FROM SECULARISM TO RADICALISM How and Why Former Ba’athists Have Come to Lead the Islamic State

Trevor McGuire University of Delaware

11 April 2016

Source: english.lasindias.com

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1. INTRODUCTION

On 20 March 2003, while sitting behind his desk in the oval office, President George W.

Bush announced the invasion of Iraq in a special address to the nation. In his opening statement,

Bush outlined three main purposes that justified the rationale behind what would become known

as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world

from grave danger.”1 To accomplish these tasks, the United States planned to expel Iraqi

President Saddam Hussein and his loyal Ba’athist regime from power. Consequently, soon over

160,000 coalition troops surged into the country, expeditiously sweeping away large swaths of

the Iraqi military. By 9 April 2003, only three weeks after OIF began, American troops marched

down the streets of Baghdad with the support of thousands upon thousands of ordinary Iraqi

civilians behind them.2 On news outlets around the world, images of American soldiers tearing

down statues of Saddam burgeoned. It was a fitting act of symbolism for the state of the

Ba’athist regime in Iraq.

But it is important to understand that the American invasion was not the only situation

unfolding in Iraq during this time period. In the first few days of the invasion, a desperate

Saddam Hussein issued a plea to the Muslim world to fight alongside his Ba’athist regime in

order to oust the Western infidels.3 One of the first to answer this call was none other than

Osama bin Laden, who (even before the US invasion) planned for an Iraqi insurgency in an

attempt to create a land of “perfect Islamic fighters.”4 It is no surprise then, that al-Qaeda directly

funded the creation of Ansar al-Islam in Northern Iraq two years prior to OIF. In fact, later raids

by US Special Forces found identical bomb-making tapes in camps operated by al-Qaeda in

Afghanistan and by Ansar al-Islam in Iraq.5 Moreover, according to British intelligence sources

during the invasion, many of their Ba’athist detainees reported fighting alongside al-Qaeda

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members.6 It is important to note that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would later come to be

considered the grandfather of the Islamic State, first attached himself to Ansar al-Islam before

becoming the full-fledged commander of al-Qaeda in Iraq.7

With the expulsion of Saddam and his Ba’athist regime, the United States set up a

temporary government, called the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The main goal of the

CPA, as stated by their 16 May 2003 First Order, was to complete the de-Ba’athification of

Iraqi society. This led directly to the alienation and marginalization of former Ba’athists in Iraq,

as many ended up in jail or exile. Ultimately, 100,000 IIS (Iraqi Intelligence Service) members,

30,000 ministry workers, and all military members above the rank of Colonel were indefinitely

expelled.8 This process, which was undoubtedly modeled after the de-Nazification programs in

post-1945 Germany, berated former Ba’athists and essentially attempted to vilify them.

Ultimately, it resulted in a Shia-dominated government that regularly mistreated its Sunni

minority.

As a result of contemporaneous Shia empowerment, side effects of the de-Ba’athification

process proliferated to the majority of Iraqi Sunnis and therefore, increased tensions between the

two groups. Consequently, during the CPA (and the subsequent Interim and Transitional

governments), radicalized Islam began becoming more and more attractive to many of the

alienated Ba’athist/Sunni groups. It is no surprise then, that by the time of the Shia Maliki

government in 2006, an explosion of radical Sunni groups occurred throughout Iraq due to their

shared interest of self-defense against worsening oppression.9 Thus, the insurgencies in post-

Ba’athist Iraq were not explicitly aimed at ousting coalition troops (albeit this obviously played a

major role), but rather at promoting self-defense against the Shia government. This rationale

(when taken into context) is understandable, for the Maliki government regularly sent out death

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squads to slaughter Sunnis and ex-Ba’athists. It is no mere coincidence then, that the Maliki

takeover paralleled the heightened rise of insurgent groups, such as the Salafist Mujahedeen

Shura Council (which was set up by Zarqawi for a single reason: to create combat brigades to

defend against Maliki).10

By this time, under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was

gradually diverging away from its parent organization. The reason for this was due to differing

strategic and tactic preferences between al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden. In October 2006,

Zarqawi’s successor (al-Masri) boldly announced that AQI had officially rebranded itself as the

Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).11 This rebranding came after al-Qaeda essentially disowned AQI after

expressing weariness of their particularly brutal tactics against the civilian population.

Fast forwarding to 9 May 2013, while under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISI

officially became the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) after announcing a merger with the

al-Nusra Front (which was also an al-Qaeda offshoot).12 It is important to note that al-Nusra,

which was an al-Qaeda affiliate, never actually agreed to the merger. Nonetheless, less than a

year later (on 4 January 2014), ISIS forces marched through the war torn city of Fallujah (which

is situated only 43 miles West of Baghdad).13 It was at this point that the infamous ISIS became

common-tongue in the lives of ordinary Americans. Within days, analysts and strategists went on

air and spoke of ISIS as “al-Qaeda on steroids.” Stories and tales of their brutality became the

top story on CNN and FOX. But it wasn’t until the beheading of James Foley, an American

reporter, that the reality of their gruesomeness became comprehendible. Images of ISIS carrying

out subsequent beheadings and other mass killings soon became almost mundane.

It does not take more than a simple Google search to see the true atrocities that those

bannered under ISIS commit each and every day. From mass rape, sexual slavery, group

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killings/beheadings, and crucifixion, to limb dismemberment and child molestation, the human

rights violations occurring under the Islamic State are nothing less than blaring. When combined

with the nature of their occupation in large portions of Iraq and Syria, exactly why the Islamic

State must be stopped boils down to a simple humanitarian and moral dilemma.

Yet a major problem in exploring this predicament can be derived from the lack of

understanding of the roots of success in the Islamic State’s rise to power. What many fail to

realize is that the Islamic State is not simply composed of hardliner terrorists and former al-

Qaeda operatives that have gone haywire. The group is a “melting pot” of professional,

radicalized, and militarized personnel from various ethnic, social, national, and political

backgrounds. Moreover, the term “terrorist” group is rashly misplaced when assigned to the

Islamic State. With a fully functioning political structure, intelligence bureau, welfare system,

educational apparatus, economy, and organized military, the Islamic State has a more practical

regime than even some sovereign and internationally recognized countries.

As previously stated, the Islamic State is a melting pot of varying ethnic, social, national,

and political backgrounds. Many have joined the group in search of common goals or because of

shared grievances. The influence these different factions have on the Islamic State cannot be

ignored when attempting to understand both their rise to power and how to potentially end their

reign of terror. The most influential of these recruits, and the focus of this paper, are the ex-

Saddamist Ba’athists that have joined up with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his predecessors. Not

only have certain blocs of these Saddamist exiles merged with the Islamic State, but they have

also found themselves leading the group. In fact, when it comes to actually operating day-to-day

functions, it is mainly ex-Ba’athists, not ordinary jihadists, who have led the organization. For

example (to name a few), Abu Ali al-Anbari (served as Emir of Syria), Abu Muslim al-Turkmani

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(served as Emir or Iraq), and Haji Bakr (who developed the top-down structure and intelligence

capabilities of the Caliphate) were all officers in the Iraqi Military under Saddam Hussein.14 In

fact, nearly every single one of Baghdadi’s closest advisors in Iraq are ex-Ba’athists.15

The simple and often-neglected truth about the Islamic State is that Baghdadi’s closest

companions are nearly all ex-officers of Saddam’s military corps. The implications of this are

conspicuous: Ba’athists played a crucial role in the rise of the Islamic State. Therefore, it does

not take much to deduce that understanding their role is vital in producing a more realistic

picture of the Islamic State phenomena (and in determining how to defeat them).

On the surface, this seems counterintuitive, for the fundamental ideologies of both the

Islamic State and Ba’athists are naturally opposed. Ba’athists, for instance, traditionally believe

in secularism, socialism, and liberty. In effect, nowhere in Ba’athism is there a prescribed notion

of political Islam. The Islamic State, on the other hand, believes in a pure Islamic theocracy

governed by their interpretations of the earliest form of Shari’a law. What many fail to realize is

that the Iraqi Ba’ath party, particularly under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, gradually

diverged from the ideals of its founder, Michel Aflaq, and towards Islamism over time.

Ultimately, the trend towards political Islam set the stage for the radicalization of Ba’athists

during the de-Ba’athification process after 2003.

But exactly how and why did these Ba’athists find their way to the highest ranks of this

theocratic regime? And what subsequent impacts can we conclude these Ba’athists have made on

the Islamic State’s success? This paper will answer both of these questions and in the process of

doing so, alleviate many other mysteries regarding how exactly Ba’athists have come to lead the

most infamous Islamist organization on the planet.

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2. SETTING THE STAGE FOR RADICALIZATIONHow the Transformation of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party Set the Foundation for Ba’athist

Radicalization in Post-2003 Iraq (1947-2003)

“There is much to be said for having an experienced international jurist who is entirely unconnected with allied invaders, on the tribunal…”

-Saddam Hussein

To reiterate, the fundamental ideologies of both the Islamic State and Iraqi Ba’athists

naturally seem opposed on the surface. This is to say that Ba’athist secularism and socialism is

the antithesis to Salafist, seventh-century-oriented, Islamic theocracy modeled by today’s Islamic

State. How could it be possible then, that factions of the old Ba’athist Saddam regime have come

to lead the Islamic State? The fact is that the political ideology of Iraqi Ba’athists shifted towards

that of Islamists over time. In short, under the direction of Saddam Hussein, the secularist beliefs

of Aflaqian Ba’athism underwent a gradual transformation towards political Islam.

Consequently, this general trend laid the groundwork for the radicalization of Ba’athists during

the de-Ba’athification process after 2003.

This gradual ideological shift is often overlooked by Western scholars. Ultimately, by the

time of the 2003 invasion, the version of Ba’athism in Iraq was no longer Ba’athism by the

standard definition. Understanding this point is crucial, for when realized, the apparent

“paradox” of an extremist-Ba’athist connection no longer seems unnatural. But to fully

comprehend the nature of Iraqi Islamized-Ba’athism, one must trace back the ideology to its

roots and study its steady, progressive metamorphosis over time. Even more importantly, one

must also look at the parallel rise of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, for they were

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unintentionally the key forgers of the modern day Ba’athist-ISIS connection (bin Laden created

AQI, later called ISIS, while Saddam led the Islamization process of the Iraqi Ba’ath party).

I. A Brief Reflection on the Rise of Ba’athism (1947-1979)

On 7 April 1947, the Arab Ba’ath party officially adopted its constitution after forming in

Damascus, Syria in 1943.16 The ideology was derived from the philosophies of its main leader,

Michel Aflaq and was summed up in the party’s slogan: Unity, Freedom, and Socialism.17 The

party first rose to power in Syria after success in the 1954 Parliamentary elections (ninety-

percent of Ba’athists that ran for office were elected).18 In 1958, the Ba’ath party’s power was

consolidated when General Nasser agreed to merge Egypt with Syria, thus creating the United

Arab Republic (UAR).19 Since the very start, the goal of the Ba’athists was to create a single,

unified Arab state and consequently, the creation of the UAR gave credence to this prospect.

In Iraq, Ba’athism became a formal political element in 1951 when the Mesopotamian

branch was established.20 Interestingly enough, the Iraqi Regional Ba’ath Party’s founder, Fuad

al-Rikabi, was a Shia Muslim and consequently, the party was initially Shia-dominated before

gradually becoming majority Sunni.21 At only 20 years of age, Saddam Hussein joined the

growing Ba’ath party in 1958 in hopes that Iraq would soon join the UAR. When Abd al-Karim

Qasim, Iraq’s Prime Minister at the time, refused to enter the UAR, a young Saddam and his

fellow Ba’athists became enraged. On 8 February 1963 (despite the UAR breakup in 1961 after a

Syrian military takeover), the dissidents staged a coup that brought the Ba’athists into control of

Iraq for the first time.22 Albeit the first Ba’athist takeover only lasted a few months, it was

nonetheless a major stepping-stone for the party.

In 1966, after years of infighting, the Arab Ba’ath party essentially split in half. For all

intents and purposes, the Iraqi sector stationed itself in Baghdad while the Syrian sector stationed

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itself in Damascus. Ironically, the Syrian-born Michel Aflaq retreated alongside his Iraqi

counterparts and served as National Secretary for the Iraqi Branch until his death in 1989. Due to

the internal power vacuum immediately following the breakup, Saddam Hussein was elected

Assistant General Secretary of the Iraqi Ba’ath party during the very same year. The

consequences of this were all too important, as only two years later he staged a coup that would

finally consolidate Iraq’s political power into the hands of the Ba’ath.23 General Ahmad Hasan

al-Bakr, Saddam’s blood relative, took charge and implemented many social changes. In fact,

during al-Bakr’s reign, Iraq underwent rapid educational and economic growth that resulted in

high earnings, increased welfare/healthcare, and the nationalization of oil (with help from the

USSR).24 The promises of Ba’athism seemed to be genuine (at least from an economic

standpoint) and in less than 10 years, the party’s membership increased from 5,000 to over 1.2

million.25

But the hopeful enterprise of Iraqi Ba’athism would not last. In 1979, Saddam Hussein

used his growing influence to push aside the weakening al-Bakr, thus becoming the fifth and last

President of Ba’athist Iraq. In addition to the Presidency, Saddam also appointed himself

Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq and Secretary General of the Ba’ath

party during this same year.26 It is important to note that Michel Aflaq remained as the National

Secretary under Saddam – a ceremonial gesture that would prove quite convenient (for reasons

specified later in this paper). Like many new leaders before him, paranoia struck a nerve within

Saddam within days of taking office. In order to consolidate power, he decided to eliminate any

Ba’ath opposition to his rule by executing several high-ranking party members.27 Moreover, in

1982, Saddam forced many other high-ranking officials to resign for similar reasons. The

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totalitarian nature of these power-tightening acts shocked many at the time, but in retrospect,

they were merely indicative of even worse actions to come.

II. 1979: The Twin Births of Saddamism and Modern Radicalization

For reasons that will be mentioned, the wielding of power by Saddam Hussein gradually

undermined any notion of true Ba’athism. In fact, it can easily be said that Saddam’s 1979 power

consolidation was the beginning of the end for Iraqi Ba’athism. Instead, although resembling

Ba’athism in several key areas, a new form of governance took place – something that can be

labeled “Saddamism.” As will be shown, Saddamism was a political dynamic in itself, as it

trended away from secularism and towards political-Islamism over time (for the remainder of

this paper, the terms Saddamism and Ba’athism will be used interchangeably, but note that they

refer to the former). Understanding this trend is crucial when taking into account exactly how

and why the radicalization of Ba’athists occurred as rapidly as it did in post-2003 Iraq.

On the economic front, Saddam partially privatized al-Bakr’s nationalized industries, thus

leading to an increase in corporatism and clientelism in the Iraqi oil markets. Essentially, this

cult of patronage was derived from businessmen pursuing their ambitions through members of

the Saddamist Ba’ath party.28 Since the goal of Ba’athism was originally Arab nationalism in

every sense of the word, the privatization of markets was a major shift from Michel Aflaq’s idea

of Ba’athism. But, it is important to note that this patrimony wasn’t limited to the economic

sector. All around Iraq, Saddam ordered statues and other portraits of himself to be erected in

near-deity-like fashion. Moreover, as previously stated, Saddam immediately began killing off

opposition that he deemed as imminent threats to his legitimacy. His use of violence against

potential opposition (something that would be repeated many times over after 1979) is yet

another leap away from the Arab socialist ideal prescribed by his National Secretary, Michel

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Aflaq. It is quite evident that the year 1979 was a turning point for Iraq. But, in retrospect, what

is even more evident are the implications that come along with the fact that on 29 December

1979, the United States placed Iraq on its first ever “State Sponsor of Terrorism” list for its

involvement in funding the militant group Abu Nidal.29 Although not quite to the degree of later

decades, this shows that Iraq was already attempting to forge an Islamic dimension within its

foreign policy (at least covertly).

Meanwhile, as Saddam was consolidating power in Iraq, Afghanistan was rapidly

plunging into chaos. In 1978, a Soviet-backed military coup brought left-winger Nur Mohammad

Taraki into power. During this time, Moscow began sending advisors to Kabul in order to

advance a “Soviet version of socialism” that would align with Soviet interests in the region.30

This new regime began implanting liberal policies (such as educating women) that directly

contradicted with traditional beliefs. Because these new policies strayed from the fundamentalist

perspective of the Islamic faith, those on the right side of the political spectrum became

increasingly agitated. In their eyes, the communists were disrupting and replacing the Shari’a

law that they have governed themselves with for centuries.31 Due to the increasing resentment

towards the still-young regime, opponents began burning down schools and violently-protesting

in the streets.32 Shortly thereafter, these protests worsened into full-fledged rebellions and by

March of 1979, entire cities plunged into anarchy. It was out of this turmoil that the Afghan

Mujahedeen, or jihadists, became relevant on the international stage.

On 24 December 1979, the Soviet Union began a ground invasion in an effort to

overthrow the Afghan government once more. Less than a week after the Soviet 40th Army

invaded, a Spetsnaz raid killed Hafizullah Amin (Taraki’s Prime Minister who took power

through a coup) and the Soviets installed a new socialist puppet government led by Babrak

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Karmal.33 In an attempt to signify the new Afghan government’s allegiance to the USSR, Karmal

even implemented a new national flag that near-perfectly mirrored the iconic Soviet “hammer

and sickle.” Not surprisingly, this attempt (and many others like it) at integration only worsened

the situation. By 1980, fighting had increased dramatically between the Soviets and the

Mujahedeen, who were now gaining international support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia34 (not

to mention arms and supplies from the US under the CIA’s Operation Cyclone35). According to

the 1991 Central Asian Survey, over 1.5 million Afghan civilians died as a result of the bloody

war that ensued. There is little reason to doubt that this further alienated a large portion of not

only the Afghan community, but also Muslim sympathizers around the Arab world. For this

reason, thousands of foreign jihadists flooded into Afghanistan to join the Mujahedeen.

One of these foreigners was a young, 22-year old Saudi millionaire named Osama bin

Laden. After graduating school with a degree in civil engineering (and after joining the Muslim

Brotherhood in 1976), bin Laden traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia in 1979 to aid the

Mujahedeen.36 Along with fighting in a few skirmishes, he was instrumental in both building

roads for jihadists and in working with CIA officials to transfer funds from Saudi Arabia to

Afghanistan via the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI).37 In these dealings

(among many others), bin Laden developed a relationship with three-star general and head of the

ISI, Hamid Gul, who would later openly support bin Laden’s jihad against the West.38

In fact, it was the connections that bin Laden made while with the Mujahedeen that led to

his success as a jihadist. In the early 1980s, he met Egyptian doctor and jihadist Ayman al-

Zawahiri: the future leader of al-Qaeda. By the time he met bin Laden, Zawahiri was already an

experienced jihadist. At age 14, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood, and supported their anti-

Nasser rhetoric. At age 15, he helped found and lead a terrorist cell within the group Muhammad

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abd-al-Salam Faraj, which would later merge to become Egyptian Islamic Jihad – the very group

he traveled to Peshawar and Afghanistan with only a few years later.39 In 1978, he earned his

master’s degree in surgery from Cairo University.40 Only three years after this, he was among

thousands arrested in connection to the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat (although he

denies this account).41

In the 1980s, after his release in Egypt, he fled to help the Mujahedeen in their fight

against the Soviets. Before coalescing with bin Laden, Zawahiri ran his own operation in

Peshawar and Eastern Afghanistan, where he funneled millions of dollars into the hands of

jihadists. However, in 1984, the two finally teamed up and formed Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK –

also known as the Afghan Services Bureau), which was fundamental in transferring funds to the

Mujahedeen.42 The MAK is generally regarded as the father of al-Qaeda and thus, it is justified

to say that it is the grandfather of the Islamic State.

As the precursor to al-Qaeda gradually developed in Afghanistan in the 1980s, a second

war was raging to the west. On 3 December 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became the

First Supreme Leader of Iran after leading the ‘79 Iranian Revolutionaries to victory (he was

even named “Person of the Year” by Time Magazine for his efforts). Throughout the revolution,

Khomeini consistently spoke of the necessity for Iran to take on the role of leading Pan-

Islamism. Immediately after taking office, this rhetoric continued and undermined Saddam’s

similar claims and desires.43 The tensions that came along with the question of who was leading

the Pan-Islamist movement only hauled century-old, Arab-Persian and Shia-Sunni disputes

between the two factions. But it is important to note that these tensions in themselves were not

powerful enough to escalate the situation between Saddam and Khomeini.

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The real roots of conflict stemmed from Saddam’s expansionist and territorial ambitions

– something that would spark his downfall only a decade later. Ultimately, he wanted to seize

control of rich, Iranian oilfields in Khuzestan, as well as the Shatt al-Arab waterway (where

several skirmishes had been fought in the weeks after Khomeini took power). Additionally, since

it was largely Arabs that inhabited Khuzestan, Saddam felt it was necessary to reassert his

control over that area.44 As tensions rose in the early months of 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini began

broadcasting into Iraq in an attempt to spark a Shia revolt.45 The personal animosity between

Saddam and Ayatollah increased with each passing day and only furthered religious schisms,

political rhetoric, and border disputes between their respective nations. Soon enough, a rapid

mobilization effort was underway by Saddam’s Ba’athists, making it nothing less than apparent

that war was inevitable.

On 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran after claiming sovereignty over the Shatt al-

Arab. On this day alone, six Ba’athist army divisions entered Iran while formations of MiG-21s

and MiG23s simultaneously bombed Khomeini’s air facilities.46 The Saddamists easily swept

through Western Iran, but were pushed back only two months later after failing to take Abadan.47

Two years later, after failed peace talks, Iran began its push into Iraqi territory. For the next six

years, the back-and-forth nature of the bloody conflict would be the norm.

III. The 1980s: Saddam’s Blunders and The Maturation of Modern Radicalization

As Iranian forces pushed into Iraqi lands for the first time in 1982, Saddam was en route

to meet with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in a desperate attempt to better relations.48 Iraq

needed friends, as international weariness and accusations towards Saddam Hussein were only

increasing with time. Attempts to talk to Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood,

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showed Saddam’s willingness to prioritize Ba’athist security over secularist ideologies (note that

this would also cause him to engage in talks with extremists during the 1990s).

Furthermore, what was also increasing during this time was Ayatollah Khomeini’s anti-

Sunni/anti-Ba’athist rhetoric.49 Again and again, he insisted that Iraqi Shias’ revolt against their

Sunni government. From the very start of the war, anti-Ba’ath Shias gave credence to

Ayatollah’s pleads and rose against their Sunni rulers. In 1982, the Shia Islamic Supreme

Council of Iraq formed in order to ally with Iran and organize Shi’ite resistance against

Saddam’s Ba’athists.50 But perhaps more importantly, Iran also funded Iraq’s Islamic Dawa

Party, which was responsible for terrorist bombings in places such as the Iraqi Embassy-Beirut in

1981 and the US Embassy-Kuwait in 198351 (and, ironically, which was also the party of future

US-installed leader Nouri al-Maliki). Moreover, Iran supported the Kurdish Democratic Party

(KDP) and helped train them during the early years of the Iraq-Iran War.52 Partially due to the

Iranian support, the KDP had early victories against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK – the

KDP’s regional rival). Pro-Iranian sentiment grew within the ranks of the KDP, and by 1983,

they fully allowed the Iranians to take over the Haji Omaran (a key border crossing).53

In short, Saddam realized Iran’s rhetoric needed to be shut down by any means necessary.

In his totalitarian fashion, Saddam sent out death squads to hunt down certain Shia factions. For

example, on 8 July 1982, he ordered the killing of 148 Shia men and children peacefully working

on an orchard.54 Additionally, in 1983 (in response to the KDP-Iranian alliance), Saddam

attempted to punish the KDP’s leaders by abducting – and presumably slaughtering – more than

5,000 Kurdish males.55 His attempts (such as the two examples just discussed) to quell the

growing Shia resentment would be the very things that prosecutors used against him to justify his

hanging (in fact, the orchard incident was the case used against him).

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And yet, even despite Saddam’s violent attempts to quiet down opposition, dissidence

continued to grow. By 1984, the Iran-Iraq War was becoming costly (in terms of lives and

monetary funds) and it would remain this way until its very end. But the high costs of war didn’t

stop a power-hungry Saddam from expanding his military efforts. In addition to furthering

military conscription in an effort to escalate the situation to total war, Saddam also increased his

use of chemical weapons against Iran—something the Iranians reported regularly to a concerned

United Nations.56 Khomeini, on the other hand, continued giving armaments and funds to the

KDP in hopes of creating an insurgency within Iraq.

To reiterate, in addition to the 300,000 dead Iranians and 150,000 dead Iraqis (by 1984),

the economic costs were already mounting heavily.57 With most of Saddam’s resources going

towards the war effort, poverty increased in Iraq, consequently causing increased dissatisfaction

towards the Ba’athist regime (mainly by the Shia majority). It was within this turmoil that the

roots of the Islamization of the Ba’ath party are situated.

Furthermore, with public dissidence mounting, Saddam once again embarked on a quest

for allies. In July 1986, he held a meeting with Pan-Arab leadership in hopes of fabricating peace

among the Iraqi Ba’athist party and popular Islamist movements, such as the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood (of which Zawahiri was a member of – and who had been a bitter rival to Ba’athist

regime since the 1940s in Syria and the 1960s in Iraq).58 Once again, endeavors with the Muslim

Brotherhood showed Saddam’s growing desperation to gain control of the situation in Iraq. By

this time, poverty and inflation in Iraq had manifested overwhelming starvation. Much of

Saddam’s opposition was now turning to religion as a means of diminishing their suffering.

Realizing this, Saddam finally turned to Islam as the means for controlling his population. Before

long, portrayals of Saddam making pilgrimages and praying in Mosques flooded throughout

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Iraqi media outlets.59 In public speeches, Saddam began referring to Mohammad’s guidance. In

retrospect, it is clear that Saddam was about to plummet down a path that would ultimately end

the dying notions of Aflaq’s Ba’athism in Iraq.

In 1987, Saddam committed one of his largest human rights atrocities in response to

continued Kurdish support for an Iranian takeover. In his so-called al-Anfal Campaign, Saddam

systematically slaughtered nearly 100,000 Kurds and Shias in Northern Iraq.60 The means used

were gruesome: chemical weapons, airstrikes, army regulars, forced deportation, and firing

squads. The following year, Iraqi MiGs dropped chemical weapons atop Halabja, killing nearly

5,000 Kurds – with 75% being women and children.61 Massive disappearances of men, women,

and children became the norm in northern Iraq during the years 1987-1988.62 It was later found

that these (usually innocent) people were shipped off to concentration camps akin to those of

Nazi Germany. According to Human Rights Watch:

“Throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, although women and children vanished in certain clearly defined areas, adult males who were captured disappeared in mass ... It is apparent that a principal purpose of Anfal was to exterminate all adult males of military service age captured in rural Iraqi Kurdistan."63

Accounts of the Anfal Campaign tell tales all too familiar to events that transpired in

Europe only four decades previously. Men, women, and children were separated, loaded onto

trucks, and shipped off to concentration camps, whereby they were stripped down and deemed

“fit” or not. Then, they were rushed into rooms and systematically slaughtered by several

different means: firing squads, rape, poison gas, incineration, and starvation, to name a few.64

Almost two decades later, mass graves filled with thousands of corpses (that date back to these

killings) were found by US and Iraqi forces.65

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Meanwhile, as Iraqi Ba’athists focused on eliminating interior opposition to their rule, the

most notorious terror group in history was being created in Peshawar, Pakistan. As Mujahedeen

forces were staring victory in the face in 1988, bin Laden and Zawahiri were meeting privately to

discuss the future of their movement. Out of this meeting came the evolved manifestation of their

group Maktab al-Khidama – something they would call al-Qaeda. Immediately following their

formation of the terror group, bin Laden and Zawahiri – a dynamic duo that would shape the

organization until bin Laden’s death – began creating training camps in Afghanistan.66

The announcement of al-Qaeda remained relatively quiet within Western circles. But

contrary to this, the establishment of the organization was one of the most pivotal points of the

20th century, and consequently, it would shape foreign policies for the next twenty years. No

longer was jihad to be limited to specific regions within “dar al-Islam” (the house of Islam).

Upon realizing their success in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, bin Laden and Zawahiri

(among others), sought to expand their cause beyond their region of operations. They stated the

goal of al-Qaeda was to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by ousting “non-

Islamic” systems of government.67 This was the only way, they argued, that Muslim unity was

ensured. Islam was the common bond between people within the House of Islam and to pay

virtue to this, they believed Muslims had to return to the true way. This ultra-conservative

ideology, commonly referred to as Salafist Islam, shaped and continues to shape cultural

paradigms within groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS to this day (NOTE: Salafism developed as a

result of Western domination in 19th century Egypt and therefore, it is important to understand

that its reactionary rise occurred many, many decades before al-Qaeda68). Realizing their

military, economic, and political inferiority to state institutions of target regimes, they decided

19

the best means to accomplish their goals were through guerilla attacks and terrorism. Thus, with

the fall of the Soviet Union, the Age of Terrorism had begun.

As will be seen, the economic turmoil and decrease in nationalism caused by the Iran-

Iraq War fabricated a desperate need for Ba’athists to regain control of Iraq. With the

Mujahedeen victory in Afghanistan, and the continuation of the Salafist movement, Iraqi’s

ultimate decision to turn to Islam (as will be discussed) was a dangerous one. In fact, Iraq’s pivot

towards political Islam came at the same exact time as the rise of al-Qaeda, making it almost

natural that the two parties expressed degrees of curiosity towards each other (this curiosity led

to the establishment of contacts between Ba’athists and the future leaders of the Islamic State in

Iraq – but this too, will be discussed later).

IV. The Necessity for Saddam to Win Over the Iraqi People

In the very same month that al-Qaeda formed in Peshawar, Saddam and Khomeini finally

made peace in Mesopotamia and Persia. In total, the war cost Iraq 561 Billion US dollars,69 over

100,000 civilian deaths (not including the al-Anfar campaign and other Ba’athist killings), and

up to 375,000 soldier-KIAs.70 The preexisting problems of poverty, inflation, and starvation were

only increasing. Furthermore, to make matters worse, Iraqi oil production and economic growth

slowed dramatically, while at the same time, government debt increased to nearly $130 Billion

(Iraq’s GDP was only $38 Billion in 1989).71

With nationalism on the decline, Saddam had no choice but to use Islam to counter public

disillusionment and to gain support. Since the start of the Iran-Iraq War, he gradually increased

Islamic rhetoric of doing “justification” for God in order to contrast Shi’ite and Kurdish

movements, such as the KDP, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Dawa Party. In short, the

20

Ba’athists needed to regain control and public confidence—and to accomplish this, they deemed

it necessary to appease Islamic sentiment.

Less than a year after the August cease-fire that ended the Iran-Iraq War, the evidence of

Ba’athist Islamization efforts became clear when on 23 June 1989, Michel Aflaq died.

Interestingly enough, immediately following his death, the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad released

a statement confirming that the revered “Father of the Ba’athist Party” embraced Islam prior to

his death (Aflaq was a known Christian throughout his life).72 Regardless of the validity of this

statement, the implications of it were clear: Saddamists was continuing to branch away from

traditional Ba’athism.

As time rolled forward, Iraq’s debt crisis continued to be rather bothersome to the

Ba’athist regime. To Saddam, the reason his economic recovery was failing was due to OPEC’s

indifference regarding Kuwait’s attempts to increase oil quotas; thus causing a decrease in oil

prices. According to Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, “every $1 drop in the price of a barrel

of oil caused a $14 Billion drop in annual Iraqi oil revenue…triggering a financial crisis in

Baghdad.”73 Additionally, Saddam accused Kuwait of drilling into Iraqi oil fields.

Whether or not the Kuwaitis were waging economic warfare on the Iraqis is irrelevant to

the backstory of the Islamization of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party. But what is relevant is Saddam’s

solution to his own allegations. By mid-1990, his troops were mobilized and ready to execute

plans to conquer Kuwait. Moreover, with his troops primed for invasion, his Islamic rhetoric

stepped up. Three days before the war’s commencement, Saddam wrote a new constitutional

draft that described martyrdom as an honor before God.74 On 2 August 1990, Ba’athist forces

finally invaded and two days later, Kuwait was in Saddam’s hands. Then, on 7 August, Saddam

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said (referring to the successful conquest of Kuwait) that: “our brains were worthless in this

matter. It was God who guided us and it was God who has blessed us.”75

Concurrently, in the next few months, Saddam reported to the media on numerous

occasions that the Prophet Muhammad had appeared to him in dreams in order to give him

military advice (I suppose with the impending US invasion, this advice failed).76 Along with this,

came Saddam’s assumption of the title “Server of God.” Subsequent to the announcement of his

being the “Servant of God,” the media, in turn, began to commonly portray Saddam as a Mahdi

(meaning a redeemer of Islam).77 Evidently, in the months following the Invasion of Kuwait,

Islam became fully politicized in Iraq – something inherently conflicting with the late Aflaq’s

secular, Ba’athist values.

With Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait came a plethora of international opposition. In fact, every

single member on the United Nations Security Council (among others) publically denounced the

actions of the Ba’athists. To name a few:78

China enacted an arms embargo. 12 of 20 Arab League members voted to create a Multinational Force based in Saudi Arabia. The US froze all assets while also sending troops to Saudi Arabia. The USSR froze all assets and sent two warships to the Gulf. France froze assets and sent warships to Gulf. Economic Community (Europe) imposed a trade embargo against Iraq. Belgium and Germany sent minesweepers to gulf and enacted an oil embargo.

Moreover, on the first day of the invasion, the United Nations Security Council enacted

Resolution 660, which both:79

1. Condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.2. Demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.

22

In the closing months of 1990, major world powers and Ba’athist Iraq held numerous

negotiations to peacefully resolve the situation – but to no avail. In November of that year,

Saddam responded to reporters questioning his decision to gamble Iraq at the expense of a US-

led invasion by saying: “If God wills something, there is no stopping his will.”80 Essentially, he

was blaming God for his decision to stay in Kuwait despite UN/US ultimatums. Moreover,

immediately following these reports, Saddam told the media that “only through jihad” would the

true spirit of Islam return.81 Not only did this show conclusively that Saddam was dependent

upon Islamic rhetoric to quell concerns within his country, but also that his divergent path from

Ba’athism was nearly to the point of no return. He linked himself to the Prophet Muhammad and

to Islam in general in order to stop critics and gain control (he was more or less “playing the

Islam card”).

But, perhaps unbeknownst to him then, his Islamization efforts would consequently open

the door for religion to fully conquer politics within the near future. As previously stated, with

the integration of the Ba’athists and Islam, religion became a thick veil covering the totalitarian

nature of Saddamists. The fact is that the promotion of the simple idea of an Islamic political

system opened the door for such a system to exist in the future (due to increasing perceptual

intellections that began to unleash themselves at this time).

According to many within his inner circle, not only did Saddam seek to create his own

school of jurisprudence within Islam, but also he deeply desired to be the Muslim leader of the

world.82 Again and again he attempted to vindicate the idea that he was indeed a Mahdi. To

reiterate once again, the increasing grandiloquence of these statements created a perfect

environment for setting future radical jihadist spirits free in post-2003 Iraq – which, in turn,

helped facilitate the radicalization of his own, fellow Ba’athists.

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On 14 January 1991, one day before the UN ultimatum for Iraq to disembark from

Kuwait collapsed, Saddam imprinted the phrase “Allahu Akbar” (God is Great) on the Iraqi

national flag.83 The reason for this was simple: Saddam realized a war with the West was

inevitable and he needed to spur non-existent nationalist spirits. Understanding that nationalism

was at an all-time low in Iraq (due to increasing economic difficulties and frustration towards the

Ba’athist regime), the Ba’athists sought to exploit the Muslim faith in order to “religiousize” the

impending conflict; thus, consequently replacing nationalist incentives to fight with religious

ones.

Two days later, on 16 January 1991, Operation Desert Shield (the codename for the

buildup of troops in preparation for a potential Iraq war) escalated into Operation Desert Storm.

The United States led 33 coalition countries into battle; proudly declaring “we will not fail.”84 In

only 1.5 months, over 60,624 tons of bombs were dropped by the USAF (this number does not

include bombs dropped by coalition nations) – which on a monthly average is comparable to

both Vietnam and World War II.85 Media images of enflamed, blackened oil fields quickly

spread throughout the world (but the reality of the destruction caused by these bombing runs

went well beyond what was viewed by the public). It was clear that the coalition planned to hit

Ba’athist forces relentlessly.

By 27 February 1991, coalition forces fully occupied Kuwait and forced Saddam to order

a retreat. One day later, President Bush officially announced the liberation of Kuwait and the

commencement of a cease-fire. But, although ground operations against the West were over, Iraq

still had an interior conflict to fight. Throughout the Gulf War and in the months leading up to it,

President Bush directly addressed Iraq’s Shia and Kurdish opposition. For example, on 1 March

1991 he stated the following:86

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“In my own view...the Iraqi people should put Saddam aside, and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace-loving nations.”

Statements like these, which ran parallel with CIA attempts to operate “pro-freedom”

radio stations in Iraq, gave dissidents the hope of Western support they needed to rebel.

Consequently, in March 1991, Iraq saw the largest Shia revolt since 1920.87 Groups involved in

these uprisings were mainly under the umbrella of al-Dawa or the Supreme Council for Islamic

Revolution in Iraq, the two largest Shia factions at the time.88 Contemporaneously to the Shia

rebellions, the KDP and PUK began revolting in the north. In short, when the simultaneous

uprisings were finally quelled, Saddam had the blood of another 100,000 citizens on his hands.89

Ultimately, over 10 percent of the country was displaced and millions more were traumatized.

Many scholars have pointed to this revolt as the “last straw” for Iraqi Shias. From this point

forward, the Shia-Sunni chasm in Iraq deepened to a point of no return. Understandably so,

Saddam lost a considerable degree of both political legitimacy and support. To counteract the

growing animosity towards his Ba’athist regime, Saddam once again embarked on winning his

people over through the use of Islam. It is no wonder, then, that by the end of the rebellion the

Ba’athists had already initiated their public Islamization effort, known as the “Return to Faith”

Campaign.

But what was even more destructive than the internal dissidence caused by Saddam’s

endless wars was the ensuing and debilitating economic costs. In fact, from 1989-1991, Iraq saw

a massive drop in its oil supply (to be exact: 2,643,000 barrels/day). The crippling cost of the

Gulf War would be something the Ba’athists ultimately failed to recover from fully (see Figure

1).

25

(Figure 1) Data Source: eia.gov

Furthermore, consequential to the drop in oil production, Iraq’s GDP per capita also

suffered greatly – giving even greater credence to the notion that Iraq’s economy was crumbling

to ashes (see Figure 2).

(Figure 2) Data Source: indexmundi.com

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Source: Wikimedia

ABOVE: Thousands of refugees roam Iraq in 1991 as a result of the Shia rebellions. The Ba’athists’ extreme methods used to cripple the revolt led to the decrease in legitimacy of Saddam’s regime and thus, (in the absence of nationalism) an increase in Ba’athist tendency to rely on Islamic rhetoric for support.

27

In 1990, two years after the war with Iran, Iraq’s Human Development Index (HDI) was

ranked 50th in the world.90 However, by 1995 Iraq’s HDI plummeted to 106th, further showing the

failure of the increasingly Islamized Ba’athist society under Saddam Hussein.

The reason for pointing out these statistics is simple: to further provide a fundamental

understanding as to the degree of necessity for Saddam to win over the hearts and minds of the

Iraqi people. With a collapsing economy, public dissidence, poverty, hunger, and unemployment

all increased dramatically. As you will see, winning his people over is very thing Saddam

Hussein intended to embark on doing. While his Islamization protocol was in full swing by the

end of 1991, it only increased with time as the final decade of the twentieth century progressed.

In fact, by the early 1990s, not only were Ba’athists expanding domestic Islamic initiatives, but

they were also seeking to further Islamist components to their foreign policy.

V. The Islamization of Domestic and Foreign Interests (1992-2002)

In the midst of the Gulf War in 1991, Osama bin Laden begged his home government in

Saudi Arabia to oust the Americans, whose boots were touching the same dirt that covered the

holy cities of Mecca and Medina. After refusing the middle-aged, ex-Mujahedeen, logistic

manager, rising tensions between the two parties culminated in the expulsion of bin Laden from

his home country. It is needless to say that bin Laden was furious with the Saudis and thus, he

traveled to Sudan whereby he continued expanding operations with al-Qaeda (AQ).91 It is here in

Sudan that the first known meeting between AQ and the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) occurred.

It is important to note (for clarification purposes) that while the paths of Osama bin

Laden and Saddam Hussein did not directly intercept in the past forty years of history just

discussed, understanding the divergent and increasingly Islamic nature of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party

from its predecessor is crucial when pondering how these perceptually ideologically opposed

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parties finally merged in post-2003 Iraq. Thus, the willingness for the IIS to engage in talks with

al-Qaeda showed how serious the Ba’athists were about consolidating their power from both

internal and external threats.

To reiterate, the disillusionment of the Iraqi populace fabricated a dire necessity for

Saddam to win over the hearts and minds of his people. With the overwhelming defeat after

promises of victory in the Gulf War, nationalistic fervor was not an option to take advantage of.

Therefore, the Ba’athists once again turned to Islam as a means of control. Whether or not

Saddam Hussein himself became a genuine devout to the Muslim faith (as he consistently

insisted) is trivial to this argument. What is important is the fact that his claims to piousness

opened the door for religious excitement within the ranks of his fellow Ba’athists. This

consequently set the foundation for the radicalization of these Ba’athists after their

marginalization under the Coalition, Interim, and Maliki governments.

Furthermore, the overwhelming scrutiny of a bin Laden-Saddam Hussein connection has

caused many simple facts to be ignored when it comes to Ba’athist cooperation with jihadists. It

is true that the evidence of their direct cooperation in the 9/11 attacks is virtually nonexistent, but

nonetheless a general relationship did, in fact, exist (and what’s important for our purposes is

the fact that this relationship increased with time). Many Americans tend to overlook the obvious

fact that attacks (like 9/11) were not the sole operational activity of al-Qaeda. Iraqi Ba’athists

often used al-Qaeda to channel funds or help procure arms (and vice versa). But these facts,

which will be discussed, are beside the point. What is important is the willingness for Ba’athists

to engage with bin Laden/AQ in the first place. Not only did this show the desperation of the

Ba’ath party to hold onto power, but also the turmoil enslaving Iraq during the 1990s. Therefore,

it must be kept in mind that this section was not designed to support any argument for an Iraqi

29

linkage to 9/11, but rather to show the establishment of contacts between Ba’athists and radical

Islamists (which helped ally factions of the two groups after 2003). The fact is that these contacts

set the groundwork for further collaboration (and ultimate merging) after Operation Iraqi

Freedom. By focusing on the connections between jihadists and Ba’athists in the 1990s, one can

fully grasp the extent of the relationship building that occurred between the two parties during

this time period.

More importantly, the establishment of contacts between Ba’athists and extremists, such

as al-Qaeda, showed Saddam’s desire to Islamize particular dimensions of Iraqi foreign policy

(at least covertly) in order to reassert his domestic claims of being a Pan-Islamic Mahdi. As

previously stated, the growth of bin Laden paralleled Saddam’s Islamization efforts and

therefore, meetings between their respective groups were only a natural occurrence (regardless of

their outcomes) when their mutual desperation for allies is taken into account.

In 1992, the IIS began listing bin Laden as an intelligence asset (as revealed in a

document the Defense Intelligence Agency reported to be authentic).92 Additionally, during the

2003 Iraq War, numerous high-level Ba’athist prisoners in Iraqi Kurdistan reported to The New

Yorker that Saddam Hussein had hosted a leader of al-Qaeda during 1992 (the leader specified

was Zawahiri).93 Interestingly enough, when Kurdish officials tried to get the CIA to interrogate

these men, they were met with no answer. This meeting was verified by an independent Iraqi

intelligence official, who stated that a third-party group (named al-Turabi) brokered the meeting

between the Ba’athist IIS and Zawahiri.94 This source also claimed that these meetings persisted

during throughout the 1990s in varying locations, such as Sudan, Pakistan, and even in a safe

house in Baghdad. Moreover, a leaked Defense Department document written by Undersecretary

30

for Policy Douglas J. Feith maintained that Saddam wished any relationship between the IIS and

al-Qaeda be kept secret (in fear of foreign probes).95

The initiation of these meetings came as Saddam was preparing for his “Return to Faith”

campaign. Not surprisingly, the developments during Return to Faith directly led to the rise of

Salafist ideology in Iraq. To lead the campaign, Saddam selected Izzat al-Douri – a Ba’athist

official who would later lead the insurgency group Naqshbandi Army and work with ISIS in

taking several key Iraqi cities. Interestingly enough, it was during this time of Islamization when

al-Douri first began to develop connections to future-ISIS top commanders (then-Saddam

loyalists) al-Turkmani and Abu Ayman al-Iraqi.96 Due to this, it is only logical to conclude that

the Return to Faith Campaign eventually aided (directly and indirectly) the success of the Islamic

State nearly 20 years later.

The first order of the campaign (although before its “official” start) occurred in August

1992, when Saddam instructed the Iraqi Ministry of Education to test every single teacher’s

knowledge of the Quran.97 In meetings with advisors and top Ba’athist-officials, Saddam

officially made public his goal to create a Pan-Islamic state – something that many of his fellow

Ba’athists agreed with.98 By definition, Iraqi Ba’athists who were loyal to Saddam could no

longer be considered Aflaqian Ba’athists. The U-turn from secular Pan-Arabism to full-fledged

Pan-Islamism that had been gradually occurring since Saddam’s taking of office was now fully

manifested.

On 1 June 1993, Saddam ordered 30,000 new Quran teachers and made Quranic study a

required subject on the general matriculation exams.99 In short, he enacted numerous programs to

further the study of Islamic law. For example, in order to acquire the 30,000 teachers he sought,

he offered generous stipends on top of increased base salaries; thus, making the job extremely

31

desirable. Moreover, new laws were passed that reformed capital punishments akin to

reactionary-Shari’a resolutions (for example thievery was now able to be punished by the

amputation of the hand).100

Meanwhile, in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, a second al-Qaeda-

Iraqi Intelligence Service meeting materialized a nonaggression pact between the two parties.101

While only speculative, it seems logical to conclude that the reasoning behind this was

preemptive – Saddam didn’t want to undermine his Pan-Islamic ambitions and his Return to

Faith Campaign by dealing with religiously inspired attacks on his soil (although these were

occurring already in relatively small numbers). It is important to note that despite the fact that

this meeting was between the leadership of both parties, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein

were both absent.

In 1994, however, bin Laden made his first face-to-face meeting with the IIS. This

meeting was initiated by al-Qaeda in order to secure arms training and weapons from the

Ba’athists. More specifically, bin Laden attempted to persuade the Iraqi Intelligence Service to

assist al-Qaeda in the “procurement of an unspecified number of Chinese-made anti-ship limpet

mines” among other foreign-made weapons.102 This was well documented in US intelligence

circles. In fact, according to page 19761 of the Congressional Records of the United States

Senate, Iraqi officials allegedly traveled to Sudan to meet with al-Qaeda three times before the

meeting with bin Laden himself.103 In addition to the procurement of arms, bin Laden also

wanted anti-Saudi rhetoric to be broadcasted throughout Iraq and joint IIS-AQ operations in

Saudi Arabia.104 Interestingly enough, the Congressional Record reveals that it was in fact the

Sudanese government that brokered the meeting between AQ and the Ba’athists (but after 1994,

32

the two parties decided it was best to meet through alternative communication channels). To

quote directly from page 61 of the 9/11 Commission Report:

“With the Sudanese regime acting as an intermediary, Bin Laden himself met with senior Iraqi Intelligence officers in Khartoum in late 1994…Bin Laden is said to have asked for space to establish training camps [within Iraq], as well as assistance in procuring weapons.”105

In the decade and a half since 9/11, facts such as these have been largely forgotten. The

reason for this is the channel(s) in which we attain our information (which is mainly largely

deceitful, opinionated, and sometimes uninformed media outlets). Thus, to say there was “no

connection” between al-Qaeda and the Ba’athists is simply misleading. To reiterate, albeit the

evidence for IIS-AQ cooperation in the attacks on 9/11 is nonexistent, a relationship did exist for

other purposes.

To continue, the head of the CIA, George Tenet, said the following regarding the

contacts:

“We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda going back a decade…Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression.”106

Furthermore, Ba’athists and al-Qaeda shared an interest in Algerian terror group “Groupe

Islamique Arme” (GIA) during this time. Interestingly enough, the GIA was one of the largest

AQ affiliates throughout the mid-90s. According to the CIA, Iraqi Ba’athists used al-Qaeda as an

intermediary to transfer funds to the GIA, thus solidifying the premise of Islamization within

Ba’athist ranks.107

With the paths of radicals and Iraqi Ba’athists finally converging, Saddam was also

furthering his Faith Campaign. In 1994, he announced his plan to build the “Grand Saddam

Mosque, which was to be the largest in the world (it also was to be encapsulated by a manmade

33

lake that stretched 70,000 yards in the shape of the Arab world).108 In addition to this, Iraqi

Ba’athists also established the “Saddam High Institute for the Study of the Blessed Quran and

the Prophet’s Esteemed Sunna” in an attempt to further his policy of Islamizing Iraqi education

and politics.109

Perhaps it is only suitable to pause for a moment and reflect on the happenings just

discussed. The domestic Islamization in Iraq and the expanding radical contacts of the IIS (such

as al-Qaeda and their affiliate GIA) are not separate entities. Together, they represent a fervent

effort by Iraqi Ba’athists to revamp Iraq into a system able to radiate the perception of Pan-

Islamic leadership. But even more importantly, they established the foundations for the post-

2003 radicalization of Ba’athists.

To continue, in 1995, after years of persuading the Iraqis to help AQ develop chemical

and conventional weapons, bin Laden’s associates began receiving bomb-making training from

IIS technical expert Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed (who was observed at bin Laden’s farm in

Khartoum in 1995 and 1996).110 To reinforce this evidence, page 19760 of the Congressional

Record quotes the CIA directly:

“Al-Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities…Iraq has provided training to al-Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs.”111

Interestingly enough, according to the Pentagon, alongside bin Laden in Khartoum was

the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, Mani-abd-al-Rashid-al-Tikriti.112 These training

sessions came as Saddam once again announced to Arab leaders (in a closed-door meeting) that

Iraq was officially a supporter of a Pan-Islamic world.113 The goal to create a Pan-Islamic state –

something the modern-day Islamic State also strives to do – now became paramount to Ba’athist

doctrine in Iraq.

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The year 1995 also saw many meetings between the IIS and Abu Hajer. “The Iraqi,” as

he was known, was an al-Qaeda operative who was crucial in orchestrating meetings between

radicals in AQ and Ba’athists in the IIS. According to the 2002 CIA report, titled Iraq and al-

Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, Abu Hajer had a great relationship with Iraqi

Intelligence and even helped negotiate the 1993 nonaggression pact.114 Moreover, in addition to

confirming his involvement in the nonaggression pact, the CIA reports that he was involved in

the 1998 embassy bombings and in the Khartoum meetings.115 Lastly, according to the Senate

Congressional Record, on 19 February 1995, the (Ba’athist) former Director of Iraqi Intelligence

Directorate 4 met with bin Laden to discuss unspecified topics.116

Furthermore, the July 2004 Intelligence Committee report stated the following regarding

the operations of the IIS:

“From 1996 to 2003, the Iraqi Intelligence Service focused its terrorist activities on Western interests, particularly against the United States and Israel…[and during this time] the general pattern that emerges is one of al-Qaeda’s enduring interest in acquiring CBRN expertise from Iraq.”117

It is no surprise then, that in 1996 the National Security Agency intercepted telephone

calls between AQ and IIS chemical weapon experts.118 Interestingly enough, during this same

year, a chemical weapons program began in Sudan, just south of Khartoum; while, at the same

time (according to Colin Powell), bin Laden was meeting with IIS officials in the same city (just

before his move to Afghanistan).119

Continuing on, as described in the 2004 Intelligence Committee Report, in 1997 AQ sent

Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi to Baghdad in order to (once again) persuade the IIS for CBRN

technology.120 According to Colin Powell, he met with Iraqi Intelligence numerous times that

year in order to purchase poison gas. Whether or not CBRN technology was provided by the

35

Ba’athists (if it even existed), is beside the point. Once again, regardless of actual negotiated

pacts/trade deals, the most important things these meetings produced were connections and

relationships.

Furthermore, it is well reported that AQ fighters were observed in training camps within

Iraq in 1997 – showing the effectiveness of bin Laden’s requests only a few years prior.121

Meanwhile, during the same time period, Saddam began to call for jihad against the West after

coming under major scrutiny over the prospect of UN weapons inspections. This event was well

reported in the Iraqi newspaper “babel.”122 But it is important to remember that Saddam’s call for

religious holy war against the West was not a rare event. In 1991 for example, Saddam called for

jihad against the United States and Saudi Arabia123 – an eerily similar cry to what Osama bin

Laden would make in due time.

In 1998, the Clinton-era Justice Department accused Iraqi Ba’athists of helping al-Qaeda

develop and procure weapons.124 Perhaps it was for this reason then, that CIA Director Tenet

declared “war” on al-Qaeda during this same year. But regardless of the reasons for the CIA’s

statement, it is nonetheless an extraordinary coincidence that this “war declaration” came as

future Iraqi Intelligence Service chief Forouk Hijazi traveled to Kandahar to meet with bin

Laden.125 Moreover, it is also an incredible coincidence that only days after the 1998, four-day,

US bombing campaign in Iraq, bin Laden and Zawahiri met with two senior Ba’athist IIS

officials (in the same month as at least three more meetings between AQ and the IIS).126 During

this time, Ba’athists vigorously attempted to build an Arab alliance against the attacks, but to no

avail. Consequently, it would be no stretch of the imagination to assume that indulging within

the ranks of al-Qaeda was their only option in trying to build allies against the West. Therefore,

36

it is logical to deduce that Western military intrusions and UN sanctions directly pushed the Iraqi

Intelligence Service and al-Qaeda into increasing cooperation with each other.

It is important to note that as meetings between AQ and the IIS were increasing in 1998,

Ba’athist rhetoric of Islamization was also increasing. For example, Izzat al-Douri openly stated

during this time that Islam was the official stance of the Iraqi Ba’ath party.127 This occurred

contemporaneously with Saddam’s continuing push for Islamic education reform and superficial

calls for holy war.

As time pushed forward into the final year of the twentieth century, speculation continued

to grow surrounding the purported Ba’athist-Jihadist connection. Once again, regardless of the

relationship between the leaders of each party, one cannot deny the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s

willingness to work with al-Qaeda (and vice versa). In 1999, an official under President Clinton

told the Washington Post that US Government Intelligence was “sure” that the IIS helped al-

Qaeda in developing weapons.128 Furthermore, according to the 2002 Intelligence Committee

Report, this came as the US intelligence community received word that al-Qaeda was planning to

strike a major landmark in New York City.129 A second report of this potential attack came only a

month later from British intelligence sources. It is needless to say that many within the US inner

circle were on their toes.

In 1999, Hijazi traveled to meet with bin Laden once again (the same CIA source says

this was extremely unlikely to happen unless ordered by Saddam himself).130 Also, by this time,

it was open knowledge that al-Qaeda had set up operational training camps in northern Iraq. As a

direct consequence to this, it seems that the IIS had deliberately given in to al-Qaeda’s requests

regarding the providing of a safe haven for AQ terrorists.

37

Furthermore, during the same year, the so-called “father of the Islamic State,” Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi (a Jordanian street thug by trade), traveled to Afghanistan. Here, he made his

first connections to al-Qaeda and even set up his own terrorist organization (back in Jordan)

called Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Tawhid or JTJ for short).131 Interestingly enough, JTJ was

fully funded by the Afghan Taliban regime and its efforts focused on training suicide bombers

within Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban-dominated areas.132 The implications of this are of the

utmost importance, as Tawhid (or “unity”) was one of the first to surge across the border into

Iraq after the 2003 US invasion.

In the year of the millennium, experts believe Zarqawi met again with bin Laden in

Kandahar.133 Reportedly, al-Zarqawi denied an invitation to join al-Qaeda despite their obvious

mutual interests. The reason for this, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, was due to

bin Laden’s insistence on focusing on the US, rather than enemies nearer to their area of

operations, such as Israel and Jordan. But regardless of the rift, many in the intelligence

community still maintain that their cooperation remained strong in the years preceding their

eventual merge. The evidence for this is solid, for after receiving rejection to his proposition, bin

Laden then gave funds to Zarqawi’s in order to help set up training camps in Herat,

Afghanistan.134

Then, in 2001, photographs showed al-Qaeda members heading to Ba’athist-funded

compounds in Northern Iraq.135 This came only weeks before the founding of Ansar al-Islam,

which was established by direct funding from Osama bin Laden (who, with knowledge of the

upcoming September 11th attacks, sought to expand operations to secure al-Qaeda’s survival

against an impending American onslaught). According to prisoners in the Kurdish camp

Sulaimaniya, Ansar al-Islam developed as a result of a joint-control operation between the

38

Ba’athists and al-Qaeda. While many may doubt this, it is nonetheless coincidental that in early

2002 a Ba’athist IIS official awarded Ansar over $100,000.136 Yet, it is important to note that

both the Ba’athists and the Islamists viewed the Kurdish people (among others) as a common

enemy. Albeit the well-documented evidence regarding Ba’athist-AQ cooperation in fighting

Kurdish groups may be over emphasized, it nonetheless is still important for our purposes, as it

shows the willingness for both parties involved to work with one another.

However, it is noteworthy to mention that one of the main leaders of Ansar al-Islam, Abu

Wail, was also an Iraqi Intelligence Service Officer under Saddam Hussein.137 In fact, many in

Iraq reported intercepting radio traffic between the Iraqi Army and Ansar. It is no surprise then,

that the leader of the PUK, Barhim Salih, claimed Ansar al-Islam was operating out of Ba’athist-

controlled Mosul.138 Moreover, according to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, it was in

Ba’athist interest to have Ansar al-Islam opposing the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Having Ansar al-

Islam as a proxy force would have given Saddam Hussein a stronghold to oust American and

foreign ambitions within the region. Thus, with this proxy force, he would have subsequently

consolidated power in Iraqi Kurdistan (which is something he always strived to do).

Interestingly enough, in 2002 both Ansar al-Islam and the Ba’athists targeted the same

PUK and KDP forces139 – this suggests organizational cooperation in the attempts to

systematically destroy their common opposition. Additionally, during the same year, Zarqawi

was given protection in Baghdad in order to get medical treatment from a hospital operated for

the Iraqi elite.140 In fact, this hospital was owned and run by Saddam Hussein’s own son. It is no

coincidence that during this year, Zarqawi also attached himself (and his group, Tawhid) to

Ansar al-Islam (which was a known client of al-Qaeda training). Therefore, whether known or

not known by the IIS, Saddam Hussein and his fellow Ba’athists directly aided an al-Qaeda

39

affiliated leader and played a role in helping him return to his leadership position (whereby he

was healthy enough to lead al-Qaeda in Iraq, which later turned into the Islamic State).

VI. A Brief Reflection on Ba’athist Islamization Until 2003

It is important to pause at this time to summarize the happenings prior to the 2003 US

invasion and reflect upon their implications. To begin, Ba’athism started out as a secular,

socialist ideology focused on the philosophies of Christian-devout Michel Aflaq. Upon taking

power in 1979, Saddam’s Ba’athists began a gradual transformation towards totalitarianism and

the inclusion of Political Islam. The undermining of Saddam’s legitimacy by Khomeini’s

rhetoric and funding for Shia/Kurdish rebel factions during the Iran-Iraq War decreased Ba’athist

popularity in Iraq. The short war promised by Saddam Hussein quickly turned into the longest

conventional war of the 20th century. Poverty, starvation, and economic woes all increased during

and after the war, making it increasingly difficult for the average Iraqi to make a living. Thus,

notions of nationalism no longer were suitable for Ba’athists to exploit for control – essentially

the “rally around the flag” effect was no longer working. Public dissidence (that often manifested

in forms of rebellion) was mounting and the Ba’athists needed to quell the situation.

To accomplish this, the Ba’athist regime turned to Islam. Rather than renewing a “rally

around the flag” effect, they decided to establish a “rally around Islam” system. Saddam declared

it an honor to die in the name of God and increasingly began referring to the Quran in public

speeches. But, by the aftermath of the Gulf War, Iraq’s economy tanked. Consequently, the

largest Shia rebellion since 1920 quickly erupted and nearly overthrew Saddam Hussein; who

responded by killing over 100,000 members of his opposition. As one would expect, the mass

killing of civilians did not roll over well with the public and thus, dissidence continued to rise. In

attempts to wither down the billowing resistance, Islamization continued to the point of a

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perceptual quasi-theocracy. Saddam told stories of meeting the Prophet Muhammad in dreams

and being guided by his infinite wisdom. Under the “Return to Faith” Campaign, Quranic

teachings expanded, Mosques were built, “Allahu Akbar” was written on the national flag,

Ba’athist calls for jihad became more frequent, and Islamic rhetoric became commonplace. Izzat

al-Douri even proclaimed that Islam was the official stance of the Ba’athist party. Consequently,

Saddam was named a redeemer of Islam, or a Mahdi, by the Iraqi media.

Interestingly enough, at the exact same time of the Islamization of Iraqi Ba’athists, the

forefathers of the Islamic State were on the rise. After succeeding in ousting the Soviets during

the Afghan War (which happened contemporaneously with the Iran-Iraq War), many within the

jihadist resistance, or Mujahedeen, sought to expand their fundamentalist operations outside of

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two of these jihadists were Osama bin Laden and Aymann al-

Zawahiri, who went on to co-found al-Qaeda (“the base”) – the father group of the Islamic State.

During the same time, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad,

established relations with al-Qaeda and eventually (over a decade later) helped them establish

Ansar al-Islam in Iraq.

During the 1990s, Iraqi Ba’athists realized they needed allies; however, international

scrutiny under the leadership of the U.N. essentially made this nearly impossible. Thus, in order

to gain influence/control, the Ba’athist Iraqi Intelligence Service began seeking relationships

elsewhere (mainly within the ranks of foreign organizations, such as al-Qaeda and the Groupe

Islamique Arme, to name a few). This relationship coincided perfectly with Iraqi Islamization

and consequently, cooperation with radicals became an integral part of Ba’athist foreign policy

(at least covertly within the intelligence community).

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Whether or not this relationship in 1990s was merely a type of “marriage of

convenience,” as stated by many scholars, is irrelevant to the argument at hand. The important

takeaway is that increasing relations between jihadists and Ba’athists, especially in the 1990s, set

the groundwork for the future merging of their separatist factions in post-2003 Iraq. Moreover,

this time period is crucial in the development of radicalized Ba’athist leadership within groups

(such as ISIS) due to the fact that the connections between leadership members first manifested

through these IIS-AQ meetings and dealings. With their belittlement, diminishment, and

marginalization under the CPA, Interim, and Maliki de-Ba’athification programs, the Ba’athists

turned to the closest “allies” they had left: the jihadists who they dealt with before the invasion.

Thus, while on the surface it may seem that Saddamist-Ba’athists and jihadists are

presently unlikely allies, quite the opposite is true. Many have pondered exactly how a secular

faction could merge with an Islamist one. The answer, as shown up until this point, is rather

simple: The Ba’athists that merged with ISIS in post-2003 Iraq were no longer following secular

guidelines, but rather ideologies that gradually shifted over time towards Islamization (see Figure

3 on next page—NOTE that Figure 3 only depicts the Ba’athists who aligned themselves with

groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq after the 2003 war. It does not depict Ba’athists who fled to

their Syrian sister-party, nor does it represent the Ba’athists who created their own rebel groups

inside Iraq). As will be shown in the following sections of this paper, although there was a

degree of cooperation and converging ideologies between the Ba’athists and radical Islamists, it

failed to manifest into a full-fledged merge until after the de-Ba’athification program ensued.

However, the purpose for laying out the connections of the 1980-1990s is to show that the

merging of Ba’athists and radicals occurred over a great expanse of time for varying reasons and

was not caused by solely the US invasion, or solely the Ba’athists thirst for control.

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(Figure 3)

43

VII. Unleashing The Alliance From Hell

There has been much scrutiny surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the

subsequent nation-building effort – and deservingly so. While the situation the Bush

administration faced was complex and convoluted, there is no question that their ultimate

strategy spurred unrest in the region. Just as the 1991 Shia uprising was purportedly the “point of

no return” for Sunni-Shia relations, the de-Ba’athification following the 2003 Iraq War was the

“point of no return” for many Ba’athists.

Whether or not the US had the evidence to back its claims of Saddam’s CBRN transfers

to al-Qaeda is viewed by many as inconclusive, despite traces of evidence (some of which that

was presented in preceding sections of this paper). In the US, the fierce debate of Saddam’s

connection to the 9/11 attacks blinds many from seeing the truth. The fact is that there were (as

shown) Ba’athist ties to radical groups, such as al-Qaeda. Did the cooperation include Ba’athist

aid in fabricating 9/11? No. But, did this cooperation exist on a limited, multifaceted level of

financial, political, and military affairs? Yes.

Three weeks after the initiation of OIF, the Ba’athist regime crumbled under the force of

American firepower. Documents captured after the conflict subsided show that the Ba’athist

regime harbored Iraqi Abdul Rahman Yasin, the man responsible for mixing the chemicals for

the 1993 World Trade Center bombings.141 Moreover, Iraqi prisoners taken under British

authority reported fighting alongside a joint Ansar al-Islam and al-Qaeda force throughout the

course of the war.142 This was a crucial development, for it was the first direct cooperation

between radical and Ba’athist forces.

Ultimately, by May 2003, the Ba’athists’ worst fear had been realized: the loss of

political control in Iraq. It is no question that desperation ensued within Ba’athist ranks. This

44

Source: MSNBC

ABOVE: Crowds of Iraqi civilians watch as a statue of Saddam is toppled, alongside his regime. The ousting of Saddam Hussein marked a critical turning point for Iraqi Ba’athists, as in the ensuing months and years, a largely oppressive de-Ba’athification process would lead them to complete their gradual radicalization process and join Islamist groups, such as the Islamic Sate.

45

desperation is the reason for the initial military cooperation between Ba’athist troops and radical

groups, like Ansar al-Islam. In fact, it is only logical to conclude that the very reason they began

the Islamization process (to re-consolidate control over the population) was the same reason that

they joined radical militants in the fight to oust the foreigners.

After taking Baghdad, the US helped set up the Coalition Provisional Authority. This

temporary government was led by American Paul Bremer and held full executive, judicial, and

legislative powers over Iraq. Immediately following its onset, the CPA released CPA Order

Number 1, which called for the “rigorous” de-Ba’athification of Iraqi society. To quote the Order

directly:143

“This order implements the declaration by eliminating the party’s structures and removing its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means, the Coalition Provisional Authority will ensure that representative government in Iraq is not threatened by Ba`athist elements returning to power…”

Moreover, as stated by the second CPA Order, Senior Ba’athist members were to be

exiled without financial compensation:144

“No payment, including a termination or pension payment, will be made to any person who is or was a [Ba’athist] Senior Party Member.”

Thus, with the advent of de-Ba’athification came a mass exile of jobless and moneyless

government officials, intelligence officers, and military leaders. In short, there were three main

outstanding flaws with de-Ba’athification that led to the radicalization of those affected. For one,

the Ba’athists were exiled based off of rank, meaning that their actual actions committed were

not taken into account whatsoever.145 Secondly, the program alienated Ba’athists – what were

these jobless, moneyless men supposed to do after their expulsion? Turning to terror

organizations, it seems, gave them the means to live they desperately needed. Lastly, de-

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Ba’athification polarized Iraqi politics and left a gaping void that an incompetent and repressive

government later filled.

Ultimately, 100,000 IIS (Iraqi Intelligence Service) members, 30,000 ministry workers,

and all military members were either released without compensation and/or indefinitely

expelled.146 Understandably enough, many of these exiled Ba’athists were extremely disgruntled

at what they viewed as unfair treatment and the destruction of their livelihoods. To be fair, the

process was poorly planned: Ba’athists in the military were expelled indefinitely based on rank

and not the actual actions they performed under Saddam Hussein. In only months, the

marginalization and alienation of Ba’athists began and with only a small number of allies, many

turned to their connections developed in the 1990s to restore their ability to live.

The disenfranchisement from the exclusion of Ba’athists from their previous political and

social stature caused stirring animosity to develop towards the US and their subsequent CPA,

Interim, and Maliki governments. The humility that was attached to de-Ba’athification brought

many Ba’athists over the edge. Those who were religious fell victim to the attractiveness of

Islamist principles and avenged their circumstance by promising to wage jihad to secure their

still-prominent goal of Pan-Islamism. Yet, at the same time, those who were simply steaming

with hatred formed their own groups and vowed to wage war to re-secure their place in power.

Either way, organized opposition was quickly mounting.

In the summer of 2003, the first resistance groups began to develop. In addition to Ansar

al-Islam, Ba’athists began to attach themselves to other resistance factions. For instance, al-

Adwa formed during this time and was almost entirely composed of former Ba’athist intelligence

and military exiles.147 In fact, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, al-

Adwa was one of the first groups to attack coalition forces after the war. Furthermore, other

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Ba’athists joined with the Fida’iyin Saddam, a paramilitary organization that was infamous for

its use of human shields during OIF. Others, however, found themselves joining more hardliner

Salafist groups, such as the 1920s Revolution Brigade and Islamic Army in Iraq – both of which

operated (at least for a time) under the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Joint

Leadership of the Mujahedeen.148

In 2003, al-Zarqawi also declared war on Shias due to their involvement in supporting the

Americans and their policies of alienating Sunnis, such as the Ba’athists.149 Zarqawi, like many

others, cited the unfair treatment of “innocents” within Iraq. Ironically enough, his declaration of

war came as Camp Bucca, one of the key prison camps that led to the rise of ISIS, was erected

near Umm Qasr.

Only a year later, after a raid on a home in Fallujah, Camp Bucca gained its most

notorious resident: Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badry – or as we today know him, Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi (the Islamic State’s leader and the self-proclaimed “Caliph” of the Islamic world).150

But this camp wasn’t just home to Baghdadi – its importance for the development of Ba’athist

leadership in ISIS cannot be stressed enough. In fact, according to the Soufan Group, the

expansive detention center was the breeding ground for the surpassing of any “marriage of

convenience” between ex-Ba’athists and Islamists. If inmates weren’t radicalized by the time

they entered the camp, they were surely radicalized on their way out of it. The list of ISIS leaders

who circulated through Bucca is expansive. To name a few:151

-Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (leader of Islamic State [IS])-Abu Muslim al-Turkmani (IS number two)-Abu Ayman al-Iraqi (senior military leader)-Haji Bakr (brought Baghdadi into power)-Abu ‘Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi (Operational leader—responsible for Mosul strategic conquest plans)-Abu Qasim (in charge of foreign fighters and suicide bombers)-Abu Lu’ay (senior military leader)

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-Abu Shema (in charge of logistics)

-Abu Suja (in charge of welfare programs fro martyrs)

There is no question that Camp Bucca played an integral role in furthering connections

between disgruntled Ba’athists and jihadists. The merging of these two groups created a

seemingly perfect entity. According to the Soufan Group, the Ba’athists were strong in

organizational skills and popularity among the populace, but they lacked the motivation and

inspiration after suffering crushing defeats by the CPA, Interim, and Maliki governments. The

jihadists filled this missing inspiration perfectly; while on the other side of the coin, the

Ba’athists-turned-Islamists helped their new jihadist partners form a viable, professional

organization.152 More importantly, due to the ex-Ba’athist transformation to violent extremism

before, during, and after Camp Bucca, both factions were on the same ideological page; thus,

coalescing in the first mass-merger of the two groups after nearly forty years of gradual

convergence (as described previously).

In 2004, as Baghdadi and his future commanders were becoming allies in US prison

camps, bin Laden and Zarqawi finally teamed up to form al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the direct

predecessor to the Islamic State.153 Immediately, the group led a plethora of insurgencies, the

most famous of which located in Fallujah (which was, by this time, deemed an AQI

stronghold).154 The main focus of AQI’s efforts was towards killing Shia personnel rather than

US troops, but nonetheless both enemies were targeted. Consequently, the Sunni-Shia chasm

worsened yet again and the US, as well as its newly installed Iraqi Interim Government, began to

lose control of the situation.

To attempt to quell the situation, President George W. Bush appointed John Negroponte

as the first ambassador to Iraq on 6 May 2004. Under the influence from Bush, Negroponte then

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brought in Mr. John Steele (who worked with Negroponte in Honduras and helped oversee

numerous human rights abuses there).155 Together, the two implemented counter-insurgency

tactics – also known as a “divide and conquer” strategy. Additionally, they began to mobilize

what is referred to by Wikileaks as “death squads” in order to shut down Sunni uprisings,

resulting in the deaths of thousands.156 But, it is now clear that their means to quell the rebels had

the opposite effect. Sunni militant groups continued to form by virtue of self-defense against

Shia-dominated security forces, death squads, and untouched militias. In fact, many groups

claimed that the purpose of their insurgency was not focused towards Coalition forces at all, but

rather solely materialized for the defense of the Sunni community.157

When one looks at the side effects of de-Ba’athification, this notion is not a surprise. The

United States purposely oversaw the marginalization of Sunnis due to the nature of their alliance

with Shia representatives, such as Maliki. The Shia were empowered by the US for one purpose:

to give the US a friendly regime in Iraq. Consequently, Shia atrocities against Sunnis were

largely overlooked out of national interest (it is important to note that the main reason the Shias

felt bitter towards the Sunnis was due to the totalitarian means used by Saddam’s Ba’athists).

On another note, in a potential foreshadowing of future ISIS strategy, bin Laden said the

following in 2004 regarding Iraq:158

“One of the most important reasons that made our enemy controls our land is [for] the pilfering of our oil. Exert all that you can to stop the largest stealing operation in history…”

Not long after, the same source says that Zawahiri told Muslims to focus on attaining

control of the oil fields. It is clear that al-Qaeda leadership already had their eyes on Iraqi oil in

the midst of the turmoil. Interestingly enough, Zarqawi made a similar statement in 2005 after

publically announcing his connection to bin Laden.159 According to the same source, Ba’athist

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groups, such as al-Adwa, also had plans to secure Iraq’s oil. Thus, it is only fitting that the only

two groups to express any real interest in Iraqi oil at the time were generally the same factions

that merged to form the Islamic State several years later.

On 19 October 2005, Saddam Hussein stood trial before the Iraqi Special Tribunal – a

US-handpicked group of judges bestowed with the responsibility of determining Saddam’s fate.

Throughout the trial, Saddam constantly yelled God is great and that Islam is Iraq’s true law.160 A

year later, on 5 November 2006, Saddam was sentenced to death by hanging (which took place

on 30 December 2006). Fittingly enough for the story of Ba’athist Islamization was Saddam’s

last words: “God is great, praise Muhammad and kill his enemies!” It is important to note that

this event was televised around the entire world. Furthermore, many high-level Ba’athist leaders

were sentenced to jail (such as Abdullah Kadhim Ruweid) on terms viewed by many as unjust.161

In fact, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch deemed the trial “unfair”

and a “flawed” process that was a major step away from a law-abiding Iraq.162 These groups also

called the trial impartial due to the US and Shia-government selected jurors. Richard Dicker of

Human Rights Watch said the following regarding the trial:163

“We saw this trial, along with the others, as an opportunity to bring justice to those Iraqis who had suffered horribly under Ba’ath Party rule. Unfortunately, we believe the serious shortcomings in the fairness of the proceedings undermined the legitimacy and credibility of the trial.”

Dicker went on to say that the courtroom proceedings were marred by “some disturbing

court practices” including the court’s failure to deliver documents to the defense in a timely

manner, the government’s public criticism of Rizgar Amin (the trial’s first judge) for being to

“sympathetic” to Saddam, and the failure for Amin’s replacement (Mr. Rahman) to “demonstrate

proper judicial demeanor in his management of the proceedings.”164 All in all, the trial was

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marked by numerous delays, political pretense, and courtroom hysterics. In fact, many Sunni

Arabs still, to this day, criticize the verdicts as the product of a “political charade” designed to

appease the agendas of the Bush administration and his puppet, Shi’ite-led Iraq government. It is

no wonder, then, that the US Military prepared in advance for an uproar of Ba’athist insurgencies

after the trial.165

Even Saddam himself sarcastically stated that “there is much to be said for having an

experienced international jurist entirely unconnected from the allied invaders, on the tribunal”

during his testimony. Nonetheless, it is no surprise then, that in the weeks following the

execution, a mass influx on Sunni protestors sprawled throughout Iraq.166 In Samarra, Sunni’s

rioted and shot weapons into the air. The failure to give Saddam a fair trial only alienated

Ba’athists and Sunnis even more, giving all the more reason for them to radicalize against an

oppressive Shi’ite government.

In 2006, the first post-OIF Iraqi-run government came into power under Prime Minister

Nouri al-Maliki. Immediately, Maliki furthered the use of death squads as prescribed by

Negroponte and Steele in accordance with the Interim Government.167 He hunted down AQI and

planned to expel all 2 million Ba’athist sympathizers within the country. His bloody-minded

tactics became too much for already-marginalized ex-Ba’athists and other Sunni Muslims and, in

turn, forced them into extremism as a means of personal protection. Furthermore, his policies

directly caused sectarianism to begin to increase within Iraq, as Sunni Muslims began moving to

Sunni neighborhoods to escape Shia discrimination (before 2003, Iraq’s cities were generally

semi-integrated).168

According to documents revealed through Wikileaks, US officials realized that the

policies under the CPA, Interim, and (mainly) the Maliki government were furthering the Shia-

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Sunni divide well beyond what it was under Saddam and his Ba’athists – yet nothing was done to

fix the problem. Moreover, a mainly Shia Iraqi Army and Security Forces oftentimes clashed

with a majority Sunni police force.169 There is no doubt that the lack of cooperation between the

two allowed groups, such as AQI (later ISIS), to spread as quickly as they did. Ultimately, if

affected Ba’athists and other Sunnis weren’t radicalized prior to 2006, the Maliki brutality and

oppression almost ensured their ideological tendencies to shift towards extremism.

To counter this, more rebel groups began to emerge. In January 2006, AQI set up the

Mujahedeen Shura Council in order to create a more unified resistance. In July, the Council

declared it would create combat brigades to defend against Shi’ite militias and government

forces.170 Only a month later, AQI suffered a heavy blow when its leader, al-Zarqawi, was killed

in an airstrike. But, the group quickly rebounded and began to increase its recruiting efforts. One

way in which they did this (under the leadership of al-Masri) was by rebranding their

organization as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).171 Immediately after selecting Abu Omar al-

Baghdadi as its leader, the ISI released the following statement:172

“Since the beginning of the Crusader invasion of Iraq, our country, the best of the Sunni Mujahedeen have been busy pushing the attacking enemy out of their country…until the black hatred of the Shia in Iraq for the Sunnis became obvious to all eyes.”

Moreover, contemporaneously with the announcement of the Islamic State in Iraq,

cooperation began to increase with the Naqshbandi Order – the very group that Izzat al-Douri

(who was in charge of the Return to Faith Campaign) was a leader of since the 1970s. The Order

formed a militant group on 30 December 2006 known as Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia,

or JRTN for short. Until 2011, the group was mainly composed of disgruntled Sunnis and Sufis.

But more important for our purposes is the fact that it was led by ex-Ba’athist officers.173 Time

53

and time again, they have directly financed ISI attacks that were focused on ousting the US and

the Shia government. Although many scholars have cited the JRTN’s relationship with the

Islamic State as merely a marriage of convenience, there is evidence to prove that it has gone

beyond this (at times). For example, the JRTN was instrumental in helping ISIS take both

Fallujah and Mosul in 2014 by offering military and economic assistance.174 Therefore, during

these times al-Douri directly cooperated with the Islamic groups his party was secretly meeting

with in the 1990s.

Moreover, in 2006 the ISI was continuing the late Zarqawi’s Shia-targeted strategy and

expanding it throughout the Province of Anbar (with great success, as Anbar became largely

under ISI control by this time). For instance, in November they repeatedly attacked the Shia-

dominated Sadr City in Baghdad. According to ISI spokesmen, the Sadr City assault was a

revenge effort for Shi’ite attacks on Sunni neighborhoods.175 While many Sunnis agreed with

their motives, their means were viewed as largely inhumane, as they regularly brutalized women

and children. It was during these attacks in Sadr and elsewhere that many Ba’athists not aligned

with those radicalized in the Islamic State in Iraq began to see the true nature of ISI’s methods.

Thus, albeit not all Ba’athists were allied with each other after 2003, the conquest of Anbar

Province by AQI/ISI directly led to a lasting chasm between ex-Ba’athists. Those more

radicalized sided with the Islamic State in Iraq, while those less radicalized sided with other

resistance groups. Consequently, many of the rebel groups teamed up with US forces to fight ISI

(in what became known as the Anbar Awakening). The coalition against ISI had profound

impacts on their operational ability and until the US withdrawal in 2011, the group mainly

focused on rebuilding itself.

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Ultimately, the de-Ba’athification process in Iraq completed the Ba’athist Islamization

process that began under Saddam Hussein. But for many of these ex-Ba’athists, their political

transformation did not stop at mere Islamization, but rather a more reactionary paradigm:

something that many refer to as Islamic extremism. The de-Ba’athification led to millions of

unemployed and disgruntled ex-governmental personnel in Iraq. Many different groups formed

(see Figure 4 on page 56), such as the JRTN and later (in 2014) the General Military Council for

Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR), which was also tied to Izzat al-Douri.176 When combined, these

two groups have upwards of 100,000 of ex-Ba’athists within their ranks. But despite the

ideological differences between groups akin to JRTN/GMCIR and ISI/ISIS, they have regularly

cooperated in military and economic affairs.

In an ironic twist of fate, the fears of a full-fledged al-Qaeda-Ba’athist connection under

the Bush Administration ultimately manifested themselves into reality through the means of

Operation Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent de-Ba’athification process. In short, the years of

1979-2003 saw a gradual shift within Iraqi Ba’athist ranks towards Islamization. No matter the

reasoning behind the push for political Islam (which was surely the desire for gaining control of

Iraq), it was nonetheless instrumental in setting the groundwork for the future radicalization of

Ba’athists. But even despite the willingness to engage in limited cooperation with groups akin to

al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the Iraqi “Return to Faith” was not enough to set radical spirits free by

itself. In post-2003 Iraq, the policies of the Shia dominated government after OIF were the

breaking point for many Ba’athists and consequently caused them to plummet into extremism as

a means for revenge, livelihood, and protection. Many of these Ba’athists found refuge in

Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq, which later evolved into the Islamic State, as we know it today. With

55

their political, military, and organizational expertise, it is no wonder how they came to run the

Islamic State.

(Figure 4)

al-Qaeda in Iraq

JRTN

GMCIR

Syrian Factions

The Islamic State

Other

PATHS OF EX-BA’ATHISTS

56

CONCEPTUAL DEGREE OF BA’ATHIST RADICALIZATION OVER TIME

(Figure 5)

OIF/De-Ba’athification

Return to Faith/Gulf

War

Khomeini steps up anti-Saddam

Rhetoric

CONCEPTUAL DEGREE

TIME

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3. RECLAIMERS OF IRAQ: The Ba’athist Role in the Rise of The Islamic State

“By Allah, we will take revenge! By Allah, we will take revenge! Even if it takes a while, we will take revenge!”

-Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

In early June 2014, an Iraqi official named Bikhtiyar al-Qadi received a startling phone

call while based in Mosul. When the government administrator inquired as to whom exactly he

was speaking to, he quickly found out his days were numbered. On the other end of the line was

none other than a former Major General in Saddam Hussein’s Elite Republican Guard. The

General explained ardently that he had appealed for months during de-Ba’athification to rejoin

the Iraqi Army – but to no avail. The ex-Ba’athist said the following:177

“We will reach you soon, and I will chop you into pieces.”

Only days later, the Islamic State (IS) overtook Mosul in a storm of revengeful and

hateful firepower. Bikhtiyar described narrowly escaping before IS forces stormed his

headquarters. He had always wondered how exactly it was the Islamic State grew to such

capability, but now he knew. He realized the “melting-pot” of expertise within the group,

particularly from the remnants of the exiled Ba’athists, was instrumental in their organizational

and operational prowess.

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There is no question that ex-Ba’athists have played an integral role in the Islamic State’s

success. The sheer number of ex-Ba’athists in top-ranking positions proves this without doubt.

But how exactly have the Ba’athist remnants influenced the Islamic State? To answer this

question, several examples of ex-Ba’athist Islamic State leaders will be used. Moreover, by

examining the highest ranks of the Islamic State, one can truly grasp the level of influence ex-

Ba’athists have in controlling the group.

I. Haji Bakr: The Designer of the Islamic State

The top-down organizational structure of the Islamic State (especially its intelligence

branch) was designed mainly by Haji Bakr, a former Ba’athist Lieutenant Colonel in the Iraqi

Air Force’s Intelligence branch.178 After the 2003 invasion, Bakr joined many of his fellow

Ba’athists by going into hiding and discretely organizing insurgency movements. Unsurprisingly,

Haji Bakr is said to have met Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi while imprisoned in Camp Bucca. Many in

the region have commonly referred him to as both the Brains of Baghdadi and the Architect of

ISIS. But perhaps more important is that fact that Haji Bakr also diligently worked to improve

relations with other Ba’athist factions, such as al-Douri’s JRTN and GMCIR.

Moreover, after being released form Camp Bucca, he traveled to Tell Rifaat, Syria in

order to rekindle his relationships with those in Syrian Intelligence under Assad. His cooperation

with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliates played an integral role in forming al-Nusra Front, which quickly

seized military bases, weapon caches, and high-tech equipment that, in turn, gave Haji Bakr the

means to form an advanced, covert intelligence/spy agency for the Islamic State.179 When he was

killed in 2014, special units captured his handwritten notes, which included his sketches for the

leadership structure of the Islamic State. Not surprising is the fact that Bakr’s plans for an ISIS

intelligence service seems to have been modeled after the Ba’athist one he served in under

59

Saddam Hussein. Moreover, included in these notes, were plans to capture the information of

every IS member in case of the need for blackmail.180 He also helped create the strategic plans

for Baghdadi that allowed him to quickly take over large chunks of Syria and Iraq.181

It is also important to note that Bakr is said to have been one of the most influential

people in Baghdadi’s rise to power. Essentially, Bakr orchestrated numerous assassinations of

Baghdadi’s opponents, thus solidifying his control over the group.182 Furthermore, after Omar

Baghdadi’s death, Haji Bakr solely led the Islamic State Military Council.

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Above: Haji Bakr’s notes regarding the organizational structure of the Islamic State(SOURCE: Speigel.de)183

II. Fadl Ahmed Abdullah al-Hiyali (Abu Muslim al-Turkmani)

Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, as he called himself, was a former Ba’athist Lieutenant

Colonel in the Iraqi Special Republican Guard. He personally knew both Saddam Hussein and

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Izzat al-Douri and following Operation Iraqi Freedom, he helped orchestrate numerous Sunni

insurgencies.184 Before long, he was imprisoned in Camp Bucca, where he first met Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi. It is unknown how radicalized Turkmani was prior to Camp Bucca, but nonetheless,

after his release, he joined Baghdadi in taking control of the Islamic State in Iraq. In 2013, he

was named Baghdadi’s deputy Emir of Iraq and Syria (prior to this he was solely the deputy

Emir to Iraq).185 In January 2014, he was named second-in-command of ISIS for his success in

managing the State’s military, logistics, finances, media, and other operations. Moreover, after

the death of Haji Bakr, he was also named head of the Military Council.186 It is no wonder, then,

as to why US intelligence analysts have called him the “right hand man of Baghdadi” time and

time again.

III. Abu Ali al-Anbari

Abu Ali al-Anbari (born Abdulrahman Mustafa al-Qaduli) was a Ba’athist Major General

under Saddam Hussein and after the 2003 OIF, he joined al-Qaeda in Iraq for revenge against his

expulsion.187 After finding his way to AQI/ISIS, al-Anbari played a crucial role in aiding in the

group’s success. He served as both Deputy Emir to Baghdadi and as Emir of Syria.188 Moreover,

he also had seats on the intelligence and security councils due to his experience as a Ba’athist

military planner and intelligence organizer. It is reported that Anbari served as temporary Caliph

after Baghdadi was injured by an airstrike. Up until his death in 2015, he was the named

successor to the Caliphate.189 Interestingly enough, in 1988 (while still a Ba’athist officer), al-

Anbari traveled to Afghanistan to help train al-Qaeda members with Osama bin Laden.190 It is

then that he befriended and gained the trust of bin Laden – something that paid off 20 years later

when bin Laden wanted to name Anbari the Emir of Iraq. He is said to have been key in planning

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successful military operations for the Islamic State and this is evident by his high-ranking

position on the military and intelligence councils.191

IV. Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi

Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi (born Adnan Islmail Najm al-Bilaqi Al-Dulaimi) was yet

another high-ranking military officer in Saddam’s Ba’athist army prior to 2003.192 After

Operation Iraqi Freedom, al-Bilawi joined AQI and worked side-by-side with al-Zarqawi in

instrumenting their insurgency efforts. In 2005, he was detained in Camp Bucca, where he met

many future Islamic State leaders. After escaping the prison, he found himself as one of the

Islamic State’s top military advisors and on the Military Council.193 Documents captured after his

death show that he was the leading planner for the conquest of Mosul, which was named the

“Invasion of Asadullah al-Bilawi Abu Abdul Rahman” in his honor by the Islamic State.194

V. Baghdadi’s Closest Companions Are Almost All Ex-Ba’athists

It is important to note that the particular examples just shown only begin to scratch the

surface of the true extent of ex-Ba’athist control over the Islamic State. Rather than focus on

more specific examples, it would be helpful to take a step back and look at the leadership of the

Islamic State in a broader context. By doing this, a number of things are revealed. For one, the

overwhelming number of ex-Ba’athists in high-ranking positions infers that the Islamic State is

not controlled by jihadists, but rather by ex-Ba’athists. Secondly, when combined with a

predominantly ex-Ba’athist leadership structure, ex-Lt. Col. Haji Bakr’s role in consolidating

Baghdadi’s reign insinuates that Baghdadi is merely a spiritual and charismatic figurehead.

Thirdly, the degree of organizational professionalism that is attached to the fact that ordinary

jihadist fighters are led by ex-officers of Saddam Hussein’s regime gives further justification for

saying that the group is, in fact, a state.

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To begin, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s closest Iraqi advisors include the following:195

Far’e Rafa’a Nu’emi (Abu Shayma) – helps lead weapon

procurement efforts

Khayri Mahmud al-Tai (Abu Kifah) – expert in explosives

and mines

Abdul Rahman al-Ofari (Abu Suja) – handles the families of

martyrs.

All of these men were once ranking officers in Iraq’s Ba’athist military.

But Ba’athist influence doesn’t stop at the advisory level. For example, the following is a list of

Baghdadi’s governors:196

Wissam Abu Zayd al-Zubeidi (Abu Nabil) – governs

Salahuddine province

Nimer Abdul Latif al-Jabouri (Abu Fatima) – governs

Kirkuk

Ahmad Muhsen Khalal al-Jouheishi (also by the name of

Abu Fatima) – governs the South and Central Euphrates region

Adnan Latif Hamid al-Suweidani (Abu Abdulsalam) –

governs Anbar

Ahmad Abdul Qader al-JAza (Abu Maisara) – responsible

for Baghdad region

Radwan Taleb Hussein al-Hamadani (Abu Jamaa) – of cities

and towns along the Iraqi-Syrian border

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Like his advisors, Baghdadi’s governors are composed entirely of men who were once

Ba’athist officers under Saddam Hussein. But the list keeps on going, for Baghdadi’s late-2014

“Cabinet” consisted of the following members:197

Shawkat Hazem al-Farhat (Abu Abdul Kudir) – Minister of

General Administration

Bisher Isma’il al Hamadani (Abu Mohammad) – Minister of

Prisoners

Abdul Wahab Khatmayar (Abu Ali) – Minister of Public

Security

Muwafak Mustapha al-Karmoush (Abu Saleh) – Minister of

Finances

Mohammad Hamed al-Duleimi (Abu Hajar) – Coordinator

of Provinces

Abdullah Ahmad al-Mashadani (Abu Qassem) – Minister of

Fighter’s Affairs

All of these “Cabinet” members were middle-aged ex-Ba’athists who have been

instrumental in governing the organization. It is also needless to say that every single one of

these men was extremely wealthy before OIF and enjoyed relatively lavish lifestyles. Moreover,

in addition to their military duties, Abdul Khatmayer and Bisher Hamadani both controlled

important business activities under Saddam (the export of agricultural goods and the import of

motor vehicles, respectively).198 This allowed Baghdadi to acquire some money from former

Ba’athist elites, and then some (when ex-Ba’athists like Khatmayer and Hamadani requested

funding from old business partners, they were usually not shut down).199

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More importantly, these Ba’athists understood Iraqi terrain well: they knew where

weapon caches, ammunitions, monies, and important resources were located. Not only did this

give ISIS fighters advanced weapon systems, like AKMs, RPGs, and surface to air missiles, but

it also gave them access to more knowledge than any other group in Iraq. In fact, after

overrunning Mosul in 2014, the Islamic State used its new weapons (possibly including captured

MiG jets and UH60 Blackhawk helicopters) to set free 500 ex-Ba’athist detainees from prisons,

such as Abu Ghraib.200

Moreover, there isn’t any doubt that the ex-Ba’athist leaders in the Islamic State

employed the military tactics they learned under Saddam Hussein. For instance, during their

siege on al-Bab, they bombarded the city for three days straight and proceeded to blockade it.

The Islamic State then stole the city’s food supply and forced it into submission through

starvation (which was the same method Ba’athists planned to use to shut down Shia

rebellions).201 Furthermore, prior to OIF, Iraqi Ba’athists built an elaborate, yet secret, system of

safe houses and weapons caches, which included materials for making improvised explosive

devices (IEDs).202 It is no surprise then, that after Baghdadi’s rise to power, these caches and

houses were used regularly to supply the Islamic State.

Ultimately, Ba’athist supervision of the day-to-day operations of the Islamic State,

combined with Baghdadi’s claimed ancestry, provided the perfect combination of

military/organizational knowhow and political/religious legitimacy for success. In the battle for

Mosul in 2014, the Ba’athist military/organizational knowhow became nothing less than evident.

Throughout Iraq, Islamic State forces put on numerous charades aimed at deceiving the Iraqi

Army. For instance, in June, Islamic State vehicles entered Samarra in Salahuddine Province.203

Immediately, the Iraqi Army responded by sending in reinforcements, but only to find that they

66

had been tricked – another Islamic State force was striking elsewhere (in Ramadi).

Consequently, the Iraqi Military quickly sent troops to Ramadi, but once again the Islamic State

had switched targets and attacked Baquba. Due to the series of seemingly random attacks, the

regional Iraqi governments began asking for reinforcements from the Iraqi Army, thus stretching

their forces thin.204 Seeing that their enemy fell face-first into their trap, the Islamic State then

initiated the attack on Mosul and won a swift victory.

It was precisely this victory that raised many eyebrows within the international

community, particularly in the West. The operational professionalism orchestrated in the

conquest of Mosul was unlike anything performed by any other “terrorist” group beforehand. It

is needless to say that many were shocked by the fact that “terrorists” could perform such a

maneuver. But, in reality, this tactical aptitude did not come from the minds of ordinary

terrorists: Recall that the plans for this invasion were drawn up by the ex-Ba’athist Abu

Abdulrahman al-Bilawi, of whom the operation was named in honor of.

The often-neglected fact is that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi surrounded, and continues to

surround, himself by remnants of Saddam’s ex-cronies (see Figure 6 on the next page). In doing

so, Baghdadi and his ex-Ba’athist companions transformed their organization into an Islamist

group unlike any other. To reiterate, the operational professionalism of the Islamic State’s

political, military, and organizational apparatuses (in addition to the fact that the group holds a

swath of territory nearly the size of Great Britain) ultimately counteracts the notion that the

group is a terrorist organization. Like it or not, the Islamic State is a state within two larger failed

states that have been stricken with civil war – and the ex-Ba’athists are to thank for this.

FORMER BA’ATHISTS IN ISLAMIC STATE

LEADERSHIP (as of early 2015)

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(Figure 6)

*** The names highlighted and bolded are former Ba’athist officers under Saddam Hussein

VI. Ex-Ba’athists are the Most Valuable Players of the Islamic State

CaliphAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi

Deputy/Emir IraqAl-Turkmani

Deputy/ Emir SyriaAl-Anbari

Abu KudirAbu Mohammed

Abu AliAbu Saleh

Abu QassemAbu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi

Abu Hajar

[CABINET MEMBERS]

Abu NabilAbu Fatma

Abu Fatma (the second)Abu Abdusalam

Abu MaisaraAbu Jamaa

[GOVERNERS OF IRAQ]

Governors of Syria

68

As you can see by Figure 6, nearly every Islamic State member in upper-level

government positions was once a Ba’athist under Saddam Hussein. It is clear that in order to

govern Iraq properly, Baghdadi has chosen to delegate authority to those who have experience in

the matter – and who better to select than the men who ruled Iraq for over 30 years? But from

this notion comes an interesting deduction. Albeit it more evidence is needed (and is likely to

come as information regarding the matter becomes declassified), it seems that Baghdadi is more

of a spiritual figurehead rather than an operational leader. Ex-Ba’athists, then, truly run the

Islamic State. But, nonetheless Baghdadi is crucial to the group’s success, as followers believe

him to be a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad.205 Thus, his presence gives the Islamic State’s

decrees and demands a powerful component of divinity.

It is likely that this was the reason why Haji Bakr was so adamant about raising Baghdadi

to power. By retracing the steps to the reason why Ba’athists decided to undergo Islamization in

the first place, one can decipher that Bakr knew (just as Saddam-era leaders did) that Ba’athists

needed to win over the hearts and minds of Iraqis. Saddam’s phony Islamic state, as well as his

claims to be a Mahdi, was considerably transparent and Ba’athists knew this well. Baghdadi, on

the other hand, was exactly what Ba’athists were missing throughout the 1980s and 1990s: a

charismatic spiritual leader that followers could relate to (Saddam was a rich, corrupt dictator).

Therefore, it is justified to say that Ba’athists (who essentially placed Baghdadi in power through

targeted killings) consciously knew they needed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and vice versa. Because

of this mutual dependency, a powerful camaraderie of political necessity ensued between

Baghdadi and his ex-Ba’athist advisors. Not only did this camaraderie form the most notorious

Islamist organization on all of Earth, but also it led to great degrees of success for the group.

69

Without Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Ba’athists do not have a charismatic leader non-

reminiscent of Saddam Hussein; and without the Ba’athists, al-Baghdadi does not have the

organizational, political, and military knowhow he needs to build a successful Caliphate. The

fact is that ex-Ba’athists have taken the Islamic State from the ashes of their crushing defeat in

2007 to the glory of their 80,000 square miles of territorial holdings that they have today. In fact,

ex-Ba’athists are the “most valuable players” of the Islamic State. They have designed and built

an effective state-like leadership structure, built and trained a capable military, designed and

erected a fully operational intelligence bureau, designed and carried out complex military

maneuvers, hauled Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to power, advised Baghdadi politically and militarily,

handled the Islamic State diplomatically and financially, and led an occupation of a landholding

the size of Great Britain. It is no wonder then, how and why Ba’athists have found their way to

the top of the Islamic State’s leadership system. The fact is that they have been nothing less than

outstandingly critical in the group’s rise and expansion, and continue to be so today.

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4. CONCLUSION: From Pawns of Saddam to Leaders of the Islamic State

There is little doubt that ex-Ba’athists have played an integral role in the rise of the

Islamic State. While on the surface it may seem that ex-Ba’athists and jihadists are unlikely

allies, quite the opposite is true. Many have pondered exactly how secularists and Islamists could

merge into one entity. The answer to this question is rather simple: The Ba’athists that merged

with ISIS in post-2003 Iraq were no longer following secular guidelines, but rather ideologies

that gradually shifted towards Islamization over time.

In the section titled Setting the Stage for Radicalization, we discussed the gradual process

of Ba’athist Islamization. The fact is that the political transformation under Saddam Hussein

(between the years of 1979-2003) set the groundwork for the radicalization of his Ba’athists after

their alienation and marginalization in the post-OIF world. There are numerous reasons why the

ideologies of Iraqi Ba’athists shifted towards political Islam. For one, the undermining of

Saddam’s legitimacy by Ayatollah Khomeini’s rhetoric caused Saddam to feel the need to

redeem his image. Secondly, Iranian funding for Shia/Kurdish rebel factions during the Iran-Iraq

War decreased Ba’athist popularity in Iraq. Thirdly, poverty, starvation, and economic woes all

increased during and after the war, making it increasingly difficult for the average Iraqi to make

a living. Fourth, notions of nationalism no longer were suitable for Ba’athists to exploit for

control – essentially the “rally around the flag” effect was no longer working. Fifth, due to the

side effects of the Gulf War, Iraq’s economy plummeted; thus increasing the issues of poverty,

unemployment, and starvation immensely. Sixth, the largest Shia rebellion since 1920 erupted in

1991 and nearly overthrew Saddam Hussein; who responded by killing over 100,000 members of

his opposition. As one would expect, the mass killing of unarmed civilians (recall the Anfal

71

Campaign, as well) caused dissidence to skyrocket. In short, Ba’athists were losing their grip on

power and faced a dire necessity to quell the situation.

To accomplish this, the Ba’athist regime turned to Islam. As a result, by the early 1990s,

Saddam increasingly invoked Islamic thought into politics. For example, he declared it an honor

to die in the name of God and even told stories of meeting the Prophet Muhammad in dreams.

By the end of the 1991 rebellion, he initiated the “Return to Faith” Campaign, which was a

political initiative to publically Islamize Iraq. Quranic teachings expanded, Mosques were built,

“Allahu Akbar” was written on the national flag, Ba’athist calls for jihad became more frequent,

and Islamic rhetoric became commonplace. Izzat al-Douri even proclaimed that Islam was the

official stance of the Ba’athist party. Soon enough, Saddam was named a redeemer of Islam, or a

Mahdi, by the Iraqi media.

At the exact same time of the Islamization of Iraqi Ba’athists, the forefathers of the

Islamic State were on the rise. After succeeding in ousting the Soviets during the Afghan War,

many within the Mujahedeen sought to expand their fundamentalist operations outside of

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two of these jihadists were Osama bin Laden and Aymann al-

Zawahiri, who went on to co-found al-Qaeda (“the base”) – the father group of the Islamic State.

The identical timing of the rise of the forefather of the Islamic State and the Islamization

of Iraqi Ba’athists is not coincidental. In direct correlation with the Return to Faith Campaign,

Ba’athists began seeking to add an Islamist dimension to their foreign policy. Thus, they actively

sought out relationships within the ranks of foreign organizations, such as al-Qaeda and the

Groupe Islamique Arme, to name a few. Numerous documented meetings ensued between

Islamists and Ba’athists during the 1990s, which allowed the two groups to develop relationships

and connections. Ultimately, these connections set the groundwork for the future merging of

72

their separatist factions in post-2003 Iraq.. With their belittlement, diminishment, and

marginalization under the CPA, Interim, and Maliki de-Ba’athification programs, the Ba’athists

turned to the closest “allies” they had left: the jihadists who they dealt with before the invasion.

Through their mutual struggle against the Americans, a cooperative relationship developed. In

short, after 2003, the Ba’athists fled to several different factions—the more radical of which

joined Baghdadi and his Islamic State.

The implications of this are outstanding. With the conquest of cities like Mosul, the

Islamic State quickly grabbed over 80,000 square miles of territory in Iraq and Syria. Their

military campaigns were extremely well organized and caused many to wonder: how? The fact is

that the Ba’athists who were exiled under the 2003 de-Ba’athification program have carried the

Islamic State on their shoulders. Due to a foreseen mutual dependence, they purposefully helped

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi rise to power through the targeted killings of opposition (a trick they

learned from their old boss). Today, nearly every single top advisor to Baghdadi is an ex-

Ba’athist. Ultimately, they designed the Islamic State from the ground up, and have created a

professional intelligence system, a capable military bureaucracy, and a legitimate political

regime. They are the “most valuable players” of the Islamic State and their overwhelming

occupation of top-level positions reflects this well.

All in all, the importance of the role ex-Ba’athists have played in the rise of the Islamic

State cannot be stressed enough. But, when attempting to understand how and why these once-

Saddam loyalists merged with jihadists, it must be taken into account that their ideologies shifted

from secularism towards radicalization gradually over time. The transformation towards political

Islam between the years of 1979-2003 ultimately set the groundwork for the Ba’athist

radicalization after Operation Iraqi Freedom and the de-Ba’athification process that ensued.

73

NOTES

74

1 "Full Text: George Bush's Address on the Start of War" (The Guardian, 2003).2 John F. Burns, “Cheers, Tears, and Looting in Capital’s Streets” (The New York Times, 2003).3 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe (Skyhorse Publishing, 2016).4 Ibid. 5 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection: How Al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America (New York: HarperCollins, 2004).6 Ibid.7 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).8 Sharon Otterman, "IRAQ: Debaathification," (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005). 9 Ahmed Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014).10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 "This Timeline Shows the Rise of ISIS," (Time). 13 Ibid. 14 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe15 Sami Moubayed, “Under the Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad,” (I.B. Tauris, 2015).16 The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Ba'th Party," (Encyclopedia Britannica). 17 Ahmed Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency18 Nabil M. Kaylani,"The Rise of the Syrian Ba‘th, 1940–1958: Political Success, Party Failure," (International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1972). 19 Ibid. 20 Tarik Kafala, "BBC NEWS | Middle East | The Iraqi Baath Party," (BBC News, 2003). 21 Yitzhak Nakash, “The Shiʻis of Iraq,” (Princeton University Press, 1994).22 Tarik Kafala, "BBC NEWS | Middle East | The Iraqi Baath Party."23 Ibid.24 Con Coughlin, “Saddam: His Rise and Fall” (Harper Perennial, 2005). 25 Ibid. 26 Tarik Kafala, "BBC NEWS | Middle East | The Iraqi Baath Party."27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Krishnadev Calamur,"Who's On The List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism, And Why," (NPR).30 CNN, “Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979-1989),” (CNN Documentary Films).31 Ibid. 32 U.S. State Department, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response,” (Office of the Historian). 33 "Timeline: Soviet War in Afghanistan," (BBC News, 2009).34 Ibid.35 Jagmohan Meher, “America's Afghanistan War: The Success That Failed,” (Delhi: Kalpaz, 2004). 36 Dilip Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan ‘Victory’," (The Nation, 1999).37 Ibid. 38 AP, "Pakistan Ex-spymaster Hamid Gul,” (Japan Times RSS).39 Marc Sageman, “Understanding Terror Networks,” (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).40 Peter L. Bergen, “The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al-Qaeda's Leader,” (New York: Free Press, 2006).41 "Mohamed Al-Zawahiri Denies Being Arrested in Syria,” (Egypt Independent). 42 Roth, John, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena B. Wille, “Monography on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission,” (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).43 "Iran Chamber Society: History of Iran: Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988," (Iran Chamber Society).

44 The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Iran-Iraq War," (Encyclopedia Britannica Online). 45 Ibid. 46 Iran Chamber Society. 47 The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Iran-Iraq War."48 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Husayn and Islam: 1968 – 2003; Ba'thi Iraq from Secularism to Faith,” (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2014).49 Ibid. 50 Shaul Bakhash, “The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution,” (New York: Basic Books, 1984).51 Bruce Hoffman, "Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism," (National Defense Research Institute, March 1990).52 David McDowall, “A Modern History of the Kurds,” (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).53 Ibid. 54 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Husayn and Islam.” 55 ABC News, "List of Saddam's Crimes Is Long," (ABC News, 2006).56 "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein," (National Security Archive – GWU). 57 Iran Chamber Society 58 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Islam.” 59 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991,” (University of Nebraska Press, 2002). 60 Kirk Semple, "Saddam Hussein Is Sentenced to Death," (The New York Times, 2006).61 "BBC ON THIS DAY 1988: Thousands Die in Halabja Gas Attack," (BBC News, 1988). 62 “Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds,” (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). 63 Ibid, (pp. 96, 170). 64 Ibid. 65 Alina Gracheva and Jane Arraf, "Iraqis Uncover Thousands in Mass Graves," (CNN, 2003). 66 "A History of Terror: Al-Qaeda 1988-2008," (The Guardian, 2008). 67 "Al-Qaeda," (Global Security).68 John L. Esposito and Emad Eldin Shahin, “The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics”. 69 Rajaee Farhang, “Iranian Perspectives on the Iran–Iraq War,” (University Press of Florida, 1997). 70 Efraim Karsh, “The Iran-Iraq War,” (New York: Rosen Pub., 2009).71 "Iraq Economic Data (1989-2003)," (Central Intelligence Agency, 2007). 72 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Islam.”73 Joe Stork and Ann M. Lesch, "Background to the Crisis: Why War?" (Middle East Report, no. 167, 1990).74 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Islam.” 75 Ibid. 76 Liam D. Anderson and Gareth R. V. Stansfield, “The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 77 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Islam.” 78 "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), World Acts Against Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” (Global Security). 79 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (Condemning the Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq), S.C. Res. 660, 45 U.N. SCOR at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990)," United Nations Security Council Resolution, 2 August 1990). 80 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Islam.” 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid.84 "A Timeline of Operation Desert Storm," (Army Live).

85 "Operation Desert Storm," (Global Security – Military). 86 Jason Embry, "Uprising in Iraq May Be Slow Because of U.S. Inaction in 1991," (Seattlepi.com, April 4, 2003). 87 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Islam.”88 Faleh A. Jabar, "Why the Uprisings Failed," (Middle East Research and Information Project). 89 Ian Black, "'Chemical Ali' on Trial for Brutal Crushing of Shia Uprising," (The Guardian, 2007). 90 "Iraq Economic Data (1989-2003)," (Central Intelligence Agency, 2007). 91 "Osama Bin Laden." (History.com, 2009). 92 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection. 93 Ibid. 94 Sam Pender, “Saddam's Ties to Al Queda,” (Virtualbookworm, 2005). 95 Ibid.96 Richard Barrett, "The Islamic State," (The Soufan Group, 2014).97 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Islam.” 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid.100 Ibid. 101 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.102 Ibid. 103 “Congressional Record,” (Washington, D.C., U.S. G.P.O., 2004).104 Ibid. 105 “The 9/11 Commission Report: Official Government Edition,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2004).106 “Congressional Record,” (Washington, D.C., U.S. G.P.O., 2004).107 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.108 Liam D. Anderson and Gareth R. V. Stansfield, “The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).109 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Islam.” 110 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.111 “Congressional Record,” (Washington, D.C., U.S. G.P.O., 2004).112 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.113 Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Islam.”114 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.115 Sam Pender, “Saddam's Ties to Al Queda,” (Virtualbookworm, 2005).116 “Congressional Record,” (Washington, D.C., U.S. G.P.O., 2004).117 Ibid. 118 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.119 Sam Pender, “Saddam's Ties to Al Queda,” (Virtualbookworm, 2005).120 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.121 Sam Pender, “Saddam's Ties to Al Queda,” (Virtualbookworm, 2005).122 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.123 Kenneth Freed and Michael Ross, "Muslim Leaders Reject Hussein's Call for Holy War,” (Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1991). 124 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.125 Julian Borger, "Saddam Link to Bin Laden," (The Guardian, February 5, 1999).126 Sam Pender, “Saddam's Ties to Al Queda,” (Virtualbookworm, 2005).127 Ahmed Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014).128 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.129 Sam Pender, “Saddam's Ties to Al Queda,” (Virtualbookworm, 2005).

130 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.131 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).132 Lee Hudson Teslik, "Profile: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi," (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006).133 Ibid.134 MJ Kirdar, “AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq,” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011)135 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.136 Ibid. 137 Sunil Ram, "The Enemy of My Enemy: The Odd Link between Ansar Al-Islam, Iraq, and Iran," (The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, March 30, 2004). 138 Ibid. 139 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.140 Craig Whitlock, "Zarqawi Building His Own Terror Network," (The Washington Post, October 3, 2004). 141 Council on Foreign Relations, "IRAQ: Iraqi Ties to Terrorism," (April 29, 2003).142 Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection.143 "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1," (National Security Agency Archives, 2003).144 "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2," (National Security Agency Archives, 2003).145 Miranda Sessons and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi, "A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq," (International Center For Transitional Justice, March 2013).146 Sharon Otterman, "IRAQ: Debaathification," (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005). 147 Ahmed Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014). 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid.150 Time Arango and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Actions in Iraq Fueled Rise of a Rebel," (New York Times, August 10, 2014). 151 "From Bucca to Kobani," (The Soufan Group, October 24, 2014). 152 Ibid.153 Tara John, "This Timeline Shows the Rise of ISIS," (Time, October 9, 2015). 154 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “The Iraq War Encyclopedia,” (ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2013). 155 Julian Assange, “The WikiLeaks Files: The World According to US Empire,” (Verso, 2015). 156 Ibid. 157 Ahmed Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014).158 Ibid.159 Ibid.160 “Saddam Hussein's Trial,” (Al Jazeera TV [Qatar], 2005).161 Kirk Semple, "Saddam Hussein Is Sentenced to Death," (New York Times, November 5, 2006).162 "Iraq: Saddam Hussein Put to Death," (Human Rights Watch, December 29, 2006). 163 Kirk Semple, "Saddam Hussein Is Sentenced to Death," (New York Times, November 5, 2006).164 Ibid.165 Ibid.166 AP, "Sunni Anger over Saddam Hanging Spills into Streets,” (USA Today, 2007).167 Julian Assange, “The WikiLeaks Files: The World According to US Empire,” (Verso, 2015).168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ahmed Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency. 171 Tara John, "This Timeline Shows the Rise of ISIS," (Time, October 9, 2015). 172 Ahmed Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency. 173 "The Re-Baathification of Iraq," (Foreign Policy).174 "Jaysh Rijal Al-Tariqa Al-Naqshbandia (JRTN)," (Stanford University).

175 Ahmed Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency.176 Nicholas Heras, "The Tribal Component of Iraq's Sunni Rebellion: The General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries," (The Jamestown Foundation, June 26, 2014). 177 Ben Hubbard, "Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS," (New York Times, August 27, 2014).178 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe (Skyhorse Publishing, 2016).179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 181 Christoph Reuter, "The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State," (SPIEGEL ONLINE, April 18, 2015). 182 "The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria: A Primer," (The Soufan Group, June 13, 2014). 183 Ibid. 184 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe.185 Ibid. 186 Eric Schmitt, “A raid on ISIS yields a trove of intelligence,” (New York Times, 8 June 2015).187 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe.188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 190 Micah Halpern, "The Next Bin Laden? Meet ISIS’ New Top Dog," (Observer, 2015). 191 Ibid. 192 Ben Hubbard, "Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS," (New York Times, August 27, 2014).193 Hisham Al-Hashimi and Telegraph Interactive Team, "Revealed: The Islamic State 'cabinet', from Finance Minister to Suicide Bomb Deployer," (The Telegraph, July 9, 2014). 194 "The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria: A Primer," (The Soufan Group, June 13, 2014).195 Sami Moubayed, “Under the Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad,” (I.B. Tauris, 2015).196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid.199 Ibid. 200 Ibid.201 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan. “ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror.” (New York: Regan Arts, 2016).202 Michael R. Gordon, and Bernard E. Trainor. “The Endgame: The inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama,” (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), p.21. 203 Sami Moubayed, “Under the Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad,” (I.B. Tauris, 2015).204 Ibid.205 William McCants, "ISIS Leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's Family Tree," (The Brookings Institution. 2015).

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