background report 2.83 land use analysis - fores · abbreviation! es! ecosystemservice! np!...
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Land Use Analysis
Project Activity 2.83 for the Project: Developing a piloting model on payments for coastal wetland ecosystem services in Mui Ca Mau National Park in the context of climate change contributing to poverty reduction
in local community
THIS DOCUMENT IS SPONSORED BY
Project sponsored by The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency in Vietnam Project Partners Biodiversity Conservation Agency, Vietnam Environment Administration, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Vietnam Research Center of Forest and Wetlands, Vietnam Forum for Reforms, Entrepreneurship and Sustainability, Sweden This report prepared by Daxam Sustainability Services, Sweden May 2013 Citation BCA, FORES, FORWET 2013, Land Use Analysis, Stockholm, Sweden Project Team Ulrika Stavlöt Ana P Aponte Scott Cole Linus Hasselström Daniel Engström Stenson Nguyen The Dong Huynh Thi Mai Nguyen Chi Thanh Nguyen Tuan Phu Nguyen Tien Dung Le Huu Phu
Contacts Biodiversity Conservation Agency, Vietnam Environment Administration, Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment Management No 10, Ton That Thuyet Street, Cau Giay district, Hanoi, Vietnam Tel.: + 84 4 37956868 Ext.3108 Forum for Reforms, Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Bellmansgatan 10 118 20 Stockholm, Sweden Tel: +46 08 45 22 660
Table of Contents 1. Land use in Viet Nam .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2. Land reforms ................................................................................................................................ 6
1.3. Land distribution .......................................................................................................................... 6
1.3.1. Forestland distribution .......................................................................................................... 7
1.3.2. Wetland distribution ............................................................................................................. 8
1.3.3. Wetland use and PES ............................................................................................................. 8
1.3.4. Customary wetland use practice in Mui Ca Mau NP ............................................................. 9
2. Laws and regulations ..................................................................................................................... 11
2.1. Forestland legislations ............................................................................................................... 11
2.1. Wetland legislations ............................................................................................................... 12
2.2. PES and land and natural resource use legislations ................................................................ 13
3. Lesson learned from pilot PES in Vietnam and land use issues ..................................................... 14
3.1. Legislation limitation .............................................................................................................. 15
3.2. HHs’ land tenure and landholding area .................................................................................. 15
3.3. Exclusion of poor HHs ............................................................................................................. 15
3.4. Multiple intermediaries in PES process .................................................................................. 16
3.5. Strong state involvement in PES process ................................................................................ 16
3.6. Application of PES for state management problem ............................................................... 17
References ............................................................................................................................................ 18
Abbreviation
ES ecosystem service
NP national park
PES payment for ecosystem service
PFES payment for forest ecosystem service
LUR land use right
HH household
SOFEs state owned forest enterprises
PDF production forest
PTF protection forest
SUF special use forest
MONRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
CAPI Coalesce Authority, Power and Influence
Purpose: Study existing situation of land use right and wetland natural resource use right of local stakeholders under legal regulations and local traditional custom in Mui Ca Mau National Park (NP) for the construction of a pilot PES scheme.
1. Land use in Viet Nam Stated by current Law on Land (2003), all lands and natural resources that come from lands in Vietnam belong to the population and the State has the administration power over them on behalf of the population. State can grant citizens and organizations the right to use lands (LUR) for a limited period (20 years for agriculture lands and 50 years for forestlands). Holders of the LUR can sell, lease, exchange, inherit, transfer, mortgage LUR and receive compensation when lands are taken back by the State but they do not own lands or decide how lands are used (Vietnamese Law on Land 2003, USAID 2012, To et al. 2012, Ta 2011). In this report, the term land use refers to both to the use of lands and natural resources that come from lands.
1.2. Land reforms Land and natural resource’s distribution in Vietnam has gone through major reforms as summarized in table 1. Table 1: Reforms on land and natural resource governance Period Major reform
1954 • Feudal government: private, commune and government land
ownerships and land tax policies. • French colony government: private land ownership, nation-‐wide
land tax system. (Phung, general department of land administration1)
1954-‐1975 • The Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north: collectivization; state ownership of all lands and natural resources.
• The Republic of Vietnam in the south: ownership right granted to land tenants (USAID 2013, Ta 2011)
1975-‐1986 • Collectivization and central planning economy: the state ownership of all lands and natural resources was extended to southern Vietnam as well.
Post 1986 • Allocation of land use rights to individuals, HHs and organizations
• LUR can be sold, transferred, mortgaged, inherit and leased. • Decentralization of land management to provincial and district
authorities. Individuals, HHs or organizations can acquire LUR by 3 major ways:
• State grants the allocation of LUR to individuals, HHs or organizations. • States rents the land to individuals, HHs or organizations. • LUR can be obtained through lease, purchase, transfer, exchange, charity and
inherit.
1.3. Land distribution This section discusses the distribution of forestland and wetland since the PES project location is situated in the mangrove forest wetland national park in Mui Ca Mau. Since the Law on Land 1987, land in Vietnam is classified according to use purpose: agriculture, forest, resident, special use and un-‐used land. Specific laws in agriculture
1 http://diachinh.net/vi/about/ Assessed 06032013
and forest sector legislate further land classification. According to the Law on Forest Protection and Development (2004), forestlands are classified in 3 main categories:
• Production forest (PDF): for production of timber and non-‐timber products. • Protection forest (PTF): for watershed protection, protection from soil erosion
and desertification and climate regulation. • Special use forest (SUF): for natural conservation, biodiversity, species
resources, scientific research, history and cultural conservation, and eco-‐tourism. National parks are under this category, so as the rehabilitation areas within the parks.
1.3.1. Forestland distribution Before 1990 State managed all forestlands through state owned forest enterprises (SOFEs). The SOFEs operated and logged timber products for sale. In 1986, as a result of economic reform, the state started the process to decollectivize land; households can be contracted to protect forestlands and use poor quality lands with no forest cover, via contracting agreements between SOFEs and HHs (McElwee 2012, ICRAF Vietnam 2012, USAID 2013). From 2004, communities and organizations can also be granted the LUR for forestlands. Currently, the State allows multiple users of forestlands with multiple tenure rights to classified forestland categories, as illustrated in table 2. Table 2: Distribution of forestland use rights in Vietnam Users Tenure rights
Assess Use Management alienation Exclusion Production
forest (PDF)
Protection forest * (PTF)
Special use forest (SUF)
PDF PTF SUF PDF PTF SUF PDF PTF SUF PDF PTF SUF
State organizations
x x x x x x x x x x ? ? ?
Business organizations
x x x x x x ? ? ?
Communities x x x x x x ? ? ? HHs/individuals x x x x x x ? ? ? Peoples committee at the commune level (**)
x x x x ? ? ?
Source: ICRAF Vietnam, 2012, Westholm et al. 2011 * The use right of protection forests (PTF) is limited to a) the extraction of non-‐timber products and timber by-‐products in natural forests, and b) selected timber products in planted forests. ** Only has temporary management right of the forest areas that are not yet allocated. Tenure rights:
• Assess: the right to enter the area • Use: the right to obtain resources e.g. timber, firewood. In the case of Mui Ca Mau
NP, HHs who lease the land, can conduct agroforestry and extensive aquaculture (Vietnam Law on Land 2003).
• Management: the right to regulate internal use patterns or transform the resource
• Alienation: the right to sale or lease of the land • Exclusion: the right to decide who can or cannot use the resource
1.3.2. Wetland distribution Wetlands in Vietnam are classified into two broad categories, in terms of land use: coastal wetland (mostly mangrove forests) and inland wetland (Monre 2004, Torell et al 2003). Mui Ca Mau National Park is coastal wetland and is under the special used forest category (SUFs).
According to the Law on Forest Protection and Development 2004, the State has the power to decide how much and how long the SUFs will be allocated or leased but it does not specify further. The State also decides if the SUFs are taken back or change the SUFs’ use category.
The provincial peoples committee exercises the State’s power to allocate, lease and take back SUFs to and from state and business organizations while the district people’s committee has these power to HHs, individuals and communities.
SUFs are only allocated to organizations, in the case of national park, it is the NP management board-‐a government appointed agency. The NP2 then can lease SUFs to HHs living in the rehabilitation areas via a contracting agreement. In this case, HHs do not receive secure tenure in term of LUR (Vietnam Govt. Decree # 181/2004/NĐ-‐CP, 2004).
According to the leasing contract, HHs will receive a designated area in the SUFs for a designated period of time to conduct forest protection and some economic activities (such as tree planting, aquaculture and agroforestry). HHs receive remuneration for their protection work and can earn a certain percentage of the income generated from their economic activities. The NP decides the area, the contract period and the remuneration based on the regulation on forestland leasing issued by Forestry Ministry-‐now MARD. The financial resources for this contracting work comes from State budget, bank loans and international aid funds and will be allocated annually to the NP. The contract must be registered at the local people’s committee (Vietnam Govt. Decision # 202/1994/QD-‐TTg, 1994).
In the case of leasing, SUFs can be leased to business organizations to protect the landscape and conduct eco-‐tourism business. These organizations must pay an annual leasing fee.
1.3.3. Wetland use and PES Land tenure has important implication to the successful implementation of PES since PES often requires long term investment decision (McElwee, 2012). In the case of Mui Ca Mau NP, the fact that HHs do not have secure tenure might create a significant challenge 2 Only state owned forest ‘owner’ organization can lease forestland to HHs (Circulation # 06 18/6/1994).
to the design of PES that involve them. The question is a creative PES structure that does not depend on land secure tenure. One should not count on institutional change in land tenure in Vietnam in the near future, given complex history of land distribution in the country.
1.3.4. Customary wetland use practice in Mui Ca Mau NP HHs in Mui Ca Mau NP received a contract for Forest Protection and Reforestation in 1998. Those contracts will finish in December 2013. With this contract the HH gains the right to use the land as follow:
• 50% for reforestation • 21% for forest protection • 29% for agriculture, forestry and/or aquaculture
As a compensation for the work protecting the forest, HHs do not need to pay any kind of taxes for the use of the land. Table 3: The contract defines the rights and responsibilities of the parties involved.
Contract for forest protection and reforestation
Parties Duties Responsibilities
Party A: Local authority
-‐ Controlling, guiding Party B to follow faithfully the plans, the processes, technical norms in reforestation and forest protection;
-‐ Suspending or cancelling the contract and forcing to compensate for the damage if Party B breaks the contract;
-‐ Settle the soil conflicts within Party A’s jurisdiction or transfer to the authority;
-‐ Making records and judging under the Law of forest protection and development.
-‐ Guiding Party B to follow regulations of forest management and the project (forest contract);
-‐ Identifying boundaries, square area, current status of the area;
-‐ Popularizing policies, processes, technical norms; organizing stock (seeding, breeding, …) services; and transferring forestry engineering to Party B;
-‐ Compensating for the damage in case of Party A’s guilty.
Party B: Households
-‐ To be allowed combination of production and enterprise on area-‐allotted;
-‐ To be taken advantage of forestry policies such as funding investment, transferring technique;
-‐ To be compensated if Party A
-‐ To be responsible for forest protection to critical land, protected forests and strict protection zone, special use forests such as be against cutting forest, against appropriating land, preventing and fighting fire, preventing insects;
-‐ To be fully responsible for funding
causes damage;
-‐ To be received 70% of profit as the projects approved after deducting expenses and taxes (Critical land, protected forests and strict protection zone, special use forests are not applied)
-‐ To be taken advantage of own products from the combination, but not damage forest.
-‐ To be transferred right of forest use to other as the date expired.
investment, forest area allotted, land and environment protection;
-‐ Obeying regulations in the law of forest protection and development, and regulations in management of protected forest, special use forest;
-‐ Complying with processes faithfully in forest protection and reforestation which Party A has instructed
-‐ Compensating Party A for damage that is caused by Party B
2. Laws and regulations 2.1. Forestland legislations Forestlands in Vietnam is subjected to different laws, including:
• Law on Land (1987, 1993, amended 1998, amended 2001, 2003, proposal amended 2013)
• Law on forest protection and development (1991, 2004) • Law on environmental protection (1993, 2005) • Law on biodiversity (2008)
Table 3: Forestland legislations
Legal document Main contents regarding land use and PES
Law on Land 1987
• Land use rights were leased and granted to households and individuals (Ta 2011)
Law on Land 1993
• SOFEs granted farmers land use certificates to lease, exchange, inherit, transfer and use lands as collateral (To et al. 2012, Ta 2011)
Law on Land amended 1998
• Long-‐term and stable use of lands for 20 years (Ta 2011)
Law on Land amended 2001
• Land use right titles to households and individuals (LUR) (Ta 2011)
Law on Land 2003
• Land use rights (LUR) is made ‘a commodity openly traded in the market’(Ta 2011). Although government has complicated regulations on LUR price but in practice the price is established according to supply-‐demand relationship. This triggers increasingly land conflicts in society, particularly when the State takes back the land and compensates LUR holders with the regulated price that in most cases is far lower than market price.
Law on Land proposal amended 2013
• Agriculture land use increases from 20 to 50 years. • Chairman of provincial people’s committee can decide to
change land use category, on land allocation and leasing of the buffer zone of SUFs to organizations and HHs and lease SUFs to economic organizations for eco-‐tourism. Previous laws gave collective decision power to provincial people’s committee.
Law on forest protection and development 1991
• Category of forest, NP belongs to SUFs. • HHs can participate in forest protection via forest
protection contract in poor quality forestlands without forest cover. (Do et al 2012)
Law on forest protection and development
• Legal forestland use rights granted to HHs • Communities and organizations are granted forestland use
right.
2004 (Do et al 2012) Law on environmental protection 1993
• User pay principle (article #7): a user of a service or resource pays directly for the amount they use.
• Biodiversity conservation principle Law on environmental protection 2005
• Regulations on environmental tax, environmental fee, establishment of environmental protection fund.
• Allows for private sector to bid for the provision of certain environmental protection services (which are often provided by state entities
Law on biodiversity 2008
• Encourage eco-‐tourism for poverty reduction for HHs living legally in the conservation area and sustainable development in the conservation buffer zone.
• State decides the establishment of national conservation zone (including NPs), provincial people’s committee decides the establishment of provincial conservation zone (NPs)
• Lands in conservation zones are allocated to the zone’s state management organizations
2.1. Wetland legislations Before 2003, there was no single legislation for wetlands, instead wetlands were regulated by different laws and regulations which cover agriculture, fishery, forestry and environment (Doan 2003). In 2003, the first government decree dedicated to regulate the conservation and sustainable development of wetlands was introduced in Vietnam: decree # 109/2003/ND-‐CP (Decree 109). The decree for the first time provides a more specific definition of wetlands (see table 4 below).
Despite the single legal framework introduced in 2003, the institutional management of wetlands is quite unclear and in some cases overlapping. For example mangrove forests in wetlands are regulated both by Decree 109 and the Law on Forest Protection and Development 2004; the water surface in the wetlands is under the Law on Water Resources (Doan 2003), and the species in the wetlands are covered by the Law on Biodiversity 2008. As a result, multiple government agencies are in-‐charge of management of wetlands, for example MARD and MONRE at the national level; department of land administration, department of fishery, department of forestry and department of science and technology and environment at provincial level (Trinh 2003).
Table 4: Wetland legislations
Legal document
Main contents related to land use and PES
Government Decree # 109/2003/ND-‐CP, 23 Sept 2003:
• 1st time definition of wetlands: ‘areas which possess peculiar ecological systems and high biodiversity, have function of maintaining water sources and ecological balance, have national and international significance’ (Source: Govt Official Gazette #159 28/09/2003)
• Purpose: increase community participation in wetland
Conservation and Sustainable Development of Wetlands
conservation • Government management of wetland exploitation activities in
agriculture, aquaculture, tourism, transportation, hydro power, irrigation.
• MONRE is the state governing agency of wetlands-‐policy making and monitoring body. MARD: organizing management of specialized wetland conservation zones
• Encourage aquaculture practices that are environmental friendly: combination of industrial aquaculture with eco-‐aquaculture, and aquaculture-‐fishery-‐agriculture model
MONRE circular # 18/2004/TT-‐BTNMT, 23 Aug 2004: instruction for implementing Govt decree 2003
• Classification of wetlands: coastal wetland (including mangrove forest) and in-‐land wetland
• Criteria and procedure to establish wetland conservation zones
• Conservation zone includes: strict conservation area, ecological rehabilitation area, administration area
• Encourage HHs living in the conservation zones and buffer zones to participate in ecological protection and development activities
MONRE decision # 04/2004/QĐ-‐BTNMT, 5 April 2004: action plan for wetland conservation 2004-‐2010
• Overall objective: conservation and sustainable development of wetlands to meet socio-‐economic development, poverty reduction, natural resource protection, environment and biodiversity.
• Objectives to 2006: Create policy to include community participation3
• Objectives to 2010: o Pilot and replicate socio-‐economic effective models for
sustainable development of wetland o Mobilize private resources (xa hoi hoa) for
conservation work
2.2. PES and land and natural resource use legislations Two major documents provide legislative principles to the application of PES in Vietnam:
• Government decree # 99/2010/NĐ-‐CP, 2010 (PFES)-‐PES for forests; • Government’s decision # 126/QĐ-‐TTg, 2012-‐pilot mechanism to share benefits in
management, protection and development of SUFs. PFES (Govt. decree # 99/2010/NĐ-‐CP): HHs who has land lease contract with NPs are eligible as providers of forest ecosystem services and receive payment accordingly. Pilot PES for SUFs (Govt. decision # 126/2012/QD-‐TTg)
3 Trang notes: cannot find such policy in existence
• Pilot locations include Xuan Thuy NP and Bach Ma NP. Mui Ca Mau NP is not included in this decision.
• Detail list of ‘shared benefits’ at designated SUFs, for example exploitation of certain forest products like rattan, bamboo, honey, wild boars, rats, snake, herb medicine, wild oysters and shrimps, oyster aquaculture, etc.
• Village community, HHs and individuals who live legally in the designated SUFs and their buffer villages are allowed to extract natural resources identified in the above mention list via a mechanism called ‘benefit sharing’.
• The plan to share benefits is prepared by NP management board and the PFES management council (representatives of all actors in PFES), subjected to approval of MARD. The plan should identify current status of natural resources, list of shared benefits, amount, period, sharing mechanism, who can receive the shared benefits, management, monitoring, evaluation of the extraction of natural resources, measurements to minimize the risk/impacts due to extraction process.
• Participants to the pilot PES for SUFs are: NP management board, village community, HHs, individuals who live legally inside the SUFs and their buffer villages.
• In this decision there is no article which mentions land use of SUFs. There are however annexes that list specific benefits from SUFs to be shared between NP management boards and local community and HHs.
3. Lesso
4. Lessons learned from pilot PES in Vietnam and land use issues There are numbers of articles analyzing land use in Vietnam in regards to pilot PES mechanism. The following lesson learnt are drawn from the author’s analysis of various land legislations and from the two major studies conducted by To et al. (2012) and McElwee (2012).
4.1. Legislation limitation The legal statement that HHs who lease SUFs land from NP cannot get the LUF provide a disincentive to invest long term in SUFs. Decision 199 legislates PES for forest where in many cases HHs are providers of ESs. Although the most recent legislation decision 126 (2013) regulates the ecosystems in mangrove forest in SUFs where HHs can be users (aquaculture, agroforestry) of ESs, there is heavy involvement of state agencies in framing the PFES (state NP management board, MARD). In the case where HHs are both providers and users of ESs like in wetland area, the synergy between decision 199 and 126 is yet known. For example, under decision 199, ESs users pay to the state forest protection fund, then providers receive remuneration from this fund. Many intermediaries involve in the distribution of this fund. On the other hand, decision 126 does not specify the payment structure, leaving it to the negotiation between representatives of HHs and NPs but the payment plan must be approved by MARD.
4.2. HHs’ land tenure and landholding area In the PFES pilot in Lam Dong province, HHs gained only short term benefit since they signed only a 1 year forest protection contract with State forest management entity. In the PFES pilot in Son La, even though HHs have longer land tenure, their small landholding area (average 2ha/HHs) also did not give them adequate remuneration that can motive their forest protection activity (To et al. 2012, McElwee 2012)
4.3. Exclusion of poor HHs Pilot PESs require formal proof of land holding, for example LURs or formal lease contract with NPs (in the case of SUFs) can exclude poor HHs who have difficulty to gain formal land access (i.e. newly immigrated or HHs living in buffer zone) or have land access via customary practice (To et al. 2012). There is currently no legal acceptance of customary practice of land use in Vietnam even though some legislation vaguely state that community should be encouraged to participate in forest protection but does not say how. The formal land use legislation
that give land use right to individual, HHs or organization conflict with customary practice, particularly in the uplands where members of the community share access to the forest and the use of forest resources. In the case of dispute, the formal land distribution legislation wins over customary practice for example village traditions (To et al. 2012). Further, poor HHs are viewed as lacking sufficient capability (manpower and capital) to protect the forest compared to wealthier HHs, which is another reason for state forest management entities (like NPs or SOFEs) to exclude them from PES programs (McElwee 2012).
4.4. Multiple intermediaries in PES process In the pilot PFES in Vietnam, multiple stakeholders are involved in the PES process, for example the ministries, the SOFEs, provincial and district authorities, the NP management board, private companies and the HHs who often have a weak voice in this setting. The result is that multiple and complicated institutions were created to satisfy the interest of these parties, for example the payment for forest protection services is not made directly to the providers, instead, it is paid through a state managed forest protection fund or forest protection contract has to be verified by local authorities. As a consequence, PES transaction costs become high and the benefits of PES to HHs is reduced significantly.
4.5. Strong state involvement in PES process State and state-‐associated organizations are vested power to decide on land distribution and may inadvertently prevent the benefits of PES from reaching the local population. For example, although the State allocates or leases the land to HHs, they have the ultimate power to decide how the land will be used and if and when the land is taken back. HHs that are allocated forestland for forest protection still have to seek the authority’s permission to log timber or to cultivate in their forestland (Nguyen et al 2008). State SOFEs still control a large amount of forestland (83% according to statistics of MARD IN 2006). HHs are frequently allocated or leased poor quality forestland with only limited forest cover (McElwee 2012). This can create a problem when PES is applied in a scenario of State-‐ownership (which includes the resources on the land) because HHs have invested their own resources in terms of trees planted. Further, even though PES contracts should, in theory, be voluntarily negotiated between contracting parties, they have to be registered at the local committee and must follow the standard terms and conditions stated by the Ministries.
The decentralization of land allocation and the leasing of land to provincial and district authorities without proper monitoring systems leads to corruption and rent-‐seeking activities, which further marginalize poor HHs.
4.6. Application of PES for state management problem Finally, the application of PES in Vietnam until now is trying to solve state management problems, for example unequal distribution of land tenure in different forest categories, poor state management of forest, corruption and vested interests of state forest management agencies, and chronic budget shortfalls. This distorts the true meaning of PES which aims to solve market externalities (McElwee 2012).
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MONRE (2004) Decision # 04/2004/QĐ-‐BTNMT, 5 April 2004: Action plan for wetland conservation 2004-‐2010.
Nguyen et al. (2008). Whose forest tenure reform is it? Lessons from case studies in Vietnam. RECOFTC Policy brief no.1. Phuc Xuan To et al. (2012). The prospects for payment for ecosystem services (PES) in Vietnam: A look at three payment schemes. Human Ecology 40, pp 237–249. Phung. History of the establishment of land management authority in Vietnam. http://diachinh.net/vi/about/ Assessed 06032013. in Vietnamese.
Ta (2011). Diversity of resource use and property rights in Tam Giang lagoon, Vietnam. International Journal of the Commons, Vol 5, No 1.
Torell et al (2003). Wetlands management in Vietnam’s Mekong delta: An overview of the pressures and responses. Wetland management in Vietnam: Issues and perspectives. WorldFish Center publication. Trinh (2003). Institutional and policy issues of wetlands management in Ben Tre province, Vietnam. Wetland management in Vietnam: Issues and perspectives. WorldFish Center publication. USAID (2013). USAID country profile: Property rights and resource governance. Vietnam
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Vietnam Government (2004). Decree # 181/2004/NĐ-‐CP, 2004. Implementation of law on land 2003. Vietnam Government (2003). Decree # 109/2003/ND-‐CP, 23 Sept 2003: Conservation and sustainable development of wetlands.
Vietnam Government (2010). Decree # 99/2010/NĐ-‐CP, 2010: Policy on PES for forests (PFES). Vietnam Prime Minister (2012). Decision # 126/QĐ-‐TTg, 2012: Pilot mechanism to share benefits in management, protection and development of SUFs.
Westholm et al. 2011. REDD+ and tenure: a review of the latest developments in research, implementation and debate. Focali report 2011:02.