automated low altitude air delivery

Automated Low Altitude Air Delivery

J.C. Dauer, S. Lorenz, J.S. Dittrich,DLR (German Aerospace Center), Institute of Flight Systems,

Braunschweig, Germany

Abstract

This paper provides an overview of a recent project of DLR that conceptually considers un-manned air cargo delivery. Flying at very low altitudes to avoid other air traffic and limiting theflight route to low risk areas shall enable a mitigation approach based on the specific operationrisks. For this operation centric approach, many different aspects including aircraft design,flight guidance, on-board hard- and software design, and risk assessment are investigated forpayloads in the range of one ton. The paper outlines the scheme of the project, expectedoutcomes and validation approach.

1. INTRODUCTION

Automated cargo delivery is one of the civil ap-plications for unmanned aircraft (UA) that is oftenconsidered to play a significant role for aviation inthe future. A new project of the DLR (GermanAerospace Center) called Automated Low AltitudeDelivery (ALAADy) investigates the application of avery low level flight unmanned aircraft for an inno-vative approach of cargo delivery. Below commonair traffic, payloads of around 1 t are carried. Thisproject investigates new safety concepts and theeconomical validity of this class of unmanned cargoaircraft (UCA). The aim of this paper is to give anoverview on this new project and its goals.

Unmanned cargo aircraft have received increasingattention in recent years. Small UCA in the range ofa few kilograms of payload, are the focus of ongoingresearch and development that is already achiev-ing high technology readiness levels (TRL). Exam-ples are projects currently present in different me-dia including the DHL Parcelcopter, Amazon PrimeAir and Google’s Project Wing. Smaller companiesalso edging into the market, for example Matter-net, California, which focus on humanitarian appli-cations.

In general, bigger scale systems are currently lim-ited to lower TRLs. One exception is the option-ally piloted Lockheed Martin K-Max, see [16] as an

early reference. Other UCA related projects, suchas Wings for Aid [21] in the Netherlands or a mili-tary application of the DARPA (Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency) financed project ARES(Aerial Reconfigurable Embedded System [1]) workwith lower TRLs.

A significant amount of research has been per-formed for larger scale UCA. The question ofwhether UCA will be accepted by society is partof [15] and is an early example. It was found thatacceptance, especially for UCA, is possible if suffi-cient information is provided.

Airspace integration for high flying UCA was ad-dressed e.g. in [7, 8, 20]. Airspace integrationof low flying drones is currently considered in theNASA Unmanned Aerial System Traffic Manage-ment (UTM) project, cf. [13]. Here, concepts aredesigned and realized that enable information distri-bution about flight corridors for low flying unmannedaircraft.

In the last decade, the need for regulation of civilianunmanned aircraft systems became imminent. Al-though the adaption of the original military technol-ogy seemed to open a lot of civilian business casesinstantly, especially bigger aircraft systems above150 kg were lacking suitable certification bases fordesign. Today, this lack is still present for civilianapplications. Approval and construction regulationswill need to be established by legislature in the fu-

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ture, so that newly developed unmanned aircraftsystems can be certified and approved.

Standardization bodies like EuroCAE (EuropeanOrganisation for Civil Aviation Equipment), RTCA(Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics)early addressed these topics. The effort resultedin requirements and first proposols for certificationspecifications, e.g. CS-LURS (Light Unmanned Ro-torcraft Systems) published by JARUS (Joint Au-thorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems)[12]. However, design of an aircraft can only begin,if the safety target has been defined. This missingingredient of defined safety targets could be cov-ered by the 2nd issue of JARUS AMC-1309 [11],which basically puts the safety target of catastrophicfailures for highly automated vehicles at 10−7 perflight hour.

EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) has pub-lished a new concept of operations for drones inMarch 2015 [3]. This document basically deals withthe regulatory problem, by introducing new risk-based categories allowing to define specific appli-cation tailored safety requirements. EASA now con-siders three different classes for UA, the open, spe-cific and certified category. The major paradigmchange in this approach is that the crash or acci-dent of the aircraft is no longer considered to bea hazard to be prevented. In lieu, there are onlythree safety risks to be addressed: mid-air collisionwith manned aircraft, harm to people and damageto property.

This paradigm is the fundamental prerequisite forthe idea of the ALAADy concept, since by flying lowand potentially applying a traffic management sys-tem like UTM, the first safety risk can be addressed.Harm to people and infrastructure is usually loca-tion dependent. Thus, either an unmanned cargoaircraft is designed to meet thorough airworthinessrequirements making it very unlikely to crash, or al-ternatively the operation is restricted to areas withreduced ground risk. The first method is mirroredby the EASA certified category [4, 5].

The second methodology is enabled by the intro-duction of the specific category, which facilitatesthe use of a specific operation risk assessment(SORA). A similar methodology is already being ap-plied by the Switzerland Federal Office of Civil Avia-tion [6], which is limited to a gross weight of 150 kg.

Interestingly, there is no implicit weight restrictionfor the EASA specific category yet, although there isconflicting information from the official documents,that one might possibly be imposed. For the scopeof the ALAADy project, we assume that the targetedaircraft size could be operated in the yet to be com-pletely defined specific category.

Simplified, this approach bridges the gap to safelyoperate a system of lower reliability compared tomanned aviation and enables a change in designmethodology. While in manned aviation, target fail-ure rates are provided for a certain class of aircraftindependent of its application, these do not exist inthe context of a SORA based approach. Rather, atarget reliability is derived, based on the SORA foreach specific application to which the use of the UAis restricted.

The project ALAADy starts with the design of a UCAconfiguration for one ton of payload as well as pos-sible scenarios for application. The project devel-ops the safety critical components for a full systemsimulation and results in an economical and safetyevaluation of such a system.

We aim at limiting the footprint of the flight routesto unpopulated areas and underneath the altitudeof the remaining air traffic. By doing so, the re-striction to the defined operation conditions can beensured by emergency landing if a violation is im-manent. For this purpose, conventional means offlight termination can be considered. However, assuch a termination would involve financial loss andeven more importantly hinder acceptance to sucha system, inherent safety properties of the vehicleare considered. This inherent property refers to thepossibility to passively perform an emergency land-ing with low impact energy and minimized damageto the system and its surrounding.

Furthermore, an avionics component, a so-calledsafety monitor, constantly supervises the state ofthe system in respect to the operational limitations.This safety monitor is in the chain of safety criticalcomponents ensuring the operation restrictions arenot violated. This monitor triggers re-planning ofthe mission if a violation is expected to occur. As alast resort, the safety monitor also causes an emer-gency landing if all other contingency plans fail. It isthe current understanding that with this safety ap-proach, the reliability requirements of most of the

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other components of the UA can be relaxed, mak-ing for example the flight control and managementsystem less complex and costly without having toreduce functionality.

The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-lows: First, some general aspects on aircraft de-sign are recalled and the unique differences to theapproach used in this project are examined. After-wards, the different work packages of the projectare discussed. Finally, the concept for validation ina scalable simulation environment is sketched.

2. DESIGN METHODOLOGY

An iterative process for the design of a manned air-craft is well established. Figure 1 shows a simpli-fied overview for the design process. It representsa procedure, which starts by defining requirementsand finishes if the process does meet all the require-ments. Based on [14] and [17] the design processcan be sketched as follows.

Requirements, whether requested by a customer(e.g. an airline) or proposed by the manufactureritself, as well as rules, e.g. from Certification Spec-ification 25 (CS-25), are the baseline of the systemdesign. Related to a civil transport airplane, a cus-tomer will quantitatively define fundamental proper-ties like ([17]):

• Payload,

• Range,

• Take-off and landing distance,

• Cruise flight level and speed,

• Maximum size.

Often, existing configurations will be used to givean initial basic airplane design. Those compara-tive studies speed up the aircraft design and endup with one configuration or a set of configura-tions. Within the aircraft design process, differentsub-components are combined. Figure 1 mentionssome examples for those components including siz-ing, selection of propulsion, dimensions of the cabinand fuselage, and other sub-components.

requirements

ok?

sizing propulsion

aircraft design

comparative

configuration

...

performance & costs

studies

wings and fuselage stability and control

no

done

Figure 1: Simplified design process for manned air-craft

Control surfaces, slats and flaps will affect the wingdesign and are fundamental for lift and roll control.Position of the center of gravity and moments of in-ertia determine the elevator and rudder construc-tion. After their arrangement, stability and control-lability are calculated.

Depending on the requirements, adaptation of thecontrol surfaces and tail unit may be necessary.Subsequent to the definition of a landing gear, take-off weight, glide slope, and other properties are cal-culated. Moreover, flight performance is the baseline for calculating operational costs. If either flightperformance or operational costs are not consistentwith the needs and expectations, changes of theplanes’ configuration or its size, will restart the air-craft design process as indicated in the flow of Fig-ure 1.

Sometimes, changes to the requirements must alsobe taken into account. However, the structured de-sign process sketched before will be supported bythe CS-25/ FAR-25 and the Acceptable Means ofCompliance (AMC). Those documents are subse-quently split into a large number of sub-documents.Overall, the design is well established and is basedon a solid fundamental set of rules.

In general, the design process of unmanned aircraftwill be similar to manned aircraft. In contrast, how-ever, due to the undefined safety targets in the oper-ation centric risk context, we apply a slightly altered


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design process as shown in Figure 2. In generalthe flow of the process is equivalent. However, theperformance criteria are now extended by the over-all risks involved in operating the unmanned sys-tem. As a consequence, flight performance, over-all costs and risks in a specific operation now de-termine whether the requirements are fulfilled. Asa system design using the SORA approach hasnot yet been fully established and consequently un-knowns remain, changes in the requirements areprobable during this process.

Other aspects than the aircraft alone, namely theground control station (GCS) and the data links be-tween aircraft and GCS, influence the risks. Fur-thermore, the design of the software is added to theprocess in a very early stage. Development andcertification of the software for aviation, is usuallydone according to the DO-178b/c [18]. A corre-sponding development process involves significantcosts that scale with the design assurance level ofthe software components. In the project ALAADy, itis therefore investigated, if applying a new softwarearchitecture exploiting the potential of operation riskmitigation is likely to reduce the design costs (seenext section).

requirements

ok?

comparative

configuration

performance & costs & risks

studies

no

done

operationallimitations

sizing propulsion geometry stability and control...aircraft design datalink +

GCS

Figure 2: Simplified design process for the un-manned aircraft of ALAADy

If the risks are deemed to be unsatisfactory, two

steps can be undertaken during the design loop ofFigure 2. Either development effort can be investedinto increasing reliability or alternatively, operationallimitations can be introduced or increased ensur-ing safety of the overall system. These limitationscan go beyond what is accepted for manned sys-tems: Unmanned aircraft are often considered tobe designed specifically for a certain kind of mis-sion. The operation limits can go as far as limitingthe unmanned aircraft to that specific mission.

3. GOALS OF THE PROJECT

In the context of the design process definition de-scribed in the previous section, there are four majorquestions the project ALAADy will provide contribu-tions to:

Economic value: In many cases, the use of UA canbe considered as a substitute for an existing solu-tion on the market. The extent to which an UCA isa substitute or enabler of new delivery concepts, isunclear at this point. The circumstances in whichthe use of unmanned aircraft provide an economi-cal benefit over logistic competitors has thus to beaddressed within the project. A set of encouraginguse-cases will therefore be discussed throughout allwork packages.

Risk based approach: The boundaries of the EASAspecific category has not yet been defined. One ofthe reasons is, that classification based on size orweight does not meet the manifold of possibilities ofUA realizations. For this reason, ALAADy investi-gates if a SORA based approach is feasible for asystem of this scale.

Setting/Environment: The environment of UA oper-ation is currently in active development both fromairspace integration and regulatory perspectives. Itwill be investigated how such an integration can beperformed for the proposed UCA, how regulationsaffect the overall costs of such a system and howcooperative detect and avoid functionality can beachieved.

Feasibility: Different aspects of achievablility of theproposed UCA will be investigated. Of special in-terest for ALAADy are the algorithms and softwarerequired for safe operation. But also system ar-chitecture including on-board avionics, datalink and


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ground control station (GCS) are considered con-ceptually.

Figure 3 presents a view on the investigations of theproject. At the beginning, a set of use-cases andaircraft (A/C) configuration is developed. The real-ization is conceived and algorithms dedicated to thenew SORA concept are implemented. Based on thesetting the UCA is operated in, the realization con-cept, both risks and overall costs are determined.

use-cases

A/C confi-gurations

risks

costs

conception

setting

A/C conception

avionics

flight-software

GCS

datalink

airspaceintegration

detect &avoid

regulations

infra-structure

Figure 3: Overview on the aspects of the project

The use-cases are chosen to cover a sufficientlywide range of possible applications. For these ap-plications market analyses are performed. Relevantcompanies that have been identified as possiblestake holders like e.g. logistics providers or sparepart distributors are interviewed. Furthermore, asurvey is performed to asses the applicability of theuse-cases focusing on experts on the capability ofunmanned aircraft. Based on these results yieldmodels are developed and the economical validityof a UCA with the above mentioned requirements isassessed.

Three different aircraft configurations are chosenby two fundamental characteristics. First, inher-ent safety properties are analyzed. This inherencyrefers to the aircraft by itself having a beneficial ef-fect on the risk assessment—e.g. low impact en-ergy or predetermined small areas covered by thegliding phase during an emergency landing. Sec-ond, the following basic flight performance require-ments shall be fulfilled:

• range: 600 km

• cruise speed: 200 km/h

• payload: 1 t

• cargo space: 3·1.3·1.3 m3 ≈ 5 m3

• reduced runway length of < 400 m

A comparative study is performed to select appro-priate configurations. See [10] for details on theperformance part of the study and Figure 4 for animpression.

For the combinations of use-cases and configura-tions realization concepts of the UCA system aredeveloped as shown in the middle block of Figure 3.This process starts by determining involved techno-logical and economical requirements.

The aircraft itself is then assessed using a flight per-formance analysis including the question if innova-tive propulsion technologies would improve the dif-ferent configurations. A structural analysis is alsoperformed. By these means, a mechanical feasibil-ity of the proposed aircraft is evaluated. Addition-ally, the inherent safety properties including pos-sibilities for safe emergency landings are investi-gated.

The on-board hard- and software architecture is de-signed. The components of the on-board softwareare identified and critical ones are implemented fordeeper analysis. We focus on algorithms contribut-ing to the operation centric risk approach. One as-pect is the motion planning toolchain, which shallconsider the operation conditions and risks as wellas motion safety.

Also part of the risk approach is a safety monitor.This monitor will observe the vehicle state and con-stantly compare it to the defined operation limita-tions. It is build on simple concepts and imple-mented using the least complexity possible. If theselimitations are likely to be violated, the mission isaborted and counter measures are invoked. By do-ing so, achieving certification credits for this soft-ware module, which is ideally one of the very fewhighly critical ones, is expected to be facilitated.

An existing ground control station U-Fly of DLR [9]is adapted for the use-cases. Data link conceptsare compared in the context of risk and a selectionis proposed. It will be investigated whether contin-uously available and reliable datalinks for C2 (com-mand and control) and flight termination are nec-essary to ensure the safe operation of the system.From another perspective, the same question is ap-proached by investigating the interplay between the


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(a) Fixed-wing configuration (b) Box-wing configuration (c) Gyroplane

Figure 4: Artistic depiction of the three chosen aircraft configurations

capabilities of the safety monitor and vehicle on theone hand and the requirements of the datalink onthe other hand.

The setting of the UCA is considered during theproject. Possibilities for airspace integration for verylow level flights are discussed. Questions of tech-nologies necessary for separation are equally con-sidered as is the information management betweenthe stakeholders. Closely related is the detect andavoid capability, which is one of the vigorously de-bated topics in the UA community enabling beyond-visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS) flights. For the very lowlevel flight, adequate technologies are reviewed, apromising technology is selected and investigatedin simulation together with the airspace integrationconcept.

Lastly, the aspect of infrastructure is important toreview. Ideally, both dedicated as well as generalairports should be served by the UCA. How the con-nection to a logistic chain could be achieved, effec-tively including possible ways of automation, needsto be explored.

All these different aspects define the unmannedcargo delivery system. All components are then an-alyzed in respect to involved risks in a SORA. Theinteraction between the significant risks found andthe aspects of the UCA are analyzed. The goal ofthis process is to find a relationship between achiev-able safety and costs. This relationship enables op-timizing the limitations of operation due to reducedreliability of the system on the one hand and the de-velopment costs to achieve an increased safety onthe other hand.

4. VALIDATION: SCALABLESIMULATION

To assess the performance of the UCA system be-yond discussion and analysis of the componentconcepts by itself, a simulation is developed. Basedon a configurable simulation environment for un-manned aircraft [2] example missions of all combi-nations of aircraft configurations and use-cases aresimulated. These simulations are combined with anair traffic simulation [19] in order to be able to real-istically populate the airspace.

There are two general goals of these simulations.First, a deeper understanding of integration aspectsof the system shall be generated. While every solu-tion to the low altitude cargo problem as describedin the previous section is assessed by itself, manyimportant aspects are revealed only if the differentsolutions have to work together to form a workingsystem.

For instance, the aircraft configuration type will in-fluences the economics (e.g. fuel consumption perdistance traveled) as well as the complexity of thenecessary safety architecture which drives the sys-tem acquisition cost. These are the kind of trade-offs that are being investigated. To this end, sim-ulation trials will be performed investigating differ-ent aspects of the validation. The simulations alsobuild the foundation for a possible future flight testimplementation on a demonstrator vehicle. By thismeans, the general feasibility of the proposed sys-tem can eventually be assessed beyond the resultsof a pure concept study.

Second, the safety and costs of this concept arebrought into focus. A system of this size has not yetbeen developed using an operation centric risk ap-proach. Therefore, we strive to reach a well basedstatement whether this approach can be applied to


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unmanned cargo aircraft to this scale of payload orif it has a natural limit caused by facets analyzedwithin the project. We discuss the implications thatcertain safety targets have on the overall systemcosts.

To achieve these two goals, different simulationscenarios are developed. Using the configurablesimulation framework presented in [2] the fidelity ofthe modules can be exchanged easily provided theinterfaces remain unchanged. For some scenariosthese levels of fidelity are easily determined. Anexample might be the safety of the path and tra-jectory planning under varying environmental con-ditions like weather.

Simplified, the requirements for the simulation mod-ules are: The algorithms for planning itself have tobe integrated into that simulation, and the aircraftsimulation must be capable of adequately respond-ing to weather conditions. In contrast, for some sim-ulation scenarios, the level of fidelity is not a pri-ori known. One example might be a certain criticalhazardous air traffic situation which will follow thesystematic risk assessment. Only if this scenariois identified, the level of fidelity of the required sim-ulation can be concluded. In the latter example, itmight be sufficient to statically represent the air traf-fic participants only on flight performance level with-out aerodynamic simulation thus significantly reduc-ing the level of complexity.

hypothesis

experiment

module implementation

simulation assembly

complexitymetrics

Figure 5: Simplified simulation experiment defini-tion process

The general procedure of defining a simulation sce-nario follows Figure 5. The process is given bydefining a hypothesis for the simulation first. Threecomponents have to be defined to test this hypoth-esis: the experiment, metrics to measure the fulfill-ment of the hypothesis and lastly the modules’ levelof complexity. The result is a set of requirements

on the simulation modules which will then be devel-oped accordingly. Finally, the simulation assemblywill be performed automatically by the framework.This process contrasts with choosing a simulationenvironment with maximal level of realism. Using ahigh fidelity simulation is best suited for investigativepurposes. In contrast, for validation purposes anadequate implementation of least complexity maybe selected to ease analyzing the relations betweencauses and observations as ambiguity in possiblecauses are avoided.

5. CONCLUSION

In this paper we provide an overview on the goalsof the DLR project ALAADy started in the beginningof 2016 and ending 2018. In this project a low fly-ing unmanned cargo aircraft for one ton of payloadin very low altitudes is investigated. The specificoperation risk approach suggested by EASA will beconsidered and analyzed. A goal of this project is togain knowledge about the general feasibility of sucha system as a first step.

Subsequently, the interplay between operation lim-itations and implied safety targets is analyzed. In-tuitively, this can be understood as the balance be-tween avoiding criticality of a risk by operation limitsor by introducing a sufficiently reliable system de-sign. However, the limits will have an impact on theuse-cases that the unmanned cargo aircraft can beused for and increased safety targets have an im-pact on the development costs. Consequently, it isinvestigated whether a sweet spot between safetyand economical revenue exists.

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based approach to regulation of unmanned aircraft.European Aviation Safety Agency, May 2015.

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Abbreviations

ALAADy Automated Low Altitude Air DeliveryAMC Acceptable Means of ComplianceBVLOS Beyond Visual Line of SightCS-LURS Certification Specification Light Un-

manned Rotorcraft SystemsDARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects

AgencyDLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raum-

fahrt (German Aerospace Center)EuroCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation

EquipmentEASA European Aviation Safety AgencyGCS Ground Control StationJARUS Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Un-

manned SystemsRTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronau-

ticsSORA Specific Operation Risk AssessmentTLR Technology Readiness LevelsUA Unmanned AircraftUCA Unmanned Cargo Aircraft


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automated low altitude air delivery

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