aznar- coquila (whole cases)

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban inCebu), petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNEROSMEÑA, respondents.

Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

PARAS, J .:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, whichismissed the petition for the disqualification of private respondent

Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial Governor of CebuProvince.

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeñaled his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the positionf Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988

ocal elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial CouncilCebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B.

Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filedwith the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of privateespondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen,eing a citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestationubmitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and

Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying thatrivate respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien

Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and ImmigrantCertificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila onMarch 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion forhe Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoinhe Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers fromabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondentnd proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved torder the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend theroclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitionerresented the following exhibits tending to show that privateespondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registrationorm No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private

espondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate ofRegistration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent datedNovember 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippinesated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of

Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that heFilipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio OsSr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine PaNo. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has noout of the country for more than six months; and that he has bregistered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, R

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the BoCanvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obthe highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaim

Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismthe petition for disqualification for not having been timely filefor lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Fcitizen.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioningqualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised undeOmnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof provides that:

'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancertificate of candidacy . — A verified petition seekdeny due course or to cancel a certificate of candmay be filed by any person exclusively on the grounany material representation contained therein as reunder Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may bat any time not later than twenty-five days from the tthe filing of the certificate of candidacy and shdecided, after the notice and hearing, not later than days before the election.

and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — voter contesting the election of any Member oBatasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city offithe ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Reputhe Philippines shall file a sworn petition fwarranto with the Commission within ten days afte

proclamation of the results of the election.

The records show that private respondent filed his certificcandidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filpetition for disqualification of said private respondent on Janua1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyontwenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the OmElection Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannobe treated as a petition for quo warrantounder Section 253 same Code as it is unquestionably premature, consideringprivate respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of only on March 3, 1988.



However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain theespondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to

which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for uso rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC didelow.

Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipinoitizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and beinglected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is notupported by substantial and convincing evidence.

n the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to

resent direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipinoitizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.

Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country;2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing ton oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreignountry. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent

Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the threementioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippineitizenship.

n concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as aitizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely reliedn the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate ofegistration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the

Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent isn American and "being an American", private respondent "mustave taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S.

Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipinoitizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an

American under the laws of the United States does not concern Usere.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumptionhat private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent uponhe petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine

itizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed toositively establish this fact.

The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al , (G.R. No.7193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R.

No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.

n the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as aitizen of the United States in 1983 per certification from the United

States District Court, Northern District of California, as dulyuthenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine

Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

rivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in

he United States but claimed that he was forced to embraceAmerican citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of theMarcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion ofnvoluntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were manyther Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo whoid not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.

ikewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was marriedo an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australianitizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Governmenthrough its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the

Department of Foreign Affairs.

The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Lafact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically dethat he was a citizen of Australia.

In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philiptherefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the ProviSorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the considered the fact that by their own admissions, theindubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Reputhe Philippines since they have sworn their total allegianceforeign state.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies htaken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo)a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport ancontinuously participated in the electoral process in this csince 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a can(pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Fand the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he strthe fact that because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when h24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña shouregarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenshOur mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not f

Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipinan American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he

American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, bof analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose andstates or certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this doemean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a perenrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, nUniversity X and University Y, presents a Certification that hstudent of University X, this does not necessarily mean thatnot still a student of University Y. In the case of OsmeñaCertification that he is an American does not mean that he is na Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenIndeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philcitizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation ocitizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed t

Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reasothere can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when thererenunciation either "'express" or "implied".

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution thatallegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shdealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effectwhile it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our chad already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenshallegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted furtheunder the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizensallegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has nbeen enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSEthe Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989



estraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediatelyxecutory.

SO ORDERED.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petit ion er, vs . HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and

TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents .

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J .:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue inhis case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person

hall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is aatural-born citizen."

[1]

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27,960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable washe 1935 Constitution.

[2]

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted inhe United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the

Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the UnitedStates. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may loseis citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or acceptingommission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision

f law reads:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may loseis citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

x x

4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armedorces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of serviceo, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of aoreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incidenthereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall notivest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the followingircumstances is present:

a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensiveact of alliance with said foreign country; or

b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippineerritory with the consent of the Republic of the

Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at theme of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission,nd taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that heoes so only in connection with his service to said foreignountry; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who isendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of aoreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned inaragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in

ny election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period ofis service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said

country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said fcountry, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoymentcivil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philcitizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizJune 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. MCorps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philcitizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second D

of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio BeIII, who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo WarranCautelam with respondent House of Representatives EleTribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualifbecome a member of the House of Representatives since he a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 Constitution.

[4]

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendereddecision

[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and dec

respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the SDistrict of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration o

decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.[6]

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assthe HRET's decision on the following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abudiscretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruleprivate respondent is a natural-born citizen of Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in vthe loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abudiscretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it consprivate respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite th

that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philcitizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errorgrave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdictionit dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacqucould not legally and constitutionally restore his naturastatus.

[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Crnatural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can sconsidered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisitioPhilippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longconsidered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philcitizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insist

Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that nborn citizens are those who are citizens from birth without havperform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquirstatus as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated sincphrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the iinherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citize

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citize

follows:

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(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the timeof the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of thePhilippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipinomothers, who elect Philippine citizenship uponreaching the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship

orrespond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, andhe naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is aitizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof .

[9]

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "arehose citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to performny act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

[10]

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who haveecome Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under

Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the RevisedNaturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization LawAct No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.

[11] To be naturalized,

n applicant has to prove that he possesses all theualifications

[12] and none of the disqualifications

[13] provided by law

o become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippineitizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from itsromulgation when the court is satisfied that during the interveningeriod, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) hasedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not beenonvicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgatedules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of theation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

[14]

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may howevereacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth

Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by whichPhilippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) byaturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of

Congress.[15]

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisitionf Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippineitizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.73, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode foreacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act

No. 63.[16]

Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes toeacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certainualifications

[17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in

Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under varioustatutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion ofhe armed forces;

[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied

orces in World War II;[20]

(3) service in the Armed Forces of theUnited States at any other time;

[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman

o an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,epatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance tohe Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local

Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides orast resided.

In Angat v. Republic ,[24]

we held:

xx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965nd 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship

would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that head to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place

of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philip[Italics in the original.]

[25]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the ornationality.

[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino who lo

citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturFilipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a nborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he wrestored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenshiphe rendered service in the Armed Forces of the U

States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizeunder R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenshrendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Fof the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forthe United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reaPhilippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Reof the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Rein the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippinessaid oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of anycitizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance tRepublic and having registered the same in the Civil RegisMagantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforprovision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his ostatus as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired aas the son of a Filipino father .

[27] It bears stressing that the

repatriation allows him torecover, or return to, his orstatus before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no lonnatural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regacitizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRETdecision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in AIII, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen o

Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acqperfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considersuch: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philcitizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there werecategories of Filipino citizens which were not considered naborn: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born bJanuary 17, 1973,

[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching th

of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturcitizens" were not considered natural-born obviously becausewere not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to a

Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers befoeffectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not consnatural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfecPhilippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers thoseof Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitutiowho elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority anatural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Secof Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Phicitizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereobe deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturFilipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apfrom the enumeration of who are citizens under the pConstitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1)

who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturaliz























































































ccordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e.,id not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain

Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-bornilipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of aeparate category for persons who, after losing Philippineitizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear:s to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalizedepending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the

mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisitionhereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go throughaturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he iserforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all theecessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of

Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by theConstitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to thelection, returns, and qualifications of the members of the

House.[29]

The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to checkwhether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretionmounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the

atter .[30]

In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court toxercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRETor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for theimple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to

nquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.[31]

There is nouch showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

____________________________________________________

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132244. September 14, 1999]

GERARDO ANGAT, pet i t ioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J .:

The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails therders, dated 22 September 1997 and 29 December 1997, issuedy the Regional Trial Court (―RTC‖) of Marikina City in Case No. N-6-03-MK, entitled ―In the Matter of the Petition of Gerardo Angat yegaspi to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under

Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, and Republic Act (―R.A.‖)No. 965 and 263[0].‖

Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of thePhilippines until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the UnitedStates of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York Street,Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March996 before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition toegain his status as a citizen of the Philippines under

Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act

No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-03-MK). In his petition, ―applying foraturalization,‖ he averred that -

FIRST. - His full name is GERARDO LEGASPI ANGAT. Copy ofis latest picture is hereto attached and made an integral part of thisetition.

SECOND. - His present place of residence is #69 New York St.,Provident Village, Marikina, Metro Manila and his former residencewas in Las Vegas, U.S.

THIRD. - His trade or profession is in buy and sell and managinghe properties of his parents which he has been engaged since hisrrival here in the Philippines.

―FOURTH. - He was born on the 22nd day of June 1954 at TManila. He was formerly a citizen of the Philippines. He loPhilippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. Hpresent a citizen or subject of the United States of America.of his birth certificate is hereto attached as Annex ‗A.‘

―FIFTH. - He is newly married to Zenaida Lim who was bTondo, Manila and now resides at petitioner‘s residence at MaMetro Manila. Copy of their marriage contract is hereto attach

Annex ‗B.‘

―SIXTH. - He returned to the Philippines from the United Sta

America in 1991. Copy of his alien registration is hereto attach Annex ‗C.‘

―SEVENTH. - He has the qualifications required by Commonw Act No. 63 as amended, and Republic Act Nos. 965 and 26reacquire Philippine citizenship, and possesses none odisqualification prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 473. Hresided in the Philippines at least six months immediately precthe date of this petition, to wit: since 1991. He has condhimself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations wconstituted government as well as with the community in whichliving.

―EIGHT. - He is not opposed to an organized governmeaffiliated with any association or group of persons who uphoteach doctrines opposing all organized government. He defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of viopersonal assault or assassination for the success predominance of men‘s ideas. He is not a polygamist or beliethe practice of polygamy. He has not been convicted of anyinvolving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any malienation or incurable contagious disease. The nation of whis a citizen or subject is not at war with the Philippines.

―NINTH. - It is his intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity tforeign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particula

the United State of America to which at this time he is a citizen

On 30 April 1996, the trial court, through the branch clcourt, issued a notice setting the case for initial hearing oJanuary 1997

[2] which, along with the petition and its annexes

received by the Office of the Solicitor General (―OSG‖) on 101996.

On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to taoath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant t8171. The motion was denied by the trial judge in his orderJuly 1996. Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1have the denial reconsidered was found to be meritorious bcourt a quo in an order, dated 20 September 1996, which samong other things, that -

―A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that petitioner is entitledbenefits of the said law considering that herein petitioner is a nborn Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalizatioforeign country. The petition and motion of the petitioner to taoath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines likewisethat the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none disqualifications under R.A. 8171.‖

[3]

Concluding, the court ruled:

―WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Order Court dated July 12, 1996 is hereby set aside. The petitioordered to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic o










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Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 before the undersigned onOctober 03, 1996 at 11:00 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.‖[4]

After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996,nother order was issued by the trial judge on 04 October 1996 tohe following effect; viz :

After the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines hadeen taken by the petitioner, Gerardo Angat y Legaspi before the

ndersigned, the petitioner is hereby repatriated and declareds citizen of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant toRepublic Act No. 8171.

The Bureau of Immigration is ordered to cancel the pertinent alienertificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification asilipino citizen to the petitioner upon the finality of this order.

Likewise, let a copy of this Order be registered in the Local CivilRegistry of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila and theGeneral Civil Registrar, Sta. Mesa, Manila, after its finality.

SO ORDERED.‖[5]

On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually amotion for reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted that theetition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lackf jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special

Committee on Naturalization consistently with Administrative OrderNo. 285 (―AO 285‖), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President

idel V. Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee onNaturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A. 8171. Themotion was found to be well taken by the trial court; thus, in anrder, dated 22 September 1997, it adjudged:

This resolves the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of theSolicitor General on March 19, 1997.

The motion alleges that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285ated August 22, 1996 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, anyerson desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenshipursuant to R.A. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special

Committee on Naturalization, which is composed of the SolicitorGeneral as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and theDirector-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency,s members, which shall process the application; that if theirpplications are approved they shall take the necessary oath ofllegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shalle deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship and the

Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancelheir certificate of registration.

The motion prays that the herein petition be dismissed on theround that the same should be filed with the Special Committee onNaturalization.

The records show that on September 20, 1996, the Court grantedhe herein petition and as a consequence thereof, the petitioner

Gerardo Angat y Legaspi took his oath of allegiance to the Republicf the Philippines before the Presiding Judge of this Court on

October 03, 1996 and on October 04, 1996, the petitioner wasrdered repatriated and declared as citizen of the Philippines.

On February 21, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General entereds appearance as counsel of the State in the subject petition and on

March 19, 1997 filed the herein manifestation and motion.

"The allegations in the manifestation and motion of the Office Solicitor General clearly shows that this Court has no jurisdover the herein petition as the same falls within the jurisdictionSpecial Committee on Naturalization. Considering that thishas no jurisdiction over this case, the order granting the satherefore null and void.

"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motidismiss filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hgranted. The orders of this Court dated September 20, 199October 04, 1996 are hereby set aside and the herein petiordered DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction w

prejudice to its re-filing before the Special CommitteNaturalization.

"SO ORDERED."[6]

A motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioner on 13 O1997, questioned the aforequoted order asseverating that sinpetition was filed on 14 March 1996, or months before the SCommittee on Naturalization was constituted by the President

AO 285 on 22 August 1996, the court a quo had the authotake cognizance of the case.

In the Order, dated 29 December 1997, the trial judge dthe motion for reconsideration.

The instant appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Procedure submits the lone assignment of error that -

―The Regional Trial Court (has) seriously erred in dismissinpetition by giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order Noabsent a provision on Retroactive Application.‖

Petitioner would insist that the trial court had jurisdictionhis petition for naturalization

[7] filed on 11 March 1996, and t

had acquired a vested right as a repatriated citizen oPhilippines when the court declared him repatriated followinorder, dated 20 September 1996, allowing him to take an oallegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which was, inadministered to him on 03 October 1996.

The contention is not meritorious.

R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 Oc1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino wwho have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to alien(b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizeon account of political or economic necessity. The peprovisions of the law read:

―SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Phicitizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinoshave lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor chon account of political or economic necessity, may reaPhilippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provi

Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: ProThat the applicant is not a:

―(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated wiassociation or group of persons who uphold and teach docopposing organized government;

―(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriviolence, personal assault, or association for the predominantheir ideas;

―(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

―(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contdiseases.



















SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessaryath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration

n the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. TheBureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alienertificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification asilipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.‖

Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree (―P.D.‖) No.25,

[8] dated 05 June 1975, amending Commonwealth Act No. 63,

n application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women whoost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as byatural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the

Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired byhe Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs andhe Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as thether members, was created pursuant to Letter of Instruction (―LOI‖)

No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOINo. 491 issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December976. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President

Corazon C. Aquino‘s Memorandum of 27 March 1987, it was not,owever, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on

Elections,[9]

the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum ofPresident Aquino had merely directed the Special Committee onNaturalization ―to cease and desist from undertaking any and allroceedings x x x under Letter of Instruction (`LOI‘) 270.‖

[10] The

Court elaborated:

This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch ofegal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing

repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequentnes and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that noxpress repeal was made because then President Aquino in her

memorandum-based on the copy furnished us by Lee-did notategorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was beingepealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact,he did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On thether hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by

mplication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowedunless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that thewo laws are clear repugnant and patently inconsistent that theyannot co-exist.‘

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even beegarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement ofhe Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her

aw-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executiveolicy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptancend processing of applications for repatriation pending whateverudgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution' might

make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725ut left it to the first Congress - once created - to deal with the

matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should havenequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to

Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidentialssuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of 'the present

overnment, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion‘ toeave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any othernterpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is noweing proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violenceot only upon statutory construction but on common sense as

well.‖[11]

ndeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995;[12]

hence,when petitioner filed his petition on 11 March 1996, the SpecialCommittee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270nder P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order85,

[13] promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in

ffect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance.

The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining thatAngat‘s petition should have been filed with the Committee,

aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdthereover. The court‘s order of 04 October 1996 was thereband void, and it did not acquire finality

[14] nor could be a sou

right on the part of petitioner .[15]

It should also be noteworthy thpetition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and thus incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Ac965

[16] and R.A. No. 2630

[17] since these laws could only ap

persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied fcountry or the armed forces of the United States of Amerfactual matter not alleged in the petition. Parenthetically, these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philcitizenship would not even be required to file a petition in couall that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance tRepublic of the Philippines and to register that fact with thregistry in the place of his residence or where he had last resithe Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, anOrder, dated 22 September 1996, issued by the court adismissing the petition of petitioner in Civil Case No. N-96-03-Mwant of jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________________________________

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIJR., pet i t ioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTRONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO

JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondent

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, pet i t ioner , vs . RONALD ALLA

KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respon

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]VICTORINO X. FORNIER, pet i t ioner , vs . HON. COMMISSIO

ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, AKNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondent

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J .:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those wthe state believes are deserving of the privilege. It“precious heritage, as well as an inestimacquisition,”

[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of raise a single question of profound importance to the nationissue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualificationpresidential candidate to hold the highest office of the landpeople are waiting for the judgment of the Court with

breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and noof the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipis he not?

The moment of introspection takes us face to faceSpanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of thheritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resin a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no lessdistinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings






























http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/mar2004/161434.HTM#_ftn1
















On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,lso known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed hisertificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republicf the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang PilipinoKNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificatef candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizenf the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald

Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place ofirth to beManila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitledVictorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on

Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando

Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petitionocketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections"COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancelis certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material

misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be aatural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, hisarents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an

American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, beinghe son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitionersseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could notave transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being anlegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegationf the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first , Allan. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomezefore his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second , even if no suchrior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only aear after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on9 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presentedeveral documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth ofPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by

Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamynd concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,fter discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an

English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopyf the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued byhe Director of the Records Management and Archives Office,ttesting to the fact that there was no record in the National

Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered thePhilippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to theffect that no available information could be found in the files of the

National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentaryieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) aertification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Divisionf the National Archives that there appeared to be no available

nformation regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry ofirths for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the

Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archiveshat no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and

Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of RonaldAllan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry

f Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of LorenzoPou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477nd No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of theertificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported

marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h)certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,

Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office duringhe period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during

World War II.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-03 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004,ornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was deniedn 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc . On 10 February004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this

Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the

Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stafinality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 16would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria JeaneTecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The CommissioElections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‗Fernando Poe, Jr.Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 16entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdictthe COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Sect

paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Couoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue ocase.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824

In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ ahave the COMELEC deny due course to o r cancel FPJ‘s certof candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material facthat FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMEpetitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election

–

―Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificcandidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due coursecancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any pexclusively on the ground that any material representation contherein as required under Section 74 hereof is false‖ –

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expresSection 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -

―Section 52. Powers and functions of the CommissioElections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred uby the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive chathe enforcement and administration of all laws relative tconduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderl

honest elections‖ -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petitdeny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuicandidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases mreviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64

[2] in an

for certiorari under Rule 65[3]

of the Revised Rules of Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also

–

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Meany case or matter brought before it within sixty days from theof its submission for decision or resolution. A case or madeemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otheprovided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, orof each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Cocertiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipcopy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constprovides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court such lower courts as may be established by law which ―includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle controversies involving rights which are legally demandabl

enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has b











rave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionn the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.‖

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No.61824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizancef by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to oureople of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make aroper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy theighest government post in the land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in

G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,aragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction ofhe COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and inrging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions theyirectly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc , shall be the sole judge of allontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the

President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for theurpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. Themission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate anyribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidentialontests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.

Roxas,[4] as ―not (being) justiciable‖ controversies or disputesnvolving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of thePresident or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse promptedCongress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "AnAct Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal toTry, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of thePresident-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines andProviding for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793esignated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the

Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although theubsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government underhe 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemedevived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987

Constitution.

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference topost-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an

lection protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinctemedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the

winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule2, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the"Rules of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal ," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April992, would support this premise -

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of allontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the

President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated . - An election contest is initiated by the filingf an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the

President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include aetition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not

nclude an election protest.

Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate forPresident or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received theecond or third highest number of votes may contest the election ofhe President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing aerified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal

within thir ty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.‖

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunalver contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of

the "President" or "Vice-President", of thePhilippines, and "candidates" for President or Vice-President. warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action aa person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exea public office.

[5] In such context, the election contest can

contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a regicandidate who would have received either the second orhighest number of votes could file an election protest. Thiagain presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, not include cases directly brought before it, questionin

qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presbefore the elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria JeaneTecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed foof jurisdiction.

The Citizenship Issue

Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give ahistorical background on the concept of citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship wagiven by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., describe

"citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of jand in the holding of an office.

[6] Aristotle saw its significance

to determine the constituency of the "State," which he describbeing composed of such persons who would be adequate in nto achieve a self-sufficient existence.

[7] The concept grew to in

one who would both govern and be governed, for qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty couexpected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlemon the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, oother .

[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public lif

fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the geinterest of society.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes ovcenturies. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, b

large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessaindividual freedom, such as rights to property, personal libert

justice.[9]

Its meaning expanded during the 19th centuinclude political citizenship, which encompassed the rigparticipate in the exercise of political power .

[10] The 20th c

saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-beinsocial security.

[11] The idea of citizenship has gained express

the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rshrinking global village, might well be the internationalizatcitizenship.

[12]

The Local Setting - from SpanishTimes to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" durinSpanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjectschurch records, the natives were called 'indios' , denoting regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish lawcitizenship became highly codified during the 19th century busheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehelaw. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, wereto apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extby Royal Decrees.

[14]

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the No

Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but











































whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be theubject of differing views among experts;

[15] however, three royal

ecrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in thePhilippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August841,

[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining

he political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,[17]

andnally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which wasxpressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of3 July 1870.

[18]

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to thePhilippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89,ccording to which the provisions of theUltramar among which this

ountry was included, would be governed by special laws.[19]

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in thisurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the firstategorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

―(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

―(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if theywere born outside of Spain,

―(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalizationpapers,

―(d) Those who, without such papers, may havebecome domiciled inhabitants of any town of theMonarchy.‖

[20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippineistory. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain wasorced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming worldower, the United States. An accepted principle of international lawictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in anbrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect onivil laws, which would remain virtually intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898etween Spain and the United States.

[21] Under Article IX of the

reaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants ofhe territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its

Congress -

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territoryver which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes herovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom,etaining in either event all their rights of property, including the righto sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shalllso have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, androfessions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as arepplicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they

may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making,efore a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchangef ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision toreserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shalle held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality ofhe territory in which they reside.

Thus –

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of theerritories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined byhe Congress."

[22]

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by theUnited States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of thePhilippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not

ecome American citizens, they, however, also ceased to bealiens" under American laws and were thus issued passports

describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled tprotection of the United States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared ffirst time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referredthe Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehelegislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippi

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsethereto, shall be deemed and held to be cit izens of the Phi l i

Is lands and as such entitled to the protection of the United Sexcept such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance

Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the trepeace between the United States and Spain, signed at December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."

[23]

Under the organic act, a ―citizen of the Philippines‖ was onewas an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject o11

th day of April 1899. The term ―inhabitant‖ was taken to in

1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a natPeninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Sppapers on or before 11 April 1899.

[24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which

no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was githe view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, thcommon law principle of jus soli , otherwise also known aprinciple of territoriality, operative in the United States and Engoverned those born in the Philippine Archipelago withinperiod.

[25] More about this later.

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States mafollowing amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorizprovide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come withforegoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession United States, and such other persons residing in the Phil

Islands who would become citizens of the United States, undlaws of the United States, if residing therein."

[26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the conc"Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The"Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil GovGeneral in the Philippines when he initially made mention of itslogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Phi

Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtuaprovisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by thof Congress in 1912 -

―That al l inhabitants of the Phi l ippine Is lands wh o were Spsubjects on the eleventh day of A pr i l , eighteen hundre

ninety-nine, and then resided in s aid Is lands, and their chborn subsequ ent ly thereto, shal l be deemed and held

ci t izens of the Phi l ippine Is lands , except such as shallelected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spaccordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace betweeUnited States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have become citizens of some other country; Provided, ThaPhilippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorizprovide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those nof the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foreprovisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the UStates, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Iswho are citizens of the United States, or who could become cof the United States under the laws of the United States, if re

therein."



















































Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of thePhilippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2)esiding in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, notcitizen of some other country.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whetherr not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935

Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, bydopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship aseing the basis of Filipino citizenship -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizensf the Philippines -

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time ofhe adoption of this Constitution

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who,efore the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to publicffice in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and uponeaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.‖

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, takenogether with existing civil law provisions at the time, which providedhat women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship andcquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatoryituations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmittingheir Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and requiredlegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipinoitizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correcthis anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status ofilipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973

Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on

itizenship to reflect such concerns -

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizensf the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of thedoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of thePhilippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to therovisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.‖

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also furtherrovided that –

A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains herPhilippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed,nder the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed toorrect the irregular situation generated by theuestionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

―The following are citizens of the Philippines:

―(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time adoption of this Constitution.

―(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens oPhilippines.

―(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mo

who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the amajority; and

―(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.‖

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses

"No person may be elected President unless he is a naturaci t izen of the Phi l ippines , a registered voter, able to rea

write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immedpreceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without havperform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenshi

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Thits history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalizatiosoli, res judicata and jus sanguini s

[28] – had been in vogue

two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to b―natural-born‖ citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per RoCollector of Customs

[29] (1912), did not last long. With the ad

of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan ChoSecretary of Labor

[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relatio

would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would teindicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPhis paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyefather of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Ponot been presented in evidence, his death certificate, howidentified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangaand 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 Septe1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan Fshowed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español fLorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an ―uncertified‖ copy

supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. PoPaulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of APoe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poestated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino cand Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, a

American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose twas born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twentyears old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenyears old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties overacity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respoand the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusioncould be drawn with some degree of certainty from the docu

would be that -















1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and BessieKelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married toeach other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,

Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establishhe fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriageertificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate ofPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents ofublic record in the custody of a public officer. The documents haveeen submitted in evidence by both contending parties during theroceedings before the COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" foretitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of

Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" forespondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted byespondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were

ubmitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,articularly in reference to the facts which they purported tohow, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriagef Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative tohe death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos,

Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized thosematerial statements in his argument. All three documents wereertified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When theubject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shalle admissible other than the original document itself, except in the

ollowing cases:

x x x x x x x x x

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a publicffice or is recorded in a public office.‖

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, themarriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birthertificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of theirontents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:

Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the

erformance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by aerson in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,re prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.‖

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value giveno the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense offficial duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty

which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine andisinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity ofecord which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as

might have occurred.[31]

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that heied on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,

Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born

ometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of

Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to considering that there was no existing record about such fact Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, howlikewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other during the same period. In his death certificate, the residenLorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be souconclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residenceperson at the time of his death was also his residence death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Managand Archives Office would have had complete records residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and FiliationUnder Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing fi(relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mothepaternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child)illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son accto petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior

August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took acknowledgment was required to establish filiatiopaternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsovoluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was poonly if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; volacknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a wilpublic document.

[32] Complementary to the new code was A

3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof,

―In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be s

and sworn to jo in t ly by the parents of the infant or only bmother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall npermissible to state or reveal in the document the name of thewho refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein

information by which such father could be identified.‖

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificatrequired to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure orequirement rendered the same useless as being an authordocument of recognition.

[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,

[34] the Cour

-

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enthe question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (E1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, mrelied upon as sufficient proof of his having been volurecognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed

it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no shthat they signed the original, let alone swore to its contenrequired in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that mighthappened, it was not even they or either of them who furnishedata to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public docuwherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be maccording to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such athere must be a clear statement in the document that the precognizes the child as his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented byparties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan Ffound. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shohave been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only otherof voluntary recognition remained to be "some other



















ocument." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35]

this Court defined what couldonstitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of publicocuments, those executed by pr ivate indiv iduals whic h must be

uthent icated b y n otar ies , and those issued by competent publicfficials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out

n Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may bemade belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment orecognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal orompulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly

made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of recordr in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place inavor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who

was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsorycknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when thehild had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike anction to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of thehild, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, anction to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be broughturing the lifetime of the presumed parent.

Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral

rgument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing forurposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or

ndubitable writing of the father. The term would include a publicnstrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or otherompetent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to beis.

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172,Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by anyf the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a finaludgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or arivate handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

n the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiationhall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of aegitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and specialaws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by thehild during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirshould the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In theseases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to

nstitute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall surviveotwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

x x x x x x x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiationn the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.

―The action must be brought within the same period specif Article 173, except when the action is based on the sparagraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be bduring the lifetime of the alleged parent.‖

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively ap Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofadoes not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accorwith the Civil Code or other laws.‖

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36]

the has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized nchild should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the volrecognition of a natural child shall take place according to this even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body ofor before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalizacknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an atto break away from the traditional idea of keeping well legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family inof the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisiointended to merely govern the private and personal affairs family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimaillegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his porights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, inprovisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Codeprovisions must be taken in the context of private relationdomain of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpoorganization of the family and the regulation of property. It ha[been] defined as the mass of precepts which determineregulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience a

members of a family, and those which exist among membersociety for the protection of private interests."

[37]

In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster ,[38]

the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x xlaws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conand legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards althoughreside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questioncivil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wifesupport, as between them, the separation of their propertierules governing property, marital authority, division of coproperty, the classification of their property, legal causes for di

the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in genercivil effects of marriage and divorce upon the personsproperties of the spouses, are questions that are govexclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Lbest exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conand legal capacity of persons are binding upon ci t izens o

Phi l ippines , even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenssignificant in civil relationships found in different parts of the



















Code,[39]

such as on successional rights and family relations.[40]

Indoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered thehild of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their

egitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define hisghts under civil law

[41] and not his political status.

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias againstlegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the

Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietarynd successional rights of members of the family, providedistinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the

monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance oftles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the

oncern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign bloodwas paramount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy wereodified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discriminationurvived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary sourcef our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains andhould remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impeder impinge on the domain of political law.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determiningis citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from andot inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil lawurposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof ofliation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive

ffects on matters alien to personal and family relations. Therdinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For

nstance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precludedrom being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of aerson deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree ofnother person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received

n evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and theelationship between the two persons is shown by evidence otherhan such act or declaration. The word `pedigree‘ includeselationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates

when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of

he relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimatelyonnected with pedigree.‖

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) theeclarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of aerson must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of theerson whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be madeefore the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationshipetween the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question

must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby KelleyMangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20efore the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ , i.e, living

ogether with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondentPJ) in one house, and as one family -

, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presentlyesiding in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn inccordance with law do hereby declare that:

―1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

―2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe,Sr.

―3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,‘ or `FPJ‘.

―4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ‘ was born on Augu1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena SManila.

―x x x x x x x x x

―7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, me

became engaged while they were students University of the Philippines in 1936. I waintroduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sistsame year.

―8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie hafirst child in 1938.

―9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and thethree children, Elizabeth, Ronald, AllanFernando II, and myself lived together wimother at our family's house on Dakota StJorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberatManila in 1945, except for some months be1943-1944.

―10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie,blessed with four (4) more children after R

Allan Poe.


―18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to ththat my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a nborn Filipino, and that he is the legitimate cFernando Poe, Sr.

―Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this

day of January 2004.

RubyKelley Mangahas

clarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlik

satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA tewhich examines genetic codes obtained from body cells illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead pcould be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiatpaternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,

[42]this Court

acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods uwe adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunatehave now the facility and expertise in using DNA teidentification and parentage testing. The University oPhilippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)

Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is

on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copiecopy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA









http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/125901.htm












he mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed tostablish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique,he use of DNA test as evidence is still open tohallenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courtshould not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNAvidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results ofcience when competently obtained in aid of situations presented,ince to reject said result is to deny progress."

Petitioner’s Argument For urisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were ailipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to

espondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According toetitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, onuly 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,

making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous andespondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposedertificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomezould be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence

ntroduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birthertificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parentshowed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father

nd an American mother who were married to each other a yearater, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents wouldmake FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as anlegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother,

Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling ofhis Court in Morano vs. Vivo,

[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de

eon[44]

and Serra vs. Republic .[45]

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicusuriae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -

We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was inach of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jusanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be aecision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if

he pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, theronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter

dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Courto look closely into these cases.

First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate childf a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson

who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. Thessue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of thetepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did notave the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about thelegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a

ather who had become Filipino by election to public office beforehe 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935

Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.

Third, Serra vs. Republic . The case was not about the illegitimateon of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chineseather and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who waslready a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to beaturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46]

This is a more complicated case. Thease was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son ofeoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, washe illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino

mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship fromeoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no

valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina motheCourt therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Lewas not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefornot only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

―The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followean obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if LeQuintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino beQuintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, basedcontrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary fcase. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repthe obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.


"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would hatextual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate theprotection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. Fwould make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate chian illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegidistinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father anillegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

―The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctionsestablished long ago by People vs. Cayat.

[47] I would grant th

distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children

on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction fpurpose but not for another purpose.

―x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elpublic service? What possible state interest can there bdisqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public offiwas not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaisondeprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an imppublic office is to punish him for the indiscretion oparents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if thneither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distitransgresses the equal protection clause and must be reproba

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a fmember of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thepetitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, sindeed fail.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the cwas to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate childalien father in line with the assumption that the mother had cuwould exercise parental authority and had the duty to suppoillegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejuddiscriminate against him.

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most signconsideration – is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamentprevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondentcan never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither connor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizethe Philippines are ―those whose fathers are citizens oPhilippines.‖ There utterly is no cogent justification to preconditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provide

In Sum –

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of j

review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 16filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Ru























Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of theCOMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, forack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed forhe disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the positionf President in the 10

th May 2004 national elections on the

ontention that FPJ has committed material representation in hisertificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-bornitizen of the Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction andrematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 bothaving been directly elevated to this Court in the latter‘s capacity ashe only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential

lection contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primaryurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, notefore, the elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether gravebuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it isecessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ isnatural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not

he father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been ailipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the allegedlegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipinoitizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipinoitizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from theresumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo

would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the

Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in thebsence of any other evidence, could have well been his place ofesidence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would haveenefited from the ―en masse Filipinization‖ that the Philippine Billad effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,

would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondentPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJas seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathersre Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are

egitimate or illegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may notstablish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizenf the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in

is favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of havingmade a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy iniolation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus

Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his caseefore the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to thearties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whetherr not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled

n Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC ,[48]

must not only be material,ut also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson andelix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections,

Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino

X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "ZoiloAntonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan KelleyPoe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled ―Victorino X. Fornier,Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald AllanKelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,‖ for failure to showrave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on

Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

_____________________________________________________


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,

vs.ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondent

G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,vs.

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondent

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respoOng, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting asidreversal of a decision of the House of Representatives EleTribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a naturaFilipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in makindetermination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second dof Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representathe second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioSixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent,Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representathe second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respopremised on the following grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizenPhilippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the sdistrict of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found fprivate respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioneNovember 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRETresolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari .







We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised inhe petitions.

ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.

The Constitution explicitly provides that the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate ElectoralTribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to thelection, returns, and qualificationsof their respective members.

See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear andomplete. The use of the word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the

urisdiction of these Tribunals.

The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v . HRET (168 SCRA 3911988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction ofhe Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz :

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes theexclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred(Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p.162). The exercise of power by the Electoral

Commission under the 1935 Constitution hasbeen described as "intended to be as completeand unimpaired as if it had originally remained inthe legislature." (id ., at p. 175) Earlier this grant ofpower to the legislature was characterized byJustice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete;(Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte andSamar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedlyreposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and itremained as full, clear and complete as thatpreviously granted the Legislature and theElectoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard tothe jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the

1987 Constitution. (p. 401)

The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grantshe HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating tolection, returns and qualifications of members of the House of

Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matterwithin its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . .

the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear andomplete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part ofhis Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affecthe same." (pp. 403-404)

When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunalsnder our constitutional grants of power?

n the later case of Robles v . HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) theSupreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyondudicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-alled extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the

Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excessf its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing

Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident usey the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of

aw, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION thathere has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)

n the leading case of Morrero v . Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the

Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond

judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showsuch arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constidenial of due process." The Court does not venture into the pearea of trying to correct perceived errors of independent brancthe Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a dedue process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or gthat no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been givexpanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions other branches and agencies of the government to detewhether or not they have acted within the bounds o

Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whetnot the governmental branch or agency has gone beyonConstitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or different view. In the absence of a showing that the HREcommitted grave abuse of discretion amounting to la

jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercicorrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its naturethe HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apperror.

As constitutional creations invested with necessary powe

Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite schethe government, are, in the exercise of their functions indepeorgans — independent of Congress and the Supreme Courpower granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [193

In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and cregard for the balance of powers, must permit this excprivilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign auhas place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of LeytSamar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])

It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the p

Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where than unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two EleTribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that mthe HRET because of its composition any less independent froCourt or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The dof judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of powdenial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necesthe exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Co

ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP

The records show that in the year 1895, the private respongrandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Oestablished his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samland which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificresidence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was bChina in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the1915.



Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who electedPhilippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935Constitution whether the election was done before or afterJanuary 17, 1973. (Records of the ConstitutionalCommission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights,Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights hasmore or less decided to extend the interpretation of who isa natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973

Constitution by adding that persons who have electedPhilippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall benatural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?

Fr. Bernas: yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in theReverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that thedecision was designed merely to accommodate formerdelegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that theReverend Father Bernas is going against this intention bysupporting the amendment?

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has beenan evolution in my thinking. (Records of the ConstitutionalCommission, Vol. 1, p. 189)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very importantbecause his election of Philippine citizenship makes himnot only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizenentitling him to run for Congress. . .

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for thatreason we will leave it to the body to approve that provisionof section 4.

Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provisionbecause it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen whowas born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be aFilipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of theConstitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy aninequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when wewere under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipinofathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos.However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fatherswould have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reachingthe age of majority; and if they do elect, they becomeFilipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens.(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)

The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. Tomake the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give aarrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It mustlso be retroactive.

should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are notlways to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The

spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, espwhere adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and inju(Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])

A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to geffective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is ahence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail ovletter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)

In the words of the Court in the case of J .M . Tuason v . LSCRA 413 [1970]:

To that primordial intent, all else is subordiOur Constitution, any constitution is not construed narrowly or pedantically foprescriptions therein contained, to parapJustice Holmes, are not mathematical forhaving their essence in their form but are oliving institutions, the significance of which inot formal. . . . (p. 427)

The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomsituation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mwas automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizenone born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still helect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,

earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fatherthose born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placequal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citize

Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannmade to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly simembers.

It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, thatorder to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore,equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who ePhilippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity oConstitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curatnature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitablabsurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render thosevalid which would have been nil at the time had it not been fcurative provisions. (See Development Bank of the PhilippiCourt of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a naturaFilipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Fcitizen.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Fmothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenshipreaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing ecitizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnaturaunnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizeonly was his mother a natural born citizen but his father hadnaturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years ocould not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 andthe Constitution would be amended to require him to have fsworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his ahaving been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a



tatement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedureor one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal andn informal process.

n the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), theCourt held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and thearticipation in election exercises constitute a positive act of electionf Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court,

we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage whenhe came of age, constitutes a positive act ofelection of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasissupplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right ofuffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

or those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot bexpected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens,

we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where

here are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. Theespondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His fatherpplied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is

Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive governmentgency. His profession requires citizenship for taking thexaminations and getting a license. He has participated in politicalxercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipinoitizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does notmbrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate anynge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his naturalomeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of

Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than anymember of this Court will ever know him. They voted byverwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress.

Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a

ilipino.

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirementor those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already

Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberatehoice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession opennly to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is aualification, voting during election time, running for public office,nd other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal

manifestations of choice for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the personlecting is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is aational of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr.

Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part ofhe private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it

would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizenlect Philippine citizenship?

The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Onglected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nineears of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalizedilipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarelypplies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in thisountry. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected

Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such ."

Emphasis supplied)

The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, vanaturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the ocitizenship.

The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of strippinOng's father of his citizenship after his death and at this vedate just so we can go after the son.

The petitioners question the citizenship of the father throcollateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdictioattack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970

To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizensJose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the princdue process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to restcan he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A deadcannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuanhave long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obvioucould not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to dhimself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case

The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizeto Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or nHRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its poMoreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship th

his mother , not through the citizenship of his father. The citizeof the father is relevant only to determine whether or nrespondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. Atime and up to the present, both mother and father were FiliRespondent Ong could not have elected any citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizein favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his which he could possibly have chosen.

There is another reason why we cannot declare the HREhaving committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided bConstitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pam

convened by authority of the Constitution drafted byConvention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondentdeclared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies

Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the ConstituConvention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent Hsuch a difference could only be characterized as error . There be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsito amount to grave abuse of discretion.

What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's decEmil Ong a natural born citizen?

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippine

were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 andresiding in said islands and their children born subsequent thwere conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.

Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subje

Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those whoconsidered Spanish Subjects, viz :

ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:

1. Persons born in Spanish territory.



2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother,even though they were born out of Spain.

3. Foreigners who may have obtainednaturalization papers.

4. Those without such papers, who may haveacquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy .(Emphasis supplied)

The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual

esidence. This domicile, once established is considered to continuend will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article0, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil.68 [1949])

As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang,Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence washen issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang,

Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests andCredentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7,972, p. 3)

The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April1, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also

n this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his realroperty.

As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls withinhe meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of

Spain.

Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless,lways returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China,uring one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This willot change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the

Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had becomeSpanish subject.

f Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having establishedis domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily,

Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitantas been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place;ne who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol.) A priori , there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that

Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of sectionof the Philippine Bill of 1902.

The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding thathe private respondent was a natural-born Filipino.

The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that documentresented to prove it were not in compliance with the best the

vidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondentailed to present the original of the documentary evidence,estimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of theody which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional

Convention was predicated.

On the contrary, the documents presented by the privateespondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.

was established in the proceedings before the HRET that theriginals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenaryession of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28,972 cannot be found.

This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos,Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimgiven before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmagency which is the official custodian of the records of theConstitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)

The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafwho as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitu

Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)

The inability to produce the originals before the HRET watestified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo

Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law doerequire the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enthat it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Ph[1918])

Since the execution of the document and the inability to prowere adequately established, the contents of the quesdocuments can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollec

witnesses.

Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity odocumentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the fmember of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo,he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest athe private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disdocuments presented during the hearing of the election pagainst the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, Febru1989, pp. 8-9)

In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-presidthe Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding offthe plenary session which deliberated on the report on the el

protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of namdelegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice FernanMr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presenteone of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's havingdeclared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor diddemur to the contents of the documents presented by the prespondent. They merely relied on the procedural objerespecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.

The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge oqualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congressbodies deliberated at length on the controversies over whichwere sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wishpresent. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusiocannot declare their acts as committed with grave abudiscretion. We have to keep clear the line between error andabuse.

ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE

The petitioners question the residence qualification of respoOng.

The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" undConstitution. The term "residence" has been understoo

synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitbut also under the 1987 Constitution.



The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that themeaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate forCongress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that inthe 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attemptto require residence in the place not less than one yearimmediately preceding the day of the elections. So myquestion is: What is the Committee's concept of residenceof a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence oris it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regularmembers of the National Assembly are concerned, theproposed section merely provides, among others, and aresident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of notless than one year preceding the day of the election. Thiswas in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, theinterpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p.87)

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7,page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same

point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as amatter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen considerat the proper time to go back to actual residence ratherthan mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficultyespecially considering that a provision in the Constitution inthe Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad mayvote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the originalconcept that it should be by domicile and not physical andactual residence. (Records of the 1987 ConstitutionalCommission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definitioniven to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same

meaning as domicile.

The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to whichwhen absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (OngHuan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of aerson from said permanent residence, no matter how long,otwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. Inther words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])

The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was theomicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to theetitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned saidomicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.

The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRETufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their house in961, another one was constructed.

ikewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two doorsf which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong,

r., November 18,1988, p. 8)

The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owproperty in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a residsaid place is misplaced.

The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his panecessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the lawsuccession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names parents.

Even assuming that the private respondent does not ow

property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los v . Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required person should have a house in order to establish his residencdomicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality orented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis suppl

To require the private respondent to own property in order eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a proqualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidatethe age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhit required by the Constitution that the candidate should alsproperty in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. BorrPhil. 412 [1965])

It has also been settled that absence from residence to pstudies or practice a profession or registration as a voter othein the place where one is elected, does not constitute loresidence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])

As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila fpurpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profeThere was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, SOn the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home proreveal that he always had the animus revertendi .

The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rundergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our history, has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Amer

Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial divgives strength to our country.

Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, iis such a person, for there is none. To mention a few, the greaRizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehwas part Chinese, and of course our own President, Co

Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom wproud were ethnically more Chinese than the private responde

Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wCitizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cheris

However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, havunreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richne

Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiqnaturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influpatrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lesometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearancminor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcommany technical traps of the judicial process were able to acitizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revisenable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examinaan applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane,indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship probleessential.



WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. Theuestioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared aatural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang,

Northern Samar.

SO ORDERED.

_____________________________________________________

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004]HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO, pet i t ioners, vs . THE

CIVIL REGISTER OF MANILA and any person having orclaiming an interest under the entry whose

cancellation or correction is sought, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J .:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed byHubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co seeking to reverse and set asidehe Order

[1] dated September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of

Manila, Branch 26, dismissing their petition for correction of entries

n the Civil Register. Likewise sought to be reversed and set asides the Order dated April 27, 1999 of the court a quo denying theetitioners‘ motion for reconsideration of the said order.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His sister,Arlene Tan Co, was born on May 19, 1975. In their respectiveertificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng andourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens.

Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for hisaturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special

Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.70. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippineitizenship under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The

Chairman of the Committee issued on February 15, 1977 Certificatef Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor. Thus, on February 15,977, Co Boon Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the

meantime, Hubert and Arlene Co finished college and earned theirespective degrees in architecture and accountancy in Philippinechools.

On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court ofManila a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correctionf entries in their certificates of birth. The case was docketed as Sp.

Proc. Case No. 98-90470. They alleged, inter alia, in their petitionhat:

3) They were born in the Philippines and the legitimate children ofCO BOON PENG;

4) Co Boon Peng, who is formerly a citizen of China, was conferredPhilippine citizenship by naturalization under Presidential DecreeNo. 1055 and had taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines on 15

th February, 1977 in the City of Manila;

5) At the time of birth of [the] petitioners, their father CO BOONPENG was still a Chinese citizen that is why entry in their respectiveirth certificates as to their father‘s citizenship was Chinese;

6) Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization to CoBoon Peng in 1977, [the] petitioners who were born in thePhilippines and still minors at that time became Filipino citizens

hrough the derivative mode of naturalization. Our Naturalization

Law, specifically Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 47amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535 which provides:

―Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who haveborn in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof;‖

(7) The naturalization of petitioners‘ father in 1977 was an event affecting and concerning their civil status that murecorded in the Civil Register, Article 407 of the New Civil Cothe Philippines which provides:

―Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil stapersons shall be recorded in the Civil Register.‖[2]

The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, thcourt render judgment correcting and changing the entries inrespective birth certificates as to the citizenship of their fathBoon Peng, from ―Chinese‖ to ―Filipino.‖

[3]

On September 23, 1998, the court a quo issued an dismissing the petition outright on the ground that the petitioinsufficient, solely because the petitioners‘ father Co Boon applied for naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conPhilippine citizenship by naturalization under PD No. 1055 anunder Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.

[4]

The petitioners sought the reconsideration of the asorder arguing that LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 were designgrant citizenship to deserving aliens; hence, should be contogether. They averred that the benefit of Section 15 of CA Nshould also be granted to the petitioners whose father was grnaturalization under LOI No. 270. However, the RTC issuOrder on April 27, 1999, denying their motion for reconsideratthe following reasons: (a) although Commonwealth Act No. 47Letter of Instructions No. 270 are statutes relating to the subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effectrespect to the minor children of the applicant. Section 15 of C473 expressly provides for the effect of the naturalization on thand children of the applicant while LOI No. 270 does not havproviso to that effect; (b) LOI No. 270 clearly refers to quindividuals only. The rules and regulations promulgated b

Committee established pursuant to LOI No. 270 andamendments issued by then President Ferdinand E. MarcosNos. 292 and 491) clearly speak of qualified individuals onproviso therein referred to its effect on the wife and children individual; (c) Section 15 of CA No. 473 should not be deemeincorporated in and applied to LOI No. 270; and, (d) the appliof the so-called ―pari materia‖ rule of construction made bpetitioners is misplaced, as what should be applied in the icase is the rule on strict construction of legislative granfranchise. The court a quo stressed that legislative grants, wthey be of property, rights or privileges, whether grantcorporations or individuals, must be strictly construed againgrantee and in favor of the grantor.

Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court assaili

court a quo’s Order dismissing their petition outright and its denying their motion for the reconsideration of the same.

The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in holdintheir petition was insufficient. They assert that contrary to theof the trial court, they are qualified to claim the benefit of Sectof CA No. 473, which provides that minor children of penaturalized thereunder who were born in the Philippineslikewise be considered citizens thereof. They contend that altLOI No. 270, under which the petitioners‘ father was naturdoes not contain a provision similar to Section 15 of CA No. 47latter provision should be deemed incorporated therein. Theyout that both laws have the same purpose and objective, igrant Philippine citizenship to qualified aliens permanently rein the Philippines. The petitioners invoke the rule that st

in pari materia are to be read together .

[5]

They posit that CA Nand LOI No. 270 should be harmonized and reconciled sinc

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tatutes relating to the same subject, or having the same generalurpose, should be read in connection with it, and should beonstrued together as they constitute one law.‖

[6]

The petitioners maintain that the letter and spirit of LOI No.70 was to grant the privilege of Philippine citizenship not only toualified aliens but also to their minor children who were born in theountry. They assert that this is apparent from paragraph 4-Ahereof, which extends the option to adopt Filipino names not only toualified applicants for naturalization but also to their wives and

minor children. They submit that when then President Ferdinand E.Marcos enacted LOI No. 270, he must be presumed to have beencquainted with the provisions of CA No. 473 and did not intend to

brogate and discontinue the beneficial effects of Section 15hereof; otherwise, Pres. Marcos would have expressly repealed

Section 15 of CA No. 473 in relation to LOI No. 270. Thus,ccording to the petitioners, the naturalization of their father duringheir minority is an act or event affecting their civil status that muste recorded in the Civil Register pursuant to Article 407 of the Civil

Code.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that theourt a quo did not err in issuing the assailed orders. Contrary tohe petitioners‘ theory, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are se paratend distinct laws; therefore, are not in pari materia. He points outhat although LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 both govern theaturalization of aliens, CA No. 473 deals with the requirements androcedure for naturalization by judicial decree; LOI No. 270, on the

ther hand, deals with the requirements and procedure foraturalization by presidential decree.

The Solicitor General further asserts that the petitioners‘ontention that the naturalization of their father is an event affectingnd concerning their civil status envisaged in Article 407 of the Civil

Code has no legal basis. The correction sought and allowed underRule 108 of the Rules of Court must be one that reflects a factxisting before or at the time of birth. In the petitioners‘ case, theaturalization of their father in 1977 took place long after they wereorn. Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, under LOI No.70 and its amendatory laws, the naturalization of a father didot ipso facto render his children also naturalized. The petitionershus cannot invoke Article 407 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the

Rules of Court to avoid strict compliance with the naturalization

aws.

The petition is meritorious.

The rule on statutory construction provides that:

Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed togetherecause enactments of the same legislature on the same subjectre supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes areupplementary or complimentary (sic) to the earlier enactments and

n the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mindhe existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted its newct with reference thereto.

[7]

Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attainhe purpose of an expressed national policy, thus:

On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provisionhas in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject

matter, it is held that in the absence of any express repeal ormendment therein, the new provision was enacted in accord withhe legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they allhould be construed together. Provisions in an act which aremitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will bepplied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent

with its purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matterre to be compared with the new provisions; and if possible byeasonable construction, both are to be construed that effect isiven to every provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although

in apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably possible constrbe in harmony with each other .

[8]

LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governinnaturalization of qualified aliens residing in the Philippines. they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 gonaturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270 gonaturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the purpose and objective: to enable aliens permanently residing Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love foloyalty to the Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, traand ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the econ

social and cultural development of our country, to be integratethe national fabric by being granted Filipino citizenship. UndLOI, the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship by naturaliis more expeditious, less cumbersome and less expensivesooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are aintegrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus acontribute to the cultural, social and political well- being country and its people.

Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitcorrectly posit, statutes in pari materia. Absent any express of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said proshould be read into the latter law as an integral part thereobeing inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of C473,

[9] which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the

children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly ato the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 27the petitioners in this case.

It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidenccertificate of naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitleto Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to profollowing material allegations in their petition: (a) that they alegitimate children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were born Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when Co Boonwas naturalized as a Filipino citizen;

The petitioners‘ recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Coamended, is appropriate. Under Article 412 of the New Civil no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected with

judicial order. The law does not provide for a specific procedlaw to be followed. But the Court approved Rule 108 of the RuCourt to provide for a procedure to implement the law.

[1

entries envisaged in Article 412 of the New Civil Code are provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which r

Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning thstatus of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separationannulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages

from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptionacknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judetermination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a and (16) changes of name.

Specific matters covered by the said provision include nostatus but also nationality.

[11] The acts, events or factual

envisaged in Article 407 of the New Civil Code include even that occur after the birth of the petitioner. However, in such the entries in the certificates of birth will not be correctchanged. The decision of the court granting the petition shannotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of thregister in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar .

[12]






























To correct simply means ―to make or set aright; to remove theaults or error from.‖ To change means ―to replace something withomething else of the same kind or with something that serves as aubstitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as tohe kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on theasis of the effect that the correction or change may be.

[13] Such

ntries include not only those clerical in nature but also substantialrrors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of

Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.[14]

The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court areummary if the entries in the civil register sought to be corrected arelerical or innocuous in nature. However, where such entries

ought to be corrected or changed are substantial: i.e., the statusnd nationality of the petitioners or the citizenship of theirarents,

[15] the proceedings are adversarial in nature as defined by

his Court in Republic v . Valencia, thus:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from anx parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given

egal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter anpportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.

[16]

In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded asespective defendants are (a) the local civil registrar; and, (b) allersons who have claims any interest which would be affectedhereby.

[17]

In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that theyre the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who was naturalizeds a Filipino citizen, but that their certificates of birth still indicatehat he is a Chinese national. In view of their father‘s naturalization,hey pray that the entries in their certificates of birth relating to theitizenship of their father be changed from ―Chinese‖ to ―Filipino.‖

The petitioners‘ recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of theRules of Court, as amended, being appropriate, it behooved the trialourt to do its duty under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,amely:

Sec. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, theourt shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the

ame, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to theerson named in the petition. The court shall also cause the ordero be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in aewspaper of general circulation in the province.

After hearing, the court shall issue an order either dismissinghe petition or issue an order granting the same. In either case, aertified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registraroncerned who shall annotate the same in the certificates of birth ofhe petitioners. The judgment of the court shall form part of theecords of the local civil register .

[18]

In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition outright iniolation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Patently, then, the trialourt erred in so doing.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition isGRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court ofManila, Branch 26, are SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The trial courts DIRECTED to reinstate the petition in Special Proceedings NO.8-90470 in the court docket, and ORDERED to continue with theroceedings in the said case under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,s amended.

SO ORDERED.

_____________________________________________________

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petit ion er, vs. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents

[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]RAUL R. LEE, petit ion er, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents .

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J .:

The ultimate question posed before this Court in thesecases is: Who should be declared the rightful governSorsogon—

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the hnumber of votes in three successive elections but who wasdeclared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office dhis alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumlost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, buclaims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be consvoid; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentithrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured thenumber of valid votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obvwas not voted directly to the position of governor, but who accto prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasas, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy contested office has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrinrepatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudencitizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of subs

justice over pure legalisms.

G.R. No. 123755.

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58

Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to revieannul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Ele(Comelec), First Division,

1 promulgated on December 19,199

another Resolution of the Comelec en bane promulgated Fe23, 1996

3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldhis Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsothe May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner RLee, another candidate, filed a petition

4 with the Comelec doc

as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualifiedseeking or holding any public office or position by reason of nbeing a citizen of the Philippines," and that his CertificaCandidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Divisthe Comelec promulgated a Resolution

5 granting the petitio

the following disposition:6

"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petitiodeclares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the OffGovernor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizthePhilippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidcancelled."

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo rem

unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. Socandidacy continued and he was voted for during the election



















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ancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any personxclusively on the ground that any material representation containedherein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition

may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the timef the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, afterotice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before thelection." (Italics supplied.)

he Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions becausehey were not rendered "within the period allowed by law," i.e., "notater than fifteen days before the election."

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of theComelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period offteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictionalefect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R.Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in theiractual environment and are identical in the ultimate questionaised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor ofhe province of Sorsogon.

On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from thearties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously theirespective memoranda.

he Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues maye restated as follows:

. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did iteasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to beroclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it beiven retroactive effect? If so, from when?

. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipinoitizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to

r hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatoryetition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that : said petition is not "are-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?

. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, validnd legal in light of existing jurisprudence?

. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed itsurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of whichrevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon,onsidering that they were not rendered within ( the period referredo in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than

fteen days before the elections"?

he First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lismota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other mattersaised are secondary to this.

The Local Government Code of 199119

expressly requiresPhilippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials,ncluding that of provincial governor, thus:

"Sec. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official mustcitizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the baramunicipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsodsangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elecresident therein for at least one (1) year immediately precediday of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or anylocal language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governmember of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mamember of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized

must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day

xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Cour t2

non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that hreacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualificprescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).

Under Philippine law,21

citizenship may be reacquired byact of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldthis Court in G.R. No. 104654

22 and during the oral argument

case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct aCongress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failmaterialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several me

of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, t"maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his atat naturalizationwas rejected by this Court because of jurisdicsubstantial and procedural defects.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldooverwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorswith a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 inand 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twicwas judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqufrom holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he cto us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogoa favorable decision from the Commission on Elections toMoreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed throuthird and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation

P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himselfwas the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lostime, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the valihis cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. BrillJr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions oDecree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hencinsists that he—not Lee—should have been proclaimed as theelected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial BoaCanvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearunquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes elections and since at that time, he already reacquirecitizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tawith serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.

First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been efferepealed," asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exerlegislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Dor Executive Issuances as the same poses a seriouscontentious issue of policy which the present government, exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave

judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution," athat in her memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the membthe Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purpoPresidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed thecease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings your functional area of responsibility as defined under LeInstructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."



















This memorandum dated March 27, 198724

cannot by anytretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning oruthorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only byubsequent ones

25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is

bvious that no express repeal was made because then PresidentAquino in her memorandum — based on the copy furnished us byee — did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 waseing repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. Inact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text.

On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory constructionhat repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will note allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguouslyemonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently

nconsistent that they cannot co-exist."26

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even beegarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement ofhe Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her

aw-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executiveolicy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptancend processing of applications for repatriation pending whateverudgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might

make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725ut left it to the first Congress — once created—to deal with the

matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should havenequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress.

The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in termshat clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in thexercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter ofepeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said

Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to theCourt by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upontatutory construction but on common sense as well.

Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularitiesawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo'spplication therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) waspproved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x," whichprevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof."rivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the

Office of the President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994.This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the SpecialCommittee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumablyhe said Committee started processing his application. On June 29,995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committeeequired. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there

was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.

Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of theSpecial Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for theersonal interest of respondent,"

27 the Solicitor General explained

uring the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation isimply baseless as there were many others who applied and wereonsidered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him tohis Court, through a Manifestation

28 filed on April 3, 1996.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced

hat the presumption of regularity in the performance of official dutynd the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo haveot been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that theroceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to concludehat such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, theequirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult toomply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.25

29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules

nd regulations to implement the said decree were left to theSpecial Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unliken naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry intoPhilippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a formeratural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previousitizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-orn citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his

rovince prior to his naturalization in the United States — a

naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escapiron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could nconscience embrace — and who, after the fall of the dictator are-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in retto his country of birth to offer once more his talent and servichis people.

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to bSolicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingconclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently pby Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivrepatriation should have been pursued before the Committeeand, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Third. Lee further contends that assuming the asrepatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualifiprescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on theof his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed,"our decision in G.R. 104654

30which held that "both the

Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philcitizens can run and be elected to Public office" Obviously, howthis was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whFrivaldo's naturalization was valid or not — and NOT the effdate thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be inthen the issue of when an aspirant for public office shouldcitizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which questio

shall now directly rule on.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n ellocal official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, oprovince x x x where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediatelypreceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other localanguage or dialect."

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x xx must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age onelection day."

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not sany particular date or time when the candidate must pocitizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist least one year's residency immediately preceding the delection) and age (at least twenty three years of age on elday).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requiremeholding an elective public office,

31 and the purpose of the citize

qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.eperson owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our pand our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official b

to govern or to discharge his functions only uponproclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of ofbegin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on Jun1995—the very day

32 the term of office of governor (and

elective officials) began—he was therefore already qualifiedproclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functionresponsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, halready qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our lqualifications consistent with the purpose for which such lawenacted. So too, even from a literal (as distingfrom liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECOFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such qualifibe required at the time of election or at the time of the filing certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally,





































ualifications — unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in thease of age and residence — should thus be possessed when theelective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he isroclaimed and at the start of his term — in this case, on June 30,995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li

Seng Giap & Sons,33

if the purpose of the citizenship requirement iso ensure that our people and country do not end up being governedy aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aimr purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved byonstruing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time ofroclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised

uring the oral argument34 to the effect that the citizenshipualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or forhat matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all,

Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, alsopecifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registeredoter." And, under the law

35 a "voter" must be a citizen of

he Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one — if he was not a citizen at theme of such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning theurpose of the requirement. If the law intendedhe citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to electiononsistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it

would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The

aw abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the lawntended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being aVOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It alsotands to reason that the voter requirement was included as anotherualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need forationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN

THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the lawtates: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, orrovince x x x where he intends to be elected." It should bemphasized that the Local Government Code requires an electivefficial to be a registered voter. It does not require him toote actually. Hence, registration—not the actual voting—is the coref this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in thisecond requirement is to ensure that the prospective official isctually registered in the area he seeks to govern — and notnywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized—andee has not disputed — that he "was and is a registered voter of

Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained asalid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in hisrecinct on May 8, 1995."

36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastlymaintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter ofSorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the courtismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to votes in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May,1995.

37

It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in therovince where he intended to be elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue ofitizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, notecessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate ofandidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code

38 gives any

oter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunityo question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. Thiss the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how toontest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising fromailure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of theocal Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can bevailed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning

andidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibilitymay be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the

very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, havinghis oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same dayhe should have been the candidate proclaimed aunquestionably garnered the highest number of votes iimmediately preceding elections and such oath had already his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such timwas no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we alsothat the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date filing of his application on August 17,1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39

"shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is providedthere are settled exceptions

40 to this general rule, such as wh

statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CRENEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino,41

curative statutes are those undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating jor administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or pdeeds and contracts which otherwise would not produceintended consequences by reason of some statutory disabfailure to comply with some technical requirement. They operconditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactoperation. Agpalo,

42 on the other hand, says that curative st

are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the mea

enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to sdefects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certaix x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxxreach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities arender valid and effective attempted acts which would be otheineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which dcreate new or take away vested rights, but only operafurtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, orddo not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective lawwithin the general rule against the retrospective operatistatutes.

43

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling cvoids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 exprecognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had losPhilippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who coulunder the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avrepatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termiof their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino womamarries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" be"such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Fwomen who had married aliens before said constitution took eThus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women—the rightacquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said s

also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenshnow desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because priorpromulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have hundergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalizatiowith the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquirePhilippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatria

The Solicitor General44

argues:

"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP v96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, absuperfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. SecuritiesExchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).


















































n this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in thexisting naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein marriedilipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of theirusbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship byaturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing thegid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship byaturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for theforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions areonsidered essentially remedial and curative."

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording ofhe preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent wasrecisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospectiveperation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that ithould so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act aswhole, or from the terms thereof."

45 It is obvious to the Court that

he statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events andransactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law andurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is

political and civil right equally as important as the freedom ofpeech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searchesnd seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights,herefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D.25 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been saidhat a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect thevident purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason ofhe statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in theuture, then it will be so applied although the statute does not inerms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right oriolate some constitutional guaranty."

46 This is all the more true of

P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit orualify the right of repatriation granted therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can theetroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law

was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipinoitizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied forepatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time

hat Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is notnly the law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given retroactive effect,ut even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June0, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of hispplication therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simplyhat if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authorityhat the law should apply to past events — i.e., situations andransactions existing even before the law came into being — inrder to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possiblehereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionallyuaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to beiven the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the moreeason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective

manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to theassage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo

n June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of datef his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the lawhat would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part ofhe legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage orrejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result fromiving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown thathere will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,isturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutionaluaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly,rivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and

whatever defects there were in his nationality should now beeemed mooted by his repatriation.

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any subslength of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateleFrivaldo—having already renounced his American citizenshwas, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This snot be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of lais to be presumed that the law-making body intended righ

justice to prevail.47

And as experience will show, the Special Committee was aprocess, act upon and grant applications for repatriation

relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.48 Ththat such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizelikelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, prejudice to the government is possible only where a perepatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his tgovernment arising in connection with or as a result of his beialien, and accruing only during the interregnum between appliand approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the palready twice frustrated, should now prevail. Undercircumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in trFrivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the dhis application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all que

about his possession of the nationality qualification— whetherdate of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (M1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's staa registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch asconsidered as having been repatriated—i.e., his Filipino citizerestored — as of August 17, 1994, his previous registrationvoter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo becam American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effegive him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the

Government Code would disqualify him "from running foelective local position?"

49 We answer this question in the neg

as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance andbefore that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his ComFrivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and hadabandoned his American citizenship—long beforeMay 8, 19best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he abanand renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriahis Filipino citizenship."

50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resodated December 19, 1995:

51

"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lo American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oallegiance to the Philippine Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his fnationality long before the elections of 1995 have not effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic thatfindings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, aany showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a ContiDisqualification?



































Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53

of theComelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto byComelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became finalnd executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no restrainingrder having been issued by this Honorable Court."

54 Hence, before

ee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995,here was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying"rivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo nowoncedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien havelso become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, andhese "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an

American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) fromunning for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."

We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193isqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988lections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is finalnd can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent

Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55

The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decidedhat Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for theurpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is noecord of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as aandidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said

n its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30,995 ), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo

was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the SupremeCourt in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of thePhilippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was inonnection with the 1992 elections."

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial ofitizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This

s because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matterose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law forhe purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,

56 we

eld:

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable injudicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court

r administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship isenerally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshedut again and again, as the occasion demands."

he Third Issue: Comelec's JurisdictionOver The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction tontertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possibleypes of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are are-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case."

Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but

hat Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's)roclamation only on July 6, 1995 — "beyond the 5-dayeglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse

was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."

This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57

has givenhe Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdictionver all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualificationsf all elective x x x provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at

ength on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of itsonstitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice

it to say that this Court has invariably recognized theCommission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulmentf proclamations —of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously isne.

58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC ,

59 we ruled:

"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumptoffice, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Inwe are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controvmay no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the wcandidate has been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. RimandoSCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA Casimiro vs.COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, howevpremised on an assumption that the proclamation proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumptoffice cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to makedeclaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA

Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"

The Court however cautioned that such power to anproclamation must "be done within ten (10) days followinproclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Cocorrectly acquired jurisdiction over the same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamationuphold him for the following reasons:

First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC ,60 "thremains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign wilin Aquino vs. COMELEC ,

61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx just t

second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorsthe pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo

62 ca

follows:

"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully awfact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bringawareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonethelesstheir votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such caselectorate may be said to have waived the validity and effica

their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or thraway their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaininnext higher number of votes may be deemed elected."

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labnotoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much leselectorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petLabo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itselfresolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the offthe city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denyingcourse to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had n

become final and subject to the final outcome of this case."

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lthe ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 19an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comcancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet finelection day as there was in both cases a pending motioreconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omresolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and sothers can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as inhe was.

Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presto show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in facin law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other words, th











































oters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of theiroting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it ishat the vice-governor and not Lee—should be proclaimed, since inosing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviouslyot the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphaticeaching of Labo:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receivingmajority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving theext highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority orefeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to haveeasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtainedhe highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he—not Lee —hould be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patentlyrroneous and should now be corrected.

he Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailedResolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995nd the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995isqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because

hey were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed bySection 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:

Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate ofandidacy.— A verified petition seeking to deny due course or toancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any personxclusively on the ground that any material representation containedherein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition

may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the timef the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decidedfter notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before thelection" (italics supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these

esolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issuedy the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,ffirmed en banc

63 on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his

lection. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directorys Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try andecide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:

SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who haseen declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be votedor, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason

candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election toe disqualified and he is voted for and receives the -winning numberf votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue

with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon

motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during theendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of suchandidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. " (Italicsupplied)

Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G.Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum datedMarch 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, asrged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or aepeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is

ot a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law. The

existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in thFrivaldo case;

64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA N

and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired brepatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to reand to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effeCourt abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments dechim a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockeryretroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally whatever defects there may have been in his registration as afor the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity dchange his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which wersubjects of such previous rulings.

Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is nsole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citinComelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Electionallowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the grounfalse material representation therein as required by SectioCiting Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holdinSection 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Ouris that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 thComelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and Ma1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismthe petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec dcommit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R. Aauthorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications evethe elections." In spite of his disagreement with us onpoint, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note that juus, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, tethat a petition to deny due course under Section 78 be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The pcase however deals with the period during which the Comay decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decidedafter the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, wthat a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the eleis valid but Loong held that a petitionfiled beyond the 25-day is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.

Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holdingiven the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriatiobe given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dour holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and evesecond Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriationmode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no quthat Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determininqualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. Bsupervening repatriation has changed his political status — 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.

Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frwas stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "inrenunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose Amcitizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule olegal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is bainternational law that a State determines ONLY those who a

own citizens — not who are the citizens of other countries.issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldstateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such fis binding and final.

The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lochasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, sbe declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for bei

American was publicly known." First, there is absolutely no emevidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even i f there isknowledge can be true post factoonly of the last two preelections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/adeliberating on his nationality before, during and after theelections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?













Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the LocalGovernment Code refers to the qualifications of elective localfficials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that theitizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must beossessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of theerm, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section9, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) tof) refer to "candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a) werentended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, theegislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a)rom the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meanthat the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election dayr prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, theame way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications ofandidates for governor, mayor, etc.

Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactiveffect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, thathe law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath ofllegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired

Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states.We hold however that the provision should be understood thus: thatfter taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to haveeacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (orepatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to haveetroacted to the date of his application therefor.

In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal

meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of theocal Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide'shesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity,

were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.

Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "ThisCourt must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree — wemust all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. Thessue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this caseo it can be followed, so it can rule!

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice ofhilosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply lawselating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; theaked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or

ubstantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions;arshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. Inpplying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popularovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood

egalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon thelectorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyrannynd an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the LocalGovernment Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the

atest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term offfice to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 toe in full force and effect up to the present, not having beenuspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, andrivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properlyranted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of theemedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right toesume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as wells his unique situation of having been forced to give up hisitizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping aegime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effects of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of

which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality.Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of

ilipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor,

nd should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore,

since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to havevalidated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of coursprecisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizerequirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize hereprevious rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdto hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equconstrued the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effthe manifest will of our people,

66 for in case of doubt, politica

must be

interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandateexpressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal nicetietechnicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereignConsistently, we have held:

"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be libconstrued to the end that the will of the people in the chopublic officials may not be defeated by mere technical obje(citations omitted)."

67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every poprotection, defense and refuge, in deference to the populaIndeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of

effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversalpopular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effresolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause eloffices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majorisuccessfully challenge a winning candidate's qualificationspetitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so paantagonistic

68 to constitutional and legal principles that ove

such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to thedemocratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constand laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertakinhas miserably failed.

In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold himineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the timregistered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it coulddisputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was statethe time of repatriation and thus hold his consequentcitizenship as a disqualification "from running for any electiveposition." But the real essence of justice does not emanatequibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds frospirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brickultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struagainst and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and someharsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial jin the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's u

situation approximating venerability in Philippine politicaConcededly, he sought American citizenship only to escapclutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot serentertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this co

At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought tohis people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmvoted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance tRepublic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and dhis failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlookedemonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assumnationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyand love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be l

this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would















iven up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plentys a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted,ay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once moreis struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves everyberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor.

And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, thendomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to beoverned by a leader of their overwhelming choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED.The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are

AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED foreing moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

_____________________________________________________

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,JR., petitioners,

vs.The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY

POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.FORNIER, respondents.

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,vs.

RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,JR., respondent.

x-----------------------------x

G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,

vs.HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN

KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POEJR., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J .:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom thetate believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a "preciouseritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,"1 that cannot be

aken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or byhose who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise aingle question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of

citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the landpeople are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated bIs Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino ornot?

The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanis American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage olaw and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hyblaws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Fil

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poeknown as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certof candidacy for the position of President of the Republic Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificacandidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citithe Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "R

Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his plbirth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, e"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commissio

Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as FerPoe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a pdocketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Ele("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a mmisrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming tonatural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Forniparents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, w

American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petasseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he couhave transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter beillegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the alleof the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first,F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gbefore his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if noprior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly year after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented sdocumentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of Fa certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by PPoe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamconcubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poediscovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photof the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issuthe Director of the Records Management and Archives O

attesting to the fact that there was no record in the Na Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or enterPhilippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the OfficCharge of the Archives Division of the National Archives effect that no available information could be found in the files National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certifiissued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division National Archives that there appeared to be no available informregarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births foCarlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the OfficCharge of the Archives Division of the National Archives th

available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and PGomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan



) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deedsor the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e)opies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and

No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate ofeath of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contractetween Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification

ssued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,tating that the records of birth in the said office during the period ofrom 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for

ack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filedis motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06ebruary 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,etitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Courtonformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised

Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,kewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ ofreliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay thenality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, wouldnclude G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, andelix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald

Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‗Fernando Poe, Jr.‘), and Victorino X.ornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo

Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe,r.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC andsserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987

Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusiveurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

urisdiction of the Court

n G. R. No. 161824

n seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to havehe COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJ‘s certificate ofandidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that

PJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitionerornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel acertificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking todeny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacymay be filed by any person exclusively on the ground thatany material representation contained therein as requiredunder Section 74 hereof is false" –

n consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed inSection 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -

"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on

Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferredupon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall haveexclusive charge of the enforcement and administration ofall laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purposeof ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Codewhich would authorize "any interested party" to file averified petition to deny or cancel the certificate ofcandidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may beeviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64

2 in an action for

ertiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote ofMembers any case or matter brought before it withindays from the date of its submission for decisiresolution. A case or matter is deemed submittedecision or resolution upon the filing of the last plebrief, or memorandum, required by the rules oCommission or by the Commission itself. Unless othprovided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, or ruling of each Commission may be brought tSupreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constprovides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court such lower courts as may be established by law which "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle controversies involving rights which are legally demandablenforceable, and to determine whether or not there has bgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurison the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Governmen

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 1was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of bCourt. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people ofundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper con who could or should be elected to occupy the hgovernment post in the land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, inNo. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Sectiparagraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdictthe COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitionsdirectly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited re

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the judge of all contests relating to the election, returnqualifications of the President or Vice-President, an

promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitutionomission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designattribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidcontests, has constrained this Court to declare, in LopeRoxas,

4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or dis

involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse proCongress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 179

Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral TribuTry, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election oPresident-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the PhilippineProviding for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Actdesignated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices oSupreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Althougsubsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of governmentthe 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic A1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be derevived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the Constitution.

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in referencepost-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an elprotest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remwould have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the wcandidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 1213, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribpromulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992,

support this premise -



"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of the President or Vice-President of thePhilippines.

"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated bythe filing of an election protest or a petition for quowarranto against the President or Vice-President. Anelection protest shall not include a petition for quowarranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include anelection protest.

"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidatefor President or for Vice-President of the Philippines whoreceived the second or third highest number of votes maycontest the election of the President or the Vice-President,as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with theClerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30)days after the proclamation of the winner."

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal overontests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of thePresident" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not ofcandidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warrantoroceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person

who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public

ffice.5

In such context, the election contest can only contemplate aost-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who

would have received either the second or third highest number ofotes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes aost-election scenario.

is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,efined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, wouldot include cases directly brought before it, questioning theualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidencyefore the elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson,t al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634,

ntitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a.ernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want ofurisdiction.

he Citizenship Issue

Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a briefistorical background on the concept of citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given byAristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen"o refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and inhe holding of an office.

6 Aristotle saw its significance if only to

etermine the constituency of the "State," which he described as

eing composed of such persons who would be adequate in numbero achieve a self-sufficient existence.

7 The concept grew to include

ne who would both govern and be governed, for whichualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could bexpected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements,n the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.

8 In

s ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentallywilling to submit his private interests to the general interest ofociety.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over theenturies. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large,o civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary forndividual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and

ustice.

9

Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to includeolitical citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in

the exercise of political power.10

The 20th century saw thestage of the development of social citizenship, which laid empon the right of the citizen to economic well-being and security.

11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression

modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rshrinking global village, might well be the internationalizatcitizenship.

12

The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Sp

regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13 In crecords, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regathe inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizebecame highly codified during the 19th century but their number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Nof these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apthe Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Decrees.

14

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the NovRecopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to subject of differing views among experts;

15 however, three

decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards

Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the pstatus of children born in the Philippine Islands,

17 and final

Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expmade applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 11870.

18

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended tPhilippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Articaccording to which the provisions of the Ultramar among whiccountry was included, would be governed by special laws.

19

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdon 18 December 1889, which came out with the first categ

enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even iwere born outside of Spain,

"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization pap

"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have bedomiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."

20

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine h

Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forso cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world poweUnited States. An accepted principle of international law dithat a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogationpolitical laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws,would remain virtually intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December between Spain and the United States.

21 Under Article IX

treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitathe territories ceded to the United States would be determinedCongress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing

territory over which Spain by the present relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in



heir Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and requiredlegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipinoitizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct thisnomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status ofilipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973

Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution onitizenship to reflect such concerns -

"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following arecitizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of

the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of thePhilippines.

"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to theprovisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred andthirty-five.

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

or good measure, Section 2 of the same article also furtherrovided that –

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alienretains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act oromission she is deemed, under the law to have renouncedher citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correcthe irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the935 Constitution.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

"The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines atthe time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizensof the Philippines.

"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 ofFilipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenshipupon reaching the age of majority; and

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance withlaw."

he Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is anatural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,able to read and write, at least forty years of age on theday of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for atleast ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those whore citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform

ny act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."27

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 A1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its hfour modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus so

judicata and jus sanguinis28

– had been in vogue. Only two, i.soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "naborn" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. CollecCustoms

29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the

Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. SecretLabor

30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would

become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to in

that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ wapaternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyefather of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Ponot been presented in evidence, his death certificate, howidentified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangaand 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, shthat he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, LoPou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introducpetitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 01936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 19the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-fiveold, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley

twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. Thcertificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 A1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, marrBessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years oldmarried.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the verasome of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent anmarriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and BKelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married toother on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, LoPoe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establisfact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The ma

certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificFPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documepublic record in the custody of a public officer. The documentsbeen submitted in evidence by both contending parties durinproceedings before the COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitionExhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan Fto Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondendeath certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondehis Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitevidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particulareference to the facts which they purported to show, i.emarriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Al

Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Panga



were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those materialtatements in his argument. All three documents were certified trueopies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - Whenthe subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, noevidence shall be admissible other than the originaldocument itself, except in the following cases:

"x x x x x x x x x

"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of apublic office or is recorded in a public office."

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, themarriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birthertificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents.

Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:

"Entries in official records. Entries in official records madein the performance of his duty by a public officer of thePhilippines, or by a person in the performance of a dutyspecially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the

facts therein stated."

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to thentries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of officialuty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which

s usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine andisinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity ofecord which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as

might have occurred.31

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on1 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,

Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was bornometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of

Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in thePhilippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902onsidering that there was no existing record about such fact in the

Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however,kewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other placeuring the same period. In his death certificate, the residence oforenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In thebsence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound toonclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of aerson at the time of his death was also his residence before death.would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and

Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents ofhe Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiationrelationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) oraternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of anlegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son accordingo petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippinesrom 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950

when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgmentwas required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was

ither judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsorycknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the

putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be harecord of birth, a will, or a public document.

32 Complementary

new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressSection 5 thereof, that -

"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shsigned and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infonly by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter cshall not be permissible to state or reveal in the docthe name of the father who refuses to acknowledgchild, or to give therein any information by whichfather could be identified."

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificatrequired to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure ofrequirement rendered the same useless as being an authordocument of recognition.

33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,

34 the Court r

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry laenacted, the question here really is whether or not hicertificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copyregistry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proofhaving been voluntarily recognized. No such relianour judgment, may be placed upon it. While it containames of both parents, there is no showing tha

signed the original, let alone swore to its contenrequired in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that have happened, it was not even they or either of themfurnished the data to be entered in the civil rePetitioners say that in any event the birth certificatethe nature of a public document wherein volrecognition of a natural child may also be made, accoto the same Article 131. True enough, but in such athere must be a clear statement in the document thparent recognizes the child as his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both pnowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown tobeen executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other prvoluntary recognition remained to be "some other public docuIn Pareja vs. Pareja,

35 this Court defined what could constitute

a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classpublic documents, those executed by private indivwhich must be authenticated by notaries, and those by competent public officials by reason of their officepublic document pointed out in Article 131 as one means by which recognition may be made belongs first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgmerecognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legcompulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expresmade in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took plafavor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate childwas recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compacknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases whechild had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of theand might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an actclaim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought durinlifetime of the presumed parent.



Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument,authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes ofoluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable

writing of the father. The term would include a public instrumentone duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competentfficial) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article73, and Article 175 provide:

"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is establishedby any of the following:

"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or afinal judgment; or

"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a publicdocument or a private handwritten instrument and signedby the parent concerned.

"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimatefiliation shall be proved by:

"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of alegitimate child; or

"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court andspecial laws.

"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought bythe child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmittedto the heirs should the child die during minority or in a stateof insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period offive years within which to institute the action.

"The action already commenced by the child shall survivenotwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

"x x x x x x x x x.

"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish theirillegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,evidence as legitimate children.

"The action must be brought within the same periodspecified in Article 173, except when the action is based onthe second paragraph of Article 172, in which case theaction may be brought during the lifetime of the allegedparent."

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article56 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar asit does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights inaccordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36

the Court hasuled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognizednatural child should be decided under Article 278 of theCivil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Codeprovides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural childshall take place according to this Code, even if the childwas born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or

before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may beretroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalizacknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an atto break away from the traditional idea of keeping well legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family inof the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisionintended to merely govern the private and personal affairs family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimaillegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his porights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, in

provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Codeprovisions must be taken in the context of private relationdomain of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its dpurpose the organization of the family and the regulaproperty. It has thus [been] defined as the maprecepts which determine and regulate the relatioassistance, authority and obedience among memberfamily, and those which exist among members of a sfor the protection of private interests."

37

In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster ,38

the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spax the laws relating to family rights and duties, or status, condition and legal capacity of persons, gSpaniards although they reside in a foreign country; tconsequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such asdealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial the domicile of the husband and wife, their suppobetween them, the separation of their properties, thegoverning property, marital authority, division of coproperty, the classification of their property, legal cfor divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to dit, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and dupon the persons and properties of the spousesquestions that are governed exclusively by the nationof the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law isexemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the scondition and legal capacity of persons are bindingcitizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad"

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenssignificant in civil relationships found in different parts of theCode,

39 such as on successional rights and family relation

adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considere

child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights alegitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to definrights under civil law

41 and not his political status.

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitiThis discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish famproperty laws, which, while defining proprietary and succesrights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the riglegitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealthstrictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were co

in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination suwhen the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of ou



Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remainnly in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge onhe domain of political law.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining hisitizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not

nextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. TheCivil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation oraternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on

matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules onvidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matterbout pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable

y the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declarationof a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to thepedigree of another person related to him by birth ormarriage, may be received in evidence where it occurredbefore the controversy, and the relationship between thetwo persons is shown by evidence other than such act ordeclaration. The word `pedigr ee‘ includes relationship,family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates whenand the places where these facts occurred, and the namesof the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history

intimately connected with pedigree."

or the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) theeclarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of aerson must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of theerson whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be madeefore the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationshipetween the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question

must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby KelleyMangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20efore the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living

ogether with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondentPJ) in one house, and as one family -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind,presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., afterbeing sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:

"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name ofRonald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Philippinesas `Fernando Poe, Jr.,‘ or `FPJ‘.

"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ‘ was born on August 20, 1939 atSt. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.

"x x x x x x x x x

"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met andbecame engaged while they were students at theUniversity of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introducedto Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.

"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their firstchild in 1938.

"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their firschildren, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando Imyself lived together with our mother at our family's on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate unliberation of Manila in 1945, except for some mbetween 1943-1944.

"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan

"x x x x x x x x x

"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the famy nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Fiand that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, S

"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikesatisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA tewhich examines genetic codes obtained from body cells illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead p

could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiatpaternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,

42 this Court

acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods uwe adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunatehave now the facility and expertise in using DNA teidentification and parentage testing. The University oPhilippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)

Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is basthe fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, onefrom the mother and the other from the father. The DNA fromother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to estparentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the uDNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, aappropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule oadmissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts sapply the results of science when competently obtained in situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny prog

Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Fcitizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respoFPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitprior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5,contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, makinsubsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respoFPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificmarriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could bedoubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificrespondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showeFPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father an

American mother who were married to each other a year later16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make Fillegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimateFPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelle

American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this CoMorano vs. Vivo,

43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo

44 and Ser

Republic.45



On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae JoaquinG. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis motawas in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on

jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncementwould be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule ofstare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant tothe lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decisionbut a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. Itherefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about anillegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepsonof a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinesemother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether thestepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather.Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did nothave the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not aboutthe illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about alegitimate son of a father who had become Filipino byelection to public office before the 1935 Constitutionpursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.

"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about theillegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was anillegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.The issue was whether one who was already a Filipinobecause of his mother who still needed to be naturalized.There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46

This is a more complicated case.The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan whowas the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed thathis father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinesefather and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued thathe got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the

Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof thatLeoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Courttherefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. IfLeoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin.Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipinobut was not even a Filipino.

"The Court should have stopped there. But instead itfollowed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter thateven if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintinwould not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. Thisstatement about Quintin, based on a contrary to factassumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x xx It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeatingthe obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.

"x x x x x x x x x

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement wouldhave no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would alsoviolate the equal protection clause of the Constitution notonce but twice. First, it would make an illegitimatedistinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimatechild, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinctionbetween the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and theillegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was

established long ago by People vs. Cayat.

47

I would grantthat the distinction between legitimate children and

illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x Bdifferences alone do not justify invidious distinctiondifferences may justify distinction for one purpose bfor another purpose.

"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimelective public service? What possible state interesthere be for disqualifying an illegitimate child becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of thethat his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the cthe fullness of political rights for no fault of his owdisqualify an illegitimate child from holding an imp

public office is to punish him for the indiscretion parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in thaif there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinthen the distinction transgresses the equal protclause and must be reprobated."

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a fmember of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thepetitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, sindeed fail.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as takingthe citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child.

to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of anfather in line with the assumption that the mother had cuwould exercise parental authority and had the duty to suppoillegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejuddiscriminate against him.

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant considerais that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing oday, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never beexplicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctionConstitution states that among the citizens of the Philippine"those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There uttno cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions there clearly are none provided.

In Sum –

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial repossesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 athe resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abdiscretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petitSPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualifiof respondent FPJ from running for the positiPresident in the 10

th May 2004 national elections o

contention that FPJ has committed material represenin his certificate of candidacy by representing himsela natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdictioprematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 an161634 both having been directly elevated to this Cothe latter‘s capacity as the only tribunal to resopresidential and vice-presidential election contest the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction Court can directly be invoked only after, not beforelections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMit is necessary to take on the matter of whether respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in

depended on whether or not the father of respondent



F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, inthe affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy ofrespondent prevents him from taking after the Filipinocitizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on theFilipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawnfrom the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 yearsold, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, andthat San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence uponhis death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,could have well been his place of residence before death,such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "enmasse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, wouldthereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father ofrespondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during whichregime respondent FPJ has seen first light, conferscitizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizensregardless of whether such children are legitimate orillegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establishconclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizenof the Philippines, the evidence on hand still wouldpreponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot beheld guilty of having made a material misrepresentation inhis certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in

relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case beforethe Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given tothe parties to present their position and evidence, and toprove whether or not there has been materialmisrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,

48 must not only be material, but

also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecsonand Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commissionon Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando

Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G.R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner,versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections andRonald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on thepart of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissingthe petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

_____________________________________________________


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGANFOUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA;

SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,responde

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J .:

Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rof the Rules of Court.

Petitioners are people‘s and/or non-governmental organizengaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the perights to self-governance and justice.

Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointincluding those of Supreme Court Justices.

Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party wappointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court.

Petitioners allege that:

On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretarrepresentation of the Office of the President, announceappointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as AssJustice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. CSr. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, by the major daily publications.

On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported thappointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañview of the question relating to the citizenship of respoGregory S. Ong. There is no indication whatever thaappointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President

On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reportedrespondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment ithere except that the validation of the issue is being done bJudicial and Bar Council (JBC)."

Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respoOng through respondent Executive Secretary is paunconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abdiscretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, thfact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certindicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy obirth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certipetitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong‘s bMay 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother waChinese.

Petitioners invoke the Constitution:

Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constprovides that "No person shall be appointed MemberSupreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless hnatural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Adefines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizthe Philippines from birth without having to perform ato acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."

1

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven after respondent Ong‘s birth his father was finally granted F

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jul2007/gr_177721_2007.html#fnt1






itizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not makeespondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong‘s birth certificatepeaks for itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth.

They invoke the Civil Code:

Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making uphe civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall berima facie evidence of the facts therein contained."

Therefore, the

ntry in Ong‘s birth certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese isrima facie evidence of the fact that Ong‘s citizenship at birth is

Chinese.

Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entryin a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a

judicial order." Thus, as long as Ong‘s birth certificate isnot changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar Council,as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated inhis birth certificate.

2

This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails overrespondent Ong‘s new Identification Certificate issued bythe Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996, statingthat he is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion ofthen Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a

natural-born Filipino. They maintain that the Department ofJustice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alterentries in a birth certificate; that respondent Ong‘s oldIdentification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that respondent Ong‘s remedy is anaction to correct his citizenship as it appears in his birthcertificate.

Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issuednnulling the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associateustice of this Court.

Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motionor the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying

hat a TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, torevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasinghe appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrainespondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging theunctions of Associate Justice of this Court.

The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.

Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment,ssentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as

Associate Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by thePresident pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII,Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:

SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judgesof lower courts shall be appointed by the President from alist of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial andBar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments needno confirmation.

Respondent Executive Secretary added that the Presidentppointed respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who

were duly screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC creatednder Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondenturther stated: "The appointment, however, was not released, butnstead, referred to the JBC for validation of respondent Ong‘sitizenship."

3 To date, however, the JBC has not received the

eferral.

Supporting the President‘s action and respondent qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary submits that:

1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretishe appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC, passed upon the appointee‘s qualifications.

2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizdetermined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmthe Department of Justice, which have the authorit

jurisdiction to make determination on matters of citize

3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Onnatural-born citizen.

4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restrorder .

4

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Oppomaintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petithave no standing to file the present suit; and that the issue ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional mandated to review the qualifications of those it recommen

judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view faiinclude the President who is an indispensable party as the onextended the appointment.

As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral linone Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25,who was allegedly a Filipino citizen

5 who married Chan

Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that inChan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos revto her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizenrespondent Ong‘s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizenwere mar ried in 1927; that, therefore, respondent‘s mother wFilipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later marrChinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becomChinese citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven yea

his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as ahe, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included naturalization.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the BureImmigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification tis a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 anthe Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen whwas born.

Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:

I. PETITIONERS‘ LACK OF STANDING AND INABTO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY WOFFICIAL ACTION IS THE VERY ACT SOUGHT T

ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LOBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL PO

AND SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE FPROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATIOTHE MERITS BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FANATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPCONSIDERING THAT:

A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILCITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGEUGENIO; and


















B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17,1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHOELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPONREACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY,RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THEREQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE IV,SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987CONSTITUTION.

III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY,WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT HE

IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVECONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."

IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONGTO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TOCLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS ANATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.

V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVELEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVEJURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION ASREGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG,

AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THESECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THERULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATIONCERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THATRESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO,THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANYCONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUMETHE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THESUPREME COURT.

7

Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which theysserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of previousecisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.

Guingona8 and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,

9 on the ground

hat the case is one of transcendental importance. They claim thathe President‘s appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Courtustice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, attended withrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.inally, they reiterate that respondent Ong‘s birth certificate, unlessorrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for theurpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what ittates, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. Thelleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not

make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The petition has merit.

irst, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simplys people‘s organizations and taxpayers since the matter involvesn issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance,amely, the qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a person to beppointed a member of this Court. Standing has been accorded andecognized in similar instances.

10

Second, as to having to implead the President as an allegedecessary party. This is not necessary since the suit impleads the

Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and heas in fact spoken for her in his Comment. Furthermore, the suitoes not seek to stop the President from extending the appointmentut only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent

Ong from accepting the same.

Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent

Ong‘s qualification for memberhip of this Court. This case is a

matter of primordial importance involving compliance wConstitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determiof the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution,

11 the

is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC hinitial competence to do so.

Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case – is respondent natural-born Filipino citizen?

On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the recorespondent Ong‘s petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar.

In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed aNo. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 813of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, heFilipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his fEugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized inwhen he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years andhe, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidensupport of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate annaturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate

12 state

he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio OngSeng, was also a Chinese citizen.

Specifically, the following appears in the records:

P E T I T I O N

COMES now the undersigned petitioner and toHonorable Court respectfully states:

1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino cand 26 years of age, having been born on May 25, 19SAN JUAN RIZAL, to spouses Eugenio Ong Han SenDy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the Philippineevidenced by the attached copy of his birth certmarked as Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, stateif Filipino citizen other than natural born, state howwhen citizenship was acquired and attach the neceproofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han (Father) See Attached documents Annex B, B-1, B-2B-4.

x x x

V E R I F I C A T I O N

Republic of the Philippines )

City of Manila ) S.S.

I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, dand state: that I am the petitioner in the foregoing pethat the same was prepared by me and/or at my insand that the allegations contained therein are true knowledge.

(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th

August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines, affiant exhhis/her Residence Certificate No. A-___________, i

at ________________, on __________________, 19



























d.)ary Publicil December 31, 1979R No. 3114917uary 19, 1979, Pasig, MM

Doc. No. 98;Page No. 10;Book No. VIII;Series of 1979.

13

n fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and BarConfidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated October 3, 1979tating that in connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979

Bar Examinations, he has to submit:

1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and

2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from theOffice of the Solicitor General.

Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.

was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the

ubmitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowedespondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.

is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondentOng is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequentecognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigrationnd the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial courttating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along

with his father.

urthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial changer correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a

udicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is aubstantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,

14 this Court held

hat:

Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of aparty are substantial in character and should be threshedout in a proper action depending upon the nature of theissues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who maybe affected by the entries are notified or represented andevidence is submitted to prove the allegations of thecomplaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.

15

Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summarydministrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors

n a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality.Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons

ecorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through aetition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.16

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in theationalities of respondent Ong‘s ancestors, by various births,

marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to behreshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct thexisting records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence

would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong‘smother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in theecords of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving inourt his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under theme-line of three Constitutions.

17 Until this is done, respondent Ong

annot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be aiolation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by

njunction from doing so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injudirected against respondent Gregory S. Ong, whhereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the posi

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the poand discharging the functions of that office, until he shallsuccessfully completed all necessary steps, through the approadversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a naturaFilipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizensh

This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________________________________

FIRST DIVISION

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

- versus -

NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J .: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed b

Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philipseeking the reversal of the April 3, 2009 Decision

[1] of the Re

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Cas17-R. The RTC granted the petition

[2] filed by respondent No

Sagun entitled ―In re: Judicial Declaration of Election of FCitizenship, Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil Registrar of BCity.‖

The facts follow:Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Ch

Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. Shborn on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City

[3] and did not elect Phi

citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at thof 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed anof Allegiance

[4] to the Republic of the Philippines. Said doc

was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 199was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil RegistBaguio City.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent appliedPhilippine passport. Her application was denied due tcitizenship of her father and there being no annotation on hecertificate that she has elected Philcitizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Loca

Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same obirth certificate.In her petition, respondent averred that she was rais

a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attendedschools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy anSaint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite heChinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a Filipinois a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay ManRoxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national eleas shown in the Voter Certification

[5] issued by Atty. Ma

Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio City.She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, sh

effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact shouannotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issof a Philippine passport.
















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On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)ntered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of the

Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City toppear in the above mentioned case.

[6] However, no comment wasled by the City Prosecutor.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered thessailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition andeclaring respondent a Filipino citizen. Thefallo of the decisioneads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition ishereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun yChan is hereby DECLARED [a] FILIPINOCITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipinocitizenship.

Upon payment of the required fees, theLocal Civil Registrar of Baguio City is herebydirected to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this

judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of saidpetitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]

Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner,

hrough the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition foreview on certiorari before us. Petitioner raises the following issues:

IWhether or not an action or proceeding for

judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship isprocedurally and jurisdictionally permissible; and,

II Whether or not an election of Philippinecitizenship, made twelve (12) years after reachingthe age of majority, is considered to have beenmade ―within a reasonable time‖ as interpreted by

jurisprudence.[8]

Petitioner argues that respondent‘s petition before the RTCwas improper on two counts: for one, law and jurisprudence clearlyontemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of

Philippine citizenship; and for another, the pleaded registration ofhe oath of allegiance with the local civil registry and its annotationn respondent‘s birth certificate are the ministerial duties of theegistrar; hence, they require no court order. Petitioner asserts thatespondent‘s petition before the trial court seeking a judicial

eclaration of her election of Philippine citizenship undeniablyntails a determination and consequent declaration of her status as

Filipino citizen which is not allowed under our legalystem. Petitioner also argues that if respondent‘s intention in filinghe petition is ultimately to have her oath of allegiance registered

with the local civil registry and annotated on her birth certificate,hen she does not have to resort to court proceedings.

Petitioner further argues that even assuming thatespondent‘s action is sanctioned, the trial court erred in findingespondent as having duly elected Philippine citizenship since herurported election was not in accordance with the procedurerescribed by law and was not made within a ―reasonableme.‖ Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an oathf allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her

lection of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiancewhich was not registered with the nearest local civil registry wasxecuted when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after sheeached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was made beyond theeriod allowed by law.

In her Comment,[9]

respondent avers that notwithstanding

er failure to formally elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching thege of majority, she has in fact effectively elected Filipino citizenshipy her performance of positive acts, among which is the exercise ofhe right of suffrage. She claims that she had voted and participatedn all local and national elections from the time she was of legal age.She also insists that she is a Filipino citizen despite the fact that herelection‖ of Philippine citizenship was delayed and unregistered.

In reply,[10]

petitioner argues that the special circumstinvoked by respondent, like her continuous and uninterrupted sthe Philippines, her having been educated in schools in the coher choice of staying here despite the naturalization of her pas American citizens, and her being a registered voter, cconfer on her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically prothe requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by ele

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) wrespondent‘s petition for declaration of election of Philcitizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprud(2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizein accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recto this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raisinvolved. There is a question of law when the doubt or diffearises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, whichnot call for an examination of the probative value of the evipresented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, therequestion of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to theor falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no das to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefcorrect or not, is a question of law.

[11]

In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety

decision of the trial court declaring respondent a Filipino citizefinding that respondent was able to substantiate her electFilipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondent‘s petit

judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenshprocedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitionraised questions of law as the resolution of these issues rest on what the law provides given the attendant circumstances.

In granting the petition, the trial court stated:

This Court believes that petitioner wasable to fully substantiate her petition regarding herelection of Filipino citizenship, and the Local CivilRegistrar of Baguio City should be ordered toannotate in her birth certificate her election ofFilipino citizenship. This Court adds that the

petitioner‘s election of Filipino citizenship shouldbe welcomed by this country and people becausethe petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship ofpowerful countries like the United States of

America and China, however, petitioner haschosen Filipino citizenship because she grew upin this country, and has learned to love thePhilippines. Her choice of electing Filipinocitizenship is, in fact, a testimony that many of ourpeople still wish to live in the Philippines, and arevery proud of our country.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition ishereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun yChan is hereby DECLARED as FILIPINO

CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipinocitizenship.

[12]

For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judeclaration of the citizenship of an individual.

[13] There is no s

legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeddeclare that a given person is part of our citizenry.

[14] This w

ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republi c [15]

citing the early case ofRepublic of the Philippines,

[16] where we clearly stated:

Under our laws, there can be no action orproceeding for the judicial declaration of thecitizenship of an individual. Courts of justice existfor settlement of justiciable controversies, whichimply a given right, legally demandable and















































enforceable, an act or omission violative of saidright, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law,for said breach of right. As an incident only of theadjudication of the rights of the parties to acontroversy, the court may pass upon, and makea pronouncement relative to their status.Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond

judicial power. x x xClearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a

pecific declaration of respondent‘s Filipino citizenship as suchronouncement was not within the court‘s competence.

As to the propriety of respondent‘s petition seeking audicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it ismperative that we determine whether respondent is required underhe law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied

with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippineitizenship.

When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governingharter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the

Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines andlect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec., Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens ofthe Philippines:

x x x x

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens ofthe Philippines and, upon reaching the age ofmajority, elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, theitizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and anlien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, uponeaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippineitizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized

n the 1973 Constitution when it provided that ―[t]hose who electPhilippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitutionf nineteen hundred and thirty-five‖ are citizens of the

Philippines.[17]

Likewise, this recognition by the 1973Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which stateshat ―[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, wholect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority‖ are

Philippine citizens.[18]

It should be noted, however, that the 1973nd 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippineitizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect onny irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered byhe 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject tohallenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challengender the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not beenommenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.

[19]

Being a legitimate child, respondent‘s citizenship followed thatf her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of

majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule thatnly legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and thatlegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mothernd follow her nationality.

[20] An illegitimate child of Filipina need

ot perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privilegesttached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes aitizen himself .

[21] But in the case of respondent, for her to be

onsidered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly electedPhilippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,[22]

enacted pursuant toSection 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes therocedure that should be followed in order to make a valid electionf Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippinecitizenship in accordance with subsection (4),[S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall beexpressed in a statement to be signed and swornto by the party concerned before any officerauthorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed

with the nearest civil registry. The said party shallaccompany the aforesaid statement with the oathof allegiance to the Constitution and theGovernment of the Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of elPhilippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oaan oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election athe oath with the nearest civil registry.

[23]

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shaccepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the exercising the right of election has complied with the requireof the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he shoube required to register as an alien.

[24] Pertinently, the p

electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition wCommission of Immigration and Deportation (now BureImmigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of regisbased on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship andOffice will initially decide, based on the evidence presentevalidity or invalidity of said election.

[25] Afterwards, the saelevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice fodetermination and review.

[26]

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutprocedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petitideclaration of election of Philippine citizenship beforecourts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Ru

of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of EntriesCivil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an actcancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., eleloss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayedthe respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this proceinfirmity, still the trial court‘s conclusion that respondent duly ePhilippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undispshow that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirefor a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not execusworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. Thdocumentary evidence submitted by respondent in support claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executyears after she reached the age of majority, whichunregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner,

assuming arguendothat respondent‘s oath of allegiance sufficexecution was not within a reasonable time after respoattained the age of majority and was not registered with the necivil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625phrase ―reasonable time‖ has been interpreted to mean thelection should be made generally within three (3) yearsreaching the age of majority.

[27] Moreover, there was no satisfexplanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failregister with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent cfailed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valieffective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cassert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in elexercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philcitizenship since the law specifically lays down the requireme

acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of sufcontinuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannothe place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respocannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching ,

[28] the pres

procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a teand painstaking process. All that is required of the electorexecute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenshipthereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Havingto comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent‘s pbefore the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Dedated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of BCity in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET A



















































The petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippineitizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun iserebyDISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.SO ORDERED.

_____________________________________________________

IRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001]

ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE D.ALOVERA,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,Branch 17, Roxas City, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OFROXAS CITY, pet i t ioners , vs . REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OFLANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR, LANDREGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE HON. COURTOF APPEALS,* respondents .

D E C I S I O N

PARDO, J .:

The case under consideration is a petition for reviewn certiorari of the decision

[1] of the Court of Appeals nullifying that

f the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, in Reconstitution Case No.R-1928,

[2]pertaining to Lot 398, Capiz Cadastre, covered by Original

Certificate of Title No. 3389.

Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr.,Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto,Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Leeiong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate areaf 1,631 square meters, designated as Lot 398 and covered by

Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at the corner of RoxasAvenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.

[3]

However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court ofirst Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong fornnulment of sale and recovery of land.

[4] The plaintiffs assailed the

alidity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition againstliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land, including

esidential, commercial or industrial land. Rebuffed in the trial courtnd the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the SupremeCourt. On June 27, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled thus:

… granting the sale to be null and void and can not give title to theendee, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that the titleemained in the vendor, who had also violated the constitutionalrohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to recover the title of

which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring therohibition. In such contingency another principle of law sets in toar the equally guilty vendor from recovering the title which he hadoluntarily conveyed for a consideration, that of pari delicto.‖

[5]

On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A. Dinglasan,

ogether with Francisco, Carmen, Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes,Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Rizal, Jimmy, and JesseDinglasan filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action forecovery of the same parcel of land.

[6] Citing the case of Philippine

Banking Corporation v. Lui She,[7]

they submitted that the sale toee Liong was null and void for being violative of the

Constitution. On September 23, 1968, the heirs of Lee Liong filedwith the trial court a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of resudicata.

[8] On October 10, 1968, and November 9, 1968, the trial

ourt denied the motion.[9]

The heirs of Lee Liong elevated the caseo the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari. On April 22, 1977,he Supreme Court annulled the orders of the trial court and directed

to dismiss the case, holding that the suit was barred by resudicata.

[10]

On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yuee filed with the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City a petition for

reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of the Capiz Cadastre, forcovered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the RegisDeeds of Roxas City.

[11] Petitioners alleged that they wer

widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, whothe heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. Lee Liong died intin February 1944. On June 30, 1947, Lee Liong‘s widow, Angand his two sons, Lee Bun Ting and Lee Bing Ho, executextra-judicial settlement of the estate of Lee Liong, adjudicathemselves the subject parcel of land.

[12] Petitioner Elizabet

acquired her share in Lot No. 398 through an extra-jsettlement and donation executed in her favor by her dechusband Lee Bing Hoo. Petitioner Pacita Yu Lee acquired herin the same lot by succession from her deceased husband LeTing, as evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial settlement.[13]

Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of DCapiz, Salvador Villaluz, issued a certification that a trcertificate of title over the property was issued in the name oLiong.

[14]However, the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxa

were burned during the war. Thus, as heretofore stateSeptember 7, 1968, petitioners filed a petition for reconstituttitle.

On June 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court, RoxasBranch 17, ordered the reconstitution of the lost or descertificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis approved plan and technical description.

[15] The dispositive p

of the trial court‘s decision reads thus:

―WHEREFORE, in reiteration, the Register of Deeds for the CRoxas is ordered to reconstitute the lost or destroyed certifictitle in the name of Lee Liong, deceased, of Roxas City, with conditions stated in paragraph 2 of this decision. This decisionbecome final after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt bRegister of Deeds and by the Commissioner of LRA of a nosuch judgment without any appeal having been filed by any oofficials.

―SO ORDERED.

―Given at Roxas City, Philippines,

―June 10, 1994.

―JOSE O. ALOVERA―Judge‖

[16]

On August 18, 1994, the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Roxas City, Branch 17 issued an Entry of Judgment.

[17]

On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with theof Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment in ReconstCase No. 1928, alleging that the Regional Trial Court, Roxahad no jurisdiction over the case.

[18] The Solicitor G

contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Leedid not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizewas constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.

On April 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgatdecision declaring the judgment of reconstitution void.

[19]

On May 24, 1996, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yfiled with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration decision.

[20] On February 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals denie

motion.[21]

Hence, this petition.[22]

Petitioners submitted that the Solicitor General was estfrom seeking annulment of the judgment of reconstitutionfailing to object during the reconstitution proceedings before thcourt, despite due notice. Petitioners alleged that the So

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General merely acted on the request of private and politicallyowerful individuals who wished to capitalize on the prime locationf the subject land.

Petitioners emphasized that the ownership of the land hadeen settled in two previous cases of the Supreme Court, where the

Court ruled in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Leeiong. Petitioners also pointed out that they acquired ownership ofhe land through actual possession of the lot and their consistentayment of taxes over the land for more than sixty years.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that theecision in the reconstitution case was void; otherwise, it would

mount to circumventing the constitutional proscription againstliens acquiring ownership of private or public agricultural lands.

We grant the petition.

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration inhe original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrumentttesting the title of a person to a piece of land.

[23] The purpose of

he reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the proceduresrescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way itas been when the loss or destruction occurred.

[24]

In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of title in theame of Lee Liong, alleging that the transfer certificate of title issuedo him was lost or destroyed during World War II. All the documentsecorded and issued by the Register of Deeds, Capiz, which include

he transfer certificate of title issued in the name of Lee Liong, werell destroyed during the war. The fact that the original of the transferertificate of title was not in the files of the Office of the Register of

Deeds did not imply that a transfer certificate of title had not beenssued.

[25] In the trial court proceedings, petitioners presented

vidence proving the sale of the land from the Dinglasans to Leeiong and the latter‘s subsequent possession of the property in theoncept of owner. Thus, the trial court, after examining all thevidence before it, ordered the reconstitution of title in the name ofee Liong.

However, there is a question as to whether Lee Liong has theualification to own land in the Philippines.

The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime

n March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Underhe 1935 Constitution,

[26] aliens could not acquire private agricultural

ands, save in cases of hereditary succession.[27]

Thus, Lee Liong, aChinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.

[28]

The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to anlien did not validate the transaction, for it was still contrary to theonstitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of theublic or private domain. However, the proper party to assail thelegality of the transaction was not the parties to theransaction.

[29] ―In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding

tle thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both theendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed theonstitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts willot afford protection to either party.‖

[30]The proper party to assail the

ale is the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this casewhen the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment ofudgment of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic morehan sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating suchction. Prescription never lies against the State.

[31]

Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the originalellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General

may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to theState, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.

[32]

In this case, subsequent circumstances militate againstscheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands ofilipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the

and has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs,etitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor

General does not dispute.

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lathe public or private domain was intended to protect landsfalling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however,would be no more public policy violated since the land is hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. ―If linvalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a cor transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transactconsidered cured and the title of the transferee is renvalid.‖

[33] Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qu

Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalithe initial transfer .

[34] The objective of the constitutional provis

keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution original certificate of title must be based on an owner‘s dupsecondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the titlereconstituted.

[35] In this case, reconstitution was based on the

and technical description approved by the Land Regis Authority.

[36] This renders the order of reconstitution void for l

factual support.[37]

A judgment with absolutely nothing to suppovoid.

[38]

As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issof a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original formcondition.

[39] It does not pass upon the ownership of the

covered by the lost or destroyed title.[40]

Any change iownership of the property must be the subject of a sepsuit.

[41] Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the la

separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issownership of the land.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDdecision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxasand dismisses the petition, without prejudice.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________________________________

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme CourtManila

EN BANC JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,

Petitioner ,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMandRENALD F. VILLANDO,

Respondents. D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J .:

Once a winning candidabeen proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed officeMember of the House of Representathe jurisdiction of the House of Representatives EleTribunal begins over election contests relating to his elereturns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as toinvalidity of her proclamation does not divest the ElecTribunal of its jurisdiction.

At the core of these contentious consolidated peare: (1) the Joint Resolution

[1] of the Commission on Ele

(COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007, disqua

Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) from running congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Orient

























































http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/178831-32.htm#_ftn1

























he COMELEC En Banc Resolution[2]

dated June 29, 2007,ffirming her disqualification; and (3) the COMELEC En

Banc Resolution[3]

dated August 16, 2007, resolving that all pendingncidents relating to her qualifications should now be determined byhe House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The facts are uncontroverted. On March 26, 2007,imkaichong filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of

Candidacy[4]

(COC) for the position of Representative of the FirstDistrict of Negros Oriental.

In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualificationwere instituted before the COMELEC by concerned citizens comingrom her locality. On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a registeredoter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental, filed the petition for herisqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenshipequirement of a Member of the House of Representatives. Theetition, which was docketed as SPA No. (PES) A07-006,

[5] alleged

hat she is not a natural-born Filipino because her parents wereChinese citizens at the time of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald

. Villando, also a registered voter of the same locality, filed theecond petition on the same ground of citizenship, docketed as SPAPES) No. A07-007.

[6] He claimed that when Limkaichong was

orn, her parents were still Chinese citizens as the proceedings forhe naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finalityue to procedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed forhe cancellation of Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to

trike out her name from the list of qualified candidates for theRepresentative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In her separate Answer s[7]

to the petitions, Limkaichonglaimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since she was born tonaturalized Filipino father and anatural-born Filipino

mother, who had reacquired her status as such due to herusband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birthn November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed afterer father took his Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and aftere was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on the same day. Sheontended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outrightor lack of cause of action. Citing Salcedo II v. Commission on

Elections,[8]

she averred that a petition filed before an election,uestioning the qualification of a candidate, should be based on

Section 78,[9]

in relation to Section 74[10]

of the Omnibus ElectionCode (OEC),

[11] and not under Sections 68

[12] and 74 thereof in

elation to Section 1,[13]

Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedur e

[14] and Section 5,

[15] paragraph C (3.a) of COMELEC

Resolution No. 7800.[16]

She also contended that the petitions wereismissible on the ground that they were in the nature of a collateralttack on her and her father‘s citizenships, in contravention of the

well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only bemade through a direct action for its nullity.

The COMELEC consolidated the two (2) petitions and re-ocketed them as SPA Nos. 07-247

[17] and 07-

48,[18]

entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TODISQUALIFY JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG FROM HERCANDIDACY AS FIRST DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF

NEGROS ORIENTAL(herein referred to as the disqualificationases), which remained pending on May 14, 2007, when the

National and Local Elections were conducted.

After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the saidlections, Limkaichong emerged as the winner with 65,708otes

[19]or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another congressional

andidate, Olivia Paras[20]

(Paras), who obtained 57,962.

On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a VeryUrgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Suspend theProclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate

f the First District of Negros Oriental.[21]

In a Joint Resolution[22]

dated May 17, 2007, the COMELECSecond Division granted the petitions in the disqualification cases,

disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative First District of Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervthe COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of ecandidates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOsuspend her proclamation. In disposing the cases, the COMSecond Division made the following ratiocination:

On the substantial issue of whetherrespondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong isdisqualified to run for the congressional seat ofthe First District of Negros Oriental on the groundthat she is not a natural-born Filipino, we hold thatshe is so disqualified.

Petitioners have successfully dischargedtheir burden of proof and has convincingly shownwith pieces of documentary evidence that JulioOng Sy, father of herein respondent JocelynSy-Limkaichong, failed to acquire Filipinocitizenship in the naturalizationproceedings which he underwent for the saidpurpose.

An examination of the records of SpecialCase No. 1043 would reveal that the Office ofthe Solicitor General was deprived of itsparticipation in all the stages of the

proceedings therein, as required underCommonwealth Act No. 473 or the RevisedNaturalization Law and Republic Act No. 530, An

Act Making Additional Provisions forNaturalization.

x x x

The documents presented by petitionersshowed that the OSG was not furnished copiesof two material orders of the trial court in thesaid proceedings. One was the July 9, 1957Order granting his petition for naturalization andthe other was the September 21, 1959Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

Moreover, from a perusal of the samepage 171 of the OSG logbook, we havedetermined that the OSG did not receive anotice for the hearing conducted by the trialcourt onJuly 9, 1959, prior to its issuance ofthe September 12, 1959 Order declaring JulioOng Sy as a Filipino citizen.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, thiswas fatal to the naturalization proceedings ofJulio Ong Sy, and prevented the same fromgaining finality. The leading case in the matteris Republic v. Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, 136 SCRA617 (May 31, 1985), wherein the Supreme Court

declared:

And as though that wasnot enough, the hearing prior tothe oathtaking of respondentTan was conducted without therequired notice to the SolicitorGeneral. It is true, as itappeared later, that FiscalVeluz, Jr. was authorized by theSolicitor General to representthe Government in the hearingof the application fornaturalization. That authority,however, does not extend toFiscal [Veluz‘s] right to appear




















































































for the State in the hearingpreparatory to theoathtaking. Private respondentTan was therefore under legalobligation to serve copy of hismotion to be allowed to take hisoath of allegiance as a Filipinocitizen upon the SolicitorGeneral which was not done.

Respondent argues that upon his taking ofthe Oath of Allegiance, Julio Ong Sy became aFilipino citizen for all intents and purposes, with allthe rights appurtenant thereto.

This argument does not hold water, aswas held by the Supreme Court in the same caseof Republic v. Valero, supra:

That private respondentTan had already taken his oathof allegiance does not in anyway legalize the proceedingsrelative thereto which ispregnant with legalinfirmities. Compounding theseirregularities is the fact that Tan

was allowed to take his oatheven before the expiration ofthe thirty (30)-day period withinwhich an appeal may be madethus making the said oath notonly highly improper but alsoillegal.

In the same case, the Supreme Courtadded:

To sustain the samewould be to sanction amonstrosity known ascitizenship by estoppel. The

grant of naturalization undersuch circumstances is illegaland cancellation thereof may behad at any time. Neitherestoppel nor res judicata maybe set up as a bar frominstituting the necessaryproceedings to nullify thecertificate of naturalization soissued.

Another glaring defect in the saidproceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy tookhis Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959,which was exactly thirty (30) days after his

declaration as a naturalized Filipino.

Even granting that the OSG was notifiedof the September 21, 1959 Order, this was stillone day short of the reglementary period requiredunder Sections 11 and 12 of C.A. No. 473, above-cited.

The thirty-day reglementary period is sorequired under the law so that the OSG couldmake known his objections and to appeal from theorder of the trial court declaring the petitioner anaturalized Filipino citizen. This is also thereason why a copy of the petitioner‘s motion totake his oath of allegiance has to be furnished tothe OSG.

The respondent insists that naturalizationproceedings are in rem and are binding on thewhole world.

She would have been correct had all thenecessary parties to the case been informed ofthe same. The OSG, being the counsel for thegovernment, has to participate in all theproceedings so that it could be bound by what hastranspired therein. Lacking the participation ofthis indispensable party to the same, theproceedings are null and void and, hence, norights could arise therefrom.

From all the foregoing, therefore, it couldbe seen that Julio Ong Sy did not acquireFilipino citizenship through the naturalizationproceedings in Special Case No.1043. Thus, he was only able to transmit to hisoffspring, Chinese citizenship.RespondentJocelyn Sy-Limkaichong being the daughter ofJulio Ong Sy, and having been bornon November 9, 1959, under the 1935 PhilippineConstitution, is a Chinese national, andis disqualified to run as First DistrictRepresentative of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions areGRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong isdeclared as DISQUALIFIED from her candidacyfor Representative of the First District of NegrosOriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of theCommission on Elections of Negros Oriental ishereby directed to strike out the name JOCELYNSY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligiblecandidates for the said position, and theconcerned Board of Canvassers is herebydirected to hold and/or suspend the proclamationof JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning

candidate, if any, until this decision has becomefinal.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The PBOC received the Joint Resolution of the COMSecond Division on the evening of May 17, 2007, and accorsuspended the proclamation of Limkaichong.

[24]

The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the COMELEBanc issued Resolution No. 8062[25]

adopting the policy-guidof not suspending the proclamation of winning candidatepending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudthe continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved c

On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMa Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of M2007 and Urgent Motion to Lift the Order SuspeProclamation.

[26]

On May 22, 2007, Limkaichong filed another motion flifting of the directive suspending her proclamation, insisting thshould be proclaimed as the winner in the congressionapursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8062.

[27] On same

Villando, one of the petitioners in the disqualification casesanUrgent Manifestation Clarifying COMELEC Resolutio8062 with Motion,

[28] praying that the COMELEC should not

suspension of Limkaichong‘s proclamation.

On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in complianceCOMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and procl


























imkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House ofRepresentatives for the First District of Negros Oriental.

[29]

Thereafter, or on May 30, 2007, Paras filed with theCOMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/or Annul the Proclamation

f Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong as First District Representative ofNegros Oriental in relation to the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution

f the COMELEC Second Division,[30]

stating, among others, thatimkaichong's proclamation violated the earlier order of the

COMELEC Second Division suspending her proclamation. Theetition, docketed as SPC No. 07-211, was dismissed by the

COMELEC First Division,[31]

ratiocinating that the disqualificationases were not yet final when Limkaichong wasroclaimed. Accordingly, her proclamation which was valid or legal,ffectively divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over theases. The COMELEC First Division explained its ruling in this

wise:

The Commission has made its intentionin issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in thatthere shall be no suspension of proclamationof winning candidates with pendingdisqualification cases involving, amongothers, issues of citizenship. As thedisqualification cases involving Limkaichong werestill pending reconsideration by the en banc, theunderlying policy which gave rise to the issuance

of the Resolution: to respect the will of the Filipinoelectorate, applies to the suspension ofproclamation of the winning congressionalcandidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition isdismissed.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

Dissatisfied, Paras moved for the reconsideration of thebove Resolution.

[32]

Meanwhile, in a Resolution[33]

dated June 29, 2007, theCOMELEC En Banc , in an equally divided vote of 3:3, denied

imkaichong‘s motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution ofhe COMELEC Second Division in the disqualification cases. Theertinent portions of the Resolution denying her motion reads:

Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rulethat the Commission has jurisdiction to rule onRespondent Limkaichong‘s Motion forReconsideration notwithstanding her proclamationas it is only this Commission, and not the Houseof Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),which has jurisdiction to review resolutions ordecisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by adivision or en banc . As stated by the SupremeCourt in the leading case of Codilla v. DeVenecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002,

respondent herself seasonably challenged thevalidity of the resolution of the Second Division inher motion for reconsideration. Hence, the issueof respondent’s disqualification was stillwithin the exclusive jurisdiction of theComelec En Banc to resolve, and HRETcannot assume jurisdiction on the matter , to

wit:

To stress again, at the time ofthe proclamation of respondentLocsin, the validity of theResolution of the COMELECSecond Division wasseasonably challenged by thepetitioner in his Motion for

Reconsideration. The issuewas still within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Comelec EnBanc to resolve. Hence, theHRET cannot assume

jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon v. Cua, eventhe HRET ruled that the―doctrinal ruling that once aproclamation has been madeand a candidate-elect hasassumed office, it is thisTribunal that has jurisdictionover an election contestinvolving members of theHouse of Representatives,could not have beenimmediately applicable due tothe issue regarding the validityof the very COMELECpronouncementsthemselves.‖ This is becausethe HRET has no jurisdiction toreview resolutions or decisionsof the COMELEC, whetherissued by a division or en banc .

Finally, in disposing the Opposition to theMotion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion forReconsideration filed by intervenor Olivia P.Paras praying that she be proclaimed as thewinning candidate for First DistrictRepresentative, suffice it to say that in the samecase of Codilla v. De Venecia, supra, theSupreme Court held, thus:

More brazen is the proclamation of respondentLocsin which violates the settled doctrine that thecandidate who obtains the second highestnumber of votes may not be proclaimed winner incase the winning candidate is disqualified. In

every election, the people‘s choice is theparamount consideration and their expressed willmust, at all times, be given effect. When themajority speaks and elects into office a candidateby giving him the highest number of votes cast inthe election for the office, no one can be declaredelected in his place. In Domino v. COMELEC ,this Court ruled, viz.:

It would be extremely repugnant to thebasic concept of the constitutionallyguaranteed right to suffrage if a candidatewho has not acquired the majority orplurality of votes is proclaimed winner andimposed as representative of a

constituency, the majority of which havepositively declared through their ballots thatthey do not choose him. To simplisticallyassume that the second placer would havereceived that (sic ) other votes would be tosubstitute our judgment for the mind of thevoters. He could not be considered the firstamong the qualified candidates because ina field which excludes the qualifiedcandidate, the conditions would havesubstantially changed.

x x x

The effect of a decision declaring aperson ineligible to hold an office is only























hat the election fails entirely, that thewreath of victory cannot be transferred fromhe disqualified winner to the repudiatedoser because the law then as now onlyuthorizes a declaration in favor of theerson who has obtained a plurality ofotes, and does not entitle the candidateeceiving the next highest number of voteso be declared elected. In such case, thelectors have failed to make a choice andhe election is a nullity. To allow theefeated and repudiated candidate to takever the elective position despite hisejection by the electorate is toisenfranchise the electorate without anyault on their part and to undermine themportance and meaning of democracy andhe people‘s right to elect officials of theirhoice.

All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb thefindings of this Commission (Second Division)in its Joint Resolution promulgated on May 17,2007.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, theinstant Motion for Reconsideration of RespondentJocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is hereby DENIED.

The Opposition to the Motion forReconsideration with Partial Motion forReconsideration filed by Intervenor Olivia P.Paras praying that she be proclaimed as thewinning candidate for the First DistrictRepresentative of Negros Oriental is herebydenied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[34]

On July 3, 2007, Limkaichong filed in the disqualificationases against her a Manifestation and Motion for Clarificationnd/or To Declare the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance

with Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure.[35]

She contended that, with her proclamation, heraving taken her oath of office and her assumption of the position,he COMELEC was divested of jurisdiction to hear theisqualification cases. She further contended that, following

Section 6,[36]

Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, theisqualification cases would have to be reheard, and if on rehearing,o decision would be reached, the action or proceedings should beismissed, because the COMELEC En Banc was equally divided inpinion when it resolved her motion for reconsideration.

On an even date, Paras wrote the House ofRepresentatives informing it of the COMELEC En Banc Resolutionated June 29, 2007 upholding the Joint Resolution of the

COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007, which disqualified

imkaichong as a congressional candidate.[37]

In the interim, then Speaker of the House of Representativesose de Venecia, Jr. (De Venecia) allowed Limkaichong to officiallyssume the office as a Member of the House of Representativesn July 23, 2007, as shown in the Journal of the House of

Representatives.[38]

Despite Limkaichong‘s repeated pleas for the resolution ofer manifestation and motion for clarification,

[39] the COMELEC did

ot resolve the same. Hence, on August 1, 2007, she filed with thisCourt a Petition for Cert iorar i [40]

under Rule 65, in relation to Rule4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as G.R. Nos.78831-32 praying for the annulment of the May 17, 2007 Joint

Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and the June 29,007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in the disqualification

cases for having been issued with grave abuse of discamounting to lack of jurisdiction. She averred that since shalready proclaimed on May 25, 2007 as Representative of theDistrict of Negros Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, and had started to perform her duties and functions as sucCOMELEC had lost its jurisdiction and it is now the HRET whic

jurisdiction over any issue involving her qualifications for thoffice.

On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc rulLimkaichong‘s manifestation and motion for clarification,

[41] w

following disquisition:

In view of the proclamation ofLimkaichong and her subsequent assumptionof office on June 30, 2007, this Commissionrules that all pending incidents relating to thequalifications of Limkaichong should now bedetermined by the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this

Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, thatall pending incidents relating to the qualificationsof Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of theHouse of Representatives should now be

determined by the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

On August 24, 2007, Louis Biraogo (Biraogo), as a citizea taxpayer, filed with the Court a Petition for ProhibitionInjunction with Preliminary Injunction and/or TempRestraining Order [42]

under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 RuCivil Procedure, docketed as G.R. No. 179120, seeking to and permanently prohibit: (a) De Venecia from alLimkaichong to sit in the House of Representatives and partiin all its official activities; and (b) Limkaichong from holding offits Member .

[43]

Meanwhile, on August 28, 2007, Paras has instituted bthe Court a Petition for Quo Warranto, ProhibitionMandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a TempRestraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction[44]

Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed aNos. 179132-33, seeking, among others, the ouster of Limkaifrom the House of Representatives on account odisqualification and for the holding of special elections to fvacancy created by such.

[45]

On even date, the COMELEC Second Division promulgResolution

[46] denying Villando's motion to suspend

proclamation of Limkaichong, which denial was affirmed b

COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution[47]

dated February 1, 2008

On September 5, 2008, Villando also filed with this a Petition for Cert iorari and Injunction with PrelimInjunction and Temporary Restraining Order [48]

under Rulethe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. Nos. 1741, contending, among others, that the COMELEC En Banc gabused its discretion in issuing the August 16, Resolution

[49] because it still acted on Limchaikong‘s manifes

and motion for clarification, notwithstanding that the same waset for hearing and considering that its June 29, 2007 Resohad already become final and executory.

As the four (4) petitions are interrelated, the Court resolconsolidate them in its Resolutions dated September 4 an2007.






























































The Court heard the parties in oral argument on August 26,008, during which the following issues were tackled:

1. Whether the proclamation of Limkaichong by theProvincial Board of Canvassers of Negros Oriental is valid;

2. Whether said proclamation divested the Commission onElections of jurisdiction to resolve the issue ofLimkaichong's citizenship;

3. Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunalshall assume jurisdiction, in lieu of the COMELEC, over theissue of Limkaichong's citizenship;

4. Whether the COMELEC Second Division and theCOMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that Limkaichong isdisqualified from running as a Member of the House ofRepresentatives on the ground that she is not a natural-born citizen;

5. Whether the COMELEC disqualification of Limkaichong isfinal and executory; and,

6. Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives maybe compelled to prohibit Limkaichong from assuming herduties as a Member of the House of Representatives.

On same day, the Court required the parties toimultaneously file within twenty (20) days their respective

memoranda, after which the petitions shall be deemed submitted foresolution, with or without the memoranda.

Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 PhilippineConstitution provides for the qualification of a Member of theHouse of Representatives, thus:

Section 6. No person shall be aMember of the House of Representatives unlesshe is a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines and, on the day of the election, is atleast twenty-five years of age, able to read and

write, and, except the party-list representatives, aregistered voter in the district in which he shall beelected, and a resident thereof for a period of notless than one year immediately preceding the dayof the election.

When Limkaichong filed her COC, she stated therein that shes a natural-born Filipino citizen. It was not true, according to theetitioners in the disqualification cases, because her fatheremained a Chinese citizen at the time of her birth. The COMELEC

Second Division has sided with Camero and Villando, andisqualified Limkaichong to run as a congressional candidate in theirst District of Negros Oriental for having failed to comply with theitizenship requirement. Accordingly, her proclamation wasrdered suspended notwithstanding that she obtained the highest

umber of votes during the elections. Nonetheless, she wasroclaimed by the PBOC pursuant to the policy guidelines of

COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 8062, and she has sincessumed her position and performed her functions as a Member ofhe House of Representatives.

W hether Limkaichong’s proclamation was valid .

The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELECSecond Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17,007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the

COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as forhe lifting of the incorporated directive suspending herroclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsiderationffectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint

Resolution.[50]

Since the execution of the May 17, 2007Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to theproclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rulethe COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions forReconsideration. – A motion to reconsider adecision, resolution, order or ruling of a Divisionshall be filed within five (5) days from thepromulgation thereof. Such motion, if not proforma , suspends the execution forimplementation of the decision, resolution,order and ruling.

In G.R. Nos. 179132-33, Paras, however, maintaineLimkaichong was a Chinese citizen who was disqualified to rucongressional candidate by way of a final judgment oCOMELEC. With that, her proclamation was questionable asame was done in open defiance of the Joint Resolution date17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. She also strthat Limkaichong's proclamation was procedurally defectappearing that one of the PBOC members was not present o25, 2007, and that it took place in a restaurant and not provincial capitol. Finally, she argued that Limkaichproclamation was void in accordance with the C

pronouncement in the case of Codilla v. De Venecia.

[51]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comon the petition of Paras, expressing its support for the positionby the latter.

A perusal of the arguments advanced by Paras anOSG does not sway the Court to rule against the validLimkaichong‘s proclamation. No less than the COMELECDivision has sustained the validity of her proclamation wdismissed, by way of a Resolution dated June 29, 2007, the pfiled by Paras to nullify the proclamation. Not only thatCOMELEC First Division has also adopted Limkaichong‘s argthat following her valid proclamation, the COMELEC‘s jurisdover the disqualification cases has ceased and that the same s

be threshed out in the proper proceedings filed beforHRET. Notably, the dismissal of Paras‘ petition was affirmed COMELEC in its Omnibus Order dated January 28, 2008.

In addition, the validity of Limkaichong's proclamationaccordance with COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 8062disqualification cases filed against her remained pending as aof her timely motion for reconsideration. Villando (in G.R.179240-41), however, maintained that Resolution No. 80invalid; hence, it could not be used as basis to vaLimkaichong's proclamation. He argued that it must be pubsince it is a ―policy-guideline‖ in the exercise of the COMErule-making power. As such, it cannot supersede the Resolution of the Second Division which was rendered pursuthe COMELEC‘s quasi-judicial power.

His argument is specious. Resolution No. 8062 is not policy- guideline. It is also an administrative interpretation two (2) provisions of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (i) S17,

[52] Article VI (ii); Section 2(2),

[53] Article IX-C; Section 6

[54] o

6646; and Sections 241[55]

and 243,[56]

Article XX of the OECsuch, it does not have to comply with the due prrequirement. The term ―administrative‖ connotes or perta―administration, especially management, as by managiconducting, directing or superintending, the execution, applicor conduct of persons or things.‖ It does not entail an opportube heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a deor resolution thereon.

[57] This is to be distinguished from ―

judicial function,‖ a term which applies, among others, to the or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, whrequired to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts


































earings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for theirfficial action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

[58]

Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELEC‘sonstitutionally mandated power to promulgate its own rules ofrocedure relative to the conduct of the elections.

[59] In adopting

uch policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and LocalElections, the COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding theovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and fairlay. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification casesre still pending at the time of the elections, should they obtain theighest number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed buthat their proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuationf the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Whereas, inhis case, the COMELEC Second Division having failed to act on theisqualification cases against Limkaichong until after the conduct ofhe elections, with her obtaining the highest number of votes fromhe electorate, her proclamation was properly effected by the PBOCursuant to Resolution No. 8062.

The Court has held in the case of Planas v.COMELEC ,

[60] that at the time of the proclamation of Defensor, the

espondent therein who garnered the highest number of votes, theDivision Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was notet final. As such, his proclamation was valid or legal, as he had athat point in time remained qualified. Limkaichong‘s situation is noifferent from that of Defensor, the former having been disqualified

y a Division Resolution on the basis of her not being a natural-bornilipino citizen. When she was proclaimed by the PBOC, she washe winner during the elections for obtaining the highest number ofotes, and at that time, the Division Resolution disqualifying her hasot yet became final as a result of the motion for reconsideration.

Whether, upon Lim kaichong's p roclamat ion, the HRET, instead

f the COMELEC, should assume jur isdict ion over the

disqu al i f icat ion cases.

In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Limkaichong argued

hat her proclamation on May 25, 2007 by the PBOC divested theCOMELEC of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to her

ualifications, and that jurisdiction now lies with the HRET.

Biraogo, on the other hand, believed otherwise. He arguedn G.R. No. 179120) that the issue concerning Limkaichong‘sisqualification is still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

COMELEC En Banc to resolve because when Limkaichong wasroclaimed on May 25, 2007, the matter was still pending resolutionefore the COMELEC En Banc .

We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once awinning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,nd assumed office as a Member of the House of

Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over electionontests relating to his election, returns, and qualificationsnds, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

[61] It follows then

hat the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELECf its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of theroclamation. The party questioning his qualification should nowresent his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, theonstitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case

nvolving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect tohe latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the

word ―sole‖ in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and inSection 250

[62] of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the

Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to itsmembers.

[63]

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House ofRepresentatives shall each have an Electoral

Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of allcontests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of their respective Members.

Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nineMembers, three of whom shall be Justices of theSupreme Court to be designated by the ChiefJustice, and the remaining six shall be Membersof the Senate or the House of Representatives, asthe case may be, who shall be chosen on thebasis of proportional representation from thepolitical parties and the parties or organizationsregistered under the party-list system representedtherein. The senior Justice in the ElectoralTribunal shall be its Chairman.

Corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules oHRET, as amended, which states:

RULE 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal isthe sole judge of all contests relating tothe election, returns, and qualifications of the

Members of the House of Representatives.

The COMELEC En Banc , in its Resolution dated A

16, 2007, had given paramount consideration to the twaforementioned provisions when it stated that:

In view of the proclamation ofLimkaichong and her subsequent assumptionof office on June 30, 2007, this Commissionrules that all pending incidents relating to thequalifications of Limkaichong should now bedetermined by the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, thisCommission resolved, as it hereby resolves, thatall pending incidents relating to the qualificationsof Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the

House of Representatives should now bedetermined by the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Worth citing also is the ratiocination of the COMELECDivision when it dismissed the petition of Paras seeking the nuLimkaichong's proclamation, thus:

The present situation is similar not to the factualcircumstances of Codilla, which Paras invokes, but ratherto that in Planas which adheres to the general rule giving

jurisdiction to the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal. As at the time of Limkaichong's proclamation,her disqualification was not yet final, her proclamation wasvalid or legal. This Commission no longer has jurisdictionover the case. This, notwithstanding the Second Division'sdirective suspending Limkaichong's proclamation.

The Commission has made its intention in issuingResolution No. 8062 very clear in that there shall be nosuspension of proclamation of winning candidates withpending disqualification cases, involving, among others,issues of citizenship. As the disqualification casesinvolving Limkaichong were still pending reconsideration bythe En Banc , the underlying policy which gave rise to theissuance of the resolution: to respect the will of the Filipinoelectorate, applies to the suspension of proclamation of the



























winning Congressional candidate for the First District ofNegros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition isDISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41)teadfastly maintained that Limkaichong‘s proclamation was tainted

with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET fromcquiring jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as inhis case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does notivest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

[64] The Court has shed light on

his in the case of Vinzons-Chato,[65]

to the effect that:

n the present case, it is not disputed that respondentUnico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath offfice as a Member of the House of RepresentativesThirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctlyuled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner

Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chatossentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged

nvalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These arematters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and

iscretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation thatespondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does notivest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where thevalidity of the proclamation of a winning candidatewho has taken his oath of office and assumed hispost as congressman is raised, that issue is bestaddressed to the HRET. The reason for thisruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity ofproceedings and a clash of jurisdiction betweenconstitutional bodies, with due regard to thepeople's mandate.

Further, for the Court to takecognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest

against respondent Unico would be to usurp theconstitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamationwill not prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction over allmatters essential to a member‘s qualification to sit in the House ofRepresentatives.

The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for themanner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quowarranto against a Member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

Rule 16. Election protest . -- A verifiedpetition contesting the election of any Member of

the House of Representatives shall be filed by anycandidate who has duly filed a certificate ofcandidacy and has been voted for the sameoffice, within ten (10) days after the proclamationof the winner. The party filing the protest shall bedesignated as the protestant while the adverseparty shall be known as the protestee.

x x x

Rule 17. Quo Warranto. -- Averified petition for quo warranto contesting theelection of a Member of the House ofRepresentatives on the ground of ineligibility or ofdisloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shallbe filed by any voter within ten (10) days after the

proclamation of the winner. The party filing thepetition shall be designated as the petitioner whilethe adverse party shall be known as therespondent.

x x x

Rule 19. Periods Non-Extendible. --The ten-day period mentioned in Rules 16 and 17is jurisdictional and cannot be extended.

Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning canin the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may one‘s eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is tbefore the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a pfor quo warranto, within the period provided by the Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections,

[66] we rule

where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to felectoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the HouRepresentatives.

The PBOC proclaimed Limkaichong as the winner on M2007. Thus, petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33179240-41) should have filed either an election protest or pfor quo warranto within ten days from May 25, 2007. But th

not. In fact, to date, no petition of protest or petition fwarranto has been filed with the HRET. Verily, the teprescriptive period for initiating a contest against Limkaichonlong expired.

However, the said ten-day prescriptive period und1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution, Membthe House of Representatives must be natural-born citizenonly at the time of their election but during their tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assamember's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[67]

the Courthat:

The argument that the petition filed with theCommission on Elections should be dismissed fortardiness is not well-taken. The herein privaterespondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo fromcontinuing to discharge his office as governorbecause he is disqualified from doing so as aforeigner. Qualifications for public office arecontinuing requirements and must bepossessed not only at the time of appointmentor election or assumption of office but duringthe officer’s entire tenure. Once any of therequired qualifications is lost, his title may beseasonably challenged. If, say, a femalelegislator were to marry a foreigner during her

term and by her act or omission acquires hisnationality, would she have the right to remainin office simply because the challenge to hertitle may not longer be made within ten daysfrom her proclamation? x x x

This Court will not permit the anomalyof a person sitting as provincial governor inthis country while owing exclusive allegianceto another country. The fact that he was electedby the people of Sorsogon does not excuse thispatent violation of the salutary rule limiting publicoffice and employment only to the citizens of thiscountry. The qualifications prescribed for electiveoffice cannot be erased by the electoratealone. The will of the people as expressedthrough the ballot cannot cure the vice of



















ineligibility, especially if they mistakenlybelieved, as in this case, that the candidatewas qualified. Obviously, this rule requiresstrict application when the deficiency is lackof citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in theRepublic of the Philippines, he must owe his totalloyalty to this country alone, abjuring andrenouncing all fealty to any other state.

However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, theroper proceeding should be in accordance with Section 18 of

Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization

Certificate Issued : - Upon motion made in theproper proceedings by the Solicitor General orhis representative, or by the proper provincialfiscal, the competent judge may cancel thenaturalization certificate issued and itsregistration in the Civil Register :

1. If it is shown that said naturalizationcertificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within fiveyears next following the issuance of saidnaturalization certificate, return to his nativecountry or to some foreign country and establish

his permanent residence there: Provided , That thefact of the person naturalized remaining morethan one year in his native country or the countryof his former nationality, or two years in any otherforeign country, shall be considered as primafacie evidence of his intention of taking up hispermanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invaliddeclaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of theperson naturalized failed to graduate from a publicor private high schools recognized by the Office ofPrivate Education [now Bureau of PrivateSchools] of the Philippines, where Philippinehistory, government or civics are taught as part of

the school curriculum, through the fault of theirparents either by neglecting to support them or bytransferring them to another school or schools. Acertified copy of the decree canceling thenaturalization certificate shall be forwarded by theClerk of Court of the Department of Interior [nowOffice of the President] and the Bureau of Justice[now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen hasallowed himself to be used as a dummy inviolation of the constitutional or legal provisionsrequiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite forthe exercise, use or enjoyment of a right,franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,[68]

where the Courtf First Instance judge motu proprio and not in the properenaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees ofertificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths ofllegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due torocedural infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged bysaid respondents, that the proceedings fornaturalization were tainted with certaininfirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is besidethe point in this case. The jurisdiction of the courtto inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must

e properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laidown by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the

naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth ActNo. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 ofCommonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely,―upon motion made in the proper proceedings by theSolicitor General or his representatives, or by the properprovincial fiscal.‖ In other words, the initiative mustcome from these officers, presumably after previousinvestigation in each particular case. (Emphasissupplied)

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, thits representatives designated by statute, that may questioillegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a that may be raised by private persons in an election case invthe naturalized citizen‘s descendant.

III Whether the COMELEC Second Div is ion and the COMELE

Banc correct ly disqual i f ied Limkaichong on the ground

she is n ot a natural-born Fi l ip ino ci t izen.

In resolving the disqualification cases, the COMELEC SDivision relied on the entries in the docket book of the OSG,only remaining record of the naturalization proceedings,

[70] and

on the basis thereof that the naturalization proceedings of Juli

Sy, Limkaichong‘s father, in Special Case No. 1043, were nuvoid. The COMELEC Second Division adopted VillandoCamero‘s arguments that the OSG was deprived of its particiin the said case for it was not furnished copies of the followinthe July 9, 1957 Order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) grthe petition for naturalization; and (b) the September 21, 1959of the CFI declaring Julio Ong Sy a Filipino citizen. Thus, whlatter took his oath of allegiance on October 21, 1959, it was e30 days after his declaration as a naturalized Filipino, or onshort of the reglementary period required under Sections 11 aof Commonwealth Act No. 473. Such defects were fatal naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy and prevented the from gaining finality. The COMELEC Second Division concthat since Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Philippine citizethrough the said naturalization proceedings, it follows

Limkaichong remains a Chinese national and is disqualified as candidate and be elected as a Member of the HouRepresentatives.

We cannot resolve the matter of Limkaichong‘s citizensthe same should have been challenged in appropriate proceeas earlier stated.

IV

Whether the COMELEC's disqual i f icat ion of Limk aichong is f inal and executory.

In resolving this issue, pertinent is the provision of S13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure:

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions orResolutions. – x x x

(b) In Special Actions and SpecialCases, a decision or resolution of theCommission en banc shall become final andexecutory after five (5) days from its promulgationunless restrained by the Supreme Court.

In his Memorandum dated June 27, 2008, Biraogo statethe Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in the disqualifcases became final and executory after five (5) days fropromulgation and that the same was not restrained by this pursuant to Section 13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC













COMELEC Second Division, as well as his petition for certiorari toet aside of the order of the COMELEC en banc , was filed within theeriod provided for in Rule 19, §2 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure and in Art. IX(A), §7 of the Constitution.

It is contended, however, that petitioner‘s motion foreconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not suspend theunning of the period for filing this petition because the motion wasro forma and, consequently, this petition should have been filed onr before August 27, 2001. It was actually filed, however, only onebruary 11, 2002. Private respondent cites the finding of the

COMELEC en banc that —

An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion forReconsideration shows that the same [are] a mere rehash of hisverments contained in his Verified Answer andMemorandum.

Neither did respondent raise new matters that would sufficientlywarrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division.This makes the said Motion pro forma.

[11]

We do not think this contention is correct. The motion foreconsideration was not pro forma and its filing did suspend theeriod for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The mereeiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by thearties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion proorma; otherwise, the movant‘s remedy would not be aeconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other

emedy.[12] But, as we have held in another case:[13]

Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed,ne is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and

mproper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and in doing so, themovant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon byhe court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss thesessues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered,he losing party would be confined to filing only motions foreopening and new trial.

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration waseld to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was aecond motion for reconsideration,

[14] or (2) it did not comply with

he rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusionslleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence,

[15] or

3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors,[16]

or (4) it merelylleged that the decision in question was contrary to law,

[17] or (5)

he adverse party was not given notice thereof .[18]

The 16-pagemotion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC enanc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error forhe COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner‘s motion foreconsideration was pro forma because the allegations raisedherein are a mere ―rehash‖ of his earlier pleadings or did not raisenew matters.‖ Hence, the filing of the motion suspended theunning of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which,s earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period providedy law.

B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve privateespondent‘s petition for cancellation of petitioner‘s certificate ofandidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the meantime,he votes were canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected

with a margin of 379 votes over private respondent. Did theCOMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the petition filed byrivate respondent?

R.A. No. 6646 provides:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.¾ Any candidate whoas been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not beoted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for anyeason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before anlection to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the

winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission

shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquprotest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenoduring the pendency thereof order the suspension oproclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his strong. (Emphasis added)

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Cerof Candidacy . — The procedure hereinabove provided shall appetitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candas provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified b

judgment before the election shall not be voted for and thecast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom n

judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be votand proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainantCOMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grountheir disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candare strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualificaticandidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificatcandidacy, which have been begun before the elections, scontinue even after such elections and proclamation owinners. In Abella v. COMELEC

[19] and Salcedo II

COMELEC ,[20]

the candidates whose certificates of candidacythe subject of petitions for cancellation were voted for and, hreceived the highest number of votes, were duly proclwinners. This Court, in the first case, affirmed and, in the sereversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered afteproclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the lattebeen divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates‘ proclamatioon the merits.

II.

On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had bresident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year befoelections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certof candidacy. We find that he had not.

First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. provides:

Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, cprovince or, in the case of a member of the sanggupanlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayadistrict where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for aone (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; anto read and write Filipino or any other local language or d(Emphasis added)

The term ―residence‖ is to be understood not in its comacceptation as referring to ―dwelling‖ or ―habitation,‖

[21] but rat

―domicile‖ or legal residence,[22]

that is, ―the place where aactually or constructively has his permanent home, where hmatter where he may be found at any given time, eventually in

to return and remain (animus manendi ).‖

[23]

A domicile of oracquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place whechild‘s parents reside and continues until the same is abandonacquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

[24]

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin inby becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Na1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, whereacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien withoright to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration lawshave allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

Indeed, residence in the United States is a requiremenaturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, §1427(a) of the UStates Code provides:

Requirements of naturalization .¾ Residence

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a) No person, except as otherwise provided in thisubchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1)

mmediately preceding the date of filing his application foraturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admittedor permanent residence, within the United States for at least fiveears and during the five years immediately preceding the date ofling his petition has been physically present therein for periodsotaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the

State or within the district of the Service in the United States inwhich the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2)as resided continuously within the United States from the date ofhe application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3)uring all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still

s a person of good moral character, attached to the principles ofhe Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the goodrder and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)

n Caasi v. Court of Appeals,[25]

this Court ruled that immigration tohe United States by virtue of a ―greencard,‖ which entitles one toeside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment ofomicile in the Philippines. With more reason then doesaturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment ofomicile in the Philippines.

Nor can petitioner contend that he was ―compelled to adoptAmerican citizenship‖ only by reason of his service in the U.S.rmed forces.

[26] It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not

nder R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those whoost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in theArmed Forces of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which,s earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among others,atural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account ofolitical or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, byaving been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenshipnd with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did noteacquire his legal residence in this country.

Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that heeestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came backo prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a

Community Tax Certificate in that year and by ―constantly declaring‖

o his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run formayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.[27]

The status of being an aliennd a non-resident can be waived either separately, when onecquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippineitizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippineitizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visander §13

[28] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an

mmigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)[29]

and thus waive histatus as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire

Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, asmended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire

Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress,[30]

inwhich case he waives not only his status as an alien but also histatus as a non-resident alien.

In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner‘s statuswhen he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20,998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statementPhilippine Immigration [ –] Balikbayan‖ in his 1998-2008 U.S.assport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore thedded inscription ―good for one year stay.‖

[31] Under §2 of R.A. No.

768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), theerm balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had beenaturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the

Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a ―visa-freentry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year‖ (§3(c)). It wouldppear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates inuestion, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay asuch was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be heldo have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on

November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the

Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.[32]

He lacked the reqresidency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Sa

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. CommissiElections

[33] in support of his contention that the resi

requirement in §39(a) of the Local Government Code includeresidency of one who is not a citizen of the Philippines. Residhowever, was not an issue in that case and this Court did notany ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldwhether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30,complied with the citizenship requirement under §39(a). It wathat he had, because citizenship may be possessed even o

day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residenalready noted, §39(a) of the Local Government Code requirethe candidate must have been a resident of the municipalityleast one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the electio

Nor can petitioner invoke this Court‘s ruling in BengzonHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal .

[34] What the Cou

in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former naturaFilipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as a naborn citizen.

Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registrationvoter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 20conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resid

the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municwherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immedpreceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray ,

[35] how

registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequentquestioning a candidate‘s lack of residency.

Petitioner‘s invocation of the liberal interpr etation of elaws cannot avail him any. As held in Aquino v. CommissElections:

[36]

A democratic government is necessarily a government of lawsrepublican government those laws are themselves ordained people. Through their representatives, they dictatequalifications necessary for service in government positions. Apetitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for ru

for membership in the House of Representatives, not even thof a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of MCity would substitute for a requirement mandated byfundamental law itself.

Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process becausCOMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to previdence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for dencancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summanature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur . event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestatdated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which he sub

documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrapetitioner‘s claim, are complete and intact in the records.

III.

The statement in petitioner‘s certificate of candidacy thhad been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for ―two years‖ time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whethCOMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certof candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner mfalse representation of a material fact in his certificate of candthus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. The OmElection Code provides:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy . ¾ The certific

candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcincandidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible fo




























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ffice; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,ncluding its component cities, highly urbanized city or district orector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which heelongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post officeddress for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; thate will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and

will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey theaws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituteduthorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to aoreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumedoluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; andhat the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to theest of his knowledge.

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate ofandidacy. ¾ A verified petition seeking to deny due course or toancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any personxclusively on the ground that any material representation containedherein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition

may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the timef the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, afterue notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before thelection.

Indeed, it has been held that a candidate‘s statement in herertificate of candidacy for the position of governor of Leyte that she

was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so[37]

or thathe candidate was a ―natural-born‖ Filipino when in fact he hadecome an Australian citizen

[38] constitutes a ground for the

ancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, weeld in Salcedo II v. COMELEC

[39] that a candidate who used her

usband‘s family name even though their marriage was void wasot guilty of misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In thease at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning aandidate‘s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificatef candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifyinghe cancellation of petitioner‘s certificate of candidacy. Theancellation of petitioner‘s certificate of candidacy in this case ishus fully justified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution

f the Second Division of the Commission on Elections, dated July9, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commissionn Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.














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