australia’s national security 2007

8/6/2019 AUSTRALIAS national security 2007

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AUSTRALIASNATIONALSECURITYA DEFENCE UPDATE 2007


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CONTENTS

DEFENCE UPDATE 2007 1

PREFACE 7

INTRODUCTION 9

1: AUSTRALIAS STRATEgIC ENvIRONmENT 13

THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 13

Globalisation and its security conseuences 14

Terrorism 14

Fragile states 15

WMD prolieration 15

The use o orce in the 21st century 16REGIONAL IMPACTS 17

Territorial threats 17

The South Pacic and East Timor 18

The broader AsiaPacic 19

The Middle East and Central Asia 21

A MORE CHALLENGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 22

SUMMARY 23

2: AUSTRALIAS DEFENCE POLICY 25WHERE AUSTRALIA MUST LEAD 26

WHERE AUSTRALIA SHOULD CONTRIBUTE 27

SUMMARY 29

3: APPLYINg AUSTRALIAS mILITARY POwER 31

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS 31

Australias role as a security leader 31

Australias role as a security contributor 32

The US alliance 34

Longterm relationships 35

WHOLEOFGOVERNMENT RESPONSES 37

A JOINT AND INTEGRATED ORGANISATION 39

SUMMARY 39


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4: UPDATE ON OPERATIONS 41

MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER PROTECTION : OPERATION RESOLUTE 41

EAST TIMOR/TIMORLESTE : OPERATION ASTUTE AND OPERATION TOWER 42

SOLOMON ISLANDS : OPERATION ANODE 42

IRAq : OPERATION CATALYST 42

AFGHANISTAN: OPERATION SLIPPER AND OPERATION PALATE II 43

ISRAEL/LEBANON : OPERATION PALADIN 44

SINAI : OPERATION MAzURKA 44

SUDAN : OPERATION AzURE 45

SUMMARY 45

5: UPDATE ON CAPAbILITY 49

MARITIME 50

LAND 51

AIR 52

COMMAND, CONTROL AND NETWORKING 53

INTELLIGENCE 53

SUPPORTING AND SUSTAINING OUR FORCES 54

SUMMARY 54

6: UPDATE ON PEOPLE AND RESOURCES 57

RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION INITIATIVES 57

RESERVES 58

DEFENCE ACqUISITION AND INDUSTRY 58

THE DEFENCE ESTATE 60

INTELLIGENCE UPGRADES 62

DEFENCE MANAGEMENT REFORM 62

SUMMARY 64


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PREFACE

PREFACE

How we deend our sovereignty, our citizens

and our interests and our success in doing

so shapes the uture o our nation. This, the

third Deence Update since the White Paper o

2000, provides an update on the Governmentseorts to meet that responsibility.

The Update describes Australias current

strategic outlook. We are experiencing

signifcant change in the international security

environment. Serious threats to stability

continue to emerge rom the Middle East while

in the AsiaPacifc the strategic landscape is

shiting. Relations between the major powers

the United States, Japan, China and India

shape Australias security environment. At the

same time, we are contending with instability

in our immediate region, as well as the global

threat o terrorism and the prolieration o

weapons o mass destruction. This Update

points to the increasing complexity o our

strategic situation and it details our Deence

policy response. Its a challenging business.

The demands placed on Deence, and its

consequential responsibilities and tasks, areunique.

To meet these demands, the Government

is building a balanced, adaptable and

integrated Deence Force. We are responding

to the change in the international security

environment by making the necessary

investments in Deence capability, including

recruitment and retention o personnel.

Deence is working with other agencies in

support o a wholeogovernment national

security response. Internationally, we work

closely with our riends and allies to promote

stability. And we are deepening our relationship

with our key ally, the United States, and with

partners in our region and globally.

The military tasks undertaken by the men

and women o the Australian Deence

Force and the Department o Deence have

increased substantially in diversity, intensity

and tempo. Australia should be proud o the

dedication, proessionalism and versatility

these military and public service proessionals

have shown in response. At the time o this

Update, Australia has over 4,000 personnel

engaged in counterterrorism, counter

insurgency, stabilisation, border protection,

and humanitarian operations in countries

as diverse as Aghanistan, Iraq, East Timor

and Solomon Islands. The Government is

committed to making sure we have a Deence

Force that is well equipped, well trained, ready

to lead in our region and able to contribute

to coalitions around the world wherever

Australias people, interests and values needdeending.

Dr Brendan Nelson, MP

Minister or Deence


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INTRODUCT

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INTRODUCT

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OUR FORCES ARE mORE ACTIvE ON OvERSEAS

OPERATIONS THAN AT ANY TImE SINCE THE vIETNAm wAR.

INTRODUCTION

Australias strategic outlook remains

challenging and dynamic. Since the last

Deence Update, issued in December 2005,

Australia has deployed military orces on a

number o operations in the South Pacic and

urther aeld. These have included sending

Australian Deence Force (ADF) personnel to

both Solomon Islands and to East Timor in

May 2006 when rioting threatened stability

in these close neighbours. As o mid2007,

signicant Australian orces remain in both

countries, working with police and military

personnel rom a number o countries.

Together with New zealand, we sent a small

orce to restore stability in Tonga ater riots

broke out late last year in the capital. In

November 2006, we prepared to help evacuate

Australians rom Fiji ater that countrys ourth

military coup in 20 years. Deence worked

with the Department o Foreign Aairs and

Trade to help evacuate 5,300 Australians

and 1,300 oreign nationals rom the confict

in Lebanon in mid2006. The ADF also

provided medical evacuation ater the May

2006 earthuake in Indonesia, and ater an

earthuake and tsunami in Solomon Islands

in April 2007.

In the Middle East in July 2006, Australian

orces handed over responsibility or the

security o Iras Al Muthanna Province to

Irai authorities. Our orces in the south o

Ira now provide a security overwatch roleand are helping to train the new Irai Army.

Our ships and aircrat are doing essential

work in the northern Gul to protect Iras oil

installations, and our Security Detachment in

Baghdad protects Australian Embassy sta

and other ocials.

In Aghanistan our Special Forces are again

perorming dangerous operations against a

resurgent Taliban in the south o the country.An ADF Reconstruction Task Force is working

with orces rom the Netherlands and other

NATO countries to rebuild basic services and

help bring stability to this remote part o


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Aghanistan. Good progress has been made,

but reconstructing the economy and social

services in Aghanistan and making the

country sae rom the Taliban and al qaeda

will take years.

These activities mean that the ADF has been

going through a very busy period. Our orces

are more active on overseas operations

than at any time since the Vietnam War. The

strategic situation in Australias immediate

region and beyond that the wider Asia

Pacic and across the world is changing in

important ways. Key concerns include how

we deal with the ragile island states o the

South Pacic and how we help East Timor and

other near neighbours who are struggling with

internal problems that weaken their stability.

Terrorism is still a major threat, not just in

the Middle East, but also in Southeast Asia.

We have done a lot to make Australia more

secure against the threat o terrorist attack

but we know that terrorist groups will attack

us at home or target our interests abroad i

they get the opportunity. Australias interests

are also threatened by the dangers o

prolierating weapons o mass destruction

(WMD), including the risk that such weapons

might all into the hands o terrorist groups.

There have been no developments since the

last Deence Update that suggest that we

ace a direct military threat either now or

in the oreseeable uture. However, military

orces in the AsiaPacic region are becoming

increasingly sophisticated and Australia must

work harder to ensure that our orces retain

an edge in leading military capabilities.

The 2003 Deence Update detailed a

rebalancing o military capabilities and

priorities to give our orces extra fexibility,

mobility and the readiness to deal with the

new strategic environment. In 2005, the

Update emphasised the ability to respond

to a wide range o eventualities, including

conventional confict, as well as the

importance o working with other government

agencies such as police and aid workers. The

2007 Update is a logical successor to these

earlier documents and takes them urther.

Because o the increasing complexity o the

international security environment, Australia

must prepare or a range o possible events,

both close to home and urther aeld, with

lessened orewarning o crises. In determining

our response, the Government has careully

assessed our national interests and how wemight best use our armed orces in pursuit

o those interests. In particular, we recognise

that working in partnership with allies and

riends builds our own security, and enhances

regional and global stability.

The Government continues to back its

commitment to Deence, and to ensure it

has the capabilities and resources it needs

to protect Australia, its people and nationalinterests. The 200708 Deence Budget

is $22 billion which is an increase o $2.1

billion or 10.6 per cent on the 200607

Budget, and represents 9.3 per cent o the

Australian Government outlays and 2 per

cent o GDP. Across the ten years to 2017,

the 200708 Budget delivered an additional

$18 billion, which provides or the continued

investment in the ADF o today and the

immediate uture. This unding will see an

investment in a number o capability areas

such as the purchase and support o 24

F/A18 Super Hornet multirole aircrat to

ensure that Australia maintains its air combat

capability edge during transition to the

F35 Joint Strike Fighter. The unding will also

improve the preparedness and sustainability

o 18 highpriority ADF capabilities such as

the Collins submarines, Anac ships and

F/A18 ghter aircrat. Recruitment and

retention, a critical issue acing the ADF, will

also benet rom this budgetary increase.


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SUmmARY

Australia aces a challenging and dynamic

environment, changing in many important

ways. In response, the ADF has been busier

overseas than at any time since the Vietnam

War. The rebalancing o the ADF continues,

and we are continuing to work with allies and

riends to build our own security.


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1

AUSTRALIAS STRATEgIC

ENvIRONmENT

C H A P T E R

IN A gLObALISED wORLD, IgNORINg PRObLEmS FURTHER AFIELDONLY INvITE THESE THREATS TO COmE CLOSER TO AUSTRALIA.

At present Australia does not ace any

conventional military threat to our territory

nor, on current trends, is this likely in the

oreseeable uture. But we cannot be

complacent. Deence must plan or a ull

range o possibilities even i they seem

remote right now. There are also serioussecurity challenges in our nearer region that

reuire Australian military power to help build

stability today. Our national interests as a

democratic, trading and globally engaged

country are threatened by the rise o terrorism

and by instability in areas such as the Middle

East. In a globalised world, ignoring problems

urther aeld only invites these threats to

come closer to Australia. While we all benet

rom globalisation, a more integrated world

and ongoing technological and demographic

change magnies the range and number o

potential threats and the strategic eect

o events, including some distant ones, on

Australias security.

THE STRATEgIC

FRAmEwORk

The Deence 2000 White Paper highlighted

two basic actors that shape Australias

deence outlook and will continue to do so

or years to come. They are the continuingpredominance o the United States, which

acts as a stabilising orce in the Asia

Pacic, and secondly, the security impact o

globalisation. Subseuent Deence Updates

identied terrorism, the prolieration o WMD

and the risks arising rom ragile states

as being immediate threats to Australian

interests. Combined, these actors created

a more complex strategic environment or

Australia. Since the East Timor crisis in

1999, we have reuently had to use the

ADF as well as engage other elements o

national capability, such as the police and

other agencies, and implement economic

and diplomatic measures, in the pursuit o

our strategic interests.


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gLObALISATION AND ITS

SECURITY CONSEqUENCES

Globalisation has provided many community,

social and economic benets to Australia

and other countries. Australia has gained

economic growth, new export markets, and

new immigrants to Australia with their skills

and ideas as conseuences o globalisation.

Australians today are more connected with the

wider world than at any other time in our history,

but the negative side o globalisation is that

this connectedness brings potential security

threats closer to us. Globalisation speeds up

the impact and signicance o existing and

new threats, shortening response times, and

increasing uncertainty. People, money, and

ideas now move aster around the world, not

always or the good. While globalisation oerssignicant opportunities, it also can help the

spread o extremist terrorism and diseases

such as avian infuenza.

These changes are reshaping our security

environment. Some major global powers

have declining ertility rates, which puts

pressure on labour orce numbers, resources

and budgets. In much o the developing

world, rapid population growth is producing

youth bulges, but their economies struggle

to create sucient jobs to enable these

young people to make a productive living. In

much o the developing world, too, there is a

massive relocation o rural people into large

cities which lack adeuate inrastructure and

opportunities or their growing populations.

In some parts o the world this situation is

contributing to a rise in support or extremist

ideologies. As urbanisation increases, so too

does the risk o health pandemics, a potential

source o great harm to Australia.

Natural events such as the 2004 Boxing

Day tsunami or severe cyclones in the

Pacic can cause ood, water and resource

shortages. Such disruption may result in

calls or Australian military intervention and

humanitarian relie. In our region Australia

can expect that we will oten be called upon

to help in these circumstances.

TERRORISm

Violent extremist terrorism will remain

a threat around the world or at least a

generation, and probably longer. This war is

very dierent rom those we have ought in

the past. Terrorism ignores borders and has

no rontlines. It has no capital that can be

captured, nor government structure that can

be compelled to surrender. It oten sets outto attack civilians, and it increasingly uses

the openness o our societies against us.

No terror group has the power to invade or

take territory rom Australia. But that does

not mean we can aord to ignore groups

such as al qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

Terrorists threaten our national interests,

including the saety o Australian citizens,

businesses and Australian government

activities abroad. Terrorism can have a

strategic eect. A particularly severe threat

would arise i terrorists were to obtain WMD.

It will take a sustained eort over many years

to overcome the dangers posed by terrorists.

Military operations against terrorism are only

part o the story. We must undercut support

or terrorism by promoting stable, democratic

societies, including in those countries

where organisations like the Taliban once

fourished.

IT wILL TAkE A SUSTAINED EFFORT OvER mANY YEARS TO OvERCOmE

THE DANgERS POSED bY TERRORISTS.


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FRAgILE STATES

Fragile states are especially vulnerable to

the damaging eects o transnational crime

and insurgencies. Such states can potentiallybecome havens or criminals and terrorists

who want to operate without being harassed

by governments. In our immediate region, the

cost o dealing with ragile states includes

expensive military and police deployments

and aid programmes designed to strengthen

the ability o ragile states to run their own

aairs. Our aim is to help build strong,

cohesive, democratic states, because these

are best placed to meet their citizens needs

and contribute to a stable neighbourhood.

In our region some vulnerable states are

struggling to deliver basic services to their

citizens because they lack the economic

capacity, and because government systems

are weak and oten corrupt. These are not

easily solvable problems. Many weak states

wait until disaster strikes beore seeking

assistance, most oten in some orm o

military support.

The ripple eects o ragile states on security

can reach around the world. The proximity

o weak states in our region means that

Australia must take their vulnerabilities

seriously and work with governments and

others to oer help. Building and restoring

nations can take many years and will cost

many millions o dollars to help overcome

economic and security weaknesses, pay or

our ADF operations, and provide policing

and assistance to improve the uality o

government. But these costs will be ar less

than attempting to reconstruct small states

that have been shattered by confict becausewe ailed to intervene at an earlier stage.

wmD PROLIFERATION

Unlike the Cold War, when the danger o

nuclear warare between the superpowers was

a realistic concern, the primary worry about

WMD technology today is the prolieration o

such weapons by countries like North Korea

and Iran and to socalled nonstate groups,

such as al qaeda. Australia criticised North

Koreas nuclear test last year. Not only did

...THE PRImARY wORRY AbOUT wmD TECHNOLOgY TODAY IS THE

PROLIFERATION OF SUCH wEAPONS bY COUNTRIES LIkE NORTH kOREA

AND IRAN AND TO SOCALLED NONSTATE gROUPS, SUCH

AS AL qAEDA.


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it raise tension in a strategically vital part o

the world, but it has made the challenge o

nonprolieration and counterprolieration

more urgent.

As we noted in the 2003 Update, WMD are

the ultimate asymmetric threat. We know that

terrorist groups, al qaeda among them, are

interested in buying or developing rudimentary

WMD. Increasingly we see that military

capabilities which were once available only to

states are being used by terror groups and

other nonstate actors. Nowhere is this more

worrying than when it might involve WMD.

Nonstate groups, particularly extremist,

decentralised, cellular networks, are unlikely

to be deterred rom using such weapons by

the threat o retaliation. So Australia has an

overriding interest to prevent the spread o

WMD by backing arms control agreements

and applying active countermeasures

with our allies such as the Prolieration

Security Initiative (PSI) where prolierationis discovered.

THE USE OF FORCE IN THE

21ST CENTURY

Al qaedas attacks in the United States on

11 September 2001 brought home the

changing nature o how orce can be used to

bring about political goals. The attacks on the

World Trade Centre and the Pentagon wereunconventional warare at its most violent

and indiscriminate worst.

On the conventional military battleeld a orce

like the ADF is easily superior in repower

to nonstate opponents. We are continuing

to improve the lethality and precision o our

orces. Yet we are constrained in ways non

state groups are not. Terrorist organisations

like al qaeda have no concern about targetinginnocent civilians or about hiding their orces

within the civilian population. The rapidly

reducing costs o technology allow these

groups to use technology as a orce multiplier

and to expand their reach. For example, the

clever use o communications technology

is helping terrorist groups to expand their

support base and to spread propaganda

among their opponents. The increased

capability o terrorists and insurgents

against a wellarmed nation was illustrated

during the IsraelHezbollah confict in 2006.

The use o both civilian and conventional

military capabilities by these groups in oteninnovative and nonconventional ways is

particularly worrying.

The ADF will always need to retain a ualitative

edge in its conventional military capabilities

a substantial challenge in itsel. But military

orces are increasingly expected to perorm

a variety o roles uite dierent rom ghting

other armed orces. These can include

stabilisation activities similar to those weare undertaking in East Timor and Solomon

Islands, peacekeeping and peacemaking, and

general security operations like those the ADF

provided during the 2006 Commonwealth

Games in Melbourne.

The ADF increasingly will be called on to ght

irregular opponents and must thereore be

able to mount counterterrorism and counter

insurgency operations, including hostagerescue tasks. Humanitarian relie missions

are also taking on a higher priority. More

generally, nonconventional and humanitarian

missions will engage more military resources,

time and eort. A credible and capable

military remains a crucial complement to

what some call sot power: diplomacy, aid,

cultural ties, peopletopeople contacts,

trade, and institution building.


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These developments have added a new

dimension to the roles and responsibilities

o the ADF. But we must also remain alert to

more conventional military dangers. Because

o the major power dynamics in our region

and the existence o critical fashpoints,

there is always the possibility o strategic

miscalculation that could lead to confict.

Australia needs to watch these risks closely,

because conventional confict in the Asia

Pacic would almost certainly engage our

national interests, and may do so with little

warning.

Closer to home in Southeast Asia, the

capabilities o military orces are increasing

as states modernise their euipment and

improve training. We expect that the ocus

o regional countries will continue to be on

using their military orces to build national

cohesion and domestic security. Our aim is

to work with our riends and neighbours to

promote regional security. One way we do this

is by cooperating with the deence orces o

many Southeast Asian states. Strong, stable

military orces in our region that work together

will enhance rather than weaken our security.

REgIONAL ImPACTS

TERRITORIAL THREATS

As in 2000, Australia does not ace any

direct threat to its territory. But althougha conventional attack on Australia seems

very remote, we must be able to deend

ourselves and to be seen by riends and

neighbours alike as taking this responsibility

seriously. We can hardly expect allies to help

us i we dont provide or our own security.

The deence o Australia thereore remains

THE ADF INCREASINgLY wILL bE CALLED ON TO FIgHT IRREgULAR

OPPONENTS...bUT wE mUST ALSO REmAIN ALERT TO mORE

CONvENTIONAL mILITARY DANgERS.


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a undamental task. While our physical

geography and maritime approaches give us

a natural strategic depth, we are aced with

much more immediate security challenges,

including nontraditional threats that wont

be deterred by our geography. These include

extremist terrorists, backed by global networks

o supporters; spillover eects rom weak

and ailed states; WMD prolieration; and

potentially, the conseuences o health

pandemics.

THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND

EAST TImOR

Many o the South Pacic island states

and East Timor continue to be scarred by

political, social and economic instability. For

many South Pacic states, weak governance,

crime and social instability are a real threat

to economic development. Papua New

Guineas (PNG) problems are compounded

by its relatively large size around 5.9

million people growing at around 2.7 per

cent a year. Major eorts are needed to

improve and rebuild inrastructure, law and

order, education and health care i the PNG

government is to meet the challenges o

ast population growth, youth unemployment,

and criminality, including raskol gangs. East

Timor aces similar economic growth and

population problems. One o the worlds

newest independent states, it must build the

habits and practice o a sovereign nation whileacing a signicant task o reconciliation and

reconstruction. Fijis ourth coup in 20 years

wE DO NOT bELIEvE THAT ANY REgIONAL POwER IS EAgER TO SEE

FUNDAmENTAL gEOSTRATEgIC CHANgE...bUT THERE IS ALwAYS A

POSSIbILITY OF STRATEgIC mISCALCULATION.


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has overturned parliamentary democracy,

set back the countrys economic prospects

and heightened perceptions o increased

instability in the region.

Australia is linked to the region by our history

as well as geography, and we have a lasting

commitment to help build stability and

prosperity. There is no easy solution: some o

these states lack the basics o sustainable

economic, institutional and inrastructure

development, and their limited budgets

and porous borders make them potentially

vulnerable to adverse infuences. Australia

will commit resources, including those o

the ADF, and work cooperatively with our

neighbours to overcome these problems.

THE bROADER ASIAPACIFIC

Australias uture strategic landscape will

be shaped by how the worlds major powers

the United States, Japan and China in

particular deal with each other in the Asia

Pacic. Thus ar the prospects are good.

The AsiaPacic has beneted rom a status

uo where the United States has been the

predominant military power or over 50 years.

This has underpinned the regions remarkable

economic growth or decades. We do not

believe that any regional power is eager to see

undamental geostrategic change. Still, as

China and India grow, and the United Statesrebalances its global commitments, power

relations will change, and as this happens

there is always a possibility o strategic

miscalculation.

The United States will remain the dominant

global economic, technological and military

power at least or some decades. The 2000

White Paper recognised that US primacy was

a oundation o the AsiaPacics stability,

and that remains the case now. Through its

military presence in the region and its bilateral

and alliance relationships with key players,

the United States will remain the major

shaper o international security, including in

the AsiaPacic, as the United States adapts

and modernises its military posture.

Australia has no closer nor more valuable

partner in the region than Japan. Japans more

active security posture within the US alliance

and multinational coalitions is in keeping

with its economic and diplomatic weight and

has long been supported by Australia. In that

role Japan has made valuable contributions

to operations in East Timor and Ira, and

Australia welcomes its eorts to contribute

more directly to regional and global stability.

Japans alliance relationship with the United

States has been one o the stabilising

eatures o postWorld War II Asia, and willcontinue to play an important role. Trilateral

cooperation between Australia, Japan and the

United States will be increasingly important

in this context. The AustraliaJapan Joint

Declaration on Security Cooperation marks an

important milestone in the bilateral security

relationship.

Chinas emergence as a major market and

driver o economic activity both regionallyand globally has beneted the expansion

o economic growth in the AsiaPacic and

globally. But the pace and scope o its military

modernisation, particularly the development

o new and disruptive capabilities such as the

antisatellite (ASAT) missile (tested in January

2007), could create misunderstandings and

instability in the region.

THE USCHINA RELATIONSHIP IS CRUCIAL

TO ASIAPACIFIC SECURITY.


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China has a legitimate interest in protecting itsown security. It has tremendous opportunities

to exert its claim as a responsible stakeholder

in regional security. China is the nation with

the greatest infuence over North Korea, and

we strongly encourage Chinas eorts to

moderate North Koreas behaviour. Taiwan

remains a source o potential strategic

miscalculation and were that to happen it

could have disastrous conseuences or the

region, and or global security. All parties

should strive or a peaceul approach to

the issue o Taiwan. Australia continues to

support the status uo and the One China

policy as the basis o our approach to the

issue.

The USChina relationship is crucial to

AsiaPacic security. Both countries are

increasingly dependent on each other or

trade and nancial and economic prosperity.

But while economic cooperation is high, there

is also an element o strategic competition.

The relationship must be managed careully

or the good o the entire region. Chinas

relationship with Japan is also a complex mix

o economic, security and political actors.

As Japan increases its security role Beijing

and Tokyo will have to work their way careully

through a changing strategic environment.

The Korean Peninsula lies at a strategic

crossroads. Its geography makes it vitally

important to China, Japan and Russia, and

South Korea is an important ally o the United

States. Australia strongly condemned North

Koreas nuclear weapons test on 9 October

2006. The test has heightened tensions

on the Korean Peninsula. A nucleararmed

North Korea threatens regional peace andstability. While diplomatic eorts have

produced undertakings or North Korean

wE REmAIN COmmITTED TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEgRITY OF

INDONESIA.

denuclearisation, its policy o brinkmanshipand belligerence continues to have a

destabilising eect on North Asia.

Indias expanding economy and greater

international engagement, including closer

relations with the United States, are giving

New Delhi a stronger voice on international

strategic matters. Australian and Indian

interests converge on key issues o global

stability, and we look orward to increasingdeence and security cooperation.

In Southeast Asia, or the next ew years

the most pressing security issues will be

about internal security matters. Terrorism,

insurgency and communal violence ester in

parts o the region, and we expect regional

governments will continue to ocus their

security eorts on them. There have been

some signicant achievements. Ater ouryears where there had been at least one

major, largescale attack a year on Australian

and Western interests in Indonesia, JI has

ailed to successully conduct an attack since

the second Bali bombings in October 2005.

The ollowing month an Indonesian police raid

killed JIs chie bomb maker and Indonesian

police and intelligence in cooperation

with Australia oiled planned attacks and

disrupted JI cells in Sulawesi and Java.

The consolidation o democracy in Indonesia

is also a very welcome development and it has

given that country its best chance or long

term stability and prosperity. As we indicated

by our signature o the Lombok Treaty in

November 2006, we remain committed to

the territorial integrity o Indonesia. We see

a stable and secure Indonesia as integral to

the democratic and economic reorms under

way, and that is also very much in Australias


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AUSTRALIASSTRATEGIC

ENVIRONMEN

T

21

own strategic interest. Still, democratic

government has not proven as resilient in

other parts o the AsiaPacic, as military

coups in Thailand and Fiji show.

Australia also values our close dialogue and

engagement with our other ASEAN partners,

particularly Singapore, Malaysia, and the

Philippines. This will help strengthen regional

cooperation, and improve the capacity o

states to look ater their own security.

THE mIDDLE EAST ANDCENTRAL ASIA

Many o the worrying strategic trends

highlighted in this Update intersect in the

Middle East. Terrorism inspired by religious

extremism, WMD prolieration, environmental

and demographic challenges, stagnant

economies and, in some cases, poor uality

political governance are all eatures o the

region.

We expect Australias strategic involvement

in the Middle East to continue, refecting

the continuing importance o the region to

our security and broader national interests.

Three eually important actors drive that

assessment. First, the United States will

remain heavily engaged in the Middle East,

including Ira and Aghanistan. Although

its strategies and military presence may

adapt, the United States does not have a

realistic option to withdraw rom the region

because to do so would undermine its own

security, and that o its allies. Second, the

wE ExPECT AUSTRALIAS STRATEgIC INvOLvEmENT IN THE mIDDLE

EAST TO CONTINUE, REFLECTINg THE CONTINUINg ImPORTANCE OFTHE REgION TO OUR SECURITY AND bROADER NATIONAL INTERESTS.


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AUSTRALIASSTRATEGIC

ENVIRONMEN

T

22

strategic interests and resource needs o

emerging global powers such as China and

India, as well as our major trading partners,

are increasingly tied to the Middle East.

Last, extremist terrorism continues to draw

unding, support and people rom the Middle

East. For as long as that is true Australia and

likeminded countries need to ght terrorism

at its source rather than wait or it to come

to our shores.

The stakes are high in Ira and Aghanistan,

not only or the peace and stability o those

countries, but also because the outcome

will infuence how the United States uses

its power in uture to deal with security

challenges. Ultimately our own security and

that o the AsiaPacic is tied to nding a

sustainable balance in the Middle East that

weakens terrorism and enhances stability.

To help deeat terrorism Australia must have

patience, a sustained military commitment,

a willingness to adapt to conditions on the

ground and work closely with our riends and

allies.

Consideration o the security situation in theMiddle East must also contend with WMD

prolieration. Irans nuclear plans remain a

major concern. A nucleararmed Iran would

be a ur ther cause o regional instability. Irans

activities have been condemned consistently

by the United Nations Security Council.

Sanctions have been imposed to enorce

principles o nuclear nonprolieration. We

recognise there is also a need or continued

and increased diplomacy by concerned

nations to counter Irans nuclear ambitions.

A mORE CHALLENgINg

STRATEgIC

ENvIRONmENTDespite the security challenges posed by

terrorism as serious as they are nation


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AUSTRALIASSTRATEGIC

ENVIRONMEN

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23

states are still the key players shaping our

security environment. In Asia, we can see

both strengthening nationstates as well as

challenges to state sovereignty. In the Middle

East, nationstates are under increasing

pressure, including rom nonstate groups.

Such changing patterns o power, orce and

capability have strategic implications or

Australia. Since the White Paper o 2000,

the Updates have tracked the emergence onew security structures and new challenges

to stability.

So Australia must prepare prudently or a

range o deence contingencies, rom small

scale local concerns and possibilities, to

unanticipated, statebased confict. We are

well placed to play a greater regional and

global role in strengthening security, and we

have a solid track record working with othersto keep our region peaceul. The next chapter

examines the key elements o our deence

policy and the impact these have on the

shape o our military orces.

SUmmARYGlobalisation, terrorism, the challenges posed

by ragile states and the threat o WMD

prolieration all continue to shape our security

environment. We also need to take into

account relations between the major powers

in our region and the changes in the use o

orce by states and terrorists. Because o their

importance to our interests and their potential

to reshape global security, the Middle East

and AsiaPacifc will continue to ocus ourattention or some time.


24/65

AUSTRALIASSTRATEGIC

ENVIRONMEN

T

24


25/65

AUSTRALIASDEFENCEPOLICY

25

AUSTRALIAS DEFENCE POLICY

Understanding our strategic environment and

the longterm trends that are changing the

AsiaPacic region is the starting point or

the Government when it comes to making

decisions about the sie and shape o the

ADF. The strength o Australias economy is

undamental to our ability to provide or our

deence. But budgets are always limited, so

dicult choices have to be made about thepriorities we set or our military orces. It is

vital to have a clear deence policy ramework

that guides decisions about developing the

ADFs capabilities and helps us to judge

when, where and how we might use our

military power.

The rst duty o the Government is to

guarantee Australias national sovereignty,

protect our citiens and promote Australiasinterests. To uphold that duty, the Government

must ensure:

security at home, to keep Australia ree

rom direct threat;

2C H A P T E R

DEFENCES ENDURINg STRATEgIC PRIORITY IS TO kEEP AUSTRALIA

AND THE AUSTRALIAN PEOPLE SAFE FROm ATTACk OR THE THREAT OFATTACk, AND FROm ECONOmIC OR POLITICAL COERCION.

continued avourable economic conditions,

essential or a trading nation and to allow

us to sustain our way o lie; and

a benign international security environment

that promotes our national interests,

including the saety o Australians

overseas.

The Governments enduring strategic priority

is to keep Australia and the Australian people

sae rom attack or the threat o attack, and

rom economic or political coercion. A secure

Australia depends on a benign security

environment; and in turn this depends on

continued economic growth, and the security

and stability o our allies and trading partners.

Stability and prosperity at home allows

Australia to contribute to the wider regional

and global security environment, and so to

promote avourable economic conditions.

The possibility o unexpected shocks to our

security arising rom some o the trends

described in the last chapter is high, though

the timing and eect o such events are hard


26/65


2

to gauge. Deence policy must be realistic

about the limits o sie and scale Australia

aces. We have to take this into account in the

design o the ADF. For example, maintaining

a mass army on the same scale as some

o our neighbours is not possible given

our demography, workorce and relatively

small population. So the task o structuring

Australias deence policies and capabilities

is a challenging one.

Our deence planning will always include a

ocus on our region. We live in an uncertain

and changing part o the world where strategic

shits are challenging our assumptions about

stability. For example, statebased confict in

North Asia though a low probability cannot

be ruled out. We must rethink the amount

o warning time we might receive about a

strategic shock and closely watch the growth

o military capabilities in other deence orces

in our region. Still, our geographic distance

rom many conficts can work to our advantage,

as does the act that we have good relations

with our neighbours.

wE LIvE IN AN UNCERTAIN AND CHANgINg PART OF THE wORLD

wHERE STRATEgIC SHIFTS ARE CHALLENgINg OUR ASSUmPTIONS

AbOUT STAbILITY.

It is the Governments policy that our armed

orces must be able to deend Australia

without relying on the combat orces o other

countries. We must be the sole guarantor o

our own security. It is not healthy or a country

to become dependent on another or its basic

deence. That situation would not be good or

Australia or our allies. Further, i Australia

was ever to be directly threatened, our allies

may well be engaged elsewhere, and unable

to assist. This may sound unlikely, but it was

a hardlearned lesson rom the Second World

War.

wHERE AUSTRALIA mUSTLEAD

We must be able to limit the options o

potential adversaries in our area o paramount

deence interest. That means it is essential

or the ADF to have the capacity to act

decisively on security issues and be able to

deter and i necessary deeat any aggressive

act against Australia or our interests in that

area. Our area o paramount deence interest


27/65


2

includes the archipelago and the maritime

approaches to Australia to our west, north

and east, the islands o the South Pacic as

ar as New zealand, our island territories and

the southern waters down to Antarctica.

Being able to reach beyond our immediate

region or a variety o deence tasks helps

us secure our deence. Such tasks might

range rom assisting civil authorities such

as the police and Customs, to adapting to

challenges posed by increasingly capable

adversaries and to participate in large

scale coalition operations. Having a strong

military capability reinorces our diplomatic

and economic power and it reassures our

neighbours that Australia is not vulnerable to

an aggressor that could destabilise the wider

region. It also contributes to the strength o

our vital alliance with the United States.

A urther consequence o the need to be able

to play a leading deence role in our immediate

region is that Australias orces must maintain

a high level o preparedness that is, the

capacity to be used on operations at short

notice. The greater distance our orces may

have to travel decreases the time available to

respond to any event it takes longer to getto the emergency and oten longer or allies to

assist. So it remains in Australias interest to

keep the initiative. Greater preparedness also

deters wouldbe aggressors by complicating

their task. The ability to control our air and

sea approaches, as noted in Deence 2000,

has evolved through necessity to cover our

area o paramount deence interest. I need

be, Australia must be prepared to assume

bEINg AbLE TO REACH bEYOND OUR ImmEDIATE REgION FOR A vARIETY

OF DEFENCE TASkS HELPS US SECURE OUR DEFENCE.

the burden o maintaining peace and stability

locally, not least as a bulwark or our own

security.

wHERE AUSTRALIA

SHOULD CONTRIbUTE

Further aeld, Australia cannot expect to

predominate as a military power nor ordinarilywould it act alone. Australia will work to create

a benign regional security environment and

pursue our national interests in conjunction

with allies and riends. Australia will aim to

make signicant ADF contributions to coalition

operations where our national interests

are closely engaged. Our range o potential

military contributions covers the spectrum

o ADF capability, rom its core task o war

ghting, through to running stabilisation

operations and humanitarian response

missions. These tasks will oten be perormed

in close cooperation with civilian elements

and agencies such as the Department o

Foreign Aairs and Trade, police and aid

organisations. The nature o these individual

contributions their shape, sie, complexity

will vary according to circumstance. For

example, in the last ew years, signicantcombat orces, including air and sea units,

have been deployed regionally and to the

Middle East. The security, capacitybuilding

and training taskorces assigned under

Operations Catalyst, Slipper, Astute and Anode

also comprise signicant contributions to the

pursuit o Australias strategic interests. The

ADF has specic skill sets oten requested

or coalition purposes, such as special orces

and airtrac controllers.


28/65


2

Australias national interests are not spread

uniormly across the globe, but nor do they

decline in proportion to the distance rom our

shoreline. For the oreseeable uture, we can

expect there will need to be a Deence ocus

on security in both the AsiaPacic and the

Middle East or the reasons outlined earlier:

the AsiaPacic is our neighbourhood, while

our strategic interests are vitally engaged in

the Middle East.

While Australia has a wide strategic outlook

and a clear interest in promoting a peaceul

global security environment, our limited

resources mean that we must design the

shape o ADF contributions to coalition

operations careully and without wasting

resources. We must distinguish between

issues in which our national interests are

directly engaged and those where we have a

general commitment because o our broader

humanitarian responsibilities. Examples o

discretionary contributions could include

deploying medical teams or planning ocers

to UN missions. Australia has made and

will continue to make such humanitarian

contributions, but these clearly engage our

security interests in a ar less direct way than

operations in our immediate region.

At a time o big strategic change it makes

more sense to work with others to ensure

peace and stability and to build a robust

military orce able to deal with many

tasks and roles. We can expect to see

more security partnerships and increased

AT A TImE OF bIg STRATEgIC CHANgE IT mAkES mORE SENSE

TO wORk wITH OTHERS TO ENSURE PEACE AND STAbILITY

AND TO bUILD A RObUST mILITARY FORCE AbLE TO DEAL

wITH mANY TASkS AND ROLES.


29/65


2

cooperation with our regional riends and

allies. This cooperation will range rom local

multilateral security assistance provided to

nations such as Solomon Islands and East

Timor, to participation in larger undertakings,

such as our involvement in Aghanistan and

Iraq, and our close cooperation there with

the United States, the United Kingdom,

Japan and deployed NATO orces. These

partnerships enhance the ADFs capabilities,boost Australias international standing and

contribute prooundly to the security o our

region.

SUmmARYDeences enduring task is to keep Australia

and its people sae rom attack and rom

military coercion. Deence policy will always

have a home bias we need certainty close

to home, and expect to lead in shaping the

security in our immediate region. But we also

recognise our interests oten must be secured

in places distant rom Australia. In those

circumstances, we expect to work with allies

and riends. Our contributions will refect theimportance o our interests and a best t

with the task at hand and the nature o the

overall operation.


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APPLYINGAUSTRALIASMILITARYPOWER

30


31/65


31

APPLYINg AUSTRALIAS mILITARY

POwER

3C H A P T E R

In previous Updates we identied global

terrorism, WMD prolieration and ragile states

as major concerns or Australian security.

We know these developments continue to

shape Australias environment, and Deence

must respond to the security concerns they

present. We also work to help the major

powers in our region maintain a constructive

dialogue with each other. Deence plays an

active part in regional security dialogues with

riends and neighbours.

INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY

PARTNERSHIPS

It is becoming hard to separate the global,

regional and local dimensions o security

threats. Australias strategic interests can

oten be aected by events geographically

ar away. But partly because o geography,

and partly because o limited resources,

Australia mostly chooses to work in coalition

with riends and allies when our interests

are aected in places beyond our immediate

area o paramount deence interest. It has

always been the Australian way to cooperate

with riends and allies. Whatever the military

task, be it detection, deterrence, prevention,

response, or reconstruction, we need partners

to help promote our security interests on the

wider world stage. Right now, that means

we must work hard to boost our security

partnerships, reinvigorate those already

established, and explore opportunities or

new partnerships to help us better deal with

todays security problems.

AUSTRALIAS ROLE AS A

SECURITY LEADER

Deence, at government direction, has

increased eorts to help stabilise dangerous

situations in ragile states. Our approach is

to lead, shape and engage: that is, we aim

to be the leading power in our immediateregion in bringing together military coalitions

that will shape positive security outcomes. As

much as possible we will do this by engaging

IT HAS ALwAYS bEEN THE AUSTRALIAN wAY TO COOPERATE wITH

FRIENDS AND ALLIES.


32/65


32

local communities in aected countries

and working with our security partners. It

is important that we try to build coalitions

o riends and neighbours in our region.

Australias strategic leadership benets

greatly rom our established partnerships in

the region, particularly with New zealand and

the island states o the South Pacic.

Capacity building remains a ocus o

our eorts in the South Pacic. We are

encouraging nations to establish more co

operative approaches to security, especially

in maritime surveillance. We are helping

regional security orces build the skills and

proessionalism, and the development o

appropriate civilmilitary relations, to enable

them to provide eective and appropriate

responses to national security challenges.

For example, we provide inrastructure

assistance to PNG and ADF advisers to the

PNG Deence Force. We also advise PNG on

weapons security and control, organisationalimprovements and budget, expenditure and

nancial management. In the South Pacic,

our deence cooperation programme oers

training opportunities in areas ranging rom

English language skills to engineering, inantry

and command. We also sponsor a range o

multilateral exercises and activities, including

humanitarian and disaster relie exercises,

maritime surveillance, and communications

projects. Through our eorts we aim to raise

skills and awareness and so the ability o

regional nations to work with us. That also

helps develop a more cohesive response to

security issues within our immediate region,

in partnership with our riends and allies.

Still, our approach particularly in Solomon

Islands and East Timor needs a lot o

patience. Progress is not assured, and oten

depends on a willingness to bring together

commitments to change the political,

economic, social and security situation.

Positive change takes time to gain momentum

and to oer tangible and sustained benets

or local populations. The path will not always

be smooth or assured, but by paying attention

and committing to security and stabilisation

eorts over the long term, we will build a

more stable environment in Australias near

region.

We expect Australia will oten be called on to

act as a security leader within our immediate

neighbourhood. We should not plan to rely

on the security capabilities and resources

o our riends and allies to assist in military

operations in our immediate region. In many

cases Australia will be called upon to lead

other countries, and to provide them with

key military resources like logistic support

and air and sea transport that will make it

possible or smaller countries to participate in

regional security missions. A strong network

o regional deence cooperation links is an

important oundation or successul regionalcoalition operations.

AUSTRALIAS ROLE AS A

SECURITY CONTRIbUTOR

Australia has or many years been an important

contributor to security operations around the

world. We aim to make sure the ADF operates

where it can add the most practical value to

missions that are important or global stability

and our national interest. We work with allies

and partners to achieve mutual security goals.

The orces we oer to international operations

need to be balanced against the demands

on other ADF commitments and the impact

they will have on our deence capabilities as

a whole. Some elements o our orces will

oer greater complementarity with partners

than others. A key consideration is to makesure our contribution achieves the best

eect given the circumstances, threats and


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33

wE ExPECT AUSTRALIA wILL OFTEN bE CALLED ON TO ACT AS A

SECURITY LEADER wITHIN OUR ImmEDIATE NEIgHbOURHOOD.

opportunities. So while the AsiaPacic and

the Middle East are both vital to Australian

interests, our Deence involvement in each

diers substantially.

In the Middle East, or example, we have

committed substantial Deence resources.

In Aghanistan, the ADF is working with NATO

orces a Dutch contingent as part o theInternational Security Assistance Force. An

ADF Reconstruction Task Force is helping to

rebuild and improve local inrastructure, rom

schools to hospitals, roads and bridges. In

a dangerous theatre o war, reconstruction

helps to bring hope and promote stability by

strengthening local capacity and increasing

security. This substantial Australian

contribution complements the eorts made

by NATO and US orces to strengthen a

weak state, disrupt terrorist operations and

bolster security. The Government believes

an ongoing commitment to Aghanistan is

important. The Government believes it is vital

we stay the course in Aghanistan. Retreat

now would weaken Aghanistans chances or

democracy, strengthen terrorism and make it

look as though we were not serious about our

own security.

In Ira, Australian orces were dispatchedto uphold Australias support or long

standing United Nations Security Council

resolutions against the danger o Ira

regaining a WMD capacity. This refected a

undamental Australian and global security

concern. Our orces are now operating with

a coalition o allies and partners that have

a common interest in helping build a stable

Ira ollowing the all o Saddam Husseins

regime. Australia will continue to honour our

obligations to the Irai people, and help them

in building a more stable uture. Deence


34/65


34

is heavily ocused on helping to build the

capacity o the Irai Security Forces, so

strengthening internal security, protecting the

sovereignty o Ira and aiding the prospects

or political reconciliation.

Deence will continue to participate in

multilateral operations with allies and

partners. The Government will target its

contributions such that they have greatest

eect, given the inherent constraints on our

orce sie and capability. Deence will continue

to develop more security partnerships and

engage in activities supporting Australias

national interests locally, regionally and

globally.

THE US ALLIANCE

Our alliance with the United States will

remain Australias most important strategic

relationship because we share many

common values and many security interests,

and have a similar strategic outlook. We are

also prepared to participate, share risk and

contribute to the overall security burden.The alliance provides our military orces

with added reach: it deepens the ADFs

wE HAvE A vITAL INTEREST IN AmERICAN POwER, AmERICAN PURPOSE

AND AmERICAN RELATIONS wITH THE OTHER POwERS OF OUR REgION.

capabilities and broadens our strategic

knowledge. The alliance enhances the hard

(military) power the ADF brings to bear and

the sot (diplomatic) power we bring to the

table. It complicates the planning o any

potential adversary. We have a vital interestin American power, American purpose and

American relations with the other major

powers o our region.

Militarily, we obtain greatest eect by

working with allies. While the United States

will remain the predominant power in the

region or at least a generation, and probably

beyond, other countries in the AsiaPacic

are increasing in strategic importance. It isundamentally important to Australia that

the United States continues to be outward

looking and positively involved in the Asia

Pacic because the United States is still the

key actor in regional stability.

qualitatively, our alliance with the United

States continues to deepen and broaden,

with both partners increasingly ocused on

mutual interests, military integration andinteroperability. The closeness is shown by

our longstanding cooperation on intelligence,


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35

surveillance and reconnaissance. New

protocols have allowed an increased sharing

o inormation and personnel exchanges.

In coalition missions ADF personnel have

been given ull operational control o US

orces. Australia and the United States

continue to explore technologies and

strategies or ballistic missile deence, space

cooperation and intelligence, surveillanceand reconnaissance, and are working to

enhance acuisition, logistics, and research

and technology issues.

LONgTERm RELATIONSHIPS

Australia has long pursued its security

interests by maintaining security partnerships

with regional riends and neighbours. Building

security partnerships and engaging regionalstates in deence and security dialogues

helps to reassure states and oers a

means by which potential problems can be

resolved. Over the past two years, Australia

has ormalised and strengthened some key

security relationships. For example, we have

concluded the AustraliaIndonesia Agreement

on the Framework for Security Cooperation,

signed the AustraliaIndia Memorandum of

Understanding on Defence Cooperation, and,

most recently, joined with Japan to make the

AustraliaJapan Joint Declaration on Security

Cooperation. We have also deepened other

longstanding relationships through the

Trilateral Dialogue with the United States and

Japan, and the AustraliaUnited Kingdom

Ministerial (AUKMIN) talks.

New Zealand is a close and longstanding

security partner. Bilateral deence relations

are underpinned by the Closer Deence

Relations agreement (CDR). A key objective

o CDR is or both countries to work together

in combined and joint military operations.

Interoperability between the two deence

orces has been enhanced through a range

o engagement activities, particularly or

operations in our region.

Close to home, the AustraliaIndonesia

Agreement on the Framework or Security

Cooperation was signed in November 2006.

This agreement is the culmination o eorts by

both countries to address common concerns

such as terrorism, peoplesmuggling and

illegal shing. The treaty underscores the

importance o deence ties and our eorts to

revitalise those ties over the past ew years.

The recent AustraliaJapan Joint Declaration

on Security Cooperation signed by the Prime

Minister on 13 March 2007 is part o a

developing regional security architecture. It

signals that Japan has decided to take up

more responsibilities as a security partner,

and rearms Japans status as one o

Australias indispensable partners in the

region. The declaration ormalises a security

dialogue that has been under way or many

years. The inaugural JapanAustralia 2+2

Ministerial meeting in June 2007 discussedkey regional security issues and ways to

urther strengthen the bilateral relationship.

Australias strategic engagement with China

has been limited to date, but it is growing at a

pace that recognises our substantial shared

interests in regional security. We maintain a

valuable dialogue with China and look orward

to expanding the relationship at a pace

comortable to both countries.

NO OTHER COUNTRY mATCHES THE RANgE AND qUALITY OF DEFENCE

ENgAgEmENT THAT wE HAvE wITH SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS.


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3

Australia and India share a common interest

in enhancing regional peace and security.

In March 2006, the deence relationship

took a signicant step orward when the

Prime Minister signed the AustraliaIndia

Memorandum on Deence Cooperation. Our

deence relationship has a natural ocus

The Five Power Defence Arrangements linking

Australia with the United Kingdom, New

zealand, Malaysia and Singapore continues

to make a substantial contribution to regional

stability as do our bilateral defence relations

with many Southeast Asian countries. These

relationships represent a signicant strategic

THE ADF HAS A LEvEL OF REACH AND THE CAPAbILITY TO SUPPORT

OvERSEAS OPERATIONS NOT POSSESSED bY OTHER gOvERNmENT

AgENCIES.

on maritime security while cooperation on

counterterrorism builds on our common

interests and experiences in this area.

Australias longstanding deence relationship

with the United Kingdom remains a valuable

strategic asset. Our close, oten combined,

participation in conficts and wars as well as

our intelligencesharing arrangements show

that we have overlapping strategic interests.Australias deence relations with the

United Kingdom enhance our strategic and

operational reach and our ability to deend

key national interests.

asset. No other country matches the range

and uality o deence engagement that

we have with Southeast Asian nations. Our

deence ties go back many years. We regularly

engage through high level contacts, dialogue,

exercises, training and education, and

personnel exchanges. These activities serve

to improve our access to decision makers,

enhance our mutual understanding, and

improve the capacity o our deence orces

to work together. In particular, they assist

regional deence orces capabilities in areas

that matter to us, such as counterterrorism,


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3

maritime security, governance, peacekeeping

and disaster relie. The Status o Forces

Agreement signed with the Philippines in

May 2007 is indicative o our strengthening

cooperation in these areas.

In the postCold War era, NATO is developing

its links with global partners, such as

those working in the International Security

Assistance Force in Aghanistan. Australia

has had valuable cooperation with NATO while

not being part o that alliance. More recently,

Australia and NATO have expanded this

engagement to include practical cooperation

on terrorism, WMD prolieration and on

assisting weak states.

wHOLEOF

gOvERNmENT

RESPONSES

The term wholeogovernment is a way o

describing the increasingly close cooperation

that takes place between Deence, Australias

intelligence agencies, State and Federal

police, the Department o Foreign Aairs and

Trade (DFAT) and other agencies involved in

internal and external security. Australias

wholeogovernment eort was a major

theme o the 2005 Update, and it continues

to grow or two reasons. First, contemporary

security challenges are complex and reuirecomprehensive responses drawing on all

acets o Australias national power. Second,

we have seen in East Timor and other places

that the stability an ADF mission can provide

will not last in the long term unless ways are

ound to create economic growth, improve

the uality o government and build strong

communities.

We expect that the ADF will be involved inmany wholeogovernment operations in

coming years by providing ontheground

stabilisation missions as needed, or by

providing specialist support including military

transport and logistic supply. But the long

term deployment o large orces is expensive,

both nancially and in terms o limiting our

options or other ADF missions.

The ADF has a level o reach and the

capability to support overseas operations not

possessed by other government agencies.

Deence can provide this support so that other

agencies can do important tasks overseas.

Strengthening nationstates and responding to

humanitarian disasters reuires a wide range

o expertise in elds like policing, governance,

economics, engineering, administration,

health and education. Nongovernment

organisations such as churches, charities,

voluntary and youth groups also do vital work

to help strengthen security in countries where

government structures and services may be

weak. Other government agencies are oten

better placed than Deence to build the rightcommunity relations. Deence will continue to

cooperate closely with the Australian Federal

Police (AFP), DFAT and AusAID on regional

stabilisation missions.

Counterterrorism concerns are also at the

oreront o security initiatives. Deence

is working closely with Indonesia and the

Philippines to build stronger networks and

counterterrorism capabilities. Cooperationwith Indonesia is a high priority or Deence,

particularly in the areas o terrorism, border

security and intelligence exchanges.

Deence is also an active participant in the

Prolieration Security Initiative, a commitment

by over 80 nations to impede or disrupt illegal

trade in WMD to both state and nonstate

groups. Deence helps to plan and work to

maintain the capabilities needed or WMDinterdiction through involvement in regular

PSI exercises. The ADF provides naval and


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3

air interdiction capabilities, working closely

with DFAT, law enorcement, Customs and

intelligence, and jointly with PSI partners.

Deences role is evolving also into a range

o domestic security tasks dealing with

nontraditional threats, such as pandemics,

natural disasters and threats to national

sovereignty in the orm o illegal immigration

and illegal shing. While the States and

Territories have increased unding in the area

o counterterrorism Deence has uniue

capabilities that may need to be deployed

to meet such threats. Since 2001, the

Government has committed more than $1.3

billion to enhance Deences domestic security

and counterterrorism capability. The Border

Protection Command works closely with key

agencies including Customs to coordinate

and respond to emerging oshore incidents,

and to protect Australias borders and critical

inrastructure. Deence works closely with

health authorities and state governments

as a supporting agency to prepare or the

possibility o a major pandemic. The ADF also

plays an instrumental role supporting civil

authorities in Government security operations

at major events, such as the Commonwealth

Games and Asia Pacic Economic Cooperation(APEC) meetings.

AN INTEgRATED FORCE...CAN RESPOND mORE RAPIDLY, PRECISELY,

AND AgILELY TO CHANgES IN THE STRATEgIC, OPERATIONAL AND

TACTICAL ENvIRONmENTS.


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3

A JOINT AND

INTEgRATED

ORgANISATIONThe term jointness reers to the way the

three Services the Army, Navy and Air Force

work together on operations. (The ADF is

moving rom one orm o jointness where

the Services work together but do so as three

distinct groups to another where the Services

retain their individual identity, culture and

expertise but work as one entity.) Deence is

exploiting communications and inormationtechnology to link sensors, weapon systems

and commanders so that each shares an

understanding o their environment an

approach to war known as networkcentric

warare. An integrated orce comprising air,

naval and land elements linked together in

this way can respond more rapidly, precisely

and agilely to changes in the strategic,

operational and tactical environments.

Deence is working to ensure the ADF gains

the ull benets o the networkcentric

approach to warare. By enhancing our

integrated command and control structures,

including the creation o Headuarters Joint

Operations Command, based at Bungendore,

New South Wales, our orces will operate

together more eectively. An integrated

orce will also provide improved intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance data.

There remain a number o challenges to be

overcome in developing an integrated orce.

Being integrated will improve the ADFs ability

to operate as an agile and fexible orce.

For example, as land orces increasingly

adopt some o the characteristics o special

orces, then integration with air support will

be essential to carry out their operations.

And in the push or greater integration,

individual Service personnel must retain their

proessional mastery, undamental to the

ADFs operational eectiveness. First and

oremost the Services must retain their

warghting skills to underpin the broader

roles perormed in many dierent missions

over recent years. The ADFs reach, its

understanding o dierent operational

environments, its skill in the use o military

orce and its expertise in providing support

and enabling capabilities collectively sustain

Deences core role as a warghting

organisation.

Deence may not always be the lead agency

or dealing with security or, more particularly,

humanitarian challenges. The key to

successully dealing with these challenges in

the uture is through integrating the eorts

o multiple agencies into a single, cohesive

operation. The recent history o successul

ontheground cooperation between agencies

during previous operations provides an

excellent basis or building such a capability.

SUmmARYAustralia has always cooperated with friends

and allies we need partners to pursue our

interest globally. The alliance with the United

States will remain Australias most important

strategic relationship, and will continue to

grow. In the region, our defence partnerships

continue to support our security interests,

as is evident in our recent agreements with

Indonesia and Japan. The business of working

with others continues within the Government:

increasingly, security engages a range of

agencies from aid, police, foreign affairs

as well as defence. And our effectiveness

is enhanced through increasing integration

between the elements of our own Defence

Force.


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UPDATEONOPERATIONS

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UPDATE

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41

UPDATE ON OPERATIONS

4C H A P T E R

mARITImE

ENFORCEmENT ANDbORDER PROTECTION :OPERATION RESOLUTE

Deence contributes some 4501 personnel

to the wholeogovernment operation

protecting our borders. Operation Resolute

provides greater fexibility in using assets

such as ships and aircrat without reducing

the number o ADF platorms on the operation

or the hours they spend on task.

Under Operation Resolute the ADF supports

the Governments Civil Maritime Surveillance

Programme, which protects Australian

sheries (including in the Southern Ocean)

and provides uarantine, customs and

environmental security. This eort aims to

deter and prevent unauthorised boat arrivals

and provides an oshore maritime security

response against maritime terrorism.

SIgNIFICANT ADF RESOURCES ADD mUSCLE TO THE gOvERNmENTSCOORDINATED EFFORT TO PROTECT OUR OFFSHORE ASSETS AND

DETER AND RESPOND TO ILLEgAL ImmIgRATION, SmUggLINg, FISHINgAND OTHER THREATS.

Operation Resolute is controlled by the

Border Protection Command (BPC), which

has assumed responsibility or operational

coordination and control o both civil and

military maritime enorcement activities within

Australias Exclusive Economic zone (EEz). The

BPC is staed by military and civilian ocials

rom Deence, Customs, the Australian

Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) and

the Australian quarantine Inspection Service

(AqIS). Signicant ADF resources add muscle

to the Governments coordinated eort toprotect our oshore assets and deter and

respond to illegal immigration, smuggling,

shing and other threats.

Our assets in Operation Resolute now include

a standing maritime orce comprising a major

naval vessel, ve (increasing to seven) patrol

boats, a coastal minehunter, a heavy landing

crat, elements rom Army regional orce

surveillance units and a PC3 Orion maritimepatrol aircrat.

1 Numbers actually deployed on all operations listed at any one time may vary depending on timings o deployments, the

sie o naval units and other actors.


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UPDATE

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EAST TImOR/TImORLESTE : OPERATION

ASTUTE AND OPERATIONTOwER

Operation Astute is the ADFs stabilisation

operation supporting the Government o East

Timor and the UN Integrated Mission in East

Timor (UNMIT). Police rom Australia and 20

other nations provide security as part o the UN

Police Force. Under Operation Astute, Deence

provides support to these police operations

as reuired. The Australianled International

Security Force (ISF) supported the UN Police

and the East Timorese Government during

the May 2007 presidential election period,

and the 30 June parliamentary elections.

At its peak in June 2006, the Australian

contingent numbered some 3,200

personnel. Earlier this year, the Australian

deployment included approximately 1,100

personnel drawn rom throughout the ADF.

The ISF includes Australian Army Black Hawk

helicopters and an Army Light Observation

Troop with Kiowa helicopters.

Since rst deploying in 1999 as part o the

International Force in East Timor (INTERFET),

the ADF has maintained a strong commitment

to the government and people o East Timor.

Operation Tower comprises the ADFs support

to the current UN mission, UNMIT. The ADF

has three personnel deployed as part o

the Military Liaison Group (MLG) and the

Joint Military Analysis Cell in the UNMIT

Headuarters.

SOLOmON ISLANDS :OPERATION ANODE

Operation Anode is the ADFs contribution

to the Australianled Regional Assistance

Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). RAMSI

is a multilateral grouping, which includes

military, police and civilian advisers working on

initiatives to restore security, law and justice,

provide better economic management, and

improve the machinery o government. The

initial 2003 deployment was at the reuest

o the Solomon Islands Government.

The military component o RAMSI comprises

personnel rom our nations: Australia, New

zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga.

The military components main task is to

provide security or RAMSIs multinational

Participating Police Force (PPF).

Approximately 140 ADF troops are now

deployed in Solomon Islands. Deployments

reached a high in April 2006, ollowing riots

in Honiara, when almost 400 ADF personnel

deployed, including two inantry companies,

two Irouois helicopters, two patrol boats,

logistics and headuarters sta.

IRAq : OPERATIONCATALYST

Operation Catalyst, the successor to

Operations Falconer and Bastille, began

in July 2003. It is the ADFs contribution

to the international eorts to reconstruct

and rehabilitate Ira. In February 2007, the

Government announced an enhanced ADF

commitment to Operation Catalyst through

an increased training eort. That raised the

number o personnel assigned to Operation

Catalyst to some 1,575 personnel. Operation

Catalyst includes a number o elements,

some o which are assigned to both Operation

Catalyst and Operation Slipper in Aghanistan.

The dual assignments include a major feet

unit, the AP3C Orion Detachment, the C130Hercules Detachment and various elements

o the National Headuarters.


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UPDATE

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Australia also has an ADF ocer assigned

to the United Nations Assistance Mission in

Ira (UNAMI), whose primary responsibilities

include providing military advice to the

United Nations Special Representative o the

Secretary General (SRSG) and coordination

o Multi National Force Ira (MNFI) support

to UNAMI.

AFgHANISTAN:OPERATION SLIPPER

AND OPERATIONPALATE II

Operation Slipper is the ADFs contribution to

the international coalition against terrorism. In

February 2006, the Prime Minister announced

the deployment o a Reconstruction Task

Force (RTF) to Aghanistan to support

coalition operations or a period o two years.

In September 2006 the RTF commenced

its deployment as part o the Netherlands

led Taskorce in Tarin Kowt, the capital o

Orugan Province in the south o Aghanistan.

The RTF consists o a mix o security and

reconstruction personnel o approximately

385 ADF members.

The RTF is reconstructing and improving

the provinces inrastructure and providing

communitybased projects to help the Aghan

Government build a stable and secure uture

or its people. To date, projects have been

completed or are under way at the Tarin

Kowt Provincial Hospital, the Tarin Kowt High

THE RTF IS RECONSTRUCTINg AND ImPROvINg THE PROvINCESINFRASTRUCTURE AND PROvIDINg COmmUNITYbASED PROJECTS

TO HELP THE AFgHAN gOvERNmENT bUILD A STAbLE AND SECUREFUTURE FOR ITS PEOPLE.


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School, a major causeway over the Garmab

Mandah River, the Yaklengah Health Centre,

and the Tamai School Compound Wall. These

projects are developed in consultation with

local authorities. The RTF has established a

Trade Training School (TTS) where the local

civilian population is taught basic engineering

and mechanical skills. The TTS also provides

military engineering training or the Aghan

National Army.

Ater comprehensive consultations with

the government o Aghanistan and our

key coalition partners, the Prime Minister

announced in April 2007 that additional ADF

elements would be sent to Aghanistan. These

include a Special Operations Task Group to

enhance orce protection to the RTF; a Royal

Australian Air Force air surveillance radar

capability deploying to Kandahar Aireld;

an additional C130J Hercules aircrat and

associated aircrew and support elements;

and an increased command and logistics

element to support the larger ADF orce.

These orces are now in place.

Australia also has an ADF ocer deployed

to Aghanistan under Operation Palate II,

supporting the UN Assistance Mission in

Aghanistan (UNAMA).

The total Australian commitment in

Aghanistan ollowing the additional

deployment will be about 970 personnel by

mid2007, peaking at about 1,000 personnel

in mid2008 when the combined orce in

the Middle East will total around 2,500

personnel.

ISRAEL/LEbANON :OPERATION PALADIN

Operation Paladin is Australias contribution

to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation

(UNTSO), established in 1948 to supervise

the truce agreed at the conclusion o the rst

ArabIsraeli War. Australia has supported this

australia’s national security 2007

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