azizul rasel ba thesis
TRANSCRIPT
The Mughals and the Dutch
in the Making of Dhaka
B.A Thesis
M.M. Azizul Islam Rasel
S-1068628
Nieuwe Rijn, 97
Email: [email protected]
Supervisor: Professor Dr. Jos Gommans
Department of History
University of Leiden, The Netherlands
1
Table of Contents
Introduction…………………………………………………………….. 3
Chapter One: Emergence of Dhaka
Location of Dhaka and its Connection with other parts of Bengal…………………. 18
Chapter Two: The Mughals in Dhaka: Dhaka as a Mughal Store House
Dhaka as a strategic location…………………………………………………………20
Dhaka as a military labour supplier…………………………………………………...23
Dhaka as a store house of war- equipments ……….………………………………….27
Dhaka as food and fodder supplier…………………………………………………….29
Mughals Contribution to the Making of Dhaka………………………………………..29
Chapter Three: The Dutch in Dhaka: Emergence of Dhaka as a Commercial Centre
The Dutch in Dhaka.........................................................................................................34
Emergence of Dhaka as a Commercial Centre………………………………………….39
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………43
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………….46
Maps
Map- 1: Eastern Bengal………………………………………………………………12
Map-2: The VOC factory in Dhaka………………………………………………… 38
Table-1: ………………………………………………………………………………. 40
2
Introduction
Dhaka, now the capital city of Bangladesh, is one of the largest cities of South Asia and the
world. Today’s Dhaka is the ninth largest city of the world.1 It is also the most densely
populated city in the world, where more than 12 million people live in.2 Nowadays Dhaka
serves as one of the principal centres for trade, administration, culture and education in this
region. Before it was made the capital of independent Bangladesh in 1971, Dhaka served as
the capital of three different States. Dhaka first gained the status of capital in 1612 as a
Mughal provincial capital. After the Mughal period, it had also played role as the provincial
capital of British India from 1905 to 1911. After the partition of India into India and Pakistan
in 1947, Dhaka played a role as a provincial capital of Pakistan.
The emergence of Dhaka as a Mughal provincial capital and later as a commercial
centre is one of the conspicuous events in the history of Bengal and South Asia. This event
has also implication for world history. Within fifty years of its birth, the city expanded and
European trading Companies established their factories in Dhaka. Besides Companies,
private traders from different parts of the world flocked into the city in a bid to make their
fortune. However, very few historians have taken the trouble to illustrate the history of the
birth of this city which made considerable contribution to the seventeenth and eighteenth
century world economy.
The reason why Dhaka emerged in the seventeenth century is still unclear. Dhaka
attracted the attention of a Resident of the British East India Company named James Taylor
who was then posted in Dhaka. In 1840, he wrote a book on Dhaka titled A Sketch of the
1 World Bank. Country Assistance Strategy for the People´s Republic of Bangladesh. July 30, 2010 Can be accessed at Country Assistance Strategy for the People's Republic of Bangladesh for the Period FY11-14, page 4 2 Bangladesh Government, Statistical Pocket Book, 2008, (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2008) 2009). Can be accessed at http://www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/SubjectMatterDataIndex/pk_book_09.pdf.)
3
Topography & Statistics of Dacca.3 Based on firsthand experience and Persian chronicles, his
book gives a general history of Dhaka and mainly focuses on the topographical description of
Dhaka. However, this book cannot be taken as a modern scientific work; rather it should be
considered a reference book for the historians of Dhaka. In 1914, another book contributed to
the history of Dhaka, written by a British civilian, F.B Bradley-Birt titled Dacca: The
Romance of an Eastern Capital.4 His work offers a popular account and hardly mentions any
sources. The first modern research on Dhaka appeared in 1962, when Ahmad Hasan Dani the
Pakistani historian wrote Dacca: Record of its Changing Fortune.5 Nonetheless, this book
has some limitations. He tried to capture a vast era, starting from the early seventeenth
century up to the middle of the twentieth century, providing only a general landscape of
Dhaka from the seventeenth to twentieth century without rigorous analysis. His research
mostly depended on Persian chronicles and in some parts, merely reproduced James Taylor
and F.B Bradley-Birt. Another major work on Dhaka appeared in 1964 by Abdul Karim who
first touched the question `why did Dhaka emerge as a Mughal capital in the seventeenth
century’? Without further explanation he opined that Dhaka emerged as a Mughal capital
because of the shifting of river courses. He also maintained that another reason of the
establishment of the Mughal capital in Dhaka was to suppress the Arakanese and the
Portuguese.6 In 1985, Om Prakash, an Indian historian published a seminal research on the
economy of Bengal. The title of his book is The Dutch East Indies Company and the
Economy of Bengal. He also takes Abdul Karim’s position regarding the shifting of river
3 JamesTaylor, A Sketch of the Topography and Statistics of Dacca, revised and reprinted, ( Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2010)
4 F.B Bradley-Birt, Dacca: The Romance of an Eastern Capital, (London: G. Bell and Sons LTD, 1914)5 Ahmad Hasan Dani, Dhaka : A Record of its Changing Fortunes, revised and reprinted (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2009) 6 Abdul Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital, (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1964): 4; 8-9
4
courses and the Mughals’ settlement in eastern Bengal and likewise does not offer further
analysis.7
The theory of the shifting of river courses is further strengthened by the work of
Richard M. Eaton. He extended this theory in his book titled The Rise of Islam and the
Bengal Frontier 1204-1760. Although Richard Eaton believes that one of the reasons for the
selecting Dhaka as Mughal provincial capital was for strategic reasons 8 but even he insisted
on the shifting of river courses.9 He argues that before the shifting of the river courses,
eastern Bengal— `virtually the whole delta, east of Karatotoya and south of the Padma—was,
in the early seventeenth century, still largely undeveloped, a region covered by marsh and
forest.’10 He argues that after the shifting of river courses the Mughals established themselves
in the heart of the active delta— Dhaka and together with Sufis, took remarkable initiatives
for the reclamation of wild land and settlement, as a result, eastern Bengal emerged as an
economic centre.11 Richard Eaton also argues that soon after the establishment of Mughal
capital in Dhaka, the Mughal’s power was effectively established in Bengal.12 This theory
became very dominant since its inception, influencing the historiography of early modern
Bengal.13
One of the aims of this thesis will be to analyze to what extent this so-called
ecological factor contributed to the emergence of Dhaka. In this context the thesis addresses
one main research question—why did Dhaka emerge in the seventeenth century? The thesis
also poses a sub question— `Why and how did the Dutch East India Company establish its 7 Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630-1720, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985): 24-58 Richard M. Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760, (California: University of California Press, 1993): 3079 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 194-5; 30710 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 30711 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 137; 226-712 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 15013 For perfect examples of the influence of Eaton’s The Rise of Islam and Bengal Frontier over later works see André Wink’s Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, The Slaves Kings and the Islamic Conquest, 11th-13th Centuries, Vol.-II, (Leiden: Brill, 1997): 5, 259-61 also see Joya Chaterjee, Spoils of Partition : Bengal and India, 1947-1967 , (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 5
5
factory in Dhaka in the second half of the seventeenth century? This sub question will
investigate the principal research question by studying the Dutch decision making regarding
the establishment of their factory in Dhaka.
The thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter will analyze the
theory of the emergence of Dhaka and will attempt to find out plausible reason why Dhaka
emerged in the early seventeenth century. The chapter will also briefly discuss the geography
of Dhaka and its connection with other parts of Bengal. The second chapter will elaborate the
argument of the first chapter: why was Dhaka important to the Mughals. It will discuss the
Mughals’ contribution to making of a secure and politically stable city. This chapter will also
create a bridge between chapter one and three. The third chapter will explain why and how
the Dutch did establish their factory in Dhaka. This chapter will also briefly discuss the
contribution of the Dutch in the making of Dhaka as a commercial centre.
This thesis is mainly based on secondary sources. But I have also used primary
sources ranging from published and unpublished archival sources, travelers account and
translated Persian chronicles. Published VOC documents such as Dag Register, Corpus
Diplomaticum, Generale Missiven and the VOC archive are used in this study. However, I
admit that due to time limitation I could not use large number of Dutch sources. It was also
not possible to consult the Portuguese sources which might be very crucial for discussing the
emergence of Dhaka. Consulting large number of Dutch and Portuguese sources might reveal
the clear picture of early years of Dhaka.
6
CHAPTER ONE
Emergence of Dhaka
The emergence of Dhaka as a Mughal provincial capital is late compared to other provincial
capitals of the Mughals. Its emergence as a city and a commercial centre in South Asia is late
as well. Dhaka attained the status of prestigious Mughal provincial capital in the early
seventeenth century when Islam Khan, the newly appointed subahdar of Bengal, after a
prolonging and enervating campaign against the Bara Bhuiya, the zamindars and the
chieftains of eastern Bengal, established his capital in 1612.14 The question remains why
Dhaka emerged in the early seventeenth century as a Mughal provincial capital. The
conventional and dominant historiography points out its finger toward the ecological factor.
According to this historiography Dhaka emerged as a Mughal provincial capital in the
seventeenth century due to the shifting of the river courses in the late sixteenth century. This
theory also suggests that soon after the establishment of the Mughal provincial capital in
Dhaka, the Mughals established control over the whole eastern Bengal and thus by their
initiatives made Dhaka as an economic centre. This chapter will analyze this theory and will
also attempt to seek the factual reason for the emergence of Dhaka in the early seventeenth
century. As geographical location and the connection between cities and its neighbouring
areas is crucial to the emergence and growth of a city, this chapter will also pay attention to
the discussion of the geographical location of Dhaka and its connection with its neighbouring
areas and other parts of Bengal.
The most prominent and principal proponent of ecological theory is Richard M. Eaton
who in 1993, stated this theory in his The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760.
His theory implies that the emergence of Dhaka in the late seventeenth century was due to the
14 Sir Jadunath Sarkar (ed.) The History of Bengal, Muslim Period,1200-1757, vol. II, reprint, (Dhaka: Dhaka University Press, 2006): 283
7
shifting of courses of the river Ganges.15 He states that in the late sixteenth century main
course of the river Ganges shifted from the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, which is now in West
Bengal, to the Bhairab, the Mathabhanga, the Garai-Madhumati, the Arialkhan and
eventually today´s Padma-Meghna channel in eastern Bengal.16 According to him, the
shifting of courses of the Ganges withdrew greater level of fresh water and silt from the
western delta, which is now West Bengal. As a consequence, the active part of the Bengal
delta, was becoming increasingly moribund area, thus, environment was polluted and
diseases spread, which ultimately resulted to the abandonment of cities and habitations of the
western delta.17 Conversely, the areas of the eastern delta were becoming exceedingly fertile.
According to him this had changed the agrarian epicentre of Bengal. As a result of the greater
flow of fresh water, it was possible to cultivate wet rice in the eastern delta. To him this
ecological changes stirred migration to the eastern delta from the moribund western delta and
as far as from North India and Middle East.18 This led to the pouring of charismatic Muslim
pioneers who had outstanding organizational power, took arduous effort for the agricultural
expansion in eastern Bengal.19 These Sufis in the course of their initiating agriculture
converted the indigenous fishermen to peasants and thus, Muslim. In this way, he argues,
Islam penetrated the whole eastern delta in the course of the seventeenth century and eastern
Bengal saw considerable population changes.20
To Eaton, the effort of the Sufis for the expansion of agriculture was accompanied by
the arrival of the Mughals in the eastern delta. He opines that when course of the Ganges
completed its shifting into the eastern delta, the Mughals established themselves in eastern
Bengal. They established their capital in the heart of the active delta— Dhaka. As soon they
15 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 30716 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier:194-5
17 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 194-518 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 195; 307; 31019 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 226, 307-820 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 310
8
curbed the power of the Bara Bhuiyas, and the other defiant zamindars and chieftains, the
Mughals established its authority at the local level. According to Eaton, unlike the western
delta, virtually the whole eastern delta was mostly undeveloped and covered with dense forest
where the expansion of agriculture was not an easy task for the Mughals and Islamic leaders.
To him, the Mughals had to create an agrarian base in eastern Bengal.21 He states that from
Sylhet to Chittagong, the Mughals attempted to gain the political goal of inculcating the
Mughal authority among `the dependant client’ rooted on the land, with the economic goal of
expanding the arable area. Eaton argues that principal mechanism for accomplishing this goal
was to grant land which contributed to the agricultural development of the forested
hinterland. He suggested that a large extent of land was granted in Dhaka, Bakerganj, Sylhet,
and Chittagong.22
Eaton´s theory of the shifting of river courses of the Ganges and consequently the
Mughals and Sufis’ arrival in eastern Bengal and their arduous endeavours to clear `forested
and marshy’ land of eastern Bengal and thus agricultural expansion in the active eastern delta
might seem plausible. However, paying a closer attention to the development of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries will provide a useful understanding to cast doubt on the ecological
theory of Richard Eaton. What Eaton says that the shifting of river courses of the Ganges
took place in the late sixteenth century (c. 1548-1579)23, is not accepted by some historians.24
Stephan van Galen, a Dutch historian argues that it is implausible that the eastward changing
of the Ganges was so drastic. He insists that the changes showed by Eaton could not be
happened in such a short time. Van Galen states that the maps used by Eaton 25 to demonstrate
the rapid eastward movement of the Ganges are not suitable for the context. Moreover, the
map Eaton used was made by Gastaldi and printed in 1548. But Gastaldi’s map was mainly 21 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier:307 22 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 307-823 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 19624 See Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 23-4; also Akbar Khan, Discovery of Bangladesh: Explorations into Dynamics of a Hidden Nation ( Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2009): 10925 See Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 196-7
9
based on geography of Ptolemy (c. 150 AD). His maps on India were modified and were used
in modern travelers´ accounts. But these maps are quite erroneous. These are not appropriate
to show the changes in complex river system such as the Ganges delta.26 Van Galen argues
that the shifting of river courses of the Ganges took much longer than Eaton assumes.27
Eaton also overstresses on the role of Islamic leaders to the expansion of agriculture.
For instance, elsewhere in his book he stresses on a popular story to support his argument.
The story told that an Islamic leader, Shah Saiyid Nasir al- Din emigrated from the Middle
East teaching the local people methods of wet rice cultivation and clearing forests. 28 It seems
quite unpersuasive as how an immigrant from the arid Middle East could teach the local
people methods of wet rice cultivation and clearing forests? These local people were
acquainted with wet rice cultivation before. It also seems unconvincing that Eaton is always
terming the areas of eastern Bengal as undeveloped, marshy and forested area. Later in this
chapter we will provide some examples that before the Mughals came to eastern Bengal,
there were several prosperous areas in eastern Bengal. Eaton’s perception of the rooting of
the Mughal authority all over the Bengal right after the establishment of the provincial capital
in Dhaka also needs to be revised.
What Eaton argues that soon after the establishment of capital the Mughals
established their power over the whole Bengal29 is not convincing. Eaton states that after
establishing their capital in Dhaka, the Mughals took endeavours to expand agriculture by
granting land in Chittagong, Shylhet, Bakerganj, but evidences show that though the Mughals
established themselves in Dhaka in the early seventeenth century they were not successful to
control the whole of eastern Bengal. They had to engage continuous fighting against the
Arakanese. Stephan Van Galen shows in his extensive work on the Arakan and Bengal that
26 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 2327 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 244
28 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 20829 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 150
10
the Arakanese king would collect tribute from the local Mughals officials in the early
seventeenth century.30 Next chapter will also show how much effort the Mughal had to pay
for fighting against the Arakanese. In the case of Chittagong it was quite impossible for the
Mughals to grant land for the expansion of agriculture, since Chittagong was under the
control of the Arakanese until 1666.
Few more words about Eaton’s perception of eastern Bengal as a densely forested and
marshy land; Eaton’s demarcation of eastern and western Bengal into sharp line is not
pragmatic. If we give a closer look to ancient geographical division of Bengal we will see
that there was no such sharp geographical division what Eaton perceives. All most all of the
historical-geographers find difficulty to demarcate sharply one parts of Bengal from the other
as different geographical divisions were changing time to time. Describing the difficulties of
sketching historical geography of ancient Bengal, one of the reputed historians writes,
‘unfortunately boundaries of some of the units [Janapada or Divison] cannot be fixed with
any degree of certainty, and the difficulty is increased by the fact that extent of even well-
known divisions like Gauda, Vanga and Radha varied in different ages.’31 Even today eastern
and western Bengal shares almost the same geographical features. Therefore to show one part
of the Bengal delta as a densely forested land and the other as an agriculturally developed is
not logical. It is natural that in the sixteenth and the seventeenth century, forests would be
found in different parts of Bengal as well as other parts of India; forest was not a unique case
for eastern Bengal. Cultivation of wet rice was also possible in the eastern delta before the so-
called shifting of courses of the Ganges. Enormous rainfall in the eastern delta made possible
to grow considerable amount of wet rice. Now shifting attention to some of the prosperous
regions of eastern Bengal before the advent of the Mughals will make clear that the eastern
30 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 731 Ramesh Chandra Majumder (ed.), The History of Bengal: Hindu period, vol. I, reprint, (Dhaka: Dhaka University Press, 2006): 12
11
delta was not forested and undeveloped as Eaton insists. Regarding our study area, we will
only discuss the surrounding areas of Dhaka.
Map-1:Eastern Bengal:1608-12
Source: Jos Gommans, Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Emipere,1500-1700
(London: Routledge, 2002):170
Bikrampur was one of the prosperous cities of eastern Bengal from the Pala rule (c.
770-810) to the Mughal arrival in eastern Bengal. It was very close to present day Dhaka and
is in now Dhaka division. James Taylor suggests that Bikrampur was 12 miles south of the
present capital Dhaka.32 Bikrampur gained importance during the Pala ruler (c. 770-810
A.D).33 It was also the seat of the Chandra dynasty (c. 900-1020 A.D)34. After the Chandra
32 Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography : 7533 Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography34 Harry Belitz, Budhism in Bangladesh. can be accessed at http://bangladesh-buddhist.org/heritage.html , also `Chandra Dynasty’ in Sirajul Islam (ed.), Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2003). Can be accessed athttp://www.banglapedia.org/httpdocs/HT/C_0124.HTM
12
dynasty, the Sena had their administrative centre in Bikrampaur (c. 1097-1280).35 When
Lakhnauti fall to the hand of Bakhtiar Khilji, Laksman Sena came to eastern Bengal and
established himself in Bikrampur. During the Pala, Chandra, and Sena dynasties, Bikrampur
was situated between the river Ichamati and Meghna on the east and the Ganges [Padma] on
the west. On the south, Bikrampur was surrounded by the river Kritinasa, on the north it was
extended up to Jalalpur Pargana.36 Therefore the kingdom of Bikrampur was surrounded by a
well network of river namely Ganges [Padma], Buriganga, Meghna, Ichamati and
Brahmaputra which made possible to connect it with neighbouring areas.37 Bikrampur was
not only well connected by waterways but Bradley-Birt says during the Sena period, it held
an important position by means of road communication.38 Although Bredley Birt’s statement
that ‘Bikrampura with every side stretched broad highways, ever open, offering the swiftest
means of communication with the world beyond’ might be exaggeration but the historical
evidences show that Bikrampur was one of the wealthy kingdoms of eastern Bengal.
Archaeological excavation suggests Bikrampur as a prosperous city of Bengal. A relic of
Sena King Ballasena’s palace which is called Ballalbari was one of the magnificent
architectures of the ancient period of Bengal.39 Ballalbari was quadrangular shaped palace
which covers an area of 3000 square feet. In the eastern side, the palace was connected with
the mainland.40
Sonargaon or Suvarngrama means golden village, some 27 kilometers south-east of
present day Dhaka metropolitan was another city of eastern Bengal during the pre- Mughal
period.41 The very name of the city denotes that the area was prosperous. Though it is tough
to locate the precise boundary of the city but from the residual relics, it can be well inferred
35 Ibid36 Jalapur Pargana was under Vanga, Present days it is Bakerganj and Barisal District, See, Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography : 7537 Birt, Dacca: The Romance of an Eastern Capital: 1638 Brit, Dacca: The Romance of an Eastern Capital: 1639 Dani, Dhaka: A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 32-340 Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography: 7641 Dani, Dhaka : A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 228
13
that Sonargaon had embraced a large tract bordered on the east, west and south by the river
Meghna, Shitalakhya and Dhaleshwari respectively and on the north by the river
Brahmaputra. Sonargaon's fame before the pre-Muslim period can be identified from a land
grant Suvarnavithi, issued in a 6th century AD mentioned the name of Suvarnagrama.
Another copper- plate titled Ghugrahati copper-plate of Samacharadeva also mentioned the
name of Suvarnagrama or Sonargaoan.42 Before the Muslim independent rulers’ advances it
was the seat of Hindu king. Zia al-Din Barani also mentions the name of one of the Hindu
kings Rai Danuj. Barani suggests, this Sena king had very friendly relation with the Delhi
sultan Ghiyad-al-din Balaban.43 The Delhi sultan once paid courtesy visit to the capital of this
king, in A.D1281.44
It is difficult to say clearly about the position of Dhaka before the Mughal established
their capital here. Sources on Dhaka before the Mughal advent are very limited. Portuguese
sources might show revealing picture of pre-Mughal Dhaka. However, two inscription of
Sultan Nasir-ud-din Mahmud Shah (1435-1459) have been discovered in Dhaka city. One is
Narinda inscription dated 1456-57 A. D. and another is Naswalagali inscription dated 1559
A.D. Abdul Karim suggests that these inscriptions show Dhaka was a place of some
importance during the Sultanate period.45
Discussion on the powerful Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of Bengal and also on the
Arakanese invasion in eastern Bengal will provide an idea that eastern Bengal was not
unpopulated before the Mughal conquered eastern Bengal. The Bara Bhuiyas and the
zamindars of eastern Bengal were active in the sixteenth century. They were operating almost
as independent rulers and very often neglected the Mughal emperor. If we briefly look to the
42 Sirajul Islam (ed.), Banglapedia, Can be accessed at http://www.banglapedia.org/httpdocs/HT/S_0495.HTM43 Zia Ud-Din Barani, Tarikh-i- Firoz Shahi, quoted in Dani’s Dhaka: A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 228 44 Dani, Dhaka: A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 228 45 Abdul Karim, `` Origin and Development of Mughal Dhaka’’ In Sharif Uddin Ahmed (ed.), Dhaka: Past Present Future, ( Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991)
14
political development of eastern Bengal before the Islam Khan’s conquest of Dhaka, it will
be useful to get an idea that how powerful they were.
The Mughal war commander Mirza Nathan frequently mentioned the strength of the
Bara Bhuiyas.46 In Bharastn-i- Ghaybi, Mirza Nathan mentioned some names of the Bara
Bhuiyas’ alliance. The mentioned names are: Bahadur Ghazi, Suna Ghazi, Anwar Ghazi,
Shaikh Pir, son of Haji Bhakul, Mirza Mumin, Madhu Ray, Binod Ray, Phalwan and Haji
Shams-ud-din Baghdadi.47 Among the Bara Bhuiyas Musa Khan who was the son of one of
the powerful zamindars of eastern Bengal Isha Khan was famous and the strongest one
among the Bara Bhuiyas. He succeeded to his father Isha Khan’s large territory which was
comprised of about the half of modern Dhaka district, half of Tippera, most part of
Mymensing, Bagura and Pabna.48 Musa Khan’s centre of political authority was in present
day Dhaka, where the Padma Lakhya, Brahmaputra met at that time.49 After the death of
powerful zamindar Kedar Ray, Musa Khan extended his control over Sripur in Bikrampur.50
Bhadur Gazi was one of the notable figures in the alliance of Bara Bhuiyas who played very
crucial role during the Musa Khan’s battle against the Mughal. Bharistan-i- Gahaybi refers
Bahadur Gazi as the zamindar of Cahura, south- east to modern Dhaka, near Kaliganj.51 Suna
Gazi was the powerful zamindar of Sarail who possessed many war- boats. But he submitted
to the Mughal when the Mughal undertook their campaign in the early seventeenth century.52
Another notable zamindar of Bara Bhuiyas’ alliance was Phalwan. He was the zamindar of
Matang, north of Sarail and South of Taraf which is now between the present district of
46 See, Mirza Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi: A history of the Mughal Wars in Assam, Cooch Behar, Bengal, Bihar during the reigns of Jahangir and Shahjahan, Vol.I, trans. M.I Borah, (Gauhati: Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Naaryani Handiqui Historical Institute, Government of Assam, 1936): 53; 56-58;77-11947 Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi, vol. I: 5648 Sarkar, The History of Bengal vol. II: 23649 Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi, vol. I: 56,60,64, also Sarkar, The History of Bengal, Vol. II: 23850 Sarkar, The History of Bengal, vol. II: 23851 See, Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi, vol. I: 88-8952 Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi, vol. I: 243-253,
15
Tippera and Sylhet.53 Nathan showed him as one of the most resolute fighter among the
zamindars of eastern Bengal. Baharistan-i-Ghayibi mentions about his stubborn defence
against the Mughal campaign. Among others, Raja Pratapaditya was regarded as one of the
most powerful zamindars of eastern Bengal before the Mughals established their capital in
Dhaka in the early seventeenth century.54 Baharistan-i-Ghaybi, Travel Dairy of Abdul Latif
and European travelers’ accounts frequently mentioned about Raja Pratapaditya. He was
famous for his military prowess and also for political eminence. Therefore, we see, in the
sixteenth century eastern Bengal was dominated by these semi-independent Bara Bhuiyas
and zamindars. The Mughal emperor Akbar and Jahangir were also concerned over the
strength of these Bara Bhuiyas and other zamindars.55 Before the establishment of Mughal
capital in Dhaka, they had attempted several times to subdue the alliance of Bara Bhuiyas and
the zamindars. However, in the late sixteenth century saw the decline of this powerful
alliance of Bara Bhuiyas and the zamindars due to various reasons. One of the reasons of the
decline of the powerful Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars might be for the growing dominance of
the Arakanese in this area from the middle of the sixteenth century. The other reason might
be internal power crisis among the Bara Bhuiyas. 56
The Arakanese dominance over eastern Bengal in the second half of the seventeenth
century is well known episode in the history of Bengal. Recently Stephan van Galen in his
Arakan and Bengal: The Rise of the Maruk U kingdom (Burma) from the fifteenth to the
seventeenth century AD shows that from the mid sixteenth century the Arakan king had
gained control over the port city Chittagong and south-eastern Bengal. Confirm evidences are
available of the Arakanese domination over south-eastern Bengal from the regime of the
53 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, Vol. II: 24054 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, Vol. II: 23755 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, Vol. II: 23556 For instance one of the powerful Zamindars Suna Ghazi went against Musa Khan. For details see Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 239
16
Arakanese king Man Phalaung (1571-1593). This interaction between Bengal and Arakan can
be dated back to the fifteenth century.57
Thus, the changing of capital from Rajmahal to Dhaka in the early seventeenth
century was due to the Mughals’ political and economic ambition over eastern Bengal and its
neighbouring states. During the late sixteenth century, power of the Bara Bhuiyas and the
zaminadrs of eastern Bengal was declined considerably. This consequence created
welcoming circumstances for the Mughals to come to Dhaka. However, still the Mughals had
to fight against these Bara Bhuiyas’ alliance and the zamindars for almost four years to
establish themselves in Dhaka in 1612.58 The main objective of the establishment of capital in
Dhaka was to check these defiant Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars and to fight against the
Arakanese and also to launch campaigns against neighbouring states. As eastern Bengal was
a prosperous region, therefore the Mughal thought if they could curb the power of the
zamindars and could defeat the Arakanese it would ensure vast revenue for the Mughal
Empire. Geographically Dhaka stands almost the centre of eastern Bengal and was well
connected with other parts of Bengal. Here we will briefly discuss about the geographical
location of Dhaka and its connection with other parts of Bengal.
Location of Dhaka and its Connection with other parts of Bengal
In our studied period Dhaka was situated in the eastern part of Bengal on the northern bank of
the river Buriganga. It was situated between 23 degrees and 24 degrees of the north latitude
and 90 degrees of the east longitude. In the seventeenth century Dhaka stood between the
river Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna. The city was extended from east to west which
57 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 3-4
58 For details about Islam Khan Campaign see Gommans, Mughal Warfare: 171-9; also Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 247-84
17
formed a triangular shape. One of its parts was extended to the meeting place of the river
Brahmaputra and Meghna. The city was surrounded by Mymensing district on the north,
Bakerganj district on the south, Tiperah [Sylhet] district on the east and Faridpur on the
west.59
The important role that Dhaka played as a Mughal administrative and later as a
commercial centre was possible because of its easy and suitable connectivity with the other
parts of Bengal. Dhaka was situated in such a suitable position that it was very easy for her to
connect with the great Padma- Brahmaputra basin which had their tributaries running all
through the country. The river Buriganga on which bank Dhaka was situated was 26 miles in
length. In fact, the river Buriganga and the other small river Dhaleswari connected Dhaka
with the great river Padma (it is called Ganges in India), Brahmaputra and Meghna.60
The Buriganga was also connected with a river called Lakhya by two branches, one in
Khizirpur and the other in near Demra approximately four miles higher up.61 By its
intersection, the river Lkahya was connected with the river Meghna through the river
Dhaleswari and the river Ichamati. Thus, Dhaka was connected with all the districts those
were on the bank of the river Meghna.62 The Meghna flowed to the Bay of Bengal near
Chandpur. Consequently Dhaka was also connected with the Bay of Bengal and thus with the
coastal districts of Bengal. The Bramaputra flowed down its old strait to the Meghna. Thus,
Brahmaputra connected Dhaka with northern Rangpur, Dinajpur, Assam, Koch Bihar and
other northern districts of Bengal. Another two rivers Karatoya and Atrai were flowing down
to the Padma. It connected Dhaka with the upper district of North Bengal. In the southern
part, the Padma was flowing right to the south before it met with the Meghna. Foreign
travelers who travelled to Dhaka also depicted that how aptly Dhaka was connected with
59 Taylor, A Sketch of the Topography : 160 Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital: 461 Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital: 462 Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital: 4
18
other parts of Bengal and even its peripheries. The foreign travelers could easily travel from
Dhaka to its neighbouring areas, and other parts of Bengal.
Although Dhaka was principally connected with other parts of Bengal by water ways
there were also some roads which made it possible to connect with neighbouring districts. A
European traveler Jean Baptiste Tavernier mentioned that it was possible to reach Dhaka by
land from neighbouring cities and villages. However, he mentioned that those who wanted to
do that they had to depend on foot.63
This chapter suggests that the emergence of Dhaka was not for the shifting of river
courses as the conventional and dominant historiography portrayed. It argues that Dhaka was
selected as the Mughal provincial capital in the early seventeenth century because of the
Mughals political and economic ambition. But what advantages Dhaka provided to the
Mughal ambition? Next chapter will discuss the importance of Dhaka to the Mughal purpose.
63, Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India, William Crooke (ed.), vol. I, (London: Oxford University Press, 1925): 102-4
19
CHAPTER TWO
The Mughals in Dhaka:
Dhaka as a Mughal Store House
The Previous chapter has discussed the emergence of Dhaka and the establishment of the
Mughal capital in Dhaka. It is argued in the first chapter that the rationale behind the
establishment of the Mughal provincial capital in Dhaka was for political and economic
ambition. This chapter will elaborate on this by explaining why and how Dhaka was
important to the Mughal and what role Dhaka played as a Mughal administrative centre in the
seventeenth century. This chapter states that Dhaka was important for the Mughal as a
military base to fulfill their ambition over eastern Bengal and the neighboring areas. The
chapter will also focus on the Mughals contribution in the making of Dhaka as a stable and
secure city.
Dhaka as a strategic location
Dhaka played a very important role as a Mughal administrative centre in the seventeenth
century. We have discussed in the previous chapter that Dhaka was situated almost in the
centre of eastern Bengal and as such strategically connected with other parts of Bengal as
well as with its peripheries. Now we will see how this location was useful for the Mughal
military campaigns in the seventeenth century. We have already seen that the Arakanese had
considerable dominance over south-eastern Bengal. Dhaka was a place from where the
Mughals could launch military campaigns against the Arakanese. It was also the most
suitable location from where they could tackle the Arakanese invasions in Bhalua, Bakla,
Jogidia, as far as Jessore, The location of Dhaka was also very ideal to launch campaigns
20
against the Arakanese settlement in Chittagong as it was well connected with the Padma-
Meghna river system and through the river Meghna, the Mughals had easy access to previous
mentioned areas, Sandwip and as far as Chittagong. It is noticed that most of the Mughal
campaigns against the Arakanese settled in Chittagong, the starting point was Dhaka and later
reinforced by the Mughal thana64 Bhalua and Jogadia.65 Location of Dhaka was also
important to launch campaigns against neighbouring states of eastern Bengal.
During the seventeenth century Mughal interest grew strongly in Koch Bihar, Kamrup
and Assam which were situated to the northern border of eastern Bengal. The Mughals’
interest in these regions was mainly for two reasons. The Mughals had an aspiration to
capture the imperial power over these areas. Secondly, they wanted to keep vigilance over
these regions. Immediately prior to the Mughal invasion, Koch Bihar grew into a powerful
state under king Naranarayan. Historians suggested that the Koch king Naranarayan came
from the Mech or Bodo tribal group.66 Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this tribal
group was being transformed into a dominant caste. In the course of the fifteenth century,
Naraynarayan established a powerful principality in these areas. He restored the temples of
the goddess Kamakhya and was a generous patron of Sanskrit scholars. He established a
claim to his family’s connection with the mythical exploits of Parashumara against the
Kshatriya. It was also found that, later on, the Koch in this area took the designation of
Rajbanshi. Thus it appeared that in the sixteenth century the Koch people and the nobility felt
a strong attachment to the royal house.67 This unity is also observed in the seventeenth
century, when the Mughals were launching campaigns against Koch Bihar and Assam.
64 Thana means military post consisted of several hundred soldiers.65 For details on the Mughals’ campaign against the Arakanese see Sarkar, The History of Bengal, vol. II: 292-5; 297-301; 302-566See B.R. Hodgson, ‘Koch, Bodo and Dhimal Tribes’ Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. XVIII, part II (1849): 704-567 Gautam Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings in Mughal India’’ In Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South Asian History and Society, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983): 56
21
Gautam Bhadra in his seminal essay, ‘Two Frontier uprisings in Mughal India’ records two
uprisings against the Mughal polity.68 These uprisings had occurred in the Koch Bihar and
border areas of Assam in the early seventeenth century (c.a. 1619-1621). He shows that the
basic characteristic of these uprisings was that the common people, kings and peasants jointly
attacked the Mughals.69 This challenge against the Mughal authority was not peculiar for
these two uprisings only; this type of uprising was in fact a common phenomenon throughout
the seventeenth century. Gautam Bhadra shows that the Mughals were sometimes so pressed
by these strong protests that they had to reconcile with the kings of these areas.70 Therefore, it
is clear from the above discussion that to bring these areas into the Mughal sway and later on
to quell the protests against the Mughals, they had to choose a suitable place from where they
could launch powerful campaigns against the kings of these areas. Fortunately, Dhaka offered
them such opportunity to carry out military campaigns against the Koch, Assam or Kamrup.
Due to Dhaka’s strategic geographic location, it was easy to carry out expeditions through the
Meghna and Brahmaputra river system and also by land to these areas [see map], which was
not possible from Rajmahal—the previous capital of Bengal. After the establishment of the
capital in Dhaka, the Mughals had strengthened their thanas in the frontiers such as Susung.
When the Mughal army would send their campaigns to these areas, the core Mughal army
was always reinforced from its frontier thanas. The presumption about the importance of
Dhaka to the Mughal military campaigns make sense when it is seen that immediately after
the establishment of the capital in Dhaka, Bengal subahdar Islam Khan launched campaign
against the kings of Koch and Kamrup in 1613.71
The assumption is further strengthened by the transfer of the capital from Rajmahal to
Dhaka for the second time. When Prince Muhammad Shuja became the subahdar of Bengal,
68 Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings’’ In Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies: II: 43-5969 Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings’’ In Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies: II : 47; 5870 Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings’’ In Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies: II : 5571 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal vol. II: 285; also Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi: 222-253
22
he transferred his capital from Dhaka to Rajmahal in 1639.72 During the viceroyalty of Prince
Shuja no such campaign to these areas was noticed. However, after the appointment of Mir
Jumla in 1659, he again transferred the capital of Bengal from Rajmahal to Dhaka. 73 It is safe
to presume that one of the reasons behind the transfer of the capital from Rajmahal to Dhaka
was to launch campaigns against Koch Bihar, Kamrup and Assam. It is noticed soon after his
arrival in Dhaka, Mir Jumla launched campaigns against Assam and Koch Bihar in
November 1661 and ended in 1663 when he died.74 All these events demonstrate the
importance of the location of Dhaka in realizing Mughal ambitions in these regions.
Dhaka as a military labour supplier
Military labour recruitment was very important for the Mughals. What crucially important
military labour recruitment was for the Mughals has been explained by a well known Mughal
court historian Abul Fazl: `the number of men brought before His Majesty [for service]
depends on the number of men available.’75 Apart from its strategic location, Dhaka offered
soldiers to the Mughal army. A close look to the Islam Khan’s campaign to eastern Bengal
and the establishment of provincial capital in Dhaka exhibits the importance of Bara Bhuiyas
and zamindars of eastern Bengal to the Mughals. We have seen that after a prolonged
campaign against the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of eastern Bengal, Islam Khan Chisti was
able to establish his capital in Dhaka. But Islam khan Chisti’s campaign in eastern Bengal did
not wipe out the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars completely. The Mughals opted for
pacification and political reconciliation. Political reconciliation was indeed needed to achieve
military assistance from the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of eastern Bengal. We have seen in
72 Karim, Dacca:The Mughal Capital, (Dhaka,1964): 1473 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal,vol. II: 34274 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal,vol. II: 35075 Abul Fazl Allami, The A-in- Akbari, ed. By H. Blochmann, vol. II, ( Calcutta, 1872-7) cited In Jos,Gommans, Mughal Warfare : Indian and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700, (London: Routledge, 2002): 67
23
the previous chapter that the Bara Bhuiyas were very powerful before the Mughals
established capital in Dhaka. They had numerous war-boats and soldiers. After the
submission of the Bara Bhuiyas, their military forces were incorporated to the Mughal army.
It is observed that Musa Khan, one of the major players of the Bara Bhuiyas alliance and the
other zamindars still retained their position though their power was curtailed. These pacified
Bara Bhuiyas, zamindars and their successors played very important role in almost all the
Mughal military campaigns. Military assistance of Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars was
indispensable for the Mughal fighting against the Arakanese. It will be clear if we give an
example of such military assistance. The Mughals’ fighting against the Arakanese in 1620,
Musa Khan and zamindar Raja Raghunath had noticeable contributions. Half of the forces of
the Mughal army of this campaign came from Musa Khan and Raja Raghunath who joined
the Mughal forces with 7000/8000 soldiers and 4000 to 5000 war-boats.76 Other members of
the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars were also active in this campaign. The evidence of such
military assistance was not unique for this campaign only. Military assistance of Bara
Bhuiyas and zamindars was also vital for the Mughals campaign against Koch Bihar, Assam
and Kamrup. Again we will take an example of the Mughal campaign in Koch Bihar and
Kamrup. In the very first Mughals’ campaign in these regions in 1613, it is noticed that Musa
Khan was playing an active role. He contributed to the Mughal army 100 war-boats with his
forces under his war commander Adil Khan.77 Likewise, other zamindars of eastern Bengal
also offered considerable military assistance to the Mughals. Thus, here we can perceive the
importance of Dhaka as a Mughal administrative centre. It was only possible to get this
consistent military assistance from the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars if the Mughals had their
76 Sarkar, The History of Bengal vol. II: 30377 For details about Kamrup Campaign see Sarkar, The History of Bengal vol. II: 285, also Nathan, Baharistan-i-Ghayibi: 222-253
24
capital in Dhaka. Indeed this assistance was not unconditional; the Mughals had to motivate
them by offering different opportunities.
The Mughal administration in Dhaka not only received assistance from the Bara
Bhuiyas and zamindars but they also exploited Dhaka’s position to get assistance from
European trading companies. The Mughal usually promised to give more trading
opportunities in return for their assistance. For instance the campaign against Koch Bihar and
Assam (1661-1663), the Mughals received help from the Europeans. Many Dutch,
Portuguese and English, sailors and soldiers joined the Mughals’ campaign against Koch
Bihar and Assam.78 The evidences of these time to time military supports are also available in
VOC documents. One such document informs that in 1663 the Dutch Director of Bengal
trade ordered the Resident in Dhaka to lend the Mughal subahdar 6 canons and some other
war equipments.79 It is also noticed that during the Shaista Khan’s campaign against the
Arakanese in 1666, the Dutch and the Portuguese extended their support to the Bengal
subahdar.80 VOC documents shows that the Dutch sent two ships named Lansmeer and
Purmerlant to assist the Mughal campaigns against the Arakanese.81
Though there are no specific statistics available on the number of recruits to the
Mughal army, it can be well asserted that Dhaka was a promising place for the Mughals to
recruit individuals for its army. As we have already seen that the Arakan king had
considerable domination over eastern Bengal from mid sixteenth century. They used to
invade south-eastern part of Bengal and captivated people from these areas for the slave
trade. Therefore, the Mughals might have maintained hopes of recruiting substantial number
of people in the army, had they been able to contain this invader. The Mughals’ aspiration
78 Sarkar (ed.),The History of Bengal, vol. II: 34679 H.T. Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh-registers gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1663, ( The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1899): 42580 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 34681 DR. W. PH. Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, van Gouverneurs-Generaal en raden aan heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel III: 1655-1674,( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964): 587
25
over military recruitment from Bengal may be substantiated by explaining the siege of Hugli
in 1632. Some historians argue that the reason behind the siege of Hugli was economic. They
argue that from 1630 onwards Mughals’ interest grew on the Bengal trade.82 This is a
plausible argument. The Portuguese had significant control over the trade in this region. If the
Mughal had to think over the maritime trade of Bengal, it had to curb the power of the
Portuguese who were settled in Hugli and also partly in Chittagong. Beyond the economic
reason of the Mughal campaign against the Portuguese in Hugli, one other reason of the
campaign was also to destroy the slave market in Hugli where the Portuguese and the
Arakanese were engaged in slave trade. Most of these slaves were captivated from south-
eastern part of Bengal. The question, however, is that: why the Mughals were so keen to
destroy the slave market. Pointing out the reasons behind the Hugli siege one of the historians
argues:
…It [Hugli] was a slave- market to which both Magh [the Arakanese] and the Portuguese
pirates had free access. It is there that they disposed of their unlucky prisoners. Slavery, it is
true, was an institution recognized by Muslim and Hindu law, but it is elementary duty of
every State to provide for the security of life and property of each and every one of its
members. Shah Jahan could not permit his subjects to be bought and sold like cattle in the
slave- market of Hugli, simply because his officers had proved unequal to the task of
defending their persons against the rovers of Chittagong and Arakan. The Portuguese of
Hughli undoubtedly shared their guilt morally and legally when they trafficked with them in
their offensive spoils. If Shah Jahan found it impossible to clear the Bay and the rivers of
Bengal of these human sharks, the least he could do was to close the market where they
bought their victims, and to eliminate their partners in this dismal business. 83
82 Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), The Mughal State 1526-1750, reprint, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008): 2883 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol: II: 367
26
The reason behind the attack of Hugli might not be as simple as he presumes. Going
beyond the conventional thinking, it may be inferred that Shah Jahan´s intention to destroy
the slave market in Hugli might not be for the emotional attachment to the ruled but he might
have seen the possibility of military recruitment from eastern Bengal. Mughals effort to wipe
out the slave trade is also evident in VOC sources. In an agreement signed between nawab of
Dhaka and the Dutch shows that the Mughal imposed the condition that the Dutch were not
permitted to recruit servants from this area and they were also not permitted to buy and
transport slaves from this area.84
Dhaka as a store house of war-equipments
Another importance of Dhaka to the Mughals was that Dhaka supplied war equipments. For
the Mughal expansion in eastern Bengal and around these areas they had to depend mostly on
water vessels. Water vessels such as war-boats were profusely found in Dhaka and its
surrounding areas from ancient period.85 It is easy to understand why water vessels were
numerously found in Dhaka. The main raw material for war-boats, wood was massively
available around Dhaka. A kind of tree locally called Dhack abundantly grew in Dhaka.86 The
wood of this tree was very apposite for boat-making. It can also be easily assumed why
Dhaka was famous for boat-making. Dhaka was surrounded by rivers and tributaries;
therefore, the principal medium for communication of these areas was mostly dependent on
84 In this agreement one of the conditions was that: …De Hollanders mogen geen jnlandsche dienaers in dienst nemen….Sij mogen geen bossekruijt, sallpeter, slaven offte slavinnen opcoopen nog min vervoeren. See ``Accordt met den nabbab Eslimchan gemaeckt in Decca den 18e September 1636’’ In H.T. Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh-registers gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1637, ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1899): 100
85 Ramesh Chandra Majumdar, Bangla Desher Itihas Prachin Jug, reprint, (Calcutta: General, 1998): 20086 Karim, Dacca: The Mughal Capital: 2
27
water vessels. Even today, a large number of boats are produced in the neighbourhood of
Dhaka.
Elephants were indispensible for military expedition in the Indian subcontinent.
Elephant could carry war materials and were also effective in sieges in hilly areas. Dhaka was
a storehouse of elephants. Elephants were found in the hilly regions of eastern Bengal. But
after the establishment of capital in Dhaka, most of the elephants came here from Assam and
Koch Bihar’s forests and hilly areas.87 Here we can infer that before the Mughal conquest of
eastern Bengal, the Mughals might have an ambition over the elephants of these areas. They
might think if they could establish capital in a suitable area of eastern Bengal, and later if
they establish control over Assam and Koch Bihar they would get ample supply of elephants
from these regions.
Our speculation about Dhaka as a store house of war-equipments becomes stronger
when we pay a close look to a rebellion which occurred in 1623. In 1623 Prince Khurram,
one of the competitors for the succession of the Mughal emperorship started rebellion against
Emperor Jahangir from the Deccan.88 The main reason behind his revolt was his aspiration to
become the Mughal emperor, which was being upset by his step mother Nur Jahan, who had
much influence on the court at that time. In the course of his revolt, he defeated and killed the
Bengal subahdar Ibrahim Khan in 1624 in Akbarnagar.89 Now, it is also necessary to pay
attention to the rebel-prince’s movement. After defeating subahdar Ibrahim Khan, Prince
Khurram advanced towards Bengal capital Dhaka. After nine days of journey, Khurram
reached Dhaka in May 1624.90 Here the question interests us is: why the rebel prince took the
risk to march towards Dhaka? The answer is clear. As has been stated before, Dhaka was a
87 Bhadra, ``Two Frontier Uprisings in Mughal India’’ In Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies II: 4988 See Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 306-7 also Nathan, Bharaistan-i- Ghaybi, Vol.II: 688-694
89 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal , p. 309,Nathan, Bharaistan-i- Ghaybi, Vol. II: 692-3
90 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal p. 309, Nathan, Bharaistan-i- Ghaybi, vol. II: 708-9
28
store house of war-equipments, his march towards Dhaka was targeted to grab war
equipments and to make friendship with the most important power players of Dhaka and the
eastern Bengal so that he could get consistent military support in the future. The available
literature shows that Prince Khurram had grabbed a large sum of money, amounting forty
millions of rupees, war equipments such as 500 elephants, 400 horses, entire artillery, and all
the fleets.91
Dhaka as food and fodder supplier
The importance of Dhaka as an administrative centre to the Mughal was not only for military
store house but also as a supplier of large amount of food for the Mughal army and fodder for
horses and elephants. Throughout centuries, rivers and flood waters deposited alluvial soil in
eastern Bengal. Thus, the land of eastern Bengal was very fertile which contributed to this
region to become rich in agriculture. Rice, pulse, vegetables and other crops produced
plentifully in Dhaka and especially in its neighboring areas. It was very easy for the Mughal
to obtain food supply and fodder for the horses from the neighbouring areas.
Mughals Contribution in the Making of Dhaka
Here we will highlight the contribution of the Mughal administration in the making of Dhaka.
The first and foremost contribution of the Mughals to Dhaka was the designation of Dhaka as
the provincial capital of Bengal. The Mughals then contributed to the stability and security of
Dhaka by pacifying the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of eastern Bengal and by containing the
invaders. Pacification of the Bara Bhuiya and zamindars was mostly done during Islam
91 Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 309, Nathan, also see Bharaistan-i- Ghaybi, vol. II: 708-9
29
Khan’s early years of viceroyalty (1608-1612). However, they needed to be checked from
time to time. To protect Dhaka and the south-eastern Bengal from invaders was not an easy
task though.
We have already mentioned the Arakanese influence over eastern Bengal. In the early
seventeenth century powerful King Meng Khamaung made strenuous efforts to continue
control over south-eastern Bengal. A letter written in 1614 to VOC personnel by the king of
Arakan also gives testimony of his ambition over Bengal. In this letter he claimed himself as
the emperor of the most `beautiful lands in the world’. Interestingly enough, he included in
his kingdom not only Rammapour [Ramu], Mawathin [Meghawati], Rawathin[Rammawati],
Chackanna[Cukkara], Satigan[Chittagong] etc. but also Syripoura[ Sripur, south to present
Dhaka] Bachlebaer[Bhallua, south to Dhaka], Kijbrajepour[Khizirpur, south to Dhaka, where
the Mughal had a military post], Vettipoura[ Bikrampur, south to Dhaka] and Bakaa[possibly
Dhaka]. In this letter he also wrote to the VOC personnel Pieter Both that he [Meng
Khamaung] was so powerful and gallant that he possessed the power to conquer the whole
world for a while.92 No doubt what he claimed in his letter was exaggeration but it is also true
that although the Mughals established themselves in Dhaka in 1612, they were not able to
control areas such as Sripur, Khizirpur or Bhallua effectively. Dhaka administration was
considerably penetrated by the Arakanese invasion in these areas almost every year until
1622.93 Between 1614 and 1626, the Arakan king made six major invasions to eastern Bengal.
On one occasion, Manrique states, they even seized Dhaka for three days and plundered the
city, and set it on fire.94 After 1630’s the Mughals were more successful in war against the
Arakanese. Henceforth, the Mughals did not face such major invasion from the Arakanese.
92 National Archives of the Netherlands, The Hague: Archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (hereafter NA VOC), 1059, fol.108-109, Briefje van Man Khamaung tot Pieter Both, n.d [ 1614] cited In Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 243 93 Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 24394 Fray SebastienManrique, Travels of Fray Sebastien Manrique, 1629-1643, vol. I, Arakan, trans. and notes by Lt.-Col. C. Eckford Luard from Itinerario De Las Missiones Orientales, ( Oxford: The Hakluyt Society, 1927): xxv-xxvi
30
By 1630s, Dhaka became more or less a secure and stable city. The Arakan kingdom was
considerably weakened after the death of King Meng Khamaung and Sirisudhammaraja and
the subsequent civil war. Security of Dhaka was further consolidated when Subahdar Shaista
Khan conquered Sandwip and Chittagong in 1666.95 In fact, the conquest of Chittagong was
very important for the security of Dhaka as well as for its commerce. Before the conquest of
Chittagong in 1666 the Mughals had made several attempts to conquer Chittagong but were
failed.
Now, the focus will be turned to the strategic initiatives that were taken by the
Mughal administration in Dhaka to the protection of Dhaka. As soon as the establishment of
the capital in Dhaka, Islam Khan Chishti strengthened the defence of Dhaka by erecting a
number of forts in some strategic places in Dhaka and around Dhaka,96 such as in Khizirpur,
Jatrapur and Idrakpur. Permanent armies were encamped there.97 Islam Khan Chishti also
increased the number of Mughal choukis or guard houses. He strengthened the pre-existing
Dhaka fort which served as a strong defense against enemy invasion.
Mir Jumla further strengthened the defence of his capital by constructing several
roads for easy and quick military movement to the other parts of the eastern Bengal and its
border regions. One such road was constructed to connect Dhaka with the northern parts of
Bengal. Abdul Karim identifies this road as the present day’s Dhaka-Mymensing road.98 He
constructed another road to connect Dhaka with eastern part of Bengal.99 Tangi Bridge built
by Mir Jumla connected Dhaka with its suburbs. French traveler Tavernier who visited Dhaka
in 1665 and Italian traveler Niccolao Manucci who visited the Mughal Empire from 1653-
1708[1663] confirms the existence of another bridge which was constructed over the Pagla
95 For detail description about Shaista Khan’s Chittagong campaign see Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 192-8, also Sarkar (ed.), The History of Bengal, vol. II: 377-381, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Studies in Mughal India, (London, 1920): 131-153
96 Dani, Dhaka: A Record of its Changing Fortunes: 2897 See Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Studies in Mughal India: 127 98 Karim, Dacca:The Mughal Capital: 3699 S.M Taifoor, Glimpses of Old Dacca, (Dhaka,1952) : 78
31
river in the neighborhood of Dhaka.100 Another European traveler Thomas Bowery who
travelled Dhaka also mentions that Mir Jumla’s initiative to build up Dhaka as a stronger city
than Rajmahal is conspicuous.101
In conclusion, on the basis of above discussion it is clear that in the seventeenth
century Dhaka worked as a wonderful military base for the Mughal campaigns against the
Arakanese, Kamrup, Koch Bihar and Assam. With arduous and continuous efforts, the
Mughal administration was more or less able to ensure the stability and security of Dhaka by
1630s. But the Mughals had to await until 1666 for the final consolidation of the security of
Dhaka when they completely defeated the Arakanese in Chittagong.
100 Tavernier, Travels in India, vol. I: 105 also Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor or Mogul India, 1653-1708, Vol- 1 translated by William Irvine, (Calcutta, 1965): 86101 Thomas Bowery, A Geographical Account of the Countries round the Bay of Bengal, 1669-1679, (Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society, 1903): 139-41
32
CHAPTER THREE
The Dutch in Dhaka: The Emergence of Dhaka as a Commercial Centre
With the protection and the political stability of Dhaka ensured by the Mughals, it was
emerging as a favorable place for trade and commerce by the late 1630s. Consequently, the
Dutch East Indies Company sent a mission to investigate the prospect of establishing factory
in Dhaka. However, the Dutch were not convinced at that time to establish their factory here.
It took fourteen more years after the first Dutch mission to establish their factory in Dhaka.
The Dutch established their factory here in 1650.102 The Dutch were the first among the
European Companies who established their factories in Dhaka. This chapter will mainly
analyze why the Dutch were interested to establish their factory in Dhaka. At the same time,
the chapter will briefly discuss the Dutch contribution to the making of Dhaka as a
commercial centre.
The Dutch East India Company or De Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie commonly
known as the VOC was established in 1602 in the Netherlands. It was a chartered company
granted by the Sates-General of the Dutch Republic. The Company was bestowed with a
monopoly to carry out business in Asia. It was also given authority to engage in war with
other foreign companies, if needed. The VOC was like a multinational company that carried
out extensive business in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and employed millions of
employees. The VOC first started its trading activities in Indonesian Archipelago. Then the
Company also expanded its business to different parts of South Asia, Far-east Asia and
Persia.103 For the case of Bengal, the VOC first established its factory in Hugli, in
102 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 40-41103 For details about the foundation the Dutch East India Company and its trading network see Femme F.Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, Expansion and Decline, (Leiden: Walburg Pers, 2003): 13-55
33
1633.104Thereafter, the VOC established factories in Balasore Pipli, and Patna. Finally, the
VOC established their business headquarters for Bengal in Chinsura, a village near Hugli.
However, their Chinsura headquarters was often mentioned as Hugli factory.105 In the course
of time, they established their factory in Dhaka. Now it will be discussed why and how the
VOC decided to establish its factory in Dhaka in the second half of the seventeenth century.
The Dutch in Dhaka
Here we will explain that how the VOC responded to the political development of Dhaka that
has been discussed in the second chapter. However, a brief discussion about the process of
the establishment of the VOC’s factories in Bengal in general will give us a useful
understanding as to why the VOC had established their factory in Dhaka. Attracted by the
prospect of Bengal trade, the VOC started their mission to establish factories in Bengal. The
commodities which attracted the VOC most for Bengal trade were especially sugar, rice,
butter, textiles, and slaves as well. Before starting factories in Bengal, the VOC purchased
Bengal commodities at the Coromandel Coast.106 These goods were earlier brought to the
Coromandel Coast by Indian merchants. Thus, it would increase the price of the goods. To
ascertain the potentiality of Bengal trade, the head of the Dutch Coromandel trade Jan Gaeff
first travelled to Bengal and Arakan in May 1615. But Gaeff’s mission which started in
1616 was failed due to bad weather. After the unsuccessful trip, not much is known of the
VOC’s attitude about Bengal trade. But a letter written in 1623 by Governor-general
Carpentier to the chief factor of Masulipatnam informs that the Company had sent three ships
for the further investigation of the prospects of Bengal trade. However, the Company
postponed the plan to establish factories in Bengal this time too. The next few years, the
104 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 37105 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 40106 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 35
34
Company was suspicious about the prospect of Bengal trade because of political turbulence.
It is discussed in the second chapter that during the rebellion of Prince Khurram in 1624,
Bengal became politically unstable. Indeed, Dhaka was the worst victim. In 1626
Masulipatnam factor reported to the Directors that they found no prospect for the Bengal
trade.107 However, after few years of further investigations and consultations, the VOC
decided to open factories in Bengal. As in 1632 the Portuguese were driven out by the
Mughals, the Dutch found an excellent opportunity to open up their factory in Hugli. The
VOC established its factory in Hugli in 1633.108 In the course of few years, the VOC
established factories in Pipli, Balasore and Patna. Pipli and Balasore factories were
established in 1636 and Patna factory was established in 1638.109
But the VOC’s Bengal factories in Hugli, Pipli and Patna were not running as
profitable as the VOC officials expected. For instance, although the VOC was able to obtain a
farman, in 1636 that permitted the VOC to carry on trade freely in these areas, did not benefit
much the VOC’s Bengal trade. The Dutch factory in Hugli was still running low as previous.
In this context, the Dutch were trying to search a supply centre that could contribute
to their Bengal trade. As has been seen before the Mughals were more successful to ensure
the security and political stability of Dhaka by 1630s, the Dutch sent a mission to Dhaka. The
VOC documents show that by the order of the Director of VOC Coromandel trade, six Dutch
people had started their mission from Hugli to Dhaka with two ships Santvoort and Wessaen
in July 1636 to investigate the prospects of Dhaka trade and also for a diplomatic meeting
with the subahdar of Bengal. But because of a dispute with the Mughal local authorities in
Hugli the Dutch were detained and brought to Dhaka where they were imprisoned for few
days. Although they were released later by the intervention of the higher VOC officials and
107 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 36108 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 37
109 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 38-9
35
the Mughal court in Delhi, however, the VOC had to spend more than thousand rupees to
solve the problem. The VOC official later had to buy a row boat and hire rowers to go back to
Hugli.110
Not only the Dutch had to spend money to solve the problem but shortly after they
had also to conclude an accord with subahdar Islam Khan Mashhadi. The agreement they
concluded with the Bengal subahdar was not too friendly for the VOC. In this agreement, the
toll of VOC ships was redefined, indeed increased. According to this agreement, a large VOC
ship was charged 3,000 rupees, a semi large ship was charged 2,000 rupees and a small ship
was charged 1,200 rupees as toll. The accord also imposed restriction of trade and shipping
on some commodities. It was said in the agreement that the VOC was not allowed to buy and
transport of slaves from Bengal and also not permitted to employ locals in their service. It
was further mentioned that VOC ships were also not permitted to carry gunpowder and
saltpeter.111
After this incident the Hugli factory was closed in December 1636 at the suggestions
of Mahuisjen and the factors were shifted to Pipli in Orissa. When subahdar Prince
Mohammad Shuja took the charge of Bengal province the Dutch were invited to reopen their
factory in Hugli.112 However, the VOC was not convinced by the subahdar’s invitation. The
Dutch did not reopen their factory sometime between 1645 and 1647.113 The other Dutch
factories in Bengal trade was not per expectation. For instance, VOC’s Patna factory was
closed after few months of its establishments in 1638.114
110 See Lennart Bes, ``Dhaka’s Dutch depictions: Dutch Records on the Capital’’s First Two Centuries’’ (Unpublished paper which was presented in Dhaka in 2010). I am very grateful to Mr. Lennart Bes who generously permited me to use his unpublished paper. also Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh Registers Casteel Batavia,1637: 96-102, also NA VOC 1122, ff 651-652111 Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh-registers Casteel Batavia,1637: 99-100112 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 39113 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal:38114DR. W. PH. Coolhaas, Generale missiven van gouverneurs-generaal en raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel. II, 1639-1655(The Hague : Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1964 ): 61
36
Over the following half decade the VOC did not show interest on Dhaka. The
question remains why the Dutch could not decide regarding the establishment of factory in
Dhaka? There might be two possible reasons— firstly the Dutch were not still convinced
about the security of Dhaka and secondly, the incident that happened in 1636 could delay
their decision about the establishing of factory in Dhaka.
The unfriendly relationship between the VOC and the Mughal local authority had
been continued until the second half of the 1640s. Although the Mughal authority in Bengal
reduced the duty on VOC ships in 1641 and 1642,115 this does not necessarily mean that the
relation between the Dutch and the Mughal local authority improved considerably. Once
expressing his grievance over Mughal authority, the chief of the VOC Hugli factory Jacob
Mahuijsen wrote to the VOC governor Carel Reijniersen that though the Mughal authority
gave them authority to do business freely in Hugli, it did not work in practice. The VOC
documents mention that the Mughal Osearon and Cororij (perhaps tax collectors) very often
abused their power and had collected illegal taxes at different points.116
During the late 1640s, the Dutch again showed some interest to establish a factory in
Dhaka. This might have been contributed by another factor. The relation between the Mughal
provincial officials and the VOC in Bengal was improving by the late 1640s. In the early
1648, a farman of the Dhaka nawab opened the
115 See J.E Heeres (ed.), Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum: Verzameling van Politieke contracten en Verdragen de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten, van Privilegebrieven, aan hen verleend, enz., 1596-1650, Eerste deel, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1907): 339-342
116 Colenbrander (ed.), Dagh-registers Casteel Batavia, 1637: 96
37
Map-2: The Dutch Factories in Dhaka and its supply centre in the neighbourhood of Dhaka . “Carannigons”( Keraniganj),
Korbarrie ( Perhaps Junglebari), Roepgons(Rupganj), Nababgons(nababganj) and “Damerah” (Demra), c. 18th century
(National Archives, The Hague: Vosmaer family map collection (access code 4.VMF), inv. no. 848, plate 36, f. 46)117
window for the establishment of the Dutch factory in Dhaka.118 On 10 February 1648 nawab
Fidai Khan issued a farman which granted power to the VOC to carry on business anywhere
in the Bengal province. In this farman, the nawab of Dhaka stipulated very strict measures
against the dishonest Mughal tax collectors and other subordinate officials. The Nawab
mentioned that all the officers under his jurisdiction in Dhaka, Hugli and Patna should take
the farman seriously. The farman mentioned that the Dutch were given the right to do
business freely in the whole Bengal and those officials or tax collectors who would collect
illegal taxes or would create inconvenience for the Dutch Bengal trade, they must have to
face legal action. Any disobedience of the sections of this farman by any Mughal officials
117 I am grateful to Lennart Bes. He permitted me to use his collection which he collected from National Archive, The Hague. 118 See Heeres (ed.), Corpus Diplomaticum, 1596-1650: 506
38
would bring dire consequences for them. The nawab mentioned that it was not his order but
`this is the order of the higher authority of mine.’119
The importance of the farman can also be perceived from an undelivered letter written
by chief factors of Pipli Jan van Elbinck to the VOC governor in Pulicat. In this letter he
mentioned that previously they had received several farmans from the `Groot-Mogols` [‘ the
Great Mughals’] but the farman of 1648 was really especial one as it granted them
extraordinary prerogatives and also vowed against the `corrupted’ tax collectors which he
hoped would foster the Dutch trade in Bengal.120 After two years of receiving this farman the
VOC established its factory in Dhaka in 1650.121 The relics of the VOC factories and garden
in Dhaka are located by Ahmad Hasan Dani on the bank of the river Buriganga at present day
Mitford and at Tejgaoan.122Tavernier who visited Dhaka in 1665 also mentioned about the
Dutch factory in Dhaka. He wrote `…The Dutch finding that their goods were not sufficiently
safe in the common house of Dacca have built a very fine house.’123
Emergence of Dhaka as a Commercial Centre
Now we will see what happened to Dhaka after the establishment of Dutch factory in here
which was in fact a battle ground in the early years of the seventeenth century. After the
establishment of the Dutch factory in Dhaka, it was being emerge as a commercial centre. In
fact the primary importance of Dhaka to the VOC was that Dhaka played as an important role
as a supply centre. VOC documents show that the Dhaka factory had started its trading
activities soon after the establishment and the commodities procured by the VOC in Dhaka
119 Heeres (ed.), Corpus Diplomaticum, 1596- 1650: 506120 `Onuitgegeven missive van Jan van Elbinck te Pippli aan den gouverneur Arnold Heussen te Pulicat, 20 Mei 1648; van Heussen aan onze vertegen woordigers te Pipli, 9 Juni 1648’ In Heeres (ed.), Corpus Diplomaticum, 1596-1650: 505121 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal: 41122 Dani, Dhaka:Record of a Changing Fortune: 36123 Tavernieer, Travels in India, vol. I: 105
39
were not insignificant in compared to other VOC factories in Bengal. From a letter written in
1652, it is noticed that the VOC ordered silk textiles worth of f 600,000 from Kasimbazar,
saltpeter and textiles worth of f 80,000, commodities from Hugli worth of f 100,000, textiles
from Udaiganj worth of f 120,000, from Balasore sugar, textiles, rice worth of f 50,000, from
Pipli sugar, rice, textile etc. and from Dhaka textiles and etc. worth of f 120,000 (see table.1).
Factory Commodity Amount in
Guilder
Kasimbazar Silk textile 600,000
Dhaka Textiles and etc. 120,000
Patna Saltpeter and
Textiles
80,000
Hugli and its
neighbourhood
…. 100,000
Udaiganj Textiles 120,000
Balasore Sugar, textiles
and rice
50,000
Pipli Sugar, rice,
textiles, etc
60,000
Total f 1130,000
Table- 1: The VOC Supply demand mentioned in a Letter written in 1652
Source: DR. W. PH. Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, van Gouverneurs-Generaal en raden aan heren
XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel II: 1639-1655,( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964): 621-622
40
A letter written in 1656 also informs about the VOC procurement opportunity in
Dhaka. The letter informs that in Patna, the VOC had good opportunity to procure saltpeter
and in Dhaka procurement of cotton textiles was favourable (`gunstig’).124 An early
eighteenth century map shows that in the course of time the VOC expanded its supply centre
in the vicinity of Dhaka such as at Rupganj, Narayanganj, Demrah, Nababganj, Junglebari,
Sonargaon, Keraniganj and Chandpur [also see Map- 2].
Growing up of Dhaka as a commercial centre is also evident from a letter written by
Rading Oecker Sary in 1661 to a Captain of the ship [the name of the ship and the name of
the person is not clear in VOC document], in which he mentioned that Dhaka was now more
successful. But at the same time he was worried about the security of their Dhaka factory
because of the `robbery’ of local influential. He advised for an inquiry of the VOC’s Dhaka
trade as the VOC agents were `robbed’ by the local influential and some of the VOC
cashboxes were lost. He also suggested an investigation of the responsible VOC officials’
activities in Dhaka.125 However the relationship between the Mughal local authority in Dhaka
and the Dutch was not always unfriendly. For instance, sometimes nobles of Dhaka requested
the VOC to import goods from its other trading centre. One such occasion by two merchant
ships Lansmeer and Purmerlant, the VOC imported different goods such as tin, sandalwood,
cinnamon, mace, catty pepper, Japanese copper rode, silver etc.126
We have already stated that the role of Dhaka factory to the VOC was as a supply
centre. Here we see by supplying the commodities to the VOC Bengal trade, Dhaka got
124 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, 1655-1674 , Deel-III: 621-622
125 `Brief een oprecht gemoed en genegentheyd geschreven door Rading Oecker Sary aen den capteyn `t schip In J.A. van Der Chijs, Dag Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1661, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1889): 386-9126 J.A van der Chijs, Dag Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1666-1667, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1895): 135
41
connected directly with the VOC chief factory in Bengal. At the same time the Dutch also
imported commodities from other trading centre to Dhaka. These trading activities connected
Dhaka not only with the trading centres of Bengal but with VOC’s farthest trading centre
such as Batavia, Persia, Japan etc. indirectly. In fact the most important contribution of the
Dutch to the making of Dhaka as a commercial ecntre was that the Dutch linked Dhaka to the
wider trading network of the Dutch.
In conclusion, this chapter argues that the Dutch established their factory in Dhaka in
the second half of the seventeenth century, as the security of Dhaka was improving by 1630s
and onwards, thus a favorable environment was created for trade. During the relentless
warfare between the Arakanese and the Mughal in the early seventeenth century commercial
centres of eastern Bengal were shifting to western Bengal.127
127 See Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 7
42
Conclusion
One of the aims of this thesis was to analyze the validity of the theory of ecological factor
which some historians believe contributed to the emergence of Dhaka. The thesis has
suggested that the so called shifting of the river courses of the Ganges in the late sixteenth
century was not vital to the formation of eastern-Bengal and the emergence of Dhaka. The
shifting of river courses is a usual factor in the history of riverine Bengal. Moreover, the
shifting of courses of the Ganges is debatable. Some historians suggest that the shifting of
river courses took much longer than perceived by Richard Eaton.128 Richard Eaton also
overstates the role of Sufis who according to Eaton contributed to the spread of agriculture in
eastern Bengal. The thesis argues that the role of Islamic leaders was not as prominent in so
called `the land reclamation’ and massive agriculture in eastern Bengal as Eaton states in his
work.129 This thesis also argues that land of eastern Bengal and area around Dhaka was not
marshy land and was not covered by dense forest as Eaton shows in his The Rise of Islam and
the Bengal Frontier 1204/1760. The thesis has suggested that before the Mughal had
penetrated eastern Bengal it had several prosperous areas. Eastern Bengal was not a vacuum
place and unpopulated land. Bara Bhuiyas activities and the Arakanese invasion in eastern
Bengal and slave trade also show that the land was well populated. The thesis also through
doubt on Eaton´s view that soon after the establishment of capital in Dhaka, the Mughal
established control over the whole eastern Bengal.130 For the first two decades in the early
seventeenth century the Mughal had to engage severe battle against the Arakanese.
The thesis has stressed on the principal research question, `why did Dhaka emerge in
the seventeenth century?’. It has been suggested that the emergence of Dhaka in the
128 See Galen, Arakan and Bengal: 244; also Khan, Discovery of Bangladesh: 109129 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier: 207130 Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier:150
43
seventeenth century was due to the Mughals’ economic and political ambition over eastern
Bengal and its neighboring states. During the sixteenth century the Bara Bhuiyas ruled
eastern Bengal. But they had no single political centre. Therefore it was easy for the powerful
Arakanese to establish dominance over Bengal. In the late sixteenth century the strength of
the Bara Bhuiyas and zamindars of Bengal was declining due to the Arakanese dominance in
these areas and also for the internal political crisis. The Mughal found it as a welcoming
situation to establish their capital in Dhaka. However, they had to fight for four years
(c.1608-1612) to establish capital in Dhaka. The Mughals’ ambition was to establish control
over eastern Bengal and to annex their power in the neighbouring states of Bengal. Dhaka
was the most suitable choice to accomplish these aspirations as Dhaka offered a wonderful
launching pad for the military campaigns in Bengal and its neighbouring states.
The thesis has also attempted to answer the sub research question that why and how
the Dutch East India Company established its factory in Dhaka in the second half of the
seventeenth century. The thesis has argued that the Mughals gained more success to ensure
the political stability of Dhaka before 1630s. They had to fight incessantly against the
Arakanese before 1630 to take grip over eastern Bengal. Thus, the commercial centres of
Bengal were normally shifted to western Bengal. As the security and the political stability of
Dhaka improved the Dutch started thinking to establish factory in Dhaka. However, the
process took about fourteen years to finally establish their factory in Dhaka.
The thesis has also illustrated the contribution of the Mughals and the Dutch in the
making of Dhaka. The Mughals´ effort, to the making of Dhaka was that they selected it as
the provincial capital and later ensured the security and political stability of Dhaka. The
contribution of the Dutch East India Company to the making of Dhaka as a commercial
centre is remarkable. The Dutch were the first among the European Companies who
established their factories in Dhaka. The Dutch commercial activities in Dhaka stimulated the
44
commerce of Dhaka. In fact the Dutch connected Dhaka to a wide trading network. Thus the
Dutch contributed to the emergence of Dhaka as a commercial centre in the second half of the
seventeenth century.
45
Biblography
Primary Sources
VOC Sources
Colenbrander, H.T, ed. 1899. Dagh-registers gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende
daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1637 The Hague: M.Nijhoff.
J.A. van Der Chijs, ed. 1899. Dag Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende
daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1661, The Hague: M. Nijhof.
Chijs, J.A van der, ed. 1895. Dag Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende
daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India anno 1666-1667, The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
Coolhaas, DR. W. PH, ed. 1964. Generale missiven van gouverneurs-generaal en raden aan
Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel. II, 1639-1655The Hague :
Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis.
---------, ed. 1964. Generale Missiven, van Gouverneurs-Generaal en raden aan heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel III: 1655-1674, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
J.E Heeres, ed. 1907. Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum: Verzameling van Politieke
contracten en Verdragen de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten, van Privilegebrieven, aan
hen verleend, enz., 1596-1650, Eerste deel, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Archive
Archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, National Archief, Den Haag.
46
Books and Journals
Alam, Muzaffar and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.) 2008. The Mughal State1506-150. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Baines ,Sir Edward. 1835. History of Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain. London: H.
Fisher, R Fisher and P. Jackson
Bangladesh Government. 2009, Statistical Pocket Book. Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of
Statistics, 2008-2009, can be accessed at
http://www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/SubjectMatterDataIndex/
pk_book_09.pdf
Bhatacharya, Sukumar. 1969. The East India Company and the Economy of Bengal. Calcutta:
Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay.
Bowery, Thomas. 1903. A Geographical Account of the Countries round the Bay of Bengal,
1669-1679. Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society.
Bradley-Birt, F.B. 1914. Dacca: Romance of Eastern Capital. London: G. Bell and Sons,
LTD.
Chaterjee, Joya. 2007. Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967. London: Cambridge
University Press.
Chaudhuri, Sushil. 1975. Trade and Commercial Organization in Bengal. Calcutta: Firma
K.L Mukhopaddhay.
Dani, Ahmad Hasan. 2009. Dhaka: A Record of its Changing Fortunes. Dhaka: Asiatic
Society of Bangladesh.
Eaton, Richard M.1993. The Rise of Islam and Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760. California:
University of California Press.
47
Galen,Stephan van. 2008. Arakan and Bengal: The Rise and Decline of the Mrauk U
Kingdom(Burma) from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century AD. Leiden.
Gaastra, Femme F. 2003. The Dutch East India Company, Expansion and Decline. Leiden:
Walburg Pers.
Bhadra, Gautam. 1983. Two Frontier Uprising in Mughal India. In Subaltern Studies II:
Writings on South Asian History and Society, ed. Ranajit Guha. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press: 43-59.
Gommans, Jos. 2002. Mughal Warfare: Indian and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700.
London: Routledge.
Khan, Akbar Ali. 2009. Discovery of Bangladesh: Explorations into Dynamics of a Hidden
Nation. Dhaka: University Press Limited.
Karim, Abdul, Dacca: The Mughal Capital, Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Pakistan:1964
Karim, Abdul. 1991. Origin and Development of Mughal Dhaka. In Dhaka: Past Present
Future, ed. Sharif Uddin Ahmed. Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh: 25-41
Lennert Bes, `Dhaka’s Dutch depictions: Dutch Records on the Capital’s First Two
Centuries’ (Unpublished paper)
Taylor, James. 2010. A Sketch of the Topography and Statistics of Dacca. Dhaka: Asiatic
Society of Bangladesh.
Manrique, Fray Sebastien. 1927. Travels of Fray Sebastien Manrique, 1629-1643, A
translation of the Itinerario de Las Missiones Orientales, translated and edited by Luard.
Eckford, Oxford: The Hakluyt Society.
Manucci, Niccolao. 1965. Storia do Mogor or Mogul India, 1653-1708, Vol- I, translated by
William Irvine, Calcutta.
Nathan, Mirza. 1936. Baharistan-i-Ghayibi: A history of the Mughal Wars in Assam, Cooch
Behar, Bengal, Bihar during the reigns of Jahangir and Shahjahan, Vol.I, trans. M.I Borah,
48
Gauhati: Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Naaryani Handiqui Historical
Institute, Government of Assam.
Prakash, Om. 1985. The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630-1720,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Majumdar, Ramesh Chandra, ed. 2006. The History of Bengal, Hindu period vol-I,. Dhaka:
Dhaka University Press
-------. 1998. Bangla Desher Itihas, Calcutta: General
Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, ed. 2006. The History of Bengal: Muslim Period,1200-1757, Vol-II,
Dhaka: Dhaka University Press.
--------. 1920. Studies in Mughal India, London.
Taifoor. 1952. S.M Glimpses of Old Dacca, Dhaka.
Tavernier, Jean Baptiste . 1925. Travels in India, William Crooke (ed.), Vol.I. London:
Oxford University Press.
Wink, André. 1997. Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, The Slaves Kings and
the Islamic Conquest, 11th-13th Centuries, Vol.-II, Leiden: Brill.
World Bank. 2010. Country Assistance Strategy for the people’s Republic of Bangladesh for
the financial year 2011-2014, can be accessed at
Country Assistance Strategy for the People's Republic of Bangladesh for the Period FY11-
14,
49