Addressing the recruitment and use of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: what is the role of the international instruments put into place to deal with this issue?

Bachelor thesis

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ContentsCover page …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….I

Table of contents ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….II

List of Abbreviations ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……III

Section 1. Introduction to the subject……………………………………………………………………………………………………1

§ 1.1 The issues that will be discussed in this thesis ……………………………………………………………………….1

§ 1.2 The themes discussed in the thesis …………………………………………………………………………………………1

§1.3 The significance of the research conducted in this area ………………………………………..………………….2

Section 2. The legal framework………………………………………………………………………………………………….………….2

§2.1 The United Nations convention on the rights of the child ………………………………….……………………. 3

§2.2 The Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol …………………..…………..….… 3

§2.3 The International Labour Organization ……………………………………………………………………………………. 5

§2.4 The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court …………………………………………….…………… 7

§2.5 The Paris Principles and Commitments …………………………………………………………………………………... 8

Section 3. The use of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo………………………………………………9

§3.1 the global issue of using child soldiers in armed conflicts ……………………………………………………….. 9

§3.2 pinpointing the cause of the ongoing conflict in the Congo …………………………………………………... 10

§3.3 Child soldiers and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ……………………………….……..……… 11

Section 4. Tackling the issue of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ………………..……12

§4.1 Practical difficulties ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 12

§4.2 The role of the committee on the rights of the child …………………………………………………………….. 14

§4.3 the role of NGOs in monitoring the optional protocol ………………………………………………….………. 15

§4.4 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) ……………….….. 17

Section 5. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….18

Figures ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…… 20

Bibliography ….……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………22

Internet sources ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 25

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List of abbreviations

AFDL Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre

AP- I Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949

AP - II Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949

CNDP Congrès national pour la défense du peuple

CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DRC the Democratic Republic of the Congo

FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo

FLDR Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

ICC International Criminal Court

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ILO International Labor Organization

M23 Mouvement du 23 Mars

MONUC l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo

MONUSCO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo

NGO Non – Governmental Organization

OP-AC Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict

RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie

TRIAL Swiss Association Against Impunity

UN United Nations

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund

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Section 1. Introduction to the subject

§ 1.1 the issue that will be dealt with in the thesis The recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts is a human rights infringement which is recognized worldwide as one of the worst forms of child labor1 and has even been classified as a war crime2 because of the psychological strain3 and obvious physical risk involved. The concentration of this problem is in the African continent as most of these countries have limited resources for countering this problem along with severe political instability.4 A big milestone in tackling this issue was adopting the United Nations optional protocol to the convention of the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict which entered into force on February 12th 2002.5 The ratification of this protocol has been widespread and there are 156 parties to the convention as of June 2014.6 Considering the limited scale of this thesis, its focus is exclusively on the way this problem is tackled in one particular geographic area: the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The issue of using child soldiers has been particularly widespread in this country as they are recruited by rebel groups like the M23 offensive7 which have become active in awakening the conflict in the area since 2009.8

§ 1.2 the themes discussed in the thesis

The main question that will be answered in this thesis is: What is the role of the various international instruments protecting children’s rights in combating the issue of child soldiering in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

Other questions that will be focused on in this thesis are:

1. What are the different judicial instruments which govern the issue of child soldiers?

2. What are the practical difficulties that arise when attempting to solve the issue of child soldiers?

3. How has the legal protection of children involved in armed conflicts evolved througout the years?

4. How does the Committee on the Rights of the Child practice its monitoring duties when it comes to the implementation of the Optional Protocol in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

5. What is the role of NGOs in addressing the issue of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

1 Art. 3(a) ILO convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour2 Article 5 and 8 (2)(b) §XXVI Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court3 See § 4.1 4 Hartjen, 20125 Coomaraswamy, 2010, p. 5376 United Nations, 20147 The group takes its name (Mouvement du 23- Mars) from the date of peace accords between the United Nations and the DRC government. 8 Nangine, et al., 2014, p. 3

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To get to the bottom of these questions I’ll be focusing on the following themes:

The first theme to be explored is that of international human rights rules which aim to protect the rights of the children and their added value to the protection of children in armed conflict. The most prominent of these instruments is the optional protocol to the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OP-AC). This protocol is monitored by the committee on the Rights of the Child which is made up of 18 independent experts on the subject of child’s rights. 9

The theme that the thesis will next focus on is that of the main issue: the use of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This use has a long history starting with the first Congo war10 and has remained an issue ever since. The ongoing conflict which has been at the root of the problem is caused by a complex of reasons which are hard to comprehend and therefore often unjustly simplified by the international community and the academic world.

There will consequently be an overview of what the various legal instruments have contributed to the attempt to mitigate the problem of recruitment and use of child soldiers. The latest report of the DRC to the committee of the Rights of the Child on its implementation of the optional protocol which provides a deeper understanding into the complexity of the issue and the different factors in play will be discussed along with the supporting role NGOs provide in monitoring the issue. Lastly the UN mission in the DRC which has a specific mandate to prevent recruitment of children and to provide reintegration programmes will be shortly elaborated.

§ 1.3 The significance of the research into this topic

The topic discussed in this topic is very relevant; the military groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly those which are active in the South Kivu province are tremendously destructive.11 A strict compliance of the optional protocol and other human rights instruments governing this issue would not only stop horrendous infringements of the human rights of these children, it would also help in diminishing the capacity of these military rebel groups, thereby weakening them. The challenge lies in solving such a problem in a third world country with such a hostile political climate.12 Evaluating the effectiveness of the legal framework dealing with this problem might be instrumental in finding out what it would take to solve not only the problem of child soldiers in the region but also the underlying conflicts.

Section 2. The legal framework The protection of children involved in armed conflict has had a long history; it started with the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977. 13 The protocols included provisions such as the “obligation of the states to take all feasible measures to prevent children under the age of fifteen from taking direct part in hostilities”,14 and prohibiting “the recruitment and the participation of children under the age of fifteen in hostilities”.15

9 UNICEF, 200910 See §3.2.1 11 ASADHO et al., 2012, p. 712 Further discussed in § 3.2.213 Williams, 2011, p. 107514 Additional Protocol I Article 7715 Additional Protocol II Article 4 Para. 3c

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It took a long time after these initial protection mechanisms were put in place for humanitarian law to catch up to this issue and provide further protection. The convention on the rights of the rights of the child (CRC) which came into force in 1989 had only a limited role in strengthening the position of child soldiers and tackling this issue.16 The biggest development that has occurred since the CRC is the adoption of the optional protocol to this convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict. The optional protocol which has been put in to force in 2002 has gained worldwide support and ratification from states. The aim of this section of the thesis is to provide clarification as to how the treaty, optional protocol, the treaty body and other children’s rights instruments work together to address the issue.

§ 2.1 The United Nations’ convention on the rights of the child

The Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most widely ratified children’s rights instrument.17The main article of the convention which deals with the issue of children involved in armed conflict is Article 38. The inclusion of this article was a reaction to a report by Graça Machel18 on the effects of armed conflict on children. In this report Machel advocates that children involved in armed conflicts are a vulnerable group in need of adequate legal protection.19 The article lays down the same obligation20 and prohibition21 as the additional protocol to the Geneva Convention. It also adopts the same age limit of fifteen years as article 38 CRC. A considerable strength of article 38 is that it applies to all armed conflicts22 and is therefore devoid of needlessly discerned categories like the ones that the Geneva Convention and its protocols use. 23

Article 38’s first paragraph compels the state parties to respect rules of international humanitarian law applicable to the field of children in armed conflict which the State is has ratified. 24 This inducement applies to both universal provisions like those mentioned in the optional protocol and the ILO convention on the Worst Kinds of Child Labor and regional instruments like the African charter on the rights and welfare of the child25. A third category which falls under the statute’s obligation are soft law provisions such as Security Council resolutions and the Paris Commitments.26

§2.2 The Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol

Art. 38 CRC has been under considerable scrutiny for not raising the maximum age of protection from fifteen to eighteen. The article was also criticized for the fact that it only prohibited direct participation.

16 It devoted only two articles: 38 and 39 to the matter17 Kimmel & Roby, 2007, p. 74618 UN expert on the issue of children involved with armed conflict (Kimmel & Roby, 2007)19 Ang, 2005, p. 120 Art. 38 CRC Para.221 Art. 38 CRC Para.322 Ang, 2005, p.2323 “The protection of the Geneva Convention and its protocols is limited to cases of ‘international conflict’ ‘high intensity non – international conflict’ and ‘low intensity international conflict’” (Ang 2005, p.23)

24 “All rules that have customary law status and rules made by legally binding instruments which the state is a party to, the instrument providing the most substantial protection is to be followed.” (Ang, 2005, p. 25)25 The DRC is not a party to this particular convention and it therefore will not be discussed further in this thesis.26 Ang, 2005

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Drafting the optional protocol was the UN’s way of appeasing the international community and reacting to the criticism.27 The first article of the optional protocol is a repetition of the obligation to take all feasible measures that we’ve already come across.

Where the optional protocol differs however is the establishment of a new minimum age of protection at eighteen years. The Optional Protocol has suffered however under international negotiations and couldn’t find enough support for a provision which would include indirect participation.28

The article provides a wider scope of protection for victims of child recruitment by specifying the obligation in Article 1 to apply to “hostilities” instead of to armed conflict. This expansion is the result of the definition of “hostilities”29 being more inclusive than that of “armed conflict”.30 Article 2 of the Optional Protocol provides a prohibition on the compulsory recruitment of children under the age of eighteen while allowing voluntary enlistment below that age. Voluntary recruitment still has a lower limit of fifteen years of age in place but there have to be enough safeguards in place to ascertain that the inscription is voluntary; children between the ages of fifteen and eighteen who are involved in armed conflicts more often than not face problems such as limited economic resources and substantial poverty. 31

The reality of these hardships causes the international community to doubt the voluntary nature of the choice to be involved with armed conflict. It has therefore been suspicious of the necessity of the division between voluntary and compulsive recruitment. 32 Article 4 of the Optional Protocol has responded to this criticism by eliminating this distinction for “armed groups which are distinct from the armed forces of a State”.33 These groups are prohibited from recruiting anyone under the age of eighteen. This article has great relevance for the situation in the DRC as the vast majority of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is affiliated with rebel groups.34

Art. 6 and 7 of the Optional Protocol urge the party states to cooperate in order to demobilize, rehabilitate and reintegrate persons who have been a victim of child recruitment and have been used in hostilities by armed forces and groups. This has led to the widespread practice of DDR-processes35 which are used to comply with this provision.36

The Optional Protocol is monitored by the Committee on the Rights of the Child which is a body made up of 18 independent experts.37 It was formed on the basis of Art.43 CRC which describes it as a monitory body who would review reports which the state parties would send the committee regularly.

27 Coomaraswamy, 2010, p. 53828 Ibid, p.53929 Described at the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1974 – 1977 as “acts of war that by their nature or purpose [strike] at the personal and material of enemy armed forces.” (Poulatova, 2013, p. 74)30 In the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross an armed conflict is “a situation during which there are periods of hostilities, interspersed with periods of truce.” (International Committee of the Red Cross , 1998)31 Article 3 OP-AC 32 Coomaraswamy, 2010, p.540 33 Also called non-state actors34 See figure 3 en 4 35 Acronym for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration36 Pauletto & Patel, 201037 UNICEF, 2009

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The Committee would go through each of these reviews in order to provide recommendations and improve the implementation of the convention. After the implementation of OP-AC, the duties of the committee were expanded to include monitoring this Optional Protocol in the same way. 38

Every state that is a party to the Optional Protocol has to submit an initial report two years after acceding to it and then subsequent periodic reports every five years. The Committee is in charge of reviewing and evaluating each of these reports39 and making recommendations to the state called “concluding observations”.40

In addition to the reports given to it by the States themselves the Committee uses information sent to it by Civil Society Organizations when evaluating the implementation of the Optional Protocol in the State. 41 These “shadow reports” or “alternative reports” allow for agencies assigned to the protection of children to express their own views of the reality and thereby provide a different perspective on the problem from the state’s own report.42

The committee has supplementary projects in addition to its tasks under Art. 43 CRC. It works with a range of actors43 in an effort to maintain international collaboration. The results of these efforts are shared biennially with the UN General Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council. 44

2.3 International Labour Organization

The Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour45, adopted in 1999 was the first convention in which the ILO specifically addressed the problem of child soldiering. It has an important part within the ILO framework for it’s considered one of the “core conventions”.46

The reason for this inclusion was consensus between the member states that the recruitment of children for use in armed conflict was grave enough to elicit being addressed as one of the worst forms of child labour. It was however not regarded as a standalone category but as a form of slavery. 47

The body that monitors the convention is the Committee of Experts. This is carried out through a process of state reporting. The ILO constitution requires member states to provide an annual report of the conventions it has ratified. 48 This has been further elaborated by the committee; every country must submit its first report on the implementation of a convention within a year after ratification. This obligation is reduced to once every two years after the first report in the case of core conventions.49

38 Poulatova, 2013, p. 7739 See §4.1.2 for a consideration of the first reporting cycle of the DRC40 CRC Guidelines Regarding Initial Reports to be submitted by State Parties under Article 8 Paragraph 1 of OP-AC. 41 45(a) CRC 42 Poulatova, 2013, p. 8043 “multilateral agencies, donor countries and developing countries” (UNICEF, 2009) 44 UNICEF, 200945 Full title: The Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour46 Cullen, 2011, p.6747 Art. 3(a) ILO convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour: “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery … including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict”48 Art. 22 ILO Constitution49 Cullen, 2011, p.69

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In analyzing the country’s obligation under the convention, the committee relies on supplemental information from children’s rights authorities such as IPEC, the UN Security Council and UNICEF.50

Since the implementation of the convention the issue of child soldiers has become of significant interest to the ILO. This has resulted in different projects aimed at assisting the elimination of the problem. One of these programs: the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) has been instrumental in preventing the recruitment of children and in furthering the reintegration of former child soldiers. 51 One of these projects is the ILO Inter-regional Programme on the Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict. The reintegration is heavily focused on improving the socio-economic circumstances of former child soldiers. 52 This is achieved using forms of “informal apprenticeships” to teach jobs to former child soldiers. This technique has proved effective considering the lack of educational resources in the area53 and the fact that former child soldiers often lack professional skills. 54 IPEC is also active in carrying out a number of measures aimed at the prevention of further recruitment of children by armed forces. 55

The convention and its elaboration by the committee of experts provide children involved with armed conflict with an extensive set of rights. The convention defines the word child as “all persons under the age of 18”56 and therefore raises the bar from the age of fifteen provided in the additional protocols to the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, the convention is not solely concerned with child combatants but it applies a broader definition of the term “child soldier”, similar to the one expressed in the Paris Principles.57 Moreover, the committee has extended the scope of protection from mere recruitment of children to include using them in conflict. 58

Lastly, the committee expects states to criminalize both forced and compulsory recruitment of children and engage in preventive measures to counter recruitment by armed forces. 59

In the final report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo60 the committee of experts stresses the amount of recruitment and use of child soldiers taking place by not only rebel groups but also by the FARDC.61 It also urges the country to abide by the Security Council resolution 1998 which asks the member states to take criminal steps to prosecute those who commit war crimes, in this case the perpetrators of child recruitment.62

50 Ibid, p.7151 Ibid, p.64 52 International Labour Organization, 200753 The report is evaluating the situation in the DRC (Bunia region) as well as that of the Ivory Coast but it uses the same techniques in both circumstances for they are similar regions in the socio-economic and political sense. 54 International Labour Organization, 201055 International Labour Organization, 200756 Article 2 ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.57 “The ILO’s concern is not limited to the cases where children are used as combatants, but extends to the use of children for auxiliary activities for armed groups (e.g. cooks, porters, or sexual services).” (Cullen , 2011 p.72) 58 Committee of Experts, Individual Observation concerning Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.182) Burundi (ratification: 2002), published: 200559 Cullen 2011, p. 7460 Committee of Experts, Individual Observation concerning Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.182) Democratic Republic of Congo (ratification: 2001), published: 200661 The national army of the DRC62 Article 5 and 8 (2)(b) §XXVI Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, addressed in §2.5

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§2.4 The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court

The Rome Statute is the treaty that established the International Criminal Court. It was a result of a conference63 attended by 160 states, 33 intergovernmental organizations and 236 NGOs.64 Article 5 of the statute assigns the competence of the International Criminal Court in the event of the execution of a war crime65 by an individual66. Article 8 provides an inventory of different crimes that constitute war crimes. The provision lists the use, conscription and enlistment of children “to participate actively in hostility” as a war crime. The ICC’s protection is limited however for it uses the age limit of fifteen years.67

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a party to the Rome Statute68 and therefore the court may bring crimes that have taken place on the territory of the DRC provided that it has the permission of the DRC government or that of the state of which the individual bares the nationality.69 The first instance of a person being convicted for the war crime of conscripting and using child soldiers70 was the rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo71 who enlisted72 and used children under the age of fifteen for the purpose of participation in hostilities from September 2002 to August 2003.73

The International Criminal Court followed this decision up by prosecuting two more citizens74 of the DRC for the war crime of enlisting and using children in hostilities.75

In its Lubanga judgment the ICC elaborates that the conscription and enlisting of children is a separate violation from using them in hostilities.76 It further implicitly stresses that the voluntary nature of the conscription for military services cannot be considered an exculpatory fact.77This point of view is illustrated in the court’s reiteration of the expert witness Elizabeth

63 “The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC)” which took place in Rome from June 15 -17 1998. 64 Arsanjani, 1999 , p.2265 Article 5 (1)(c) Rome Statute 66 Article 1 Rome Statute: “… shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons …” 67 Article 8 (b) (xxvi) Rome Statute: “Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.” 68 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 201169 Article 12 Rome Statute 70 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 201271 Wagner, 2013 , p.14572 Into the Force Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo (FLPC)73 Drumbl, 2014 , p.8774 “Germain Katanga, commander of the Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI), and Mathieu Ngudjolo, former leader of the Front des Nationalistes et des Intégrationnistes (FNI)” (Waddell, et al., 2008 , p.39)75 Waddell, et al., 2008 , p.3976 Lubanga trial judgment par. 60977 “Insofar as much of the evidence adduced in the trial related to enlistment of volunteers, the legal irrelevance of this fact was clearly pertinent. At times, the Trial Judgment refers to the ‘voluntary’ nature of the recruitment. It explicitly uses quotation marks around the term, ostensibly to denote skepticism at the possibility that the recruitment could actually be voluntary.” (Drumbl, 2014 , p. 103)

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Schauer’s views in which she states that children are unable to express consent to join an armed group because of their “limited understanding of the consequences of their choices”.78 The court modified the aforementioned statements by allowing the manner of conscription to be considered in the court decision on sentencing and reparations.79

In the same judgment the court defines the sentence “using a child to participate actively in hostilities” as a situation in which the “support provided by the child to the combatants exposed him or her to real danger as a potential target”.80

§2.5 The Paris Principles and Commitments

The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices were constructed during a meeting of child protection experts who were gathered in Cape Town, South Africa in 1997. In the course of the meeting these experts came up with a number of standards, guidelines and good practice on both preventive measures to keep children from being recruited as well as ways to integrate children back into their communities once they’re affiliated with armed forces. 81

In celebrating the ten-year anniversary of these principles, a couple of organizations involved in the protection of children examined what they’ve learned from the past ten years and hereby created a new set of principles called The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups. In the same deliberations the organizations conceived a set of commitments82 which ended up being enforced by 58 countries who agreed to abide by them. 83

The Paris Principles advocate for the integration of the types of recruitment that are currently being seen as distinguishable in the international law context. The principles therefore prohibit all three forms84. The Paris Commitments urge the state parties that have agreed to them to abide by the existing rules of international law which address the issue of protecting children involved with armed forces. The Commitments are at the same time striving to change the direction of International law and policy and afford more protection to the victims of child recruitment. 85

One of the documents’ aspirations is to eliminate the ability of children to volunteer their services to state actors from the age of 15.86 The Commitments furthermore advocate active investigation and persecution of the perpetrators of child recruitment87 and call for full cooperation with actions called upon by the Security Council against parties to an armed conflict which use or recruit children. 88

78 Lubanga trial judgment par. 61079 Lubanga trial judgment par. 61080 Ibid, par. 62881 Stark, et al., 2009, p. 52382 Conveniently called the Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Groups. 83 Stark, et al., 2009, p. 52384 Compulsory, voluntary and forced recruitment (Principle 2.4)85 Drumbl, 201286 Drumbl, 2012, p.244 87 Commitment 6 88 Commitment 8

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Section 3. The use of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo The problem of child soldiers is widespread and global, in 2005 Save the Children the total amount of child soldiers as 250 000.89 UNICEF had a slightly higher estimate at 300 000 in 2002.90 A study by the Brookings Institution claims that 80% of these children are under the age of fifteen. 91 The amount of child soldiers in the eastern part of the Congo has been estimated at 8000 in 2009.92 Academic scholars believe that these figures will continue to increase. 93 Children are targeted specifically by armed groups because of their undemanding nature, the low cost of sustaining them and their inane impressionability among other factors.94 The UN Secretary - General reported in his annual report on children and armed conflict that 19 countries were involved with child recruitment between 2011 and 2012. Most of the victims of this human rights violation are concentrated in the African continent. 95 The African continent has experienced the fastest growth in the amount of child soldiers and the average age of these children is declining at the same time. These numbers might suggest that the international instruments in place to counter the issue are not effective. 96 This section will discuss the issue of child soldiers in more depth and will subsequently go into the social and economic structures responsible for the armed conflict in the DRC and will finally discuss the specifics of child soldiers in the DRC.

§3.1 the global issue of using children in armed conflicts

The way child soldiers are usually depicted in mass media images are as teenage boys carrying arms portrayed as helpless, passive victims. This image however accurate it might be in certain circumstances ignores any kind of nuance and generalizes the diverse group of children.97

The term “child soldier” is most clearly described in the Paris Principles which defines “A child associated with an armed force or an armed group” as:

“any person below 18 years of age who is who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.”98

Other tasks children are asked to perform are extremely hazardous and perilous such as laying landlines99 and to function as human shields.100 This definition clearly shows that the phenomenon of the child soldier is more complicated and multifaceted than what is depicted in the media and in the minds of the global community.

89 Conradi, 2013, p. 121290 Breen, 2007, p. 7191 Human Security Center , 200592 Pauletto & Patel, 201093 Rakisits, 2008; Achvarina & Reich, 200694 Bosch & Easthorpe, 2012, p.595Rakisits, 200896 Ibid. 97 Drumbl, 2012, p. 3898 §2.1 of The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles) 99 Stark, et al., 2009, p. 524100 Bosch & Easthorpe, 2012, p. 5

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The substantial percentage of girls who are child soldiers is another illustration of the imbalance between the reality and the depiction of child soldiers. The Save the Children report101 reported that girls accounted for 40 per cent of the total number of child soldiers worldwide. 102 The reason for such a substantive percentage of female child soldiers lies in their ability to fulfill a multitude of roles within the armed group: they are just as readily put to use as combatants as male soldiers but they can also be used as sex slaves, caregivers to infants and spies among other tasks. 103

The main reason that so many children are successfully recruited lies in their impressionable nature. Children are moldable and can therefore be manipulated in to becoming deadly warriors. After being drafted children become dependent on the armed force their involved with and rely on them for support and psychological identification. 104The way children are treated by the armed forces they rely on is often disruptive. Those who are unluckiest are often stripped of food and rest, viciously beaten when they do something wrong and forced to perform horrendous acts such as kill and rape under the influence of addictive substances.105

Child soldiers have a variety of ways to get involved with armed forces. Sometimes they’re forced or coerced into the armed forces. There are also some instances of children being born into armed groups. The last and most prominent group is that of children who volunteer their services to the armed forces. 106 The international community often underestimates the amount of children who volunteer their services. There is often not enough attention being paid that children may volunteer their services out of their inane impulsivity.107

§3.2 pinpointing the cause of the ongoing conflict in the Congo

The prominent contributing factor to the recruitment and use of child soldiers is the ongoing conflict in the country. The presence of a variety of armed groups causing destruction is not a new thing in the DRC. The country has been through two wars: the first (1996-1997) and second (1998-2002) Congo wars. And the country has remained unstable even more than a decade after the latest war has come to an end. 108These conflicts aren’t concentrated in one region for guerilla groups can be found wreaking havoc in the Kivu provinces,109 the Ituri region where Ugandan troops attempt to hold on to their power and the southern province of Katanga which has seen so much violence in recent times that it has been renamed “the triangle of death”.110 The situation seemed to improve with the defeat of the M23 movement in November 23 but that defeat was only illusionary for the group has rapidly recouped and has been active since the beginning of 2014. 111

101 Published in 2005 102 Conradi, 2013, p. 1212103 Ibid. 104 Kimmel & Roby, 2007, p. 745105 Ibid, p.746106 Drumbl, 2012, p. 42107 Ibid 108 Stearns, 2013 109 Jourdan, 2011 , p.90110 Keulers, 2013111 Ibid.

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There have been several instances where “tunnel vision” by the international community as well as academic scholars which have harmed solving the conflict and with it the use and recruitment by the groups causing the conflict. The most obvious example is the trend to attribute the continuing nature of the conflict to lack of “political will” of the government. This criticism is supported by the government’s tendency to reintegrate military groups into the FARDC112, but there’s not enough attention being paid to alternative (genuine) motives that the government might be pursuing. 113 The same focus on a single theme is also seen when international actors see the conflict in the area as an effect of the trade of mineral resources and the selectivity in focusing disproportionately on victims of sexual abuse at the expense of others.114

The DRC would best be served with foreign aid which understands the entire picture of the conflict in the area and will invest in a future of growth and stability. 115 This will likely only happen when humanitarian aid is carried out by more experience troops than is now the case with the UN peace mission. The extent of the conflict in the DRC is too immense to be solved with a quick fix of donor aid and small-scale humanitarian intervention.116

§3.3 Child soldiers and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Various scholars have argued the presence of a strong correlation between the social and economic marginalization of young people in Africa and war in the same region. 117 The reasons for this marginalization lie in a complex web of dynamics which has evolved over time. The disintegration of the land distribution structure and state institutions such as the school system has contributed to this marginalization.118

In the eastern Congo, the enrollment into military groups is a rare chance to achieve social mobility and to escape social marginalization. When there’s an existing conflict in an area, the intensification of violence often means that enrollment is the only alternative to dying.119 Armed groups often capitalize on this development. An example of this is the armed group Mai Mai120 which has used ritualistic symbols such as the use of ‘magic water’121to shield bullets, to appeal to new, young recruits. This use of ritualistic symbols which are culturally defined122 promotes mobilization. 123 Recruits are further enticed by the allure of asserting their self worth and gaining an entrance to new sources of power.124

These observations are supported by empirical data gathered by UNICEF in 1997125 and the ILO in 2007126 which were centered on the motivations of children to join military groups.

112 The National army of the DRC 113 Baaz & Verweijen, 2013, p. 577-578114 Autesserre, 2012115 Stearns, 2012116 Ibid. 117 Jourdan, 2011, p. 95118 Ibid.119 Ibid, p.97120 Also often stylized as Mayi-Mayi 121Known as Mayi , hence the name Mayi-Mayi122 This use of ‘magic water’ is a concept known throughout Africa and has been used to great effect to initiate the new generations into armed forces and to entice them to fight.123Jourdan, 2011 , p.91124 Ibid, p.90125 See figure 1 126 see figure 2

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Other prolific military group recruiting children in the area are the M23 rebellion, the Nyatura and the FDLR127. According to MONUSCO which has a report on armed group recruitment in the region between may 2012 and September 2013 the child recruitments by these three groups account for 45% of the total figure of recruited children. 128

Section 4. Tackling the issue of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

§4.1 Practical difficulties

The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict provides a clear mandate to the member states to demobilize children involved with armed groups. 129 Fulfilling this commitment is however not always without difficulty. Reintegration is often achieved through various DDR – programmes which are carried out by institutions such as MONUSCO130, IPEC131 and a number of NGOs.132 The DDR programmes which currently take place in the DRC are structured through different phases. The first phase is the removal of the child from the armed group their involved with, this is followed by a replacement and structuring the child’s life through school and ordinary life. This second phase might be accompanied by psychological assistance provided that the child is observed as requiring this assistance. Finally the child is put into the care of relatives or other responsible guardians to care for them. In this final stage the child also is put into educational and vocational programmes to provide a legitimate alternative to conscription into armed forces. 133

One of the difficulties faced when trying to get children away from armed forces is the reluctance of the victims themselves to be extracted from an environment they’ve acclimated to. As mentioned earlier in the paper, girls are often given a number of different jobs within the armed group. Because of this multitude of roles, the girls feel like a substantial part of the group which makes it hard to extract them from that environment. 134 Among children who were used as combatants there is the danger that they will eventually begin to see committing violent acts as rewarding. This psychological effect called “appetitive aggression” is exacerbated when the combatants start at a younger age.

This results in more aggression former child combatants as opposed to their counterparts who have started at a lower age.135 This will complicate the removal of former combatants as well as the prevention of rerecruitment.

127 Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda128 MONUSCO, 2013 , see figure 4129 Article 6 (3) OP-AC: “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to this Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service.”130 See §4.4 131 Discussed in § 2.3 132 e.g. Child Soldier International and Caritas 133Pauletto & Patel, 2010 , p. 43 134 Conradi, 2013, p. 1212135 Weierstall, et al., 2013, p. 505

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Moreover, the Optional Protocol provides that member states are bound by the obligation to assist in the social reintegration of these former child soldiers and to provide support for their physical and psychological needs.136 This is an arduous task for victims of child recruitment often return to the communities where they were once recruited and at other times where they had committed horrible acts. The psychological scarring that many child recruits suffer is also substantial and hard to treat.137

The trauma of being separated from the armed forces mixed with the experiences of being in combat can make former child combatants an easy target for post-traumatic stress disorder. This disorder involves symptoms like severe panic attacks and feeling detached from ones environment. 138 Reintegration requires several years to be effective; therefore it has to be grounded in a long – term funding scheme to succeed.139 Suboptimal reintegration could lead to former combatants going back to the armed forces and becoming permanent members as well as a lasting impression on social interaction.140

Birth registration is the official way of recording a child’s date of birth, and allows for the child to receive a birth certificate. The CRC protects this right141 as registration establishes the foundation of a child’s legal protection. It provides an important function in carrying out the Optional Protocol for it provides the evidence of a person being either underage or an adult.142 The social disorganization in the DRC is demonstrated by its inadequate public administration which fails to keep decent birth registration records. The low birth registration rates in the country 143 are a significant obstacle in preventing inadvertent under–age recruitment.144 This is also problematic in the context of the country’s obligation under ILO Convention no. 182 as the Committee of experts has stressed the importance of engaging in preventive measures to counter recruitment by armed forces. 145

The Committee on the Rights of the Child has put the responsibility of determining the age of a recruit on the recruiting authorities.146 The use of alternative methods to documentary proof of age is allowable. The most used methods to establish age are medical or physical methodologies but the accuracy of these methods is questioned by medical professionals.147

Both national Congolese law148 and international treaties149 urge the DRC’s to uphold its obligation to prohibit anyone under the age of 18 from being recruited into the armed forces. The difficulty in ensuring that the DRC upholds it international obligations is that the greatest perpetrators of the crime

136 Article 6 (3) OP-AC: “States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to these persons all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.”137 Drumbl, 2012, p. 22138 Kimmel & Roby, 2007, p. 747139 Özerdem & Podder, 2011, pp. 312-313140 Kimmel & Roby, 2007141 Art. 7 (1) CRC: “The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality…” 142 Child Soldiers International, 2012143 28% according to (UNICEF, 2013)144 Bosch & Easthorpe, 2012145 Cullen 2011, p. 74146 CRC/C/OPAC/EGY/CO/1 §18147 Child Soldiers International, 2012148 Art.7 Congolese Military Law and Arts. 190 and 41 of the DRC constitution adopted in 2005149 Most notably the discussed Optional Protocol and the ILO Convention No.182

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of child recruitment are non-state actors which are not bound by treaty law directly domestic law which is often not and therefore must be tried by domestic law which are often not enforced.150 A related problem is the added hassle of dealing with multiple jurisdictions in the case of recruitments which occur across borders or involve refugees from neighboring countries.151

§4.2 The role of the committee on the rights of the child

The Democratic Republic of the Congo delivered its first report to the committee in 2011.152 The Committee relied on information from different sources; the information provided in the report by representatives of DRC, extensive reporting by the MONUSCO team153 and reports from Civil Society Organizations. 154 In this report the Committee sat down with representatives of the country and addressed the problems it saw in upholding the Optional Protocol.

One of the first observations made by the Committee was that the legal framework which allows criminal sanctions for recruitment and use of children in armed conflict hasn’t greatly contributed to persecutions or convictions of perpetrators of the crimes. 155 The Committee underscores the fact that the State is providing the perpetrators another way to get away with their crimes by refusing to hand known recruiters over to the International Criminal Court to be tried there.156 The committee consequently asked for information as to the steps the country has taken to integrate the provisions given in the statute of Rome157 in domestic law.158The committee was also critical of the continuous employment of certain members of the FARDC which were known to disregard the Optional Protocol.159

The priorities of the country were also put into question. The vast investment of the country in defense160 and relatively little into health and education, this seems to misrepresent the causes of the conflict in the area; namely economic misfortune and distribution and ownership of natural resources. The budget would be better spend by a more substantial investment in stabilizing and reconstructing the Eastern provinces. 161

This miscalculating is also seen in the budget for the judiciary; which is extremely low, 162 and might partly be to blame for the corruption within the justice system. 163The committee suggested that a commensurate salary would mitigate the incentive to take bribes.164

150 Discussed in the next section151 Bosch & Easthorpe, 2012152 CRC/C/SR.1674 153 MONUSCO, 2013154TRIAL, 2011; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2011155 CRC/C/SR.1674, Para. 11 156 Ibid. Para. 21 157 Elaborated in §2.5 158 Ibid Para. 16159 Ibid. Para. 11 160 30% of the state budget (Ibid. Para. 8)161 Ibid. Para. 28-29 162 Less than 1% of the state budget 163 Ibid. Para. 51 164 Ibid Para. 54

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Another point that the committee continuously repeats is that the country is responsible for ending the recruitment of children by all armed forces in its territory and that by ratifying the Optional Protocol it has accepted this responsibility. 165

This opinion is most eloquently expressed in the following statement by one of the members of the Committee:

“The State party must honor its commitments. The Optional Protocol was being violated in every possible way, and the State party bore responsibility for that even when the enlistment and use of children was the work of other actors.”166

The Committee moreover points to the reluctance of the FARDC to check their militants in order to eliminate the risk that any children were amongst them. 167 This is problematic because verified reports by the United Nations show the occurrence of child recruitment within both the FARDC and the Republican Guard. 168 Another concern raised was the steps taken to ensure that formed recruits could benefit from DDR-programmes. 169 Training programmes which are provided for former child soldiers by professionals should be provided as a part of the public education system and be separate from efforts made by NGOs.170

The committee wanted to be informed as to the specific mechanisms used for inter-regional coordination as well as the method of raising awareness to this issue throughout the country, for this is required under Article 6 par. 2 of the protocol. 171The Committee furthermore urged the DRC to ensure that children were not detained or arrested172 since it had been informed that children were being incarcerated in a military intelligence prison during the first six months of 2008.173 Lastly, The Committee also raised its concern on the problem of the low birth registration174 in the country. 175

§4.3 the role of NGOs in monitoring the optional protocol

NGOs (or non –governmental organizations) are organizations that don’t have any ties to a government; they usually consist of activists who are devoted to working on specific issues and share ideas and values. The tasks that NGOs carry out are essential, such as spreading information to raise public awareness to an issue and remain in contact with more powerful organizations and governments. 176 The role of NGOs within the UN is laid down in the UN charter.177 NGOs have had a

165 Ibid. Para. 40 166 Ibid. Para. 18 167 Ibid. Para. 15 168 Ibid. Para. 37 169 CRC/C/SR.1674, para. 17170 Ibid Para. 23171 Ibid. Para. 22 172 Ibid. para. 17173 Ibid. Para. 31174 See the previous section175 Ibid. Para. 17 176 Breen, 2003177 Art. 71 of the UN Charter: “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations, which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements shall be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultations with the Member of the United Nations concerned.”

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considerable influence in the protection of children’s right in the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 178

In 1983 the Ad Hoc NGO Group on the Drafting on the Convention on the Rights of the Child was formed to play a role in drafting the CRC. The NGO ended up being of constructive influence on the eventual text of the convention. A result of this positive cooperation has been the Convention’s mandate that it gives to NGOs in monitoring its implementation.179 This feature is unique to the CRC as there are no other international human rights treaties which give such powers to NGOs. 180

One of the privileges that NGOs enjoy is that they may express their opinions by attending public and private meeting of the committee when they are invited by the monitoring body itself.181 NGOs may also submit reports to the committee pertaining to subjects they cover in their activities.182The committee has encouraged NGOs to submit reports as to how they perceive the implementation of the Convention in a particular country has been carried out. 183 The committee has come to use NGOs as an additional source of information provided from a different perspective than that of the states.184 In addition to providing valuable regional information to the committee, NGOs such as Save the Children have been instrumental in facilitating DDR processes. 185

The Committee on the Rights of the Child has used different “shadow reports” in its assessment of its monitory capacities. In evaluating the first submitted report by the DRC on the optional protocol the Committee received these reports from two different NGOs: one by the Swiss Association against Impunity (TRIAL)186 and one by the Coalition to stop the Use of Child Soldiers.187

TRIAL has provided the Committee with a variety of criticisms of the DRC’s failure to prosecute its citizens for the recruitment and use of child soldiers which constitutes as undermining its obligation under the optional protocol. The first remark the NGO makes is regarding a fundamental error in the Congolese domestic law which governs the prosecution of human rights violations: the DRC is unable to prosecute cases which don’t have a “direct link” to the DRC. 188 By using appropriate criminal sanctions the country would be fulfilling its obligation to take all “feasible measures” under article 4 of the optional protocol. The use of criminal sanctions has been advocated by the Committee.189 The domestic criminal law undermines the principle of universal jurisdiction via the “direct link” condition.190 Another lacuna in the domestic law is the Congolese Military Code191 which only applies to

178 Breen, 2003 179 Art. 45 (a) CRC: “The committee may invite the specialized agencies, the United Nations Children’s Fund and other competent bodies as it may consider appropriate to provide expert advice on the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their respective mandates.” 180 Breen, 2003 181 Rule 34(2) of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Rights of the Child182 Rule 70 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Rights of the Child183 Breen, 2003184 Ibid. 185 Pauletto & Patel, 2010186 TRIAL, 2011187 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2011188 TRIAL, 2011 , p.2 189 CRC, Concluding Observations Solomon Islands, 2 July 2003, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.208190 TRIAL, 2011 , p.8 191 Article 174

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those who’ve carried out war crimes while “belonging to the enemy”. Moreover the military criminal court only mentions the jurisdiction over “war crimes” but doesn’t further define what’s meant by the term.192

Lastly, TRIAL expresses concern over the new draft of the criminal code which if implemented would cause the jurisdiction with regard to war crimes to be supplemental to that of the ICC instead of the other way around.193

The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has provided its own analysis of the situation in the DRC. It raises awareness to the already discussed issue of child recruitment by the FARDC and the Republican Guard. It is concerns about the treatment of children within these organizations.194Children are also assimilated into these groups through assimilation facilitated by the government.195

The coalition expressed severe dissatisfaction with the passivity in which the crime of child recruitment and use has been prosecuted and the ineffectiveness of the verdicts of those who have faced prosecution. 196 The NGO cites the impunity given to Bosco Ntaganda, former leader of the CNDP among others. The president Kabila of the DRC has stated197 that the decision to not prosecute Ntaganda was a sacrifice for stability and peace in the Kivu provinces.198 The Coalition attributes this passiveness to lack of “political will” by authorities to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. 199 The NGO clarifies a number of practical difficulties in trying perpetrators of child recruitment. One such difficulty lies in the fact that the judge trying the case must carry a higher rank than the defendant. Trials are often subpar and don’t live up to international standards. Victims are often scared to accuse military officers that have committed a breach of their human rights. The Coalition raises awareness to the incarceration of 28 children in a military detention center for three months. 200

Lastly the coalition points to the limited success of social reintegration techniques due to the government’s lack of “political leadership”.201

§4.4 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

The United Nations effort in the Congo has started under the acronym MONUC in 1999. It has been the United Nations most expensive202 and wide-ranging peacekeeping operation has ventured since its outset in 1945. The UN mission was to enforce the peace using a variety of approaches such as apprehending armed groups in the DRC and in neighboring countries and screening for perpetrators of war crimes. 203 MONUC’s shortcomings caused a compromise between the DRC government’s eagerness of the withdrawal of MONUC from the country and the UN’s aspirations of pursuing its

192 TRIAL, 2011 , p.9 193 Ibid. p, 10194 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2011 , p. 11195 Ibid. p.10 196 Ibid. p.20 197 In 2009 198 Ibid. p.19199Ibid. p.22200 Ibid. p.24 201 Ibid. p.26202 $ 1.3 billion for the year 2010 – 2011 alone (ASADHO et al., 2012) 203 Koko, 2011

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peacekeeping effort in the country.204 MONUSCO was initiated on 1 July 2010 and its main objectives were; safeguarding and protecting civilians and to stabilize and support peace consolidation.205

MONUSCO has been tasked with child protection by the Security Council. MONUSCO employs a Child Protection Section who monitor and report on the status of children involved in the conflict. The mandate includes deliberation with perpetrators in order to put a stop to child recruitment and other forms of violations to children’s human rights.206 The Child Protection Section of the mission is also working together with UNICEF, ICRC and NGOs in repatriating children who might be involved with foreign armed forces and wish to return to their country.207 The Child Protection Section of MONUSCO has been active208 in DDR programs which are aimed at rehabilitating children who were previously part of armed forces and reintegrating them back to their old communities.209

Section 5. Conclusion

The main question asked in the beginning of the thesis was: “What is the role of the various international instruments protecting children’s rights in combating the issue of child soldiering in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?”

When looking at the entire range of instruments dedicated to the issue, it would be improbable for anyone to say that the protection they afford the victims of child recruitment isn’t substantive. There has been a lot of progress in the field of protecting victims of child recruitment from its infancy in the times of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.

Both the Optional Protocol to the CRC and ILO Convention no. 182 have furthermore provided the international community with a way to monitor the issue on a regular basis. Articles 6 and 7 of the Optional Protocol have developed a legally binding right for former child recruits to be given a second chance through reintegration projects. NGOs fulfill an instrumental role in carrying out a large number of these projects concentrated in the area which have already resulted in the demobilization of thousands of child soldiers. The ILO’s ILO Inter-regional Programme on the Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict is a great example of assisting former child soldiers through social reintegration. Further research into the best strategies to provide psychological assistance as well as research into the effectiveness of the various DDR-processes could go a long way in preventing long term problems in child soldiers and mitigate the incentive to be allured back into armed forces.

The ICC which is governed by the Rome Statute has established universal jurisdiction by including both the recruitment and the use of child soldiers as war crimes. It has also made some headway in actual prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes; a feat which the Congolese government hasn’t carried through on yet. The actual substance of the court cases can be considered as

204 Ibid.205 MONUSCO, 2013206 Ibid. 207 United Nations, 2012208 United Nations, 2013209 Pauletto & Patel, 2010

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authoritative interpretations of how far the protection of children involved with armed groups extends.

The Paris Principles provide an instrumental overview of all the knowledge and experience gained on combating the issue of child recruitment and use in armed conflict. The Paris Commitments asserts the states dedication to solving the problem, regardless of its non-binding nature.

Because of the extensive legal protection; the problem of child soldiers is no longer that of a lack of legal resources but one of the inactivity to implement it. The results of the reports submitted to both the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee of experts illustrate this fact. This might suggest that the area in which there is the most to gain is the monitoring by supervising bodies. Being in more constant communication with the country about the implementation of a particular instrument could both expand public knowledge of the problem of child soldiering and provide consistent pressure to perform.

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25%

28%15%

7%

25%

Figure 1: Motivations of Children to become involved with armed groups in Bukavu, the DRC (UNICEF, 1997)

Material benefitsAbsence of job oportunities Revenge against Mobuto armyEnding the conflictOther

Figure 1

9%

11%

10%

15%

21%

34%

Figure 2: Children's motivation for joining armed forces and groups in Congo, DRC and Rwanda (ILO, 2007)

FearDesire to leave familyDesire for vengeanceFascinationIdeologyMaterial Needs

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Figure 2

FDLR FARDC Mai Mai (PARECO

)

other Mai Mai factions

FRPI/FPJC

LRA0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Figure 3: Children who escaped or were released from armed forces and group in 2010 (UN Special Representative of the Sec-

retary-General for Children and Armed Conflict , 2011)

Children who escaped or were released from armed forces and group in 2010

Figure 3 N=5,505

21

Nyatura

FDLR

M23

Rayia

MutombokiFR

PI

ex-Pare

co/U

PCLR

A

Variety

of other

groups

050

100150200250300350

Figure 4: Recruitment of children in the period from january 2012 untill september 2013 (MONUSCO, 2012)

children recruited from january 2012 untill september 2013

Figure 4 N=1,656

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