B.5.2 WP83

Surveillance – Study Issues Associated with

Incorrect Flight Identification

Presented by:Bill Holtzman (USA)

on behalf of TOC

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B.5.2 Flight ID

Ground sensors send interrogation that includes the ID of the target plane.

Other aircraft receiving the interrogation will not respond.

Mode S

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B.5.2 Flight ID

• Automatic - interrogation not needed to start squitter

• Dependent – data from on-board nav and comm gear

• Surveillance – contains radar-like data

• Broadcast – transmission available to all users

ADS-B

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B.5.2 Flight ID

BDS Registers are the physical memory in the transponder in which specific data is stored.

BDS Registers

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B.5.2 Flight ID

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BDS Registers

Money question: Can Flight ID replace 4096 codes?

B.5.2 Flight ID

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ICAO Annex 10, Volume III, Chapter 9

Assigned by State of Registry

24-bit sequence of 1’s and 0’s

Entered by technician

16,777,214 possible

Shall not be changed

Aircraft/Airframe Address

B.5.2 Flight ID

24-bit Aircraft Address

Source: Eurocontrol, Principles of Mode S Operation and Interrogator Codes, March 18, 2003

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B.5.2 Flight ID

“Current monitoring of Mode S transponders that also use the 24-bit address has shown a steady stream of problems, including:

- duplicated addresses,

- nonsensical addresses.”

Source: EUROCONTROL ATM PROCEDURES DEVELOPMENT SUB-GROUP (APDSG), January 23-25, 2007

Agenda Item: 12, 24-bit aircraft address in the flight plan

24-bit ID errors

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B.5.2 Flight ID

Flight ID

Text string of 8 or less characters containing one of the following:

Carrier and call sign – “KLM 45”

Military call sign – “Air Force 1”

Tail number - “CFXDE”

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B.5.2 Flight ID

DF - Downlink format

UF - Uplink format

• Specifications on data transmission between the aircraft and the ground

• DF messages contain data extracted from BDS Registers

UF/DF

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B.5.2 Flight ID

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Downlink formats

Source: “Understanding Mode S Technology”, Wes Stamper, Aeroflex, Defense Electronics, 12/1/2005

B.5.2 Flight ID

NAVCANADA Hudson Bay

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B.5.2 Flight ID

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NAVCANADA

Source: Hudson Bay ADS-B, January 2009, NAVCANADA Pilot Guidance Brochure

B.5.2 Flight ID

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NAVCANADA

Source: Hudson Bay ADS-B, January 2009, NAVCANADA Pilot Guidance Brochure

B.5.2 Flight ID

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NAVCANADA

Source: Hudson Bay ADS-B, January 2009, NAVCANADA Pilot Guidance Brochure

B.5.2 Flight ID

Manual Correlation

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B.5.2 Flight ID

Automated Correlation

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B.5.2 Flight ID

ASAS

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Airborne Separation Assistance Systems

ASAS applications:

• Clearance references another aircraft, a “third party”

• In-Trail Procedure and other new methods

B.5.2 Flight ID

Mode A Correlation

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B.5.2 Flight ID

Conspicuity Code

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B.5.2 Flight ID

In-Flight Lock

Courtesy: Carlos Limon, President, IFALPA21

B.5.2 Flight ID

Mode A vs Mode S

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B.5.2 Flight ID

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IFATCA considers the following to be the minimum attributes of any CDTI system used in Airborne Separation Assurance applications: Positive unambiguous identification of all relevant aircraft to the standards currently required of ATC systems and controllers.

IFATCA Santiago 1999

B.5.2 Flight ID

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IFATCA Policy: Identification issues need to be resolved prior to the implementation of ASAS applications.

IFATCA Buenos Aires 2003

B.5.2 Flight ID

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TOC discusses the issues of capability to ‘switch off’ incorrect ADS-B data…In Australia, incorrect Flight ID input is relatively common and the ability to change it ‘airborne’ is limited. [There are] proposed changes to ‘Civil Aviation Regulations’ mandating this function.

IFATCA Istanbul 2007

B.5.2 Flight ID

Maastricht Study

Source: ICAO ASP, Louisville, KY, April 20-24, 2009. Eurocontrol Maastricht – UAC Statistics on Aircraft Identification 26

B.5.2 Flight ID

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“..a procedural requirement for controller/pilot communications establishing a shared traffic referent is implicit in the design of multiple [ASAS] applications.”

MITRE Study

Source: MITRE Corporation, ICAS 2008, Say Who? Homing in on Conventions for Traffic Identification in Communications Centered Around a Cockpit Traffic Display

B.5.2 Flight ID

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“Ideally, the cross validation of display information should be performed automatically and prior to the controller/pilot communication. Cross-validation mechanism may be achieved via new software.”

MITRE Opinion

Source: MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia, USA, Karol Kerns in an ad hoc paper 2009

B.5.2 Flight ID

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8.5.3.4 Whenever it is observed on the situation display that the aircraft identification transmitted by a Mode S-equipped aircraft is different from that expected from the aircraft, the pilot shall be requested to confirm and, if necessary, re-enter the correct aircraft identification.

ICAO Doc 4444: PANS-ATM

B.5.2 Flight ID

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8.5.3.5 If...the discrepancy continues to exist, the following actions shall be taken by the controller:

a)inform the pilot...

b)where possible, correct the label...

c) notify...the next control position...

ICAO Doc 4444: PANS-ATM

B.5.2 Flight ID

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– A work around is not an intrinsic solution

– “Pay attention” and “make sure” are not guarantees of anything

– Positive identification is no different than positive separation

ICAO Doc 4444: PANS-ATM

B.5.2 Flight ID

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Surface Vehicles

“Sensis VeeLo NextGen…installs on the external surface of vehicles…to provide controllers with vehicle position and identity.

“...broadcasts location and identity using Mode S Extended Squitter...”

Source: Sensis web site (http://www.sensis.com/docs/50/)

B.5.2 Flight ID

IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual page 3 2 1 5:

To ensure integrity of system surveillance data (not just ATC surveillance) it is essential that the automatic transmission of erroneous dependent position data can be disabled or marked as inaccurate during all phases of flight.

Current TPM

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B.5.2 Flight ID

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1. CorrelationsWhere Mode S flight ID is used to correlate a track:

the correlation fails if the Flight ID is incorrect.

Where transponder code is used to correlate a track:

the aircraft ID shown to the controller on the scope and the aircraft ID shown to the pilot on the CDTI may not

agree.

Conclusions

B.5.2 Flight ID

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2. IFATCA policy remains valid. “Identification issues need to be resolved prior to the implementation of ASAS applications.”

3. Mode S Flight ID needs to have the same priority, display, and ease of use as existing Mode A implementations on the aircraft.

Conclusions

B.5.2 Flight ID

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Debate

B.5.2 Flight ID

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4.1 - IFATCA Policy is:ATC systems must validate the Flight ID transmitted by an aircraft’s Mode S transponder and indicate to the controller any discrepancy with the ICAO aircraft identification in the flight plan.and is included on page 3 2 1 6 of the IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual.

Recommendations

B.5.2 Flight ID

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4.2 - IFATCA Policy is: Any broadcast of incorrect ATM data should be corrected or if unable then:•Switched off, or•Marked as invalid.

and is included on page 3 2 1 6 of the IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual.

Recommendations