australia’s coastal pilotage regulatory arrangements · the amsa, was not to be used for managing...
TRANSCRIPT
Australia’s Coastal Pilotage
Regulatory Arrangements
Conrad AdamsPrincipal Advisor – Coastal Pilotage
Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
Australasian Marine Pilots Institute (AMPI) Spring Workshop 2018
• In this presentation, we’ll cover …… Coastal pilotage history
The basis for coastal pilotage areas
Deregulation & responsibility transfer
Operational business arrangements
AMSA’s role and regulatory challenges
Reviews into coastal pilotage arrangements
Prevailing regulatory framework
Pilot and provider licence conditions
Presentation Overview
• Pilotage in the Torres Strait (TS) and Great Barrier Reef (GBR) area has been conducted for at least 143 years!
• The earliest full-length commercial coastal pilotage was conducted 1874 with a vessel transiting from Singapore to Brisbane via Torres Strait and the Inner Route.
• In 1884, the Marine Board of Queensland introduced regulations governing the pilot service for vessels transiting GBR & TS.
• The regulations dealt with pilot licensing, the number of pilots, pilotage charges and pilot fees (the Board set the fees & charges).
• Pilotage in these areas was voluntary until mandatory arrangements were implemented for the Inner Route of the GBR in 1991, and in Torres Strait in 2006 (pursuant to their declaration as PSSA’s by the IMO). More on this later……
Coastal Pilotage - History
• Up until 1993, licensing, operational administration and marine pilotage tariffs were the responsibility of the Queensland Government, operated via the Queensland Marine Board.
Coastal Pilotage - History
• Under Queensland control, the coastal pilotage service had been effectively a statutory monopoly operated by a single provider (the “Queensland Coast and Torres Strait Pilot Service”).
• At the time, individual coastal pilots were self-employed and responsible to the Marine Board, which licensed the pilots and appointed the secretaries (who managed infrastructure / bookings).
• In 1951, the pilots and secretaries acquired the principal assets, the pilot launches boats and pilot houses (and subsequently started also providing pilot transfer services for the pilot service).
The Basis for Coastal Pilotage Areas
• The Great Barrier Reef (GBR) and Torres Strait (TS) are recognised internationally for their biodiversity, cultural significance & environmental importance, evidenced by their declaration as ‘particularly sensitive sea areas’ (PSSA’s), by the IMO in 1991 & 2006.
• The consequences of a serious marine incident in the GBR / TS have the potential to damage Australia’s environmental and economic reputation, something which those tasked with managing the delivery of safety outcomes within the PSSA’s (including AMSA), are very aware of.
Great Barrier Reef Biodiversity
Quick Info / Statistics:• World’s 1st PSSA • GBR marine park covers
345,000 km2
• Over 2,900 reefs • 940 islands & cays • 2,300km along Qld coastline • 1,500 fish species • 360 hard coral species • Over 1/3 of world’s soft coral • 6 of the world’s 7 endangered
turtles • Over 30 species of marine
mammals
= Serious biodiversity!
Protection Arrangements
• Australia protects the PSSA’s from pollution and environmental damage through a range of internationally-recognised ship safety, environmental management and navigational safety measures, including:
restrictions on discharges from ships implementation of a ship routing system (SRS) – Two Way Route emergency towage arrangements (ETV) a coastal vessel traffic service (REEFVTS) a network of aids to navigation (AtoN) AIS and DGPS networks compulsory pilotage arrangements (coastal pilotage).
The reef is a navigationally challenging area….
• The Torres Strait and Inner Route of the GBR are “labyrinth’s of coral reefs, submerged rocks and dangers to navigation”.
Coastal Pilotage - Why?
Strong tidal influences, particularly in Torres Strait.
• This photo shows the tidal streams at Hammond Rock (Torres Strait)….
• Local area knowledge is a must.
Coastal Pilotage - Why?
Coastal Pilotage - Why?
To Avoid This…..
e.g. ‘Bunga Teratai Satu’ unpiloted grounding on Sudbury Reef in 2000 outside the compulsory pilotage area.
• Australia, as an island nation, is reliant on shipping to facilitate the bulk of the country’s international trade, including significant trade in natural resources.
• Australian ports manage 10% of the world’s sea trade.
• Queensland has 14 trading ports located within the GBR Marine Park including:• The large coal export ports of
Hay Point & Dalrymple Bay; & • The ports of Cairns,
Townsville, Mackay and Gladstone.
Image depicting historical AIS tracks of SOLAS vessel movements throughout Queensland (brightness indicates higher frequency)
Coastal Pilotage & Trade Routes
• In 1992, the Queensland and Commonwealth Governments agreed that responsibility for regulating the now compulsory coastal pilotage arrangements would transfer to the Commonwealth, commencing 1 July ‘93.
• The establishment of the ‘associated protective measure’ of pilotage in the GBR was via Australia’s submission as a member State of the IMO, hence regulation of the subsequent pilotage arrangements by the Commonwealth (on behalf of Australia) was considered appropriate.
• Around the same time, users of the pilotage service had expressed concerns about the level of pricing and the ability of a service provider to exercise monopoly power, which was later referred to the Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA) for consideration. The PSA is now known at the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).
Deregulation & Transfer of Responsibilities
• When the Commonwealth Government assumed responsibility, it adopted the policy that the pilot licensing system, which was to be administered by the AMSA, was not to be used for managing service pricing, because agencies such as the PSA maintained oversight of these matters.
• In line with the contemporary Commonwealth microeconomic reform policies at the time (which were aimed at encouraging market efficiency and flexibility), stakeholders agreed that AMSA should only regulate pilot licensing and the safety of pilotage operations.
• There would be no regulation of the commercial aspects of pilotage services, such as the number of pilots, their recruitment, terms and conditions of pilot employment, pilotage fees, provision of infrastructure and/or administration of the pilotage service.
• Government control over these matters was to be relinquished and the provision of coastal pilotage services handed over to the private sector, with the setting of pilotage fees to be determined by the market.
Deregulation & Transfer of Responsibilities
• When AMSA became responsible for regulating coastal pilotage, it introduced ‘performance based regulation’ with a focus on licensing, standards and safety management. The economic regulation that had previously been exercised by the Marine Board was discontinued.
• The relevant regulatory arrangements were established pursuant to the Navigation Act and via relevant subordinate legislation, namely Marine Orders Part 54 (Coastal Pilotage) – MO54, and subsequent iterations.
• The Navigation Act was amended to allow AMSA to make relevant regulations and regulate the licensing of coastal pilots and the safe performance of coastal pilotage.
• Various amendments to the legislative particulars have ensued to enhance the regulatory framework, address regulatory challenges, and respond to historical reviews of coastal pilotage. (More on this later….).
Deregulation & Transfer of Responsibilities
• When the Board-regulated pilot service monopoly officially ended, two competing pilotage service providers emerged through a split in the former service provider and its members (pilots and secretaries).
Operational Business Arrangements
• ‘Queensland Coastal Pilot Service Pty Ltd’, now known as Torres Pilots (TP), evolved from the previous service with a small number of pilots.
• The remaining pilots established a second provider, ‘Queensland Coast and Torres Pilot Association Pty Ltd’, now known as Australian Reef Pilots (ARP), resulting in a duopoly and a competitive pilotage service delivery model.
• Individually, pilots continued to offer their services, generally through private personal companies as contractors to either of these pilotage providers.
• The providers acted as booking agents for the pilots’ services and accepted a commission or fee from the pilot based on a percentage of the pilotage fee, or an agreed payment under the respective contract.
• Recruitment and training of new pilots, consistent with AMSA licensing (and other) requirements per MO54, was coordinated by the pilotage provider.
• AMSA is responsible for the regulation of pilotage in theQueensland coastal pilotage areas. This includes two key areasof focus:
Setting and enforcing standards to be compliedwith by pilotage service providers; and
Setting and enforcing standards andcompetencies of the marine pilots engaged toprovide coastal pilotage services.
AMSA’s Role
• AMSA regulates the safe provision of coastal pilotage by:
Licensing pilots (including training requirements) Licensing ‘Pilotage Providers’ Regulating the use of a Under Keel Clearance (UKCM) System
for Torres Strait, and Monitoring pilots & Pilotage Provider operations
Note: AMSA regulates coastal pilotage and not port pilotage. AMSA does however regulate pilot transfer arrangements (per Marine Order 21) and pilot launch operations (as domestic commercial vessels).
AMSA’s Role
• The following issues have previously been identified for AMSA (as the maritime safety regulator), in trying to ensure appropriate safety outcomes across multiple pilotage service providers.
the relationships between the pilotage service providers the relationships between pilots contracted by different providers the relationships between the pilots and providers the requirements for pilot training the need for duplicated infrastructure the daily competition for a limited number of ships, and the difficulty in developing an overall safety culture.
Regulatory Challenges
• Marine Order 54 aims to address these aspects, which has been reviewed and updated on a number of occasions since release.
• Since 1993, various independent reviews have been undertaken into the Commonwealth’s coastal pilotage arrangements and the safety regulation of coastal pilotage services.
– 1993 Prices Surveillance Authority Inquiry– 1994 Crone Review– 1999 House of Representatives Standing Committee (Managing Fatigue in
Transport)– 2000 Holden Review– 2001 Review of Great Barrier Reef Ship Safety and Pollution Prevention
Measures– 2005 McCoy Review– 2010 Australian Transport Safety Bureau Safety Issue Investigation into
Queensland Coastal Pilotage
• Importantly, no evidence has been found to date that the competitive environment has significantly impacted safety outcomes, or specifically resulted in an increase in risk events (even considering an increase in shipping numbers).
Regulatory Reviews
• 1993 Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA) Inquiry– Formal inquiry regarding the appropriateness, level and structure of coastal
pilotage fees, including consideration of regulation and barriers to entry on pricing and completion.
– The report reflected that the provision of coastal pilotage services was notconsidered to be a natural monopoly and the market was found to be quite contestable.
– Endorsed the “market approach” adopted by AMSA in only regulating pilot licensing
– concluded that many users had already benefited from a significant reduction in pilot charges (around 20%), and increased transparency, simplicity and negotiability of charges (due to the recent regulatory restructuring and deregulation).
Key Review Findings
• 1994 Crone Review– The review concluded that, provided effective safety audit & control
mechanisms were in place, there was no evidence that the absence of direct commercial regulation posed a threat to the safety of the GBR & TS.
• 1999 House of Reps Standing Committee Inquiry– This review included consideration of fatigue management in marine
pilotage and highlighted the importance of fatigue as a causal factor in maritime incident.
– The report recommended that the AMSA’s fatigue management arrangements for coastal pilotage should be expanded to specify the maximum duration of a pilot’s tour of duty and length of rest break.
Key Review Findings
• 2000 Holden Review– The review recommended that a competitive structure for the provision of
safe pilotage and regulation that has minimal impact on commercial economic issues, should remain the hallmark of coastal pilotage policy.
• 2001 Review of Great Barrier Reef Ship Safety and Pollution Prevention Measures– The report noted that the Commonwealth Government had clearly
decided, in agreeing to regulate coastal pilotage, that it was not appropriate to directly control the supply or pricing of pilot services, and that appropriate review mechanisms were available through the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).
– The review supported AMSA’s adoption of the safety management systems (SMS) approach in MO54 as an effective way to address safety outcomes in the competitive environment for pilotage services.
Key Review Findings
• 2005 McCoy Review– The review assessed the effectiveness of initiatives by AMSA to
strengthen safety regulation, including enhancements to the safety management system, development of the check pilot scheme, improved fatigue management measures, upgraded training and ongoing professional development schemes.
– The review examined all aspects of coastal pilotage safety regulation and overall found that the system of safety regulation was the most comprehensive in Australia and was fundamentally sound.
– The report found that the robust and sound safety regulatory systems in place meant that the effects of competition were not reducing safety outcomes, and that no evidence was found supporting claims that safety had been compromised because of competition.
– Recommendations included the application of safety management systems and codes by pilotage service providers.
Key Review Findings
• 2010 ATSB Safety Issue Investigation into Queensland Coastal Pilotage– The ATSB report made a number of
recommendations related to AMSA’s regulation of coastal pilotage, including potential improvements to MO54, pilot training, fatigue management and the check pilot system, all of which were considered by AMSA with corresponding actions taken to address each recommendation.
– AMSA considers that the actions taken have adequately addressed the recommendations, as required, notwithstanding that enhancements and improvements to the regulatory framework are always possible as part of a system continuous improvement.
Key Review Findings
Regulatory Improvements
As a result of the historical reviews:
• Various amendments have occurred since 1993 to strengthen the regulatory arrangements prescribed in MO54
• These amendments have occurred with the primary aim of supporting the development of an industry-wide safety culture, and improving the effectiveness of the regulatory options available to deal with procedural / operational breaches, which have the potential to put ship safety at risk.
The five (5) coastal pilotage areas are:• Great North East
Channel (GNEC) –including the Prince of Wales Channel
• The Inner Route of the GBR (Inner Route)
• Whitsundays• Hydrographers
Passage• Torres Strait (Areas
A and B)
Coastal Pilotage Areas
Applicability:• All ships greater than 70m in length and any:
― loaded oil tanker― loaded chemical carrier― loaded gas carrier
must have a licensed pilot embarked to transit through the coastal pilotage areas.
• Naval vessels are excluded.
Prevailing Regulatory Arrangements
(irrespective of length)
Key Requirements• Pilotage providers and individual coastal pilots must conduct
pilotage operations in the pilotage areas in accordance with: the licence conditions specified in Marine Order 54 (MO54) the requirements specified in the respective pilotage provider’s
Safety Management System (SMS).
• Broader regulatory arrangements in MO54 provide for sanctions, licence suspensions, licence cancellations and other measures which apply to both individual pilots and pilotage providers.
• MO54 also covers licensing, pilot launch compliance, Check Pilotage and provides for an Exemption framework.
Prevailing Regulatory Arrangements
• A safety management system for a pilotage provider must describe the following to the satisfaction of AMSA (per MO54): how the pilotage provider’s work practices are conducted safely how the pilotage provider complies with the applicable fatigue risk
management plan how risks associated with all operations of the pilotage crew of the
pilotage provider are identified and minimised how the pilotage provider complies with MO54 how the pilotage provider ensures that all licensed pilots including
trainee pilots, are trained to comply with MO54 how the pilotage provider ensures compliance with the under keel
clearance requirements.
Pilotage Provider SMS Requirements
• The safety management system must also include the following information: the standard operating procedures of the pilotage provider requirements for internal audits how the system is revised and kept up to date a statement of the procedures for carrying out corrective actions incident reporting and investigation methods a drug and alcohol policy for staff of the pilotage provider and
people employed or contracted by the pilotage provider if the pilotage provider conducts pilot transfers by helicopter, the
procedures for the training, induction and familiarisation of pilots, including its frequency.
Pilotage Provider SMS Requirements
• MO54 specifies various additional licence conditions for Pilotage Providers, including aspects related to: administrative notification requirements to AMSA Fatigue Risk Management Plan (FRMP) compliance designated person (DP) requirements medical certification requirements for pilots pilot duty requirements while in a pilotage area Under Keel Clearance Management (UKCM) system usage
requirements (for transits of Torres Strait) pilot transfer arrangements recordkeeping / production of records & information to AMSA pilotage assignment reporting to AMSA REEFREP reporting incident reporting pilot training conduct of ‘operational safety meetings’
Pilotage Provider Licence Conditions
• AMSA-licensed coastal pilots are also subject to licence conditions related to the following matters: administrative notification requirements to AMSA compliance with the pilotage provider’s SMS training and continuing professional development UKCM system usage requirements REEFREP reporting
Coastal Pilot Licence Conditions
• In particular, if the pilot holds a restricted pilot licence or an unrestricted pilot licence, the pilot must: give information and advice to the master of the vessel to assist the
master and the vessel’s navigating officers to make safe passage through the pilotage area
remain on duty on a vessel whenever the vessel is in the pilotage area unless otherwise authorised by AMSA
comply with the Navigation Act and this Order consider and take into account the pilot advisory notes (PAN’s) prepare a detailed passage plan for the pilotage of a vessel that:
uses the approved passage plan model, specific to the vessel being piloted; and
is agreed with the master of the vessel take into account relevant information regarding the vessel including
information provided by onboard systems and external aids to navigation
Restricted & Unrestricted Licence Requirements
• Continued from previous …. the pilot must: confirm with the master all emergency plans relevant to the vessel and
the pilot’s role in the plans ensure correct communications procedures are used for VHF radio and
any other equipment that may be used during the pilotage ensure that watchkeeping arrangements are in accordance with the
guidance on keeping a navigational watch set out in STCW Code Section A-VIII/2
when piloting a vessel — ensure that the vessel is operated in accordance with the COLREGs
comply with the Safety Management System of the pilotage provider engaging the pilot to conduct the pilotage
comply, as much as practicable, with the Safety Management System of the vessel being piloted
comply with the applicable fatigue risk management plan
Restricted & Unrestricted Licence Requirements
• Continued from previous …. the pilot must: use a personal flotation device that complies with any Australian
Standard that applies to it if the pilot holds an unrestricted pilot licence for the Whitsundays
pilotage area and is permitted to anchor in the area — anchor in the area in accordance with the conditions of anchoring in the area
tell the pilotage provider and REEFVTS of any incident involving the vessel being piloted, no later than 2 hours after the incident occurs.
perform the duties mentioned in this section with the appropriate skill, care and attention to ensure the safe passage of the vessel the pilot is piloting.
Restricted & Unrestricted Licence Requirements
• The pilotage provider must tell AMSA, in writing, of any incident involving a vessel piloted or operated by a member of the pilotage crew of the pilotage provider, as follows: after an incident involving a pilot launch - within 4 hours after the incident
occurred after an incident involving a vessel piloted by a person contracted or
employed by the pilotage provider - within 4 hours after the incident if requested by AMSA, give AMSA, in writing, more detailed information
about the incident within 72 hours after the request is made An incident report by a pilot employed or contracted by the pilotage
provider that meets the above requirements is taken to be a report by a pilotage provider that meets those requirements
An incident that is reported to REEFVTS is taken to have been reported to AMSA in accordance with the above requirements.
Incident Reporting Framework
• Serviced by two main Pilotage Providers - Torres Pilots (TP) and Australian Reef Pilots (ARP).
• There are currently 83 active licensed pilots across both Pilotage Providers.
• In the 12 months (1 Jul ‘17 – 30 Jun ‘18), 4,995 piloted voyages have been conducted throughout the coastal pilotage areas.
• 2,199 (44%) of these piloted voyages have been Inner Route transits.
• Annual figures have remained relatively static over recent years.
Coastal Pilotage Industry Today
Certification and Pilotage System (CPS)
• CPS includes details on each coastal pilot including licensing and voyage history etc.• CPS is interfaced with REEFVTS’s Traffic Information Module (TIM).• CPS automatically checks voyage data with AMSA’s Fatigue Management Plan
requirements.
AMSA’s Fatigue Risk Management Plan
• AMSA’s default fatigue risk management plan (FRMP) describes various requirements to manage pilot fatigue, including minimum rest and leave periods.
• AMSA requires all coastal pilots to adhere to the requirements in the plan (or an alternative plan approved by AMSA) under MO54.
• The plan is based on the concepts of a ‘roster cycle’, ‘roster cycle points’ and ‘optimal rest’.
• Different coastal pilotage voyages accrue different roster cycle points (per next slide).
AMSA’s Fatigue Risk Management Plan
Key Inclusions:• Inner Route: 2.5 points per voyage.• All other coastal pilotage voyages: 1 point
per voyage.• A roster cycle terminates after 15 points are
accrued.• A minimum of 5 consecutive ‘optimal nights
rest’ are then required to reset the cycle.• Roster cycles cannot exceed 28 days.• Minimum rest requirements in between
voyages.• Minimum rest requirements after continuous
travel to commence a roster cycle.• Minimum 63 days leave per annum (leave
must be a minimum of 10 consecutive days).• The FRMP is available online at:
https://www.amsa.gov.au/fatigue-risk-management-plan-default-plan
Queensland Coastal Passage Plan (QCPP)
• The QCPP has been developed primarily for the benefit of Masters and mates of ships transiting any of the coastal pilotage areas described in MO54.
• The QCPP is the ‘approved passage plan model’ referred to in MO54.
• The QCPP is produced by AMSA and seeks to improve pre-pilotage communications between coastal pilotage providers, the ships they service and the pilots embarked within these ships.
• The QCPP improves the readiness of ships transiting coastal pilotage areas within the GBR & TS by ensuring that voyage plans, waypoints and other planning considerations have been completed in a standardised manner.
• The plan is available online at:https://www.amsa.gov.au/safety-navigation/navigating-coastal-waters/queensland-coastal-passage-plan
Development Background
• Historical accidents related to non-compliant pilot transfer arrangements have resulted in serious injury and death to marine pilots.
• Compliance with the transfer requirements is a long-standing safety issue as identified by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau in its 2010 report into Coastal Pilotage, which suggested that risk events were potentially under-reported by pilots, resulting in inadequate risk identification and mitigation.
• AMSA regulates pilot transfer requirements in Australia via Marine Order 21 (Section 12), which gives effect to SOLAS Chapter V (Regulation 23), therefore AMSA, as Australia’s maritime safety regulator, has a vested interested in providing innovative methods to increase non-compliance reporting.
Pilot Transfer Reporting - ‘AMSA Pilot’ App
About the App
• The App is primarily an information-sharing tool to help improve personal safety for marine pilots.
• The information resources contained in the App can assist pilots to identify the specific nature of the non-compliance.
• This information can be utilised to clarify the correct requirement(s) with the Master or Responsible Officer onboard, to assist understanding and rectification.
‘AMSA Pilot’ App
FeaturesThe ‘AMSA Pilot’ App contains the following services and information resources:
• Semi-automated non-compliance report form. The form contains various self-populating fields (user location, date & time) to simplify the reporting process.
• The ability to attach photos and enter free text in the report. Submitted reports are sent to AMSA’s ‘Incident Reports’ section via email.
• AMSA Information Sheet (399) - Using Pilot Ladders.
• Marine Notice 19/2015 (Use of Pilot Ladders).
• Marine Order 21 (Safety and Emergency Arrangements) – Section 12 (Pilot transfer arrangements excerpt).
• High-res IMO / IMPA Pilot Ladder Poster.
• ISO 799:2004 (Pilot Ladders).
‘AMSA Pilot’ App
Features cont’d• IMO Resolution A.1045(27) - Pilot Transfer Arrangements.
• IMO Unified Interpretation of SOLAS V/23.3.3.
• A link to AMSA’s online marine safety concern reporting page (355).
• Push notifications. This enables AMSA to engage directly with App users in real-time.
• Announcements page. This feature enables App users to stay informed about recent developments related to pilotage, including links to investigation reports etc.
• A map of AMSA’s offices nationwide, with links to telephone numbers for each office.
• App-sharing function. Share a link to the App (in the respective App Store), via text, email, Facebook, Twitter etc.
• Links to AMSA’s social media pages (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube).
• Please continue to use the App – 196 reports received to date!
‘AMSA Pilot’ App
• Coastal pilotage in the GBR and TS has a long history.
Presentation Summary
• Despite initial concerns related to potential safety consequences of establishing a commercially competitive service provision model for coastal pilotage…..
• AMSA’s regulatory arrangements are an example of how a safe and successful commercial model can prevail, subject to:
– the existence of an appropriately detailed, reviewed and continuously-improved compliance framework (covering all aspects associated with the conduct of pilotage), and
– an appropriate auditing framework to ensure pilotage provider (ergo pilot) compliance with the various regulatory requirements.
For further information on Australia’s coastal pilotage arrangements, please contact:
Conrad AdamsPrincipal Advisor - Coastal PilotageOperations DivisionAMSAEmail: [email protected]: 07 3001 6806
Thanks for your time!