %aiver; %aiver on the

part of the accused must bedistinguished from mootness ofthe petition, for in the presentcase, petitioner did not, by hisactive participation in the trial,waive his stated objections.

!he +'ce of the (olicitoreneral 2+(5 later argued that

the present petition had beenrendered moot since thepresentation of evidence,wherein petitioner activelyparticipated, had beenconcluded. %aiver on the partof the accused must bedistinguished from mootness ofthe petition, for in the presentcase, petitioner did not, by hisactive participation in the trial,

waive his stated objections.

Criminal Frocedure;Arraignment; -ail; %aiver; Anaccused, in applying for bail,does not waive his right tochallenge the regularity of thereinvestigation of the chargeagainst him, the validity of theadmission of the Amendednformation, and the legality ofhis arrest under the Amendednformation, where hevigorously raised them prior tohis arraignment; !he principlethat the accused is precludedafter arraignment from*uestioning the illegal arrest orthe lac# of or irregularpreliminary investigationapplies Ponly if he voluntarily

enters his plea and participatesduring trial, without previouslyinvo#ing his objections thereto.(ection /, ule 33: of theules of Court provides6 (C./. -ail not a bar to objectionson illegal arrest, lac# of orirregular preliminary

investigation.An applicationfor or admission to bail shall notbar the accused fromchallenging the validity of hisarrest or the legality of thewarrant issued therefor, or fromassailing the regularity or*uestioning the absence of apreliminary investigation of thecharge against him, providedthat he raises them before

entering his plea. !he courtshall resolve the matter as earlyas practicable but not later thanthe start of the trial of the case.-y applying for bail, petitionerdid not waive his right tochallenge the regularity of thereinvestigation of the chargeagainst him, the validity of theadmission of the Amendednformation, and the legality ofhis arrest under the Amendednformation, as he vigorouslyraised them prior to hisarraignment. During thearraignment on @arch 3, 114,petitioner refused to enter hisplea since the issues he raisedwere still pending resolution bythe appellate court, thusprompting the trial court to

:


25/66

enter a plea of Pnot guiltyQ forhim. !he principle that theaccused is precluded afterarraignment from *uestioningthe illegal arrest or the lac# ofor irregular preliminaryinvestigation applies Ponly if hevoluntarily enters his plea and

participates during trial, withoutpreviously invo#ing hisobjections thereto.Q !here mustbe clear and convincing proofthat petitioner had an actualintention to relin*uish his rightto *uestion the e)istence ofprobable cause. %hen the onlyproof of intention rests on whata party does, his act should beso manifestly consistent with,

and indicative of, an intent tovoluntarily and une*uivocallyrelin*uish the particular rightthat no other e)planation of hisconduct is possible.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame;njunction; !he non=issuance ofan injunctive relief only meansthat the appellate court did notpreliminarily $nd any e)ceptionto the long=standing doctrinethat injunction will not lie toenjoin a criminal prosecution.%hatever delay arising frompetitioner"s availment ofremedies against the trialcourt"s +rders cannot beimputed to petitioner to operateas a valid waiver on his part.&either can the non=issuance of

a writ of preliminary injunctionbe deemed as a voluntaryrelin*uishment of petitioner"sprincipal prayer. !he non=issuance of such injunctive reliefonly means that the appellatecourt did not preliminarily $ndany e)ception to the long=

standing doctrine thatinjunction will not lie to enjoin acriminal prosecution.Conse*uently, the trial of thecase too# its course.

(ame; (ame; (ame; @oot andAcademic ssues; %ords andFhrases; A moot and academiccase is one that ceases topresent a justiciable controversy

by virtue of supervening events,so that a declaration thereonwould be of no practical use orvalue; !he judgment convictingpetitioner of homicide under theAmended nformation formurder operates as asupervening event that mootedthe present petition; nstead,however, of denying the petitionoutright on the ground ofmootness, the Court proceedsto resolve the legal issues inorder to formulate controllingprinciples to guide the bench,bar and publicin the presentcase, there is compelling reasonto clarify the remedies availablebefore and after the $ling of aninformation in cases subject ofin*uest.A moot and academic

case is one that ceases topresent a justiciable controversyby virtue of supervening events,so that a declaration thereonwould be of no practical use orvalue. !he judgment convictingpetitioner of homicide under theAmended nformation for

murder operates as asupervening event that mootedthe present petition. Assumingthat there is ground to annulthe $nding of probable causefor murder, there is no practicaluse or value in abrogating theconcluded proceedings andretrying the case under theoriginal nformation forhomicide just to arrive, more

li#ely or even de$nitely, at thesame conviction of homicide.@ootness would have also set inhad petitioner been convicted ofmurder, for proof beyondreasonable doubt, which ismuch higher than probablecause, would have beenestablished in that instance.nstead, however, of denyingthe petition outright on theground of mootness, the Courtproceeds to resolve the legalissues in order to formulatecontrolling principles to guidethe bench, bar and public. nthe present case, there iscompelling reason to clarify theremedies available before andafter the $ling of an informationin cases subject of in*uest.

E


26/66

(ame; Freliminary nvestigation;n*uest; %ords and Fhrases;n*uest is de$ned as aninformal and summaryinvestigation conducted by apublic prosecutor in criminalcases involving persons

arrested and detained withoutthe bene$t of a warrant ofarrest issued by the court forthe purpose of determiningwhether said persons shouldremain under custody andcorrespondingly be charged incourt.A preliminaryinvestigation is re*uired beforethe $ling of a complaint orinformation for an o?ense

where the penalty prescribed bylaw is at least four years, twomonths and one day withoutregard to $ne. As an e)ception,the rules provide that there isno need for a preliminaryinvestigation in cases of a lawfularrest without a warrantinvolving such type of o?ense,so long as an in*uest, whereavailable, has been conducted.n*uest is de$ned as aninformal and summaryinvestigation conducted by apublic prosecutor in criminalcases involving personsarrested and detained withoutthe bene$t of a warrant ofarrest issued by the court forthe purpose of determiningwhether said persons should

remain under custody andcorrespondingly be charged incourt.

(ame; (ame; (ame; -efore the$ling of complaint orinformation in court, the privatecomplainant may proceed in

coordinating with the arrestingo'cer and the in*uest o'cerduring the latter"s conduct ofin*uest, while the arrestedperson has the option to avail ofa 3E=day preliminaryinvestigation, provided he dulysigns a waiver of any objectionagainst delay in his delivery tothe proper judicial authoritiesunder Article 3E of the evised

Fenal Code; !he acceleratedprocess of in*uest, owing to itssummary nature and theattendant ris# of runningagainst Article 3E, ends witheither the prompt $ling of aninformation in court or theimmediate release of thearrested personthe rules onin*uest do not provide for amotion for reconsideration.tis imperative to $rst ta#e acloser loo# at the predicamentof both the arrested person andthe private complainant duringthe brief period of in*uest, tograsp the respective remediesavailable to them before andafter the $ling of a complaint orinformation in court. -I+

!> IL& +I C+@FLA&! +

&I+@A!+& & C+


27/66

reinvestigation, if any, beforeelevating the matter to theDepartment of Justice 2D+J5(ecretary.Contrary topetitioner"s position that privatecomplainant should haveappealed to the D+J (ecretary,such remedy is not immediately

available in cases subject ofin*uest. &oteworthy is theproviso that the appeal to theD+J (ecretary is by Ppetition bya proper party under such rulesas the Department of

Justice may prescribe.Q !he rulereferred to is the 111 &ationalFrosecution (ervice ule onAppeal, (ection 3 of whichprovides that the ule shall

Papply to appeals fromresolutions ) ) ) in casessubject of preliminaryinvestigationV reinvestigation.Qn cases subject of in*uest,therefore, the private partyshould $rst avail of apreliminary investigation orreinvestigation, if any, beforeelevating the matter to the D+J(ecretary. n case the in*uestproceedings yield no probablecause, the private complainantmay pursue the case throughthe regular course of apreliminary investigation.

(ame; (ame; einvestigation;+nce a complaint or informationis $led in court, the accused isprovided with another

opportunity to as# for apreliminary investigation within$ve days from the time helearns of its $ling, while aprivate complainant can movefor reinvestigation in cases he isallowed to intervene by counselin the criminal action and is

granted the authority toprosecute, with the conformityof the public prosecutor.+&CA C+@FLA&! + &I+@A!+&( ILD & C+


28/66

which is void ab initio cannot beamended to obviate a groundfor *uashal. An amendmentwhich operates to vest

jurisdiction upon the trial courtis li#ewise impermissible.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame; Any

remedial measure springingfrom the reinvestigationbe it acomplete disposition or anintermediate modi$cation of thechargeis eventually addressedto the sound discretion of thetrial court, which must ma#e anindependent evaluation orassessment of the merits of thecase.Considering the generalrule that an information may be

amended even in substance andeven without leave of court atany time before entry of plea,does it mean that the conductof a reinvestigation at thatstage is a mere superuityS t isnot. Any remedial measurespringing from thereinvestigationbe it acomplete disposition or anintermediate modi$cation of thechargeis eventually addressedto the sound discretion of thetrial court, which must ma#e anindependent evaluation orassessment of the merits of thecase. (ince the trial court wouldultimately ma#e thedetermination on the proposedcourse of action, it is for theprosecution to consider whether

a reinvestigation is necessary toadduce and review the evidencefor purposes of buttressing theappropriate motion to be $led incourt.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame; Dueprocess of law demands that no

substantial amendment of aninformation may be admittedwithout conducting another or anew preliminary investigation.einvestigation is re*uired incases involving a substantialamendment of the information.Due process of law demandsthat no substantial amendmentof an information may beadmitted without conducting

another or a new preliminaryinvestigation. n @atalam v. !hend Division of the(andiganbayan, :EE (CA 47/211E5, the Court ruled that asubstantial amendment in aninformation entitles an accusedto another preliminaryinvestigation, unless theamended information contains acharge related to or is includedin the original nformation.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame; !heamendment of the nformationfrom homicide to murder is asubstantial amendment whichwould ma#e it not just a rightbut a duty of the prosecution toas# for a preliminaryinvestigation.!he *uestion to

be resolved is whether theamendment of the nformationfrom homicide to murder isconsidered a substantialamendment, which would ma#eit not just a right but a duty ofthe prosecution to as# for apreliminary investigation. !he

Court answers in thea'rmative. A substantialamendment consists of therecital of facts constituting theo?ense charged anddeterminative of the jurisdictionof the court. All other mattersare merely of form. !hefollowing have been held to bemere formal amendments6 235new allegations which relate

only to the range of the penaltythat the court might impose inthe event of conviction; 25 anamendment which does notcharge another o?ense di?erentor distinct from that charged inthe original one; 275 additionalallegations which do not alterthe prosecution"s theory of thecase so as to cause surprise tothe accused and a?ect the formof defense he has or willassume; 2:5 an amendmentwhich does not adversely a?ectany substantial right of theaccused; and 2E5 an amendmentthat merely adds speci$cationsto eliminate vagueness in theinformation and not to introducenew and material facts, andmerely states with additional

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precision something which isalready contained in the originalinformation and which addsnothing essential for convictionfor the crime charged. !he testas to whether a defendant isprejudiced by the amendment iswhether a defense under the

information as it originally stoodwould be available after theamendment is made, andwhether any evidencedefendant might have would bee*ually applicable to theinformation in the one form asin the other. An amendment toan information which does notchange the nature of the crimealleged therein does not a?ect

the essence of the o?ense orcause surprise or deprive theaccused of an opportunity tomeet the new averment hadeach been held to be one ofform and not of substance.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame; !hemere fact that the two chargesare related does not necessarilyor automatically deprive theaccused of his right to anotherpreliminary investigation.@atalam adds that the merefact that the two charges arerelated does not necessarily orautomatically deprive theaccused of his right to anotherpreliminary investigation.&otatu dignum is the fact thatboth the original nformation

and the amended nformation in@atalam were similarly chargingthe accused with violation of(ection 72e5 of the Anti=raftand Corrupt Fractices Act.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame;%ords and Fhrases; !here is no

substantial distinction betweena preliminary investigation anda reinvestigation since both areconducted in the same mannerand for the same objective ofdetermining whether theree)ists su'cient ground toengender a well=founded beliefthat a crime has beencommitted and the respondentis probably guilty thereof and

should be held for trial.Considering that another or anew preliminary investigation isre*uired, the fact that what wasconducted in the present casewas a reinvestigation does notinvalidate the substantialamendment of the nformation.

!here is no substantialdistinction between apreliminary investigation and areinvestigation since both areconducted in the same mannerand for the same objective ofdetermining whether theree)ists su'cient ground toengender a well=founded beliefthat a crime has beencommitted and the respondentis probably guilty thereof andshould be held for trial. %hat is

essential is that petitioner wasplaced on guard to defendhimself from the charge ofmurder after the claimedcircumstances were made#nown to him as early as the$rst motion.

(ame; (ame; (ame; (ame; !herules do not even re*uire, as acondition sine *ua non to thevalidity of a preliminaryinvestigation, the presence ofthe respondent as long ase?orts to reach him were madeand an opportunity tocontrovert the complainant"sevidence was accorded him.Fetitioner did not, however,

ma#e much of the opportunityto present countervailingevidence on the proposedamended charge. Despite noticeof hearing, petitioner opted tomerely observe the proceedingsand declined to activelyparticipate, even with e)tremecaution, in the reinvestigation.@ercado v. Court of Appeals,:E (CA E0: 2300E5 statesthat the rules do not evenre*uire, as a condition sine *uanon to the validity of apreliminary investigation, thepresence of the respondent aslong as e?orts to reach himwere made and an opportunityto controvert the complainant"sevidence was accorded him.

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(ame; (ame; Judges; -ias andFartiality; !he pace in resolvingincidents of the case is not perse an indication of bias.egarding petitioner"sprotestations of haste, su'ce tostate that the pace in resolvingincidents of the case is not per

se an indication of bias. n(antos=Concio v. Department of

Justice, E:7 (CA 41 211K5, the

Court held6 (peed in theconduct of proceedings by a

judicial or *uasi=judicial o'cercannot per se be instantlyattributed to an injudiciousperformance of functions. Ior

one"s prompt dispatch may beanother"s undue haste. !heorderly administration of justiceremains as the paramount andconstant consideration, withparticular regard of thecircumstances peculiar to eachcase. !he presumption ofregularity includes the publico'cer"s o'cial actuations in allphases of wor#. Consistent withsuch presumption, it wasincumbent upon petitioners topresent contradictory evidenceother than a mere tallying ofdays or numerical calculation.

!his, petitioners failed todischarge. !he swift completionof the nvestigating Fanel"sinitial tas# cannot be relegatedas shoddy or shady without

discounting the presumablyregular performance of not justone but $ve state prosecutors.

(ame; (ame; !here is ahierarchy of o'cials in theprosecutory arm of thee)ecutive branch headed by the

(ecretary of Justice who isvested with the prerogative toappoint a special prosecutor ordesignate an acting prosecutorto handle a particular case,which broad power of controlhas been recognied by

jurisprudence.!here is noground for petitioner"sprotestations against the D+J(ecretary"s sudden designation

of (enior (tate Frosecutormmanuel Belasco as ActingCity Frosecutor of @a#ati Cityfor the present case and thelatter"s conformity to the motionfor reinvestigation. n grantingthe reinvestigation, JudgeAlameda cannot choose thepublic prosecutor who willconduct the reinvestigation orpreliminary investigation. !hereis a hierarchy of o'cials in theprosecutory arm of thee)ecutive branch headed by the(ecretary of Justice who isvested with the prerogative toappoint a special prosecutor ordesignate an acting prosecutorto handle a particular case,which broad power of control

has been recognied byjurisprudence.

(ame; (ame; Guantum of Froof;!he standard of strong evidence

of guilt which is su'cient todeny bail to an accused ismar#edly higher than the

standard of judicial probablecause which is su'cient toinitiate a criminal case.!hatthe evidence of guilt was notstrong as subse*uentlyassessed in the bail hearingsdoes not a?ect the priordetermination of probable causebecause, as the appellate courtcorrectly stated, the standard ofstrong evidence of guilt which is

su'cient to deny bail to anaccused is mar#edly higher thanthe standard of judicial probablecause which is su'cient toinitiate a criminal case.(ame; (ame; Frobable Cause;

!here are two #inds ofdetermination of probablecause6 e)ecutive and judicial;

!he e)ecutive determination ofprobable cause is one madeduring preliminaryinvestigation; !he judicialdetermination of probable causeis one made by the judge toascertain whether a warrant ofarrest should be issued againstthe accused.!here are two#inds of determination ofprobable cause6 e)ecutive and

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judicial. !he e)ecutivedetermination of probable causeis one made during preliminaryinvestigation. t is a functionthat properly pertains to thepublic prosecutor who is given abroad discretion to determinewhether probable cause e)ists

and to charge those whom hebelieves to have committed thecrime as de$ned by law andthus should be held for trial.+therwise stated, such o'cialhas the *uasi=judicial authorityto determine whether or not acriminal case must be $led incourt. %hether that functionhas been correctly dischargedby the public prosecutor, i.e.,

whether he has made a correctascertainment of the e)istenceof probable cause in a case, is amatter that the trial court itselfdoes not and may not becompelled to pass upon. !he

judicial determination ofprobable cause is one made bythe judge to ascertain whethera warrant of arrest should beissued against the accused. !he

judge must satisfy himself thatbased on the evidencesubmitted, there is necessity forplacing the accused undercustody in order not to frustratethe ends of justice. f the judge$nds no probable cause, the

judge cannot be forced to issuethe arrest warrant. Faragraph2a5, (ection E, ule 33 of the

ules of Court outlines theprocedure to be followed by the!C.

(ame; (ame; (ame; JudicialDetermination of FrobableCause; !o move the court toconduct a judicial determination

of probable cause is a meresuperuity, for with or withoutsuch motion, the judge is duty=bound to personally evaluatethe resolution of the publicprosecutor and the supportingevidence.!o move the court toconduct a judicial determinationof probable cause is a meresuperuity, for with or withoutsuch motion, the judge is duty=

bound to personally evaluatethe resolution of the publicprosecutor and the supportingevidence. n fact, the tas# of thepresiding judge when thenformation is $led with thecourt is $rst and foremost todetermine the e)istence or non=e)istence of probable cause forthe arrest of the accused. %hatthe Constitution underscores isthe e)clusive and personalresponsibility of the issuing

judge to satisfy himself of thee)istence of probable cause.-ut the judge is not re*uired topersonally e)amine thecomplainant and his witnesses.Iollowing established doctrineand procedure, he shall 235personally evaluate the report

and the supporting documentssubmitted by the prosecutorregarding the e)istence ofprobable cause, and on thebasis thereof, he may alreadyma#e a personal determinationof the e)istence of probablecause; and 25 if he is not

satis$ed that probable causee)ists, he may disregard theprosecutor"s report and re*uirethe submission of supportinga'davits of witnesses to aidhim in arriving at a conclusionas to the e)istence of probablecause. 2emphasis andunderscoring supplied5

(ame; (ame; (ame; !he

accused cannot, as a matter ofright, insist on a hearing for

judicial determination ofprobable cause.!he rules donot re*uire cases to be set forhearing to determine probablecause for the issuance of awarrant of arrest of the accusedbefore any warrant may beissued. Fetitioner thus cannot,as a matter of right, insist on ahearing for judicialdetermination of probablecause. Certainly, petitionerPcannot determine beforehandhow cursory or e)haustive the8judge"s9 e)amination of therecords should be 8since t9hee)tent of the judge"se)amination depends on thee)ercise of his sound discretion

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as the circumstances of thecase re*uire.Q n one case, theCourt emphatically stated6 !heperiods provided in the evisedules of Criminal Frocedure aremandatory, and as such, the

judge must determine thepresence or absence of

probable cause within suchperiods. !he (andiganbayan"sdetermination of probable causeis made e) parte and issummary in nature, notadversarial. !he Judge shouldnot be stymied and distractedfrom his determination ofprobable cause by needlessmotions for determination ofprobable cause $led by the

accused. 2emphasis andunderscoring supplied5

(ame; Freliminary nvestigation;einvestigation; t is notmaterial that no new matter orevidence was presented duringthe reinvestigation of the casereinvestigation, as the worditself implies, is merely a repeatinvestigation of the case whichis simply a chance for theprosecutor to review and re=evaluate its $ndings and theevidence already submitted.Fetitioner proceeds to discuss atlength evidentiary matters,arguing that no circumstancese)ist that would *ualify thecrime from homicide to murder.

!he allegation of lac# of

substantial or material newevidence deserves no credence,because new pieces of evidenceare not prere*uisites for a validconduct of reinvestigation. t isnot material that no new matteror evidence was presentedduring the reinvestigation of the

case. t should be stressed thatreinvestigation, as the worditself implies, is merely a repeatinvestigation of the case. &ewmatters or evidence are notprere*uisites for areinvestigation, which is simplya chance for the prosecutor toreview and re=evaluate its$ndings and the evidencealready submitted.

Certiorari; Although it ispossible that error may becommitted in the discharge oflawful functions, this does notrender the act amenable tocorrection and annulment bythe e)traordinary remedy ofcertiorari, absent any showingof grave abuse of discretionamounting to e)cess of

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his guilt is proven beyondreasonable doubt, and to enablehim to prepare his defensewithout being subject topunishment prior to conviction.-ail is the security re*uired bythe court and given by theaccused to ensure that the

accused appears before theproper court at the scheduledtime and place to answer thecharges brought against him orher. t is awarded to theaccused to honor thepresumption of innocence untilhis guilt is proven beyondreasonable doubt, and to enablehim to prepare his defensewithout being subject to

punishment prior to conviction.

(ame; (ame; %hether bail is amatter of right or of discretion,reasonable notice of hearing isre*uired to be given to theprosecutor or $scal or at leasthe must be as#ed for hisrecommendation.-ail shouldbe $)ed according to thecircumstances of each case. !he

amount $)ed should besu'cient to ensure thepresence of the accused at thetrial yet reasonable enough tocomply with the constitutionalprovision that bail should not bee)cessive. !herefore, whetherbail is a matter of right or ofdiscretion, reasonable notice ofhearing is re*uired to be given

to the prosecutor or $scal or atleast he must be as#ed for hisrecommendation because in$)ing the amount of bail, the

judge is re*uired to ta#e intoaccount a number of factorssuch as the applicant"scharacter and reputation,

forfeiture of other bonds orwhether he is a fugitive from

justice.

(ame; (ame; %ords andFhrases; A summary hearingmeans such brief and speedymethod of receiving andconsidering the evidence ofguilt as is practicable andconsistent with the purpose of

hearing which is merely todetermine the weight ofevidence for purposes of bail.A summary hearing means suchbrief and speedy method ofreceiving and considering theevidence of guilt as ispracticable and consistent withthe purpose of hearing which ismerely to determine the weightof evidence for purposes of bail.

+n such hearing, the court doesnot sit to try the merits or toenter into any nice in*uiry as tothe weight that ought to beallowed to the evidence for oragainst the accused, nor will itspeculate on the outcome of thetrial or on what further evidencemay be therein o?ered oradmitted. !he course of in*uiry

may be left to the discretion ofthe court which may con$neitself to receiving such evidenceas has reference to substantialmatters, avoiding unnecessarythoroughness in thee)amination and crosse)amination.

(ame; (ame; Judges; !he judgeis mandated to conduct ahearing even in cases where theprosecution chooses to just $lea comment or leaves theapplication of bail to the sounddiscretion of the court.n therecent case of nocencio -ascov. Judge Leo @. apatalo, thisCourt ruled that P) ) ) the judge

is mandated to conduct ahearing even in cases where theprosecution chooses to just $lea comment or leave theapplication of bail to the sounddiscretion of the court. Ahearing is li#ewise re*uired ifthe prosecution refuses toadduce evidence in oppositionto the application to grant and$) bail. !he importance of a

hearing has been emphasied innot a few cases wherein thecourt ruled that, even if theprosecution refuses to adduceevidence or fails to interpose anobjection to the motion forbail, it is still mandatory for thecourt to conduct a hearing oras# searching *uestions fromwhich it may infer the strength

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of the evidence of guilt, or thelac# of it against the accused.Q

(ame; (ame; (ame; nasmuchas the determination of whetheror not the evidence of guiltagainst the accused is strong isa matter of judicial discretion, it

may rightly be e)ercised onlyafter the evidence is submittedto the court at the hearing.

!he reason for this is plain.nasmuch as the determinationof whether or not the evidenceof guilt against the accused isstrong is a matter of judicialdiscretion, it may rightly bee)ercised only after theevidence is submitted to the

court at the hearing. (ince thediscretion is directed to theweight of evidence and sinceevidence cannot properly beweighed if not duly e)hibited orproduced before the court, it isobvious that a proper e)erciseof judicial discretion re*uiresthat the evidence of guilt besubmitted to the court, thepetitioner having the right of

cross e)amination and tointroduce evidence in his ownrebuttal.

(ame; (ame; (ame; !he court"sorder granting or refusing bailmust contain a summary of theevidence for the prosecution,otherwise the order may beinvalidated because the

summary of the evidence forthe prosecution which containsthe judge"s evaluation of theevidence may be considered asan aspect of procedural dueprocess for both the prosecutionand the defense.%orth noting,too, is the fact that the order

granting the application, as wellas the reduction for bail in theaforecited cases, did not containa summary of the evidencepresented by the prosecution. nCriminal Case &o. 14=K4:,respondent only arrived at theconclusion that Pthe evidencewas not so strong to warrant the$)ation of said amountQ and theobservation that6 P%hen the

hearing of this petition wascalled, some legal s#irmishesarose between the Frosecutorand the Defense Counsel, afterwhich, the prosecutor out ofhumanitarian reason yieldedand manifested that he isamenable that the accused beadmitted to bail in the amountof F11,111.11Q in CriminalCase &o. 1K=K//. %ell settled in

a number of cases is the rulethat the court"s order grantingor refusing bail must contain asummary of the evidence forthe prosecution, otherwise theorder granting or denying bailmay be invalidated because thesummary of the evidence forthe prosecution which containsthe judge"s evaluation of the

evidence may be considered asan aspect of procedural dueprocess for both the prosecutionand the defense.

(ame; (ame; !he right to bailcan only be availed of by aperson who is in custody of the

law or otherwise deprived of hisliberty and it would bepremature, not to sayincongruous, to $le a petitionfor bail for someone whosefreedom has yet to be curtailed.!he procedural lapse ofrespondent judge is aggravatedby the fact that even though theaccused in Criminal Case &o.14=K4:, Feople v. Ahmed

Duerme, have yet to bearrested, respondent already$)ed bail in the sum ofF11,111.11. espondentevidently #new that the accusedwere still at large as he evenhad to direct their arrest in thesame order where hesimultaneously granted thembail. At this juncture, there is aneed to reiterate the basic

principle that the right to bailcan only be availed of by aperson who is in custody of thelaw or otherwise deprived of hisliberty and it would bepremature, not to sayincongruous, to $le a petitionfor bail for someone whosefreedom has yet to be curtailed.

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(ame; (ame; As long as in$)ing the amount of bail thecourt is guided by the purposefor which bail is re*uired, thatis, to secure the appearance ofthe accused to answer chargesbrought against him, thedecision of the court to grant

bail in the sum it deemsappropriate will not beinterfered with.n CriminalCase &o. 1K=03E for homicide$led against accused &ilo deivera, complainant alleges thatthe amount of F3:,K11.11granted by respondent asbailbond of the accused is toolow. espondent judge stressesthat the amount was

recommended by theprosecutor and not motu proprioby the trial court. espondentadded that the amount of bailwas appropriate inasmuch as itwas $)ed in accordance withthe guidelines set forth in(ection 0 of AdministrativeCircular 3=0:. As long as in$)ing the amount of bail, thecourt is guided by the purpose

for which bail is re*uired, thatis, to secure the appearance ofthe accused to answer chargesbrought against him, thedecision of the court to grantbail in the sum it deemsappropriate will not beinterfered with.

(ame; (ame; Judges; rossgnorance; A judge is guilty ofgross ignorance of the law if hegrants bail in a murder casewithout conducting the re*uisitehearing.n sum, we $ndrespondent Judge (egundo -.Catral guilty of gross ignorance

of the law for having grantedbail to the accused in CriminalCases &os. 14=K4: and 1K=K//without having conducted there*uisite hearing. t is indeedsurprising, not to say, alarming,that the Court should bebesieged with a number ofadministrative cases $ledagainst erring judges involvingbail. After all, there is no dearth

of jurisprudence on the basicprinciples involving bail. As amatter of fact, the Court itself,through its Fhilippine JudicialAcademy, has been includinglectures on the subject in theregular seminars conducted for

judges.

(ame; (ame; (ame; Duties ofJudge in -ail Applications.-e

that as it may, we reiterate thefollowing duties of the trial

judge in case an application forbail is $led6 P3. n all cases,whether bail is a matter of rightor of discretion, notify theprosecutor of the hearing of theapplication for bail or re*uirehim to submit hisrecommendation 2(ection 3K,

ule 33: of the ules of Courtas amended5; . %here bail is amatter of discretion, conduct ahearing of the application forbail regardless of whether or notthe prosecution refuses topresent evidence to show thatthe guilt of the accused is

strong for the purpose ofenabling the court to e)erciseits sound discretion 2(ections 4and K5; 7. Decide whether theguilt of the accused is strongbased on the summary ofevidence of the prosecution; :.f the guilt of the accused is notstrong, discharge the accusedupon the approval of thebailbond 2(ection 305.

+therwise, the petition shouldbe denied.Q

(ame; (ame; (ame; Iaith in theadministration of justice canonly be engendered if litigantsare convinced that themembers of the -ench cannot

justly be charged with ade$ciency in their grasp of legalprinciples.%ith such succinct

but clear rules now incorporatedin the ules of Court, trial

judges are enjoined to studythem well and be guidedaccordingly. Admittedly, judgescannot be held to account foran erroneous decision renderedin good faith, but this defense ismuch too fre*uently cited evenif not applicable. A number of

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cases on bail having alreadybeen decided, this Court

justi$ably e)pects judges todischarge their dutiesassiduously. Ior a judge is calledupon to e)hibit more than just acursory ac*uaintance withstatutes and procedural rules; it

is imperative that he beconversant with basic legalprinciples. Iaith in theadministration of justice canonly be engendered if litigantsare convinced that themembers of the -ench cannot

justly be charged with ade$ciency in their grasp of legalprinciples. Cortes vs. Catral, 40(CA 3, A.@. &o. !J=04=37K4

(eptember 31, 3004

6. M)r>)+-/el)'o v Flore

Judges; ross gnorance of theLaw; t is imperative that judgesbe conversant with basic legalprinciplesjudges owe it to thepublic and to the legalprofession to #now the law theyare supposed to apply to a

given controversy.!heforegoing $ndings anddis*uisitions of the +CA are wellta#en. t is imperative that

judges be conversant with basiclegal principles. ndeed, theCode of Judicial Conduct enjoins

judges to Pbe faithful to the lawand mainta

bail self incrimination

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